SCHOPENHAUER & INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
A Dialogue between India and Germany

Editor
Arati Barua

Prajapati said to the gods, "Sacrifice is your food, Immortality your strength, the Sun is your light."

jñānāchyopāsīdānastanabrāvidhyāgyo
vokramamārītutam va
urgvā suryo vo jyotir iti
Schopenhauer and Indian Philosophy: A Dialogue between India and Germany

Edited by
Arati Barua

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Schopenhauer and Indian Thought
In India F. Max Müller is more known than any other German scholar in the context of Indian thought and culture. Of course, his contribution is phenomenal in the exposition and propagation of Indian philosophy and culture and he has attracted both positive and negative evaluations, but not much attention has been paid to Arthur Schopenhauer who was a pioneering thinker in understanding and imbibing Indian thought, particularly Vedanta and Buddhism. He was deeply and profoundly influenced by Indian thought and had lofty appreciation for the Vedas, Upaniṣads, Gītā and Buddhist scriptures which are profusely quoted by him in support of his views. He was familiar with Jainism and the Kural, a South Indian Classic. We are well familiar with his famous statement about the Upaniṣads which I quote, “they have been solace of my life and they will be solace of my death”.¹ It has been said that every night before going to bed he used to read a few pages of the Upaniṣads. He explicitly acknowledges in the preface of his book, “The World As Will And Idea”² that his work can be better understood in the background of the philosophies of the ‘Hindus’ along with that of Plato and Kant. He writes that if one who “has also received and assimilated the sacred primitive Indian wisdom, then he is the best of all prepared to hear what I have to say to him”.³ It can therefore be said that he was the first German thinker to use Indian thought profitably and on that basis attempted to improve upon the Kantian philosophy with inputs from Vedānta and Buddhism. Some scholars have claimed that Schopenhauer up to this day remains the only great Western philosopher who has been well versed in Eastern thought and, to have related it to his own works. However, this
should not be taken to be a case of influence or borrowing as that of assimilation and absorption.

Unlike his contemporary Hegel, Schopenhauer had a good understanding of Indian philosophy in its proper perspective and therefore he has been rightly described as a bridge between Indian and Western thoughts, who put forth a symbiosis of the two at the deepest level. Though he read Indian classics only in translations and was aware of the limitations of translation and very few translations were available at that time, he could get the glimpse of the richness, subtlety and profundity of Indian thought. His capturing and understanding of the spirit of Indian thought and his adoration for the same is marvellous and amazing. His zeal and efforts to acquire works on Indian thought in translations and expositions are praiseworthy.

There are a few salient features of Schopenhauer's thought which need to be attended to in contemporary times. He depreciated those who lived on philosophy, who created their livelihood out of the need of human beings for metaphysics and who exploited it as much as possible. He named Sophists and professors of philosophy who indulged in this enterprise. He was very harsh in characterizing university philosophy as "juggling and humbug". He appreciated the need for metaphysics but insisted that it should cater to the innermost human needs and aspirations. It should not be empty speculation, barren hair splitting and logic chopping. Such metaphysics has to stem from intuitive apprehensions of the true nature of reality. He emphasized the primacy of volition and action rather than that of reason. He provided a strong anti-dote to rationalistic tendency and put forth 'Will' as the pivotal point of philosophical reflections. In this respect he was very close to Indian Thought. He maintained that such an intuitive faculty to envision the true nature of reality was available to primitive people who were nearer to nature and had more genuine disposition of the mind. He writes, "They were thus capable of a purer and more direct comprehension on the inner essence of nature, and were thus in a position to satisfy the need for metaphysics in a more estimable manner. Thus there originated in those primitive ancestors of the Brahmanas, the Rishis, the almost superhuman conceptions recorded in the Upaniṣads of the Vedas". He further opines, "But the conviction here described and arising directly out of the apprehension of nature must have been extremely lively in those
sublime authors of the Upaniṣads of the Vedas who can scarcely be regarded as mere human beings. For this conviction speaks to us so forcibly from an immense number of their utterances that we must ascribe this immediate illumination of their mind to the fact that standing nearer to the origin of our race as regards time, these sages apprehended the inner essence of things more clearly and profoundly than the already enfeebled race as mortals now are, is capable of doing so". 5

In his metaphysics, which runs parallel to a symbiosis of Vedānta and Buddhism, Schopenhauer begins with One Primal Spirit as the root, like the 'Tadekam' of the Rgveda, and describes It as a Single Underlying Will, a Unity of all existences. Will is the essential nature of reality. It precedes all existences. The Rgveda 6 also says, ‘‘Kāmastadagre samavartatādhi mānasoterath prathamam yādasita’’. All phenomena proceed from it as Its representations and ideas (So’kāmayatekoham bahusyamitii). The world of multiplicity is only Its representation and idea. We have to realize this. In the world there is will-to-be and will-to-live. This gives rise to striving or trisna due to delusion or avidyā. This further results in suffering. This is all natural but our goal should be cessation of all striving. This is nirvāṇa. Affirmation of will-to-be (bhavārsna) is samsāra. Denial of this will is nirvāṇa.

From this metaphysics Schopenhauer is led to non-egoistic ethics. He advocates an ethics of renunciation and asceticism on the pattern of the brahmavihāras of maitri, karunā, muditā and upēksā of Buddhism. He follows the middle path of Buddhism avoiding extremes of asceticism and indulgence. Like the Buddha he also insisted that virtue ensues from knowledge and this knowledge is not of dogmas or principles but a practical wisdom of universal oneness. D.W. Hamlyn has rightly put it as follows. ‘‘To be good is therefore to be loving; to be loving is to be compassionate; to be compassionate is to see the identity of ones real self with that of others. To see that one needs to pierce the veil of Māyā and recognize in truth the Single Will as the thing-in- itself underlying the multiplicity of phenomena’’. 7

Though Schopenhauer highlighted tragedy and suffering, these have only initial roles and not the final one in his aesthetics. According to him aesthetic experiences communicate the grandeur of joy of pure contemplation. The real is joyful and joy-yielding and so are the intuitive realizations of the saints. All this echoes the
Anandavalli section of the Taittiriya Upanisad. Viewing the beautiful gives disinterested joy.

Schopenhauer has been a trend setter in Modern Western thought and has influenced later thinkers like Nietzsche and the school of existentialism. Indian thought greatly influenced him. He went to the extent of saying that Christianity has Indian blood in its veins.  

References


6. *RgVeda*


Comparison Vs. Historical Inquiry: A Word about Method

Comparisons of Schopenhauer’s thought with Indian philosophy may involve ideas or movements that Schopenhauer was not at all acquainted with, for example Yogacāra, or philosophies which he only knew through questionable or possibly misleading sources, for example old Latin translations of the Upanishads or of Vedanta texts. Comparisons of ideas can, but do not have to be, bound by historical considerations; thus a comparison of, say, Schopenhauer’s and Gandhi’s attitude to animals, or of Schopenhauer’s thought and 20th-century Indian philosophy, would be perfectly in order. However, such comparisons often involve claims about possible influence of Indian thought on Schopenhauer. Max Hecker, one of the pioneers in the field of “Schopenhauer and India” studies, claimed for example:

Schopenhauerian philosophy, which from the outset bore the seal of Indian spirit on its front, was not directly influenced by it. [...] Only later on, when [Schopenhauer] acquainted himself with the fruits of Indian speculation, did he establish a direct connection between Indian thought and his own.¹

Unlike authors of other comparative studies, Hecker was quite open about his agenda and way of proceeding: he had noticed a “remarkable inner kinship”² between Schopenhauer and Indian thought and set out to demonstrate “only the fundamental congruence”³ which for him was a “fact” from the very outset.⁴ Numerous Indologists have since attempted the exact opposite,
namely, to "prove" that their modern or post-modern understanding of Indian philosophy is "correct" while Schopenhauer's is different and thus flawed and inadequate. An exotic but typical example is found in a recent Japanese book about Schopenhauer and Indian philosophy:

If one investigates the matter thoroughly one finds that Schopenhauer's understanding of Indian philosophy is for the most part not accurate. This is what I prove in this book. He had no correct notion of the Upanishad's saying Tat tvam asī. His interpretation of the Bhagavadgītā and Sankhya-karika is wrong. He has not grasped the meaning of Brahman.⁵

In the present contribution I will conduct an inquiry that is fundamentally different from such comparative undertakings, and it is important to clearly mark the difference. Schopenhauer's encounter with Indian thought is a historical sequence of events; what we are after is thus historical evidence, not philosophical speculation. Many examples of voluntary or involuntary mix-up between these two approaches prove how important it is to make a firm distinction between speculative comparison and historical inquiry.⁶ Questions of encounter, acquaintance, or influence ought to be historical inquiries, and any answers to such questions need to be based on scientific evidence rather than speculation. This means, among other things, that any argument which bases itself on a modern Upanishad translation or a modern view of Indian religion unknown to Schopenhauer falls into the realm of comparison. In the case of the Upanishads, for example, a historical inquiry ought to rely on the Latin Oupnek'hat and, depending on the period in Schopenhauer's life and topic, on other translations he was familiar with. It goes without saying that Schopenhauer's own, richly annotated copy of the Oupnek'hat should be a mainstay of such research. With regard to Buddhism, arguments to the effect that Schopenhauer 'only knew Buddhism in its degenerated form as it reigns in Nepal, Tibet, and China'⁷ reflect, besides being incorrect,⁸ a late 19th century view of Buddhism heavily influenced by European theology. They thus belong to the fascinating world of comparison and ought to be treated like the fictional counterargument that the Indians knew Christianity not in its original Hebrew purity but only in the degenerated Syrian, Roman
Catholic, and Lutheran forms. The question is not what Schopenhauer should have known but what he actually did know.

It is thus only through historical inquiry that can we hope to find cogent answers to questions such as: Exactly when did Schopenhauer first encounter Indian thought? From whom did he learn about it, and what sources did he consult? What kind of Indian philosophy did he first discover? Many other questions of interest, for example regarding the influence of this initial encounter, will barely be touched at this time; here we must first try to nail down a number of basic facts and to establish their historical sequence. We thus have to keep the eye firmly on all the historical evidence that we can muster up. For a start let us briefly examine Schopenhauer’s earliest India-related notes.

Schopenhauer’s India-related Ethnography
Notes from 1811

In the Winter semester of 1810/11 Prof. G.E. Schulze, Schopenhauer’s first professor of philosophy, remarked that South Sea islanders are enfeebled because of their vegetarian diet in a warm climate. Schopenhauer wrote this down in his notebook and added his question: “What about the Hindus?”9 He obviously thought that Indians are not mentally or physically impaired because of their particular diet. Had Schopenhauer read about India? In the Göttingen university library records there is no indication that he had borrowed Asia-related books.10 At any rate, in the first decades of the 19th century German intellectuals had a broad interest in India which was in part fueled, as we will see, by the romantic search for origins. In 1811 Schopenhauer took a course by Prof. Heeren, a noted authority in Germany’s nascent field of Asia-related studies.11 His ethnography course of 1811 covered the entire expanse of Asia, from Turkey and Arabia through Persia, Inner Asia, India, Southeast Asia, China, Tibet, North Asia, and Korea to Japan.12 Schopenhauer’s attendance record and detailed notes suggest that he harbored a certain interest in such matters from the time he began to study philosophy. But did he note down anything of interest about Indian philosophy and religion?

Schopenhauer’s 1811 ethnography course notes related to India comprise ten densely handwritten pages.13 Almost all of the notes concern the geography and history of the subcontinent and its
Schopenhauer and Indian Philosophy

adjacent regions, and only a few passages are relevant for our theme. The first is about the holy city of Benares:

Benares ist die heilige Stadt der Indus enthält die Schulen der Braminen, die heilige Sanskrit Sprache wird gelehrt, und die heiligen Bücher erklärt: es werden Wallfarthen hingehan um im Ganges sich zu baden.  

The second consists of Schopenhauer’s notes from Heeren’s description of the Brahmin caste:


The first caste is that of the Brahmins; all religion and science is with them. They are whiter, refrain from all animal food, and are marked by a brown self-braided thread; they must not marry into any other caste. Among the Brahmins there are large gradations. Their activities are not just cultural but comprise all learning. They are doctors, judges etc. The most respected caste is in charge of the explication of the Vedas or sacred books and understands the Sanskrit language, though they must not teach it to anyone from another caste.

Our third passage concerns the three main divinities and India’s sacred scriptures. Our reproduction of Schopenhauer’s handwriting shows the remark about the main divinities on the first three lines with an additional remark in the margin:
Brahma, Krishna and Vishnu are the 3 main divinities; they are called Indian trinity and are represented together in one picture. According to the pronouncement of some, Brahma is the creative, Krishna the preserving, and Vishnu the destroying principle. But it is not certain that this is correctly conceived.

The subsequent fourth passage, also shown above, is Schopenhauer's first known reference to the Vedas:

There are four sacred books, the Vedams, all in the Sanskrit language; they have great commentaries and further commentaries on them, which is why the sacred literature is very voluminous. Copies are in the British Museum and were given only under the condition that they be bound in silk, never in cow hide.

