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Extremist Activity in the Military,...

EXTREMIST ACTIVITY IN THE MILITARY

COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD

JUNE 25, 1996



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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

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EXTREMIST ACTIVITY IN THE MILITARY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, June 25, 1996.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:07 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Floyd D. Spence (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FLOYD D. SPENCE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order.

This afternoon the committee will receive testimony on the issue of extremist activity in the Armed Forces from outside experts on extremist groups, the military service Secretaries, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

Last December, three white soldiers from the Army's 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg were arrested and charged with killing a black civilian couple in Fayetteville, NC. Since their arrest, investigators have determined that these soldiers were associated with a local skinhead group. Police believe the murders were racially motivated, and the soldiers are expected to be tried later on this summer.

Several months before the Fayetteville murders, two former Army soldiers with ties to militia groups were charged with the devastating bombing of a Federal building in Oklahoma City.

These recent incidents have properly raised the level of concern about extremist activity in the military. While experts who track hate group activity believe there is probably less extremist activities in the military than in the general population, some have contended that the number of military members in hate groups appears to be on the rise.

Today's hearings will begin to examine the issues raised as a result of the tragic events in North Carolina and Oklahoma. Specifically, the committee will explore how prevalent extremist activity is in the Armed Forces, the services' efforts to identify extremist activity within the ranks, and their ability to combat it.

After the tragic events in Fayetteville, the Secretary of the Army established a task force to assess the influence of extremist groups in the Army, and to ensure that the Army culture is one that fosters teamwork and respect for human dignity. I applaud Secretary West's prompt response and look forward to hearing about the results of the Army's efforts.

I also am interested in hearing about the level of extremist group activity and the effort to combat it being undertaken by each of the other services.

We were all disturbed by the tragic events in Fayetteville and found it unsettling to learn that active duty soldiers had been implicated in these terrible murders. Our military personnel are entrusted to defend our country against all enemies, foreign and domestic. It is troubling to hear of a case where military members have chosen to break the law to become persecutors rather than protectors of other Americans. There simply is no room for hate groups or extremist activity within our military.

Before recognizing our witnesses, I would like to first yield to the committee's ranking Democrat, Mr. Dellums, for any opening comments he would like to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First I would like to thank you for convening this hearing on extremist activity in the military, and I compliment you on your opening statement. I join with you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses today.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we should begin by acknowledging that there is extremist activity in the military. There is. This is because our military is made up of members of our society, and there is hate-motivated activity in that society, and our military is made up of members of that society. Part of the reason we are here today is to begin to discern not if, but how much of this activity exists in the military.

First let us acknowledge that our military is, first and foremost, comprised of dedicated professional and highly capable men and women who deserve the highest degree of respect and admiration for the job they do, day in and day out, on behalf of our country. The readiness of our military to do the wide variety of jobs they are asked to do is ample and clear demonstration of their collective understanding of what it means to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States. In light of this fact, we can never relax our guard against those who would poison that atmosphere and attempt to sway others away from their sworn obligations, toward an agenda of hatred, and actions of violence in service of that hatred, actions of violence that undermine the Constitution these men and women have sworn to uphold.

Mr. Chairman, as you recall, when I came to the Armed Service Committee at the beginning of my second term some 23 years ago, I understood that racial strife was tearing at the fabric of our military institutions because it, indeed, was tearing at the fabric of our society. For more than two decades, I have witnessed wide swings in the emotional climate and resulting morale of our troops. There have been many causes for those swings, among them the institutional response, or the perceived lack thereof, to matters of basic justice and fairness. This is, has been, and always will be, a basic contributing factor to an individual's sense of self-worth, a unit's

ability to be cohesive, and a military's capacity to be ready for action.

In the fall of 1993, I commissioned the Task Force on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Military. One finding of the task force, I believe, is particularly relevant to today's hearing—and I'm sure you would join with me.

I quote from the finding of that task force set up in 1993: "It is worth noting that white supremacy and skinhead activity by service members was reported at several facilities; at one facility, both majority and minority service members reported that it occurs at a level that poses a threat to good order."

In light of this stark and unmistakable warning, it is important that we understand what sort of climate exists at Fort Bragg and in our military facilities around the world.

As we hear from our first panel of witnesses from the civilian community, it will be important to discern their opinion of what happened at Fayetteville, what is the extent of extremist activity—both organized and individual—and what is the extent of attempts by groups outside the military to recruit service members to their causes.

From our panel of Defense Department witnesses, I hope to learn more about their impressions of the same issues, and, to the extent that their evaluation is widely divergent from those outside the military, as media reports would indicate, how is that difference reconciled by our military leadership. That is important for all of us to know and to understand.

I believe we need to know if the response by the services in general, and if the response by the Army in the Fayetteville case in particular, to warning signs of extremist behavior, has been adequate.

Further, we need to know what are the collective and individual actions that have been taken by the Department of Defense and by the services to set in place policies and mechanisms for the early prevention and identification of hate-motivated activity, whether it be by an individual or by an organized group, within the military.

Finally, early reports indicate that there is a range of responses by the services, and by the Department, to this problem. It is important to understand if these differences indicate a discrepancy in the relative seriousness with which the services view the problem, or whether there is a disagreement over what legal remedies are available to the military in this important matter. I think we should pursue that in the course of these hearings, Mr. Chairman. And also, how these remedies may be limited by the Constitution's guarantees on speech and association.

I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your generosity, and with those opening remarks, I would yield back the balance of my time. I again join you in welcoming our witnesses, and I look forward with rapt attention to the contribution that they will make to these proceedings.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

We have two separate panels today before us. The first panel we will hear from immediately, and second, we will hear from the service Secretaries a little later.

The first panel is composed of Mr. John J. Johnson, director of programs, and former director of the Armed Services and Veterans' Affairs Department, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; Mr. Joe Roy, from the Southern Poverty Law Center; and Mr. Waldo Copley, chairman of the Criminal Justice Department, Metropolitan State College of Denver.

Mr. Johnson, why don't you lead off.

STATEMENT OF JOHN J. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR OF THE ARMED SERVICES AND VETERANS AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good day, Mr. Chairman, and committee members. I thank you for the opportunity to come before you as a representative of the Nation's largest and oldest civil rights organization, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, to address a grave and serious issue—extremism in the military.

As you know, on March 1, 1996, the North Carolina State Conference of Branches of the NAACP released a task force report entitled, "Community and Military Response to White Supremacist Activities In and Around Military Bases." I have included a copy of that report as a part of my testimony here today, and it will form the basis for much of my statement. We would like to share that with you, if we may. As a further indication of how seriously we take this issue, sir; the NAACP is also conducting a hearing on extremism in the military on July 6 of this year, just prior to the start of our 87th annual national convention in Charlotte, NC. We have invited representatives of the Department of Defense to participate in the hearing because we truly believe that the remedy to this sickness of extremism must involve cooperation between the military, the civil rights community, including groups like the NAACP, and community leaders, if the remedy is to be permanent.

By way of background, on December 7, 1995, Michael James and Jackie Burden were shot in the head while standing on the corner near Hall Street and Campbell Avenue in Fayetteville, NC. Three white soldiers of the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg were charged in the case. Since that tragic night, we have learned what we feared most, that at least two of the soldiers have ties to skinhead activities and the attack was, in fact, racially motivated.

News accounts reported that police found Nazi and white supremacist materials in a room rented by one suspect. It was also reported that, following the slayings, the military police conducted surprise base inspections at Fort Bragg and confiscated flight jackets and Doc Marten boots, the uniform of the skinhead subculture.

The NAACP Fayetteville branch acted promptly in addressing the racially motivated slayings. The NAACP North Carolina Conference of Branches formed a special task force and held a series of community forums in an attempt to gauge the racial climate and to identify white supremacist activities in and around military installations in North Carolina. I should call to your attention the fact that over 700 people attended the forums in various locations throughout the State.

At this time I wish to share with you the following conclusions from the task force report:

Although the military is to be applauded for its official stance against racism in its ranks, there are continuing concerns that are very troubling to the NAACP.

Despite reported boasting by skinhead and extremist organizations regarding their recruitment activities in the North Carolina area, we should point out that the NAACP found no evidence to support this contention on the bases visited by the task force. However, there is evidence of some wannabes, if you will, and some military personnel participating in skinhead activities, espousing skinhead and racist views, wearing skinhead garb, even on base, displaying Nazi flags and racist/offensive materials on base, using racial slurs and/or committing violent crimes in the North Carolina area.

Reports from the Fort Bragg area since December 1995, continue to be quite disturbing. It is clear that Fort Bragg has a serious problem. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the military's finding of only 22 skinheads out of some 14,736 soldiers assigned to the 82d Airborne Division, is unbelievably optimistic. We believe that, at least in the case of Fort Bragg, the potential for, if not the reality of, organized racist or skinhead activities clearly exists in that area.

I want to point out clearly here as well that we join, just as you do, Mr. Chairman, in commending the Army for its swift action, and particularly Secretary West, for his swift action following the Fayetteville tragedy, to investigate skinhead activities in its ranks. However, we take issue with the Army and Fort Bragg's refusal to cooperate with the North Carolina NAACP task force. It was a tremendous opportunity, it seemed to us, for the Army to join with the oldest and most effective civil rights organization in the world to demonstrate its commitment to rid its forces of soldiers who would participate in white supremacist or extremist group activities. There could be no clearer or stronger signal to fight racism than a joint effort by the Army personnel and the NAACP. This was an opportunity sadly missed.

We find it troubling that five soldiers at Fort Bragg would have the audacity to stage a skinhead meeting for a photo shoot on post, dressed in skinhead garb and displaying a Nazi flag, especially in light of the Army's investigation, counseling and training following the slayings in Fayetteville. Thus, it appears there is a need for the Army to take more direct and visibly decisive action against soldiers who participate in skinhead groups or activities, to send an unequivocal message that such activities will not be tolerated.

Conflicting interpretations of what constitutes passive or active participation in white supremacist and skinhead groups make enforcement of and compliance with these policies difficult in all branches of the military. Many base officials appear to have difficulty drawing the line of distinction between what is passive and active participation. We believe that uniform interpretations should be developed and communicated to all military personnel.

We are concerned that the U.S. Coast Guard regulations state—and I quote—“* * * membership and participation in discriminatory organizations by individual service members is permitted, as

long as Coast Guard affiliation is not implied or expressed." Such a statement can easily give the appearance that the Coast Guard condones active participation in discriminatory groups.

There appears to be significant differences between the way base officials view the enforcement of some policies and the way some enlisted personnel view the enforcement of the same policies. For example, although base officials said that racist materials must be removed, enlisted personnel cited several instances of these materials on base and said that often persons are not required to remove the racist material even when the base command is aware of them.

The North Carolina NAACP task force report also includes some 12 salient recommendations for the civilian and military leaders of our Armed Forces and the Coast Guard. In the interest of time, I will not elaborate on all 12 recommendations. However, I would like to recount four that we think require immediate consideration and implementation. They are as follows:

First, the military should develop uniform interpretations of policies addressing active versus passive participation in white supremacist and skinhead groups. These uniform interpretations should be communicated to all military personnel and Department of Defense civilian employees.

Second, the Coast Guard's policy permitting membership and participation in discriminatory groups should be amended to prohibit active participation in these groups.

Third, periodic assessments by base or installation officials should be initiated to gauge the racial climate of the installation and surrounding areas through formal and informal surveys, group discussions, and meetings between installation officials and community leaders.

Fourth, base and installation officials should seek to establish and maintain good working relationships between the military installation and the community, to facilitate the identification and resolution of problems or concerns, to share information, and to feel the pulse, if you will, of race relations in the community.

Now, while the bulk of my remarks today have concentrated and centered around the situation in North Carolina, we feel you should know that, within the past 2 years, we have received a number of calls and inquiries from people throughout the Nation, in and around military branches across the Nation, relating to racist, skinhead, and white supremacist type activities.

In closing, I am reminded of one finding in particular reported by the House Armed Services Committee task force on equality of opportunity and treatment in the Armed Forces, published in December of 1994. It was the differing perceptions of equal opportunity programs by senior military personnel and junior military personnel. Senior officials felt the policies were in place and that equal opportunity programs were sound and working, while junior personnel felt the policies were lip service and that equal opportunity programs were nonfunctional. An NAACP delegation, of which I was part, traveled to military installations in Germany in 1992 and identified a similar finding in its report. A copy of this report I would like to submit to you as well for your committee's consideration as a part of my testimony here today.

I imagine this committee will hear this afternoon from senior military officials who will again say that policies prohibiting involvement in extremist group activities are sound and in place, but I would be curious to hear what junior military members would say.

In my mind, the challenge facing the military is to bridge the perception gap between senior and junior personnel. Senior officials must not only ensure the policy is sound and in place, but they must also ensure the policy is implemented and enforced throughout the organization, so that it is a reality for the most senior individuals and the most junior individuals simultaneously. The NAACP stands ready, Mr. Chairman, to assist the Department of Defense in this endeavor.

We thank you for the opportunity to share these observations with you this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.

Mr. Roy.

**STATEMENT OF JOSEPH T. ROY, SR., DIRECTOR, KLANWATCH,
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER**

Mr. ROY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On behalf of the Southern Poverty Law Center and its nearly 300,000 donors nationwide, I would like to thank the committee for inviting us here today to have input in this hearing.

Klanwatch, which is a department of the Southern Poverty Law Center, was established 17 years ago to monitor hate groups and extremist organizations. In October 1984, we established the Militia Task Force to track antigovernment organizations that were being infiltrated by white supremacy individuals.

We have developed the largest data base on supremacists and patriot movement members and groups in the country. We are currently tracking over 260 white supremacy groups and well over 800 so-called patriot organizations in 50 States. Many of these are located near military installations. They actively seek to access the military's vast armament, equipment, ammunition, and personnel.

The white supremacy movement in general has seen a slight decline in the last few years. This is because of lawsuits, because of hate crime litigation, because of prosecution by law enforcement, and they found a new home in this so-called patriot movement and began migrating into that direction. Many of these groups actively target the military for recruitment and membership. This is not a new phenomenon. Going back over the last decade, we have seen numerous incidents where military personnel have been involved with these groups and have been involved in criminal incidents.

In 1986, we filed a civil suit against a group calling itself the White Patriot Party in North Carolina, which was the Carolina Klan. They claimed to have well over a thousand members. While this number may be inflated, the rallies that we monitored turned up 2 to 300 members on any given date. These individuals were decked out in camouflage uniforms, marching in cadence, and appeared to have some semblance of military training.

In the settlement of the case, this group agreed to stop paramilitary training and harassing the blacks that we were representing in the State. However, a year later, we found not only were

they still training, but they had recruited active duty Marines who were conducting training near Fort Bragg. The Marines were members as well as a few that held leadership positions in this group. Testimony at trial revealed that the group was buying from military sources LAW rockets, C-4 explosives, Claymore mines and other pyrotechnics.

We wrote a letter to the then Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, warning of the dangerous nature of this activity in April 1986, and we asked him to prohibit membership and activities in these groups. In August, we were appointed special prosecutors to aid the Department of Justice in the prosecution of the leaders of the White Patriot Party. We were able to secure convictions against the leaders and they were sent to jail.

A short time later, members of this same group were arrested for conspiring to hijack a military convoy and take TOW rockets, one of which was designated for the Law Center in Montgomery. In September 1986, Mr. Weinberger replied by issuing a directive to the military, which I have enclosed a copy with my testimony. The directive, however, appears to have been inadequate. There continued to be incidents throughout the decade.

As recently as December 1995, in the North Carolina incident, where the three 82d Airborne soldiers were arrested for the Fayetteville murders, investigators found white supremacy materials in the homes of one of the soldiers. Some of this material was from the National Alliance, one of the fastest growing neo-Nazi movements in the country.

A fourth soldier, it was discovered, had rented a billboard for the National Alliance and erected it near the Fort Bragg facility. The National Alliance is the producer of a publication called "The Turner Diaries," which you may or may not be familiar with. The Turner Diaries was required reading by the White Patriot Party a decade earlier. It is extremely popular in the so-called Patriot movement today.

The Oklahoma City bombing was a clear example of the capabilities and the dangers that these extremists project to the American public. The Turner Diaries has been called the blueprint for white victory by the movement, by critics, and by the media. In Pierce's own words, who is the founder of the National Alliance and author of The Turner Diaries, "we are in a war for the survival of our race * * * that ultimately we cannot win * * * except by killing our enemies."

We cannot afford to ignore the fact that our Nation's Armed Forces are prime targets for recruitment by extremists, white supremacists, and other groups. We must deny them access to the finest training and technology available in the world through our military institutions.

The policy statement that was issued has proven inadequate. As we understand it, military commanders have drawn a distinction between active participation and mere membership. The former, but not the latter, has been prohibited. In our view, any type of involvement with white supremacist groups, including mere membership, should be grounds for discharge. Membership in white supremacist groups requires an affirmative step, and it is not a status issue, such as being black or gay. Because of the unique role

of the military, there would be no first amendment problem in adopting a stricter policy against white supremacists.

I'm not here today to condemn the military but, rather, feel they should be applauded for their efforts in uncovering extremists in their ranks. But they must be held accountable for how they deal with it.

Since the Oklahoma City bombing, I have had numerous occasions to talk with military personnel on all levels, from street level recruits up to the command staff. They all show an eagerness to rid the military of these types.

The military is no different from any other group in society when it comes to exposure to racists and extremists. Because of the sheer numbers, they will have a certain percentage of these people in their ranks. They will not be condemned for having found them in their ranks, but they will certainly be judged for what they do about it.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Roy follows:]

TESTIMONY OF
JOSEPH T. ROY, SR.
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

HEARING ON
EXTREMIST ACTIVITY IN THE MILITARY

JUNE 25, 1996

My name is Joe Roy, I am the director of Klanwatch, a project of the Southern Poverty Law Center. We are located in Montgomery, Alabama.

The Law Center was founded over 25 years ago to protect the rights of victims of injustice. In 1979, the Center established Klanwatch to monitor white supremacist groups and to track hate crime. In October 1994, we established a Militia Task Force to monitor the growing antigovernment Patriot movement and its militias. We took this step after uncovering strategic links between white supremacist organizations and some of the militia groups that had begun springing up throughout the United States.

Klanwatch maintains the largest database in the country on the white supremacist and Patriot movements. We gather and analyze intelligence on such groups and provide this information to over 6,500 law enforcement agencies nationwide. Our files contain information on over 15,000 individuals and more than 4,000 groups. I have provided the Committee with a copy of our February *Klanwatch Intelligence Report* which contains a list and map of over 260 white supremacist groups currently operating in the U.S. I have also provided the Committee with a copy of a report we issued in April, *False Patriots: The Threat of Antigovernment Extremists*, which contains a list of over 800 Patriot groups that we identified between 1994 and 1996 and a map showing their locations.

Many of these white supremacist and Patriot groups operate near military installations where they actively conduct recruitment campaigns and seek access to the military's vast arsenal of armament, equipment and ammunition.

Status of the White Supremacist Movement Today

In the last decade, the organized hate movement in the United States has undergone dramatic changes. Today, the white supremacist movement has an active membership of about 25,000. The movement is now spearheaded by the increasingly militant neo-Nazi organizations that operate across the nation. While the Klan has fractured into a hundred squabbling factions under the weight of lawsuits and internal friction over money and power, the nation's neo-Nazi organizations have been growing. Like the Klan before them, these groups are actively recruiting on high school and college campuses and, increasingly, in the nation's armed forces.

In the last year, prominent neo-Nazis, along with a handful of militant Klansmen and Patriot extremists, have recruited actively in every branch of the military. This is not a new phenomenon, nor is it a surprising one. Members of the military are extremely attractive recruits for extremist organizations. Those with specialized training, access to sophisticated weaponry and classified information are especially valuable.

Targeting the Military

The National Alliance, in our judgment, is the most dangerous neo-Nazi organization operating in North America today. The group is growing at unprecedented levels and has made the military a target of its aggressive recruiting campaign. The West Virginia-based outfit is headed by William Pierce, a much-revered patriarch of both the white supremacist and Patriot movements. Pierce has made no secret of the fact that his idea of "taking back" America involves the kind of racist revolution he graphically detailed in his infamous 1978 novel, *The Turner Diaries*.

Oklahoma City bombing suspect Timothy McVeigh was an avid fan of Pierce's novel. While on active duty with the Army, McVeigh handed out copies of the inflammatory book to his Army buddies and after his discharge, sold it at gun shows. Pierce recently observed that *The Turner Diaries* had been "effective in educating and inspiring a substantial portion of the people who have read it." The novel depicts a truck bombing remarkably similar to the Oklahoma City explosion.

Shortly after the Oklahoma bombing, Pierce predicted more antigovernment violence. To Pierce, the issue is simple: "It's a case of either we destroy them or they will destroy us, with no chance for compromise or armistice."

Pierce outlined his strategy for recruiting in the military in one of his organization's most widely circulated publications, *What is the National Alliance?* In that tract, Pierce writes that a National Alliance member in the military "uses his daily interactions with career personnel to select exceptional individuals who are receptive, and he then gives them the opportunity to serve their race while carrying out their military ... functions."

In the last two years, National Alliance's membership has soared into the thousands. In 1992, the organization had known chapters in only three states. Today, it operates in more than a dozen. By Pierce's own count, the group's membership has increased 30-fold since 1990. In 1993, Pierce said that his organization's membership "doubled in 1990-91 and again in 1992."

Pierce's long-range goal is to ignite a worldwide race war and establish an Aryan utopia in North America—a fascist society free of Jews, blacks, other racial minorities, and, most important, the "traitors" to the white race so openly hated by Pierce and his neo-Nazi followers. As his organization and influence grow, Pierce has made his objectives clear. "We are in a war

for the survival of our race ... that ultimately we cannot win ... except by killing our enemies.”

A Racist Murder

The most shocking recent example of racist extremism in the military came to light late last year during a murder investigation in North Carolina. Not surprisingly, persons associated with Pierce's National Alliance appear to have been involved.

On the night of Dec. 7, 1995, a black couple—Jackie Burden, 27, and Michael James, 36—were shot to death as they walked down a quiet street in Fayetteville near the Fort Bragg Army base. Three active duty soldiers—two of them avowed neo-Nazis assigned to Fort Bragg's 82nd Airborne Division—were charged with the shootings. Police searching one of the soldier's off-post room after the murders found a Nazi flag and a variety of white supremacist literature, including numerous National Alliance publications and a pamphlet detailing how to join the organization.

The shootings came eight months after 23-year-old Robert Hunt, a recruiter for the National Alliance, rented a billboard near the Army post's main gate. At the time, Hunt also served with the 82nd Airborne. His billboard read: “Enough! Let's start taking back America! National Alliance” and carried the telephone number of the group's local message line.

The Enemy Within

Some of the efforts to promote extremist activity in the military come from within the ranks.

In 1992, an underground organization of veteran and active duty Special Forces personnel with Patriot and white supremacist sympathies was formed

at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. This clandestine group called the Special Forces Underground combines a racist, anti-democratic agenda with sophisticated tactical skills and military weaponry. The combination is extremely dangerous.

The Underground's quarterly publication, *The Resister*, provides professional instruction on covert communications, counter-intelligence and sniper training. *The Resister's* editor, who writes under an alias, asserts that the Special Forces Underground opposes "universal suffrage ... so-called 'civil rights' ... federal law enforcement ... environmental laws ... (and) equal opportunity." *The Resister* has also claimed that the reason the murder rate in England and Europe is lower than that in the United States is because "European countries are almost exclusively white." Until recently, this publication has been available on the Internet and on various computer bulletin boards, including those serving white supremacists.

The Special Forces Underground, with its highly trained professional membership and its commitment to an anti-government guerrilla campaign, presents a significant threat of domestic terror and civil disorder. Yet we understand that the Army has determined that the underground operation cannot be classified as an extremist group under Army regulations.

Weapons Thefts a Serious Threat to National Security

Sophisticated weaponry, equipment and ammunition have been smuggled off American military installations for years by white supremacists and their sympathizers.

- In 1986, active duty military personnel were members of a paramilitary-style Klan group called the White Patriot Party. A former Marine testified that he sold the group 13 LAW rockets, 10 Claymore mines, and nearly 200 pounds of C-4 explosives. He said that the materials were

used in the white supremacist group's training exercises which he conducted along with active duty military personnel from Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Our investigation of these activities uncovered active-duty Marines who held leadership positions in the group and publicly participated in White Patriot Party activities.

- In 1990, more than 500 weapons were discovered at the Cambridge, Massachusetts, residence of a technical sergeant with the Air National Guard. Police also found Nazi literature, 50,000 rounds of ammunition, 300 rifles, 200 handguns, a mortar, an anti-tank gun, a machine gun and a rocket launcher.

- In 1991, two active duty soldiers were indicted on 16 counts of weapons violations. As part of a group calling themselves the Knights of the New Order, they had stockpiled military weapons, ammunition, and explosives with the intention of attacking newspapers, television stations and businesses owned by Jews and blacks. Weapons seized included a Soviet anti-aircraft gun, an automatic M-16, 40 pounds of C-4 explosives, dynamite, booby traps, electric blasting caps, detonation fuse, M-16 rifle parts, AR-15s and other assault rifles, a grenade launcher, a case of grenades, Claymore mines, silencers, a large quantity of ammunition, a sawed off shotgun, and several 40-mm high-explosive cannon rounds. The weapons were taken from Fort Campbell, Kentucky and Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Conclusion

We are all aware that racists and other extremists are present to some extent in every segment of our society today. The nation's armed forces are no exception. The military should be applauded for uncovering organized

extremist activity in its ranks, but it must be held accountable for how it deals with this serious problem. We cannot afford to ignore the fact that our nation's armed forces are today a prime target for recruitment by extremists in both the Patriot and white supremacist movements.

In 1986, after we uncovered evidence that military personnel in North Carolina were involved with the paramilitary force of the neo-Nazi White Patriot Party, we wrote the Secretary of Defense and asked him to prohibit active-duty members of the armed services from holding membership in groups like the Klan or from taking part in their activities.

In response, the Defense Department issued the following directive in September 1986:

1. Recent activities of white supremacy, neo-Nazi and other groups which espouse or attempt to create overt discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, religion or national origin prompt me to remind military personnel of their special responsibilities.
2. Military Personnel, duty bound to uphold the constitution, must reject participation in such organizations. Active participation, including public demonstrations, recruiting and training members, and organizing or leading such organizations is utterly incompatible with military service. The system of rank and command, the requirements of trust and cohesiveness among service members, and the discipline essential to military units demand that service personnel reject the goals of such groups.
3. Commanders have ample authority to employ the full range of administrative procedures, including separation, or appropriate disciplinary action, against military personnel who actively participate in groups described above. Commanders have the authority to order the facilities and events sponsored or controlled by such groups "off-limits." I strongly encourage commanders at every level to insure that

all personnel fully appreciate their responsibility to their comrades and to the nation to uphold and advance the principle of individual equality.

This policy statement appears to have proven inadequate. As we understand it, military commanders have drawn a distinction between “active participation” and “mere membership” in extremist groups. The former, but not the latter, has been prohibited.

In our view, any type of involvement with white supremacist groups -- including mere membership -- should be grounds for discharge. Membership in white supremacist groups requires an affirmative step; it is not a status issue such as being black or gay. Because of the unique role of the military, there would be no First Amendment problem with adopting a stricter policy against white supremacists. Cf. McMullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936 (1985) (police may fire personnel with ties to the Klan).

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Roy.
Mr. Copley.

STATEMENT OF WALDO H. COPLEY, CHAIRMAN, DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, METROPOLITAN STATE COLLEGE OF DENVER

Mr. COPLEY. Mr. Spence, Mr. Dellums, committee members, I appreciate the opportunity to talk with you today. Unlike my two predecessors, I am not representing any group, except myself, and what knowledge that I may have that will be useful to you.

During 22 years of military service, 10 of them as a special investigations officer, followed by another nearly 20 years of teaching civilian law enforcement officers at various stages of their careers, I think I have developed more than a basic knowledge of extremists, their context, and their activities. One of the aspects apparent early on in any serious examination of American history—indeed, the history of mankind—is that certain groups of people, certain individuals with a following, take extreme views around any issue. We are certainly aware of that. We see it in the civilian community, and as Mr. Dellums has mentioned, certainly we see it in the military community, because the military is made up of civilians who are in our system, generally speaking, there temporarily.

I am not going to talk about or even try to present the “one man’s extremist is another’s patriot; one man’s freedom fighter is another’s patriot,” because I don’t necessarily accept that view, although there is a perspective when we look at where nations have come from in providing their current leadership. We look at the early activities of the leaders and we find that they were on the extremes of their particular social or political structure.

An honorable practice in American history has been the organization of like-minded citizens to support or protest various aspects of government activity. The Constitution guarantees this, and a significant portion of the Supreme Court’s decisions in the last 200 years has helped to define that, in some cases very specifically, and it continues to be an issue on how far, what is protest, how can we protest legitimately, what are the boundaries. At what point does the legitimate expression of a viewpoint cross over appropriate limits and become proscribed by custom, usage, or law?

Assuming an answer to that, then we have to go a little bit farther and look to see if this applies to the military community. Do we give up the phrase, do we give up the citizen when we take up the uniform? Of course, the answer is no. We are still citizens in the military, as we are in civilian life. But there are some legitimate proscriptions on certain behaviors that the military can apply to their members. What are these limits? Is off duty, off base, different than off duty, on base? Are the accouterments of off-base activity—posters and uniforms and so on—proscribed from being on base if they’re limited to private living space? Is the living space in a dormitory different than family quarters on base?

For my discussion I include extremist activity as any behavior in support of or resistance to any ideology which involves the military member in activities having the potential to affect his or her ability to respond in an appropriate and timely manner to any military requirement. Given the classic and historically unique nature of mili-

tary service, the ability to respond to military requirements is to a large extent the lens through which all extremist or other activities must be viewed.

The presence of individual extremists in the military must be clearly distinguished from the concept of military extremists—that is, groups that are active in extremist activities which are supported by the military services. These are negligible or nonexistent, I would submit. The military, as a unit, as a group, certainly proscribes that, discourages it, prohibits it, and takes severe action against it.

The appropriate point of contact, if you will, between the military services and the individual extremist, or extremist activity, should be where it has always been: the noncommissioned officers, the direct supervisors, the officers of the unit who have the responsibility to ensure that their unit, their personnel, are prepared to perform their military duties.

How far can they go to find out what their people are doing? That's where we have some potential problems or some potential issues. Can a squad leader raise an issue about some of his people's off-duty activity? At what point can he raise the issue? He can raise the issue, I submit, if it interferes with their military duty. As a military member, the military services have the right to ensure that all of the people working in the unit are capable of responding in an appropriate way.

Beyond those limits, it gets much more difficult. The general requirement for good order and discipline and the fundamental need for prompt and unfettered response to calls for military response is a framework that already exists. Perhaps the one single thing that may be needed, or a thing that may be needed, is some specific training, some specific knowledge of—and I put this in quotes—"how to recognize an extremist." In that context, then, the NCO's and the officers involved, that is part of their function as supervisors, to ensure that their people are not engaged in any extremist activity that affects the military in their ability to respond.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Copley follows:]



School of Professional Studies
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EXTREMIST ACTIVITY IN THE MILITARY
(A Statement For the House Committee on National Security)

During 22 years of military service -- ten as a special investigations officer -- followed by nearly 20 years of teaching civilian law enforcement officers at various stages of their careers, I have developed a bit more than a basic knowledge of the conditions and dimensions of extremist groups. One of the aspects apparent early on in any serious examination is that American history; indeed the history of mankind, is replete with examples of human behavior that is at -- or beyond -- the extreme of accepted activity. In this short presentation I do not intend to develop the "...one man's freedom fighter is another's terrorist" argument, as neither time or space permit; and I do not accept the premise that the morality of behavior is necessarily situational. That argument however does illustrate a bit of the problem faced by the military services and the larger civil polity; particularly in this country.

An honorable practice in American history has been the organization of like-minded citizens to support or protest various aspects of government activity. The Constitution guarantees the right to do that and a significant percentage of the Supreme Court's opinions during the past 200 years have been devoted to defining, extending and reinforcing that sometimes disruptive right. What then are the limits of protest? At what point does the legitimate expression of a viewpoint cross over appropriate limits and become proscribed by custom, usage and law?

Assuming an answer to that, another whole dimension still exists: As the questions of protest and redress are decided for the civilian population,

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do the same parameters apply to military members? Assuming (as I do) that there is a difference in the acceptable behavior for military members, what does this mean for the military services? What are the limits that can legitimately be placed on off-duty behavior of service members? Is off-duty off-base different than off-duty on-base? Are the accoutrements of off-base activity (posters, literature, etc) proscribed from being on-base if they are limited to on-base private living space? Is the living space in a dormitory subject to the same rules as on-base family quarters?

It is clearly time to define extremist activity and relate that definition to the military. For the purposes of this discussion, I will include as extremist any behavior in support of or resistance to any ideology which involves the military member in activities having the potential to affect the ability to respond in an appropriate and timely manner to any military requirement. Given the classic and historically unique nature of military service (setting aside as non-germane in this case efforts to "soften" the conditions of military life); the ability to respond to military requirements is to a large extent the lens through which all activities must be viewed.

The presence of individual extremists in the military must be clearly distinguished from the concept of military extremists -- groups that are active in extremist activities which are supported by the military services. These instances are negligible or non-existent. One of the reasons is the rather intense scrutiny given to performance standards and expenditure of military resources by the chain of command as well as civilian oversight of budget disbursement. Another is individual responsibility of NCO's and officers for the performance of their units; any diversion of resources would likely show up in unit achievement data and be challenged quickly.

Having made the quick distinction between individual action and organized behavior, we must indeed acknowledge that there are extremists in the military service. It is possible -- maybe even likely --

that they are able to make contact with individual members at other military bases, but the concept of organized, coordinated inter-base and inter-unit activity is essentially lacking. The closest thing to an inter-base operation of illegal activity I have experienced was a group calling themselves "The Old Men Of The Mountain;" however their focus was entirely theft. They were organized by a NCO who had an outlet for the sale of tools and enlisted several young recruits into a wide-spread group who stole tools and other small items on order.

Identification of extremists within the military must be placed where the welfare and performance of the unit has always been - with the NCO's and officers in the unit. The general requirement for good order and discipline and the fundamental need for prompt and unfettered response to calls for military response is a framework that already exists. Leaders and supervisors must be trained in "how to recognize an extremist" to give them the tools to properly manage their unit. They should be supported in their judgment and the actions they are called upon to take.



Professor W. H. Copley, PhD
Chairman, Department of Criminal Justice
Captain USAF (Ret)

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Copley.

Before going to the other panel, we will go ahead and take some questions from you gentlemen.

Mr. Dellums.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First, let me thank all three witnesses for your opening remarks, and second, to thank you for the advance copies of your testimony, giving us an opportunity to read in some detail the major thrust of your testimony, and also allowing us to prepare some questions that hopefully will shape and frame the thrust of this committee proceeding.

Mr. Chairman, I would note there are several of my colleagues here who I'm sure have demonstrated their interest and are keenly interested in engaging the witnesses, so what I would like to do is ask all three panelists questions, but in the interest of time, I would begin by asking four questions for the record directed to Mr. Roy, and then hopefully, time permitting, if a second round is warranted, I would like to come back and ask the other two witnesses some follow-up questions.

Mr. Roy, as I said, I read your testimony, and all of the testimony of the previous witnesses, with great interest. I would like to go to some of the specific comments that you made in your testimony.

You stated that a recruiter for the neo-Nazi National Alliance, who rented a billboard outside Fort Bragg in an attempt to recruit military personnel to the Alliance, was an active duty member of the 82d Airborne Division at the time the billboard was rented for purposes of recruitment of active duty personnel.

Did your organization make an attempt to alert the Army to this, and if so, what was the Army's response to your contact in this regard?

Mr. ROY. When we developed the information that it was an active duty member of the military that had rented the billboard, it was after he had been discharged from the service, and most probably or more closely around the timeframe that the North Carolina incident occurred.

Mr. DELLUMS. Regarding the so-called Special Forces underground that you referred to in your testimony, the Army has stated that this is not an organization made up of active duty personnel but a militia-type organization, probably comprised of former Special Forces veterans and others who pretend to be an internal organization. The Army has said there is no truth to the claims made by the publishers of *The Resister*, that it has been able to subvert U.S. military policy within the ranks, as was reported in Haiti.

What was your reaction to the Army position on this? What evidence do you have that active duty personnel are, indeed, involved in this organization, and are they or are they not successfully doing what they claim to do?

Mr. ROY. Our information is based on intelligence gathering that we do, through acquisition of their publications, through law enforcement contacts, and through confidential sources that we use in the field.

We have no knowledge of specific identifications of active duty personnel, but the general consensus throughout the country of

people who are familiar with the publication, they are in agreement, at least outside of the military, that there are quite possibly active duty military people involved in that publication.

Could you repeat the other part of your question?

Mr. DELLUMS. I think you've answered it. I said what was your reaction to the Army's position with respect to that.

Mr. ROY. Again, we view the mere membership and active participation as a dangerous stand for the military to take in regards to these extremist groups. We won't be so fortunate, or unfortunate, to see these manifestations of violent acts by these groups, such as we've seen in North Carolina with the White Patriot Party, or with the killings at Fort Bragg.

The information that we're developing, the trend that we're seeing, is to infiltrate the military, not as a racist but to acquire information, intelligence, and access to armaments. The ones that we see are not necessarily the ones that are going to be the biggest problem. It's going to be the ones that are working underground to try to infiltrate this organization.

Mr. DELLUMS. Let me come back to a specific point that I alluded to in that regard, Haiti. As you recall, the publication called *The Resister* indicated that there were at least elements in the Special Forces unit stationed in Haiti that were capable of attempting to undermine the return of the President of Haiti. The military has indicated that they looked at it and that there was no such organization.

The question I was asking you was, as you looked at this, did you derive any information that led you to believe that this publication was written by people other than those pretending to be inside, were there actually people inside, or do you have direct evidence of that? And as you looked at it, did you develop any direct evidence that would lead you to believe that these people, so-called forces, were able to do what they suggested they were able to do in the context of the Haiti operation?

Mr. ROY. It certainly would be speculation on my part as to whether or not they could carry out any kind of operation like that. They are certainly making a genuine effort, the movement in general is, to have those kind of capabilities. However, as far as the identity of the people that are publishing this publication, and the fact that they are active duty military personnel, I have no direct knowledge of that.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you.

Now, you say in your testimony that sophisticated weaponry has been smuggled off of American military facilities for years by white supremacists and their sympathizers, and the examples you cite in your prepared remarks were in 1986, 1990, and 1991.

What is your knowledge of any continued activity of this sort, and has the problem been effectively dealt with since 1991, as your organization looked at these activities?

Mr. ROY. There have been a number of other incidents, which I don't have with me but will certainly provide the committee with. The military has made an effort, from an accounting standpoint, since the White Patriot Party incident, to tighten up their accountability on the weaponry and pyrotechnics available on these military installations.

To what degree of success they've gotten to, I don't know. I don't have access to that information. I do know that our intelligence report goes out to over 6,000 law enforcement agencies around the country. A good number of these I go to and speak to and educate them on the terrorist movement in this country. On a number of occasions I have received expressed concern from law enforcement regarding our National Guard bases and things like this, which they are concerned about, pyrotechnics, ammunition and explosives, things like this, leaving these facilities.

Mr. DELLUMS. So your testimony is that an effort has been made but you have no direct ability at this point to assess the effectiveness or efficacy of their effort?

Mr. ROY. I have no way to gauge that, but I do know, just based on the arrests that we see and the caches of arms and materials that are out there, the materials are getting there eventually. Whether they're coming through off the bases or coming through surplus, or contractors that are supposed to destroy them and don't, we just don't have the answer to that. But the materials are showing up in the movement.

Mr. DELLUMS. But at this point you're not sure how they're getting there.

Mr. ROY. Right.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, just one final question, and I would yield and come back a little later.

Some have suggested that supremacist activity and hate group activity in the military may be somewhere between 1 and 3 percent. I have no capacity to assess the efficacy of those remarks.

But if that is, indeed, true, then it would seem to me that the issue is one of targeting and one of concentration, because 1 to 3 percent, dispersed across 1.4 million people, makes one statement, and concentrated in certain units, in certain places, then makes a profoundly different statement.

With that as a preface for my final question, I would ask, to what extent is the concentration of hate groups around military facilities a coincidence or the result of a defined strategy, in your opinion, and are specific types of military facilities targeted, what types and why, as you have looked at this issue?