The fifth note concerns religious practices:
Die Religionsübungen sind größtenteils Büßungen, werden besonders von den Fakirs getrieben.\textsuperscript{19}

Finally, the sixth relevant note is about Indian law and philosophy:

Ihre Gesetzbücher sind durch die Engländer bekannt. Ueber ihre Philosophie, die auch spekulativ getrieben ist, finden man im Spiegel des Akmar die beste Nachricht.\textsuperscript{20}

These notes show that the ethnography course by Prof. Heeren concentrated on geography, history, and commerce and — assuming that Schopenhauer’s notes are faithful — that Heeren furnished little information about Indian philosophy and religion. The fact that Schopenhauer missed few lectures and took extensive notes shows his keenness to know the world; and that he underlined certain words indicates that he had some interest in Asian philosophy and religion.\textsuperscript{21} Whatever its extent, such interest seems to have been poorly served in these lectures. Heeren provided some references to sources, but neither Schopenhauer’s lecture notes nor his other notes from the period exhibit any trace of an encounter with Asian thought. This encounter only happened after two more years of study in Berlin (1811-13) and the redaction of the doctoral thesis in Rudolstadt, when the young doctor of philosophy returned for half a year to his mother’s residence in Weimar.

Schopenhauer’s Account of His “Introduction to Indian Antiquity”

In a letter from the year 1851 Schopenhauer included the following information about this 1813/14 winter in Weimar:

In 1813 I prepared myself for [Ph.D.] promotion in Berlin, but displaced by the war I found myself in autumn in Thuringia. Unable to return, I was forced to

One should note that in this statement there is no word of an introduction to "Indian philosophy" or to the Oupnek'hat. Schopenhauer simply says that Majer introduced him to "Indian antiquity".

However, tantalized by the sparseness of information, researchers soon began to fantasize. Ludwig Alsdorf, for example, had a vision of young Schopenhauer sitting for half a year at the feet of guru Majer:

Schopenhauer’s first encounter with India leads us back to the beginning of our path: it was a student and heir of Herder who introduced him to Indian antiquity: the Romantic and Private University Instructor [Privatdozent] in Jena, Friedrich Majer (1772-1818) who, though ignorant of Sanskrit like Herder, occupied himself with India with more insistence than his mentor. From November 1813 to May of 1814, Schopenhauer sat at Majer’s feet in Weimar. In the following years, while he wrote his major work The World as Will and Representation, the book [Oupnek’hat] fell into his hands which he subsequently chose as his bible.
For Alsdorf, Schopenhauer's long Indian apprenticeship had nothing to do with his discovery of the *Oupnek’hat*; he saw the discovery of this book as a chance event which took place years after the six-month teach-in with guru Majer.

Rudolf Merkel, on the other hand, thought it likely that Majer had given Schopenhauer the reference to A.-H. Anquetil-Duperron's famous *Oupnek’hat* so that he could borrow it from the local library:

> It is probable that following a suggestion by Majer, Schopenhauer borrowed Anquetil Duperron’s *Oupnek’hat* on March 26 of 1814 from the Weimar library. He returned the book on May 18 because in the meantime he probably had taken possession of his own copy.  

We can infer that Merkel situated Majer's introduction shortly before March 26 of 1814, the date when Schopenhauer borrowed the *Oupnek’hat*. With the library practically at his doorstep, Schopenhauer was not likely to wait for weeks or months before following up on an interesting lead. However, Merkel's guess that Schopenhauer had soon bought the *Oupnek’hat* is contradicted by evidence.

A similar dating of Majer’s ‘introduction to Indian antiquity’ and a similar link of this introduction with the *Oupnek’hat* appears in the speculation by Arthur Hübscher:

> The Orientalist Friedrich Majer, a disciple of Herder, opened up for him the teachings of Indian antiquity, the philosophy of Vedanta, and the mysticism of the Vedas. The reference to the *Oupnek’hat*, the Latin rendering of a Persian version of the *Upanishads* which Schopenhauer already was reading in spring of 1814, is likely to have come from Majer.

Hübscher’s portrayal contains two additional unproven assertions: 1. that Majer introduced Schopenhauer to the philosophy of the Vedanta; and 2. that he did the same for the mysticism of the Vedas.

For Hübscher's wife Angelika, her husband's ‘likely reference’ by Majer to the *Oupnek’hat* quickly congealed into a fact: “During his stay in Weimar during the winter 1813/14 he met Majer in the circle around Goethe. Majer recommended the reading of the
Oupnek’hat to him”. Such seeming facticity was destined to blossom, and to this day it regularly pops up in books and dissertations.

An author of a recent dissertation is not content with letting Majer supply the reference to the Oupnek’hat but suggests that he introduced the young philosopher to its content: “Schopenhauer receives a reference to the Oupnekhat in the winter of 1813/14 during his second stay in Weimar. It is the orientalist Friedrich Majer who familiarizes him with this text”. Another dissertation even brings several translations of the Upanishads into play:

Majer, who wrote several essays and prefaces on Indian religion and literature as well as a book entitled Brahma: on the Brahminical Religion of India in 1818, suggested to Schopenhauer that he read the most recent translations of the Upaniṣads by Anquetil Duperron.

In fantasyland, Majer’s simple “introduction to Indian antiquities” continues to gain color and scope. In the eyes of Brian Magee, for example, Schopenhauer learned not only of a book: it was “Friedrich Majer, the orientalist who introduced him to Hinduism and Buddhism”. U.W. Meyer thinks that Friedrich Majer familiarized Schopenhauer for the first time with the term māyā and asserts that “there is no doubt that Schopenhauer took over Majer’s understanding of brahman. Stephen Batchelor has Majer give Schopenhauer a copy of the Oupnek’hat while Moira Nicholls dreams up an early date for Majer’s “introduction” and is stingier in having Majer sell the Oupnek’hat to Schopenhauer: “Schopenhauer first acquired a copy of the Oupnek’hat from the orientalist Friedrich Majer in late 1813”. In fantasyland anything is possible, and dates can of course also be freely manipulated. Thus, Roger-Pol Droit can proclaim: “It is known that Friedrich Maier [sic], since 1811, made Schopenhauer discover the Oupnek’hat”. Frédéric Lenoir adds some more drama to this totally unsupported assertion by proclaiming that “in 1811” Schopenhauer “was seized by the Oupnek’hat”.

Whatever such creative authors happen to imagine: Schopenhauer unambiguously stated that Majer introduced him to “Indian antiquity”, no more and no less; and his letter leaves no doubt that this introduction took place “simultaneously” with his Goethe visits during the “winter in Weimar”, i.e., during the winter months of
1813/14. But luckily we do not have to leave it at that because we have additional sources at our disposal.

Goethe and Julius Klaproth

As we have seen, in Schopenhauer's recollection the two major events of the Weimar winter were his meetings with Goethe and Majer's "introduction to Indian antiquity". Goethe's activities during this time are so well documented that we can establish a timeline of his meetings with Schopenhauer; for Majer's "introduction", on the other hand, we must draw conclusions based on inferences from various sources.

After presenting his dissertation to the University of Iena near Weimar at the end of September of 1813, Schopenhauer stayed for an additional month in Rudolstadt. During this month he received his Ph.D. diploma and had 500 copies of the dissertation printed. At the beginning of November Schopenhauer mailed his book to various people including Goethe. Schopenhauer had already known the famous writer and statesman for several years, and Goethe had remarked the son of the hostess during gatherings at Mrs. Schopenhauer's residence; but the two had never actually spoken to each other. However, before Schopenhauer had left for Göttingen in 1809 and Berlin in 1811, Goethe had graciously agreed to write recommendation letters for the young student.

A week after receiving Schopenhauer's dissertation, Goethe for the first time mentioned it to a visitor on November 11 of 1813. On that very day Goethe received the visit of another young man of particular interest to our topic: Julius Klaproth (1783-1835), a renowned and ambitious orientalist with whose chemist father Schopenhauer had studied in Berlin. Klaproth had first visited Weimar eleven years earlier, in the autumn of 1802, to examine exotic texts from the library of Büttner and to help Goethe with cataloguing orientalia. At that time Klaproth had managed to win Weimar resident Friedrich Majer as a major contributor to a two-volume collection of articles on Asia. This collection, edited by the 19-year-old Klaproth and published at the local Industrie-Comptoir under the title Das Asiatische Magazin, is of particular interest because, as we will see, it became the first known Asia-related source which Schopenhauer borrowed from a library.
Since November of 1813 Klaproth was thus once again in Weimar for close to two months; this time he was busy finishing up the manuscript and arranging for the publication of his second exploration voyage report. Ever curious, Goethe wanted to hear about this expedition to the Caucasus in detail and also took the occasion to question the orientalist about a Chinese painting set.

Schopenhauer and Goethe

Schopenhauer’s first visit to Goethe’s house took place on November 23 of 1813, and Goethe was favorably impressed by the young philosopher:

Der junge Schopenhauer hat sich mir als einen merkwürdigen und interessanten Mann dargestellt. [...] ist mit einem gewissen scharfsinnigen Eigensinn beschäftigt ein Paroli und Sixleva in das Kartenspiel unserer neuen Philosophie zu bringen. Man muß abwarten, ob ihn die Herren vom Metier in ihrer Gilde passiren lassen; ich finde ihn geistreich und das Übrige lasse ich dahin gestellt.

The young Schopenhauer has presented himself to me as a memorable and interesting man. [...] With a certain astute obstinacy he is engaged in raising the stakes three- or sixfold in the card game of modern philosophy. It is to be seen whether the people of his profession will let him pass in their guild; I find him intelligent and do not worry about the rest.

So it came that Goethe invited Schopenhauer to a series of intensive discussions and demonstrations of his theory of colors at his Weimar residence. On November 29 they held the first meeting which lasted the entire evening. Further meetings are documented for December 18, January 8 of 1814, January 13, January 26, March 2, and April 3. On May 15 of 1814 Schopenhauer visited Goethe in Berka to say good-bye before leaving for Dresden where he was to write his major work, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung.

Let us now return to the beginning of December of 1813, i.e., the days just after the first study meeting of the aged writer with the young philosopher. Two days after that first evening-long meeting
with Schopenhauer, Klaproth visited Goethe once more at his home.\textsuperscript{58} December was a socially active season in the small town, and Goethe not only received many visitors at home but also participated at social gatherings elsewhere. The house of Schopenhauer's mother where the young man lodged was a hub of social activity. In the evening of December 3, for example, Mrs. Schopenhauer held a party at her residence. Goethe spent the whole evening until after midnight at this party, and it is quite possible that Julius Klaproth, the well-known son of a professor of Schopenhauer and acquaintance of Goethe, was also among the invited guests. We do know, at any rate, that on the very next day, December 4, Dr. Schopenhauer went to the library and borrowed, along with Newton's \textit{Opticks} (which he certainly needed for his studies with Goethe), a book which is very different from the philosophical and scientific works that he usually sought: the two-volume \textit{Das Asiatische Magazin} whose editor, as we have seen, was none other than Julius Klaproth.

Another possible participant in the gathering was Friedrich Majer who during this period was again living in Weimar; we know that two days after the Schopenhauer party he had lunch with Goethe.\textsuperscript{59} It is impossible to say with any certainty who gave Schopenhauer the reference to \textit{Das Asiatische Magazin}; since both Majer and Klaproth had many contributions in this work we can guess that one or the other talked to Schopenhauer about it, possibly at the party, and that Schopenhauer went to borrow it the following day; but in such a small town there were certainly also many other occasions to meet either man, and Goethe cannot be excluded either because he showed a pronounced interest in Asian matters during this period.

The Weimar Library Records from Fall of 1813 to Spring of 1814

During my 1997 Weimar visit the lending register of the ducal (now Anna Amalia) library was still extant. It had been perused by several earlier researchers; Mockrauer, for example, had examined it before 1928 and reported:

The register of the former Duchy library of Weimar shows that Schopenhauer during that winter borrowed the 'Asiatische Magazin,' edited by Beck, Hänsel and Baumgärtner, vol. 1-3, 1806-1807, for four months; the
Schopenhauer had indeed checked out "Das Asiatische Magazin", but both the 1813 page and the 1814 page of the library record unmistakably say "2 Bde" (2 volumes), and Schopenhauer's excerpts and references leave no doubt that what he borrowed was the two-volume set of Das Asiatische Magazin edited by Klaproth in 1802. This shows once more the importance of careful inspection of primary source materials. Since no transcription of this library record has been published to date I include here a draft transcription with some annotation and comments related to Klaproth, Majer, and to Schopenhauer's study meetings with Goethe.61

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Book title as given in Weimar Library Record</th>
<th>Checkout</th>
<th>Return</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Platonis Opera Vol. V et VI Edit. Bipont.</td>
<td>1813/06/10</td>
<td>1813/06/26</td>
<td>Summer to fall 1813 period: Books for writing doctoral dissertation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft</td>
<td>1813/06/10</td>
<td>1813/07/21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urteilskraft</td>
<td>1813/06/10</td>
<td>1813/07/21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prolegomena zur Metaphysik</td>
<td>1813/06/10</td>
<td>1813/07/21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euklides xxxxx Buch der Elemente</td>
<td>1813/06/10</td>
<td>1813/07/21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartesii principia philosophiae</td>
<td>1813/06/10</td>
<td>1813/07/21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schellings System des transzendentalen Idealismus</td>
<td>1813/06/15</td>
<td>1813/07/28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platonis Opera. Vol. X. Ed. Bipont.</td>
<td>1813/06/15</td>
<td>1813/07/28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ab. Burja Grxxxxx x.xx</td>
<td>1813/06/15</td>
<td>1813/07/21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Date Range</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reimarus Vernunftlehre x.al.</td>
<td>1813/06/28 – 1813/07/21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kiesewetter's Logik</td>
<td>1813/06/28 – 1813/07/21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Platonis Opera T. 7</td>
<td>1813/06/28 – 1813/07/21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Leibnitz Opera T. II 4°</td>
<td>1813/06/28 – 1813/07/21</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Reinhold Theorie des Vorstellungs-Vermögens</td>
<td>1813/07/29 – 1813/11/20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>--- Erklärung dartüber</td>
<td>1813/07/29 – 1813/11/20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kant's Kritik der rein. Vernunft</td>
<td>1813/07/29 – 1813/11/20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- Urteilskraft</td>
<td>1813/07/29 – 1813/11/20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Essays moral. 8° Cc. 4, 135</td>
<td>1813/08/25 – 1813/11/20</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Wolffii Ontologia 15, xx xxxx</td>
<td>1813/09/09 – 1813/11/20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kiesewetter's Logik</td>
<td>1813/09/09 – 1813/11/20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Schellings System des transzendentalen Idealismus</td>
<td>1813/09/09 – 1813/11/20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- Nov. 20, 1813: Last borrowed book related to dissertation returned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- Nov. 11: Goethe writes in letter about Schopenhauer’s dissertation; receives visit by Julius Klaproth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essays moral. 8° Co. 4: 134</td>
<td>1813/11/20 – 1814/03/20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- Beginning of winter 1813/14 period</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wolfii Iliados pars posterior</td>
<td>1813/11/20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulus Commentar. N. T. III&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Jg</td>
<td>1813/11/20</td>
<td>1814/02/04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberlands Plays T. I. II.</td>
<td>1813/11/20</td>
<td>1814/03/23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 27: Goethe writes that Klaproth is in Weimar (Nov. 1813-Jan. 1814) Nov. 29: First study meeting of Schopenhauer with Goethe</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 1: Klaproth visits Goethe</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 3: Goethe spends the whole evening until after midnight in Mrs. Schopenhauer’s salon</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Asiatisches Magazin, 2 Bde.</em></td>
<td>1813/12/04</td>
<td>1814/03/30 <em>First documented borrowing of Asia-related book by Schopenhauer</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newton’s Optick.</td>
<td>1813/12/04</td>
<td>1814/03/02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 5: Friedrich Majer has lunch at Goethe’s house</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulus Comment. N.T. IV</td>
<td>1813/12/15</td>
<td>1814/02/02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_____ Zusätze</td>
<td>1813/12/15</td>
<td>1814/02/02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_____ Kritik</td>
<td>1813/12/15</td>
<td>1814/02/02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_____ Comment. N.T. 123&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; Jge</td>
<td>1813/12/18</td>
<td>1814/02/02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 18: 2nd Goethe study meeting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>New Year 1814: Klaproth’s farewell visit to Goethe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Date Received</td>
<td>Date Returned</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Voigts Magazin der Naturk. 1. 11 u. 12te Jg.</td>
<td>1814/01/16</td>
<td>1814/02/04</td>
<td>Jan. 8, 1814: 3rd Goethe study meeting; Jan. 13: 4th Goethe study meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oken Ueber Licht &amp; Wärme</td>
<td>1814/01/16</td>
<td>1814/02/09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_____ Naturxxxx</td>
<td>1814/01/16</td>
<td>1814/03/02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitfort Hist. de la Grèce, T. I. II</td>
<td>1814/01/26</td>
<td>1814/05/18</td>
<td>Jan. 26: Fifth Goethe study meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spittlers Grundr der Chr. Kirche 3 Bde.</td>
<td>1814/02/02</td>
<td>1814/02/05</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Taño Opera T. 9. 10.</td>
<td>1814/02/05</td>
<td>1814/03/02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steffens Naturgesch. der Erde</td>
<td>1814/02/09</td>
<td>1814/03/16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runge's Farbenkugel</td>
<td>1814/02/09</td>
<td>1814/03/02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eichhorns Gesch. d. Litter. 1. &amp; 2. Bd.</td>
<td>1814/02/09</td>
<td>1814/03/02</td>
<td>Mar. 2: Sixth Goethe study meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harper über die Ursache des Wahnsinns</td>
<td>1814/03/11</td>
<td>1814/03/16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walchs Concordienbuch 1730</td>
<td>1814/03/16</td>
<td>1814/05/18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bacon moral essays</td>
<td>1814/03/23</td>
<td>1814/05/18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfii Iliados p. II</td>
<td>1814/03/23</td>
<td>1814/05/18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouphnekat Auct. Anquetil Dupperon T. I. II.</td>
<td>1814/03/26</td>
<td>1814/05/18</td>
<td>Second borrowed Asia-related book is the Latin Upanishad translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polier sur la Mythologie des Indous 2 Vol.</td>
<td>1814/03/26</td>
<td>1814/06/03</td>
<td>Third and last Asia-related book checked out from the Weimar library</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Books borrowed in the first (summer/fall of 1813) period are directly related to the redaction of Schopenhauer’s dissertation, and from December onward several books show a clear connection to the study meetings and discussions with Goethe. In Schopenhauer’s Manuscript Remains, various remarks, quotes, and themes can be traced to specific books in the above list; but here we are exclusively concerned with the three Asia-related works highlighted in the table by double enclosure lines. It is striking that after taking home Das Asiatische Magazin on December 4 of 1813, almost four months passed before he borrowed the next books related to Asia, Polier’s Mythologie des Indous and the famous Oupnek’hat. Of course we cannot exclude that Schopenhauer also borrowed Asia-related books from Weimar residents like Goethe or Majer; but so far there is no evidence for this.

Majer’s Introduction of Schopenhauer to Indian Antiquities

An unmistakable sign of Indian influence in the Manuscript Remains is the expression “Maja der Indier” in section 189. Just before, in section 187, there is a precise reference to a book of the Iliad which Schopenhauer had borrowed on March 23, i.e. three days before Polier and the Oupnek’hat. It would thus appear that the section with “Maja der Indier” was written around the end of March of 1814 when Schopenhauer had borrowed these two books.

In view of Schopenhauer’s library record we are now faced with the question: when did Majer’s famous “introduction to Indian antiquity” actually take place? Assuming that such an introduction
would trigger at least some reading activity, one would point either
to early December of 1813, i.e. before Schopenhauer borrowed *Das
Asiatische Magazin*, or to late March of 1814 (before he checked out
Polier’s *Mythologie* and the *Oupnek’hat*). The additional assumption
that an introduction which had – according to Schopenhauer – an
“essential impact” on him would produce some unmistakable trace
in the *Manuscript Remains* leaves us only with March of 1814. It
would indeed be strange if Schopenhauer had received such a
stimulating introduction in December and refrained from reading up
on the matter or writing about it for almost four months. We may
thus hypothesize that Schopenhauer got the reference to *Das
Asiatische Magazin* around the beginning of December of 1813 and
that Majer’s “unsolicited introduction to Indian antiquity” took
place in March of 1814. This scenario would imply that what incited
Schopenhauer to borrow Polier and the *Oupnek’hat* in late March
was Majer’s “introduction.” Is there any supporting evidence for
this? What was the content of Majer’s “introduction”? Why did
Schopenhauer specify that it was an introduction to “Indian
antiquity” rather than, say, “Indian philosophy” or “Indian
religion”?

Answers to some of these questions can be found in the preface
and first part of Majer’s *Brahma or the Religion of the Indians as
Brahmanism*. This book was published in 1818, shortly before
Majer’s death. It is the culminating point of a typically romantic
quest for mankind’s original religion, the *Urreligion* (primeval
religion). In this Majer rightly saw himself as an heir to Herder, the
man who had written the laudatory preface to Majer’s *Historical
Investigations on the Cultural History of the Peoples*. In a string of
books from the early 1770s to the completion in 1791 of his
*magnum opus* entitled *Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of
Mankind*, Herder had sought to trace the source of all religion and
culture, and in this realm of prehistory myth was a guiding light.
Seeing the Old Testament as just one local expression of a common
*Urreligion*, Herder’s search led via Persia ever closer to mankind’s
ultimate birthplace ... in the Caucasus perhaps, or in Kashmir? On
the way east, ancient texts such as the *Zend Avesta* appeared to
him as additional Old Testaments. But where was the oldest of them
all to be found, that elusive *Urtext* of the *Urreligion*? Herder could
not yet find it; but his pupil Friedrich Majer, who for a time had free
access to Herder’s house in Weimar, was luckier.
From a time "when in Germany almost nobody other than Herder and Kleuker spoke in public about India", Majer thought that "in India, more than anywhere else, all development and education of mankind had its source in religion". He sought to document this Urreligion in various publications including "Klaproth's Asiatic Magazine" and [...] in the entries on India in the Mythological Lexicon, and planned a magnum opus which, "on the model of Herder's Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind", was supposed to develop "on the basis of the oldest history of India" a "history of the universe, our solar system, the earth, and mankind". For this purpose Majer collected a "considerable amount of materials on the history and antiquity of India", but for various reasons he never got around to realize this grandiose plan. For us, however, even the plan is of great interest since we are looking for hints regarding the content of Majer's "introduction to Indian antiquity".

Around 1811-1813, Majer was still pursuing his dream, but now it had taken the form of a series of "mythological pocketbooks" in which he wanted to trace "the history of all religions", beginning with "the aborigines of America". Almost a century before Majer, the Jesuit missionary Père Lafitau had already attempted a similar feat in a four-volume work, but at that time the origin of all things was firmly set in the Middle East of the Old Testament, and the American Indians had to get their Urreligion from Jerusalem and Greece by way of China. For Majer, on the other hand, everything began in India.


For Majer, even Mexican and Peruvian kings had “received the first light-rays of a revelation” from India. These light-rays had waves of the Jamuna, where the mild breezes from the hills of Malaya caress the soft blossoms of spice plants so playfully that even the hearts of devout hermits get seduced by their rich perfumes; where the trees resound with the melodious tunes of nightingales and the humming of honeybees. These wonderful voices speaking from paradisiacal nature to the hearts of the first human inhabitants in whose breasts a still pure, unaltered harmony reverberated – does it not become apparent how that early, divine flare of the human spirit could thus originate, that light through whose rays later all higher life in all directions, the entire life and activity and existence of mankind, took its origin?
“appeared thousands of years earlier on the old continent, on the shores of the Jamuna and Ganga”. Thus culture had made its way from ancient India to the Americas “in all its splendor” and in due course enlightened “an entire society”.  

The Indian primeval revelation was thus mankind’s original religion and the source of all culture which Herder had so passionately sought but had failed to precisely locate. According to Majer, “Roger, Baldaeus, la Croze, Sonnerat, Paulinus, Kleuker, Polier etc.” had all sought to portray it. But unfortunately all of these previous authors writing about India had done so in confused ways, above all else, they had failed to properly distinguish between India’s pure, ancient creed − “the religion of Brahma” − and its degenerate successors which are “Shivaism, Vishnuism, and Buddhism.” It was Majer’s plan to write a tome on each of these four religions and present the whole as a kind of blueprint for the universal history of mankind; but he lost a tragic struggle against adverse circumstances and a debilitating illness and barely managed to finish the first volume. But as this testament, the volume on the “religion of Brahma”, presents the foundation of Majer’s whole edifice, it is quite sufficient for us to get an idea of his whole project. Everything rests on this original revelation, the oldest and purest form of religion; and just this religion forms the core of Majer’s “Indian antiquity”. Could it be that traces of this golden age had by chance survived in written form – a message in a bottle from the dawn of time, the oldest testament of them all?

The Oupnek’hat and Polier Recommendations

According to Majer, mankind’s oldest testament had indeed survived, and its name is Oupnek’hat. Thanks to the indefatigable efforts of “that old praiseworthy India sailor Anquetil du Perron, the man who had also made resound among us Ormuzd’s word of life to Zoroaster”, the Oupnek’hat had been brought to European shores and been translated into Latin. In the Brahma preface Majer retells in detail the story of Anquetil-Duperron’s Oupnek’hat and defends its authenticity against critics. Majer acknowledges that the Latin translation from the Persian represents only “a mediated source” but emphasizes that it unquestionably is “a rich collection of genuine Veda-Upanishads” which ought to “occupy the first place among all sources for Indian history of religion and science of
antiquity [Alterthumskunde] as long as we do not receive a direct translation of the Sanskrit original".¹¹

Of course Majer was not exactly a prophet in the desert. He was only one figure among a whole group of German mythologists and symbologists who wanted, in the wake of Herder, to take advantage of this oldest testament of mankind to explain the entire course of early human history. Kanne, Creuzer, and Görres had received the same message from the dawn of humanity; after the publication of the Latin Oupnek'hat in 1802, this famous trio was busily constructing architectures of the history of mankind that were based on this fossil, the world’s oldest text. The Oupnek'hat thus appeared as an imprint of the mother of all religions able to firmly anchor all ancient human culture and religion in mythical India. On this line Görres wrote in 1809:

From this [...] we conclude that in the Upnek'hat we really possess the System of the ancient Vedams; that the entire Asian mythology rests on it; that [Asian mythology] can exclusively be grasped in this common mother system; and that the book itself is thus of infinite importance for the religious and philosophical history of the Orient until the Vedams themselves, from which it issued, become accessible to us.⁸²

I will discuss the fascinating Franco-German Oupnek'hat tradition and its wondrous blossoms in a forthcoming monograph; in the present context it is sufficient to see 1. what ‘Indian antiquity’ signified for Majer, and 2. that the Oupnek'hat formed its main pillar.⁸³ On the basis of the information presented above it is reasonable for us to conclude that Majer is a good candidate for the Oupnek'hat recommendation to Schopenhauer.