Mr. ROY. Well, I think the location of these organizations around military facilities is not very important, the proximity to the bases. Our world is a very much smaller place because of technology. These people are using the Internet, fax tree, cell phones, satellite radio. I mean, they have all the technology that we have available to us, so it's immaterial to them whether—

Mr. DELLUMS. Where they're physically located?

Mr. ROY. That's right.

Again, as I said in my testimony, the military has always been targeted by these groups for recruitment, just because they have access to the pyrotechnics, the finest training in the world. They're an attractive target, and always have been.

The problem is that the white supremacy movement, the underground that's moving into the Patriot organization, are going to escalate their targeting of military installations because of their military structure. These people, for all intents and purposes, the 10-percent underbelly of this movement, are at war with this country.

They want access to the military, and we anticipate and have seen, through their publications, through talking to other people that investigate these types of incidents, that they are extremely interested in the military. And it makes perfect sense that they would be.

Mr. DELLUMS. So, beyond those remarks, there are no specific types of units or facilities that you perceive to be targeted?

Mr. ROY. That's right. I don't think we can put blinders on and look at just white supremacy, skinheads, and things like that. The antigovernment movement in this country far outshadows the number of active white supremacists in this country, and they are also interested in the military. So, you know, we have to widen our vision as to where the problem is going to be and where this recruiting is going to come from.

Then, when you couple the infiltration by white supremacists into the underground, into the Patriot movement, that's where your McVeighs of the world are going to come from.

Mr. DELLUMS. The widened view includes the antigovernment organizations?

Mr. ROY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would yield at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. We have a vote on, so we will break right now. We'll come right back.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come back to order.

Mr. Sisisky.

Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for testifying today.

There is one thing that I'm not clear on, and that's the difference between passive and active. Where is that line there—you know, unless the Supreme Court acts somewhere. It is very difficult for me to believe that you allow the passive, because you don't really know who is the active outside. That's a problem to me and I would like for you to explain that, if you could, the differences there.

Mr. ROY. Yes, sir.

Our impression is that if you belong to one of these groups, and you're active duty military, that's OK. But if you participate in their functions, or do anything that's considered activity, then you're an active member—you know, if you try to espouse these views within the ranks.

To us—and I'm in agreement with you. To us, there's no difference. Once you take that step and become a member, that's an overt act, an activity, the mere fact that you joined this group.

Mr. SISISKY. I intend to ask the same question to the Secretaries when they appear. But there's another question in my mind. A lot of this filtered down to Fort Bragg, and I have to ask the question.

I think in somebody's testimony you testified that they were uncooperative. Is that true?

Mr. JOHNSON. That's correct. The NAACP North Carolina State Conference, as I referenced in my remarks earlier, appointed a task force. They conducted some hearings throughout the State to try to get a feel from people throughout the State on how much of this activity was actually occurring in and around military bases. They

then sought to meet with the military personnel there at Fort Bragg on at least two occasions, and were denied that opportunity. It just seemed to us it was a golden opportunity missed, where people should have been very open and forthcoming.

I believe it was only when communication was sent to the Department of Defense, or perhaps to even Mr. West's office, that eventually someone said yes, you can meet with these people.

Now, I don't have the exact facts, but I do——

Mr. SISISKY. My guess is that they wouldn't have made a command decision without calling Washington. I would think they would do that.

Mr. JOHNSON. I should say to you, sir, that the NAACP has had a very positive working relationship and good cooperation from the Department of Defense. Their Equal Opportunity Office there, we are in communication with them on a daily basis, as we get inquires, complaints, and concerns. They are very open and desirous of working with us.

But that does not always filter down to the local level. In many instances, our branches around the country have not had the kind of dialogue at the local level that they would like to have.

Mr. SISISKY. Coming back to passive and active, to your knowledge—and I will ask the Secretaries this—to your knowledge, are all the services alike in the treatment of those words?

Mr. ROY. I don't know that they all are, but the times that it has come up, yes, sir.

Mr. SISISKY. OK. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

I think it was mentioned that, since our military in many respects is a reflection, a cross-section of our society, one would expect to find in the military the kinds of attitudes and positions that one finds in society.

I'm curious as to whether you think the extremism, considering the part of our society that our military comes from, primarily young men and young women, is extremism more than you would expect from the part of society that our military comes from, or less?

Mr. JOHNSON. I would literally argue that we should discourage it in our society as a whole, to begin with. Even if it's just 1 percent, as someone referenced earlier, it's 1 percent too much. People who join the military I would think join with the thought that they will be treated equally, that they will receive the same sort of treatment, that they will not be subjected to this sort of undue harassment. It just seems to me it's something that should not be tolerated.

Mr. BARTLETT. I would agree. I would think that, of the selection process, what the military is, with prejudice toward a lesser representation for extremism in the military than there is—I would think, when you're coming to defend your country and perhaps to fight and die for your country, I would think that that kind of motivation would kind of mitigate against persons with extreme views, volunteering for the military to begin with.

Is there an attempt in the selection process to weed out those who would come into the military with extremist views?

Mr. COPLEY. Let me try that.

I would say probably—and I'm talking from some time back—merely being made aware of the parameters of the military life would discourage a lot of folks who might be a little bit extremist in their viewpoints anyway. I'm talking extremism in terms of antigovernment extremists.

A 19-year-old budding skinhead is not as likely to volunteer—he may have been drafted, but that was another time, another period; but I don't think he would be likely to volunteer just to come in, unless he had some overriding plan, unless he was directed to volunteer, join up, get into some branch where he could learn some particular skill. But just off the street, I would say that's probably less likely to happen than it would have been during the draft, when everybody came in.

Mr. BARTLETT. To your knowledge, is there an effective, aggressive program in the military to discourage the kind of extremism that we're concerned about in this hearing?

Mr. ROY. I'm not aware of an aggressive, organized program. I know that the people that I've talked to in the military, at every level, since the Oklahoma City bombing are extremely interested in purging the ranks of racists and antigovernment extremism. That's what they have expressed to me. That's why we are here today to urge that they be given the tools to get them out of there.

Mr. BARTLETT. Are there things that the Congress can do to facilitate that?

Mr. ROY. I'm not sure. I think it maybe would have to come from the Secretary of Defense, maybe redo the criteria for ridding the military of these people. I think it probably could come from there just as easily.

I don't think we need to pass a whole lot of new legislation, especially when you're dealing with antigovernment extremists in this country. That's one of the things they fear. There already are laws in place to deal with these people outside of the military, and it's probably just a matter of policy and procedures as to how they're booted out.

Mr. JOHNSON. I would like to add—and the answer may more appropriately come from some people in the military itself. But I did reference the Equal Opportunity Office there in the Department of Defense. I know they're understaffed, as I guess most agencies are. But there is an enormous backlog of inquires and cases that we send there, and they just don't have the staff to process them as quickly as is desirable.

There is something called a Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute or something like that—I may not have the title exactly right—based in Florida. It does some outstanding work in promoting affirmative action, equal opportunity type training. We would like to see more of that sort of thing occur in the military, and again, resources are quite limited.

Mr. BARLETT. Thank you. I think that, in general, the military has led the way in providing equal opportunities for everyone, and I hope the military is able to lead the way in diminishing this kind of extremism and the part of society that they represent.

Mr. JOHNSON. I would just want to share with you that, at least in the NAACP world, we have often said that the military has kind

of set the standard, talking about "Be all you can be," you know. The opportunities were there.

But when you see this sort of thing, they have kind of helped set the standard for society in terms of equal opportunity. So when you see this reversal, or you see this increased activity around military bases, it is kind of a bad signal it is sending, not only throughout the military but throughout the Nation as a whole.

Mr. BARLETT. I think the fact of this hearing speaks to our concern. Thank you all very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Pickett.

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not have any questions of this panel at this time. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Tejada.

Mr. TEJEDA. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kennedy.

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the panel members for their testimony.

I want to raise the question that my colleague, Mr. Bartlett, just raised, but in a different way. How do you see preventing these extremists from cropping up in the first place? What kinds of things do you think can be put in place in the military to prevent this from bubbling up, so to speak?

I appreciate the answer with respect to DEOMI and equal opportunities training, but I would like to have you further explain what, besides adding resources to that alone, what kind of sensitivity training and the like can you recommend to this panel that we can think about in terms of trying to prevent this atmosphere of encouraging extremists in the military?

Mr. JOHNSON. I would speak to one part of that, if I may. When you have people in command positions that say that certain things will not be tolerated, and then walk right by and see skinhead posters on the wall, swastikas or whatever it may be, and say nothing about it, and don't enforce the regulation—I think that's what I tried to speak to a little earlier. It seems to me the military needs to look very closely at not just providing "lip service," as some people have referred to it, and that a more direct approach be taken in that regard.

Mr. KENNEDY. Would you further that a little bit and explain for me, when you say there's a gap, what the difference is in terms of the perception and how that can be remedied. What ideas do you have for us?

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't know that there's a magic answer. I think being very stern and firm, you know. If I walked down these halls and saw something on the wall that shouldn't be there, if I'm in position to issue the order, I would say I want that down and I want to know where it came from and apply the appropriate punishment.

I referenced one of these reports. I visited Germany a few years back. It was amazing to us to meet with senior military personnel in the morning, who would almost bring you to tears talking about their commitment to equal opportunity and that they were reaching out to all that needed to be done, only to come back in the

evening and to talk to people who were not in the hierarchy of the military, who would come and tell you about experiences that they were confronted with, instances of racism and discriminatory acts.

Somehow, between the people who are in charge and the people who are kind of at the lower levels, lower positions, there is a wide gap of understanding there.

Mr. KENNEDY. Any recommendations that you can make to us, as to how to change that gap, obviously any recommendations you can give us in terms of kinds of training approaches and the like, I think this panel would really benefit from that.

I would like to ask the rest of the panel as to what they feel we can do to address this prevention element.

Mr. COPLEY. I think an atmosphere of support for the things that need to be done—and let me pull something out of ancient history.

Some of you may be aware, if you've been in the military, of the general sort of harassment that goes on between upper and lower class in officer training school and the old officer candidate school. At the time I was in officer candidate school, we changed commanders and we got a new commander who was an old, literally, colonel. He had been around since forever. He dictated that there would be no more harassment, hazing. There would be no more hazing.

OK. So we backed off. But that wasn't enough, because it was still happening at some level, a level he found unacceptable, and for about a 10-day period you could get up in the morning and you would find the colonel was already there. He had been there. He had come over at 3 o'clock in the morning. He would come over at 3 in the afternoon. He was there on site, and if you were doing some hazing to an underclassman, you turned around and here's the colonel looking over your shoulder. He fired about a dozen young officer candidates, in the sense that he demoted them from their officer candidate rank and down to basic.

Lo and behold, the hazing incidents just almost disappeared. What happened after I left, I couldn't even give you a clue. But I do know that his activity caused it. His personal commitment to making that happen made it happen. That's what we need.

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you.

I would like to say that I think that echoes the recommendations of the report from the Dellums task force, that leadership is the answer to this in a lot of respects.

Mr. Roy.

Mr. ROY. Well, I think, too, that a lot of this can be caught in the recruitment phase by the military when these people enter the service. It probably needs to be revisited as they move up in their career through the service, because there are different things that affect people when they go into the military. They may go in as a bright-eyed 19-year-old kid, and then when they get stepped on a time or two, through their military career, and meet the right person from an outside group that wants to recruit them into the ranks, they make that change at that point. So I think there needs to be some safeguards built in along the career chain.

Mr. KENNEDY. Speaking to that, we are going to talk a lot about participation, active participation, in these groups. How do you determine which group qualifies as a group that, if you participate

with or you're a member of, it goes beyond the pale or it is cause for dismissal or censure?

I know there used to be a list of groups that weren't tolerated, but that's gone away because of freedom of speech. I would like to ask all of you to comment on what the military can do to gauge which group is one that doesn't promote order and so on?

Mr. ROY. I think certainly, if you look at the ruling by the eleventh circuit in a law enforcement case, where they fired some law enforcement personnel for belonging to a group, the court decision said that police officers were like the military, that they don't enjoy the same constitutional rights as us mere mortals, if you will—and I'm paraphrasing.

I have talked to several people in the military here recently this week, who expressed to me the problem that they're having, that it's easier to identify what the person is doing than it is which group they might belong to, or what the beliefs of the group are.

But when you take an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States, and you espouse the overthrow of the Government, you know, I don't think it takes a rocket scientist to figure out that, OK, he's one. If he's wearing swastikas or publicly demonstrating his support and membership in a group—You know, I think these things can be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. It's not going to be a major effort to fall in and find out where the problem is.

Certainly the materials and the intelligence data that we have at the Law Center will be made available to anybody in the military that is interested in reading them or wants to check out a particular group and see what they espouse and what their track record is.

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. That raises a good question. We hear a lot of times about the constitutional rights of people who are in the military, law enforcement and others, and that does raise a whole new set of questions about freedom of speech and activity and association. And when it goes beyond the individual exercising his right of free speech, or the banning of a group as an organization, depriving somebody else of their rights. It gets down to a real touchy thing.

I was wondering, Mr. Johnson. You made mention in your testimony to removing racist material, whether it was appropriate or not to do that. Mr. Bartlett and some of us here lately have been involved with having pornographic material removed from bases, and the question of constitutional rights came up. I was just wondering, would you be in favor of removing pornographic material from the access that our service people have?

Mr. JOHNSON. That's not what I'm here to speak on, but let me just say that, I think, what you do in the privacy of your own home is your business. It seems to me, however, if you are in the military, what you put on the walls that belong to the U.S. military, what kind of uniforms you wear during that period of time, the military should have some influence and control over what you do.

If I go to work somewhere, my employer says, to some degree, how I'm expected to carry myself. That employer would not keep me if I carried myself in a way totally unacceptable to the employer.

Mr. DORNAN. Well said.

The CHAIRMAN. That's interesting.

Another thing, too, one of you referred to the fact that the antigovernment groups were by far the largest—Mr. Roy, Mr. Copley, or somebody. That, I think, hits home, too.

I was just going through the Klanwatch intelligence report, Mr. Roy, and would point out that hate groups and extremist groups aren't confined to black, white, white on black, or this kind of thing. Just looking down this list of all the incidents you give here in this publication, it is very revealing, about hate groups based on religion, antigovernment agendas, race.

I saw white, black, black-white, Asian, Hispanic, Latinos, black, Jews-black, Japanese, white, Asian-Cambodian. All these difference instances here showing, I guess, that you've got extreme hate groups, one race against another, no matter what it is. It is not confined to just black-white. I think we're dealing here with the situation in the military right now, but it goes beyond just black-white and the standpoint of race.

I just wanted to make that point.

Mr. Dornan.

Mr. DORNAN. I would like to direct this question to everyone. Just like the chairman brought up, I think it is a culture of degradation issue. The selling of Hustler magazine, even if it's behind plywood boards, or you have to ask for it at the counter, or it's high on the shelves, everybody wants to talk Playboy—and I'm no fan of that demeaning magazine. But Hustler and Penthouse both out-sell Playboy. So I particularly respect your response, Mr. Johnson.

But now another issue of conscience has come up. The Air Force Advocate General's Office has sent an incredibly, in my opinion, offensive letter to all the Catholic chaplains, which is the largest group of chaplains of like denomination in the Air Force, telling them what they can or cannot say from the pulpit in their sermons. Sometimes this is on infanticide and that ugly partial birth, so-called abortion death. I agree with Cardinal Ratzinger in Europe. I think it is infanticide.

Which brings us to a problem. Suppose we had a commander in chief who flat out came out for infanticide, real infanticide. You've got a month to kill your baby. Decide if you want it. Would anybody in the military, in any JAG office, suggest that the chaplains of our Nation couldn't go ballistic? Suppose the President came out for legal prostitution. Suppose the President made a mistake that cost a four-star a sad ending to his career, the Commander in Chief of Pacific Forces, and said about these three rapists that they should have spent the money to rent a car to get a prostitute. It cost him his assignment, one of the top combat commanders in the world, the biggest geographical area, CINCPAC.

I would like all of you to comment on where we can go in the military, through our JAG offices, in telling rabbis, ministers, and priests what they can or cannot say in the pulpit, whether it's an election year or not. Does anybody want to be brave and volunteer for a comment first? Otherwise, I'll go left to right, starting with Dr. Copley.

Mr. COPLEY. I would submit that, from the pulpit, a minister, a chaplain, has the same freedom that any other religious leader

does in the civilian community. I was not aware of that directive from the Air Force. I think it's probably challengeable and certainly inappropriate.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Dr. Copley.

What I will do is send you the copy that I've gotten hold of, actually over my e-mail from the Air Force chaplains, and from the largest archdiocese in this hemisphere. It is not a geographical diocese, and non-Catholics sometimes wonder what the "arch" word means. It just means bigger than your normal diocese, like an archangel, an archcriminal, or an archdeacon, an arch anything. It just means bigger, as in San Francisco, New York, Baltimore, Washington, DC, Chicago, Boston, and LA, here in the District of Columbia under Cardinal Hickey. But the military ordinance is the largest archdiocese in this hemisphere at least, of our young men and women in the military of Catholic faith.

So I will send you this notice that went out, and I will give you the military ordinance office that's in New York, their argument and why they think, to use common language, it's an in-your-face, outrageous restriction of their ability to preach what they perceive is solid Christian doctrine from the pulpit.

Do you want to take a shot at it, Mr. Roy?

Mr. ROY. I certainly think we need to be careful not to mix apples and oranges. I think the chaplains sign on to the military to perform a specific service, and that is the spiritual welfare and guidance of their flock, so to speak.

However, the enlisted personnel who belong to these terrorist groups and to these white supremacy groups, they have taken an oath to uphold and defend the people of the United States and the Constitution, all people. It is very, very clear that, if you belong to an organization or espouse views that you want to overthrow the Government, or kill minorities or whatever—

Mr. DORNAN. Or even just spread hate.

Mr. ROY. Yeah. I mean, you have pretty much stepped out of your area of agreement there when you became a member of the Armed Forces.

As far as the memo you're talking about, I don't know that that could be handled in the same way, or if it even falls in the same purview.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you.

Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't have any comment on that, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. All right.

Mr. Chairman, that's all I had. I would like the opportunity to bring it up again to the four Secretaries. I would point out to them and remind all of our guests in this hallowed hall today that there is one flag that flies above Old Glory, our Star Spangled Banner, and it's the Chaplain's flag, with the Star of David or cross on it. That triangular banner goes above the U.S. flag, acknowledging that "In God we trust."

Thank you, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize for missing part of your testimony. Have you all recommended any language to the UCMJ that would address hate-

type crimes, specifically being listed in the UCMJ as being prohibited?

I have heard you outline a problem. I have not heard you suggest a solution. Again, I have been out of the room, so I'm curious.

Mr. ROY. In my testimony I submitted a case law reference where the courts have upheld removing these people from the military. You know, that's our recommendation, that they be purged from the military.

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, generally, you are purged for violating or either not meeting a standard or violating something in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Have you all recommended any language to that extent, based on your experiences?

Mr. ROY. I haven't submitted any; no.

Mr. JOHNSON. Not specific language. We did, in both of these reports, include certain recommendations that we think the military should study and look at ways of trying to address these concerns.

Mr. TAYLOR. Such as?

Mr. JOHNSON. They are all spelled out here. We talked about the Coast Guard policy permitting membership and participation in discriminatory groups; we talked about there being some uniform interpretations of policies addressing passive versus active participation, that sort of thing.

Mr. TAYLOR. Getting back to your discriminatory groups, name one.

Mr. ROY. I can't hear you, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Johnson, I'm a former Coast Guardsman and that kind of surprised me when you said that. I'm just curious as to what these discriminatory groups are that, by name, the Coast Guard is allowing people to participate in. I'm not so sure you can back up that statement, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. What I read earlier was—and let me try to find it, what the policy in the Coast Guard says.

"We are concerned that the U.S. Coast Guard regulations state: 'Membership and participation in discriminatory organizations by individual servicemembers is permitted, as long as Coast Guard affiliation is not implied or expressed.'" This certainly gives the appearance, or could give the appearance, that the Coast Guard condones active participation in discriminatory groups. It is our understanding that that is, in fact, in the policy of the U.S. Coast Guard.

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, Mr. Johnson, there are lots of discriminatory groups out there that are not based on race, creed, or color. There are at least two religions that I know of that say they're the only way to Heaven. That is a discriminatory group.

Now, is that what you're making reference to?

Mr. JOHNSON. I'm sorry. I didn't understand. There are two groups that say what?

Mr. TAYLOR. I mean, discriminatory groups is such a broad statement, Mr. Johnson. You know, the purpose of this hearing is to talk about hate crimes. You make reference to discriminatory groups. There are lots of discriminatory groups. As I said, there are at least two religions that I know of that say that they are the only path to Heaven.

Now, I would consider that pretty discriminatory. But if your purpose is to tie this down to race or color, or even religion, for

hate crimes, I think you ought to spell that out. The world is full of discriminatory groups.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think the point we seek to make here is that it is not clear, throughout the service, what is acceptable behavior and what is not acceptable behavior. What may be acceptable to me may not be acceptable to you, or vice versa. Those procedures need to be clarified. That's basically what we're saying.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Johnson, that I do not doubt, but I do think that when you have gone to the trouble to outline this problem, I think it only fair that you also try to suggest a remedy. That was the point of my first question. Again, the second part is that it would have to be a remedy that would stand the constitutional challenge. Otherwise, we really haven't accomplished much.

My second question would go to Mr. Roy. You did perk my interest when you were making reference to the groups that refer to themselves as "patriots," because I have also seen a rise in that type of activity.

Are you saying that everyone who refers to themselves as a patriot is a racist, or is it that just some people with racist tendencies have sort of attached themselves to these groups as a way of going out and either getting some validity to their cause or as a way to go out and recruit new members?

Mr. ROY. Well, in the over-800-plus groups that we're tracking right now in the so-called patriot movement, probably 90 percent, comparatively speaking, are relatively harmless. They are made up of people who are extremely frustrated and angry at the Government who are searching for some forum to vent those frustrations. Racism may or may not have anything to do with grinding that ax, so to say.

What we're alarmed about is the 10-percent underbelly that is being infiltrated by current and past members of the white supremacy movement and other radical groups that have moved into this arena, and who live off that 90-percent kind of as a host body. They use them for financing, safe houses, information, weapons, things like this, because they all share the same antigovernment fervor and rhetoric.

You know, racism is just one of the many, many plies to the patriot movement. There is a lot of people out there in it, and a lot of them are angry about a lot of different things.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Watts.

Mr. WATTS. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions. I am just reviewing the magazine, the Klanwatch intelligence report. This is from the Southern Poverty Law Center.

Mr. Roy, this is your magazine that you put out, just kind of outlining what activities you guys have worked on or monitored over these many years. I knew that much of this was going on out there, but it was quite interesting in just what I see here and what I've read.

Mr. Chairman, I missed a lot of the hearing, so I don't have any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Edwards.

Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Chairman, recognizing that there's a second panel this afternoon, I would like to pass on questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McHale.

Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, good afternoon.

I would like to follow up on a line of questioning begun by Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Roy, let me tell you at the outset that I am very familiar with the Southern Poverty Law Center. I have very high regard for your organization, and a great deal of respect for the personal courage that has been shown by Morris Dees over the years, in terms of advancing freedom in the face of what has often been armed opposition.

Having said that, I think throughout your testimony, Mr. Roy, the central element that you have emphasized is the constitutional distinction between civilians and servicemembers. You made reference to an eleventh circuit case that you presented as an analogy regarding police officers, and apparently that was central to the court's holding in that case. I understand that distinction and, to a point, I agree with it. When you're standing at the position of attention in the second rank, there is no freedom of speech.

I listened to Mr. Johnson earlier when he talked about racist posters that implicitly would be on display in a military environment, and I don't believe that's protected by the Constitution. I believe that an order can be given to remove such posters.

Mr. Roy, I think you recognize that you move up against a much more difficult constitutional challenge when you assert, as you have, that passive membership alone would be a sufficient basis for discharge. As I understand your testimony, that is, in fact, what you would urge, at least in terms of membership in the kinds of organizations that we're discussing today.

So, to draw a distinction between what the law is and what you believe the law should be, let me ask a very specific question. Under existing case law, what is the constitutional distinction between a civilian and a servicemember, if any, when measuring first amendment freedoms of association and speech? And in answering that, if you could make specific reference to conduct that would be off duty and off base, and if you could, for instance, make reference to reservists versus active duty personnel.

In the literature that I've seen submitted today, there has been a focus on, apparently and tragically, a focus on recruiting reservists to become members of these kinds of organizations. What kinds of constitutional freedoms would be protected for a civilian but would be denied to a reservist or to an active duty servicemember?

Mr. ROY. Well, I hate to give you such a short answer after such an eloquent question, but I'm not an attorney so I can't really give you the nuts and bolts that you would need to make your evaluation.

I do know from 22 years of experience in law enforcement and investigating these types of incidents, that law enforcement officers and military personnel don't enjoy the same rights that everybody else does. It's just a fact of life. From my experience, and based on what I have seen, that's where the courts are.

I think we need to step back and look at the fact that trying these things before the courts, and letting the courts make those

decisions for us, in the long run is going to be a lot less expensive process in life and property than allowing these people to stay in the military.

Mr. MCHALE. I appreciate your answer. There is a distinction, in my view, between someone who is in the military and someone who is a civilian, but, I think, the courts have—and perhaps as a result of this issue—will continue to place limits on that distinction. You don't surrender the Constitution when you put on a uniform. So the issue becomes if, in fact, you can be denied freedom of speech in a military formation—and you can—at what point is the freedom of speech to be preserved if, for instance, it's off duty and during an off-base, without any affiliation otherwise to active service?

I guess what I'm getting at, and just to give you a specific issue—and I'm not really asking for a response. I would just ask you to think about it. If I understand your testimony correctly, you would establish a different constitutional standard for a civilian when compared to a reservist during the 28 days a month that that reservist was living and working in the civilian community. I don't argue with that proposition for the moment, but I submit to you, having such a constitutional distinction raises some very substantial constitutional questions.

Mr. ROY. Certainly. I think, when you look at this, we're talking about terrorists here, terrorism. Certainly there are provisions in law for that.

One of the chief concerns of law enforcement around the country are especially these people that work in the Guard and work two weekends a month. Those are certainly more approachable probably than active duty military personnel. It's going to be a key problem that the military needs to address and to make those kinds of decisions. I wish I had those answers for you.

Mr. MCHALE. It is a key problem, and I don't mean to suggest the answers, either. But in a situation where a civilian would undoubtedly be protected in his membership in a group, it raises a very strong constitutional challenge to say that a reservist, when off duty, off base, would not be constitutionally protected.

If I understand your testimony, that is, in fact, one of the elements that you advance today. I'm not even necessarily disagreeing with that for the moment, but I am suggesting that such a distinction raises some very difficult constitutional questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Underwood.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have two, kind of the nature of a comment and a question to Dr. Copley, and a question perhaps for Mr. Roy.

In your testimony, Dr. Copley, you seem to make a distinction between extremist behavior and extremist beliefs, and you make the assertion, I believe, that the judgment of this should be on the ability to respond to military requirements.

Is it your judgment that holding racist beliefs impedes somebody in responding to military requirements?

Mr. COPLEY. The prohibition should be on activity, not beliefs. If someone believes some in some extremist perspective, or has a specific belief that we feel is extreme, I believe, even in the military,

he is protected by holding that belief. If he starts to act on it, then we have the existing laws to deal with actions. That's what I thought I said.

Your question, as I understand it, was do I think this applies on and off base. It doesn't make any difference where it's at. If it happens, if the action happens, if someone acts in an extremist way, then they are outside the law, outside the UCMJ, and they can be dealt with under the law because, very simply, it impedes their ability to respond.

If you're running a——

Mr. UNDERWOOD. What about membership in extremist groups? Is that action?

Mr. COPLEY. Membership? Well, we were talking about active and passive membership. Passive membership, as we have tried to define it; no, that does not limit your ability to act militarily. Active membership and participation, recruitment, fundraising, has the possibility to; yes.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. That certainly poses some problems for me. I think that, clearly, there must be a connection between—I don't see membership in these organizations as necessarily passive. You have to take an active step to be a member of these organizations.

Mr. ROY, I don't know whether this was addressed, but the issue of gangs, racial gangs and ethnic gangs, was raised, at least somewhere here in the midst of these papers. Is there any connection between—I heard you earlier in response to Mr. Dellums talk about the general nature and the extent of participation in racist or white supremacist groups. Could you give the same kind of characterization, to your knowledge—and maybe you don't have it—on participation in racial and ethnic based groups, or so-called gangs, and, in your judgment, is there any kind of connection at all between participation in these gangs and the growth of participation in white supremacist groups?

Mr. ROY. Well, certainly we get peripheral information during our intelligence gathering on these different groups that are out there, white supremacists, patriot groups, what have you, concerning gangs. It is an issue that they raise.

Our experience and our focus is on white supremacists and extreme right groups. But the issue has been raised by these groups concerning gangs, and that is one of their targets or one of their excuses, if you will—you know, if they do it, why can't we do it?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. But I thought it was more in the reverse. I would have thought that perhaps the growth of some racial or ethnic gangs is in response to the growth of white supremacist groups.

Mr. ROY. I think it's probably a combination of both. I mean, who knows?

We know in prisons, for example, there's a tremendous amount of recruitment of white supremacists in the prison population. Also, probably the lion's share of people that are serving time in this country join some kind of gang or affiliate with some kind of gang, depending on what their ethnicity is or race or whatever. I don't know so much if that's a big factor in the military. We have heard complaints on an anecdotal basis, out of members of white supremacy gangs or groups, that the gangs in the military are a problem.

Not being that experienced in that field and with the military itself, it wouldn't know to what extent or how large the problem is.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. OK. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dellums.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I indicated that I had questions for all of our witnesses, but as I listen to my colleagues raise questions, they have touched upon the questions that I had, in whole or in part, and I would like to join with you in thanking Messrs. Johnson, Roy, and Copley for their contribution to these proceedings.

I would yield back my time, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I also would like to tell you that we appreciate all of your input. You have helped greatly in this committee's work.

We will now proceed to the next panel and let you gentlemen take a break. Thank you.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will be reconvened. We will start off with our second panel.

At the outset, I would like to apologize for keeping you important people waiting in the holding room, or wherever you were down there, but we got involved with the other panel.

We have with us today the Honorable Togo West, the Secretary of the Army; the Honorable John Dalton, Secretary of the Navy; the Honorable Sheila Widnall, Secretary of the Air Force; and the Honorable Edwin Dorn, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

Welcome to all of you. If you have any statements you would like to make, you can submit them for the record or otherwise proceed.

Let's start with Mr. West.

STATEMENT OF HON. TOGO D. WEST, JR., SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Secretary WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon. It's a pleasure to be with you, with ranking minority member Dellums, and the members of the committee, to talk about extremist activities in the military.

I am going to submit my statement for the record, with your permission, and confine myself to very brief opening comments in view of the many demands on your time.

Ten days ago we celebrated the Army's 221st birthday. It was a time which we shared with you, right out on the west front of the Capitol.

The CHAIRMAN. You did a great job that day.

Secretary WEST. Thank you, sir.

It was a time when we remembered, among other things, a long and unbroken bond between the American soldier and the American people, a bond that consists of the commitment that each soldier makes by virtue of his oath, constitutional oath, to service and to the Constitution. It is this bond, this oath, this sense of duty that makes extremist activities inconsistent with the service of our service members. As I mentioned last December to the American people, the American soldier's duty is to protect the public, not to put any one or two or more of them in fear of their lives.

When we learned of the unfortunate incidents of last December, the murders of Ms. Jackie Burden and Mr. Michael James in Fayetteville, and the apparent involvement of American soldiers in their deaths, I formed an interdisciplinary task force to assess the extent of extremism in the Army, since early reports seemed to suggest some potential connection between those events and the concerns of extremism.

I was privileged to be able to convince a panel of competent individuals, of experience and of reputation, to join in this major undertaking, which we eventually named "The Secretary of the Army's Task Force on Extremist Activities: Defending American Values." The task force was led by Maj. Gen. Larry Jordan, the deputy inspector general. It included a former member of the staff of this committee, Miss Karen Heath, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy—a courtesy extended to us by my colleague, the Secretary of the Navy, Secretary Dalton; Mr. John McLaurin III, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Military Personnel Management and Equal Opportunity Policy; the Director of the Army Criminal Investigation Command, Brig. Gen. Dan Doherty; and perhaps the most astute and certainly the most informed member of the task force, because that's the way they operate, the sergeant major of the Army, Gene McKinney.

Their charter was to determine the extent of involvement of our soldiers in organizations promoting extremist activities and, moreover, to assess the overall human relations environment throughout the Army. They sent out four review teams that covered the continental United States, Europe, and the Pacific. They talked to more than 7,600 soldiers and, in addition, they did surveys of some 17,000 soldiers, covering essentially the same locale. These were different soldiers, who were surveyed with written questionnaires, some 94 questions and answers, questions to which they wrote answers, and were not the same population that was met with and talked to. Out of that, they came up with results which we have reported in our report entitled "Defending American Values," dated March 21, 1996.

They also, as part of that effort, reviewed data from law enforcement authorities, both civilian and military. And when we reported the results of this, we reported as well the findings and recommendations that were contained in that task force report.

I was able to report that the basic conclusion of that task force is that extremist activity in the Army and touching the Army is minimal. That's their conclusion, Mr. Chairman, not mine. But I endorsed it.

Civilian law enforcement officials around the installations agreed with this finding, and they found as well that there has been little targeting by extremist organizations of U.S. Army soldiers, per se. They concluded, as did I, and as do I today, that America can be confident in its Army today, as it has been for 221 years.

Mr. Chairman, the vast majority of soldiers interviewed embraced the notion that extremism has no place in military life. Even so, one extremist incident, one member of an extremist group, is one too many for the U.S. Army, an entity that exists on the notion that it is teamwork more than anything else that helps them to do their job.

So, the recommendations from that task force took that into account, that there were things that could be done and many recommendations were made. Specifically, the report urged the Office of the Secretary of Defense to invoke the assistance of Mr. Dorn, who is here today, and revising or at least reviewing the DOD directive that sets out guidelines for all the services on handling dissident and protest activities among members of the Armed Forces, our overall guidance, and as part of that, we can then adjust our Army regulation which would expand and clarify exactly what our policy and provisions are with respect to extremists.

Because one of the conclusions the task force reached was that soldiers were clear that extremism had no place in the Army, they were clear on their values, America's values, but they weren't so clear on precisely what the Army meant when it attempted to draw a line between active and passive membership and other such details.

The report also recommended that we develop a reporting process that would provide more timely and accurate information on extremism and share it among appropriate agencies and on more appropriate levels within the Department of the Army. And because the way to tell when the Army is serious about something, you look at its training, that we review Army training on initial entry and during the career of soldiers and during professional development for officers and NCO's, to ensure that discipline, motivation, team-building, and Army values are addressed effectively, and that we address extremism and the Army's policy on extremism as well.

Even with the good news, there was some butts, some butts about the equal opportunity climate within the Army, some things that we need to be attentive to as we continue to ensure that America has the best army that any nation could possibly have ever wanted. So the task force made additional recommendations with the human relations environment:

First of all that we review our equal opportunity program, including the way we staff, the way we train, and our complaint process, a complaint process, I might add, that we have recently reviewed and revised just about a year and a half ago, I think, and which has gotten a fair number of compliments by all observers. But still we can improve it, and the task force said we should try.

That we develop a process to evaluate soldiers' behavior, adaptability, and human relations sensitivities during recruitment and during initial entry training, and that we clarify the Army policies and chain of command responsibilities for the barracks in which single soldiers live.

One of the conclusions of the task force was the NCO's and officers wondered whether, with some of our innovations in providing better quality of life for single soldiers in the barracks, whether we had somehow attenuated the responsibilities and authorities of unit leaders for knowing what their soldiers are doing and what's happening in the barracks after hours.

We then adopted an implementation plan to move swiftly on those recommendations. I directed the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs to oversee personally the implementation. Already lead agencies have completed their plans, and they have been reviewed to ensure that our approach is con-

sistent and coordinated, and I have been provided two periodic updates.

Let me briefly mention two areas in which specific progress has been made already.

First, in our efforts to clarify for soldiers and NCO's and commanders alike, we have completed most of the drafting or redrafting process on Army Regulation 600-20, which sets out the policy for dealing with extremism. We hope that it will result in a better and clearer definition of the term "extremism". We believe it will focus the commander's attention on soldier conduct and its impact on the unit rather than on this unclear question of active membership versus passive. The real focus in regulating soldiers, we believe, ought to be on what they do, not on what is claimed they belong to.

It will identify, we believe, in this draft specific prohibitions involving extremist organization activities, and in acceding to the recommendation of the task force, it will make those provisions enforceable under the UCMJ, the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

One note I might add. When I say that we will focus on behavior, not membership, membership is not neglected in this new draft, not at all. Membership continues to have its disadvantages. But the focus is on behavior.

Also, the new revision will affirm commanders' inherent authority and responsibility to prohibit soldiers from engaging in or participating in activities that undermine the good morale, the discipline, and the unity of their units.

It will provide a list of options available to commanders in handling these kinds of cases in addressing violations of this provision. A final revision of that is due to me for approval, Mr. Chairman, on the 1st of July. I think we're on target for that, but that is the deadline.

The second significant progress that I would report on at the outset is in acting on the recommendation of reporting and tracking criminal and extremist activities. On April 11, 1996, the Army's CIC, Criminal Investigative Command, issued guidance to its field elements as to how these kinds of violations, extremist activities, are to be collected and disseminated. Also included in that is how we will collect and disseminate information on gang-related activities as well, one of the other concerns that grew out of our task force.

This guidance includes a format for our local CID offices, to develop an extremist and gang activity threat assessment, that would be made available to installation commanders throughout the Army. It gives them an additional tool to know what's happening in and around their installations and to know better whether there is information involving extremist activity that they need to be alert to.

By September 1 of this year, 1996, our 1995 data will be available for review. We will have collected the statistics from 1995 and we will be able to use it in our planning and in informing our installation commanders.

In many ways—and in just a few short months, that's a fair amount of initial progress, but it's only progress in two areas. There are other areas in which I will probably have an opportunity

to report to you during the questioning, but I wanted to alert you at the outset to those two.

In closing, then, let me remind you once again of the title that we gave to our task force and to its report, "Defending American Values", as the cause of the idea that our soldiers in the American Army represent America, and if they, indeed, internalize the American values of this great Nation, then they will be better equipped and all of us will be better served as they defend those values.

Thank you for this opportunity, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Secretary West follows:]

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE TOGO D. WEST, JR.
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SECOND SESSION, 104TH CONGRESS

ON EXTREMIST GROUPS

25 JUNE 1996

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

**STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE TOGO D. WEST, JR.
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
ON EXTREMIST GROUPS**

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the House National Security Committee today on my assessment of extremist activities in our Army and the steps we are taking to ensure the Army indeed upholds the principles it has pledged to defend. The bond between Army soldiers and the American people is a long-standing one of more than 221 years. It is a bond composed of a commitment through our soldiers' oath of service and their duty to the Constitution. It is this bond, this oath, and this sense of duty that make extremist activities inconsistent with service as a soldier. As I told the American people and the Army last December, the American soldier's duty is to protect the public, not to put any one or two or more of them in fear for their lives.

**FORMATION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY'S
TASK FORCE ON EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES**

When I learned of the murders of Ms. Jackie Burden and Mr. Michael James in Fayetteville, North Carolina, of the apparent extremist motivation behind them, and of the implication of three soldiers in the crimes, I formed an interdisciplinary task force to assess the extent of extremism in the Army. I selected quality soldiers and civilians to lead and direct this major undertaking, and called it "The Secretary of the Army's Task Force on Extremist Activities: Defending American Values."

Led by Major General Larry R. Jordan, Deputy Inspector General, the Task Force included Ms. Karen S. Heath, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs); Mr. John P. McLaurin III, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Military Personnel Management and Equal Opportunity Policy); Brigadier General Daniel Doherty, Commanding General, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command; and Sergeant Major of the Army Gene C. McKinney.

I charged the Task Force to determine the extent of involvement of our soldiers in organizations promoting extremist activities and to assess the overall human relations environment throughout the Army. The Task Force based its assessment on three independent means of review.