But what about the second book which Schopenhauer borrowed on March 26 of 1814, the Mythologie des Indous by the Swiss Colonel de Polier? Had Majer not named Polier among a bunch of authors guilty of having presented a ‘totally confused picture’ of Indian mythology and religion?⁸⁴ Yes, of course he had; but there is another, quite compelling reason why Schopenhauer could have taken enough interest in Polier’s Mythologie des Indous to borrow it along with the Oupnek'hat.

Research on the Oupnek'hat is still in its infancy; this is also true with regard to Schopenhauer whose copious scribblings in the
margins are not yet documented let alone analyzed. Since so few specialists have taken the trouble to actually examine these marvelous tomes it is not surprising that even prominent features have so far received scant attention: Anquetil-Duperron’s copious and interesting annotation, for example, and his appended explanations and parerga. Some of the most intriguing pages, and the most pertinent ones in the present context, form the “Parergon De Kantismo” in the first volume (pp. 711-724) of the Oupnek’hath. These seminal reflections on the link between Kantian and Indian philosophy influenced Madame la Chanoinesse de Polier, who in the comments included in her murdered cousin’s Mythologie des Indous (whose editor she was), also “wanted the Oupnek’hath to be compared with the metaphysical ideas of Kant”. Can we not imagine that Schopenhauer, steeped in Kant’s ideas, would dart to the library at the mere mention of a philosophical connection between the ancient Vedas and Kant’s philosophy? But this would presuppose that Schopenhauer already had a pronounced interest in Indian thought. It is true that such an interest could have been the result of Majer’s “introduction,” but we simply have no way of proving this. What we do know is that Schopenhauer borrowed these two books on March 26 of 1814 and that the Oupnek’hath almost immediately exerted such an influence on the genesis of his philosophical system that Schopenhauer soon mentioned it ahead of Kant and Plato, leading Hübischer to whine: “He should have mentioned Plato and Kant in the first place – yet he names the Upanishads”.

But was this encounter with the Oupnek’hath Schopenhauer’s first acquaintance with Indian thought? Or was there an earlier, initial encounter which could have prepared the ground for Majer’s arguments and the Oupnek’hath revolution? These questions bring us back to the odd 4-month hiatus between December 4th of 1813 and March 26 of 1814. Did Das Asiatische Magazin have any discernible impact on Schopenhauer? Did it contain anything related to Indian philosophy which could have stimulated the young thinker, and are there any traces of Schopenhauer’s study of the Magazin in his Manuscript Remains?

Das Asiatische Magazin

The content of the Magazin, as we will call it for brevity’s and German grammar’s sake, has been almost entirely ignored in
previous research. In an earlier article I mentioned some of the Buddhism-related articles in the Magazin which happen to constitute Schopenhauer’s earliest known reading matter on Buddhism. But the Magazin also contains a fair amount of material about Indian thought, and if Schopenhauer did not let these two volumes sleep for four months in a corner of his Weimar room we can assume that the Magazin also contains his earliest known reading matter in the field of Indian philosophy. Our list of Weimar book borrowings shows that Schopenhauer sometimes returned books after only a few days and visited the library frequently; so it is not far-fetched to think that he kept the Magazin for some purpose and harbored a definite interest in it. As it happens, two early excerpts from the Magazin from Schopenhauer’s hand exist on an undated loose sheet; and quotations, notes, and references in Schopenhauer’s unpublished and published works indicate that he did read the Magazin with attention; but the timing of such reading can at present not be conclusively established. His interest was not short-lived because at a later point he took the trouble to actually buy these two volumes.

Each volume of the Magazin contains about 30 articles, and editor Klaproth and Friedrich Majer are the main contributors as each had furnished about a dozen articles. Both were young men eager to impress others and leave their mark in the scholarly world, and both resorted to questionable means to achieve that end which included passing off other people’s work as their own, either by leaving articles by others unsigned (editor Klaproth) or by stating in big letters “by Friedrich Majer” even when his was only the translation from English. More pertinent to the present inquiry, however, are questions concerning the content of the Magazin and evidence for Schopenhauer’s interest in it.

A Loose Sheet with Notes

From the Weimar library records we know that Schopenhauer borrowed the Magazin for almost four months and we may assume that he read its contents; but do we have any proof of that? There is no conclusive proof, unfortunately, but we do have rather convincing evidence in form of notes from Schopenhauer’s hand which, in my opinion, stem from the time between December of 1813 and March of 1814.

The notes in question are on a loose folded sheet of paper which forms four pages and which on pages 2 and 3 contains excerpts from
Majer’s *Bhagavadgītā* translation. But let us first look at the entire sheet. Hübscher proposes two dates for it: “about 1815/16”, and “around 1816”. The only evidence he adduces for this dating is the “handwriting”, but in fact the handwriting of these notes is such that precision dating is absolutely impossible. Dating by content is more promising since some notes relate to specific newspapers or to books which Schopenhauer had borrowed from libraries.

On the first page, Schopenhauer copied out of a Nürnberg newspaper a story of someone who starved himself to death; this story appeared on July 29 of 1813, and because it is a newspaper report we may not be too wrong in assuming that Schopenhauer jotted this down not very long after it appeared, i.e., sometime during the summer of 1813. The remaining three pages contain a total of ten notes or excerpts. Page 2 contains notes 1, 2, and part of note 3. *Note 1* is a simple reference to a book review that had appeared in 1806 and cannot be dated. *Note 2* is related to the redness of hot iron and the possibility of vision in near darkness; these might well be notes for questions to be discussed with Goethe during their meetings which began on November 29 of 1813. *Note 3* is the excerpt from Klaproth’s *Magazin* and begins with Schopenhauer’s indication of the source: “Aus dem Asiatischen Magazin. Theil II. p. 287 Bhaguat-Geeta. Dialog 13”. According to my hypothesis, this excerpt (which takes up a whole handwritten page and runs up to the first third of page 3) was written down between December 4 of 1813 and March 30 of 1814. Since it is from a later dialogue in volume 2, I would tend to place it in the first months of 1814 rather than December of 1813. *Note 4* contains several references with dates; the last of these, “März 1814”, appears to point to the source of Schopenhauer’s information. March or April of 1814 might thus be considered as possible dates for note 4. The rest of the notes mostly relate to books which Schopenhauer borrowed in Dresden between the summer of 1814 and the end of 1815/16; they have less importance here since the notes obviously were made sequentially at various times. Here we are primarily interested in the date of note 3 which consists of Schopenhauer’s *Bhagavadgītā* excerpts.

The result of these rather technical considerations is that everything in the content and sequence of notes on this loose sheet supports the hypothesis that Schopenhauer’s *Bhagavadgītā* excerpts
were indeed written while he had borrowed the *Magazin* from the Weimar library. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it thus makes sense to assume that the *Bhagavadgītā* excerpts from the *Magazin* stem from the time between December 4 of 1813 and March 30 of 1814 and can be regarded as a trace of Schopenhauer’s initial encounter with Indian thought. While the evidence does not amount to solid proof it is sufficient for a strong conjecture. At any rate, Schopenhauer borrowed the *Magazin* and kept it at home for almost four months while its editor Klaproth (until early January 1814) and the *Bhagavadgītā* translator Friedrich Majer (throughout this period) were living in the same small town of Weimar. It is improbable that under such circumstances Schopenhauer would borrow the *Magazin* for such a long time just to leave it unread. Furthermore, there is another indication that he was indeed reading the *Magazin* during this period: a remark in Schopenhauer’s *Manuscript Remains* from early 1814. It appears to be related to a series of articles by Majer entitled “On the Incarnations of Vishnu” and might well constitute the earliest sign of Schopenhauer’s India-related reading:

Welcher Unsinn sich selbst erklären, sich selbst erkennen zu wollen! sich selbst zur Vorstellung machen zu wollen und dann nichts übrig zu lassen das eben alle diese erklärten (verbundenen) Vorstellungen hat! Ist das nicht die Erde vom Atlas, den Atlas vom Elephanten, diesen von einer Schildkröte und diese von Nichts tragen lassen? What nonsense to attempt to explain oneself, to know oneself! to want to turn oneself into a representation and then to leave nothing which has all of these explained (connected) representations! Is this not like letting the earth be carried by Atlas, Atlas by the elephant, the elephant by the tortoise, and the tortoise by nothing?

Whether this metaphor is related to Locke, Majer’s writing on Vishnu mythology, or to his “introduction to Indian antiquity” we cannot tell; but since we are here primarily concerned with philosophy rather than mythology we may regard the *Bhagavadgītā* as the earliest source with which Schopenhauer came into direct contact. Of course Schopenhauer did not encounter a modern translation, and neither did he consult Wilkins. True to the principles
of historical inquiry we must examine the exact same source as Schopenhauer, i.e. Majer’s presentation and interpretation of the *Bhagavadgītā* in the *Magazin*. It is through this prism that Schopenhauer initially got into contact with Indian thought, and since this encounter took place earlier than the one with Anquetil-Duperron’s *Oupnek’hāt* (and, as explained above, possibly earlier than Majer’s “introduction to Indian antiquity,” too), Majer’s translations from the *Bhagavadgītā* in the *Magazin* merit a close reading.

**Majer’s *Bhagavadgītā***

Having come to the conclusion that Schopenhauer’s initial encounter with Indian thought probably did not, as hitherto maintained, consist in Friedrich Majer’s “introduction to Indian antiquity” and the subsequent discovery of the *Oupnek’hāt* around the end of March of 1814 but rather in an earlier encounter with the *Bhagavadgītā* in the German translation of Friedrich Majer, we must now investigate what Schopenhauer encountered in this translation.

Apart from the Vishnu-related series of articles that was just mentioned, the *Magazin* contains a number of contributions of interest in the Schopenhauer context. Most pertinent to our present inquiry is a series of five contributions that all bear the title “*Der Bhaguvat-Geeta, oder Gespräche zwischen Kreeshna und Arjoon*”. Each article is proudly signed “by Dr. Fr. Majer”. However, as mentioned above, these articles are only translations into German from Charles Wilkins’ English translation of the Indian classic. Majer’s original contribution is thus limited to his German translation, a number of notes, and a preface. The fact that the bulk of the five installments is no more than a translation from the English is only mentioned in Majer’s preface to the first article; all installments proudly bear the signature “by Friedrich Majer”. But the extent of Majer’s own contribution and the faithfulness of his translation is of little concern to our inquiry: it was through this translation with this introduction and these notes that Schopenhauer encountered the *Bhagavadgītā*, and neither Wilkins’ nor any other translation ought to concern us here. In his preface to the first installment, Majer explains the interest of the *Bhagavadgītā* as follows:
Keinem aufmerksamen Leser wird es entgehen, wie diese wenigstens viertausend Jahre alten Ideen und Träume der aus einer höchsteigenthümlichen Verbindung seltsamer Fabeln und Einbildungen, und der abstractesten Speculation bestehenden Weisheit des fernen Orients – in einem wunderbaren Zusammenhange mit dem stehen, was in ganz andern Zeiten und Himmelsstrichen ein Plato, Spinoza oder Jacob Böhm über die interessantesten Gegenstände des Nachdenkens glaubten und dachten, wenn auch in andern Formen sagten und vortragen.

Suche’s Worte von Majer haben ein vertrautes Echo für Schopenhauer, der seine Aussagen über diese wunderbare Verbindung zwischen seiner Philosophie und der Weisheit des Ostens wohl kennt. Da wir hier vielleicht gerade am Anfang dieser „wunderbaren Verbindung“ für Schopenhauer sind, einer der obersten Fragen in unserer Erkenntnis sein Inhalt zu dieser frühen Zeit. Majer betrachtete die Bhagavadgītā als eines der Haupttreasure of Indian antiquity, eine hoch relevante Quelle der „noch unvollkommenen Versuche“ zu erklären (mit Anmerkungen) „die zerstreuten Schätze der indischen Metaphysik, höherer Theologie, und mythologische Poesie und Fabel aus einem gemeinsamen Standpunkt“.

Doch bevor wir uns auf eine nähere Betrachtung Majers Bhagavadgītā konzentrieren, müssen wir uns daran erinnern, dass wir vorsichtig sein sollten, zu viel daraus zu machen. Nach allem, wenn wir der Philosophie des Majer zu glauben haben, hat Majer Schopenhauer mit der Indischen Antike ohne zu fragen eingeführt. Wenn wir davon ausgehen, dass diese Einführung im März 1814 erfolgte, so würden wir...
to conclude that Schopenhauer was too little interested or too shy to pose India-related questions to Majer, or alternatively that he did not have an occasion to do so. Most available evidence points to the Oupnek'hat as the match which definitely lit Schopenhauer's fiery interest in Indian philosophy and religion. But there are the above-mentioned turtle-and-elephant metaphor and Schopenhauer's excerpts from the *Bhagavadgītā*, both of which appear to date from the months before his encounter with Anquetil-Duperron's Latino-Persian Upanishads. We thus return to the hypothesis raised above concerning a possible nursing of interest in Indian thought between December of 1813 and March of 1814. In the following we will look at some facets of Majer's *Bhagavadgītā* while trying to find out what it was that attracted Schopenhauer's interest to such an extent that he wrote down excerpts and kept them for the rest of his life.

**Yogic Concentration**

In a letter by Warren Hastings which precedes Wilkins' *Bhagavadgītā* rendering and also opens Majer's German translation, it is stated that "the Brahmans are bound to a kind of mental discipline" in which "the mind is concentrated on a single point" whereby "the mental confusion which engenders ignorance" is dissolved.¹⁰⁸

Die, welche sich dieser Übung ergeben, vermögen nicht allein ihr Herz vor jeder sinnlichen Begierde rein zu erhalten, sondern auch ihre Aufmerksamkeit von jedem äußeren Objecte abzuziehen und gänzlich auf den Gegenstand ihrer Meditation zu heften.¹⁰⁹

Those who engage in this practice manage not only to keep their heart pure in the face of any sensual desire, but also to withdraw their attention from any external object and to fix it entirely on the object of their meditation.¹¹⁰

This kind of "objective attention" was highly esteemed by Schopenhauer from an early period. When in the Winter semester of 1810/11 Prof. Schulze made a remark to the effect that "immersed concentration" (Vertieftsein) was nothing other than "an inability to direct one's attention, while focused on one object, also on other
things”, Schopenhauer wrote a sharp rejoinder next to Schulze’s observation:

Ego. An dieser Geistesschwäche hat also Sokrates stark laborirt, als er, wie Alkibiades im Symposium erzählt, ein Mal 24 Stunden unbeweglich auf dem Felde stand.¹¹¹

Schopenhauer might thus have agreed with Hastings who stated in the introductory letter whose German translation appears before the Bhagavadgītā text: “Even the most diligent men of Europe find it is difficult to fix one’s attention to such a high degree”. In India, by contrast, there are people who “often have had a daily habit of engaging in absolute contemplation [absolute Anschauung] from youth to mature age”, thus adding their own insights to the treasures accumulated by their forebears.¹¹² As the body gains strength through exercise, so does the mind; and according to Hastings it is exactly through such exercise that Indians were able to achieve “discoveries of new trajectories, of new connections of ideas” and to develop their own, original philosophical systems.¹¹³

[Solche Geistesübungen führten] zu Systemen, die, obgleich speculativ und subtil, dennoch gleich den einfachsten der unsrigen, auf Wahrheit gegründet sein können, da sie den Vorteil haben, aus einer von jeder fremden Mischung gereinigten Quelle herzuließen.¹¹⁴

[Such exercise led the Indians] to systems which, though speculative and subtle, could nevertheless be founded on truth – like the most basic [systems] of ours – because they have the advantage to stem from a source which is freed from any foreign admixture.”

The Gītā, in Hastings’ view, is thus a work “of great originality, lofty inspiration, and an almost unequalled power of reasoning and diction” which, in spite of its special method, contains “as a peculiar exception among all religions known to us” a theology “which corresponds best with that of the Christian church and explains its basic doctrine in a glorious manner”.¹¹⁵
Krishna’s Revelation

Needless to say, the *Bhagavadgītā* is an episode from the voluminous Mahabharata epic and one of India’s most acclaimed literary products. In this episode, the hero Krishna reveals himself to the Pandu prince Arjuna, who faces battle against his own kin, as the incarnation of the creator/destroyer Vishnu. Vishnu is, according to Majer, the indestructible “world spirit” (Weltgeist)\(^1\)\(^{16}\) which assumes myriad forms and is, among many other names, called “eternal, universal, enduring, unchangeable, invisible and ungraspable”.\(^1\)\(^{17}\) Since Majer had also included a three-part series of articles about the incarnations of Vishnu in the *Magazin*, it is clear that the subject was of the greatest interest to him.

Let us now look at the first “conversation between Kreeshna and Arjoon”, to use Majer’s spelling. Whereas “men of limited capacity [...] deliver their heart to earthly desires” and expect “recompense for the deeds of this life”,\(^1\)\(^{18}\) the accomplished man “attains true wisdom”\(^1\)\(^{19}\) which is nothing other than freedom from desire. “Free from duality”,\(^1\)\(^{20}\) he keeps “steadfastly to the track of truth”,\(^1\)\(^{21}\) has renounced “all thoughts about the fruits of his actions”,\(^1\)\(^{22}\) and devotes his mind “with constant application ceaselessly to contemplation”.\(^1\)\(^{23}\)

Derjenige hegt wahre Weisheit in sich, welcher sein Herz jeglicher Begierde verschließt, der mit sich selbst zufrieden ist, und sein Glück in sich selbst trägt. Ihm schlägt im Unglücke sein Herz nicht unruhiger, er fühlt sich glücklich und zufrieden, wenn es ihm wohl geht.

Unruhe, Furcht und Zorn bleiben ihm fremd.\(^1\)\(^{24}\)

He embodies genuine wisdom who shuts off his heart to any desire, who is at peace with himself and carries his fortune within himself. In misfortune his heart is not less at ease, and he also feels as happy and content as when things go well for him. Unease, anxiety and ire are foreign to him.

The similarity of such statements to Schopenhauer’s “better consciousness”, a conception he had been developing for years and which stands opposed to man’s “empirical consciousness” marked by self-interest and ever unfulfilled desire, is striking. According to Majer’s *Bhagavadgītā*, the deluded one who commits acts “only out
of self-interest' (Eigennutz) \(^\text{125}\) "harbors the illusion that it is he himself who does all these deeds which [in truth] are simply the result of the principle of his constitution", \(^\text{126}\) and his mind is enthralled by "objects of the senses". \(^\text{127}\)

The wise man, by contrast, attains victory against passion, "that dangerous destroyer of wisdom and science" (Zerstörer der Weisheit und der Wissenschaft), \(^\text{128}\) and finds something which goes beyond reason: "the essence" (das Wesen). \(^\text{129}\) At the end of the first installment of Majer's translation this "Wesen" is defined as follows: "The encompassing soul, a world-spirit of which the individual soul forms but a part" ("Die allgemeine Seele, ein Weltgeist, von dem die Lebensseele nur ein Theil ist"). \(^\text{130}\) But only a wise man knows this Weltgeist, a man who "remains free from desire in all his actions" ("der bey allen seinen Unternehmungen frey vom Begehren bleibt"). \(^\text{131}\)

Ein solcher begehrt keinen Lohn für seine Handlungen, er ist stets zufrieden und unabhängig, und kann, wenn er gleich an einem Werke Theil nimmt, doch immer als nichthandelnd betrachtet werden. Er ist ohne Unruhe, demüthigen Herzens und Geistes, und von allem Sinnengenusse frey; und da er nur die Functionen des Körpers erfüllt, so begeht er keine Sünde. Er bleibt zufrieden, was auch geschehen mag: er hat die Zweyseitigkeit überwunden, und ist frey von Begierde. Im Glücke wie im Unglücke bleibt er immer derselbe, und ob er gleich handelt, so wird er doch von der Handlung nicht beschränkt. \(^\text{132}\)

Such [a wise man] desires no recompense for his actions, is always content and independent and can, even though he engages in some enterprise, still always be regarded as unengaged. He is without unrest, of humble heart and mind, and free of all sensual enjoyment; and since he only performs the functions of the body he does not commit any sin. He remains content whatever may happen: he has overcome duality and is free from desire. In fortune and misfortune he always stays the same, and though he may act he is not limited by his action.
But who can attain such marvelous wisdom, such "better consciousness"? Krishna, as relayed to young Schopenhauer by Wilkins via Majer, answers: "He attains it who combines his firm resolve with knowledge of himself" ("Der gelangt dazu, welcher mit einem festen Entschlusses die Kenntniß seiner selbst verbindet").

Wessen Gemüth die Gabe dieser Andacht besitzt, wer alle Dinge mit gleichem Blicke betrachtet, der sieht die Weltseele in allen Dingen, und alle Dinge in dem allgemeinen Weltgeiste.

Unfortunately only very few mortals attain such insight into this "primordial being" ("Urwesen") which manifests itself in the material and spiritual elements of humanity. But, lofty as such insight may be, it is not yet the highest:

But you must further know that I have another essence which is distinct from this and far higher: [an essence] whose nature is life and by which the world is maintained. You must know that these two are the generative sources of all of nature.

This fundamental essence constitutes everything, from the "wetness in water" to "light in the sun" and from "human nature in man" to "life in all beings": it is "the eternal seed of nature as a whole".

In the ninth and tenth conversations, Krishna finally reveals himself to his listener Arjuna as Vishnu, the creator and destroyer of everything, the "inexhaustible seed of nature", and the "soul which inhabits the body of every being"; moreover, he shows himself also as "all-devouring death as well as resurrection of those who return to life".
The following conversation, number 11, brings us to a peak of this divine revelation; watched by the stunned Arjuna, Krishna reveals his own body as "the entire living and lifeless world."¹⁴³

Schöne, Arjuna, die Millionen meiner göttlichen Formen, deren Gattungen eben so verschieden sind, als die Gestalten und Farben von einander abweichen.¹⁴⁴

See, Arjuna, the millions of my divine forms, the species of which are just as different and varied as forms and colors.

In this way Arjuna is finally brought to the realization: "You are this everlasting essence, distinct from all transitory things,"¹⁴⁵ and he sings Krishna’s praise: "Everything is included in you; thus you are everything" ("Alles ist in dir eingeschlossen; du bist also Alles").¹⁴⁶

Schopenhauer’s First Excerpt from the Bhagavadgītā

After Arjuna, trembling in awe, was allowed to see the entire cosmos in the body of Krishna, Krishna in the thirteenth conversation goes on to reveal himself, as it were, as the innermost being of Arjuna himself, namely, as the perceiver (kṣetra-gna) of Arjuna’s own body (kṣetra). This, characteristically, is the place where Schopenhauer’s first excerpt from the Bhagavadgītā begins on the loose sheet of paper which might date from the first months of 1814:

Kriṣhna oder Gott spricht:¹⁴⁷ Lerne daß das Wort Kṣetra den Körper bedeutet, u. Kṣetra-gna denjenigen, welcher ihn erkennt. Wisse daß Ich¹⁴⁸ Krishna or God says: Realize that the word Kṣetra signifies body, and Kṣetra-gna [means] him who perceives it. Realize that I am this Kṣetra-gna in all its mortal forms. The knowledge
Schopenhauer's Initial Encounter with Indian Thought

What was it in this statement that interested young Schopenhauer to such a degree that he had to note it down on a sheet of paper which he was to safeguard for almost fifty years? Here, the body of the listener Arjuna itself, together with all its organs and capacities including the "perception of oneself" (des "Gefühles seiner selbst") is revealed as the field (kshetra) through which wisdom can be attained. One's own body is thus the avenue by which everything can be penetrated.