First, the Task Force sent out four review teams to visit 28 major Army installations in the United States, Germany and Korea. During these visits, they interviewed 7,683 soldiers, both individually and in groups.

Second, the Task Force reviewed the results of a written survey of 17,080 respondents conducted by Army Research Institute. The survey supplemented the Task Force interviews, surveyed a different population from those interviewed, and afforded soldiers a confidential means to provide information on the extent of extremism in the Army.

Third, the Task Force reviewed data provided by Army law enforcement and other local, state and federal law enforcement agencies. The Task Force completed its assessment February 28, 1996, and provided its findings to me at the beginning of March.

On March 21, 1996, I was able to report to the Army and the American people that, based on the information provided to the Task Force, extremist activity in the Army and touching the Army is minimal. Civilian law enforcement officials around the installations agreed with this finding. In addition, there has been little targeting by extremist organizations of groups of U.S. Army soldiers. The Task Force concluded that America can be as confident of its Army today as it has always been in the past. Our findings indicate that the vast majority of soldiers interviewed embrace the notion that extremism has no place in military life.

TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS

Even so, one incident is one too many, and the Task Force made several recommendations for improvement. These recommendations were that the Army should:

- request that DoD review DoD Directive 1325.6, Guidelines for Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces, and issue guidance on extremist organizations and activities;
- clarify and expand the Army's regulation (AR 600-20, Army Command Policy) governing extremist activity;
- develop a reporting process for timely and accurate information sharing on extremism among appropriate staff agencies; and
- review soldier training at initial entry and during their career-long professional development to ensure that discipline, motivation, team building, and Army values are addressed effectively.

The Task Force simultaneously conducted an assessment on selected areas in the Army human relations environment. They made the following recommendations in the human relations area:

- review the Army Equal Opportunity Program, including staffing, training, and the complaint process, to ensure responsiveness to the contemporary needs of soldiers and leaders;
- develop a process to evaluate soldiers' behavior, adaptability and human relations sensitivities during recruitment and Initial Entry Training; and
- clarify Army policies and chain of command responsibilities for the barracks in which single soldiers live.

In March, when I reported to the American people on extremist activity in the Army, I also directed the Army to take immediate steps to improve its approach to extremist activities and to focus our efforts on providing a human relations climate that fosters teamwork, respect for human dignity, and pride in oneself and the Army.

We are moving swiftly. I have directed the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) to oversee personally the implementation of the Task Force's recommendations. Lead agencies have completed their implementation plans, and they have been reviewed to ensure that our approach is coordinated and synchronized. Periodic updates will be provided to me to ensure that the recommendations are being addressed.

SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS

I would like to address two specific areas where we have already made significant progress.

The first is in the review and revision of Army policy on extremist activities. On April 1, 1996, the Office of the General Counsel completed its review on policy governing extremist activities and is currently working with The Judge Advocate General to draft a revision to paragraph 4-12, AR 600-20 (Army Command Policy). The Army is revising its policy on extremist activities to ensure that our soldiers and commanders understand what is and is not acceptable behavior. In addition, the Army is assisting DoD with revision of its policy on extremist activities.

The second area of significant progress is that of reporting and tracking extremist criminal activities in the Army. On April 11, 1996, the Army Criminal Investigation Command issued guidance to its field

elements to formalize data collection and dissemination of information concerning extremist and gang criminal activities on and around Army installations and facilities. The first Criminal Intelligence Report, covering calendar year 1995, is due to Criminal Investigative Command headquarters by July 15, 1996. Subsequent reports are now due quarterly. The command guidance included a format to develop an extremist and gang criminal activity threat assessment that will be available to installation commanders. By September 1, 1996, the 1995 data will be available for review and for use by Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence for their annual Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army training guidance.

I am satisfied with the initial progress we have made. My staff will continue to work with field commanders to ensure full implementation of the Task Force recommendations.

In closing, the work of the "Secretary of the Army's Task Force on Extremist Activities: Defending American Values" has proved valuable to our Army, even as the incident that prompted its formation was a senseless, needless tragedy. As I said at the outset last December, even one incident of extremist activity is one too many in our Army. We need to ensure that our Army is ready -- that its units are cohesive and that its members can perform as part of an effective team. And, we need to ensure that our Army adheres to the values it is charged to protect. Through the actions I have described to you, I intend to do that. Our nation and its sons and daughters who serve in uniform deserve no less.

The Secretary of the Army's Task Force on Extremist Activities



Defending American Values

March 21, 1996

THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY'S TASK FORCE
ON EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES:
DEFENDING AMERICAN VALUES

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For over 220 years the United States Army has been the defender of the Nation and the values embodied in our Constitution. That sacred bond of trust between the Army and the American people was brought into question on December 7, 1995, when soldiers allegedly committed two racially motivated murders in Fayetteville, North Carolina. The Army is a reflection of American society and has a 21% annual turnover of personnel. The Army cannot escape the growing impact of extremist and racist organizations in our society at large; but clearly, the Army must identify and address indications of extremist and racist attitudes among soldiers and appropriately deal with extremist behavior when it occurs. The Secretary of the Army formed this Task Force to determine the scope and impact of extremist activities within our ranks and to make recommendations.

The Task Force visited 28 major Army installations in the United States, Germany and Korea during January and February 1996. Task Force support teams interviewed soldiers, both individually and in groups stratified by race, ethnicity and rank; and checked a variety of military and local law enforcement records for evidence of extremist activity. During 7,638 interviews, less than one percent (0.52%) reported that a soldier or Army civilian was an active participant in an extremist group. Additionally, less than one percent (0.98%) reported coming into other types of contact with extremist groups on or near Army installations.

The Army Research Institute analyzed confidential written surveys of 17,080 soldiers administered at the 28 installations where interviews were conducted. In the survey 3.5% of the soldier participants reported they have been approached to join an extremist organization since joining the Army. Another 7.1% reported they knew another soldier whom they believed to be a member of an extremist organization. The Task Force concludes that interview findings are more accurate than survey findings due to the greater ability of personal interviews to corroborate reports and eliminate duplicative reporting. We also consulted with nationally recognized human rights organizations to ensure a full understanding of the challenges of extremism and racism in the Army.

The Task Force concludes that there is minimal evidence of extremist activity in the Army. However, other areas of concern were identified. While leaders and soldiers perceive that extremist activity is minimal in the Active Army, all soldiers agree that the Army is no place for extremists. Extremist groups are visible and active in communities outside some Army installations; however, local law enforcement authorities state that extremist groups do not seem to be specifically targeting soldiers for recruitment. The Army regulation on participation in extremist organizations is misunderstood and confusing to soldiers and junior leaders. Existing Army training programs and

THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY'S TASK FORCE
ON EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES:
DEFENDING AMERICAN VALUES

assessment tools do not adequately address extremism. Gang-related activities appear to be more pervasive than extremist activities on and near Army installations and are becoming a significant security concern for many soldiers. Existing open installations combined with less regulated barracks policies have degraded the commander's knowledge about potential illegal activities after duty hours.

While assessing the extent of extremism in the Army, the Task Force found many contributing factors. Overt racism is suppressed by Army policy, however there is an undercurrent of subtle racism which reflects a similar undercurrent in contemporary American society. The impact of this undercurrent is aggravated by the high Operational Pace of units, a "zero defect" mentality, and inexperience among first-line supervisors. The Army's Equal Opportunity Program is not effectively educating soldiers in units and in Army schools on extremism nor providing a tool for commanders to assess and improve the human relations environment in their units.

The Task Force makes twelve major recommendations:

- Clarify and expand the Army's regulation on extremist activity.
- Conduct separate assessments of extremist activity in the Reserve Components and Army civilian workforce.
- Develop a reporting process for timely and accurate information sharing on extremism among appropriate staff agencies.
- Ensure that all law enforcement and other relevant information on extremist activities is disseminated to battalion and lower levels.
- Develop a process to evaluate soldiers' behavior, adaptability and human relations sensitivity during recruitment and Initial Entry Training.
- Review soldier Initial Entry Training to ensure necessary discipline, motivation, team building, and inculcation of Army values.
- Review leadership and human relations training in all pre-commissioning and professional development training.
- Review the Army Equal Opportunity Program, including staffing, training and the complaint process, to ensure responsiveness to the contemporary needs of soldier and leaders.
- Clarify Army policies and chain of command responsibilities for soldier quarters.
- Ensure that membership in fraternal, social or private organizations does not impact on the conduct of official Army duties.
- Request Department of Defense review DoD Directive 1325.6 and issue guidance on extremist organizations and activities.
- Develop a Department of the Army Pamphlet on extremist activity for use by leaders at all levels.

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Report of the Secretary of the Army's Task Force on Extremist Activities

DEFENDING AMERICAN VALUES

This report provides the observations, findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Secretary of the Army's Task Force on Extremist Activities: Defending American Values (hereafter referred to as the Task Force). The Secretary announced the Task Force on December 12, 1995, in response to tragic events which ran counter to the special bond between the American people and the soldiers sworn to protect them. The specific catalyst for the Task Force was the homicides of Mr. Michael James and Ms. Jackie Burden on December 7, 1995, in Fayetteville, North Carolina. To date, three soldiers have been charged in direct connection with that crime. Rather than focus exclusively on the Fayetteville homicides, the Task Force was charged to determine the extent of involvement by soldiers in organizations which promote extremist activity, and to assess the overall human relations environment throughout the Army. Task Force members were:

Major General Larry R. Jordan	Deputy The Inspector General
Ms. Karen S. Heath	Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
Mr. John P. McLaurin III	Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Military Personnel Management and Equal Opportunity Policy)
Brigadier General Daniel Doherty	Commanding General, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command
Sergeant Major Gene C. McKinney	Sergeant Major of the Army


Task Force Member biographies are at Annex A.

Acknowledgments


The Task Force was assisted in its efforts by over 50 officers, noncommissioned officers, and Army civilian employees (Department of the Army Civilians and Non-Appropriated Fund employees) who provided full-time support in coordinating and conducting field visits, developing data collection instruments, collecting and analyzing that data, and providing detailed policy research. The Task Force wishes to publicly acknowledge the hard work of this full-time support staff along with the many thousands of Army team members at installations worldwide who facilitated our visits and participated in data collection. The Task Force also acknowledges the contributions of the outside agencies, both Federal and private, who provided valuable time and expertise to this effort. The value of their individual and collective efforts will be evident in the America's Army of the future.




Larry R. Jordan
Major General, United States Army
Task Force Chair




Karen S. Heath
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Task Force Member



John P. McLaurin III
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
Task Force Member



Daniel Doherty
Brigadier General, United States Army
Task Force Member



Gene C. McKinney
Sergeant Major of the Army
Task Force Member

Part I

IMPACT OF EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES

"I ... do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic . . ."

With these words soldiers, whether they be commissioned officers or the newest recruits, enter the service of their country and the United States Army. In taking this oath, soldiers swear allegiance not only to the Constitution, but also to the values our citizens hold most dear. The Armed Forces of the United States are, in a very real way, the ultimate guarantors of the American way of life. In particular, the United States Army and its soldiers have proved this out with sacrifices of sweat, blood, and lives on battlefields at Lexington, Gettysburg, Bataan, Normandy, Pusan, the Ia Drang Valley, and Medina Ridge, along with other places too numerous and obscure to mention here. As such, the bedrock American values of the worth and dignity of every person, the respect for diversity, tolerance of differences, and civil rights of all must not just be protected by the Army, but also practiced by it. For over 220 years, the American people have had a special relationship with their Army. Soldiers have always been our sons and daughters but, since 1972, they have been sons and daughters who felt a special calling and *volunteered* for the task of defending America.

Regrettably, the homicides of Mr. James and Ms. Burden in Fayetteville, NC, allegedly by soldiers who harbored extremist views and racial motivations have called into question the reputation of the Army and the relationship it enjoys with the American people. That there might be soldiers whose political views and personal biases are so extreme as to lead them to murder innocent citizens has raised the disturbing possibility that there may be others in the Army with similar attitudes who could display such illegal and reprehensible behaviors. The mission of this Task Force was to assess the influence of extremist groups in the Army and to review the human relations environment, in particular the effect of extremist groups on that environment.

The areas of interest which are reported herein include: the extent of extremist activity in the Army; the way in which the human relations environment in the Army impacts extremism; the manner in which the leadership deals with extremism; and recommendations to more effectively deal with the extremism. This report concentrates on a central theme. The Secretary wanted to report to the American people on a very focused issue which arose from the Fayetteville homicides: the extent of extremism in their Army.

Historically, the Army leadership has dealt effectively with blatant acts of extremism. The Army is a value-based organization. Annually the Army replaces approximately 21% of its force from American society. All possess differing attitudes, behavior, and mores. The Army soldierization (socialization) process seeks to instill the professional soldier's core qualities of *commitment, competence, candor, courage, and compassion*. The leadership recognizes its responsibility to develop and mold soldiers, and thus seeks to change inappropriate behavior in the short term and to change attitudes in the long run. The goal is to develop good Americans, as well as good soldiers who internalize and practice the Army ethos of *duty*. Contained within the concept of duty are the values of *integrity and selfless service* which are outlined in the Army Field Manual 100-1, *The Army*. Officer and noncommissioned officer leaders model soldierly values as part of their effort to ensure ethical excellence in units and soldiers. Those soldiers who cannot internalize the Army values do not remain in the service.

Commanders and leaders have the administrative and disciplinary tools to deal effectively with manifestations of extremist behaviors. Interactive systems are in place to address extremist activity in the Army (i.e., Uniform Code of Military Justice, administrative sanctions, required Equal Opportunity and *Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army* training, mandated unit command climate assessments, required performance evaluations, and counseling).

In addition to the leaders in the chain of command, the Army has trained, dedicated, and full-time chaplains, equal opportunity advisors and inspectors general with an assigned mission to monitor the human relations environment. These systems are designed to be proactive, not merely reactive. Previously, however, they have not focused on extremism.

ASSESSMENT OF SOLDIER PARTICIPATION IN EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES

It is the conclusion of this Task Force based on available information that the extent of soldier participation in extremist activities or organizations is minimal. The Task Force found no widespread or organized extremist activity in the Army. It did identify instances of individuals or small, informal groups of individuals who held extremist views. Allegations or suspicions of widespread, concerted recruitment of soldiers for extremist causes, and participation by soldiers in organized extremist activities, were not substantiated in the three methods the Task Force used to assess the extent of extremist activity in the Army (soldier interviews, surveys, and reviews of data provided by both military and law enforcement agencies).

The first way the Task Force assessed the extent of extremist activity was through soldier interviews conducted at 28 installations in 12 states as well as seven sites in Germany and five sites in Korea.

In discussing extremist activity and organizations we used the definition found in Army Regulation 600-20, *Command Policy*, paragraph 4-12, "Extremist Organizations," that:

Military personnel, duty bound to uphold the Constitution, must reject participation in organizations which --

1. *Espouse supremacist causes,*
 2. *Attempt to create illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, gender, religion, or national origin, or*
 3. *Advocate the use of force or violence, or otherwise engage in efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights.*
- Of the 7,638 soldiers interviewed there were 40 first-hand reports that another soldier, Army civilian employee, or Army family member was an active participant in what the interviewee considered to be an extremist organization under the definition of extremism.
 - Of the 7,638 soldiers interviewed there were 36 first-hand reports that another soldier, Army civilian employee, or Army family member was a passive participant in what the interviewee considered to be an extremist organization under the definition of extremism.
 - Another 72 interviewees told us that they had some other type of contact with extremist organizations or activities during the preceding 12 months. Reports

of such contact included: firsthand accounts of verbal threats from extremists, attempts at recruitment, encounters with extremist group media, and also hearsay reports of extremist group meetings or other activities.

- There were 36 reports from interviewees who told us that they observed soldiers, Army civilian employees or Army family members who displayed extremist characteristics of dress or lifestyle, most frequently of the type associated with skinheads.
- Finally, there were 55 reports from interviewees of casual encounters with extremist symbology on or near Army installations. The most frequently encountered symbols were swastikas and the letters “KKK.”
- Intermingled with the extremist activity indicators outlined above, we had reports from 70 soldiers who felt that they or their families were being threatened by illegal and violent gang activity in or around Army installations. Much gang activity was territorially and racially defined.

The accuracy of these findings is dependent upon the willingness of the respondents to truthfully provide information. Some soldiers may have withheld information about their own or other soldiers' participation in or association with extremist organizations out of fear of punishment or reprisal. However, the methodology employed, the large sample size, and the broad geographic distribution of the sampling lend credibility to the data.

Second, the Task Force supplemented these group and individual interviews with the Army Research Institute analysis of a confidential written survey administered to 17,080 soldiers. Both the interviewed and surveyed soldiers were given the official definition of extremist organizations found in Army Regulation 600-20, *Army Command Policy*, that “extremist organizations espouse supremacist causes; attempt to create illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, gender, religion, or national origin; or advocate the use of force or violence and otherwise engage in efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights.” A wide variance of opinion exists among soldiers on what constitutes an extremist organization or cause. Some soldiers tended to apply their own ideas as to which organizations were extremist. The written survey was not as precise in determining the exact extent of possible extremist activity as face-to-face interviews. Interviewers found that, while some organizations were unanimously viewed as extremist, there were considerable differences of opinion on many others, including some social and fraternal organizations whose members may be primarily from one ethnic or racial group, and whose ideas may be controversial. Live interviewers were better able to distinguish more generally accepted instances of extremism and to determine when one identified instance of extremism was referred to by multiple soldiers in different interview groups (i.e., double counted). Daily interviewer wrap-up sessions clearly showed that activities of a few individuals were repeatedly cited in different

interview groups . In contrast, the survey instrument did not provide for this level of refinement.

Army Research Institute analysts stated that weighted survey results could not be used to accurately estimate the level of extremist activity, but weighted survey results do point out the number of soldiers who are aware of extremist activity and who, in some cases, have been approached.

- 3.5% of the soldiers surveyed reported having been approached to join an extremist organization since joining the Army. 4.6% of the soldiers surveyed reported having been approached to join an extremist organization prior to joining the Army.
- 3.1% of the soldiers surveyed reported having been approached to participate in an extremist activity since joining the Army. 4.5% of the soldiers surveyed reported having been approached to participate in an extremist activity prior to joining the Army.
- 7.1% of soldiers surveyed reported that they knew another soldier whom they believed to be a member of an extremist organization. 11.6% of soldiers surveyed reported that they knew another soldier whom they believed to be an extremist, but not a member of an extremist organization

The third way the Task Force assessed the extent of extremist activity was through the review of data provided by Army law enforcement and other local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. The common theme from local civilian law enforcement officials was that soldiers were rarely part of an extremist threat, nor were they specifically targeted for recruitment, due to the level of routine control and aggressive response to incidents by the military chain of command. The assessment teams found that appropriate collection and sharing of criminal intelligence by military and civilian law enforcement agencies occurred routinely at each installation visited. All available criminal intelligence on extremist activity was also effectively communicated to brigade- or installation-level commanders by Army law enforcement. However, communication of criminal intelligence on extremist activity, absent criminality, to and from commanders at battalion level and below was extremely rare. The type of criminal intelligence normally collected and shared by Army law enforcement involved the activities of individuals or groups which posed a demonstrated or potential threat to the security and safety of Army installations and personnel. Few soldiers were identified by law enforcement officials as being involved in extremist activity. When soldier participation in extremist activity rose to the level of criminal conduct, communication of such conduct between military and civilian law enforcement agencies and unit commanders was effective.

The Task Force also consulted outside private organizations who continuously monitor human relations trends in the United States. They provided the Task Force with valuable information about extremism in the Nation as a whole, as well as their perspective on extremism in the military. Generally, they confirmed the Task Force conclusion that there is no widespread or organized extremist activity in the active military, and shared the Task Force concern that even isolated incidents of extremist activity in the Army are unacceptable.

Accordingly, the Task Force concludes that, based on information provided the Task Force, extremist activity in the Army exists to a relatively small degree. Nevertheless, any degree of extremist activity is incompatible with American values and cannot be tolerated.

What Type of Extremist Activity Occurs

Recruitment

Overall, little active recruiting of soldiers by extremist organizations is evident. A possible exception could be Special Operations Forces, which some senior commanders believe are targeted by the militia movement. The Task Force was unable to irrefutably confirm or deny this belief during the course of this assessment. Some Active Component soldiers of various ranks were concerned that the Reserve Components and Department of the Army civilian employees are much more closely tied to the non-transient civilian population and may be more susceptible to or targeted for recruitment by extremist groups. Off-post extremist activity in surrounding communities varied by location, and ranged from negligible to considerable.

The soldierization process begun in initial entry training, with its focus on teamwork, should, along with encouraging unit cohesion, help reduce the new soldiers' vulnerability to extremist arguments. This continued soldierization is important since The Army Research Institute survey found that 17.4 % of those surveyed report coming into contact with extremist or racist material. Personal interview sessions corroborate the existence of this material. Soldiers at every installation had isolated stories of seeing pamphlets, recruiting posters or billboards, graffiti, or unsolicited facsimile or electronic mail messages. Extremist material is increasingly present on the Internet. No pattern could be drawn from these disparate events. Some of the types of material with which soldiers reported coming into contact are: symbols and slogans, personal tattoos or distinctive clothes, posters and pictures, audio tapes, magazines and books, and fliers and leaflets.

Hate Groups, Militias, and Gangs

Soldiers reported contact with three basic types of extremist organizations: Hate groups, militias, and gangs. Nationally recognized hate groups seem to be active in the communities surrounding most major installations. In addition, many installations have

lesser known hate groups which seem to be limited geographically to the immediate locale. Soldiers at most installations report contact with these organizations at local bars, shopping areas, bowling alleys, or restaurants. Again, the nature of some reported contact with soldiers seems to be a function of the soldier being in a certain place at a certain time and not one of the extremist organization specifically targeting the soldier. There are off-post establishments known to soldiers which cater to hate groups.

Most reported contact with militias tended to involve knowledge of the existence of such groups, knowledge of rallies and other public activities, sightings of suspected militia members at local events, or chance encounters in rural or forest areas. The existence of official state militias, legitimate historical militia organizations, historical re-enactment groups, and paint-ball game organizations caused some confusion between these legitimate activities and organizations and that of the paramilitary extremist groups. The Task Force found only two soldiers confirmed to have affiliations with such extremist groups.

Of all groups, gangs are of the most concern to soldiers. Gangs posed a particular problem for the Task Force because they tend not to be considered as extremist organizations in the terms defined in AR 600-20, paragraph 4-12. Most of them do not fit the working definition of an extremist group in that they do not seek to deny others their civil rights by force or threat of force. Gangs are frequently organized along racial or ethnic lines and are prone to violent behavior. Of all the extremist organizations, gangs are the most likely to operate on an installation (e.g., housing areas, clubs, schools, etc.). Most soldiers believe that open-post policies, coupled with either poor screening of patrons for eligibility at on-post morale, welfare, and recreation outlets and clubs, or unruly conduct by guests of authorized patrons, contribute to gang presence. Further, the lack of on-post housing forces many junior soldiers to live in low-cost housing off post in areas which are occupied by gangs.

Skinheads

The skinhead issue was one of the most complex to deal with, particularly since it is a part of a subculture that exists on post, off post, and in youth gangs. The music, the dress code, the hair style, and the values of skinheads of both the racist and so called non-racist skinhead movements are virtually indistinguishable. Soldiers affecting the skinhead or punk rock appearance exist in the Army at every installation which was visited. Many soldiers and leaders believe much of this activity centers around an appreciation and taste for the punk culture and not necessarily a desire to violently deny others their civil rights.

*Interview Responses**Soldier Response to Extremism*

Soldiers universally stated that they believe extremism has no place in the Army. The freedoms of speech and association guaranteed by the Constitution are not lost on soldiers, but the majority strongly believe that certain rights are held in abeyance when entering the Army. These restrictions are required to preserve good order and discipline in an institution which must achieve rapid and thorough obedience to orders by both individuals and teams to succeed in defending the Nation in modern armed conflict. The regulatory differentiation between active participation in an extremist group and passive support for such a group is regarded by most soldiers as confusing. To most soldiers, any belief in, association with, or membership in an extremist organization should be grounds for separation from the Army, whereas senior leaders in the field recommend a graduated but firm and rapid response of individual counseling, adverse personnel action, legal action, or separation from the military, depending on the nature of the soldier's extremist involvement. In the final analysis, soldiers do not approve of hard core extremism or hate groups and do not want the Army to either.

Simultaneously, soldiers tend to tolerate a wide array of behaviors which, on the surface, would appear to many to be controversial. Such things as dress codes, room decor, and language are situational. There is no leap to judgment as to whether a soldier is an extremist or racist based on outward affectations alone. For instance, some soldiers noted that current fashion trends are strongly influenced by the music and video industries. Many of today's youth wear articles of clothing and accessories which are "in fashion," especially those that are reputed to have some secret or sinister meaning. This may show that the wearer is fashion conscious, not necessarily a member of some extremist group. Most soldiers felt that through close contact they could tell whether a soldier was an extremist or just "making a fashion statement."

Commander/Leader Response to Extremism

Over the course of interviews with 103 brigade- and 150 battalion-level commanders, as well as 272 command sergeants major, responses were amazingly consistent. The vast majority viewed any participation in or with extremist organizations or any type of extremist behavior as totally incompatible with military service. The majority were consistent in articulating the steps they have taken or would take in dealing with any extremist activity brought to their attention, and in the shortcomings of the Army's current regulation on extremist activity--Army Regulation 600-20, paragraph 4-12. Senior commanders, especially those who have had soldiers involved in extremist activities, said that the Army Regulation gives them sufficient guidelines on what constitutes an extremist organization and what administrative steps can be taken to change a soldier's behavior prior to employing the military justice system. Junior leaders, who most often implement policy, were less sanguine. Many junior leaders requested a list of extremist organizations and a specific checklist of actions to be taken

upon confirmation of extremist activity. All cited the need for a thorough investigation coupled with close liaison with their legal advisor as the initial steps in dealing with soldiers possibly involved in extremist activities. Depending on the severity of the offense, actions from counseling/reprimand through adverse efficiency reports and elimination from the Army would follow. There was no stated reluctance to discharge or prosecute a soldier who would not modify his or her extremist behavior. Senior commanders said the Army Regulation has two shortcomings: lack of a punitive clause (i.e., violation of the regulation itself is not an offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice), and insufficient clarification between active and passive participation.

Commanders interviewed who have had to take action against soldiers for any form of extremist activity generally stated that they were satisfied with wording and focus of the Army Regulation. However, little evidence was found that paragraph 4-12 facilitated dealing with extremists. Most of these soldiers were eliminated for varying forms of non-extremist misconduct. These commanders stated that a punitive clause in the Army Regulation would have greatly simplified the administrative and/or judicial process. Additionally, these commanders were an exception to many leaders and soldiers, who were not familiar with all aspects of the Army Regulation and who echoed confusion concerning extremist organizations vice extremist activity. However, most leaders understood the regulation's intent, and were committed to taking swift action against any soldier whose participation in or association with extremism might have a deleterious effect on unit cohesion or good order and discipline of their unit.

In contrast to the approach of more senior leaders at brigade and battalion, many junior officers and noncommissioned officers at company through squad level are confused as to what groups are by definition extremist and what nonviolent actions cross the line of extremism. Much confusion exists concerning active versus passive participation. Some leaders are afraid to take preemptive action for fear of cutting some of the privileges that the majority of the Army is trying to afford its junior soldiers via the Single Soldier Initiative and Better Opportunities for Single Soldiers. These contemporary programs strive to give young single soldiers living in the barracks similar latitude in life-style (i.e., room arrangement, choice of where to eat, etc.) in their off-duty hours as has traditionally been extended to married service members. These programs are often seen as unnecessarily restricting the authority of leaders to monitor what happens in the barracks after duty hours or the behavior of their soldiers off post.

Command action is also hampered because, although information sharing between military and local civilian law enforcement officials is excellent, vertical dissemination of that information to the lower echelons of command (battalion-level and lower leaders--who must deal directly with the soldiers) is uneven. Also there is inadequate horizontal sharing of information on posts between Equal Opportunity Offices, Military Police, Judge Advocate, Chaplains, Mental Health professionals, and other staff agencies which should "be aware" of various types of extremist activity. At present, the Army lacks a common service-wide methodology for integrating and tracking information on hate crimes and extremist activity. Consequently, small unit leaders often do not get the

information they need to make preventive corrections and to educate their soldiers on the specific potential of any extremist threat in the area.

ASSESSMENT OF THE HUMAN RELATIONS ENVIRONMENT IN THE ARMY

The Task Force believes that any analysis of extremism must be conducted with an appreciation for the current human relations environment in the Army. There is a unique dynamic between extremism in an organization and the human relations of that organization. A poor climate can foster stereotyping and hate, and a unit with poor human relations can become a breeding ground for extremism. Likewise, a strong human relations environment can deter extremism as it fosters open communications, promotes tolerance of diversity, and encourages dialogue. The Task Force provides the following thumbnail sketch of the state of human relations in the Active Army as a necessary backdrop when evaluating extremism in the Active force today and the threat it could pose in the future.

As previously stated, the Army replaces approximately 21% of its soldiers each year. These soldiers come from all segments of our society and bring with them their differing attitudes, behaviors, tolerances, and intolerances. Currently, there are no screening methods available to identify recruits who possess or are prone to develop extremist attitudes. In Initial Entry Training as well as officer pre-commissioning programs, the Army soldierization process seeks to instill Army values in its soldiers and future leaders. However, soldier and leader feedback suggested the need for even greater inculcation of core Army values.

Areas of Concern

The Task Force identified several areas of concern in the human relations environment which may impact on the propensity of soldiers to participate in extremist activities.

- Most majority and many minority soldiers believe overt racism and discrimination are suppressed by the Army's unequivocal Equal Opportunity policy and by firm enforcement of that policy.
- The human relations environment is best where the chain of command is clear in its policy, proactive, and both quick and unambiguous in its response to incidents or complaints.
- Many soldiers believe teamwork, racial integration, and equitable treatment occur in the workplace, yet most minority and many majority soldiers believe that subtle racism exists. Most report that off-duty socialization often polarizes along racial, ethnic, cultural, or other lines. This behavior, however, is often viewed as natural and acceptable.

- Senior Army leaders believe the Army's human relations environment is shaped by institutional mores and operational requirements and reflects Army values. In some instances, leadership at battalion or higher level may have differing perceptions of the human relations environment from those of junior soldiers due to hierarchical insulation, generational differences, or preconceptions. Junior soldiers reported an undercurrent which reflects their perception of race relations in the country at large. This undercurrent focuses on racial, ethnic, and cultural differences, stereotyping, separatism, self-polarization, misperception and individual racial animosity. This undercurrent must be addressed to limit our vulnerability to extremism.
- Many soldiers perceive that members of fraternal, social, and private organizations display favoritism while on duty, especially when membership in these organizations is predominately from one race or ethnic group. This inhibits the fostering of a strong human relations environment.

The Army relies on its Equal Opportunity Program and requisite training to address these issues. The quality of Equal Opportunity Advisors and Representatives was found to range from excellent to fair, resulting in uneven unit Equal Opportunity training throughout the Army. There is a perception that some graduates of the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute lack the interpersonal skills to be effective. The assessment also revealed several installations where Equal Opportunity staffing was inadequate. This was usually the result of an imbalance between the Army Regulation 600-20 requirements and personnel authorizations.

Recently, equal opportunity training has focused predominately on sexual harassment and sexism. Currently, most soldiers and leaders believe that sexism is more prevalent than racism at the unit level. Based on their experiences in the 1970s, senior leaders in the field believed the Army's racial problems were solved. However, the Army must educate soldiers and leaders on racist and other extremist activities and organizations to insulate them from recruitment and participation, as well as instructing them on sexual harassment. Soldiers must have the expertise to recognize and report racist, supremacist and other extremist activities to their chain of command.

This is particularly important because the Army Equal Opportunity Complaint System has not succeeded in achieving credibility with some soldiers and leaders. Junior soldiers continue to fear reprisal for filing equal opportunity complaints. Many majority soldiers and small unit leaders perceive that some minority soldiers and females are abusing the equal opportunity system. System credibility is further degraded because minorities and females are over-represented in Equal Opportunity staff positions. If soldiers lack faith in the willingness of the chain of command to adequately address their complaints, a climate of suspicion and distrust can be created.

Shifting Demographics

The Army is experiencing a dramatic decrease in minority presence in combat arms units. While the absence of minorities was quite noticeable in all combat units, it is even more pronounced within Special Operations Forces. This representation might lead to adverse human relations consequences in the future by fostering supremacist attitudes among white combat arms soldiers.

Operational Pace

The high Operational Pace for units is contributing to a stressful human relations environment. Operational Pace can be defined by the amount of time units and soldiers are out of their garrisons or away from home, living and working for extended periods in a field environment to accomplish contingency or readiness missions. Recurring contingency missions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and elsewhere around the world are significantly stressing the Army. High Operational Pace limits the time and resources available to commanders to effectively deal with human relations problems or extremism. When key leader involvement in Equal Opportunity training is lacking, soldiers interpret this to mean that the training is not important. High Operational Pace often leaves insufficient time for non-go-to-war training. In this stressful environment, there is little time for feedback to soldiers or for command information sessions in which to address soldiers' concerns. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that some junior and mid-level noncommissioned officers lack sufficient experience and leadership training to solve human relations problems. Consequently, the troubled soldier, with an extremist viewpoint, could go uncorrected and undetected until his attitudes manifest themselves as violent or otherwise illegal behaviors.

Social Issues

Alcohol was viewed by many as a major contributor to lowering inhibitions to racist or extremist behavior. Some Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Club activities perpetuate polarization by race and group affiliation. The abuse of alcohol and polarization, where it occurs, can contribute to the deterioration of the human relations environment.

Zero-Defect Environment

Today's Army is still experiencing the effects of downsizing, base realignments, and increased contingency operations, which contribute to a perception of instability and career insecurity in the force. Within this context of change, many soldiers and leaders, especially junior officers and noncommissioned officers, perceive a zero-defect environment developing. Zero-defect is viewed as no tolerance for mistakes, no opportunity for recovery, and a demand for perfection. This concern with failure avoidance can lead to subordinates insulating superiors from bad news for fear of unwanted attention or criticism, soldiers discrediting the chain of command for failure to

take decisive action on equal opportunity complaints, or the chain of command labeling soldiers who file complaints as malcontents and whiners.

Dignity and Respect

The threat to the Army by extremists may be minimal at this time, but it does not mean that this situation may not change, especially as extremism in American society ebbs and flows. If commanders remain focused only on the next mission and are not sensitive enough to extremism's potential impact on their soldiers, and if no one brings problems to the attention of leaders for fear of admitting imperfection, then the risk to the Army posed by extremism can grow. Given this, the Army must redouble its efforts to instill its values in the force.

Throughout the assessment, senior leaders, especially brigade and battalion commanders, reported three major approaches to ensuring their soldiers were treated with dignity and respect. They were:

- Modeling through their own behavior and actions those values and traits they wished to instill in their subordinates, i.e., fair treatment of all soldiers, honesty in all actions, total commitment to the Army, support of superiors, etc.

- Implementing all Army human relations policies, programs, and regulations.

- Monitoring their organization's climate via commander/leader presence, sensing sessions and surveys, and swift action on all reports of violations of regulations and policies.

Most leaders felt they personally made a genuine effort to treat soldiers fairly, according them dignity and respect. A striking aspect of their interview responses was that, while each discrete group felt they accorded others dignity and respect, they, as a group, did not feel they were accorded proper respect or treated fairly. Some junior soldiers attributed this failure to maintain a positive command climate to shortcomings of new and inexperienced sergeants. Some senior noncommissioned officers, particularly First Sergeants, attributed command climate shortcomings to mid-grade noncommissioned officers, specifically staff sergeants.

Part II

REVIEW OF POLICIES

The Task Force analyzed Executive Orders, Department of Defense Directives, and Army and other Services regulations relating to the basic policy regarding extremist activities and organizations; other related policy issues in areas of training, data collection and reporting, climate assessments, and accessions; and feedback from the Task Force field teams.

POLICY

Department of Defense Directive, 1325.6, *Guidelines for Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces*, provides the basic guidance on prohibited activities:

Military personnel must reject participation in organizations that espouse supremacist causes; attempt to create illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, religion, or national origin; or, advocate the use of force or violence, or otherwise engage in efforts, to deprive individuals of their civil rights. Active participation, such as publicly demonstrating or rallying, fund raising, recruiting and training members, and organizing or leading such organizations is incompatible with Military Service, and is therefore prohibited. Commanders have authority to employ the full range of administrative procedures, including separation or appropriate disciplinary action, against military personnel who actively participate in such groups.

Following the Oklahoma City bombing, the Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff provided additional emphasis and guidance in a message entitled *Extremist Activity* on 3 May 1995. One day later, the Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff referenced Department of Defense Directive 1325.6 in their memorandum *Dissident and Protest Activity*, when they wrote, "Accordingly, we ask that you direct commanders and supervisors to disseminate this memorandum throughout their organizations and to ensure that their personnel are briefed on the guidance in this memorandum, Department of Defense Directive 1325.6, and the Service implementing directions." Few soldiers or leaders below brigade-level recalled such briefings.

The first time the terms *knowing membership* and *active participation* were used to determine policies toward individuals involved in extremist organizations was in Executive Order 11785, published in 1974. Two Department of Defense Directives, 5200.2, *Department of Defense Personnel Security Program*, and 1325.6, *Guidelines for*

Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces, use the same terminology. Two Army Regulations, 604-10, *Military Personnel Security Program*, and 380-67, *Department of the Army Personnel Security Program*, both use this concept when developing criteria for application of security standards.

Army Regulation 600-20, *Army Command Policy*, paragraph 4-12, "Extremist Organizations," implements Department of Defense Directive 1325.6 by stating that "activities of extremist organizations are inconsistent with the responsibilities of military service. Active participation by soldiers is prohibited." This regulation goes further by stating "Passive activities, such as mere membership, receiving literature in the mail, or presence at an event, although strongly discouraged as incompatible with military service, are not prohibited by Army policy."

The guidance contained in Army Regulation 600-20 is limited to participation in organizations. It does not address the inappropriate behaviors of an individual soldier who neither seeks nor maintains membership in, or affiliation with an extremist organization. However, leaders in units which have dealt with extremist behavior state that the focus should be on individual behavior rather than organizational affiliation as a more effective approach.

Further complicating the policy's focus on organizations versus activities, is the confusion over which groups should be categorized as extremists. While many commanders seek an official list of extremist organizations, Executive Order 11785 abolishes the use and development of such lists.

The regulatory guidance is also troubling to some leaders in the field, because of the terms "active" and "passive." These terms can be and are misunderstood, raising apparent contradictions. As an example, in the regulation, membership alone is not prohibited and may be termed "passive participation." However, further guidance states, soldiers "must reject participation" in such organizations.

The provision of paragraph 4-12 which prohibits active participation in extremist organizations refers to Army Regulation 600-20, Chapter 6, "Equal Opportunity." This implies that the term "extremist" applies only to those groups whose hate is based upon race, ethnicity, religion, and/or national origin. This interpretation would not encompass all extremist ideologies such as those militias or "patriots" advocating the overthrow of the United States government. It is noted that the Army's description of "disloyal or subversive military personnel" used in 1948 addresses all of these ideologies while encompassing both group and individual behaviors:

Activities and associations which may be considered as establishing reasonable grounds for the discharge of disloyal or subversive military personnel and for the rejection of persons for military service will include, but are not limited to, one or more of the following:

Advocacy of revolution, or by force or violence to alter the existing constitutional form of government of the United States; advocacy of revolution, or by force or violence to bring about the economic, political, or social change

Membership in, affiliation with, or sympathetic association with any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons--

Which practices, seeks to practice or advocates--

Denial by force, violence, or intimidation, to any person, group of persons, or class of persons within the United States or Territory subject to its jurisdiction of any right or rights which the Federal Constitution guarantees or protects against encroachment by either or both Federal and State Governments

Individual behaviors are easily addressed without concern about whether an organization meets the regulatory definition of extremist or deliberations over organizational affiliation or membership. Commanders already have the authority to deal effectively with extremism when the practices are overt. Army Regulation 600-20, paragraph 4-4, "Soldier Conduct," provides that ensuring proper conduct of soldiers is a function of command. Commanders rely on all leaders in the Army to "Take action against military personnel in any case where the soldier's conduct violates good order and discipline." Paragraph 4-12 lists options available to the commander for dealing with a soldier's participation in an extremist group. Although Army Regulation 600-20, paragraph 4-12, is not punitive, the commander's inherent authority to impose administrative sanctions and the specific offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice provide sufficient authority to enforce Army policy.