It is impossible not to note a striking development in Schopenhauer's thought which took place just around the time of his initial encounter with Indian thought. I am referring to the importance of "knowledge of oneself" and of the role of one's "body" in this enterprise. We have seen that the possibly earliest trace in Schopenhauer's notebooks which betrays Indian influence is section 171 of the Manuscript Remains where the metaphor of the elephant and the turtle is used in the context of the futility of trying to know oneself: such knowledge, according to Schopenhauer, necessarily moves in a vicious circle because the subject "I" can ultimately only know itself as an object or representation and never as a subject; and representation without a subject is as baseless as resting the world on Atlas, Atlas on an elephant, the elephant on a turtle, and the turtle on nothing. The lead-up to the elephant-and-turtle passage lays this out clearly:

Wer nun aber 

_now, he who attempts to explain himself must posit himself (the subject) as ground or as consequence: whereby he turns himself into a representation. But the representation of whom? All representations are, in the end, only his own (the subject's) representations. Whatever can at all be known and thus explained is for that very reason nothing but representation.\textsuperscript{153}_

Now, he who attempts to explain himself must posit himself (the subject) as ground or as consequence: whereby he turns himself into a representation. But the representation of whom? All representations are, in the end, only his own (the subject's) representations. Whatever can at all be known and thus explained is for that very reason nothing but representation.\textsuperscript{153}
Schopenhauer and Indian Philosophy

This certainly sounds like a vicious circle; yet it is just in this circle that Schopenhauer sees the possibility of breaking through the riddle of nature. Section 171 opens with the remark: "Gnóti sauton! [Know thyself!] Commentary: Square the circle, make five an even number (says the manual of magic): then the whole of nature will be at your service". 154

How would self-knowledge be a way out of this vicious circle? Is there "a hole in the veil of nature"155 through which man could catch a glimpse of nature as it really is – the basis of the turtle, the whole universe, and himself – thus squaring the circle? This is exactly where Schopenhauer’s first excerpt from the Bhagavadgītā comes in: man’s own body is that keyhole to the universe. This thought appears, seemingly out of the blue, just two sections after Schopenhauer’s first mention of the "Maja of the Indians". It marks a crucial breakthrough in the development of Schopenhauer’s burgeoning philosophical system and begins with a sentence in which Schopenhauer underlined almost every word: "The body, (the corporeal man) is nothing other than the will that has become visible". 156

Although we cannot say with any measure of certainty to what degree Majer’s Bhagavadgītā influenced the young philosopher we cannot but note that the thrust of some of its passages points very much in the direction which the burgeoning metaphysics of will was going to take. One need only to replace speaker Krishna with "will" and open one’s ears:

In dieser animalischen Welt giebt es einen Theil meiner selbst, welcher der universelle Geist aller Dinge ist. Er versammelt die fünf Organe der Sinne und den Geist, welcher der sechste ist, um daraus einen Körper zu bilden, und ihn von neuem zu verlassen. [...] Der Thor nimmt ihn nicht wahr, weil er von den Goon oder Eigenschaften besessen ist, er mag sterben oder leben, oder

In this animal world there is a part of myself which is the universal spirit of all things. It comprises the five sense organs and mind which is the sixth [sense organ], and it does so in order to form them a body, only to [later] leave it again. [...] The fool does not perceive it because he is enthralled by the Goon or properties whether he is dying, living, or enjoying. However, he who possesses the eyes of wisdom does see it. Those
genießen. Der aber sieht ihn, welcher die Augen der Weisheit hat. Auch die, welche ihren Geist in der Meditation üben, können diese Weltseele in sich selbst wahrnehmen; während jene, deren Gemüt ungebildet und deren Urtheil schwach ist, ihn ungeachtet aller Nachfor-

schungen nicht finden.¹⁵⁷

On the background of the opening of the crucial section 191 of Schopenhauer's *Manuscript Remains* where Schopenhauer declares man's body to be "will made visible", the voice of the divine Krishna booms with even more gravitas from Schopenhauer's first *Bhagavadgītā* excerpt: "Realize that the word Kṣhetra signifies body, and Kṣhetra-gna [means] him who perceives it. Realize that I am this Kṣhetra-gna in all its mortal forms. The knowledge of Kṣhetra or Kṣhetra-gna I call Gnan or wisdom".¹⁵⁸

The characteristics of wisdom as portrayed in Majer's *Bhagavadgītā* echo in many ways those of Schopenhauer's "better consciousness:" "freedom from self-love, hypocrisy, and injustice", freedom from attachment even to wife and children, disgust about society, etc.¹⁵⁹ Agnan or ignorance, on the other hand, bears the marks of Schopenhauer's "empirical consciousness" as it is linked to "will" and to "evil desire or a passion inimical to man, a daughter of the sensual principle" through which "the world is veiled, just as the flame by smoke".¹⁶⁰

Unter der Form des Willens wird der Verstand des weisen Menschen durch diesen unversöhnlichen Feind verdunkelt, welcher, gleich einem verzehrenden Feuer die Verwüstung mit sich bringt, und schwer zu besänftigen ist. Am liebsten maßt er sich die Herrschaft über die Sinne, das Herz und den Verstand an.

Under the form of will, the reason of the wise man is obscured by this irreconcilable enemy who, in the manner of a consuming fire, brings with it devastation and is hard to pacify. It prefers to exert dominance over the senses, the heart, and reason. In this way it manages to cloud reason and put the soul to sleep. Thus it is your foremost
Durch dies weiß er die Vernunft zu trüben und die Seele einzuschläfern. Es ist also deine erste Pflicht, 

_**deine Leidenschaften zu überwinden**, und diesen gefährlichen Zerstörer der Weisheit und der Wissenschaft zu bezwingen._

Just like Schopenhauer's will, this pervading force is "indivisible yet distributed in all things. It is the ruler of all things; it is what in turn destroys and again creates". But ordinary man cannot perceive it; it is only by way of profound knowledge of oneself that one can catch a glimpse of the "Tattwa or first principle", the "object of wisdom".

Es ist ganz Hände und Füße; ganz Angesicht, Kopf und Auge; er ist ganz Ohr, und in dem Mittelpuncte der Welt wohnend, erfüllt er ihren weiten Raum. Er selbst hat keine Organe; er ist das Licht, was alle Fähigkeiten der Organe zurückstrahlen. Ohne an etwas gebunden zu seyn, umfaßt er Alles; und ohne alle Eigenschaft teilt er alle Eigenschaften. Er ist das Innere und Aeußere, das Bewegliche und Unbewegliche der ganzen Natur. [...] Er ist untheilbar, und doch in allen Dingen vertheilt. [...] Er ist die Weisheit, das Object und das Ziel der Weisheit, und er wohnt in allen Herzen.

It is entirely hands and feet; entirely face, head, and eye; it is entirely ear, and situated in the center of the world it fills its broad expanse. It does not have any organs of itself; it is the light which all capacities of the organs reflect. Without being bound to anything it encompasses everything; and without any characteristic it shares all characteristics. It is the Inside and the Outside, the mobile and immobile of the entire nature. [...] Indivisible, it nevertheless is distributed in all things. [...] It is wisdom, the object and goal of wisdom, and it dwells in all hearts.
The passages just quoted stem from the thirteenth conversation of Krishna and Arjuna, and we will now turn to Schopenhauer’s second *Bhagavadgītā* excerpt which reproduces almost the entire last page of this conversation.

**Schopenhauer’s Second Excerpt from the *Bhagavadgītā***

Schopenhauer’s second excerpt from the *Bhagavadgītā* is substantially longer than the first. While the first reproduces the very beginning of conversation 13, this second excerpt reproduces the final paragraph of the same conversation. The excerpt is a rather faithful reproduction of Majer’s translation; the one exception is Schopenhauer’s omission of a sub-clause.

We have seen that Schopenhauer was interested in the opening of conversation 13 where Krishna reveals to Arjuna that “all things, whether living or not, have their origin in the union of *Kṣetra* and *Kṣetra-gna*”. In Schopenhauer’s first *Bhagavadgītā* excerpt these terms were defined as follows: “*Kṣetra* signifies the body, and *Kṣetra-gna* the one who perceives it”. Krishna then tells Arjuna about his broad concept of body; its origin and essence, he says, can only be understood through *gnan* which is selfless wisdom and the “knowledge of *Tattwa* or the first principle”. The object of such wisdom is *Gneya*, defined by Krishna as beginningless *Brahma* which, as cited above, is “all hands and feet; all face, head, and eye” and forms the center of the world while also filling its wide expanse. Indivisible yet distributed in all things, this is the object and goal of wisdom.

At the beginning of the final paragraph of this conversation, Krishna states that all things, living or not, have their origin in *Kṣetra* (body) and *Kṣetra-gna* (perceiver of the body). It appears that this topic was of great interest to Schopenhauer, as was that of the *Weltseele* (world-soul) which in this passage is said to “illuminate all bodies.” But let us now look at the whole excerpt as Schopenhauer wrote it down (discrepancies with the *Magazin*’s original text are specified in the notes):

**Derjenige**, welcher alle seine Handlungen durch die Natur, Prakriti, perceives vollzogen sieht, nimmt zugleich wahr, daß Atma soul is not active in this. If he
Schopenhauer’s two excerpts clearly give the lie to Zimmer’s assertion that Schopenhauer “did not make use of the Bhagavadgītā.” At the same time, Zimmer’s regret for this supposed failure is interesting. According to him, in the Bhagavadgītā

the terribly lofty power present in the world and in oneself – what Schopenhauer called “will” – was indeed conceived as something all-divine [Allgöttliches] in whose contemplation and experience the devoted believer feels secure and is able to overcome the brutal contradiction of the life given to him, dissolving the total meaninglessness of all existence which rolls through universes and eons.

The sources which I presented above permit us to add several more points of convergence, not the least of which is the “final separation from animal nature” through acquisition of desireless and selfless wisdom – a thought that pops up at various places in Majer’s text.

Conclusion

To conclude I must emphasize once more that I am not arguing that the materials presented above are sufficient grounds for unequivocally proving a strong Bhagavadgītā influence on Schopenhauer at this early stage. At present, the sources known to us simply do not support such a clear-cut conclusion. Given that my dating of Schopenhauer’s Bhagavadgītā excerpts is not quite bomb-proof, that relevant notes in the Manuscript Remains have an element of ambiguity, and that at present it does not seem possible to disentangle possible influences of the Bhagavadgītā, Klaproth, Majer, Polier, and the Oupnek’hāt, conclusions can of course not be categorical. We can, however, state that Schopenhauer’s initial encounter with Indian thought did not, as almost universally held in previous research, happen with the Oupnek’hāt but rather with Majer’s translation of the Bhagavadgītā. We can further assert that Majer’s text addressed a number of themes which already were – or soon became – crucially important for the genesis of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of will.
References

1. M. F. Hecker, *Schopenhauer und die indische Philosophie*, Köln 1897: 5-6. Unless otherwise noted all translations from German, French, and Japanese into English are by the author.


6. The most extreme case in recent times is Douglas Berger's *The Veil of Maya: Schopenhauer's System theory of falsification: the key to Schopenhauer’s appropriation of pre-systematic Indian philosophical thought*, Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI Dissertation Services, 2000. This dissertation purports to be a study of Indian influences on the genesis of Schopenhauer's system but exhibits ignorance of even the most basic historical facts and sources concerning Schopenhauer's early sources about India. For example, Berger asserts that in his ethnography notes Schopenhauer "mentions nothing about India" (p. 38) and ignores that Schopenhauer borrowed *Das Asiatische Magazin* in 1813 (p. 39).


12. See the list with page references to Schopenhauer's original notebook in App, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18; remarks on Prof. Heeren and his special interest in India on pp. 15-16.


14. Schopenhauer Archiv, case III, p. 87. The left column is always my transcription of the still unpublished Schopenhauer manuscript notes. It exactly replicates the original spelling, abbreviations, etc. The right column contains my English translation. See the complete transcription
and English translation of these India-related notes in Schopenhauer Jahrbuch 87, 2006: 15-31.

15. Ibid., p. 91.


17. Ibid.


21. Apart from two underlined island names, the underlined words in passages five and six are the only nouns emphasized in this way by Schopenhauer on the entire ten pages of notes.


25. It is rather unlikely that Schopenhauer already owned a copy of the Oupnek'hat in May of 1814. We know that he borrowed the two large volumes again in Dresden from June 8 to July 16; see Jacob Mühlenthaler, *Die Mystik bei Schopenhauer*, Berlin: Alexander Duncker Verlag, 1910, p. 68. Why would he have done so if he already owned them? A more likely scenario is that Schopenhauer got possession of his own set of the Oupnek'hat during the first Dresden summer (1814).


29. Berger, op. cit., p. 38. Berger does not specify what other translations Major might have had in mind. But Berger's consistent mistaken reference to the title of the Oupnek'hat ("Secretum Legendum" instead of Duperron's "Secretum Tegendum") is an interesting slip because, thanks to Dārā Shākoh and Duperron, the Oupnek'hat had indeed become a "secret to be read" (legendum) rather than one that one should "keep silent about" (tegendum)! I could not yet consult the book version where such mistakes might be corrected: Douglas Berger, *The Veil of


32. Ibid., p. 250 (note 87).


37. Gesammelte Briefe GBr 5-6, No. 11 (letter to Heinrich Karl Abraham Eichstäd, written in Rudolstadt on October 5, 1813.


39. GBr 53, No. 56; see also p. 655.

40. See Steiger, op. cit., p. 353.

41. GBr 7, No. 14.

42. Six days after receiving the dissertation, Goethe spoke about it to Riemer. See Steiger, op. cit., p. 758.


44. Klaproth’s father, Martin-Heinrich Klaproth, was professor of chemistry in Berlin and is known for his discovery of uranium.


47. Gimm (op. cit., p. 567) overlooked that in 1813 an earlier meeting of Klaproth and Goethe took place in Dresden, not in Weimar; thus there is no evidence for an August visit to Weimar by Klaproth. This time, Klaproth left town after his new-year visit to Goethe; the problem Gimm (op. cit.: 581-2) had with the initials “H.R.” Klaproth in the record of Goethe’s son August is easily solved: it was indeed Julius Klaproth, and H.R. stands for Klaproth’s title “Hofrat” (court counselor).


49. Steiger, op. cit., p. 758.

50. Letter by Goethe to Knebel of November 24, 1813; Steiger, op. cit., p. 756.

51. Goethe’s diary features only one entry for this evening: “Abends Doktor Schopenhauer” [in the evening Dr Schopenhauer]. Steiger, op. cit., p. 766.