Existing administrative procedures, non-judicial punishment, and disciplinary actions available to the commander and other leaders are found in Department of Defense Directive 1325.6, Army Regulation 635-200, *Enlisted Separations*, Army Regulation 600-8-24, *Officer Transfers and Discharges*, Army Regulation 600-20, *Army Command Policy*, Army Regulation 601-280 *Army Reenlistment Program*, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Commanders have a wide variety of actions available to address soldier misconduct arising from participation in extremist activities, ranging from counseling and on-the-spot correction for a very minor infraction, to bar to reenlistment, administrative discharge, and court-martial for a more severe manifestation of extremist behavior. In addition, the personnel security procedures contained in Army Regulation 380-67, *Personnel Security Clearances*, authorize commanders to deny access to classified information and suspend the security clearance of a soldier manifesting extremist behaviors.

The draft of Change 2 to the Joint Ethics Regulation, (Department of Defense Regulation 5500.7) provides more specific guidance on employee use of Government communications systems and those paid for by the Federal Government (i.e., telephones, facsimile machines, electronic mail, and access to the Internet). It will require that employees use such systems for official use and authorized purposes only, and it defines

and sets criteria for such uses, which might include some "personal use" in appropriate circumstances.

A detailed summary of contemporary directives and regulations relating to extremist organizations or activity is at Annex B.

TRAINING

There is no specific Army requirement to conduct training on extremist activities per se. Army Regulation 350-1, *Individual Military Education*, does require commanders to conduct awareness and refresher training on subjects that support unit cohesion, discipline, and morale. Army Regulation 600-20, Chapter 6, requires commanders to educate soldiers on the Army's policy of fair and equitable treatment for all personnel. Army Regulation 600-20, paragraph 4-12, directs commanders, as a minimum, to educate and counsel soldiers identified as members of extremist groups and/or when they engage in extremist group activities. Army Regulation 350-41 requires commanders to conduct awareness and refresher training as needed for moral and ethical development.

Regarding security training, Department of Defense Directive 5240.6, *Counterintelligence Awareness and Briefing Program*, and Army Regulation 381-12, *Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army* require counterintelligence awareness; periodic education on both international and domestic terrorist threats; and reporting of such threats pursuant to program guidelines. *Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army* applies to all national security crimes to include subversion, sedition, spying, treason, espionage, sabotage, and terrorism. Based on Executive Order 12333, *Intelligence Activities*, which focuses on international threats, *Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army* training has traditionally focused on international, rather than domestic threats.

Equal Opportunity Training Support Packages used in Army leader development courses, beginning with training received in pre-commissioning and initial entry courses, and training materials available to the field (Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-20, *Unit Equal Opportunity Training Guide*, and Training Circular 26-6, *Commander's Equal Opportunity Handbook*), do not specifically address extremist activity. They do, however, discuss racism, discrimination (to include religious intolerance), and aspects of behavior contrary to morale, teamwork, good order, and discipline.

There is a lack of congruency among the training tools available to Army schools and units in the field. Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-20, Training Circular 26-6 and Training and Doctrine Command's Training Support Packages currently used in officer and noncommissioned officer professional development courses differ in the information provided to leaders and soldiers. The training objectives used in the Training Support Packages are repetitive rather than sequential and progressive in nature.

The extent and quality of human relations training received by officer candidates varies greatly depending upon their commissioning source. Extremism is not specifically addressed. The United States Military Academy employs a comprehensive program entitled *Bedrock II: Consideration of Others*. This program provides 62 hours of human relations training over the course of the four years a cadet spends at USMA. Reserve Officers Training Corps' human relations training is not standardized. Cadet Command

directs local Reserve Officer Training Corps commanders to evaluate and devise their own programs based upon training needs. There are no standard human relations training support packages used throughout Cadet Command. Soldiers in the Officer Candidate Course receive a two hour block of instruction in the area of human relations.

Formal training is not provided to Army law enforcement personnel in hate or bias motivated crimes while attending the United States Army Military Police School at Fort McClellan. In January 1996, U.S. Army Military Police School instructors received a one-hour block of awareness training concerning extremist activity. Personnel in attendance were directed to integrate this training into all law enforcement courses.

DATA COLLECTION AND REPORTING

The Department of Justice and Department of Defense each publish guidance for reporting and data collection of extremist activity. Army reporting requirements are contained in Army Regulation 190-40, *Serious Incident Report*, Army Regulation 190-45, *Law Enforcement Reporting*, Army Regulation 195-2, *Criminal Investigation Activities*, Army Regulation 380-13, *Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Non-Affiliated Persons and Organizations*, and Army Regulation 600-20, *Army Command Policy*.

Regulatory guidance concerning data collection and reporting of extremist activities is not specific. It must be inferred from fragmented references to criminal conduct normally associated with such incidents. There is no specific requirement for data collection and reporting of extremist activity in Department of Defense and Army Equal Opportunity channels. Quarterly and yearly complaint reports (Department of the Army Form 7980) do not specify a category on extremism, though complaints of extremism may be categorized as complaints of racial, ethnic, or religious discrimination. Required Annual Statistical and Narrative Reports contain no requirement for annotation of extremist activity. There is no requirement in Department of Defense or Army regulations for incorporation of law enforcement data of civil rights violations or hate and bias-motivated crimes into the required annual Military Equal Opportunity Assessment.

The 1990 Hate Crimes Statistics Act mandated collection of hate crime statistics by federal agencies. Automated data collection and reporting of hate crimes under the National Incident-Based Reporting System is scheduled for implementation by the Department of Defense in January 1997. All racially motivated crimes, to include hate crimes, are currently reported in accordance with Army Regulation 190-40, which mandates submission of a Serious Incident Report to Headquarters, Department of the Army for selected serious incidents or criminal offenses. The Serious Incident Report contains a data entry for "racially or ethnically motivated criminal acts." However, field experience indicates that racial or ethnic motivation is not always immediately discernible. Often, such determinations are made later in the investigation. No reporting requirements currently exist for crimes resulting from religious intolerance or sexual orientation; however, a forthcoming revision to Army Regulation 190-40 will require a Serious Incident Report on all forms of bias/hate crimes.

Military law enforcement personnel are authorized by Army Regulation 380-13 to collect, process, store, and report data on extremist groups and activities that threaten military supplies, classified information, personnel, or installations. This regulation specifically authorizes data collection in response to efforts to subvert loyalty, discipline, or morale of military and civilian personnel by ". . . actively encouraging violation of laws, disobedience of lawful orders and regulation, or disruption of military activities." To facilitate the collection of this data, Army law enforcement agencies are authorized to

coordinate with local law enforcement agencies for the purpose of determining actual or potential threats to the military. The United States Army Criminal Investigation Command is specifically responsible for the collection and distribution of criminal intelligence with other military and civilian law enforcement agencies.

Dissemination of information on extremist activity within the local command is implied but not required. While Equal Opportunity Advisors, Chaplains, and Inspectors General are all tasked with maintaining "the pulse" of the command climate in their units, distribution of information concerning extremist activity to these personnel/agencies is not mandated.

CLIMATE ASSESSMENTS

Commanders can proactively seek to discern the presence of unit members who sympathize with or engage in extremist activity through the conduct of periodic unit climate assessments. Command climate assessments typically include interviews of key personnel in and around the unit; sensing sessions with a sampling of unit personnel; a review by the commander and staff of unit records in the areas of awards, promotions, retention, discipline, job assignments, and school opportunities; and a human relations survey of unit personnel. When done properly, the assessment should enable a commander should be able to identify human relations concerns, to include issues of extremism. More often than not, commanders rely heavily on the results and analysis of the survey tool in their assessment of command climate since the information is received anonymously, reducing the respondent's fear of reprisal. Department of Defense Directive 1350.2 directs "Secretaries of military departments shall require commanders to . . . assess equal opportunity climate (preferably as part of assumption of command) and schedule follow-up periodically thereafter."

Army regulatory guidance does not yet reflect the new Department of Defense Directive. However, Interim Change 4 to Army Regulation 600-20, dated September 17, 1993, states, "It is strongly encouraged that commanders conduct a unit climate assessment and unit training needs assessment within 90 days of assuming command (180 days for Reserve Component) and annually thereafter." The forthcoming revision to Army Regulation 600-20 will mandate conduct of such assessments.

Training documents available to the field are also not in accord with the Department of Defense requirement. Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-20, *Unit Equal Opportunity Training Guide*, incorrectly requires conduct of command climate assessments within 60 days of assumption of command vice 90 days as specified by Army Regulation 600-20. Training Circular 26-6, *Commanders' Equal Opportunity Handbook*, reflects the previously published standard in that, "It is strongly recommended that commanders conduct unit climate assessments within 90 days of assuming command (180 days for Reserve Components) and annually thereafter."

Climate assessments at Department of the Army level have historically not addressed extremist group or gang activity. The Army's current service-wide survey of command climate, the *Sample Survey of Military Personnel*, does not address extremism. Several unit climate survey tools are available Department of Defense- and Army-wide. These include the *Department of Defense Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey*, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-69, *Unit Climate Profile*, and the *Training Diagnostic Assessment System*. However none of these surveys specifically address the issue of extremism. Climate surveys developed for specific Major Commands (i.e., US Army Europe *Personnel Opinion Survey*) and units (*Rangers, Fort Hood Leadership Survey*) address various aspects of the human relations environment in units, but none directly address extremist activity. The Army Violence Prevention Program includes an

optional *Unit Risk Inventory Survey*. Although the Army Violence Prevention Program identifies the Army's concern with extremist activity within units, the Unit Risk Inventory does not query its respondents on this issue.

Climate survey tools available Army-wide are dated and do not adequately address other current human relations issues. Far from being "user friendly," surveys such as the *Unit Climate Profile* require hours of work in development of raw data and further work in analysis. Unit Equal Opportunity Advisors are not trained in the use of the Unit Climate Profile or the Training Diagnostic Assessment System and scant information is provided to untrained personnel on analysis procedures.

Due to the workload involved, such surveys, though available to commanders, are rarely utilized. Current computer survey technology could easily accomplish initial data analysis for the commander, breaking down responses by racial, ethnic, religious, and gender categories, as well as by subordinate unit and pay grade.

Commanders of installations and units above brigade level do not have access to viable climate surveys. Climate surveys, such as the Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey, Unit Climate Profile, and Training Diagnostic Assessment System, were originally developed for use in company- and battalion-size units. As such, these surveys do not provide an aggregate picture of command climate in higher echelon units, staffs, and installations. Thus, the existing surveys are inadequate in identifying extremist as well as other human relations concerns at higher echelons of commands.

Though commanders are required by Department of Defense Directive to conduct climate assessments, the survey tools available to them for use are inadequate. None include questions on extremist activity. Training in analysis of such survey tools is either scant or nonexistent.

ACCESSIONS

There is no screening process to preclude individuals involved in prior extremist activity from enlisting. Police records checks are done for enlistees only if the applicant states that he or she committed an offense or if the recruiter has reason to suspect the applicant is concealing a criminal record. Many localities seal juvenile records and if the law enforcement authority queried refuses in writing to provide information or asks a fee, then the police records check is not required. A police records check is performed on all officer accessions subject to the same limitations regarding sealed records, written refusals, and fee demands.

When processing for national security clearances, applicants are required to fill out Standard Form 86, *Security Questionnaire*, which asks only if the applicant "has ever been an officer or a member or made contributions to organizations dedicated to the violent overthrow of the United States Government and which engages in illegal activities to that end, knowing that the organization engages in such activities with the specific intent to further such activities."

Doctors may medically reject service applicants for "Tattoos that will significantly limit effective performance of military service." Knowledge of tattoo patterns is important for medical personnel involved in the accession process due to the proclivity for members of some extremist groups to get specific tattoos as part of their initiation or other organizational rituals.

The following specific recommendations result from the review of policies, training, data, collection, climate assessments and accessions:

Policy:

- Re-title the Army Equal Opportunity Program as the Army Human Relations Program.
- Revise Army Regulation 600-20, paragraph 4-12, to clarify the Army's policy on extremist activity. As part of this revision:
 - Recommend that the term "extremism" be defined in Army Regulation 600-20, to include all forms of extremist ideologies or behavior.
 - Consider making the revised provision punitive.
 - Reaffirm the commander's inherent authority and responsibility to take action in order to maintain good order and discipline.
 - Address individual conduct that constitutes "extremist activity" but is not connected with membership in or association with an identified extremist organization.
 - Drop the "term passive" altogether in favor of more precisely defined language.
- Expand Army Regulation 381-12, *Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army*, to include threats posed by extremists.

Training:

- Develop a state of the art, interactive, discussion-based set of training support packages for use at each level of professional military education. Make such training sequential and progressive in nature, attuned to the levels of experience and responsibility of the target audience.
- Revise training support packages for leadership training provided at Primary, Basic, and Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Courses; Warrant Officer and Officer Basic Courses; First Sergeant Course; Advanced Warrant Officer Courses; Advanced Officer Courses; Sergeant Majors Academy; and Command and General Staff Course, Pre-Command Course, and Senior Service Colleges. Teach

leaders how extremist behavior and activities impact on good order and discipline of organizations and the leaders' recourse to such activities.

- Conduct training on Army policy in relation to extremist groups as an enabling learning objective in required *Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army* training. Assemble training packages to support commanders and supervisors in the field. Conduct periodic training and maintain accountability through the existing Command Inspection Program.
- Provide commanders with a Criminal Investigation Command installation/local security assessment that describes the current local extremist threat. As part of the required *Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army* training, these assessments would be prepared at least annually (updated as required) and form the basis for identifying vulnerabilities that require correction.
- Revise Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-20, Training Circular 26-6 and Equal Opportunity Training Support Packages to elaborate on extremism and to conform with revisions to Army Regulation 600-20, paragraph 4-12.
- Consider applying requirements similar to the United States Military Academy's *Consideration of Others* program to all pre-commissioning programs.
- Develop a new Department of the Army pamphlet on extremist activity for use by Army leaders that will: provide information on Army policy and regulatory guidance; provide elaboration on defining extremist groups and activity; identify training resources and reporting requirements; and discuss administrative and punitive sanctions available to commanders.

Climate Assessment:

- Use technology to produce automated climate surveys that include questions on extremism and can generate a report of findings for installations, higher echelon headquarters, and brigade-, battalion-, and company-size units.
- Add a segment on "Extremist/Gang Activity" to the Sample Survey of Military Personnel for ongoing survey assessment of these issues at Department of the Army level.
- Include questions on extremist activity in the Army Violence Prevention Program's Unit Risk Inventory. Incorporate the Unit Risk Inventory into the development of current unit climate assessments as an optional segment.
- Implement all provisions of Department of Defense Directive 1350.2.

Accessions:

- Request revision to Department of Defense policy to allow recruiters to question military applicants for previous extremist affiliation/activity.
- Perform local record check where applicant has lived.
- Seek Congressional relief from Services' payment of administrative fees for criminal records checks.
- Inform all applicants for military service of the Army's policy on extremist behavior. Incorporate this policy into statements of understanding signed by applicants for military service.

Part III**CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE
FAYETTEVILLE HOMICIDES**

About midnight on the evening of December 6-7, 1995, Private First Class James Burmeister, Private First Class Malcom Wright, and Specialist Four Randy Meadows, soldiers assigned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, allegedly murdered Mr. Michael James and Ms. Jackie Burden in the 400 block of Campbell Street, Fayetteville, North Carolina. Investigation determined that these soldiers associated with a small local "skinhead" group.

Police obtained arrest warrants for Burmeister and Wright and arrested them without incident at Burmeister's residence around 8:10 AM, December 7, 1995. Local authorities subsequently charged all three soldiers with murder and incarcerated them in the Cumberland County Jail. They are expected to be tried later this summer.

Investigation to date has revealed no apparent connection between Burmeister, Wright, and Meadows prior to their assignments to Fort Bragg. They came from different parts of the country, were serving their first enlistment and had no known criminal histories.

Since these crimes were allegedly committed by soldiers subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command at Fort Bragg assisted in the Fayetteville Police Department investigation. During the conduct of the investigation of the murder of Mr. James and Ms. Burden, it was discovered that there was an earlier skinhead shooting involving Fort Bragg soldiers.

On April 1, 1995, a soldier, a member of a local skinhead group called SHARP (Skinheads Against Racial Prejudice), was treated for a gunshot wound in the chest. The victim reported that he was wounded by an unknown assailant during a drive-by shooting at an off-post residence where members of SHARP were known to gather. Investigation revealed that this shooting incident actually occurred during a physical altercation between racist skinheads and SHARP. The participants were predominantly soldiers assigned to Fort Bragg. A separate criminal investigation was initiated and conducted by military and local authorities and prosecution is pending.

The degree of command response to the soldiers identified as being involved with skinhead activities included formal counseling, administrative discharges, bars to re-enlistment, and formal non-judicial and judicial actions. The degree of response depended on the extent to which these soldiers were found to be involved in prohibited or disruptive activities or behavior. Burmeister, Wright, and Meadows are awaiting trial for

murder and conspiracy. Court-martial charges have been preferred against three soldiers for their involvement in the April 1995 shooting incident. Sixteen (16) soldiers have been counseled and barred from reenlistment for their involvement with skinhead activity, two of whom were punished under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice for related misconduct. Three soldiers received written reprimands in addition to the counseling and bar to reenlistment. The remaining soldiers were counseled about their skinhead affiliations with no further action required at this time.

LESSONS LEARNED

When the murder of Ms. Burden and Mr. James occurred, leaders of XVIII Airborne Corps and U.S. Army Special Operations Command, both headquartered at Fort Bragg, took multiple steps to define the scope of extremism at Fort Bragg and to determine its effects on their organizations. First, the Commanding Generals requested all information from the CID investigation of the homicides to determine how many soldiers were involved in extremist organizations/activities; to discern with the help of local law enforcement, what extremist organizations were active in the Fort Bragg area; and to ascertain which of these organizations had penetrated the post, i.e., had soldier involvement, were recruiting, etc. Next, both Commanding Generals directed a series of steps to inform both their soldiers and the Fort Bragg military community of the Army's regulations and rules concerning extremist organizations/activities. These included the following:

- Policy letters that outlined command positions concerning extremism.
- A formal chain-teaching program throughout both units that outlined Army and Fort Bragg policies and regulations.
- Surveys and sensing sessions conducted by the Fort Bragg Inspector General and Equal Opportunity personnel to determine the human relations climate on the post and to seek any new or additional information about the circumstances surrounding either the Burden/James homicides or extremist organizations/activities in general
- Use of the post newspaper and TV channel to inform the Fort Bragg community of Army policy concerning extremist organizations/activities and to solicit any information from the general post population about the incident.

These actions were supplemented by commanders' conferences focused on this issue and frequent updates at regular command and staff meetings at all levels.

In addition to these actions, the XVIII Airborne Corps conducted an after action review of the homicides to determine if such crimes could have been forecast,

if the chain of command missed any indicators, if soldiers who profess and/or participate in extremist organizations/activities exhibit common traits, and if anything could have been done better. Examples of potential indicators include history of poor performance (Army Physical Fitness Test failures, multiple counseling statements, etc.), tattoos or extremist paraphernalia, or prior association with any formal or informal group. After a thorough analysis, the after action review revealed the following:

Specialist Burmeister had been involved in several incidents prior to the homicides that, had they been reviewed through a racist/extremist filter, would have revealed some indicators of his involvement in extremist activities.

- A total of 26 soldiers at Fort Bragg have been identified as having some association with extremist activities.
- There were no clear indicators suggesting a common profile among Fort Bragg soldiers charged with the homicides or those subsequently identified as extremists. These soldiers exhibited the following common characteristics which, taken by themselves, do not necessarily indicate extremist beliefs or predict violent behavior:
 - Very short 'high and tight' haircuts.
 - Similar dress: blue jeans, boots, suspenders.
 - Interest in the punk rock culture to include frequenting local clubs which catered to this environment.
- The Task Force assessment revealed that prior to the Burden/James homicides, there were few strong indications that extremist organizations/activities were an issue at Fort Bragg. Subsequently, extremism received only passing attention in unit equal opportunity training.
- After the homicides, the senior leaders of both the XVIII Airborne Corps and US Army Special Operations Command took action to investigate the scope and depth of any potential soldier involvement in extremist organizations/activities.

Part IV

TASK FORCE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

- Most commanders, leaders, and soldiers perceive that extremist activity is minimal in the Active Army.
- The vast majority of soldiers perceive extremist activity as incompatible with military service.
- Although there were relatively few extremists identified in the Army, leaders recognize that even a few extremists can have a pronounced dysfunctional impact on the Army's bond with the American people, institutional values, and unit cohesion.
- Extremist groups are visible and active in communities outside some Army installations. Local law enforcement authorities state that extremist groups do not seem to be specifically targeting soldiers for recruitment. The results of Task Force interviews and surveys tend to substantiate this conclusion.
- The current policy on participation in extremist organizations is confusing and complicates the commander's interpretation of extremist activity.
- Gang-related activities appear to be more pervasive than extremist activities as defined in Army Regulation 600-20. Gang related activity both off post and on post (i.e., billets, military housing areas, schools, and Morale, Welfare, and Recreation facilities), sometimes involves family members and young soldiers. Gangs are a significant security concern for many soldiers.
- Many soldiers and leaders were unfamiliar with the guidance contained in Army Regulation 600-20. Most soldiers believe no participation in extremist organizations, active or passive, should be tolerated. The vast majority of soldiers believe that membership should be prohibited.
- The sharing of criminal intelligence, to include extremist activity, by military and civilian law enforcement authorities occurs routinely.
- Existing open installations combined with less regulated barracks policies degrade the commander's knowledge about potential extremist activities after duty hours.

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

- The overall human relations environment in the Army generally reflects the degree of tolerance and intolerance in American society and impacts the degree of vulnerability of soldiers to extremism.
- The Army's annual recruitment of approximately 21% of its personnel strength ensures that it remains reflective of the nation's values. This turnover also continually exposes the Army to new soldiers who may hold extremist views and affiliations.
- Most majority and many minority soldiers believe overt racism and discrimination are suppressed by the Army's unequivocal Equal Opportunity policy and its firm enforcement. The human relations environment is best where the chain of command is clear in its policy, proactive, and both quick and unambiguous in its response to incidents or complaints.
- Many soldiers believe teamwork, racial and ethnic integration, and equitable treatment occur in the workplace, yet most minority and many majority soldiers believe that subtle racism exists. On an interpersonal level, junior soldiers report an undercurrent which focuses on racial, ethnic, and cultural differences, stereotyping, separatism, self-polarization, misperception, and individual racial animosity. Most report that off-duty socialization often polarizes along ethnic, cultural, or other lines, which is often viewed as natural and acceptable.
- Leaders and soldiers alike cited high Operational Pace, unpredictability, reorganization impacts, and financial hardship of junior soldiers as contributing to a stressful human relations environment.
- Many soldiers and leaders, especially junior noncommissioned officers and officers, perceive a "Zero Defect" environment. Many believe this concern with failure avoidance leads to shielding superiors from bad news and to not attacking the root cause of problems for fear of unwanted attention or criticism.
- In some instances, leadership at battalion or higher levels may have differing perceptions of the human relations environment from those of junior soldiers, due to "hierarchical insulation," generational differences, or preconceptions.
- Some new sergeants and staff sergeants are viewed as lacking the necessary experience and leadership training to effectively resolve human relations problems.

- The Army does not have a formal process to evaluate soldier extremist behaviors, adaptability, and sensitivity to human relations issues during the recruiting process or Initial Entry Training.
- Sexual harassment and sexism have received greater emphasis and attention from commanders than other human relations issues in the last two to three years. Based on their experience in the 1970s and 1980s, senior leaders in the field appeared to believe the Army's racial problems were being adequately addressed. Racism and extremism were perceived as lesser problems and were less likely to have been targeted for training or leadership focus.
- Equal Opportunity and other human relations training within many units appears to be conducted erratically or with varying degrees of effectiveness. Until recently, little has been included on the subject of extremism.
- Many junior soldiers expressed little confidence in the responsiveness of the Equal Opportunity complaint system. They also consider the unit-level Equal Opportunity Representatives ineffective. By contrast, the Equal Opportunity complaint system is often viewed by junior leaders and some other soldiers as being abused by minorities and females.
- Most leaders believe that the absence of an Army standard and confusing billets policies degrade commanders' ability to be aware of and influence after-duty activities. Single Soldier Initiatives (SSI) and Better Opportunities for Single Soldiers (BOSS) are widely misunderstood, confused with each other, and often misinterpreted as limiting the chain of command's authority/ability to manage the billets (establish policy, inspect, enforce standards).
- Most soldiers believe that open-post policies, coupled with either lax screening of patrons for eligibility at Morale, Welfare, and Recreation outlets and clubs, or unruly conduct by "guests" of authorized patrons, can contribute to disruptive activities and undesirable incidents.
- Alcohol abuse reduces individual inhibitions against unacceptable and illegal behavior, and when coupled with varying degrees of racial, ethnic, and cultural polarization, can degrade the general human relations environment in units.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Revise Army Regulation 600-20, *Army Command Policy*, paragraph 4-12, to eliminate the confusion created by the distinctions between active and passive participation in organizations and activities; to specify more clearly when commanders will counsel and/or take adverse action against soldiers who are displaying extremist behavior, and to make the regulation punitive.
- Conduct separate in-depth reviews of the extent of extremist activity and the human relations environment in the Reserve Components and in the Army civilian workforce.
- Develop a reporting process for the timely and accurate sharing of information on extremism among appropriate staff agencies, e.g., Equal Opportunity, Military Police, and Judge Advocates.
- Ensure that all information on extremist activities is disseminated to leaders at battalion and lower levels.
- Develop a process to evaluate soldiers' behaviors, adaptability, and sensitivity to human relations issues during recruitment and initial entry training, and screen for extremist views and participation during recruitment and initial entry training.
- Review Initial Entry Training to determine whether it is properly structured, resourced, and conducted to instill necessary individual discipline and motivation, team building, and inculcation of Army values. Review sustainment training of Army Values after Initial Entry Training.
- Review officer pre-commissioning programs to determine the adequacy of leadership and human relations training with an eye toward adopting a comprehensive program like the United States Military Academy's *Consideration of Others'* program.
- Ensure that officer and noncommissioned officer professional development courses include sufficient instruction on leadership, human relations and extremism.
- Review the Army Equal Opportunity Program, including the complaint process, training, reporting, and oversight to ensure responsiveness to the contemporary needs of soldiers.
- Improve Equal Opportunity training in Army schools and in units, conduct as required by regulation, and incorporate relevant portions on extremism.

- Fully staff Equal Opportunity Staff Officer, Advisor, and Representative positions with appropriately trained personnel who represent the racial and gender composition of the Army.
- Establish an Army policy and clarify guidance on Single Soldier Initiatives and the Better Opportunities for Single Soldiers programs. Clarify policies on acceptable standards of conduct in and appearance of soldier quarters and on the chain of command's role in enforcement.
- Clearly state policy and then ensure that membership in fraternal, social, or private organizations will in no way impact upon the conduct of official or on-duty activities.
- Implement the detailed recommendations concerning Policy, Training, Data Reporting, and Accessions contained in Part II.

Part V**TASK FORCE BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY****OVERVIEW**

This assessment is the result of an intensive two-month effort in which the Task Force members synthesized and distilled the results of 1,681 individual leader interviews and 5,957 interviews of soldiers and civilians in group settings at 28 installations both overseas and in the continental United States. This "real world" experience was buttressed by an in-depth look at current Army and Department of Defense policies and regulations pertaining to extremism and the Army's existing human relations environment. Finally, the Army Research Institute administered a confidential survey to 17,080 soldiers to help supplement the Task Force's interview conclusions.

This report reflects the overall opinion of the interviewed and surveyed soldiers and civilians and the conclusions of the Task Force as to the extent of extremist activity in the Army. The complex and evolving nature of the extremist problem in America, and the rigorous time constraints, shaped the assessment strategy and population sample. The resulting report provides an assessment of the Army today.

THE TASK FORCE CHARTER AND SECRETARIAL GUIDANCE

The Secretary of the Army appointed Major General Larry R. Jordan to the Task Force Chair on December 12, 1995. The Task Force was comprised of an interdisciplinary team of senior personnel chosen by the Secretary from the human relations, law enforcement, and other appropriate disciplines. The Secretary gave the Task Force seven missions.

- Assess the extent of soldier participation in racist and other extremist organizations.
- Assess the current human relations environment among active duty soldiers in the Army, in particular the influence of extremist groups on that environment.
- Assess how the chain of command views and exercises its authority to handle participation in extremist organizations.
- Assess how well the chain of command emphasizes the need to treat others with dignity and respect.
- Assess the adequacy of information sharing on racist and other extremist organizations between military and civilian law enforcement officials.
- Identify the *strengths* and *weaknesses* of Army policy governing participation in racist and other extremist organizations, to include implementation, training, and oversight. Provide recommendations to correct task force-identified weaknesses.
- Review the circumstances underlying the killing of Mr. James and Ms. Burden in Fayetteville, North Carolina.

The charter also described the scope of the assessment which the Secretary expected. The Task Force was charged to look at large concentrations of soldiers in the United States and overseas, including Korea and Europe. It became clear that the large mission and short time allotted precluded looking at any group other than active duty forces.

The Secretary addressed the initial Task Force meeting on January 3, 1996, and personally amplified the intent, purpose, and scope of the Task Force and its mission. He reiterated that the central thrust of the Task Force effort was to review the influence of extremist groups on the Army. Although the human relations environment in general would be reviewed, the impact of extremist groups on that environment was to be the focus of the assessment. Finally, the Secretary enumerated the following principles which he expected to govern the Task Force recommendations. They must:

- Support the way the Army operates as a team
- Emphasize the effective use of the chain of command
- Reinforce the responsibility of commanders and noncommissioned officers for the welfare of their soldiers and for what their soldiers are doing
- Support the Army's leadership style of establishing responsibility at the lowest appropriate level. In this regard, suggesting centralized Department of the Army programs was to be viewed with skepticism.

A copy of the Task Force Charter is at Annex C and a verbatim transcript of the Secretary's remarks is at Annex D.

TASK FORCE METHODOLOGY

The data to support the assessment was obtained through a mixture of confidential written surveys, group sensing sessions, personal interviews of selected leaders and key staff personnel, and reviews of local Criminal Investigation Command, Inspectors General, Equal Opportunity, and Staff Judge Advocate records. Personal Task Force member oversight of these activities occurred at almost all locations.

Team Composition

The Task Force assembled five teams to assist in the data-gathering effort. Four teams were charged with traveling to various installations, and one team was charged with the review of departmental policy, recording of task force deliberations, and report preparation. Each of the four assessment teams had a senior team chief (colonel or lieutenant colonel) and a senior noncommissioned officer (master sergeant) detailed to it from the Inspector General Agency, three trained Inspectors General interviewers (chief warrant officer, major, or lieutenant colonel), and senior representatives from the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, The Judge Advocate General's Office, the Criminal Investigation Command, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, and a Command Sergeant Major who represented the Sergeant Major of the Army. These teams were also designed to reflect racial and gender diversity. The resources of The Inspector General were used extensively during this assessment because of their experience in conducting Army-wide inspections and interviewing soldiers. It is important to remember, however, that this was not an Inspector General inspection but rather an assessment for the Secretary of the Army by a special Task Force supported by a variety of resources. The policy team was similarly composed, formally led by a colonel but with three lieutenant colonels heading different functional areas: policy review, coordination of Task Force operations, and Task Force deliberations and report preparation.

Team Training

Intensive training was provided for the teams prior to conducting the first field visit.

- The Criminal Investigation Command, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms provided information on trends, behavior, symbols, and modus operandi associated with extremist and racist groups.
- The United States Military Academy Leader Development Branch and Behavioral Science and Leadership Department provided material on human behavior and programs to address human relations.

The Offices of the General Counsel and The Judge Advocate General and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel provided information on various Army policies, in particular on Army Regulation 600-20, *Army Command Policy*.

- The United States Army Recruiting Command provided information on the criteria against which potential enlistees are screened.
- The United States Army Training and Doctrine Command provided information on the Initial Entry Training soldierization process and the inculcation of values.
- The Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, provided information on various equal opportunity issues and human relations topics.
- The Inspector General Agency provided instruction on interview techniques and group dynamics.

In addition, the Task Force spent considerable time in sessions designed to standardize the wording of the questions which would be asked, and the order in which they would be asked, as well as standardizing other administrative and reporting requirements to ensure that the same type of information was being gathered at the various installations.

Site Selection

The Task Force felt strongly that it was necessary to visit a large number of posts worldwide both to meet the Secretary's expressed guidance and to do a thorough check on the pulse of the Army and the nature of any extremist threat. Accordingly, an ambitious schedule was put together which ensured that the operational as well as training environments were looked at, that the bases visited in the continental United States were geographically dispersed, and that a wide variety of units were seen (combat, combat support, combat service support, and special operations forces).

In all, 103 brigade or equivalent level commands were visited at 28 installations in 12 states as well as seven sites in Germany and five sites in Korea. The following installations were visited in the United States: Fort Lewis, Washington; Fort Shafter, Schofield Barracks, and Tripler Army Medical Center, Hawaii; Fort Jackson, South Carolina; Fort Riley, Kansas; Fort Benning, Georgia; Forts Hood and Bliss, Texas; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort McClellan, Alabama; Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort Knox, Kentucky; Forts Richardson and Wainwright, Alaska; and the Military Entrance Processing Station, Baltimore, Maryland. In general, the teams were at the smaller installations for a week and at the larger installations for two weeks.

Leader Interviews

Individual interviews were conducted with various leaders at each installation visited. Required interviews included the Commanding General, Deputy Commanding General, and Chief of Staff at installations or the Commanding General, Assistant Division Commanders, and Chief of Staff at divisional headquarters. In addition, a large number of brigade commanders (colonel-level), battalion commanders (lieutenant colonel-level), and command sergeants major were interviewed at each location. The teams also interviewed selected key staff members who would have knowledge as to the state of extremist activity and human relations in the area such as: Equal Opportunity Officers and Advisors, Provost Marshals, Criminal Investigation Command agents, Command Judge Advocates, Chaplains, Inspectors General, military mental health professionals (social workers, psychiatrists, psychologists), senior civilians, local civil police, and Federal Bureau of Investigation officers. In all, 63 command group personnel, 253 brigade- and battalion-level commanders, 272 command sergeants major, and 1,093 staff officers and other key personnel were interviewed.

A summary of the demographics of the interview population, by grade or duty position and race, is at Annex E.

Soldier and Civilian Interviews

Most soldiers and civilians were interviewed in group sessions. Groups were established in a variety of ways at each installation in accordance with the desires of the Task Force. Rank was one factor. These stratified groups were: Company Commanders (captains), lieutenants, First Sergeants, master sergeants/sergeants first class, staff sergeants, sergeants, specialists through privates, chief warrant officers and warrant officers, General Schedule 12 through 8 Department of the Army civilian employees, General Schedule 7 through 1 Department of the Army civilian employees, and Wage Grade Department of the Army Civilians. Some groups were racially diverse. Other groups stratified by race (Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, and Other). Males and females were mixed in those groups which represented commands with women assigned to them.

In all, 531 group interview sessions were held in which 5,256 soldiers and 701 Department of the Army Civilians were interviewed.

The selection of these group interviewees was of concern to the Task Force. In order to insure a random sampling, installations were given a series of the final two digits from Social Security numbers against which they ran a data query. Any soldier whose Social Security number ended in the assigned two digits was required to participate in the group interview sessions. Such randomly identified soldiers comprised 50% of the groups interviewed. The remaining 50% of the groups were selected from assigned units to provide an approximate picture of diversity in the command.

Candor was encouraged by the granting of conditional anonymity during the interviews. Soldiers were informed that anything they said during the interview would not be shared with their commanders and supervisors with the exception that admissions of personal criminal wrong-doing would have to be referred to proper authorities. Individual soldier opinions and comments would be treated as privileged communications. This policy was reinforced by the interview teams. No unauthorized personnel from the command were allowed in the interview rooms as observers. The only personnel privy to soldier interview sessions were the Task Force members, the interviewers, and the soldiers being interviewed. In some interview sessions with Army civilian employees, union personnel were permitted to be present in accordance with the union contract. Candor was further encouraged by stratifying group interviews by rank, and for a portion of some categories, by race and ethnicity.

Coordination with Law Enforcement Officials

The teams interviewed military, local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies to ensure that the exchange of communications between military and civil authorities on the subjects of extremist activity and hate crimes was satisfactory and two way.

Army Research Institute Survey

The Army Research Institute designed a 94-question confidential survey which was administered to 17,080 soldiers at the same installations where the interviews were conducted. This survey was administered in conjunction with the traveling teams' interviews but was independent of the traveling teams' efforts. The survey was used to help supplement team observations. A demographic summary of the Army Research Institute survey is at Annex F.

Outside Agencies Consulted

During the course of this assessment, the Task Force met with representatives and received briefings from the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. Within the Department of Defense, the Task Force also coordinated with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Department of the Air Force, and the Department of the Navy. The Task Force also solicited the input of private organizations which had directly offered or expressed their concern in the wake of the Fayetteville homicides. These included the Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'rith, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the National Conference on Christians and Jews, the National Urban League, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Southern Poverty Law Center, and the Wiesenthal Center. The Task Force acknowledges the concern, expertise, and effort of those government and private organizations which provided input.

ANNEXES

ANNEX A---Task Force Member Biographies

ANNEX B---Summary of Contemporary Policy on Extremism

ANNEX C---Task Force Charter

ANNEX D---Secretary's Remarks to the Task Force

ANNEX E---Interview Demographics

ANNEX F---Survey Demographics

ANNEX A

TASK FORCE MEMBER BIOGRAPHIES

Major General Larry R. Jordan

Chairman of the Task Force on Extremist Activities. MG Jordan is currently serving as Deputy The Inspector General of the Army. He has served more than twenty seven years as an Armor Officer, and as Commanding General of the United States Army Armor Center and Fort Knox, Kentucky, one of the Army's largest training installations. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy.

Brigadier General Daniel Doherty

Member of the Task Force on Extremist Activities. BG Doherty has served more than twenty seven years as a Military Police Officer, and is currently the Commanding General of the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command.

Mr. John P. McLaurin, III

Member of the Task Force on Extremist Activities. Mr. McLaurin is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Military Personnel Management and Equal Opportunity Policy. He is a retired Colonel of the United States Army and a lawyer. His key active duty assignments before concluding his career in the Judge Advocate Generals Corps included Staff Judge Advocate of the 2nd Infantry Division in the Republic of Korea, and of the Health Services Command in San Antonio, Texas.