52. Steiger, op. cit., p. 771.


54. Steiger & Reimann, op. cit., p. 22. See also GBr 9, No. 18. Since other visitors (Wolff and Riemer) stayed for dinner, this meeting seems not to have been exclusively dedicated to discussion of Goethe’s color theory.

55. Steiger & Reimann, op. cit., p. 28. Since Goethe’s diary features no other entries it is possible that Schopenhauer spent the entire afternoon and evening with Goethe.

56. Steiger & Reimann, op. cit., p 43. No other visitor is recorded for this evening.

57. Steiger & Reimann, op. cit., p. 52. This meeting took place on Palm Sunday afternoon and was followed by visits of other people.

58. Steiger, op. cit., p. 767.

59. Ibid., p. 768.


61. The book titles in the left column reproduce the entry in the library record; mistaken spellings (such as “apokriph” instead of “apokryph”, “Ouphnekat” instead of “Oupnekhat”, “Duperron” instead of “Dupperon”, etc.) are also reproduced exactly as they appear in the original. Illegible words are reproduced as a series of x; their number approximately corresponds to the number of illegible letters. The titles and dates of check-out and return are given as they appear under “Schopenhauer” in the Weimar library Ausleihbuch for the years 1813 and 1814. The comments in the fourth column are of course by me.
64. HN1: 104 (No. 189). See below for the possibly earliest sign in section 171 of HN1 (the elephant-turtle passage).
71. Majer, *Brahma*, p. VI.
73. Majer, *Brahma*, p. VI.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 13. Majer insists that “doubts about the faithfulness of [Anquetil’s] translation and even more so about the Persian one” are “unjustified” and mentions in his support “great admirers” of the *Oupnek’hat* in France like Senator Lanjuinais.
83. The *Laws of Menu* came a close second; see *ibid.*, pp. 4-5.
84. *Ibid.*, p. XI. See the translation above for other guilty writers.

86. HN1, 422 (No. 623): "I confess, by the way, that I do not think that my system could ever have taken form before the Upanishads, Plato, and Kant could throw their rays simultaneously into one man's spirit".


89. Schopenhauer Archiv, case XXVIII, 92-93; see the next sections.

90. In HN5: 334 Hübscher provides only four references: this hardly scratches the surface.

91. See the indications in HN5: 334.


93. Schopenhauer Archiv, case XXVIII, pp. 91-94.

94. HN 2, p. XXIX.

95. HN 5, p. 334.

96. HN 2, p. XXIX.

97. See HN 1, p. XXIX; the story itself is reproduced in HN 5: 507. Schopenhauer made use of this story in *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, vol. I (see HN 1: XXIX).

98. These notes are transcribed in HN 1, pp. 245-247. To avoid confusion I use Hübscher's numbering scheme.

99. Merkel's assertion (op. cit., p. 166) that Schopenhauer also "used" *Das Asiatische Magazin* in Dresden between September 24 and October 19 of 1815 seems too specific to be a simple conjecture. However, neither Merkel nor anyone else furnished any supporting evidence. Mühlethalter's list of all the materials borrowed by Schopenhauer from the Dresden library shows no trace of any *Magazin* entry during the period in question (op. cit., p. 72), and according to Perk Loesch of the Sächsische Landesbibliothek / Staats – und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (letter dated May 8, 1996) it is impossible to reconstruct what materials the "India closet" at the said library – which both Schopenhauer and Krause used – contained.


101. HN 1; 96 (no. 171).

104. “Nothing” of course refers to the absence of a subject in which such Vorstellungen arise.

103. Of particular interest are the articles related to Buddhism such as “Ueber die Fo-Religion in China” (vol. 1, pp. 148-169) which probably constitute Schopenhauer’s earliest readings on this religion. See Urs App, “Schopenhauers Begegnung mit dem Buddhismus”, Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 79 [1998]: 42 ff.


105. The Bhagvat-Geeta, or Dialogues of Kreeshna and Arjoon: in Eighteen Lectures; with Notes. Translated from the original Sanskreet, or Ancient Language of the Brahman, by Charles Wilkins, London 1785.


107. Ibid., p. 408.


109. Majer 1802 I: 413.

110. In the interest of unbiased appraisal of what Schopenhauer actually read, this English translation was made by the author without consulting the English original.

111. HN 2, S. 15.

112. Majer Magazin vol. 1, p. 414. As mentioned above, the translations from Majer’s contributions are (in the interest of unbiased appraisal of what Schopenhauer actually read) made from Majer’s German into English without consultation of the English originals.

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid.


116. Ibid., p. 426.

117. Majer Magazin, vol. 1, p. 440; the italics are from the Asiatisches Magazin.

118. Majer Magazin, vol. 1, p. 442

119. Ibid., p. 444.

120. Ibid., “Frey von der Zweyheit (Duplicität)”.

121. Ibid.

122. Majer 1802 I: 443.

123. Majer 1802 I: 444.

124. Ibid.; the italics are from the Asiatisches Magazin. See also vol. 2, p. 118.


126. Ibid., p. 450.
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128. Ibid., p. 452.
129. Majer Magazin, vol. 1, p. 453; the emphasis is from the Magazin.
130. Ibid.
132. Ibid. The emphasis is in the original. See p. 113 where freedom from duality (“‘Doppelseitigkeit’”) is again mentioned.
134. Ibid., p. 123.
135. “Among ten thousand mortals only very few aspire to perfection, and among those who do and attain it there again is only a small number who know me according to my nature” (“Unter zehntausend Sterblichen streben nur sehr wenige nach Vollkommenheit, und unter denen, die danach streben, und dahin gelangen, ist wiederum nur eine kleine Anzahl, die mich meiner Natur gemäß kennt”). Majer Magazin, vol. 2, p. 126.
136. “My primordial essence consists of eight parts, earth, water, fire, air, and ether (Khang), along with feeling, reason, and Ahang-Kar, [which is] knowledge of oneself” (“Mein Urwesen besteht aus acht Theilen, Erde, Wasser, Feuer, Luft und Aether (Khang) nebst Gemüth, Verstand und Ahang-Kar, die Kenntniss seiner selbst.”) Majer Magazin, vol. 2, p. 126.
139. Ibid., p. 127. See also pp. 234 and 254.
140. Ibid., p. 234.
141. Ibid., p. 245.
142. Ibid., p. 253.
143. Ibid., p. 274.
144. Ibid.
145. Ibid., p. 280.
146. Ibid., p. 281.
147. This introductory phrase (HN 2, p. 245) is by Schopenhauer.
148. Schopenhauer (HN 2 S. 245) writes the word “‘ich’” with an initial capital I.
149. Starting from here Schopenhauer does not underline anything.
150. HN 2, p. 245 (Schopenhauer Archiv XXVIII, p. 92). Schopenhauer cites Majer, Asiatisches Magazin, vol. 2, p. 287; he only introduces the passage by “Krishna or God says” (“‘Kreeshna oder Gott spricht’”) and adds the definite article “‘die’” to “‘Weisheit’” at the end. All emphases stem from the Magazin; differences to Schopenhauer’s excerpt are as noted above.
151. Schopenhauer indicates at the beginning of this note that this excerpt stems from the Magazin, vol. 2, p. 287.
152. HN 1, p. 96 (no. 171). The emphases are by Schopenhauer.

154. “γνωσιςατον! Kommentar: Quadrirre den Cirkel, mache fünff grad, (sagt das Zauberbuch) dann ist die ganze Natur dir Unrthen’’. Payne misunderstands “grad” to mean “degree” instead of “even”; thus Schopenhauer’s “make five [an] even [number]” is supposed to signify a nonsensical “make five degrees”. These few samples from Payne’s translation of the *Manuscript Remains* should suffice to warn all readers that it should never be used without careful comparison to the German original.

155. HN 1, p. 99 (no. 176). This appears to be Schopenhauer’s first allusion to māyā, the veil of illusion which will appear by name a few pages later: “die Maja der Indier’’ (HN 1, p. 104, no. 189).

156. “Der Leib, (der körperliche Mensch) ist nichts als der sichtbar gewordne Wille’’. HN 1, p. 106 (no. 191).


158. See note 146.


160. Majer *Magazin*, vol. 1, p. 452. Needless to say, Schopenhauer’s “empirical” and “better” consciousness are concepts that he had used for a considerable time before encountering Indian thought; thus there is of course no Indian influence implied, just an interesting similarity.


163. Majer *Magazin*, vol. 2, p. 289; emphases are reproduced as they appear in the *Magazin*.


171. Schopenhauer (HN XXVIII p. 92) did not underline (italicize) this word as in the original but only emphasized it by somewhat larger letters in Roman style.

172. Schopenhauer (HN 2, p. 245) wrote “zugleich” instead of the *Magazin*’s “zu gleicher Zeit.”

173. Schopenhauer (HN XXVIII, p. 92) did not underline (italicize) this word as in the original but only emphasized it by somewhat larger letters in Latin style.

174. Schopenhauer (HN 2, p. 245) has the spelling “dabei” as opposed to the *Magazin*’s “dabey”. 
175. Majer *Magazin*, vol. 2, p. 292 here has a comma.

176. Schopenhauer (HN 2, p. 245) omitted the sub-clause of the *Magazin*; it is here included in square brackets.

177. Schopenhauer (HN XXVIII, p. 92) did not underline this word as in the original but only emphasized it by somewhat larger letters.

178. In Majer's *Magazin*, vol. 2, p. 292 this entire sentence is emphasized by italics.

179. Schopenhauer (HN XXVIII, p. 92) did not underline (italicize) this word as in the original but only emphasized it by somewhat larger letters.


185. The text reproduced here was transcribed from Schopenhauer Archiv Ms. XXVIII, pp. 92-93 and corresponds to HN 2, pp. 245-246. The differences mentioned in the footnotes concern discrepancies between Schopenhauer’s note and the original text as found in *Das Asiatische Magazin*, vol. 2, pp. 292-293.

186. The passage in square brackets appears in the *Magazin* but was omitted by Schopenhauer.


188. *Ibid.* Zimmer was focused on Schlegel’s Latin translation which included the earliest critical text edition and appeared only in 1823; he did not take into account Majer’s translations from Wilkins.
Schopenhauer in the context of the ‘Oriental Renaissance’

Stephen Cross

If, I say, the reader has already received and assimilated the divine inspiration of Indian wisdom, then he is best of all prepared to hear what I have to say to him. *The World as Will and Representation*, Volume 1, p. xv.

In 1788 when Schopenhauer was born on the shores of the Baltic, an event was taking place in a far-distant part of the world which was to have a lasting effect upon the Germany of his time. In the Indian province of Bengal a handful of Englishmen, servants of the East India Company, were beginning to unlock the treasure chest of the ancient literature of India.

The key to this was the Sanskrit language. If we set aside several earlier missionaries whose studies, though by no means negligible, did not bear fruit,¹ we can say that up until this time the classical language of India, Sanskrit, was entirely unknown to Europeans. It was the preserve of the Brahman (*brāhmaṇa*) caste whose responsibility it was to maintain the spiritual and intellectual heritage of India, and fearing misunderstanding they were unwilling to divulge it to Europeans. The British needed access to the language for administrative reasons and under Warren Hastings were able to break the embargo: it was arranged that a young jurist working for East India Company, Charles Wilkins (1749-1836), should travel to Benares and there receive instruction from Indian pandits. Wilkins gained a good knowledge of Sanskrit, and the barrier represented by the language was finally broken.

Very soon after this, in January 1784, William Jones (1746-1794) arrived in Bengal as Chief Justice of the English colony. Already an accomplished scholar of oriental languages, he eagerly seized the
opportunity to learn Sanskrit. Within a year of his arrival Jones had established the Asiatic Society of Bengal, and from then on a stream of Sanskrit literature in translation started to flow to Europe; two of the most significant works being Wilkins’ translation of the Bhagavad Gītā (1784), and Jones’ Sacontalā, or the Fatal Ring (1789), a translation of the play Abhijñāna-Śakuntalā by the great Indian poet Kālidāsa.

Hardly less important was the stream of essays, reports and speculative papers which appeared in the journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Asiatick Researches. Most of the leading figures during the early years of the Romantic movement in Germany and France were familiar with its pages. In its initial issue there appeared William Jones’ important study ‘On the Gods of Greece, Italy and India’, and later volumes contained the scholarly essays of H.T. Colebrooke on Hinduism. In its pages, too, was to be found Jones’ celebrated Presidential Address of 1786 to the Asiatic Society, in which he claimed that the resemblance of the ancient Sanskrit language to Greek and Latin was undeniable, and its connection with German, Celtic, and Persian very probable. With this the idea the concept of an Indo-European group of languages came into being, and a completely new vision of world-history was suggested. For a Europe hitherto anchored to Biblical chronology and the view of early history which went with it the implications were huge, and the effects of Jones’ insight reverberated throughout the nineteenth century.