Ms. Karen Scott Heath

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Date	Directive or Regulation	Quote	Remarks
Jun-1974	Executive Order 11785 <i>Amending Executive order No. 10450</i>	<p>Section 2. Neither the Attorney General, nor the Subversive Activities Control Board, nor any other agency shall designate organizations pursuant to section 12 of Executive Order 10450, nor circulate nor publish a list of organizations previously so designated. The list of organizations previously designated is hereby abolished and shall not be used for any purpose.</p> <p>Section 3. Subparagraph (5), paragraph (a) of section 8 of Executive Order 10450 is revised to read as follows: <i>"Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in, any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons (hereinafter referred to as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State, or which seeks to overthrow the Government of the United States or any state or subdivision thereof by unlawful means."</i></p>	DoD Directive 5200.2 DoD Personnel Security Program
Oct-86	<i>Change 2. to DoD Directive 1325.6 Guidelines for Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces</i>	<p>III. Specific Guidelines</p> <p>G. Military personnel must reject participation in organizations that espouse supremacist causes; attempt to create illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, religion, or national origin; or, advocate the use of force or violence, or otherwise engage in efforts, to deprive individuals of their civil rights. Active participation, such as publicly demonstrating or rallying, fund raising, recruiting and training members, and organizing or leading such organizations is incompatible with Military Service; is therefore prohibited. Commanders have authority to employ the full range of administrative procedures, including separation or appropriate disciplinary action against military personnel who actively participate in such groups.</p>	Chapter 4-12 AR 600-20

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Date	Directive or Regulation	Quote	Remarks
Jan-87	DoD Directive 5200.2 DoD Personnel Security Program	<p>Chapter II Policies Section 2 Criterion for Application of Security Standards</p> <p>2-200 Criteria for Application of Security Standards</p> <p>... The criteria for determining eligibility for a clearance under the security standard shall include, but not be limited to the following:</p> <p>d. <i>Knowing membership</i> with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons (hereafter referred to as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State or which seeks to overthrow the Government of the United States, or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means.</p>	AR 380-67 DA Personnel Security Program AR 604-10 Military Personnel Security Program
Jan-80	DoD Directive 5200.27 Acquisition of Information concerning persons and organizations not affiliated with the Department of Defense	<p>D. Authorized Activities</p> <p>DoD components, are authorized to gather information essential to the accomplishment of the following defense actions.</p> <p>1a. Subversion of loyalty, discipline, or morale of DoD military or civilian personnel by actively encouraging violations of law, disobedience of lawful orders or regulations, or disruption of military activities.</p>	AR 190-45 Law Enforcement Reporting AR 380-13 Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Non-affiliated persons and Organizations
Feb-86	DoD Directive 5240.6 Counterintelligence Awareness and Briefing Program	<p>A. Purpose</p> <p>3. Establishes requirements for the periodic briefing of DoD personnel on hostile intelligence and terrorist threats.</p> <p>4. Prescribes judicial and administrative sanctions for DoD personnel who fail to comply with the requirements of this Directive.</p> <p>F. Procedures</p> <p>1(2) Information concerning any . . . terrorist organization, sabotage, or subversive activity that is reasonably believed to pose or have a potential to pose a direct threat to DoD or</p>	AR 381-12 Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the US Army 18 USC 2387 Criminal Subversion . . . generally includes inciting military or civilian personnel of the DoD to violate laws, disobey lawful orders or regulations, or disrupt military activities, with the willful intent thereby to interfere with, or impair the loyalty, morale, or discipline, of the military forces of the United States. Terrorism- The unlawful use or threatened use of force or

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Date	Directive or Regulation	Quote	Remarks
Aug-93	DoD Directive 3500.7 <i>Joint Ethics Regulation</i>	<p>other US facility, activity, personnel or resources.</p> <p>3-301 Membership and Management DoD employees may become members and may participate in the management of non-Federal entities as individuals in a personal capacity provided they act exclusively outside the scope of their official position. . . .</p> <p>12-501 Primary Ethical Values Respect To treat people with dignity, to honor privacy and to allow self-determination are critical in a government of diverse people. Lack of respect leads to a breakdown of loyalty and honesty within a government and brings chaos to the international community.</p>	<p>violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societal objectives. (from political, religious, or ideological objectives. (from Counterintelligence Awareness and Briefing Program.)</p> <p>Terrorist Organization- On going organization, association, or group of three or more people engaged in conduct or patterns of conduct which involves use of force or violence</p> <p>Purpose of group using violence must intimidate/coerce a government, civilian population of segment in furtherance of political or social objective. (FBI Definition)</p>
Jun-94	FM 100-1 <i>The Army</i>	<p>The Army Ethos . . . The Army ethos, the guiding beliefs, standards and ideals that characterize and motivate the Army, is succinctly described in one word—Duty. Duty is behavior required by moral obligation, demanded by custom, or enjoined by feelings of rightness 5-6) . . . It requires the impartial administration of standards without regard to friendship, personality, rank, or other bias (7)</p> <p>Compassion is basic respect for the dignity of each individual, treating all with dignity and respect. It is the personification of the "Golden Rule," treat others as you want them to treat you (9)</p> <p>The American Soldier American soldiers come from a wide range of cultural backgrounds. Upon entering the military service, they are called upon to adapt their individual values to those of the military profession. (10)</p>	

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Aug-95	AR 40-501 <i>Standards of Medical Fitness</i>	<p>2-32 Personality, behavior, or academic skills disorders The causes for rejection are as follows:</p> <p>a. Personality or behavior disorders, as evidenced by frequent encounters with law enforcement agencies, antisocial attitudes or behavior which, while not sufficient cause for administrative rejection, are tangible evidence of impaired characterological capacity to adapt to military service.</p> <p>z. Tattoos that will significantly limit effective performance of military service.</p>	
May-92	AR 135-100 <i>Appointment of Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the Army</i> AR 145-1 <i>Senior ROTC Program</i>	<p>3-3 Ineligibles</p> <p>3-43 Disenrollment a. . . Nonscholarship and scholarship cadets will be disenrolled for the following reasons: (12) Misconduct, demonstrated by disorderly or disrespectful conduct in the ROTC classroom or during training, or other misconduct that substantially interferes with the ROTC mission, including participation in unlawful demonstrations against the ROTC, illegal interference with rights of other ROTC students, or similar acts.</p>	<p><i>Applicable to Reserve and National Guard Officer Appointments</i></p> <p><i>No stipulation denying students with extremist tendencies the right to enroll in either basic or advanced course.</i></p>
Jun-93	AR 190-24 <i>Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board</i>	<p>2-4 Duties and functions of boards The AFDCBs will-</p> <p>b. Receive reports, and take appropriate action on conditions in their area of responsibility relating to any of the following--</p> <p>(1) Disorders and lack of discipline (5) Racial and other discriminatory practices (8) Criminal or illegal activities involving cults or hate groups.</p> <p>2-6 Off-limits establishments and areas</p>	

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Nov-93	AR 190-40 <i>Serious Incident Reports</i>	<p>a. The establishment of off-limits areas is a function of Command. It may be used by commanders to help maintain good discipline, health, morals, safety, and welfare of service members.</p> <p>1-4 Responsibilities</p> <p>b. Commanders of MACOMs will:</p> <p>(3) Implement a reporting system . . . and ensure that the MACOM headquarters submits the SIR to HQDA (overseas only)</p> <p>c. CONUS Installation commanders will- Report SIR to HQDA. . . .</p> <p>d. All Active Army, Army National Guard, or United States Army Reserve unit, agency, or activity commanders, to include commanders of Army elements of unified commands or combined commands, will-</p> <p>(1) Expeditionarily notify the CONUS installation commander having geographic reporting responsibility or the overseas MACOM commander, as appropriate, of serious incidents.</p> <p>2-3 Incidents not reportable by SIR</p> <p>h. Incidents involving subversion and espionage directed against the US Army and deliberate security violations</p> <p>Appendix B Category 1 Reportable Serious Incidents</p> <p>d. Terrorist activities, sabotage, and incidents, initiated or sponsored by known terrorists, dissident groups, or criminal elements that occur on an installation, or involve military personnel or property off an installation.</p> <p>Appendix C Category 2 Reportable Serious Incidents</p> <p>C-1</p> <p>c. Racially or ethnically motivated criminal acts.</p> <p>p. Group breaches of discipline involving 10 or more persons who collectively act to defy authority.</p> <p>C-2. Any other incident that the commander determines to be of concern to HQDA based on the nature, gravity, potential for adverse publicity, or potential consequences of the incident.</p>	<p><i>Under revision</i></p> <p><i>propriet to broaden to include all bias crime, categories "religious, sexual orientation, national origin"</i></p> <p><i>propriet to change to "3" or more (same as FBI)</i></p> <p><i>No follow up if "Race/Ethnic" not immediately discerned</i></p>

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Date	Directive or Regulation	Quote	Remarks
Sep-86	AR 190-45 <i>Law Enforcement Reporting</i>	<p>2-4 Acquisition and storage of information on non-DoD affiliated persons and organizations</p> <p>a. Information on persons and organizations not affiliated with DoD may be acquired, reported, processed, and stored per AR 380-13. Situations listed in AR 380-13 justifying acquisition of this information include, but are not limited to-</p> <p>(3) Subversion of loyalty, discipline, or morale of DA military or civilian personnel by actively encouraging violation of laws, disobedience of lawful orders and regulations, or disruption of military activities.</p> <p>4-2 Military Police Report (DA Form 3975)</p> <p>b. Cautionary rule. An incident will not be reported as a founded offense unless adequately substantiated by police investigation. A person will not be reported as the subject of an offense without probable cause supported by corroborating evidence.</p> <p>(DA Form 4833)</p> <p>Table 4-2. Offense Code List</p> <p>3E Civil Rights</p> <p>DA Form 2819 Crime Data Report</p>	<p>See DoD Directive 5200.27 <i>Acquisition of Information concerning persons and organizations not affiliated with the Department of Defense</i></p> <p>Proponent changing report to match /collect NIBRS requirements: includes "Bias/motivation" data</p> <p>Dissemination</p> <p>Local Commanders and Supervisors</p> <p>Crime Records Center (Army)</p> <p>No requirements to report to HQDA</p> <p>Not required to disseminate to subordinate equal opportunity advisors, Inspector General, or Chaplain</p> <p>No other code for defining hate crimes</p> <p>No mechanism for recording hate crimes</p>
Sep-93	AR 190-51 <i>Security of Unclassified Army Property (Sensitive and NonSensitive)</i>	<p>This regulation sets forth physical security policies, procedures and standards for safeguarding Army property. It gives commanders the flexibility to enhance physical security by adapting invested resources to meet local needs based on risk analysis results.</p>	
Oct-85	AR 195-2 <i>Criminal Investigation Activities</i>		<p>Describes the investigative authority of the US Army and provides guidelines for determining if an Army interest exists in a given criminal offense (para 3-1)</p>
Jul-85	AR 340-21 <i>Military Personnel Security Program</i>	<p>1-5 Policy</p> <p>b. Collect only the personal information about an individual that is legally authorized and necessary to support Army operations. Disclose this information only as authorized by the Privacy Act and this regulation.</p>	

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		<p>3-2. Blanket routine use disclosure</p> <p>c. Disclosure of requested information. If the information is relevant and necessary to the requesting agency's decision, a record may be disclosed to a Federal agency in response to its request in connection with—</p> <p>(1) Hiring or retention of an employee</p> <p>(2) Issuance of a security clearance</p> <p>(3) Reporting of an investigation of an employee</p> <p>4-5 First amendment rights</p> <p>No record describing how an individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment will be kept unless expressly authorized by Federal statute, by the subject individual, or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity. Exercise of these rights includes, but is not limited to, religious and political beliefs, freedom of speech and the press, and the right of assembly and to petition.</p>																					
Mar 83	AR 350-1 <i>Unit Training</i>	<p>4-6 CMT (Common military training) categories</p> <p>a. Program (P) Program training applies to the majority of soldiers and is conducted in a structured manner as follows.</p> <p>(1) ... training base (resident training) is conducted in accordance with an approved POI.</p> <p>(2) ... training in units is conducted on a continuing or cyclical basis. . . .</p> <p>c. Refresher (R) Refresher training is used when periodic or recurring emphasis is required. . . . <i>Refresher training frequency is left to the commander's discretion.</i></p> <p>e. Awareness (A) Awareness training can be accomplished by briefings or orientations. . . . <i>How and when this training is conducted is discretionary and depends on the commander's evaluation of need.</i></p> <p>Table B-1 Common military training in units</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="777 878 880 1039"> <thead> <tr> <th>Applicable Subjects</th> <th>350-41</th> <th>ACSL</th> <th>P</th> <th>P</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>SAEDA</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Counterterrorism</td> <td>525-13</td> <td>DCSPER</td> <td>A,T</td> <td>A,T</td> </tr> <tr> <td>EO/Sex Harass</td> <td>600-20</td> <td>DCSPER</td> <td>R</td> <td>R</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Applicable Subjects	350-41	ACSL	P	P	SAEDA					Counterterrorism	525-13	DCSPER	A,T	A,T	EO/Sex Harass	600-20	DCSPER	R	R	
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Date	Directive or Regulation	Quote	Remarks
Aug-93	AR 150-41 Unit Training	<p>Command Info 360-81 OCPA A A</p> <p>Legend P- Program = Periodic requirements for all units A- Awareness = Does not assume training in schools, but does require command emphasis R- Refresher = Assumes training to standard in schools, but requires occasional review to sustain training level for all soldiers T- Time Sensitive = Training required within a reasonable period before an event or exercise</p> <p>Table B-2 Common Training in Army Schools</p> <p>Applicable Subjects B A P Bn An S F Oh Oa C Cg EO/Sex Harass P P P P P A A A SAEDA P P P R Standard Conduct P R R P Military Justice P P A A A</p> <p>Legend B-Basic, A- ALT, P- PLDC, Bn- BNCOC, An-ANCOC, S- SMC, F- Functional, Oh-OBC/WOCS, Oa-OAC/SWOT, C-CAS, Cg-COSOC/MWOC</p>	
Aug-93	AR 150-41 Unit Training	<p>B-3 CMT (Common military training) categories</p> <p>(1) Program (P) Program training applies to the majority of soldiers and is conducted in a structured manner as follows. (a) ... training base (resident training) is conducted in accordance with an approved POI (b) ... training in units is conducted on a continuing or cyclical basis. . . (9). Refresher (R) Refresher training is used when periodic or recurring emphasis is required. . . <i>Refresher training frequency is left to the commander's discretion.</i> (11). Awareness (A) Awareness training can be accomplished by briefings or orientations <i>How and when this training is conducted is discretionary and depends on the commander's evaluation of need.</i></p> <p>Table B-1 Common military training in units</p> <p>Applicable Subjects</p>	

Date	Directive or Regulation	Quote	Remarks
Sep-85	AR 351-5 US Army OCS	<p>SAEDA 350-41 ACSL P P Counterrorism 525-13 DCSPER A,T A,T EO/Sex Harass 600-20 DCSPER R R Command Info 360-81 OCPA A A</p> <p>Legend <i>P</i> - Program = Periodic requirements for all units <i>A</i> - Awareness = Does not assume training in schools, but does require command emphasis <i>R</i> - Refresher = Assumes training to standard in schools, but requires occasional review to sustain training level for all soldiers <i>T</i> - Time Sensitive = Training required within a reasonable period before an event or exercise</p> <p>Table B-2 Common Training in Army Schools <i>Applicable Subjects</i> B A P Bn An S F Ob Oa C Cg EO/Sex Harass P P P P P A A A A SAEDA P P P P P P P R Standard Conduct P R R P P R Military Justice P P A A A A</p> <p>Legend B-Basic, A-AIT, P-PLDC, Bn-BNCOG, An-ANCOG, S-SMC, F-Functional, Ob-OB/C/WOCS, Oa-OAC/SWOT, C-CAS', Cg-CGSOC/MWOC</p> <p>Chapter 1 Introduction 1-6 Installation OCS Structured Interview a. The objective of the Structured Interview is to identify the degree to which the The applicant's past behavior is a variety of situations is evaluated to predict future performance. Chapter 2 Eligibility Requirements 2.2 Who May Not Apply Individuals may not apply if: b. Their selection would clearly not be in the interests of National Security Predeparture Interview a. . . . This in-depth interview is to verify that the selectee is</p>	

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Sep-74	AR 380-13. <i>Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Non-affiliated Persons and Organizations</i>	<p>still qualified and motivated to attend OCS.</p> <p>Figure 4-1 Interviewer guidance and checklist format</p> <p>7. Are you prepared to accept all aspects of your training, including those which you may not like or understand?</p> <p>DA Form 5339-R, Oct 84 <i>OCS Applicants Evaluation Sheet</i></p> <p>2. Adaptability</p> <p>3. Attitude</p> <p>7. Personal Traits</p> <p>6. Operations related to protection of Army personnel, functions and property</p> <p>a. Information on persons and organizations not affiliated with the DoD may be acquired, reported, processed, and stored under the authority of this paragraph only if there is a reasonable basis to believe that one or more of the following situations exists:</p> <p>(3) Subversion of loyalty, discipline or morale of Department of the Army military or civilian personnel by actively encouraging violation of laws, disobedience of lawful orders and regulations, or disruption of military activities.</p> <p>c. The criteria to be used in submitting a request to conduct a special investigation operation involving persons or organizations not affiliated with DoD are as follows:</p> <p>(1) The target group must represent a significant and demonstrable threat to the security effectiveness of Army functions and property</p>	See DoD Directive 5200.27 <i>Acquisition of Information concerning persons and organizations not affiliated with the Department of Defense</i>
Sep 88	AR 380-67 <i>DA Personnel Security Program</i>	<p>Section II Criteria for application of security standards</p> <p>2-200 d. Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons (hereafter referred to as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State or which seeks to overthrow the Government of the United</p>	See DoD Directive 5200.2 <i>DoD Personnel Security Program</i>

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		<p>States, or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means.</p> <p>2-401 Subversive affiliations</p> <p>a. In the context of DoD investigative policy, subversion refers only to such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States. Specifically, this is limited to information concerning the activities of individuals or groups that involve or will involve the violation of Federal law, for the purpose of:</p> <p>(3) Depriving persons of their civil rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States.</p> <p>b. Military Department/FBI jurisdiction.</p> <p>Allegations of activities covered by criteria a through f para 2-200 of this regulation are in the exclusive investigative domain of either the counterintelligence agencies of the Military Departments or the FBI</p> <p>Appendix 1 Adjudication Policy</p> <p>1-2 Loyalty</p> <p>a. Basis . . . Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons (hereafter referred to as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State or which seeks to overthrow the Government of the United States, or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means.</p> <p>b. Disqualifying factors</p> <p>(2) Membership in an organization that has been characterized by the DOJ as on which meets the criteria as one which meets the criteria in the above cited "Basis."</p> <p>(3) Knowing participation in acts that involve force or violence or threats of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or to</p>	

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Mar-93	AR 381-12, <i>Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the US Army</i>	<p>overthrow or alter the form of government of the United States or any State.</p> <p>(4) Monetary contributions, service, or other support of the organization defined in "Basis" above, with the intent of furthering the unlawful objectives of the organization.</p> <p>(5) Participation, support, aid, comfort, or sympathetic association with persons, groups, or organizations, as defined in the "Basis" above.</p> <p>(6) Evidence of continuing sympathy with the unlawful aims and objectives of such an organization, as defined in the "Basis" above.</p> <p>(7) Holding a position of major doctrinal or managerial influence in an organization as defined in the "Basis" above.</p> <p>c. Mitigating factors</p> <p>(1) Lack of knowledge or understanding of the unlawful aims of the organization.</p> <p>(3) Affiliation for less than a year out of curiosity or academic interest.</p> <p>(4) Sympathy or support limited to the lawful objectives of the organization.</p>	<p>SAEDA is a bi-annual training requirement per change 1- It has accountability under Army Command Inspection Program</p> <p>Definition of subversive/terrorist comparable to extremist Content of SAEDA training has traditionally focused on foreign threat Neither field nor HQDA has made correlation Training package needs revision to include Extremist Activity</p>
		<p>SAEDA-Chapter 3 Reporting Requirements</p> <p>2-2 Content of Training</p> <p>...At a minimum, SAEDA training will include instructions on the following:</p> <p>i. The international and domestic terrorist threat, the vulnerability of DA personnel and their family members to terrorist acts, and the defensive measures that may be employed to thwart such acts.</p> <p>j. The intelligence threat posed by nontraditional adversaries.</p> <p>3-1 SAEDA Incidents</p> <p>...Personnel subject to the UCMJ who fail to comply with the requirement of this paragraph are subject to punishment under UCMJ, as well as to adverse administrative or other adverse action authorized by applicable provisions of the USC or federal regulations. . . . The following incidents and</p>	

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Jun-92	AR 525-13 <i>The Army Combating Terrorist Program</i>	<p>situations will be reported.</p> <p>g. Information concerning any international or domestic terrorist activity or sabotage that poses an actual or perceived threat to Army or other US facilities, activities, personnel or resources.</p> <p>i. Active attempts to encourage military or civilian employees to violate laws, disobey lawful orders or regulations, or disrupt military activities (subversion)</p> <p>k. Participation by Army personnel in activities advocating or teaching the overthrow of the United States by force or violence or seeking to alter the form of Government by unconstitutional means (sedition).</p> <p>1-4 US Government and army policies for CBT/TT</p> <p>b(1)(d) Ensure all personnel are informed of the terrorist threat and of all security precautions designed to reduce their vulnerability to terrorist attack.</p> <p>2-10 CG TRADOC will</p> <p>a. Develop and implement appropriate training programs from AT, to include:</p> <p>(1) An orientation for cadets and officer candidates undergoing precommissioning training and for soldiers undergoing initial entry training which familiarizes them with individual protective measures</p> <p>(2) Comprehensive training in leadership courses designed to train officers and NCOs to exercise their responsibilities for protecting personnel, family members, facilities and equipment from terrorist attack,</p> <p>2-11 CG, USAF/DC will-</p> <p>a. Collect, evaluate, and disseminate to affected commands criminal information pertaining to terrorist activities, within the provisions of applicable statutes and regulations.</p> <p>f. Report terrorist incidents, suspected terrorist activity and criminal information concerning the terrorist threat to appropriate local commanders.</p> <p>2-12 CG INSCOM will</p> <p>d Include terrorist threat information in briefings on</p>	<p>AR 525-13 <i>Definition of terrorism</i></p> <p><i>The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.</i></p>

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		<p>subversion and espionage directed against the Army (SAEDA) per AR 381-12.</p> <p>e. Serve as the Army's intelligence liaison representative to Federal, State, and local agencies. . . . to exchange terrorism information.</p> <p>2-16. MACOM Commanders will</p> <p>d. Ensure that SAEDA training (AR 381-12) includes information on the nature of the terrorist threat, vulnerabilities of military personnel. . . .</p> <p>e. Develop AT education and training programs, threat briefings and public affairs command information programs to inform. . . . Such materials should be disseminated. . . . during periods when the THREATCON level exceeds NORMAL in CONUS locations.</p> <p>2-18 Installation Commanders will</p> <p>c. Prepare an installation/focal security threat assessment that describes the current terrorist threat. Assessments should be prepared at least annually (and updated as required) and form the basis for identifying vulnerabilities that require correction.</p> <p>3-9 Training and Exercises</p> <p>a. Individual awareness training will be conducted for all new accessions during their initial entry training. This training will focus on the worldwide terrorist threat to Army personnel. . . .</p> <p>b. Leaders courses. . . will include instruction in CBT/T responsibilities and techniques applicable to force protection. . . .</p>	
Jul-95	AR 600-8-24 <i>Officer Transfers and Discharges</i>	<p>Chapter 4 Eliminations</p> <p>4-1 Overview</p> <p>c. An officer who has his or her security clearance withdrawn or withheld due to unfavorable information regarding loyalty, subversion, or security may be processed for involuntary separation according to AR 604-10.</p> <p>4-2 Reasons for Elimination</p> <p>While not all inclusive, when one of the following or similar</p>	

Date	Directive or Regulation	Quote	Remarks
Dec 86 w c1 Oct 94	AR 600-37 <i>Suspension of Favorable Actions for Military Personnel in Notional Security Cases or Other Investigations or Proceedings</i>		<p>conditions exist, elimination action may be or will be initiated as indicated below:</p> <p>a. Substandard performance of duty</p> <p>b. Misconduct, moral or professional dereliction, or in the interest of national security.</p> <p>(5) Acts of personal misconduct (including but not limited to acts committed while in a drunken or intoxicated state).</p> <p>(8) Conduct unbecoming an officer.</p> <p>(10) Acts or behavior not clearly consistent with the interests of national security. (See AR 604-10)</p> <p>c. Derogatory Information</p> <p>Chapter 4 Unfavorable Information In Intelligence and Security Files</p> <p>4-1 Security Information</p> <p>Derogatory information concerning loyalty and subversion (AR 604-10 ch 2) will be processed as set forth in that regulation.</p> <p>4-3 Commanders will ensure that security clearances are not suspended in lieu of punishment under the UCMJ or other disciplinary measures. Denial or revocation of a security clearance will not be used as a punishment or disciplinary measure.</p>
Mar-88	AR 600-50 <i>Standards of Conduct for Department of the Army Personnel</i> AR 600-20 <i>Army Command Policies and Procedures</i>	<p><i>superseceded by DoD 5500.7R Joint Ethics Regulation</i></p> <p>Chapter 2 2-1 Chain of Command</p> <p>b. Commanders are responsible for everything their command does or fails to do . . .</p> <p>d. Soldiers have a responsibility to ensure their unit commander is made aware of problems which affect the discipline, moral, and effectiveness of the unit.</p> <p>Chapter 4-4 Soldier Conduct</p> <p>a. Ensuring the proper conduct of soldiers is a function of command. Commanders rely upon all leaders in the Army, whether they are on or off duty or in a leave status, to—</p> <p>(2) Take action against military personnel in any case where</p>	

ANNEX B—SUMMARY OF CONTEMPORARY POLICY ON EXTREMISM

Date	Directive or Regulation	Quote	Remarks
		<p>the soldier's conduct violates good order and discipline.</p> <p>Chapter 4-12 Extremist Organizations (Added)</p> <p>The activities of extremist organizations are inconsistent with the responsibilities of military service. Active participation by soldiers is prohibited. (see para 6-3)</p> <p>a. Military personnel, duty bound to uphold the Constitution, must reject participation in organizations which-</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Espouse supremacist causes. 2) Attempt to create illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, gender, religion, or national origin. 3) Advocate the use of force or violence, or otherwise engage in efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights. b. Passive activities, such as mere membership, receiving literature in the mail, or presence at an event, although strongly discouraged as incompatible with military service, are not prohibited by Army policy. Positive actions to limit soldier participation are listed in d below. c. The prohibited activities concerning extremist groups include the following: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Participating in a public demonstration or rally. 2) Knowingly attending a meeting or activity while on duty, when in uniform, when in a foreign country, or in violation of off limits sanctions or commander's order. 3) Conducting fund-raising activities. 4) Recruiting or training members (including encouraging other soldiers to join). 5) Organizing or leading such a group 6) Distributing literature on or off a military installation. 7) Participating in any activity that is in violation of regulations, constitutes a breach of law and order, or is likely to result in violence. d. Commanders should take positive actions when soldiers in their units are identified as members of extremist groups and /or when they engage in extremist group activities. Some of these actions include— <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Educating soldiers as to the Army's policy of fair and 	<p>See Change 2. to DoD Directive 1325.6 Guidelines for Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces</p> <p>Recommendations</p> <p>Title and Address "Activity" not "Organizations"</p> <p>Add para on Command Authority</p> <p>Definition is confusing</p> <p>Use Definition of Extremists</p> <p>Use Definition from Security Regulations</p> <p>Do not tie to REDCAT/Gender alone</p> <p>Will address militias and others</p> <p>Make Regulation punitive</p>

Date	Directive or Regulation	Quote	Remarks
		<p>equitable treatment for all. Commanders will point out that soldiers holding views to the contrary are not in harmony with Army goals, beliefs, and values, and should seriously reconsider their position.</p> <p>2) Counseling and advising soldiers of the incompatibility of such organizations with military service, and that their membership—</p> <p>a) Article 92-Failure to obey a lawful order or violation of a lawful regulation or general order (for example, participation in nonapproved on-post meetings or demonstrations, distribution of literature without approval or discrimination.)</p> <p>b) Article 116-Three or more people whose actions cause "Public Terror"</p> <p>c) Article 117-Provoking words or gestures</p> <p>d) Article 134-Conduct which is disorderly or service discrediting.</p> <p>8) Imposing off-limits restrictions on off post facilities that pose a threat to the discipline, health, morale, safety, or welfare of military personnel in accordance with AR 1909-24.</p> <p>9) Ordering soldiers not to participate in specific events sponsored by extremist groups when there is a reasonable likelihood of such participation resulting in activities which are illegal or are prejudicial to good order, discipline, or morale.</p> <p>e. Actions taken by commanders must be appropriate to the specific facts surrounding any incident. Not every incident warrants separation or UCMJ action.</p> <p>2-10 Moral and administrative criteria</p> <p>a. Applicant Interview. Recruiter will interview applicant on any records of arrest, charges, juvenile court adjudication's, traffic violations, probation periods, dismissed or pending charges or convictions, including those which have been expunged or sealed.</p> <p>(1) If applicant claims none, processing may continue</p>	
Mar-95	AR 601-210 <i>Regular Army and Army Reserve Enlistment Program</i>		

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Date	Directive or Regulation	Quote	Remarks
		<p>without a police records check.</p> <p>(3) If applicant admits an offense, or recruiter has reasons to suspect applicant may be concealing a record, start police records check . . .</p> <p>b. Police Clearance</p> <p>c. Delay of police reply. If reply from police authorities is not received within 21 days, a copy of the DD Form 369 request will be forwarded to the battalion whose area includes the city in question. Battalion commander will exert every effort to obtain police clearance and return results to requesting recruiting station. If efforts to obtain information fail, process allegation as self-admitted offense.</p> <p>1. Police records check not required. If law enforcement agency states, in writing, that it will not provide information or that a fee is required and copy of that statement is maintained in recruiting battalion, police records check will not be required. DD Form 369 will contain reference to that written statement. The form will be forwarded with enlistment packet.</p> <p>2-16 Entrance National Agency Check/National Agency Check-ENTNAC/NAAC</p> <p>a. DD Form 398-2 will be initiated on all ENTNAC/NAAC requests (superseded)</p> <p>4-24 Nonvalver, medical, moral, and administrative disqualification's</p> <p>The following are disqualification's that cannot be waived:</p> <p>h. History of antisocial behavior.</p> <p>m. Persons whose enlistment are not clearly consistent with the interests of national security under AR 604-10.</p> <p>Chapter 6 MEPA Processing Phase</p> <p>Section II Guidance Counselor Processing Phase</p> <p>6-3c . . . specifically, question applicant on existence of juvenile and youthful offender records. Explains thoroughly to each applicant the Army policy that adjudication as a youthful offender or juvenile delinquent by a State, or disposition by Federal juvenile authorities, will not prevent</p>	<p><i>superseded by SF 86 Sep 93</i></p> <p><i>List of 26 different areas the guidance counselor must cover from Army policy on Drugs to discouraging enlistees from wearing contact lenses to basic training</i></p>

Date	Directive or Regulation	Quote	Remarks
		<p>enlistment if applicant is otherwise eligible. DA Form 3286-67, Jun 91 <i>Statement of Understanding (Army Policy)</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sure Pay 2. Alcohol and Drug Abuse 3. Religious Practice Accommodation 	
	AR 601-270 <i>MEPS Processing</i>	<p>Chapter 3 Operational Guidance 3-6 Applicant clothing standards Applicants being processed at the MEPS will be dressed in a manner decided by the IRC.</p> <p>Chapter 6 Operating Procedures 6-5 MEPS pre-enlistment interview MEPS will interview applicants (before the Oath of Enlistment is administered) for the purpose of assisting recruiting activities. . . . Any additional information obtained from applicants which may have a bearing on their qualification for military service will be furnished to the appropriate MEPS examining officer . . . for resolution. Specific interview requirements and procedures will be established by the Commander, USMEPCOM, in coordination with recruiting Service commanders.</p> <p>Chapter 9 Processing of Selective Service Registrants (This chapter will be implemented upon direction of HQDA)</p> <p>9-15 Initial Screening . . . Registrants are unacceptable when their record of convictions or adverse juvenile adjudication's reflects frequent difficulties with law enforcement agencies, criminal tendencies, a history of <i>antisocial behavior</i>, alcoholism, drug abuse, sexual misconduct, or questionable moral character.</p>	
Sep-95	AR 601-280 <i>Army Reenlistment Program</i>	<p>1-8 Authority to act on retention actions f. In those cases where a soldier is fully qualified for retention but his commander believes it is not in the best interest of the Army for the soldier to continue to serve (but a Bar to Reenlistment is not warranted), the commander may forward the soldier's request for reenlistment or</p>	

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Date	Directive or Regulation	Quote	Remarks
Apr-75	AR 604-10 Military Personnel Security Program		<p>extension through command channels to the first Colonel or higher in the soldier's chain of command . . . If denial of the requested action is supported, the commander will provide his or her comments, attached as an endorsement . . . through the servicing senior Career Counselor to the Commander PERSCOM . . . The Commander PERSCOM, may, on a case-by-case basis, deny reenlistment and/or extension to any soldier who does not have a statutory entitlement to reenlist. . . Any commander who is a commissioned officer in the soldier's chain of command may stop the process for denial and approve the soldier's request.</p> <p>8-2 Standards for Reenlistment</p> <p>a. Only soldiers of high moral character, personal competence, and demonstrated adaptability to the requirements of the professional soldier's moral code will be reenlisted in the Active Army.</p> <p>8-4 Criteria</p> <p>d. Soldiers against whom a Bar to Reenlistment may be initiated:</p> <p>(13) Cannot adapt to military life; uncooperative; involved in frequent difficulties with fellow soldiers</p> <p>(15) Causes trouble in the civilian community</p> <p>(17) Personal behavior brings discredit upon his unit or the Army</p> <p>8-5 Procedures</p> <p>a(2) A Bar to Reenlistment should not be based on generalities, approximate dates, vague places or time. It should be based on specific incidents substantiated by official remarks made at the time of each occurrence. the soldier should be counseled on each occurrence and told that all instances are made matter of official record when acts considered unworthy of the US Army are performed</p> <p>This revision eliminates reference to the Attorney General's list. . . . The factors listed in table 2-1 interpret rather than limit the criteria and are not all-inclusive.</p> <p>See DoD Directive 5200.2 DoD Personnel Security Program Regulation is not obsolete, but is not used, no proponent</p>

Date	Directive or Regulation	Quote	Remarks
Sep-95	AR 611-101 <i>Commissioned Officer Classification System</i>	<p>4. <i>Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in, any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws</i></p> <p>e. Whether the individual was or should have been aware of the subversive aims of the organization.</p> <p>f. Extent of the individual's activities in the organization. (e.g., was he an official; did he participate actively and publicly in meetings, social events, demonstrations, or parades, etc.; did he recruit other members, did he subscribe to literature of the organization, etc.)</p> <p>g. Whether the individual supported the organization financially, or participated in drives, benefits, etc., for strengthening the organization.</p> <p>h. Reasons advanced by the individual for membership, affiliation or association, e.g., to obtain low-cost insurance, improving conditions of minority groups, or belief in other alleged objectives of a patriotic or similar acceptable nature, social activities, etc.</p>	found
Sep-95	AR 611-201 <i>Enlisted Classification System</i>	<p>Chapter 1- General Information</p> <p>"Separation policies . . . promote the readiness of the Army by providing an orderly means to ensure the Army is served by individuals capable of meeting required standards of duty performance and discipline."</p> <p>Chapter 13-Separation for Unsatisfactory Performance 13-2 Criteria</p> <p>a. Commanders will separate a soldier for unsatisfactory</p>	Nothing applicable
Sep-95	AR 635-200 <i>Enlisted Administrative Separations</i>	<p>Chapter 1- General Information</p> <p>"Separation policies . . . promote the readiness of the Army by providing an orderly means to ensure the Army is served by individuals capable of meeting required standards of duty performance and discipline."</p> <p>Chapter 13-Separation for Unsatisfactory Performance 13-2 Criteria</p> <p>a. Commanders will separate a soldier for unsatisfactory</p>	Nothing applicable

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Date	Directive or Regulation	Quote	Remarks
		<p>performance when it is clearly established that—</p> <p>(3) The seriousness of the circumstances is such that the soldier's retention would have an adverse impact on military discipline, good order, and morale, and</p> <p>(4) It is likely that the soldier will be a disruptive influence in present or future duty assignments, and</p> <p>(5) It is likely that the circumstances forming the basis for initiation of separation proceedings will continue or recur, and</p> <p>(6) The ability of the soldier to perform duties effectively in the future, including potential for advancement or leadership, is unlikely, and</p> <p>(7) The soldier meets medical retention standards.</p> <p>Chapter 14 Section III Acts or Patterns of Misconduct</p> <p>b. A pattern of misconduct</p> <p>(2) Conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline. Discreditable conduct, and conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline includes conduct violative of the accepted standards of personal conduct found in the UCMJ, Army Regulations, the civil law, and time honored customs and traditions of the Army.</p>	
Sep-92	AR 670-1 <i>Wear and Appearance of Uniforms</i>	<p>1-7 Personal appearance policies</p> <p>a. General The Army is a uniformed service where discipline is judged, in part, by the manner in which the individual wears the uniform as prescribed.</p> <p>b. Exceptions to appearance standards based on religious practices.</p> <p>(1a) Religious apparel, articles, and jewelry that are not visible or apparent. "Religious apparel" is defined as articles of clothing worn as part of the observance of the religious faith practiced by the soldier.</p> <p>(1b) Visible or apparent religious articles, symbols, and jewelry under the same circumstances as authorized for nonreligious reasons.</p> <p>(4) When a soldier is wearing an Army uniform outside of worship services or other rites and rituals, neat and</p>	

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Date	Directive or Regulation	Quote	Remarks
		<p>conservative items of religious apparel are those that-</p> <p>(a) Are discreet in style and design, and subdued in brightness or color.</p> <p>(b) Do not replace or interfere with the proper wearing of any prescribed article of the uniform.</p> <p>1-8 Hair and fingernail standards and grooming policies</p> <p>d. Hygiene and body grooming. . . . Tattooing in areas of the body, (i.e., face, legs) that would cause the tattoo to be exposed while in class A uniform, detract from a soldierly appearance.</p> <p>1-10 When wearing the Army uniform is required or prohibited</p> <p>h. The wear of Army uniforms is prohibited</p> <p>(1) In connection with the furtherance of any political or commercial interests or when engaged in off duty civilian employment.</p> <p>(2) When participating in public speeches, interviews, picket lines, marches, rallies, or public demonstrations, except as authorized by competent authority.</p> <p>(3) When attending any meeting or event which is a function of or is sponsored by, and extremist organization</p> <p>(4) When wearing the uniform would bring discredit upon the Army.</p> <p>1-14 Wearing of Jewelry</p> <p>a. The wearing of a wrist watch, a wrist ID bracelet, including a conservative style MIA/POW ID bracelet (only one item per wrist) and not more than two rings is authorized. . . .</p> <p>b. No jewelry, watch chains, or similar items, to include pens and pencils, will appear exposed on uniforms.</p> <p>d. Fad devices, vogue medallions, personal talismans, or amulets are not authorized for wear in uniform or on duty.</p>	
Mar-90	DD Form 398-2 superseded by SF 86		<p>27. Organizations</p> <p>b. Are you now or have you ever been affiliated with any organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which:</p>

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Date	Directive or Regulation	Quote	Remarks
Sep-95 effective 1 Jun 96	SF 86	<p>(2) Advocates or approves the commission of acts of force, violence, coercion, or intimidation to deny persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States.</p> <p>30. Your Association Record</p> <p>a. Have you ever been an officer or a member or made a contribution to an organization dedicated to the violent overthrow of the United States Government and which engages in illegal activities to that end, knowing that the organization engages in such activities with the specific intent to further such activities.</p>	

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

15 December 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL LARRY R. JORDAN
DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Task Force Charter

I have selected you to lead a task force to assess the human relations environment in general and the influence of extremist groups in particular among soldiers throughout the Army. The task force will ascertain and describe this environment, determine how it can be made better for all of our soldiers, and make recommendations as to how we can better deal with racist and other extremist forces that intrude upon the Army community. This memorandum will serve as the task force's charter.

The task force will be interdisciplinary, composed of senior personnel selected by me from the human relations, law enforcement, and other disciplines that will bring various perspectives to this undertaking.


The task force will examine the human relations environment among soldiers across the Army, and will specifically review the circumstances underlying the recent incident in Fayetteville, North Carolina. The task force will look at large concentrations of soldiers in the United States and overseas, including Korea and Europe. Its review will include an assessment of the extent to which soldiers participate in racist and other extremist organizations; how the chain of command views and exercises its authority to handle any such participation and how well it emphasizes the need to treat others with dignity and respect; the adequacy of the sharing of appropriate information on such participation between military and civilian law enforcement officials; and the strengths and weaknesses of departmental policies pertaining to such participation, their implementation throughout the Army, and related training and oversight. The task force will recommend changes addressing any weaknesses identified.

The Director of the Army Staff will provide all required administrative support; and, of course, the worldwide resources of the Office of The Inspector General will be available to you, as well. Prior to beginning the review, you should coordinate with appropriate officials at the Department of Justice.

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Because of the importance of this issue to the Army, please keep me regularly informed of your progress. The task force's report should be provided to me by March 1, 1996.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Togo D. West, Jr.", with a long, sweeping flourish extending to the right.

Togo D. West, Jr.

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ANNEX D

*Opening Remarks
Secretary of the Army
Honorable Togo D. West, Jr.
Defending American Values:
The Secretary of the Army's Task Force on Extremist Organizations
January 3, 1996*

I. Introduction

Good morning. I am here to give you some guidance as you set out upon this critical review. You need to know from the very beginning of this undertaking that your mission has been set out not only by me, but also by the Secretary of Defense. Secretary Perry is very aware of the composition of this group, your charter, and my personal involvement and he asked me to stress to you his interest in this Task Force. This early – and continuing – involvement by the Secretary of Defense is a great indicator of the importance of your mission.

Your work will have potentially far-reaching impact throughout not only the Army, but the entire Department of Defense. In looking at the influence of extremist groups among our soldiers, you will be looking at issues that affect the very fabric of our value system and your findings and recommendations have the potential to benefit all of the Services.

I have named this group "The Secretary of the Army's Task Force on Extremist Activities," and I have given it a subtitle as well: "Defending American Values." The title reflects my intent of the direction, purpose, and scope of this task force and its mission.

This morning I want to personally express that intent to you; first and foremost, you must understand the mission, if you are to succeed. But I would also say that I want my intent to be clear to the Army, the Defense Department and to the public. As for getting the word out to those audiences, I intend to remove as much of the burden as possible from you, so that you can concentrate on your mission. I have brought Sergeant First Class Rebecca Marcum in from the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute to assist with public affairs, which will be handled directly from my office. However, as the teams visit locations throughout the Army, they will, simply through the conduct of their business, represent my intent to many of our commanders and soldiers. They will, in effect, be spokespersons themselves to a significant portion of the Army.

II. Secretary's intent

A. Direction: task force responsibility to the Secretary of the Army

I have named this "The Secretary of the Army's Task Force," because I want it to be clear that this task force is responsible to me. The influence of extremist groups is a matter of potential concern to all Army units and organizations and it is an influence that could have a significant impact on the our ability to successfully operate. For those reasons, this issue deserves – and has – my personal attention.

As the leader of the task force, Major General Larry Jordan will direct the teams and their work. However, each of you on the task force—each member as well as the leader himself—is responsible for what the task force achieves. All of you are individually and collectively responsible to me and no other for your review and recommendations.

B. Scope: central focus of task force

I have called this the "Task Force on Extremist Activities," because I want to stay focused on the central thrust: reviewing the influence of extremist groups on the Army. As I have stated in your charter, you will "assess the human relations environment in general," but you must keep in mind that it is the effect of extremist groups in particular on that environment which I have asked you to review. The Secretary of Defense agrees with this approach, and I have limited your time accordingly.

Your review will touch on many aspects of human relations—intolerance of all types, issues of race, gender, religion, rank, active versus reserve component distinctions, perhaps military versus civilian employee versus family member issues. You may in fact include among your recommendations further study in any of these or other areas. But resist the impulse to become fully engaged now in one of those related studies or in a comprehensive study of human relations. You do not have time, and it is not in the charter I have given you.

C. Purpose: the larger implications of the review

Having cautioned you on the limited scope of your task, I will reiterate that the subject of this review has far-reaching implications for our Army and the entire Department of Defense.

I have given the task force the description of "Defending American Values," because that is what the Army does, and that is what the task force must help me ensure that we continue to do. Indeed, the Army has defended American values for more than 220 years. Even before the birth of this nation, our Army defended the very values upon which the nation was to be founded.

Soldiers have a special bond with the American people whom they are charged to protect. That bond is reflected in our soldiers' commitment through their oath of service and their duty to the Constitution. It is this bond and this oath—and a tradition of service that dates back more than 220 years—that make active participation in extremist organizations simply inconsistent with service as a soldier.

The impetus for this review was the tragic killing of Mr. Michael James and Ms. Jackie Burden in Fayetteville, the alleged involvement of three soldiers in those killings, and the reported involvement of those soldiers in extremist groups. I have asked you to include in your review the circumstances underlying this incident, but more than that, to look at the Army as well—for any one incident is an incident too many if it is at war with our basic principles.

I am looking to you for recommendations that will help me ensure that the Army continues to defend American values—particularly those of respect for human dignity and fairness for all—and to preserve them among our ranks.

III. Further guidance

You have my intent of the direction, scope, and purpose of your review. In addition, I would offer several points in the way of guidance for you to keep in mind as you conduct the review and particularly when you write your recommendations.

First, keep in mind that your recommendations should support the way the Army operates as a team. They should emphasize effective use of the chain of command. Commanders and noncommissioned officers are responsible for their soldiers' welfare and their discipline; they are responsible for how and what their soldiers are doing. Our preferred leadership style in the Army is to "power down," or establish responsibility at the lowest appropriate levels. While it may be tempting to come up with recommendations for centralized programs run at Department of the Army level, beware of suggesting ideas that would run counter to our leadership principles in the Army.

Second, your recommendations must also be clearly focused and feasible. They should be aimed specifically at any problem areas you find, and they should be executable.

Finally, keep in mind that I have asked you to look at our strengths as well as weaknesses in addressing soldier participation in extremist organizations. Your recommendations may include ways of maintaining or even enhancing our strengths. In any event, do not overlook them in your effort to identify weaknesses.

IV. Conclusion

As you go through this review, there are five key points I want you to remember and use as your guide.

One – Know that the entire Army is watching your work; even more importantly, all of the Defense Department will be waiting for your findings. And perhaps most important of all, the American people are concerned about how their Army is doing and how it is controlling extremist behavior and the people of the United States will be watching.

Two – Your review has the potential to establish a whole new set of groundrules for how we monitor, and if necessary, regulate the associations, affiliations and conduct of our soldiers.

Three – Only you, as members of this Task Force, will be accountable for your work. You must each be comfortable with your recommendations which you will base on the true findings, whatever they may be.

Four – Remember that you will examine an institution with a very proud heritage which boasts some of the finest soldiers to serve. I ask you to remember this because it will give your work context; it will paint for you the background against which you should carefully consider your findings and recommendations.

Five – Until we publish and release a report, your views, expectations and findings as members of this Task Force are only for the ears of one another and me. I have worked very hard to provide you with flexibility and confidentiality and you must guard both of those as prized possessions.

I have set for you a hefty charter, but one that I believe is realistic. In closing, I would like to recall an observation by American statesman Adlai Stevenson, who said: **“It is often easier to fight for principles than to live up to them.”** [speech, New York City, 1952]

There is little doubt, here in our country or anywhere in the world, of our Army's ability to fight and win any battle in order to protect the American people and the values for which this nation stands. Your task is to determine if there is more we can or should be doing to ensure that we live up to those values within the Army itself.

Annex E

INTERVIEW DEMOGRAPHICS

TASK FORCE TEAM INTERVIEWS

Total Interviewed - 7,638

White - 4,265 (56%)

Male - 6,366 (83%)

Black - 2,165 (28%)

Female - 1,272 (17%)

Hispanic - 840 (11%)

Other - 368 (5%)

Individual Interviews - 1,681

Command Group - 63 (4%)

Brigade Commanders - 103 (6%)

Battalion Commanders - 150 (9%)

Command Sergeants Major - 272 (16%)

Staff Members - 1,093 (65%)

Group Interviews - 531 Groups (5,957 Interviewees)

Company Commanders - 418 (7%)

First Sergeants - 375 (6%)

Officers (Captain - Warrants) - 871 (15%)

Noncommissioned Officers - 2,307 (39%)

Junior Enlisted (Private - Corporal) - 1,285 (22%)

Civilians - 701 (12%)

Annex F

SURVEY DEMOGRAPHICS

	<i>Number Surveyed</i>
<i>Total Survey Respondents</i>	<i>17,080</i>
 <i>Racial/Ethnic Groupings</i>	
White	9,109
Black	4,217
Hispanic	1,671
Other	1,232
Did Not Answer Question	851
 <i>Military Rank Groupings*</i>	
Officer (All)	3797
Sr. NCO (E7-E9)	3060
Jr. NCO (E5-E6)	4714
Jr. Enl (E1-E4)	5365
Did Not Answer Question	144
 <i>Gender Groupings</i>	
Male	14,135
Female	2,591
Did Not Answer Question	354

(* Standard survey techniques, which weight answers based on percentages of each category at surveyed installations,- were utilized in analyzing the raw survey data.)

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Secretary Dalton.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN H. DALTON, SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY**

Secretary DALTON. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Dellums, distinguished members of this committee, it is indeed a pleasure to be back before you again today, and once again it's a great pleasure to be with my distinguished colleagues, the Secretary of the Army and Air Force, and for the first time ever to be at the table with Secretary Dorn.

It is a privilege to address this committee on the Department of the Navy's effort in the prevention of extremist activity. The Navy and Marine Corps are firmly committed to zero tolerance of extremist activity. The tragic incident in Fayetteville, NC, last year sent a clear signal on the importance of both awareness and timely action with respect to extremism.

While this egregious behavior has not been a significant problem for the Navy Department in the past, we intend to leave no doubt that this sort of behavior will be dealt with swiftly and strongly.

I am charged by law to maintain the readiness of the Navy and Marine Corps. The prevention of extremist activity and the elimination of detrimental extremist conduct is clearly a readiness issue. To ensure that we maintain a ready force, I have made one of my primary goals that the Navy and Marine Corps foster a climate where each and every member is treated with dignity and respect.

Toward that objective, the Department has many successful programs already in place. But as I discussed in detail in my written statement, we discovered some areas that needed improvement during our recent program review. So we have expanded our training to specifically address the issue of extremist activity. These training enhancements will focus the Department's preventative and corrective measures on the broader context of our equal opportunity program.

The Navy and Marine Corps have monitored equal opportunity and racial incidents for a number of years, and we responded aggressively to every confirmed report. The Department has a number of survey instruments to track command climate, both at the local command level and servicewide. In the Navy and Marine Corps, the results of our most recent surveys were very encouraging. Our sailors and marines take our equal opportunity program seriously, and we are proud of our record.

Immediately after the incident in Fayetteville, the Navy Department launched a comprehensive review of our equal opportunity programs, policies, and experiences to achieve five goals:

First, to determine the scope of extremist activity in the Navy and Marine Corps; second, to determine the parameters of our authority to control extremist activity among our members; third, to change regulations and policies, if necessary, to ensure swift separation processing of any member in the Department who engages in extremist conduct; fourth, to establish an efficient and effective way to identify and monitor extremist incidents; and fifth, to foster and improve the climate of tolerance and mutual respect in the

Navy Department. The detailed results of these efforts are reported in my written statement.

In closing, I would like to reaffirm the Navy Department's commitment to a force which respects and defends the personal dignity of every American. The Department's policy is very clear. We have zero tolerance. We have zero tolerance for any hate group conduct. We want to eliminate conduct that adversely affects good order and discipline. We simply do not, and will not, tolerate sailors, marines or civilians in the Department of the Navy who engage in extremist activities.

I am confident that the Navy and Marine Corps are taking the steps needed to prevent or, if necessary, aggressively combat extremist activity in the Department of the Navy. Our core values of honor, courage, and commitment describe the standard of behavior for our men and women. The readiness of the Navy and Marine Corps to defend our Nation's interest around the world depends upon our unwavering adherence to these core values. Let me assure you that the Department of the Navy is indeed ready to meet the challenges ahead.

Thank you for addressing this important issue. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Dalton follows:

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL
RELEASED BY THE HOUSE
NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF
THE HONORABLE JOHN H. DALTON
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
BEFORE THE
HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
25 JUNE 1996
CONCERNING EXTREMIST ACTIVITY

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL
RELEASED BY THE HOUSE
NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE

I INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman:

I am pleased to appear before the committee this afternoon to testify on our efforts targeted against extremism.

We in the Navy and Marine Corps are firmly committed to the elimination of all extremist activity in our service. While this egregious behavior has not been a significant problem for the Department of the Navy in the past, nor do we expect it to be in the future, we have seen a few possible hate-crime related incidents during the past year. As such, we are taking proactive steps to reemphasize the unacceptability of these acts. Through specific awareness training and by clarifying the appropriate response under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, we intend to leave no doubt that this sort of behavior, whether as a part of a group or acting alone, will be dealt with swiftly and with zero tolerance. As one of our primary goals in the Department of the Navy is to foster a climate where each member is treated with dignity and respect, our equal opportunity training programs will include initiatives which will be designed to address this issue.

The Navy and Marine Corps have monitored equal opportunity and racial incidents earnestly for a number of years, and we've responded aggressively to every confirmed report. We have a number of survey instruments to track command climate, both locally and service-wide. In both Navy and Marine Corps, the results of our most recent equal opportunity surveys were very encouraging. We take our equal opportunity program seriously, as it has a direct impact on our readiness, and we are proud of our record. Additionally, there are many initiatives in place to enhance the equal opportunity environment in the Navy and Marine Corps and to more fully integrate all sectors of our service.

The incident in Fayetteville, North Carolina in December, 1995 was a clear signal on the importance of timely action to specifically address extremism. Immediately after that incident, the Department of the Navy launched a comprehensive review of our equal opportunity programs, policies, and experiences to achieve five goals:

(1) to determine the scope of extremist activity in the Navy and Marine Corps today;

(2) to analyze the parameters of our authority to control extremist activities among our members;

(3) to change regulations and policies, if necessary, to ensure swift separation processing of any person in the Naval Service who engages in detrimental extremist conduct;

(4) to establish an efficient and effective way to identify and monitor extremist incidents; and

(5) to foster and improve the climate of tolerance and mutual respect in the Department of the Navy.

I would like to report the results of these efforts, and to reaffirm our commitment to a force that respects and defends equal opportunity and equal protection under the law for every American. We have not tolerated Sailors or Marines who engage in extremist conduct in the past, and we will never tolerate such conduct.

II FINDINGS

Scope of Extremist Activity in the Navy and Marine Corps

The Judge Advocate General of the Navy assembled data from military attorneys and others in late December and early January that led us to conclude that the problem of extremist activity in the Navy and Marine Corps is a limited one. The number of cases is few, and commanders possess adequate tools to combat such activities.

A survey of all 35 Navy and Marine Corps Military Judges resulted in only three recalling any court-martial case in which criminal conduct based on race, religion, ethnic origin, political beliefs, or gender was involved.

A similar survey of Fleet and Staff Judge Advocates was conducted for the following five major Navy commands:

- Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
- Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
- Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe
- Chief of Naval Education and Training, and
- Chief, Naval Reserve Force

None reported any extremist-related cases.

The Director of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service reported that his organization has conducted only two criminal investigations during the past two years that they categorized as "hate crimes."

On 18 December, the Commandant of the Marine Corps reiterated Department of the Navy policy that prohibits participation in groups or activities that espouse hate and violence in a letter to every Marine Commanding Officer. He asked every command to take a hard look and assess the potential for extremist problems within the command. No significant problems were uncovered.

The Equal Opportunity Division at the Bureau of Naval Personnel receives and tracks complaints of sexual harassment and race-based discrimination. The Division reported that the number of extremist or hate crime-related incidents since 1988 was less than 15. Of that number, the majority were not hate crimes perpetrated by Navy personnel, but in fact, Navy personnel were the targets of the hate crime acts.

In spite of the relatively benign result of these surveys, the few reported incidents over the last year require positive action. The Department of the Navy will take positive steps, both in Human Relations training and in our separation procedures, to arrest any potential problem in this regard. The bottom line is extremist conduct undermines unit cohesion and is detrimental to good order and discipline and mission accomplishment, and will not be part of the Department of the Navy.

Navy and Marine Corps can Prohibit Extremist Conduct

Next, we looked at the legal foundations and parameters that would govern any Naval Service action in providing guidance to the Fleet. The object of that guidance was intended to prevent and extinguish any extremist activities and to process for separation those members who engage in such conduct.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, "the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society," which, "must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life." Often, this requires us to impose burdens on our members' personal liberties unlike anything comparable in civilian society. In several seminal, precedent-setting decisions, the Supreme Court deferred to the judgment of the military in policy decisions that infringe on a member's constitutional rights beyond the level permissible in civilian society, because of the unique needs of the military.

The Navy and Marine Corps conclude that service member conduct involving extremist or supremacist activities can undermine unit cohesion or be detrimental to good order and discipline or mission accomplishment. Such conduct is incompatible with military service. The Navy and Marine Corps will not enlist, commission, or retain a Sailor or Marine who engages in a single, substantiated incident of extremist conduct that risks undermining unit cohesion.

We believe the courts will uphold as legally permissible our application of this policy. We believe we are on firm legal ground to set Department of the Navy policy that prohibits extremist conduct that undermines unit cohesion or is detrimental to good order and discipline or mission accomplishment.

III INITIATIVES

Modification of Pertinent Regulations

The consensus among commanders, our legal specialists, and Department of the Navy leadership is that current Department of Defense, Navy, and Marine Corps directives give us implicit authority to deal effectively with this issue; however, we are

making slight modifications to ensure we address extremism in a more explicit manner. These changes are in the process of being drafted and approved.

The applicable directives recognize that discriminatory and extremist practices, on or off base, directed against others undermine morale, efficiency, and mission accomplishment. The directives give commanders the necessary tools to control such activities.

One of these policy changes, which will improve our ability to enforce our zero tolerance policy on extremism, is to clarify that serious misconduct involving participation in extremist or supremacist activities -- whether alone or as part of a group -- is a basis for administrative separation, and that a single substantiated incident of serious misconduct will result in mandatory separation processing. An incident involves serious misconduct when the commander, in his or her independent judgment, determines that the misconduct is more likely than not to undermine unit cohesion or be detrimental to the good order, discipline, or mission accomplishment of the command or unit. In any particular case, the commander may take any appropriate disciplinary or administrative actions, including administrative separation processing. The change makes it crystal clear that those who engage in such conduct are not welcome as members of the Navy and Marine Corps.

Enhancements to Reporting Procedures

A thorough review of the applicable directives governing equal opportunity in the military determined that procedures are in place for an effective program to monitor extremist and supremacist activities.

Defense, Navy and Marine Corps directives on equal opportunity provide both the policy and structure for monitoring violations and complaints while improving morale, discipline, and mission effectiveness. While the Service Chiefs and the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs have responsibility for overall development and supervision of programs in support of equal opportunity policies, local commanders are responsible for implementing the provisions of the

Navy and Marine Corps Equal Opportunity Manual. One key command obligation is to report and handle racial incidents, including those "involving members of the command actively expressing or demonstrating open support for known supremacist organizations."

More importantly, commands report all racial incidents to higher authority. Serious racial incidents require an immediate telephone report to the next superior commander, while minor incidents are reported through routine channels. In addition, the Department of the Navy Discrimination and Sexual Harassment system requires commands to submit quarterly reports to headquarters outlining incidents of discrimination and harassment.

Navy and Marine Corps Equal Opportunity offices monitor the overall climate and recommend corrective actions when necessary. The most common problems addressed are isolated complaints of racial discrimination and incidents of sexual harassment. As mentioned previously, the instances of extremist-based incidents are few but still warrant positive action. As such, I have directed the Navy and Marine Corps to establish procedures to ensure that all information on hate groups and their activities is shared among all appropriate law enforcement/human relations branches of the Department, and then disseminated to the lowest level of leadership. This will ensure that we have an accurate picture of the threat within the local community and that all units will be aware of it. Additionally, I have directed my staff to determine the best means of tracking information on extremist activities in order that precise information on the extremist threat is available to Departmental leadership and throughout the Fleet and Corps.

Continuation of Efforts to Improve Equal Opportunity

The overwhelming majority of service personnel strongly support fundamental principles of individual worth, respect for others, equal opportunity, and our democratic form of government. However, we must act decisively to deal with the fringe element which may be drawn to hate groups and extremist activities.

Our best defense is to screen out potential trouble makers before enlistment or accession. Congress proposed in the

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 that each prospective recruit be provided information "concerning the meaning of the oath of office or oath of enlistment for service in the Armed Forces in terms of the equal protection and civil liberties guarantees of the Constitution, and each such individual shall be informed that if supporting those guarantees is not possible personally for that individual, then that individual should decline to enter the Armed Forces."

This requirement is fundamental to the Navy's mission and readiness and can be implemented without legislation because it is the right thing to do. The Navy will clearly advise any person who joins the Armed Forces with a contrary personal belief that extremist conduct detrimental to good order and discipline will be grounds for mandatory processing for separation.

The Navy and Marine Corps are well positioned to foster productive attitudes. Our members live and work closely with others from different racial, ethnic, religious, and regional backgrounds. Retention and advancement are based on performance and a commitment to fair treatment of others; equal opportunity is a critical factor in evaluations and fitness reports. Through training and education, we can combat further the problems posed by racist, extremist, and supremacist organizations.

We are currently working to incorporate training on extremism for Sailors and Marines, both to raise awareness and educate our members about these organizations, and to make certain that our leaders are fully aware of the tools they have at their disposal for combating this problem, should it occur on their watch. This training will be provided at all levels of the chain of command, from the newest recruit through senior officers.

The Navy is developing a training module to address extremist group activity. This course will be integrated into our Navy Rights and Responsibilities (NR&R) course, and offered annually to all Navy personnel. It is anticipated that the new training module will be in place by the end of 1996.

The Marine Corps is undertaking a similar initiative. An extremism awareness module has already been incorporated in their Staff NCO Advanced course, and will be included in all other

Marine Corps University Professional Military Education Schools by the 1996-1997 academic year. The goal is to include this training in the equal opportunity and leadership courses spanning recruit training through the Commanders Course.

These educational efforts dovetail perfectly with another provision in Congress' proposed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 -- mandatory training on "race relations, equal opportunity, opposition to gender discrimination, and sensitivity to hate group activity" during boot camp and on a regular basis thereafter. In view of existing programs, the Navy and Marine Corps will be well-positioned to comply with this requirement if it is enacted into law.

IV CONCLUSION

In conclusion, thank you again for the opportunity to outline our efforts targeted at extremist activity.

I am confident that we are taking the steps needed to aggressively combat this challenge in the Department of the Navy. We will continue our focus on the broader context of our equal opportunity program, as we work to make our Service one that promotes high standards of character and ethics, and upholds the worth of each individual Sailor and Marine.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Widnall.

**STATEMENT OF HON. SHEILA E. WIDNALL, SECRETARY OF
THE AIR FORCE**

Secretary WIDNALL. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I welcome this opportunity to appear with my colleagues to discuss this very serious issue and to let you know what actions the Air Force is taking to deter and eliminate any presence of hate groups in our forces. I have submitted an expanded statement for the record.

The racist attitudes and discriminatory acts that give rise to hate groups are a very real threat to military strength and cohesiveness. Such attitudes and acts reflect larger movements within society and threaten the entire sense of community, military and civilian, that makes America work. Insofar as these attitudes can be found in our forces—and I think, fortunately, they are much less prevalent in the military than in the larger society—they reflect a broader national concern. The rancor, suspicion, and the lack of civility that increasingly mar our discourse threaten permanent damage to our political and social institutions. It is incumbent on all of us, whether we wear a uniform or not, to do what we can to heal these breaches in our society to avoid driving further wedges between the groups that make up this wonderful mosaic that is America.

The American military has a powerful role to play in that regard. We are, to some extent, a reflection of society, but we should also be an engine, helping to move this Nation toward tolerance and equal opportunity. We have played that role since the late 1940's, compelled in no small part by the iron necessity of combat readiness. We have an absolute obligation, and the American people have an absolute right to expect, that military members will use their expertise and the lethal tools of our trade to protect them and never to harm them.

It is important to establish the framework within which we approach this issue of extremism within our ranks. We exist to fight and win America's wars. Nothing must come between the Air Force and its ability to fulfill that mission. Cohesion within a military unit is at the heart of military effectiveness. Division within the ranks, conversely, destroys a force. We cannot tolerate that, and General Fogleman and I have taken decisive action to ensure that our policy is clear, that it is understood by everyone in the Air Force, and that our commanders have the authority they need to combat this threat.

In the Air Force, our policy is clearly stated and widely publicized. We prohibit active participation in organizations that support supremacist causes or advocate the use of force, violence, or illegal discrimination, or otherwise engage in efforts to deprive individuals of civil rights. This policy, at its core, mandates respect and dignity for all individuals. We must ensure that our people enjoy the rights and the working environment necessary for them to exert their talents fully in the service of their country.

My written statement for the record outlines the steps we took in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing to assess the magnitude of the problem. On the whole, the information obtained was

encouraging. But in any organization, there is always a concern that there is a disconnect between headquarters and the people in the field. And so we went out to our wing commanders last March to make sure, beyond any shadow of a doubt, that they were confident that they had the guidance they needed and the authority and the latitude necessary to eliminate this threat.

Ultimately, it is these commanders across the force who will ensure the success of this policy. They responded almost unanimously that they knew what was expected of them, and that they had the authority necessary to execute their responsibilities. For example, from Mildenhall Air Base, our commander noted that "I have no doubts about my authority or, for that matter, my responsibility as a commander, to judge the appropriateness of indices of extremist activity. Similarly, I would have no difficulty taking active steps to ensure that the offender is dealt with administratively commensurate with the offense. Nor would I have difficulty taking sterner measures authorized under the UCMJ should such action be warranted, either by repeat offenses or the seriousness of the conduct."

And so we are satisfied that we are doing whatever is necessary to combat this evil. Our policy of zero tolerance is clear and comprehensive. We have ensured education in this area at numerous points throughout each person's career, and we have strengthened our training programs for wing and group commanders to make sure that these principles are fully understood.

Across the Air Force we find that our people are mature and focused on mission accomplishment. They understand and support the policy. The results of our survey were encouraging in that regard, and we found no evidence of hate groups operating on any of our bases around the world. But we can never take it for granted that in an organization composed of nearly 400,000 men and women in uniform that every person will live up to the standards that we establish. So we will never relax. The stakes are too high. We will maintain our vigilance, because only by doing so can we ensure that we can fulfill our obligations to this Nation.

Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss these issues. I look forward to our discussion.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Widnall follows:]

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

**PRESENTATION TO THE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

SUBJECT: EXTREMIST GROUP ACTIVITY IN THE MILITARY

**STATEMENT OF: THE HONORABLE SHEILA E. WIDNALL
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE**

25 JUNE 1996

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

Overview

The attitudes and activities championed by members of hate groups are antithetical to the fundamental principles of this nation. They are also entirely incompatible with an effective military. I welcome this opportunity to discuss this issue with you and to let you know what actions the Air Force is taking to deter and eliminate any presence of hate groups in our forces.

My testimony today will cover four areas: Air Force policy; how we assessed the extent of these kinds of activities by Air Force members; the authority of commanders to deal with hate group activity on their installations; and training and education we provide our military personnel on the policy underlying hate groups. My goal is to outline the range of actions that the Air Force has taken to ensure that we understand this threat and are countering it quickly and effectively.

The racist attitudes and discriminatory acts that are the hallmark of hate groups are a very real threat to military strength and cohesiveness. Such attitudes and acts reflect larger movements within society and threaten the entire sense of community, military and civilian, that makes America work. Insofar as these attitudes can be found in our forces--and I think that, fortunately, they are much less prevalent in the military than in the larger society--they reflect a broader, national concern. The rancor, suspicion and the lack of civility that increasingly mar our discourse, here in Washington and across our society,

threaten permanent damage to our political and social institutions. It is incumbent on all of us--whether we wear a uniform or not--to do what we can to heal these breaches in our society, to avoid driving further wedges between the groups that make up this wonderful mosaic that is America.

The American military has a powerful role to play in that regard. We are to some extent a reflection of society--but we should also be an engine, moving this nation toward tolerance and equal opportunity. We have helped to play that role since the late 1940s--compelled in no small part by the iron necessity of combat readiness. We have an absolute obligation to ensure--and the American people have an absolute right to expect--that military members will use their expertise and the lethal tools of our trade to protect them and never to harm them.

It is important to establish the framework within which we approach this issue of extremism within our ranks. We exist to fight and win America's wars. Nothing must come between the Air Force and its ability to fulfill that mission. Cohesion within the ranks is at the heart of military effectiveness: division within the ranks, conversely, destroys a force. We cannot tolerate that--and General Fogleman and I have taken decisive action to ensure that our policy is clear, that it is understood by everyone in the Air Force, and that our commanders have the authority they need to combat this threat.

Air Force Policy

Our policy is clearly delineated in Air Force Instruction 51-903, Dissident and Protest Activities. Violations of this AFI are subject to a range of actions, from administrative measures such as counseling, to disciplinary actions under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Our policy prohibits active participation in organizations that support supremacist causes or advocate illegal discrimination, advocate use of unlawful force or violence, or otherwise engage in efforts to deprive individuals of civil rights. Active participation includes publicly demonstrating or rallying, fund-raising, recruiting and training members, and organizing or leading.

You may have noticed I did not mention membership. Although membership alone is not prohibited, supervisors properly consider the fact that individuals belong to a group advocating supremacist causes when evaluating or assigning them. The policy I have described implements the Department of Defense Directive on Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces.

More broadly, Air Force policy, at its core, mandates respect and dignity for all individuals. We must ensure that our people enjoy the rights and the working environment necessary for them to exert their talents fully in the service of their country.

Assessing the Extent of the Problem

To eliminate the threat posed by hate groups, we first had to understand the magnitude of the problem. On 4 May 1995, soon after the Oklahoma City bombing, General Fogleman sent a message to all major command commanders directing them to have their subordinate commanders revisit the policy on membership and participation in hate groups. Following the Fayetteville murders, General Fogleman and I sent a message on 20 December 1995 to major command commanders directing that all commanders readdress the rules regarding participation in such groups. The message also reemphasized Air Force policy--active participation in hate groups is totally unacceptable and will result in administrative or disciplinary actions.

We also directed that commanders report violations or suspected violations of Air Force policy on hate group activity since 1 January 1994. Finally, we directed the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, or OSI, to conduct a review of all criminal investigative case files opened since 1 January 1994 to determine if any involved Air Force members espousing or actively participating in supremacist causes.

Commanders reported 14 incidents, the majority of which involved graffiti or other individual expressions of racist attitudes. None indicated that known hate groups were or are operating on Air Force installations.

The OSI also reported four cases. Two of these involved actual or potential violations of Air Force policy on active participation in supremacist and hate group activities. A summary of these two cases follows:

- MacDill AFB, FL, Dec 95--an Air Force member attempted to recruit military members into a supremacist group--the National Association for the Advancement of White People. The individual received a letter of reprimand with an unfavorable information file and attended sensitivity training. Of the incidents reported by commanders and by the OSI, this was the only one involving substantiated allegations of active participation in supremacist group activity.

- Dover AFB, DE, April 96--AFOSI received an allegation that an airman had made racially motivated remarks and attempted to recruit another Air Force member into a "Neo-Nazi" group. To date, AFOSI's investigation has not corroborated the allegation. Command officials have been briefed on the matter and if there are any further evidence of attempts to recruit for, or distribute literature published by, "Neo-Nazi" groups, appropriate action will be taken.

Commanders' Authority

On the whole, these results are encouraging. But in any organization, there is always the concern that there is a disconnect between the headquarters and the people in

the field. And so, we went out to our wing commanders last March, to make sure--beyond any shadow of a doubt--that they were confident that they had the guidance they needed, and the authority and latitude necessary to deal with this threat.

Ultimately, it is these commanders across the force who will ensure the success of this policy. And they responded almost unanimously that they knew what was expected of them--and that they had the authority they need to execute their responsibilities.

For example, from Mildenhall AB our commander noted that "I have no doubts about my authority, or, for that matter, my responsibility as a commander, to judge the appropriateness of... indices of extremist group activity. Similarly, I would have no difficulty...taking active steps to ensure that the offender is dealt with administratively commensurate with the offense. Nor would I have difficulty taking sterner measures authorized under the UCMJ should such action be warranted either by repeated offenses or the seriousness of the conduct."

Training and Education

Our efforts to deal with this threat have included these surveys to measure its extent and steps to ensure that our commanders have the tools they need. A third essential element, of course, is informing our personnel about these groups--how they can affect mission accomplishment, and what the consequences are if our personnel participate in

hate groups. We have included training in this area within our overall equal opportunity education and training programs. Our training is directed at different points of an individual's career in the Air Force. It is included during basic training and at first duty station for our younger, less experienced personnel; it is in the curriculum for Airman Leadership School; it is being included in the curricula for all levels of officer and noncommissioned officer professional military education; and, we have included this issue in training courses for wing and group commanders. Finally, our Equal Opportunity 2000 training, a four-hour course which all military and civilian personnel must attend, includes discussion of extremist group activities/policies along with discussion of discrimination and sexual harassment issues.

To get a sampling of how some of our Air Force bases are addressing hate group issues, and because they were in close proximity to each other, my deputy for equal opportunity conducted a fact-finding trip to our bases in North and South Carolina in late March. These bases were also selected because the North Carolina bases were mentioned in a report by the North Carolina state chapter of the NAACP and had participated in NAACP-sponsored town meetings to determine if there were problems with extremist groups around military bases. My deputy reported that the human relations climate is healthy and there is no evidence that Air Force members are actively participating in hate groups, or that Air Force personnel are being recruited by these organizations. He also reported that the OSI detachments at these bases have an excellent working relationship with both local and federal law enforcement officials. Discussions with these officials

indicate they have no knowledge of Air Force personnel being involved in hate group activity in either North or South Carolina.

Summary

In summary, we are satisfied that we are doing what is necessary to combat this evil. Across the Air Force, we find that our people are mature and focused on mission accomplishment. They understand and support the policy. The results of the survey were encouraging in that regard. We found no evidence of hate groups operating on any of our bases around the world.

But we can never take it for granted that in an organization nearly 400,000 strong, every person will live up to the standards we establish. So we can never relax. The stakes are too high. We will maintain our vigilance--because only by doing so can we ensure that we can fulfill our obligations to this nation.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, ma'am.
Secretary Dorn.

**STATEMENT OF HON. EDWIN DORN, UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS**

Mr. DORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Dellums, distinguished members of the committee. I am honored to join Secretary West and Secretary Dalton and Secretary Widnall at this witness table.

This is an important and timely hearing. It is important because it gives us an opportunity to reiterate our determination to keep racists and other extremists from disrupting the U.S. military. It is timely because we're just now in the process of refining the rules and prohibit military personnel from participating in extremist activities.

Let me offer three points of reference about the U.S. military before I discuss our treatment of extremism. First, the United States has the finest military in the world. It attracts high quality, young men and women, and it trains them to a high state of readiness, and it tries to provide them and their families with a good quality of life. On that point, I agree wholeheartedly with Mr. Dellums, who said that in his opening statement. Second, the U.S. military has long been a leader in the area of equal opportunity, and third, those who participate in racist or other extremist activities are a minuscule proportion of the force and we want them out of the force altogether.

We are doing three things to discourage extremist activity. First, as Secretary West mentioned, we are refining our policy. Our basic statement on this matter, DOD directive 1325.6, was last updated in 1986. The directive, for the record, says that military personnel must reject participation in organizations that espouse supremacist causes, that attempt to create illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, religion, or national origin, or that advocate the use of force or violence or otherwise engage in efforts to deprive individuals of their rights.

We think that statement is pretty sound, but we think some of the details of that directive can be improved upon. For example, we hope to improve it to make clear that our policy applies to reservists and not just to active duty personnel. Mr. McHale, this is a question you asked during the previous panel.

We also want to get at this difficult issue of active versus passive participation. Already the directive describes certain kinds of activities—demonstrating, fundraising, recruiting and training members and so on. Our directive will make clear that military personnel should not do anything to discourage the objective of a group whose activities harm the good order and discipline of a military unit.

The revised directive will not attempt to list all the possible activities or displays or organizations that can be prohibited. Rather, it will make clear that whether a particular activity or display will be prohibited will depend on the commander's judgment about the effect of that display or activity on good order and discipline. So that's the first thing we're doing, refining the policy.

Second, we are enhancing our training. As we looked at what we were doing, we discovered that DOD did not require training on extremist activities. All of the services, it turns out, were offering blocks of training on extremism, but exactly what they were offering and when and to whom varied. So, in the future, we're going to ask all the services to provide training at key points: during basic training, during precommission training, and during professional military education programs and so on.

We have also instructed the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute to add a block of instruction on extremism. Training is important, Mr. Chairman, because the military services are ever-changing. Every year we recruit about 200,000 young men and women into the active force, and another 150,000 into the Reserve components. They come from all corners of society, and we want them to come from all corners of society. However, some of them do come from a few dark corners, where young people are exposed to racist and xenophobic and misogynist notions. So from day one, the services must teach these recruits the military's core beliefs, and among those core beliefs is the belief that equal opportunity is a military necessity. The services have been remarkably successful in instilling the values of racial tolerance and equal opportunity. The senseless tragedy at Fayetteville suggests that we're not a 100 percent successful.

Third, we are improving our monitoring and our reporting. The services use a variety of means to monitor and report extremist activity. However, the Department of Defense has never aggregated the service information, partly because the services reporting formats are different.

In the future, we're going to do two things about that. First, we are developing a standard format—it's going to be called Defense Incident Based Reporting System—and second, consistent with congressional requirements, we're going to conduct periodic, DOD-wide surveys to gauge the state of race relations in the military. I believe those periodic reviews will be useful and instructive. I think they should probably be done every 2 years, probably no more than that, so that we can gauge trends.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me stress something that came up in the preceding panel, and that is the importance of leadership. This was one of the key findings, Mr. Dellums, from your 1994 report.

What military leaders say and do, the command climate that they establish is very important, perhaps more important than the formal rules we adopt and the formal reports we require. I think this idea about leadership is a useful lesson for a lot of us who occupy positions of leadership. We should be very mindful of the impression we create when we talk about racial issues, because those are some of the most sensitive and divisive issues in our society.

Only recently did this society renounce legal segregation and discrimination. Many of us in this room attended segregated schools, and some of us rode in the back of a bus. The stain of racism didn't evaporate with the passage of civil rights laws. It's fading, but slowly. We should use our moral and our mental energies to promote racial justice. We should use our positions of leadership to foster racial reconciliation.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving me an opportunity to make that statement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dorn follows:]

**Statement by The Honorable Edwin Dorn
Under Secretary of Defense
for Personnel & Readiness**

**Hearings on Extremism in The Armed Forces
House National Security Committee
June 25, 1996**

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Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss extremist activity in our military forces.

I will cover three important areas in my testimony. First, I want to place the issue of hate and bias-motivated activities in context. To this end, I will provide the Committee with an update on the state of our armed forces. Second, I will review our current initiatives to improve the quality of life of our service members. An important aspect of this initiative involves our efforts to ensure that all service members are treated fairly and provided the opportunity to achieve their full potential in the service of their country. Finally, I will specifically address the issue of hate based violence or, if you will, extremism in the armed forces.

Mr. Chairman, Americans can be proud of our armed forces today. The downsizing of our active forces is now nearly complete; the active force is nearly 600,000 people smaller than it was in the late 1980s. This drawdown has been unprecedented, in the sense that this is the first time we have confronted the challenge of shrinking an all-volunteer force. We have met that challenge. Our force today is experienced, capable, and diverse; it has the right mix of skills to meet current and future challenges; it continues to attract high quality young men and women; and it is ready. Indeed, this is the first time in history that we have managed to maintain readiness while drawing down the force. These successes are the result of the hard work of two administrations, strong support from the Congress, and the management skills and sound judgment of the Defense Department's military and civilian leaders.

As the Department reaches the end of the drawdown, its leaders have begun to focus on the factors needed to maintain a high quality force in the future. The keys to recruiting and retaining high quality personnel are providing a decent quality of life for our military personnel and their families, and keeping faith with our veterans and retirees. We must attend to basics like

compensation, housing, and health care; we must provide opportunities for personal fulfillment and professional development; and we must treat our people fairly.

This Administration has established and funded an extraordinary quality of life initiative to support the 1.5 million men and women on active duty and their families. It began with President Clinton's and Secretary Perry's determination to spend the \$7.7 billion necessary to see that service members get the maximum pay raise allowed by law through the end of the decade -- an unprecedented commitment. Additionally, Secretary Perry's quality of life initiative committed \$2.7 billion over Fiscal Years 1996-01 to improve housing, reduce the housing cost gap for those who live off post, expand child care, supplement the income of service members assigned to high cost areas in the United States, improve morale and recreation services, and provide other benefits for the members and their families.

As the Services complete their downsizing, the focus has shifted to the task of stabilizing the force. Any drawdown of the size that has been achieved, even one carefully and successfully managed, will cause turbulence -- it is an inevitable by-product of change. Therefore, DoD is taking steps to provide a greater sense of stability to members of our armed forces and their families.

Secretary Perry's quality of life initiative is one important element of that effort. Less quantifiable factors also contribute to a stable environment for service members. For example, we must ensure that the tempo at which our people work -- particularly the amount of time they are deployed -- is not so burdensome that it wears them out physically, keeps them away from their families, or deprives them of opportunities for personal development. Our force has been very busy since the end of the Cold War. We have been watching our operating tempos and our personnel tempos to ensure that we are not burning people out.

Equal opportunity policies and programs are another central part of our effort to support all service members. Equal opportunity programs help to provide today's all-volunteer force access to the largest and most diverse pool of qualified men and women, allow the military to train and assign people according to the needs of the service, and guarantee service men and women that they will be judged by their performance and will be protected from illegal discrimination and sexual harassment.

Discrimination and sexual harassment jeopardize combat readiness by weakening interpersonal bonds, fomenting distrust, eroding unit cohesion, and threatening good order and discipline. An organizational climate poisoned by bias sets member against member and undermines institutional allegiance. Quality of life in the armed forces is supported by comprehensive and reliable systems for addressing human relations issues and for investigating and resolving discrimination complaints. Such systems provide a visible symbol of organizational commitment to equality and fair treatment, education and training, counseling support, and assistance to complainants when equal opportunity violations occur.

Department of Defense policy clearly proscribes discrimination, sexual harassment, and active participation in organizations which preach hatred, intolerance, and violence. The Department of Defense and the Military Services strive to ensure that they are organizations in which every individual is able to contribute to his or her fullest potential in an atmosphere of respect and dignity. Furthermore, the Department, of necessity, is building a force that reflects the diversity of the nation.

Now, I would like to turn to the specific subject of today's hearing. The President and the Secretary of Defense are adamant that bias - motivated conduct has no place in the armed forces. Back in the 1960s and 1970s, we learned that we could not control what a person thinks, but we

could control behavior. Morris Dees, the prominent civil rights attorney and co-founder of the Southern Poverty Law Center, once said that America is a place where we are free to hate, but not to hurt. Hate or bias motivated conduct destroys unit cohesion; people who cannot respect one another during peacetime cannot be trusted to look out for one another during combat. More fundamentally, hate and bias motivated conduct run counter to some of this nation's most important values -- our belief in the dignity of the individual and our commitment to liberty and justice for all.

Our policies are clear, and we have the tools to enforce them. Commanders are expected to employ the full range of administrative procedures, including separation or appropriate disciplinary action, to deal with military personnel whose participation or acts are detrimental to the good order and discipline that is at the core of military effectiveness.

I want to enter in the record the statement that Secretary of Defense Perry issued following the tragic incident last December in Fayetteville, North Carolina:

Two recent murders in Fayetteville . . . have led to media questions about Department of Defense policy concerning the participation of military personnel in supremacist organizations. Without commenting on the facts of this case, I want to say that there is no place for racial hatred or extremism in the US military.

The policies of the Department of Defense clearly prohibit racial intolerance and discrimination in any form. Equal treatment, respect, and trust are values that the men and women in the military take very seriously. These values are fundamental to a just society, and they are fundamental to military effectiveness. Military training stresses these principles; military conduct requires their observance.

Every member of the armed forces takes an oath to 'support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.' The men and women in the military understand the gravity of this oath. Department of Defense policies state that military personnel must reject participation in organizations that espouse supremacist causes; attempt to create illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, religion, or national origin; or advocate the use of force or violence, or otherwise engage in efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights.

In the wake of the Fayetteville murders, Secretary of the Army Togo West assembled a task force to assess the human relations environment in general and the influence of extremist groups in particular among soldiers throughout the Army, and make recommendations about the extent and nature of this problem in the Army. As you know, Mr. Chairman, the news from that inquiry was generally good: extremism is not a wide-spread problem in the Army. The other Service Secretaries have also reviewed this issue, and all indications are that the extent of hate and bias motivated activity is small throughout the military.

At the same time as the Service reviews, my office undertook a review of: 1) the adequacy and effectiveness of defense policy directives and service implementing directives with respect to the conduct of military personnel and their involvement in groups which advocate illegal discrimination or conduct or condone violence to deprive others of their civil rights; 2) the adequacy and effectiveness of training concerning involvement in such organizations or in other dissident activities; and 3) the implementation of a uniform DoD system for reporting race/gender based serious incidents.

Our review concluded that the core elements of the DoD policy were sound and that any modifications to DoD policy should build on the existing policy. We found that all Services had developed and implemented training programs covering extremist organizations and dissident activities, but Service policies did not require or provide a mechanism for tracking training which focused on such activities. Training provided was often incorporated as part of a broader topic or program of training and was thus hard to identify or track. We also found that current DoD policy did not contain an explicit requirement for training in the Services and that the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) did not provide training for the Department's equal opportunity advisors on hate groups or on extremist and dissident activities.

With respect to information on race/gender-based serious incidents, we found that DoD policy has not required the establishment of a uniform system for collecting and retrieving data on extremist group activity or on hate/bias motivated crimes or related serious incidents. Information collected by the Services is generally retained within the functional area that collects it. Further, we found that DoD surveys and DEOMI climate assessments do not address hate group activities or advocacy.

This March, we started revising DoD Directive 1325.6, "Guidelines for Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces," to address the conclusions from our review. The proposed revision is intended to clarify the Department's policy by more precisely describing sanctioned activities and emphasizing that commanders must actively address activities they view as detrimental to good order, discipline, or mission accomplishment.

The proposed revision also makes it even more clear that vigilance with respect to the existence of such activities, active use of investigative authorities -- to include prompt, fair

complaint-handling processes--and use of administrative powers--such as counseling, reprimands, orders, and performance evaluations--are functions of command and that the full range of those powers should be used when confronting hate group activity.

Finally, the revised Directive would require that the military departments ensure that the policy is included in initial active duty training, pre-commissioning training, professional military education, commander training, and other appropriate Service training programs, such as for law enforcement or equal opportunity personnel.

This is important, since training has been one of the keys to the military's remarkable success in race relations and equal opportunity over the last two decades. In addition, the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute has begun designing a program of training on hate groups and their activities for equal opportunity advisors, equal opportunity program managers and senior leaders.

Finally, we are now working to implement the Defense Incident Based Reporting System (DIBRS), which we have been developing on a priority basis. DIBRS is a comprehensive reporting system primarily designed to track criminal incidents (this includes all UCMJ violations) from their commission through ultimate disposition. Implementation of DIBRS, which is anticipated late this year, will provide for the uniform reporting of race-, gender-, and religion-based incidents. The reporting requirements include the identification of "bias-motivated" incidents/offenses. Under this category, there are 23 different types of bias motivation that can be checked, including two catch-all types of "other religious" and "other-ethnicity." This identifier would be tagged to specific incidents/offenses, thereby providing a picture of the nature of offenses that are bias motivated. DIBRS will also provide data on the ultimate disposition of

these cases. We are also reviewing the feasibility of assessing the level of hate or bias based activities and advocacy through survey and climate assessments.

As noted in the May 1995 report of the Defense Equal Opportunity Council Task Force on Discrimination and Sexual Harassment, "the U.S. Armed Forces are not immune to social forces that affect our larger society. Racial and ethnic unrest, changing workplace demographics, economic insecurity, and class differences can spill over to create tension within the armed services." Thus, our vigilance with respect to hate or bias motivated activities will continue.

But once again, Mr. Chairman, let me be clear about the policy of this Department and the Administration: there is no place in our military forces for the vicious, ugly, and divisive views that characterize hate groups. Service members have a right to hold any political opinion, but no one has a right to harass or intimidate others or otherwise affect the good order and discipline on which the effectiveness of military units and hence our national defense rests. We know from long experience that dissension, intolerance, and prejudice affect the cohesion and esprit de corps that are critical to success in peacetime and in combat. It is our obligation, as leaders, to maintain the most effective fighting force in the world. I can assure you that is exactly what we will do.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss this important matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Before we get into questions, I understand Secretary Widnall has another engagement—

Secretary WIDNALL. A little tight time schedule.

The CHAIRMAN. So if there are any questions for her, we might want to ask them of her first.

Mr. Dellums, I'll let you start off.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I have questions for a number of the panelists, but let me first make an observation to you, Mr. Chairman, to my colleagues, and to the witnesses.

We're going to talk further today, as we did earlier today, about constitutional rights, freedom of speech, freedom of association, active and passive. It is very interesting that two military people can stand side by side and each of them can utter three words and the response is somewhat different. "I am gay." The response is uniform, clear, and unequivocal. That is illegal and you're out of here. The second person says, "I am Nazi. I am neo-Nazi." There are variations on how we respond.

My questions will be an effort to try to elicit why, whether that should be the case, or whether it shouldn't be the case. I'm not a lawyer. As I understand, when a constitutional right is invoked, like the right of association, as I understand it, the standard is not that the Government can do nothing but, rather, it must first demonstrate a compelling state interest. For example, as Secretary Dalton and others have pointed out, Mr. Dorn and others, good order and discipline and readiness, these become compelling state interests. And second, it must take the least restrictive course to achieve these goals. DOD and service steps should be measured against that constitutional test.

With that sort of opening, Secretary Dalton, you stepped forward, unequivocally, straightforward, and said zero tolerance. Is it your testimony that the Navy intends to take a dramatic departure, as I understand your testimony, from the past practice of differentiating between active and passive association with extremist groups? Is it now the position of the Navy that there's no difference, in that any association is a challenge to good order and discipline and, therefore, a readiness issue, and indeed, grounds for dismissal, and finally, how is it that the Navy feels the courts will uphold this in light of first amendment issues?

Secretary DALTON. Mr. Dellums, in my written statement I covered this point a little more clearly than in my oral statement. I would like to refer you to page 6 of that statement:

"One of these policy changes which will improve our ability to enforce our zero tolerance policy on extremism is to clarify that serious misconduct involving participation in extremist or supremacist activities—whether alone or as part of a group—is the basis for administrative separation, and that a single substantiated incident of serious misconduct will result in mandatory separation processing. An incident involves serious misconduct when the commander, in his or her independent judgment, determines that the misconduct is more likely than not to undermine unit cohesion or be detrimental to the good order, discipline, or mission accomplishment of the command or unit. In any particular case, the commander may take

appropriate disciplinary or administrative actions, including administrative separation processing. The changes makes it crystal clear that those who engage in such conduct are not welcome members of the Navy and Marine Corps."

I think that states our policy as clearly as I can state it.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary West, your task force recommends that the guidance on what is permissible passive activity and impermissible active activity be clarified. What is the status of that effort, and why is it that the Army would not simply make the same kind of statement that the Navy makes on this issue?

Secretary WEST. I'm not sure that the bottom line of the Navy statement is very much different from the way ours will read, except that I noticed that Secretary Dalton emphasizes one incident and out. I don't think that's in our AR.

How we will resolve it is that we have dropped the distinction between active and passive from our draft, our new Army regulation, and simply focus on the conduct. The question is, "What did you do? Did you tack up a banner? Did you hand out material? Did you espouse membership? Did you attend a meeting of an extremist group, that you knew espoused extremist values, in uniform? Did you do fund-raising? What is the action you did?"

It doesn't require that you be a member. The question is, what has been your activity? On that basis, we will act. And that will be subject, as I said, that kind of a violation, to treatment under the UCMJ as well as part of the array of options open to the commander. That emphasis is not currently in our effective AR.

Now, membership in an extremist organization is still not to be something that now will suddenly be accepted by the Army. It still is also objectionable under our Army regulation, our new draft. We have attempted to avoid the confusion between merely passive and merely active, however, by saying that if you propose to take punitive action, it must be based on action, based on conduct. That is consistent with the position we have taken in a number of similar situations across the Department.

When I say that membership is not without its disadvantages, the Army regulation will continue to point out that membership can be taken into consideration for promotion purposes. Membership can be taken into consideration for assignment purposes. That is because membership itself is, in the Army's view, not to be encouraged. That can be taken into account when considering things like promotions or assignments. That's different from when you can take it into account for purposes of punishment or separation. That depends on conduct.

That will be the way the AR, as it is currently drafted, is focused. We think it's a lot clearer and commanders shouldn't be trying to decide between what's active and what's passive. The question is their conduct. If it contributes to the disruption of good order and morale and discipline of the unit, the commander acts.

Mr. DELLUMS. Have tried to listen very carefully, and I want to understand. That's why I said, if one military person uses one set of three words, the response is uniform, but another set of three words, I'm not sure that it is. I'm attempting to try to understand that.

Your focus was on activity and behavior. That connotes action. As I understood the Navy's response, they said that there is no distinction being made between passive and active. It's zero tolerance. If you're a member, you're out of here, because it is a readiness issue and it goes to the question of cohesion, et cetera.

As I listened carefully to you, it doesn't seem to me that that is quite the position of the Army. I'm just trying to understand it. Am I wrong? Am I hearing incorrectly, or are there nuances here that do speak to differences? And if so, I think we ultimately want to come to a uniform policy as to how we address this issue across the military.

Secretary WEST. Yes, sir. You are correct, that in my statement of the revision of the Army regulation, as it exists in draft now, there is not a position that says that membership is directly punishable.

Now, let me also say that I listened closely to what Secretary Dalton said as well. I did not hear that in his prescription, either. I think, in fact, we are the same on that question.

Mr. DELLUMS. That's a fair response.

Secretary Dalton, would you like to respond?

Secretary DALTON. Yes, sir, Mr. Dellums.

I think we're clear that extremist activity has no place in the Navy and Marine Corps. If someone has a belief, something that is his or her belief in something and they keep that to themselves, that's their business. But if they become engaged in extremist activity, belong to extremist groups, and they make that an issue in the unit, the unit commander has the wherewithal if, in his judgment, that will demean the good order and discipline of that organization, to move toward having that person processed for termination from the service.

Mr. DELLUMS. Secretary Widnall, would you like to respond to this, or do you have to leave?

Secretary WIDNALL. I would, but—Let me just read this note I have been handed. We just got word that a terrorist event has occurred at Dhahran. A truck bomb has exploded in the Air Force area of Khobar Towers, a housing area. There are 60 known casualties.

I would like to excuse myself and go on and try to find out what this is all about. Thank you.

[Secretary Widnall departs.]

Mr. DELLUMS. With your permission, let me withdraw at this point. I will come back to Secretary Dorn on the second round and give my other colleagues a chance to ask questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dornan.

Mr. DORNAN. The Secretary of the Air Force said there was an explosion in the housing area at Dhahran, and there were 16 casualties?

Secretary DALTON. Sixty, six zero, as I understood her, Mr. Dornan.

Mr. DORNAN. Sixty. And there was no breakdown with fatalities?

Secretary DALTON. Casualties was all she said.

Mr. DORNAN. Isn't it self-evident that that's probably some form of hate crime, mixed in with politics and international tension, religious extremism.

Let me go back to Secretary Dorn and just go down the line with our other two Secretaries.

Is there any doubt in any of your minds that the U.S. military forces and its civilian leadership has a handle on this now?

Mr. DORN. As we all tried to stress during our testimony, Mr. Dornan, we have worked very hard to clarify what the rules are, to discern whether or not we have problems, to make it very clear that violations of the rules will be dealt with very swiftly. This is the colloquy that Mr. Dellums, Secretary West, and Secretary Dalton were just engaged in.

Will I say that we have reached a zero point with respect to extremism in the military? I doubt it very seriously. But we hope that through our combined efforts, those who engage in those proscribed activities have been put on notice.

Mr. DORNAN. Good. If you could grab hold of my one little figure of speech, a handle on it, we're never going to get this to zero. It's just like the world is never going to get rape, thievery, bearing false witness, murder, and mayhem to zero. We always try to hold down the percentage rates.

But do you have, with confidence, a feeling that you have a grip on it, that you know where you're going here, and you're getting good responses from the backbone of the military, the NCO's and the chief petty officers?

Mr. DORN. I think it was very useful that Secretary West, when he conducted his review, had the Sergeant Major of the Army involved, because that's one of the very important channels, the NCO channels, through which we can communicate what the rules are and through which we can discern when the wrong conduct is occurring and being first with counseling, and if that doesn't work, then take the swift action to separate the miscreants from service.

Mr. DORNAN. You see, I joined the Air Force as an enlisted man in 1953, and I have all these fond memories of being on board a totally unbiased operation, thinking boy, this is better than school. I went to Christian schools. We're all in this together, a patriotic feeling. What a new day. This was 43 years ago. I can't believe we're going backwards, anywhere, at any time, other than ugly anomalies.

Secretary Dalton, is it your feeling the Navy is or should be better now than it was in 1986, or 1976 or 1966?

Secretary DALTON. I know it's better than it was in 1966, Mr. Dornan, because I was on active duty at that time. We had a fine Navy then and I was pleased to serve. But I can tell you, we are so much better today in terms of the quality of people that we have serving on active duty and the Reserves. Our sailors and marines are the highest quality I think we've ever had and I'm very proud of them.

Mr. DORNAN. Even in 1966, when you were on active duty, didn't you have a feeling—unless you came from some homogenous wonderful little Norman Rockwell farm town—didn't you have a feeling that the military, even then, was better than society at large, that it was great, that it was a brotherhood—sisterhood hadn't started yet, except for the nurses—but that it was a good place to serve and that everybody knew clearly that bias was wrong.

Secretary DALTON. Yes, sir. I, indeed, felt very good about the Navy then. But as I say, I feel even better about it today, for the

Navy and Marine Corps. I really do think we're a stronger Department today, we have better people serving who are brighter, more committed, more dedicated, more involved in the community, better citizens and contributors to society, in addition to being great sailors and marines.

I mean, they were fine then. I'm just saying that I was one then and I think they're better today.

Mr. DORNAN. Secretary West, I was your guest on your aircraft to go to the Battle of the Bulge. I was proud to be the only Congressman or Senator there for that 50th anniversary. We just touched lightly on some of this stuff. We had no idea that in a few months there would be this ugly shooting at Fort Bragg and the murder of an honorable Army man.

But don't you feel that we're in better shape now, in spite of some ugly incidents, than we were 5 years ago?

Secretary WEST. Congressman, I remember the trip. I think you put it correctly. I can't avoid saying this, and please forgive me. I did not serve quite as early as Secretary Dalton did, but when I served in 1968-71, I think I can react the way he's reacting. We had good people then. We have extraordinary people now.

Certainly things are far, far better. Indeed, in those years when I served, we were having challenges with respect to drugs, with respect to race relations and a lot of other things in the United States, in Europe, and in the Pacific. We are far better now than we were then.

Our task force—I have the benefit of our task force's report, which says that yes, we know where we're going, and yes, to use your words, we're getting good feedback from our NCO's and from our chain of command. The task force warns us, of course, never assume we know everything, never assume we've achieved everything we need to achieve, that we must be on our guard.

Mr. DORNAN. Right.

That's all I had, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Dornan.

Mr. Pickett.

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome our witnesses here today.

Secretary Dorn made a most impressive statement about the role that equal opportunity plays in maintaining the kind of force that we want, and along this line I would like to inquire whether or not the Army and the Navy, what kind of current initiatives they have in this area of improving equal opportunity programs.

Secretary DALTON. Mr. Pickett, I feel very good about the progress that we're making with respect to equal opportunity in the Navy and Marine Corps. The surveys that we've taken over the last few years show very promising, very positive results, from the standpoint of showing that we've made significant progress in this area, and that the attitudes are very positive.

The command structure, from the most senior to most junior, is very much attuned to the importance of treating our shipmates with dignity and respect.

I am also very pleased about some of the specific programs that we have initiated to reach out and to recruit more broadly and to offer opportunities for minorities in the officer ranks of our service.

A few years ago when we addressed this issue, we saw that we were doing well in the Navy and Marine Corps with respect to recruiting of minorities in the enlisted ranks, but we were not doing very well in the officer ranks. We instituted a program to reach out and to advertise and to speak on high school campuses in minority areas and we have significantly enhanced that opportunity. I am hopeful that, indeed, by the turn of the century we will have accessions coming into our officer ranks that will reach the possibility of even doubling where we were before. I think there's a real chance of our doing that, based on our commitment in that area.

So I am very encouraged and very positive about what we're doing with equal opportunity, and the commitment and stressing of our core values of honor, courage, and commitment, in having our sailors and marines look upon their shipmates with dignity and respect. That's a prime goal of mine, as I mentioned in my opening statement, and I feel very positive about some of the results we've achieved.

Mr. PICKETT. Secretary West.

Secretary WEST. I would like to take the opportunity to submit some lists of activities for the record, Congressman, because there's a long list that I would like to call your attention to. Let me mention three right now specifically.

First of all, across the Department of Defense, Secretary Dalton and I, and Secretary Widnall, are part of something led principally by Dr. Dorn and his Deputy Assistant Secretary who is here with him, Bill Leftwich, under the overall leadership of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, called the Defense Equal Opportunity Council, management council, I guess, which coordinates and oversees across the Department all of our equal opportunity efforts to make sure that, even as we move in our services individually, we also work together and report monthly on how we're doing.

One recent activity by that council is that, immediately after I received my task force report, Dr. Perry directed that that council, operating under the Deputy Secretary of Defense, review it and look at it for Department-wide implications. That's an important role. It has an important role in reminding everyone throughout all the services of the commitment of the senior leadership.

Second, remember I said that within the Army you can tell when things are important to us, because we put it in our training. So at every level of our soldier training, of our NCO training, and of our officer training, whether they go to command or general staff college, or whether they go to senior service college, or whether our NCO's are at some schooling within their career advancement, as part of each one of those, there is a block devoted to equal opportunity and command relationships. So for us, perhaps the most important thing we do is to continually reinforce our commanders, our soldiers, on our principles of equal opportunity and fair treatment, and of how to look for the indications when it's not there.

I think the third thing I would mention is from my earlier service in the late sixties, early seventies. One of the things I was privileged to be a part of as a young captain assigned to Army M&RA at that time was when we, for the first time, took a look, Departmentwide, throughout the Army and the Department of Defense, at creating a group of slots called equal opportunity officer billets.

For the first time in the history of the military, actual billets within the services would be devoted to an officer or an NCO whose job was to assure the equal opportunity climate within that unit, or those units. In the Army, it resulted in some 2,200 billets specifically assigned to that.

We still do it today. They are trained by DEOMI, the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute at Patrick Air Force Base. They come back to our service, as do the other services, and help to improve the climate within our commands.

Those are three I specifically wanted to mention.

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you.

One other question. We had a previous panel here and they focused in part on the difficulty of getting the message down to the lowest level in the command chain, the enlisted people, that sometimes the higher echelons understand what the policy is supposed to be but the policy is not understood by the bulk of the people that should know about it.

Would you care to comment about what kind of efforts are being made to detect and correct those kinds of problems?

Secretary WEST. I think that's one of the things that we saw in the report of our task force as well. We can never assume that, even if we have worked this problem over and over again, that the flow of information continues. For us, it is a matter of, once again, going back through and educating all of our leaders and reminding them.

One of the things the task force recommended to the Army is that we put together a DA, a Department of the Army pamphlet, for example, on extremism, and on equal opportunity, that laid out for our leaders what to look for in their units and how to work it.

Part of what will be there, I think, is an emphasis on enhanced communications. That's just one of the possible things we are looking at and trying to do.

We won't ever solve the communication problem. We will solve it permanently, we will solve it now, and it will work fine, and then we will look again and see that there is some more that we need to do. It's part of the process of continually making sure that our force operates at peak efficiency.

Mr. PICKETT. Mr. Dalton.

Secretary DALTON. Mr. Pickett, I would identify myself with those remarks, and also say that our surveys are very encouraging in that it appears that down the chain of command there is a real interest in this issue of equal opportunity, that our sailors and Marines seem to, indeed, be more inclined than historically—going back to the sixties, the time that I referred to and beyond, we did have some race problems. But the results in the last few years are very encouraging from the standpoint of equal opportunity, getting to not just the senior level but all the way down to the junior ranks. We're making genuine progress there, and I'm very pleased to say that.

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Pickett.

Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Tejada.

Mr. TEJEDA. Just very briefly, Mr. Chairman.

I greatly appreciate the information and the work and all the word that was given. I especially, though, wish to thank Secretary of the Navy John Dalton for all your testimony and all the work on the Navy and Marine Corps.

Thank you all very much, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary DALTON. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kennedy.

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like the panel to answer one of the questions I have with respect to the zero tolerance, because it is borne out of the policy of the zero defect mentality within the military, that if you have a problem, God forbid, you don't want to talk about it or report it because it may end up on some chart, and we don't want to make a mountain out of a molehill. So what happens is things don't get reported because, you know, let's not make much ado about nothing, so to speak.

One of the worries I have about a really zero defect mentality with respect to defect—and everyone can acknowledge that if there's a little bit of extremism, I'm not saying that that isn't just grounds for expulsion from the military. But how do we address the broader issues that all of you have addressed in your opening statements, with respect to the atmosphere of race relations and the like with this zero defect mentality? Can you answer that in terms of communication?

Secretary DALTON. Yes, sir, Mr. Kennedy. I think the issue of reprisal and some sort of fear of retaliation and failure to report because of that is one that I feel we have really made excellent strides to ensure that our complaint system is accessible to all personnel without fear of reprisal.

We have revised equal opportunity manuals that address the informal resolution system for informal complaint filing, and we also have a formal complaint procedure that emphasizes the resolution of complaints at the lowest level. This formal complaint system involves the UCMJ and Navy Regulation 1150 processes. Also, our discrimination and sexual harassment reporting system [DASH] is now in place, and the results from it are very encouraging.

I think that whereas fear of reprisal has been an issue in the past—and I don't mean that we're where we want to be today, but I think we're much further along toward where we need to be than we were, and we have the procedures in place and the processes in place to protect the individual from reprisal or retaliation.

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you.

Secretary Dorn.

Mr. DORN. Mr. Kennedy, zero defects is obviously a goal. What's important is the steps you go through to get there. Of course, one of those steps involves open communication, a determination to solve the problem and to address the problems.

If the zero defects approach has caused people to close down and hide problems, that's really a perverse working of the system. I know that all the services have worked very hard to make sure that zero defects is a goal and that they have procedures in place to get there.

Secretary WEST. The only thing I would add, Congressman, is, I think the two are entirely different and I think that's been the burden of what you just heard. Zero tolerance is the Secretary of the Navy's, and I think we all sign up to it, the expression of an uncompromising attitude toward extremism in the military.

Zero defects has to do with notions by commanders and NCO's as to whether their mistakes will be overlooked or not, as to whether they have room to fail as they dare to try to do the best they can. I think the two are different.

I embrace the Secretary of the Navy's standard without any reluctance, and I believe it is an extremely fair one.

Mr. KENNEDY. I would like to ask you a question about gays and lesbians in the military. As a military policy now, if you say you're gay—I think this was a question that ranking member Dellums approached—that is grounds for your dismissal. That sort of conduct, if you say it, you're gone.

If that's the situation of being a member, so to speak, of some group that is undesirable by the military, can you go into this notion between passive and active involvement? If you just say you're a member of a group, or if you say you've got your own opinions about stuff, maybe opinions the military finds disrupts orderly conduct, why can't the same rule apply for extremist groups that now applies, I think unfairly, toward gays and lesbians?

Secretary WEST. I was asked that question when I first mentioned our policy, so let me just quickly give you an answer from my perspective. I think you will want to hear from Dr. Dorn overall.

My sense is that the two are not that different. The fact is that the rule, as we interpret it in the Army with respect to gays and lesbians, is not if you say it you're gone. It's if you say it, then we have reason to look at see whether you have indicated that you are willing to engage in, guess what, some conduct, take some action, which would undermine the good order and discipline of our units.

That standard—some action, some conduct which would undermine the good order and discipline and morale of our units—is precisely the same one that undergirds our attitude toward extremist activities.

Mr. KENNEDY. Let me just interrupt for a moment there. "Don't ask, don't tell" presupposes that just saying it is conduct.

Secretary WEST. No, no. Presupposes that saying it gives reason for the inquiry as to whether you have shown that you would act.

Mr. KENNEDY. OK. Thank you.

Mr. DORN. I wholeheartedly support what Secretary West said. I think he said it as clearly as he usually does. In both instances, we are talking about a form of conduct.

Mr. KENNEDY. OK.

Secretary DALTON. Mr. Chairman, I know the committee has been very interested in this issue with respect to Dhahran. I just got a further report. If I could, I would like to report.

Apparently a fuel truck was detonated by two individuals in the western housing area in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The first reports are that there are 120 people injured, 2 known dead, and more details are coming in. There has been no news coverage yet. These

are fragmented reports that we're receiving. I thought the committee would be interested in knowing that.

Mr. DORNAN. Suicide bombers, the two?

Secretary DALTON. I don't know any more than I just read, Mr. Dornan.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McHale.

Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I want to commend you on your testimony over the past hour or so. We heard from a very fine panel immediately prior to your own, and I think you have brought a focus to their comments that has improved on what was their fine testimony.

Secretary West, I particularly want to commend you and Dr. Dorn for your emphasis on conduct rather than political belief. I also think, Secretary West, considering the fact that you delivered it extemporaneously, it would have been impossible to draw a better distinction between a zero defect mentality and the zero tolerance standard that was articulated by the Secretary of the Navy. You did a superb job.

As I listened to that mission statement from the Secretary of the Navy, I thought zero tolerance defines very well the standard to be achieved. And I also thought, Dr. Dorn—and again, I'm handing out compliments, I guess, more frequently than I normally do in these few minutes—but I thought your statement with regard to the commander's guidance that ought to provide the broad parameters of conduct by officers and NCO's during the course of your opening statement was superb.

In terms of communicating that down the chain of command, I would strongly recommend that each one of you, in an appropriate way, either with the full text or with excerpts, print in the appropriate professional journals—whether it's Naval Proceedings, the Marine Corps Gazette, or Leatherneck, whatever journal you think is the best method of communication—the heart and soul of what you stated today, because I think many outside this hearing room should hear your thoughts.

Having said all of that, let me just ask one question. I want to make sure that you are well informed when these kinds of extremist activities take place. I want to make sure that you know about the conduct when it occurs.

A long time ago, almost at the same time period as the Secretary of the Army, I was a second lieutenant back in 1973, 1974. I know what the procedure was in those days to communicate the occurrence of a serious incident when, in fact, such an incident, particularly if it were racially related, would take place.

Could you briefly, and individually, describe for us what happens, real world, if there is a problem out in the fleet, if there's a problem at some base, and we have reason to believe it's serious and that it was racially motivated, what system kicks in to guarantee that the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the service Secretary, ultimately at the OSD level, that those who need to know that information, in fact, receive it?

Secretary WEST. For the Army, we still do have a process of serious incidence reports. They are forwarded by the senior commander concerned. In the case of Europe, it would be the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army (Europe). For Fort Bragg, it would be either the

lieutenant general who commands the 18th Airborne Corps, or the lieutenant general who commands the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

That is forwarded directly by wire, by cable, to Headquarters, Department of the Army, and I read them every morning when I come in. So does the Chief of Staff, a message for each one. That is the first information we get, as soon as the incident occurs. Whether it is simply a—well, nothing is simple these days. Whether it is equipment that is missing of a significant amount, whether it is a death, whether it is a criminal incident on an installation, or something even greater, we get the serious incident reports right away so that we know immediately when they happen.

Secretary DALTON. We have a similar network of information flowing up the chain of command. Hopefully, disciplinary action is taken at the local level and that we are informed of what it is, as opposed to ending up being involved in that ourselves. But we typically have the report, the OpRep, which is a message report that is followed up every 14 days until it's resolved, and then a situation report that keeps us posted in terms of how this issue is resolved.

The OpRep goes up through the CNO. The CNO and the Commandant would make me aware of it, and they are kept apprised until it's resolved. Obviously, they have an opportunity to pass judgment on how it's resolved.

Mr. MCHALE. Let me jump in at this point, Dr. Dorn, before you comment.

Are you gentlemen satisfied that the information flow is satisfactory and that what you need to know is coming to you?

Secretary DALTON. I feel good about that, Mr. McHale, from the standpoint of not only the kind of reporting, per se, when these events occur, but also the surveys that we do on a regular basis to look at the overall situation. These surveys are done with large samples and so you really do get a sense of just how serious a problem like this might be.

Mr. MCHALE. Mr. Chairman, I see my light is on, so let me just close with this and then invite Dr. Dorn's comment.

Do you gentlemen then routinely communicate that information, when appropriate, to Dr. Dorn? Is that where it goes from your office?

Secretary DALTON. Our Office of Manpower and Reserve Affairs communicates with Dr. Dorn, I think for each of our services, so that he's apprised of that information.

Mr. MCHALE. Dr. Dorn.

Mr. DORN. The one breakdown is that it is very difficult, or it has been difficult in the past, to aggregate the information across the services, the reason being that the Navy is reporting slightly different incidents than is the Army. So, Mr. McHale, when we get a question from you, "How many incidents of x-type were there in the Defense Department in 1995", we have trouble getting that and answering that question from our files. That's the reason we want to refine our system and develop the defense incident based reporting system, so that we will have a reporting standard and a clear way to aggregate the data.

Mr. MCHALE. How soon will that be in place?

Mr. DORN. We hope to get it in place by the end of the year.

Mr. McHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Dellums.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, in answering Mr. McHale's question, you gave me an answer to one of the questions that I wanted to raise with you, with respect to section 554 of the fiscal year 1995 bill, where we put in a requirement of biannual surveys and reporting to the Congress. To date, we have not received a report, and I just wanted to put you on notice that at some point we would like that report. I think, in answering Mr. McHale, you in part laid out why we have not received the report.

Mr. DORN. We are conducting two types of surveys biannually, Mr. Dellums. One is a report on sexual harassment. We began that survey in 1995. The results are being tabulated right now, and within a matter of days, that report will be ready.

The DOD-wide survey on race relations is going to be put into the field this summer. Those results will be ready in 1997.

It is important that we separate those two. Each of those is going to be very big surveys. The sexual harassment survey had a sample of about 90,000. The race relations survey will be of equal size. So it's important that we alternate years. Otherwise, we begin inundating the system with surveys.

Keep in mind that these DOD-wide surveys are on top of surveys that the individual services conduct.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you very much.

I appreciated very much the response of both you, Secretary Dorn, and Secretary West, with respect to responding to the question posed to you by Mr. Kennedy, regarding the issue of gays on the one hand and people who participate in hate organizations on the other hand.

When I placed that in juxtaposition, I understand that when someone says "I am gay", they trigger—and I'm not a lawyer. But as I understand it, what they trigger is what in the vernacular is referred to as "rebuttable presumption." What that means to the everyday person is you've got to end up proving a negative.

As I have been following that body of law, in a few instances people have been successful in proving a negative; that is, in addressing a rebuttable presumption, they have stayed in the military. But for the most part, once people make the statement, they're out of there. So I understand what you're saying about behavior, but in the real world, it is extremely difficult.

What I was trying to grasp from these hearings is whether or not, when someone says "I am Nazi, I am skinhead, I am neo-Nazi, I'm a member of a racist organization", an extremist group, whether or not our response then triggers rebuttable presumption. Does it then require that person to prove a negative? Does that mean, when they say that, maybe a few cases are successful? But, for the most part, once they make that statement, they're out of there.

That's why I said, I would be interested, as we move through this process, to understand whether or not we treat both in the same way, which is the triggering of rebuttable presumption once someone articulates their point of view. I listened to you carefully and

I understand what it is you're saying, but in looking at the actual practice, most people who make the statement are out of there.

I'm just wondering whether or not the policies that are being enunciated at the table today are policies that say that people who make the comment about membership in extremist groups also trigger the same response.

Mr. DORN. If someone were to approach his or her sergeant major and say "I am a Nazi", to use your example, the sergeant major would be obliged to figure out what that means in terms of actual conduct as opposed to a system of beliefs.

Remember that we are treading a line here having to do with one's first amendment rights, one's right to believe whatever one wishes to believe. The emphasis again is on one's conduct. You and I might conjure in our minds what that statement means in terms of conduct, but we need to go find out.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for permitting me the opportunity to point out that we have been joined this afternoon by my distinguished colleague from North Carolina, Miss Clayton. I also want to thank you for providing the opportunity for my colleague to participate in these hearings, providing her an opportunity to make a statement.

In that regard, I would like to yield to my distinguished colleague to proceed in any fashion she chooses.

STATEMENT OF HON. EVA M. CLAYTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NORTH CAROLINA

Ms. CLAYTON. Thank you. I appreciate it, and I thank the chairman for allowing me to have this opportunity to participate in the hearing. I am not a member of this distinguished committee, but I am the Representative where the two deaths occurred. I did represent Jackie Burden and Michael James, who were brutally killed supposedly by a military person, so I have a personal interest in this.

I also want to commend all of you for your testimony. I probably won't be as lavish as my friend, who is a former military person. Nevertheless, I am very respectful for what you have said. I am impressed, indeed, about the zero tolerance and some of the steps that have been put in place, recognizing some of the deficiencies that are there.

In that regard, I want to make a couple of observations and ask one question.

I think you heard on the first panel, at least the representative from the NAACP, who said they feel that the Army is moving in the right direction, and they commended them on the activities that have happened, but recognize that more needs to be done.

Also, General Keane, who is now the commander there, I think you have to recognize he moved in a swift and effective way. But again, I think some of the steps that are now being put in place, particularly as it looks to monitoring and reporting—because there was evidence that if you had, indeed, looked hard enough, you would have seen some signs, whether passive behavior or whatever, some signs that something was going on in the lives of those young persons who are now being accused. So I am pleased to see that happen.

I also want to commend Secretary West for ordering a comprehensive study. I think the study said that things are not as bad, but I would suggest that if, indeed, there is one or two incidents, we should not feel very good about it. I think you alluded to that as well, Secretary West. Although there is no extensive presence of extremists, but if the occurrence of having extremist groups who would create an inability for military readiness, where you need a cohesive group of people who are committed to the values of the United States, then zero tolerance is the only way to have that. Certainly, the lives of these two people are threatened by that.

There were two opportunities in your report, I think. One was looking at housing. I say this because I know of the conditions at Fort Bragg—and it's true at other places, too—that the lack of sufficient housing within the base is creating some tension. I'm aware that there's a lack of housing outside, too. So you have some quality of life issues that are related to people engaging in this kind of activity.

I would like for you to comment on what has been done. I know there has been additional funding, but what has been done in that area.

The second question would be, I like the words that the military is a reflection of our society. I would also say, conversely, the military is a part of our society. We don't live on an island, separated. Fort Bragg is part of a Federal community and there has to be relationships established with that community. Before we had an incident, obviously, there was a lack of quality relationship with either the local police there, and also all sectors of the community, particularly the minority community. Still there are concerns to this date. There has not been the kind of reaching out to make that connection.

The Army has to be respected by the civilians if it's going to continue to have its pride honored. So I'm interested in those continuing relationships with the local people around there, and I am also very much interested in some of the healing and the bridges that need to be built as well as the quality of life and the housing they so desperately need.

Secretary WEST. Let me say something first about the second of your two comments, if I might.

I couldn't agree more. I think your point about the importance of our military, wherever they find themselves, having a close and constructive relationship with the communities around them—after all, are there communities which nurture them, which provide them with services that we cannot provide for ourselves? We are not able to be completely self-sufficient in any community. Do they provide us with insights, all the things that communities have always provided our servicemembers, with housing, places for our families to go?

For those reasons, and many others, it is important for our posts, for Fort Bragg specifically, to be part of the community and to reach out, to be receiving of anything the community wants to provide in the way of information and assistance.

I believe General Keane is committed to that. I am pleased to hear the comments you made about him when you started, and I

believe he will be even more committed to it, having learned of what you said here today, which is very valuable to us.

The fact is that the real reason for the people on our posts to reach out to the communities, the folks at Fort Bragg, all the units there, to reach out to the community, is because this Army doesn't belong to us. It doesn't belong to me, it doesn't belong to the Congress, and it doesn't belong to the President. It belongs to the American people, all of whom are in that community. So I agree with you and we will see that it continues to improve in terms of reaching out. That is something that is very important to all of us in the Army family. I thank you for that observation.

On the first part, on the housing, I think I'm going to have to inform myself a little bit more about the housing situation there. I have been to Fort Bragg several times, and my impression has been that we do all that we can, perhaps even more than we do at other posts, to see to the needs of our families. But, having learned from you that some of those needs are being unmet, I will look into it further.

Ms. CLAYTON. Can you comment if there's being any special effort proposed by you or General Keane to reach out to particularly the minority community?

Secretary WEST. Other than the fact that we have every reason to, and I know that General Keane is personally committed—as you said, there has been quite a bit of evidence of his involvement with the community, and I know you want to do more.

One of the first things I think General Keane did was to get together with the community leadership, with the NAACP chapter. I think he intends to continue that. I think his priority, quite frankly, is to be as engaged with the community, minority and all segments, as the community wishes to be engaged. You're going to see more of General Keane than you may want.

Ms. CLAYTON. Thank you.

Again, to his credit, I think he has started that. As you can expect, in an area where there's been this tragedy, there is a need for healing. To his credit, he has reached out, in spite of an effort—there was a little resistance earlier. But he, as an individual, corrected that, and indeed, there is communication with the NAACP and others.

Also with the local police. There is information that the local police may know about the military and there needs to be a structure so that—as you said so well, this military is a part of the citizenry and is owned by the citizenry. But they could have better communication and I think he could prevent some of the incidents that have happened.

Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary WEST. Thank you for your kind words about General Keane.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, ma'am.

Mr. Dellums.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I would yield briefly to Mr. Kennedy.

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you.

One of the things, I think, that came from the task force review of race relations and gender issues within the military that I

learned about was in the asking of the questions. There was a real positive reaction, because they set up these groups in the military for everyone to discuss what they perceived to be problems and got that cultural baggage out on the table and everyone was able to talk in a frank manner. They had a much better appreciation for all these issues, separate from this very sterile kind of filling out forms if there's a complaint here, or going to some outside social action reporting system to complain about some feeling of discrimination or what have you.

I'm wondering, in the manner that these training sessions go forward, whether that hasn't been one of the positive outcomes of the actual investigations, that people liked being asked are there problems and can you tell us a little bit more about what your experience is, as opposed to did you feel that that comment was derogatory or not. It was more of just an open discussion.

I don't know how you teach that. I would be interested in—if you were able to bottle that, I'm sure it would be helpful to not only the military but it would be helpful to us in society as well. I would be anxious to hear any discussion on that.

Secretary WEST. I think you're right. It was very helpful, as well as being helpful to us. You realize, of course, it was one of two things we did with that task force.

I might mention to you that three members of the task force are here—Major General Jordan behind me, the Chair and the head of the task force is here. And seated next to him or nearby is another one of our members, and Karen Heath there is a third member. So we have three of us here, all of whom either oversaw or participated in those sessions themselves.

The other thing, though, is that even though those sessions are helpful, there is always the sense that maybe a member may not be willing to say “yeah, not only have I been in contact with a racist, I am one.” So we also need a mechanism for giving them an opportunity to express themselves in an unattributed way. So we also did 17,000 questionnaires, with 94 questions. It was a different group, but from the same posts. So we got both benefits, the benefit of the kind of cathartic reaction that you're describing on the one hand, but also the sense of just being sure nothing was being held back.

Others could respond with complete anonymity, but the disadvantage there, of course, is you never get a chance to make sure that they're using the same terms of reference that we're using.

Mr. KENNEDY. How much of an emphasis are you going to put with DEOMI and funding adequate training, so that everyone sort of gets exposure to this and we end up preventing these extremist groups from catching hold because we've done such a good job at keeping the stuff from—

Secretary WEST. I think that's one of the reasons that Dr. Perry wanted to make sure that, as soon as we got our report, we turned it over to the Defense Equal Opportunity Council, which Dr. Dorn is principally responsible for. Over to you, Dr. Dorn.

Mr. DORN. Thanks.

I am pleased to hear you mention the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, which as you know is the oldest and largest organization in the country, probably in the world, that is dedi-

cated to training about equal opportunity. It is located at Patrick Air Force Base. And while the Secretary—

Mr. KENNEDY. I appreciate that very much. Thank you. [Laughter.]

Mr. DORN. While the Secretary of the Air Force was forced to leave in order to deal with what appears to have been a tragedy in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, I am pleased to report that the Air Force, as executive agent for DEOMI, has agreed to support it rather fulsomely. It needed new facilities and the Air Force has agreed to put those facilities in its budget. The new director of DEOMI is an Air Force colonel who has a Ph.D. in psychology. It's going to be well led.

As I mentioned earlier, one of the things we did in response to Secretary West's report was to require DEOMI to begin including a block of instruction on extremism in the courses it offers participants.

Someone else asked early on what have we done to advance equal opportunity. One of the things we have done is, since 1994, every new general officer, every new flag officer, every new member of the SES, goes through DEOMI training on equal opportunity.

Mr. KENNEDY. If I can follow up on that, in speaking of the promotion of equal opportunity, how often do equal opportunity instructors get promoted, as a matter of emphasizing the importance of what they do in the military?

Mr. DORN. That's a good question. I can't give you an answer because equal opportunity is not a career field in all the services. In the Air Force, for example, it's incorporated within a career field called social actions.

In the Navy, if I recall correctly—and Secretary Dalton can speak to this—it is an assignment, but then one rotates from the equal opportunity assignment into another assignment and so it's rather difficult to track.

Secretary DALTON. I would be happy to provide an answer for the record, too, Mr. Kennedy.

I can tell you that we put our best people in equal opportunity positions. I would think that the statistics would show that, indeed, they are promoted at a significant rate. But I will provide that for the record.

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I would like to note the presence of two distinguished people who now work at DOD, who were members of this committee staff, Charlie Tompkins and Karen Heath.

I say that because, back in 1993, when a number of dramatic events occurred, this gentleman was chair of the committee. It occurred to me that the easiest thing I could have done was in the context of Washington dynamics, to emerge as the black chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, and to challenge on a personality basis; and I decided that it would be handled as a personality issue. But I chose, rather, to pick up the telephone on one afternoon and call Charlie Tompkins.

I said to Charlie Tompkins, I want you to head up a staff task force. Go out around this country, around this world, and lay the

predicate for both administrative and congressional action to address the issue of lack of equal opportunity, issues of race and gender, and do it in a quiet, methodical manner that would demand, that would become an imperative for the Department of Defense to act, and for the Congress of the United States to act.

I take this opportunity to publicly congratulate both of them for doing an outstanding job, because they did do that.

Mr. Kennedy, you are absolutely correct, that this is a process, and a process can, indeed, trigger constructive responses. I would like to believe that the task force in 1993, that wrote the report in 1994, did trigger a constructive response for a new task force in the Department of Defense which took it to a next step.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank you, Mr. Chairman. You made a commitment to this gentleman that you would hold a hearing at the full committee level to focus on this particular issue, and I would like to think that this hearing has and will continue to evoke constructive responses from the Pentagon and in the context of the Congress on this extraordinarily important issue.

Finally, I would like to thank all of the distinguished witnesses here for your contribution to these proceedings. It is vital and it's terribly important. At a time in our country when black churches are being burned, one has to be extraordinarily naive to assume that we've risen above the issues of race and class and gender that continue to divide us and tear us asunder as a society.

I appreciate the fact that you folks have stepped up to the plate and are attempting to address these issues in a progressive and aggressive manner.

Mr. Chairman, again, I thank all of you. I thank all of my colleagues. I would have liked very much for all 55 of us to have been here, but obviously that's not the nature of this beast. You have to be at five or six places at one time. But for those of you who had the ability to be here today, particularly members on this side of the committee, I thank you very much for your patience and your diligence and your participation in these proceedings.

Again, finally, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your endurance and for your commitment, and I would yield back to you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Secretary DALTON. Mr. Chairman, if I could just make one point with respect to Mr. Dellums' comment, Mr. Charlie Tompkins is a case where the House National Security Committee's loss was the Navy Department's gain. We're glad to have him.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I echo that.

Again, I want to extend my thanks and appreciation to you. We have kept you a lot longer than we should have, and we appreciate your time. You have contributed a lot to our proceedings and we thank you for it.

Miss Clayton.

Ms. CLAYTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask for unanimous consent to put my statement in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, ma'am. It will be put in the record.

Ms. CLAYTON. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Clayton follows:]

11/25/95
Record

Statement of
Representative Eva M. Clayton
U.S. House National Security Committee
Hearing on Extremist Activity in the Military
June 25, 1996
2:00 PM - 2118 Rayburn H.O.B.

Chairman Spence, I would like to thank you and Ranking Minority Member Ronald Dellums for holding this hearing to address the issue of extremist activity in the military. I appreciate the opportunity you have provided for me to participate in this hearing.

On December 7, 1995, Michael James and Jackie Burden, who were both African-American, were walking along Hall street in Fayetteville, North Carolina when they were brutally murdered. These senseless slayings were apparently random as the three caucasian soldiers from Fort Bragg, who are accused of killing them, did not know them.

News reports indicate that the accused soldiers engaged the unsuspecting couple, harassed them and when they responded, shot them in the head assassination style. The incident sent a chill throughout Fayetteville and left many residents puzzled, bewildered and greatly concerned. It also raised new questions about the presence of radical and extreme groups within the United States military.

At least one of the three soldiers held white supremacist views, was known to display a Nazi flag over his barracks bed and was known to keep a 9 millimeter handgun in his locker. More distressing, was the fact that all of the suspects appear to be members of a right-wing group called the "Special Forces Underground", which publishes a magazine called the "Resister". Members of this group have been seen wearing black boots with white laces, red suspenders, flight jackets and chains, an unofficial uniform.

We are all familiar with the expression that if we do not learn from history we are doomed to repeat the same mistakes. We also know that hindsight is 20/20. Some may find it difficult, now, with all the evidence that has been provided since December 7, 1995, to believe that the Army was unaware of telltale signs of extremist activities among the enlisted ranks at Fort Bragg.

Let me hasten to add that I do believe the Army leadership was unaware of these telltale signs. The Army overlooked instances of racial extremism in its ranks because its training focused primarily in other areas such as sexual harassment. Fort Bragg commander, Lt. General John Keane, has been quoted as saying "Some of our leaders were not sufficiently sensitive to symbols and outward manifestations of extremism". "We just didn't see the extremist problem developing," he added. "We should have, yes, but we didn't."

General Keane should be commended for the quick, decisive and effective action he has implemented to address the situation at Fort Bragg. In addition, Army Secretary Togo West should be commended for ordering a comprehensive Army-wide examination of racism and extremism in the ranks. The NAACP has indicated that they "are satisfied that the Army has made, and is continuing to make, good progress in dealing with racism and extremism at Fort Bragg and elsewhere".

However, there is still much to be done. There has not been sufficient outreach to Fayetteville community, especially the African-American population, to foster the ongoing relationship with the military that would help alleviate their fears. Each branch of service needs to undergo the same comprehensive examination of extremism in the ranks. Each branch of service needs to expand their human relations program to include the examination of extremist philosophy, inclusive of warning signs, much as it was done for sexual harassment.

As I have previously stated if we do not learn from our mistakes we are doomed to repeat them. On December 7, 1941, our naval fleet and our nation were devastated when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. History clearly shows that there were warning signs prior to the bombing. But our government and our military were not ready or willing to admit that we had a potential enemy, a potential disaster, waiting to happen. We were not ready, not prepared when the bombers came and we paid a very high price.

Fifty-four years later, on December 7, 1995, Michael James and Jackie Burden were brutally murdered by three soldiers who appear to be members of an extremist group. The precision of hindsight reveals that signs of extremism existed prior to the murders. The Army was not ready, not prepared to recognize or deal with extremist activity. It is incumbent upon each branch of service to acknowledge this problem and to be prepared to deal with it. It is incumbent upon this Congress to acknowledge this problem and to take appropriate action to help alleviate extremism. We have already taken a step in the right direction by providing funding for improved base housing and other quality of life issues for our enlisted troops. Housing and quality of life issues are said to be a problem for Fort Bragg and the Fayetteville area.

After Pearl Harbor we resolved that we would never be caught unprepared and we have diligently pursued military readiness. We must now resolve to be eternally vigilant in addressing instances of extremism, dealing with such instances effectively and taking measures that are necessary to prevent such incidents in the future.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will be adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:55 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[The following prepared statements and documents were submitted for the record:]

**STATEMENTS
AND QUESTIONS
SUBMITTED
FOR THE
RECORD**



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20370-5000

IN REPLY REFER TO
5354 /
Pers-612C

AUG 5 1996


MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT, CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON
OFFICE (PERS-OOXC)

Subj: FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS TO TESTIMONY GIVEN TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE REGARDING EXTREMIST
ACTIVITIES IN THE MILITARY

Ref: (a) DCN 96U128006525

Encl: (1) Promotions of EOA's in the Navy

1. As requested by reference (a), enclosure (1) is provided.


J. N. STAFFORD
Captain, U.S. Navy
Director, Equal Opportunity
Division (Pers-61)

PNCs Richard
Pers-612C/695-2851
5 Aug 96

SUBJECT

PROMOTIONS OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ASSISTANTS (EOA'S) IN THE NAVY

BACKGROUND

The Secretary of the Navy appeared before the National Security Committee on 25 June 1996 and was asked by Representative Kennedy "How often do equal opportunity instructors get promoted, as a matter of emphasizing the importance of what they do in the military?"

Transcript pages 120 and 121 also request "receipt of a required report (section 554 of the fiscal year '95 authorization bill)". Since the "required report" is a biennial survey that the Secretary of Defense (vice SECNAV) must conduct, it is not appropriate for us to comment on this issue.

DISCUSSION

Navy personnel in pay grades E-6 to E-9 are eligible for selection as Equal Opportunity Assistants (EOA's). All Navy enlisted ratings are eligible. There are 129 EOA billets.

EOA's eligible for promotion to E-7, E-8 and E-9 are selected for advancement to the next higher pay grade through annual promotion boards convened at the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Additionally, E-6 personnel are required to pass an examination in their rating/occupational field before being screened by the E-7 promotion board. Advancements are based on vacancies within specific ratings/occupational fields and EOA's must compete within their ratings/occupational fields.

Once an EOA completes the obligated 36 month EOA assignment they are detailed back to their rating/occupational field. A few EOAs are assigned a follow-on tour when their rating/occupational field detailer releases them and if their sea/shore rotation schedule can be adhered to.

9.206 EQUAL OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM SPECIALISTS (EOPS) SELECTION
(NEC 9515).

Navy Equal Opportunity Program Specialists (EOPS) serve as subject matter experts on equal opportunity, discrimination and harassment issues. They are assigned to selected Echelon 2 and Echelon 3 staffs, the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Chief of Naval Education and Training and the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI). Assignment to an EOPS billet is contingent upon successful completion of the sixteen week course of instruction at DEOMI and awarding of NEC 9515.

9.2061 Qualifications. To be eligible for selection for EOPS training, applicants must meet the following minimum qualifications.

- Be a Chief Petty Officer (E-7) or above. Exceptional E-6 applicants will be considered on a case by case basis.
- Overall performance average of 4.0 (new form), 3.8 (old form) over a period of observations of not less than 36 months.
- Be in good physical condition and meet current Navy physical readiness standards per OPNAVINST 6110.1 series.
- Be temperamentally suited for independent duty assignments, emotionally stable (for example: without debilitation, domestic or personal problems, chronic indebtedness, etc.), able to effectively perform in a stressful environment.
- Have a clear disciplinary record for the past 48 months with no drug/alcohol related incidents including DUI within the past 48 months.
- Be recommended by the Commanding Officer.
- Complete a command screen as outlined in Figure 1.
- Be interviewed by an EOPS. Interview criteria is outlined in Figure 2. If an EOPS is not stationed within a reasonable commuting distance, contact the EOPS Community Manager (Pers-612C) to arrange for a phone interview (Commercial 703-614-1190/DSN 224-1190).

DEOMI/BUPERS/OPNAV billets will be filled with experienced (prior tour) EOPS's. They will be a graduate of a military instructor course or civilian equivalent. A BUPERS (Pers-61) endorsement must be obtained prior to selection for these positions.

9.2062 Submission of Requests. The results of the command screen and EOPS interview will be submitted with a command endorsement on the NAVPERS 1306/7 and forwarded to BUPERS (Pers- 4010D1) via BUPERS (Pers-61).

Enclosure (1)

PROSPECTIVE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM SPECIALIST SCREEN DOCUMENT

The Commanding Officer, Medical Officer and Dental Officer must screen and evaluate prospective EOPS in each category as indicated. Upon completion, forward this document to BUPERS (Pers-4010D1 via Pers-61) with member's request for EOPS duty as directed by BUPERS transfer directive.

MEMBER'S NAME: _____ SSN: _____ RATE: _____

A. Medical Officer's Screening. The purpose of the medical screening is to determine whether the member or dependents have a medical history which would prevent assignment to high stress duty or areas where military medical facilities are not available.

1. Member's height: _____ weight _____ as of _____ (date of exam).
 Is the member overweight? Yes No
 Is the member on weight control? Yes No
 Should member be on weight control? Yes No
 Does member's weight fluctuate frequently? Yes No

2. Is member presently being treated for or treated in the past for high blood pressure, heart problems, ulcers or stress related illness? _____ If yes, explain. _____

3. Has the member been treated at an ARD, ARC or CAAC for alcohol, drug or weight control? Date(s): _____
 Prognosis: _____

4. If married, are all members of the family free from health problems which require special medical attention? _____ If not, are family members enrolled in EFM Program and area of country recommended for assignment and/or location of medical facilities able to care for dependents: _____

5. I recommend/do not recommend member for independent duty as an EOPS based on medical screening.

Medical Officer's signature, rank
 DSN: _____

Figure (1)

B. Dental Officer's Screening. The dental screen is to determine whether the member has dental conditions which require ongoing treatment for which treatment cannot be completed prior to transfer. Such conditions are disqualifying for EOPS duty for reasons similar to those above for the medical screening.

1. Has the member completed a TYPE II dental examination in the past six months. Has an entry been made on the Dental Standard Form 63 that the member does not require dental treatment on dental prosthetic restoration? _____

2. If the member requires dental treatment or dental prosthetic restorations, give estimated length of time needed to complete treatment and month and year member will be fit for transfer.

3. I recommend/do not recommend member for independent duty as an EOPS, based on dental screening.

Dental Officers signature, rank
DSN: _____

C. Commanding Officer's Screening. The Commanding Officer must be thoroughly familiar with Article 9.206 and Appendix J of OPNAVINST 5354.1 series which outlines Duties and Responsibilities of EOPS's. The screen must be conducted and certified personally by the Commanding Officer.

1. Is the member able to speak clearly without speech impediment? _____ If not, provide a brief explanation: _____

2. Is the member's record clear of courts-martial or Commanding Officer's NJP or civilian authorities involvement by the member or dependents for the past 48 months? _____ If not, provide details. Give specific recommendation for waiver consideration if appropriate: _____

3. Does the member have the ability to discharge responsibilities in an independent duty assignment? _____ If not, provide explanation: _____

4. Does a review of the member's evaluations for previous three years indicate overall evaluation marks of 4.0 (3.8 using old
2

form) or above and no individual trait below 3.0 (3.6 using old form)? YES _____ NO _____

Does the member present a neat, well-groomed appearance? _____

Does the member meet physical readiness standards? _____

Does the member meet height and weight or body fat standards? _____

If no to any of above, provide explanation: _____

5. Is the individual free from financial difficulty based on service record/pay record review and screen? _____ If appropriate, attach summary of financial status.

6. Has the member been interviewed by an EOPS and considered qualified? _____ (See article 9.206)

EOPS Name _____ Date of interview _____

7. Is the member free of martial problems (i.e., pending separation/divorce)? _____

8. Is the member a volunteer for EOPS duty? _____

9. Commanding Officer's comments: _____

Commanding Officer signature, rank
DSN: _____

PROSPECTIVE EOPS INTERVIEW DOCUMENT

NAME	SSN	RATE
------	-----	------

1. The following is a list of recommended questions to be posed to a prospective EOPS candidate.

- a. Tell me about the Navy's Equal Opportunity Policy?
- b. Explain the Navy's vehicle for implementing Equal Opportunity.
- c. What attracted you to apply for special programs?
- d. Tell me about your long range goals.
- e. Tell me about your short range goals.
- f. Why do you want to leave your rating and work in special programs?
- g. What experiences have you had with equal opportunity related duties?

2. Consider the applicant and evaluate the member on the following :

- a. Appearance
- b. Oral Communication/Expression of ideas
- c. Leadership Potential
- d. Member's willingness to serve as an EOPS

Use the following scale:

OUTSTANDING EXCELLENT GOOD ADEQUATE UNSATISFACTORY

3. Comments _____

4. Recommendation _____

 Interviewing EOPS Name/
 signature, date
 DSN: _____

Figure (2)

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE NAVYSECNAV *signs*

FROM: RADM LEE F. GUNN *LF Gunn* **AUG 22 1996**
 Chief of Naval Personnel (Acting)
 Prepared by: CAPT D. A. Gove, Pers-00X, 614-1102

SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS TO USD(P&R) AND SECNAV TESTIMONY
 BEFORE THE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE (NSC) ON
 25JUN96 REGARDING EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES IN THE MILITARY
 ACTION MEMORANDUM (DCN 96U128006525)

PURPOSE: To respond to Representative Spence (R-SC), Chairman
 NSC, on the status of 1) the Biennial Survey On The
 State Of Race And Ethnic Issues In The Military,
 required by FY95 Defense Authorization Bill, Section
 554; and 2) how often Equal Opportunity Assistants
 (EOA's) get promoted, as a matter of emphasizing their
 importance in the military. (ATT 1)

DISCUSSION:

- SECDEF is responsible for the Biennial Survey. Colonel Mike Shane, ASD(FMP), informed Pers-00XC that ASD(FMP) will respond on issue of Biennial Survey. Originally due 01MAY95, survey preparations are just now nearing completion. Results are not expected to be available until next year. (ATT 2)
- Pers-61 provided the following: (ATT 3)
 - .. All ratings E6-9 are eligible for EOA assignments, however, E-6 applicants must be exceptional. There are 129 EOA billets. (ATT 4)
 - .. E7-9 EOA's are advanced by annual selection board. E7-9 advancements are based on vacancies within specific ratings and EOAs must compete within their ratings. A letter to the selection board, addressing the importance of an EOA's job, was added to each EOA's record in Jan 96. (ATT 5)
 - .. E6 EOA's must pass examination in their rating before being screened by E7 selection board.

CHOP	VCNCR <i>9</i>	CNO	MRA				
DATE	<i>NOV 2 0/10</i>	<i>AM/ONS</i> <i>0/2</i>					

- After a 36 month tour EOAs rotate to a billet in their rating. A few EOAs may elect to do a follow-on tour if they are needed to fill an EOA billet, and their sea/shore rotation schedule can be met.
- Major Wrice, 693-0237, provided USMC EOA advancement statistics for USMC. (ATT 6)

RECOMMENDATION: Sign letter responding to Mr. Spence's questions.

Attachments:

1. Mr. Spence's ltr of 23JUL96
2. Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 103-337, Chapter 22, §451
3. Pers-61 memo of 05AUG96
4. Enlisted Transfer Manual Article 9.206
5. Letter of Explanation
6. USMC EOA statistics



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
 1000 NAVY PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, DC 20350-1000

17 September 1996

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence
 Chairman, Committee on
 National Security
 House of Representatives
 Washington, DC 20515-6035

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter of July 23, 1996, regarding my testimony on extremist activity in the military before your Committee on June 25, 1996. I appreciate your kind words about my contribution to the Committee on this most important issue.

You requested the status of a report required by Section 554 of the Fiscal Year 1995 Defense Authorization Bill, and information on the promotion rate of our Equal Opportunity Assistants (EOA). This report is the Biennial Survey On The State Of Race And Ethnic Issues In The Military, conducted by the Secretary of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy) has advised me that he will respond to you on this issue.

As Dr. Dorn stated during the hearing, experienced Navy/Marine Corps personnel (paygrades E6-9) from all ratings/MOS's (Military Occupational Specialty) are eligible to apply for assignment as EOAs. Equal opportunity is not an individual rating or career field in the Navy or Marine Corps. As a result, the promotion rate of those serving, or who have served, as EOAs is primarily determined by their performance within their rating/MOS's. Those advanced to E7-9 are selected by promotion boards which convene annually at the Bureau of Naval Personnel and Headquarters Marine Corps. In the Navy, E6 personnel are required to pass an examination in their rating before being screened by the E7 selection board. In the Marine Corps and Navy, advancement rates are based on vacancies within specific ratings/MOS's and EOAs must compete within their ratings/MOS's for promotion into these vacancies. Additionally, in the Marine Corps since its inception in Fiscal Year 1994 and in the Navy since January 1996, E-6 EOA applicants must be exceptional and are considered for selection on a case by case basis. While assignment as an EOA can be considered career enhancing, other factors such as professional performance, competence within a specific rating/MOS and time in grade also influence promotion board decisions. The enclosed statistics give a breakdown by pay grade of EOA advancements from the Fiscal Year 1996 and 1997 selection boards.

Once EOAs complete a 36 month EOA tour, they are typically assigned to fill a billet requiring their rating skills. A few may be assigned to another EOA tour to fill an urgent requirement if their sea/shore rotation schedule can be met.

In the Navy, in January 1996, we added a letter of explanation to each EOA's official record advising statutory and administrative selection boards that assignment as an EOA must be viewed favorably and positively with regard to the EOA's individual performance record.

For the Marines, the promotion rates in equal opportunity related billets have significantly exceeded the overall promotion rates for all Marines. This is indicative of the rigorous screening process we use to accept only high quality applicants to the EOA billets.

Chairman Spence, I hope this information is helpful in your analysis and evaluation of extremist activity. As always, please do not hesitate to contact me if I can be of further assistance in this or any other matter.

Sincerely,



John H. Dalton
Secretary of the Navy

Enclosure

**NAVY
EOA ADVANCEMENT STATISTICS**

The following is a breakdown by pay grade of EOA advancements in EOA billets from the FY96 and FY97 selection boards:

BY FY PAY GRADE	EOAs ELIGIBLE	EOAs ADVANCED	% EOAs ADVANCED	TOTAL NAVY%*
<u>1996</u>				
E-6 TO E-7	21	4	19.0	16.4
E-7 TO E-8	55	4	7.3	9.9
E-8 TO E-9	15	2	13.3	11.6

<u>1997</u>				
E-6 TO E-7	18	1	5.6	15.9
E-7 TO E-8	54	4	7.4	10.74
E-8 TO E-9	11	2	18.2	16.2

The following is a breakdown by pay grade of EOA advancements by the FY96 and FY97 selection boards for personnel who have completed a tour in equal opportunity and who are now assigned to duty in their rating/occupational field:

BY FY PAY GRADE	EOAs ELIGIBLE	EOAs ADVANCED	% EOAs ADVANCED	TOTAL NAVY%*
<u>1996</u>				
E-6 TO E-7	32	2	6.3	16.4
E-7 TO E-8	56	4	7.1	9.9
E-8 TO E-9	11	2	18.2	11.6

<u>1997</u>				
E-6 TO E-7	24	1	4.2	15.9
E-7 TO E-8	44	6	13.6	10.74
E-8 TO E-9	11	0	0	16.2

* Total Navy % is the percent of all enlisted members in all ratings who were advanced during the advancement cycle.

**MARINE CORPS
EOA ADVANCEMENT STATISTICS**

The following is a breakdown by pay grade of EOA advancements from the FY96 and FY97 selection boards:

BY FY PAY GRADE	EOAs ELIGIBLE	EOAs ADVANCED	% EOAs ADVANCED
--------------------	------------------	------------------	--------------------

1996

E-6 TO E-7	2	1	50.0
E-7 TO E-8	2	2	100.0
E-8 TO E-9	2	2	100.0

None were eligible for advancement by the FY97 promotion boards.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20370-5000

IN REPLY REFER TO
1300
SER 461E1/0050

FEB 23 1995

DISTRIBUTION GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM # 02-95

Subj: ASSIGNMENT OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM SPECIALISTS
(NEC 9515)

1. The Navy invests significant time and expense in the training of Equal Opportunity Program Specialists (EOPS). Each assignment in the EOPS program improves the skills of these personnel in every facet of their responsibilities. However, the continuous assignment of EOPS NEC 9515 personnel to back-to-back tours has its disadvantages and may degrade the member's ability to remain competitive with others in their rating. To allow more frequent use of NEC 9515 specialists and still permit these individuals to remain competitive for advancement, the following procedures will be effective immediately.

a. Personnel rotating from an existing EOPS (NEC 9515) shore billet will be screened by the 9515 detailer for an EOPS sea duty (type 2, 3, 4) billet. If one is available the specialist may be assigned to that billet. If no EOPS sea duty is available the sailor will be returned to his/her rating detailer for an in-rate assignment.

b. When an EOPS specialist approaches his/her projected rotation date from a non-EOPS NEC 9515 billet the detailer will nominate the person to the Shore Special Programs Branch (PERS 4010) for assignment to a valid EOPS requirement. If no billet exists the member will be returned to his/her rating detailer for assignment.

c. Although EOPS specialists may be re-toured to consecutive NEC 9515 assignments, the sea/shore rotation for the member's rating will be followed.

d. A shore-to-shore EOPS assignment sequence will not normally be approved.

2. This DGM will remain in effect until cancelled.

N. R. Ryan, Jr.
N. R. RYAN, JR.
Assistant Chief of Naval
Personnel for Distribution

Distribution: Pers-40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 4G
NR BUPERS 4 COMP 606, NR BUPERS 46 COMP 506

Copy to:
PEPS-2, 21



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20370-5000

IN REPLY REFER TO
1326 /
Ser 612C/472
24 JAN 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: LETTER OF EXPLANATION ICO [REDACTED]

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to advise statutory and administrative selection boards and assignment/distribution personnel of the background relating to [REDACTED] assignment as an Equal Opportunity Program Specialist (EOPS).
2. Although this assignment may be considered out of the mainstream of [REDACTED] professional development, it was absolutely necessary due to higher priority requirements. This was a bona fide "needs of the Navy" detail. The assignment is based on the need to revitalize and strengthen equal opportunity in the Navy. This assignment must be viewed favorably and positively with regard to [REDACTED] overall performance record and the high priority the Navy has placed on the duties to be performed.
3. This memorandum will be made a part of [REDACTED] official service record.

J. I. Maslowski

J. I. MASLOWSKI
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel
Distribution (Pers-4)

Copy to: [REDACTED]

Pers-4010
Pers-3
Pers-612C



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775

5354
MPE
9 Aug 96

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS)

Subj: FOLLOW UP QUESTIONS TO TESTIMONY GIVEN TO NATIONAL
SECURITY COMMITTEE REGARDING EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES IN THE
MILITARY

Ref: (a) ASN (M&RA) memo of 5 Aug 96

1. Your memorandum request information concerning the promotion opportunity for Marines in equal opportunity related billets. The following information is provided for inclusion in the DoD response:

- a. Officers: 1 eligible, 1 was selected
- b. Enlisted: 11 eligible, 10* were selected.

* The one Marine that was not selected had already been passed for promotion before coming in the program.

2. The promotion rates for Marines in equal opportunity related billets has exceeded the overall promotion rates for all Marines. This is an indication that we are properly screening and accepting high quality applicants to the EOA billets.

Anthony L. Jackson
ANTHONY L. JACKSON
LtCol, U.S. Marine Corps

OPTIONAL FORM 98 (7-90)		FAX TRANSMITTAL		# of pages <u>2</u>
To	<u>LT LUCAS</u>	From	<u>MAJ WAICE</u>	
Dept./Agency	<u>BUPERS</u>	Phone #	<u>693-0237</u>	
Fax #	<u>693-1746</u>	Fax #	<u>693-4959</u>	
FORM 98-11-517-7768		5010-101 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION		

MARINE CORPS PROMOTION OF MARINES IN EO BILLETS

NAME

MAJOR	W. JONES	SELECTED FOR LTCOL FY97
MGYSGT	R. COTE	PROMOTED 1994
MGYSGT	C. GLENN	PROMOTED 1994
MGYSGT	W. BUTCHER	PROMOTED 1996
MGYSGT	R. CHANG	PROMOTES 1996
1STSQT	J. ANNIS	PROMOTED 1996
MSGT	K. THOMAS	PROMOTED 1995
MSGT	M. EWING	PROMOTED 1994
MSGT	L. HARRIS	PROMOTED 1996
GYSQT	E. OSTERHOUT	PROMOTED 1995
SSQT	S. LAIRD	SELECTED FOR QYSQT FY96

STATEMENT OF THE

ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE

ON

HATE GROUPS IN THE MILITARY

**HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
JUNE 25, 1996**

STATEMENT OF THE ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE
HATE GROUPS IN THE MILITARY
JUNE 25, 1996

Introduction

The Anti-Defamation League commends the Committee for conducting today's hearing on Hate Groups in the Military and is pleased to have the opportunity to register the League's assessment of and concern about this phenomenon.

As a civil rights and human relations agency with over eighty years of experience monitoring extremist and hate group activity, the Anti-Defamation League has shared information on these groups with military staff and offered to provide anti-bias training through our A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE Institute. We appreciate the military's receptivity to the League's efforts to combat the forces of extremism and hate, and we are encouraged by the progress made in this regard.

The problem, however, remains serious, and must be a priority until hate group activity is eradicated from the military. While the level of activity has been quantified as "minimal," when one considers its nature and potential danger, the fact that seven percent of soldiers surveyed at 28 installations know another soldier involved in an extremist organization is a matter of serious concern.

Hate in the Military

Hate in the military is, tragically, not just a recent problem. Through the years, factions of the Ku Klux Klan have attempted -- with occasional success -- to infiltrate the armed forces and establish cells at military camps and bases. For example, after a violent racial disturbance took place at the Camp Pendleton U. S. Marine Corps base in California in 1976, it was discovered that a group of white Marines had joined David Duke's Knights of the KKK and were actively recruiting new members. In 1979, a larger Klan unit consisting of soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas,

was uncovered. Some of the soldiers stood guard at a Klan rally featuring David Duke and his Texas "Great Titan," Louis Beam, in Euless, Texas.

Similarly, 1979 saw episodes of Klan activity in the Navy. A supply ship operating out of Norfolk, Virginia, reportedly had a unit of some twenty Klansmen. In another incident, three white sailors, two of whom were admitted Klan members, were reported to have donned Klan robes and confronted black shipmates. In addition, a cross burning was reported on the USS America aircraft carrier. When the national leader of the Invisible Empire Knights of the Ku Klux Klan at the time, Bill Wilkinson, later aimed a Klan recruitment campaign at sailors in the Norfolk area, four U.S. Navy men were tried and convicted after attending a Klan rally that had been declared off-limits by their commander.

In 1980, ADL alerted former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown that city officials in Hampton, Virginia issued to the "Hampton Klavern" of the "Invisible Empire" a permit to distribute literature and solicit contributions. Bill Wilkinson had announced that the local unit planned to hold rallies in Hampton. The Klansmen who applied for the permit were both Army enlisted men stationed at Fort Monroe.

In 1985, ADL revealed Wilkinson's ties to convicted Soviet spy John A. Walker, Jr. Walker was Wilkinson's chief Klan recruiter in the Norfolk area during the time he was providing the Soviets with U.S. Navy secrets. The two men met while serving in the Navy.

In 1986, evidence surfaced that Marines based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, had taken part in illegal paramilitary training exercises of the White Patriot Party -- a violence-prone, neo-Nazi group. Following a letter of inquiry from ADL to former U.S. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, three Marines were discharged for their participation in White Patriot Party activities.

In 1990, five airmen serving as security policemen at Carswell Air Force Base near Fort Worth, Texas were involved in Ku Klux Klan activity. The five were discharged by the Air Force.

In April of 1994, five soldiers from Fort Benning, Georgia were charged with being part of a network of white supremacist groups operating in Alabama and Georgia that was stockpiling stolen weapons, ammunition and explosives. Two of these soldiers were ultimately court-martialed.

Most recently, the National Alliance, the most active neo-Nazi organization in the country, posted a billboard outside Fort Bragg, North Carolina to recruit new members and persuade military personnel to call the organization's hotline. The Alliance even boasted of its Fort Bragg area recruitment efforts in its April 1995 members-only bulletin. Subsequently, two African-Americans in Fayetteville, North Carolina were murdered, allegedly by two white soldiers from Fort Bragg who were involved in the neo-Nazi skinhead movement. Although the perpetrators were not connected to the National Alliance but instead to other groups, the event focused the nation's attention on the issue of extremism in the military.

While the Secretary of the Army's Task Force on Extremist Activities concluded this past March that there was minimal evidence of extremist activity in the Army, it did identify "instances of individuals or small groups of individuals who held extremist views." The murder in Fayetteville in December 1995, allegedly by two such "individuals" who were involved in the neo-Nazi skinhead scene, highlights the danger posed by even small numbers of extremists in the military. Though they may be few in number, the access that hate group activists in the military have to weapons, explosives and training makes them a potentially significant threat to society. In addition, the presence of haters and extremists in the military poses a threat to good order in the ranks.



The Anti-Defamation League's Response to Extremism in the Military

Since 1913, the mission of the ADL has been to "stop the defamation of the Jewish people and to secure justice and fair treatment to all citizens alike." Dedicated to combating anti-Semitism, prejudice and bigotry in all forms, defending democratic ideals, and promoting civil rights, ADL is proud of its leadership role in the development of innovative materials, services, and programs that build bridges of communication, understanding, and respect among diverse racial, religious, and ethnic groups. The League has taken an active role in confronting extremism in the military through our national office in New York and 28 regional offices nationwide, responding to inquiries, gathering and distributing information on extremist group activity, and conducting Hate Crime Training Seminars for armed services personnel.

Our Hate Crime Training Seminars are designed to increase the participants' knowledge and awareness of extremist group activity and to assist military personnel in recognizing and investigating bias-motivated crimes. The ideology and activities of national extremist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazi skinheads, armed militias, and Christian Identity groups are examined, as well as the recent spate of hate group activity on the Internet. By assisting supervisory personnel in recognizing extremist group literature and symbols, the military will be better positioned to identify hate group activity.

In addition, ADL seminars address various factors for identifying and defining a hate crime, constitutional issues in hate crime enforcement, and the residual effect of hate crimes on the larger community. This past March, the League presented a seminar for the Department of Defense at the Norfolk Naval Base in Virginia. The seminar was well received and we hope it will provide the impetus for further programming.

In the wake of the murders allegedly committed by Fort Bragg soldiers late last year, ADL urged Defense Secretary William Perry to reevaluate existing policies on extremist activity by armed services personnel. Subsequently, League representatives were invited to the Pentagon to

meet with the Task Force on Extremism in the Army, which is charged with recommending steps to address extremist activity. Major General Larry R. Jordan, head of the Task Force, told ADL officials that the group was assessing what modifications may be required to bolster current policies and practices concerning procedures and training. In the course of the meeting, ADL expressed several concerns about the adequacy of present military guidelines on extremism and of training for commanders and personnel to insure effective implementation of the guidelines. Additionally, ADL representatives stressed to the Task Force the necessity for both systematic data collection on bias incidents and effective anti-bias programs.

This past March, ADL welcomed the release of a report prepared by the Task Force addressing the problems of extremism within military ranks. The report called for clarification of a Defense Department policy that distinguishes between “passive” and “active” participation in extremist organizations and activities by soldiers. “Passive” participation, which is currently permitted, includes membership in hate groups and receiving their literature. “Active” participation, such as recruitment and fund raising, is already proscribed. In addition, the report noted that there is no screening process to preclude individuals involved in prior extremist activity from enlisting and recommended screening for extremist views and activity during recruitment and initial entry training.

Action Agenda to Confront Hate in the Military

While the armed services have made meaningful progress to confront extremism and hate in the military, continued diligence is necessary. ADL is pleased to offer the following recommendations.

1) Data Collection and Anti-Bias Training. This Committee should encourage the military not only to continue collecting data and information on extremist groups but also to increase resources for this activity. To the extent that the armed services bolster their intelligence-gathering network on extremism, the military will be better positioned to root it out. Similarly, it has been the League’s experience that when there is increased organizational sensitivity to the

forces of bias and bigotry, their force and effect are greatly diminished. Screening during recruitment is critical, and anti-bias programming should be included as a component of basic training as well.

2) Evaluation and Reporting to Congress. The League encourages the appropriate armed services tribunal(s) to conduct ongoing reviews of compliance with the military guidelines on extremism and report to Congress on a regular basis. These reviews would promote compliance and may serve as a deterrent to army personnel who might otherwise be inclined to seek out affiliation with hate groups.

3) Integration of Military Task Forces. The other services should follow the Army's lead and develop a coordinated response to extremism and hate. A concerted effort by all of the armed services will reinforce and build on progress the Army has made in responding to extremism and will ensure consistent progress by the military as a whole.

Conclusion

The League is encouraged by and supports the efforts of the armed services to respond vigilantly to extremist group recruiting of military personnel and extremist group activity in the military. As the Defense Secretary himself has indicated to the League, hate groups operating in the military continue to be a serious issue. Efforts to root out this activity must be a high priority.

The Anti-Defamation League stands ready to work with members of Congress, the Administration and the military to respond to and ultimately eradicate this dangerous phenomenon.



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