A second important source for European knowledge of the thought of India at this time was the achievement of a single man, the French scholar-traveller, A.H. Anquetil Duperron (1731-1805). This was a translation of the Upaniṣads – not of the Sanskrit original but of a Persian translation known as the Sirr-i Akbar, or ‘The Great Secret’. This book had been assembled in the mid-seventeenth century under the personal direction of Prince Mohammed Dara Shukoh, the eldest son and heir apparent of the Mughal Emperor, Shah Jahan. Prince Dara was an initiated Sufi, and deeply interested in the spiritual life. He was committed to that school of thought, always strong in India, which seeks an underlying unity behind the outwardly diverse forms of religion, and thus was directly in the tradition of his great-grandfather, the Emperor Akbar, and of such notable earlier religious teachers as Kabir and Guru Nanak.
The *Sīr-i Akbar* had considerable merits, for Dara was intensely serious about his task and gathered at Benares for the work of compilation and translation the finest Hindu pandits of the day. It brought together not only the twelve principal *Upaniṣads*, but a total of fifty *Upanishads* in all, and was by far the most comprehensive collection of these texts in translation right up until the publication of Deussen’s *Sechzig Upanishads des Veda* in 1897. However, as Schopenhauer was to note, Dara paid a high price for the *Sīr-i Akbar*. Shortly after its completion his openness to Hindu thought was used by his younger brother Aurangzeb to attack him as an apostate from Islam, unworthy of the throne, and in the struggle that followed Dara lost both the Mughal Empire and his life.

Anquetil translated the *Sīr-i Akbar* into Latin, and it appeared in the years 1801-1802 under the title, *The Oupnek'hat* – the Persianised form used by Dara Shukoh of the word *Upaniṣad*. Thus it was as *The Oupnek'hat* that the *Upaniṣads* became known to the West. Anquetil Duperron was not simply a translator, but a creative thinker whose ideas had a significant impact. He showed his profound understanding of the content of the *Upaniṣads* by setting on the title-page the words “*Quisquis Deum intelligit, Deus fit*” – his translation of the great affirmation of the *Mundaka Upaniṣad*, “He, verily, who knows the Supreme Brahman becomes Brahman himself”.

The *Oupnek'hat* was, in the words of Wilhelm Halbfass, to be “a work of seminal importance for the modern European understanding of Indian thought”. It is well known that it became of great importance to Schopenhauer, who wrote of it the famous words, “It has been the consolation of my life and will be that of my death”.

The effect upon the early-Romantic poets and thinkers of Germany, first of the discoveries of the British in Bengal and then of the *Oupnehk'hat*, was considerable. Two important facts stood out: first, from the British researches, there resulted the idea of a great family of languages uniting far-away India with Europe, and implying a common cultural and (so it seemed at the time) racial background. And secondly, from the pages of the *Oupnek'hat*, the discovery in the East of an ancient doctrine which did not belong to the Semitic tradition, which pre-dated Christianity by many centuries, and yet which was perceived to bear more than a passing resemblance to the transcendental idealism of Kant. The coming together of these facts was explosive. By many in Germany, during
the years while Schopenhauer was growing to maturity, the religion and culture of ancient India was regarded not as something to look back upon but as a door opening into the future. A wave of enthusiasm and fervent hope swept through the rising generation in the universities. It was felt that brilliant new possibilities heralding the beginning of a great cultural renewal, a rebirth both of spiritual life and of poetry, had suddenly become available:7 "In the first ardor of their discoveries", wrote Edgar Quinet, who had observed the mood in Germany at first hand, "the orientalists proclaimed that, in its entirety, an antiquity more profound, more philosophical, and more poetical than that of Greece and Rome was emerging from the depths of Asia".8

The idea of a second Renaissance, an "Oriental Renaissance", became current among the Indophiles of Germany and France. Schelling, in a letter of 1806, wrote: "We cannot do without [the Orient]. Open, free communication with it must exist, so that the old life of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries may better return".9 Echoing the same idea, Anquetil Duperron wrote: "We stand, in relation to Sanskrit, where Europe stood in relation to Greek at the time of the fall of Constantinople . . .".10 And in 1808 Friedrich Schlegel's important study Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier (On the Language and Wisdom of the Indians) appeared, in which we find the following passage:

May Indic studies find as many disciples and protectors as Germany and Italy saw spring up in such great numbers for Greek studies in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and may they be able to do as many things in as short a time. The Renaissance of antiquity promptly transformed and rejuvenated all the sciences; we might add that it rejuvenated and transformed the world. We could even say that the effects of Indic studies, if these enterprises were taken up and introduced into learned circles with the same energy today, would be no less great and far-reaching.11

Ten years after this Schopenhauer, in the Preface to The World as Will and Representation, wrote that knowledge of the Upaniṣads is "the greatest advantage which this still young century has to show over previous centuries, since I surmise that the influence of Sanskrit literature will penetrate no less deeply than did the revival of Greek literature in the fifteenth century".12
The enthusiasm for India which seized upon many of the best minds in Germany and France at this time had about it an entirely different character from anything which had gone before. In the seventeenth century too there had been interest in India. At this time travellers such as J.B. Tavernier, N. Manucci and François Bernier wrote accounts of their sojourns in the Mughal Empire which created a good deal of interest. In England, Dryden wrote one of his best-known stage works, the tragedy Aurengzebe (1675), on the basis of events at the Mughal court. But all of this was the fascination which a fabulously rich empire in a distant and exotic land held for Europe. It had little to do with the philosophical thought or the literature of India, and of these almost nothing was known.

In the eighteenth century it had been China rather than India which caught the European imagination. A fashion for things Chinese swept through cultured circles, and the Confucian way of life was idealized by Enlightenment thinkers to produce a picture of a stable, balanced society based not on revelation but on human reason. Thus for the greater part of the eighteenth century China, and at times also India, was used as a means of undermining the Christian dominance of Europe. There was no real interest in and very little knowledge of these distant societies and their systems of belief, but they could be, and were, used by the philosophes in their unremitting war against the Church.

With the advent of the Romantic era all of this changed, and by the last decade of the eighteenth century the attitude to India of many of the best young minds in Germany was completely different. Now the interest was real, sincere, and indeed, passionate. The enthusiasm – dubbed “Indomania” (“Indomanie”) by the sceptics – was concentrated especially at the university centres of Jena and Heidelberg, and at Weimar. In these places the early Romantic movement was in full flower and a galaxy of brilliant young minds took fire from one another, among them Schelling, Novalis, the brothers Friedrich and A.W. Schlegel, Tieck, Brentano, Jean-Paul Richter, Georg Forster, Görres, and Creuzer; the older figures of Herder, Goethe, and to some extent Schiller, were also deeply involved.

In both France and Germany periodicals by which one could keep abreast of the new developments and owing much to Asiatick Researches sprang up, while the early volumes of Asiatick
Researches were translated into both languages. And we may obtain some idea of the eagerness with which the newly-discovered literature of India was welcomed in Germany from the flood of re-translations which followed the appearance of the English materials. Within two years of its appearance, Jones’ Šakuntalā was translated into German by Herder’s disciple, Georg Forster; it appeared in 1791 as Sakontala oder der entscheidende Ring, and was a sensational success. Another disciple of Herder, Friedrich Majer, made translations of Wilkins’ Bhagavad Gītā and Jones’ Gīṭa Govinda; these were published at Weimar in 1802 in the newly-created Asiatisches Magazin, producing a powerful effect in Romantic circles. A German translation of Jones’ Ordinances of Menu appeared in 1797, three years after its publication in Calcutta. In 1808 Schelling’s disciple, Thomas Rixner, translated a section of Anquetil’s Oupnek’hat into German, thus creating a triple-translation (Sanskrit-Persian-Latin-German) which must constitute something of a record!

Initially it was the drama Šakuntalā which attracted most attention, for its sudden appearance from such an unexpected quarter as India seemed a miracle. Kālidāsa, who is believed to have worked in the fifth century, is now recognized as India’s greatest dramatic poet and the work astonished Europe. The unexpected sophistication and refined taste exhibited by the drama, the literary skill with which it was executed, and the charm and pathos of the situation it depicted, amazed and moved its German readers, and indeed all of cultured Europe. It earned for Jones a lasting international reputation: “the merit of this man are universally known”, wrote Goethe some 30 years later, and in a letter to the French Orientalist A.L. de Chézy, he described the effect which Šakuntalā had upon him; the passage is worth citing, for what was true of Goethe was true of many others:

The first time I became aware of this unfathomable work, it aroused such an enthusiasm in me, attracted me so much, that I did not cease studying it, indeed, even felt impelled to the impossible task of adapting it for the German stage, even though only inadequately. Through this admittedly fruitless endeavour I became so intimately acquainted with this highly treasured work, it determined such an epoch in the course of my life, it
"The East is lighting up from afar, the past is being restored", sang Novalis in his *Geistliche Lieder* ("Spiritual Songs"), "and India must, even in the North itself, burst joyfully into flower for the Beloved".

But what was it, we may ask, which lay behind the extraordinary eagerness with which the early Romantics in Germany welcomed the discovery of Indian thought? The factors involved were, of course, many and complex, but we may point to three which had particular importance. First, the discovery of the intellectual and imaginative world of India came to the German Romantics as an immense relief after the spiritually barren decades during which the philosophers of the Enlightenment had dominated Europe. It was like a refreshing shower. In Germany, throughout the period of the Aufklärung, rationalism and the classicism which went with it had existed in uneasy partnership – seen at its most creative in Goethe – with deeply-rooted indigenous traditions of hermetic and mystical thought, reaching back to figures such as Boehme and Paracelsus; the Sturm und Drang movement had been the first explosive outburst of protest. By the end of the eighteenth century the dogmatic assertions of the Christian churches had for many ceased to be convincing; on the other hand the narrow rationalism, the one-dimensional emphasis on man, and the merely theoretical deism of the Enlightenment had become an intolerable burden. India seemed to promise all that Novalis called "the cold, dead Spitsbergen of that sitting-room reason" denied to the soul. In terms which sound strangely familiar to our ears, the leaders of the Romantic movement in Germany deplored the spirit of contemporary Europe. They castigated the reductionism and spiritual impoverishment which accompanied the Enlightenment, the obsession with economic well-being and the limitation of experience to the practical domain. Europe seemed to have lost its capacity for higher thought, and along with it, its spiritual unity and inward harmony. Man's religious nature, intimately connected with poetry and art, seemed in danger of atrophy, and we find Wackenroder declaring:

One must with courageous arm reach through the pile of rubble into which our life is being crumbled, in order to hold on powerfully to art, to the great and enduring that extends beyond everything into eternity, which offers us its radiant hand down from heaven.
Another key figure of the early Romantic movement, A.W. Schlegel, in lectures he published in 1803, attacked the utilitarian thinking and pragmatism of modern Europe, centred round nothing more than economics and "the pursuit of the common good", and expressed the hope that a revival would flow from contact with the Indian sources. His brother, Friedrich Schlegel, likewise deplored the state to which European culture had been reduced in the course of the Enlightenment: "Man cannot sink any deeper; it is impossible", he cried, also in 1803, "man himself has almost become a machine ...". And five years later, looking back on the years of the Enlightenment, he wrote that:

Errors accumulated so rapidly, that philosophy soon degenerated into mere scepticism, and the vigour of human understanding, becoming at length enfeebled by continued doubt and unbelief, philosophy next declined into empiric theory; the idea of a Supreme Divinity, if admitted in words, was denied in principle, till it became almost annihilated; and man, under the specious plea of confining himself within the sphere of utility and rationalism, cast aside, as an erring and romantic impulse, that lofty spirit, intellect and sentiment, which alone distinguished him from the brute creation.

Secondly, and complementing the above, there was a factor we have already met with in speaking of Anquetil Duperron. This was the rebirth among the Romantics of a tradition of European thought, important in the Renaissance but largely eclipsed during the eighteenth century, that there lies hidden somewhere in the East (the Renaissance tended to favour Egypt) a profound knowledge, long since lost to Europe, from which such imposing figures as Zoroaster, Hermes Trismegistus and Plato had derived the deepest portions of their wisdom. Christianity, it was believed, had once drawn from this pristine source, but with the passage of time the sparkling waters of the original inspiration had become clouded. This idea, springing to life again in the Romantic era, merged with the discovery of Sanskrit literature to form a potent mixture. We cannot fully understand the German attitude to India at this time, nor indeed that of Schopenhauer, without taking account of it.

Thirdly, Germans were quick to perceive the bonds, by no means imaginary, between their own cultural traditions and those revealed
by the newly discovered literature of India. The same affinity of mind revealed by the relationship of the languages – and to German eyes, no major European language bears closer resemblance to Sanskrit than does German – was seen to be reflected across a broad spectrum of cultural life. A strong tendency towards abstract thought, the interest in philology, the high value placed on careful scholarship and system-making, are common to both cultures. More fundamentally, the sense of the vanity and transitoriness of life, the tendency to welcome death as a friend, and the Weltschmerz, or pessimism with regard to our existence in the world so evident in the writing of Schopenhauer, Von Platen, and others – all of these find their equivalents in Indian thought; so too does the strong assumption that the ultimate meaning of life must lie beyond rational thought, and salvation consist in some way in a surrender of individual being. And at the same time, Germans were delighted to find in Indian literature the same loving descriptions of the natural world which feature so vividly in their own writings and music, and which are relatively infrequent in Greek and Jewish poetry, and the same delight in connecting the joys and sorrows of man with the Nature which surrounds him. For all of these reasons, then, the rising generation of Romantic poets and thinkers turned towards the East in search of a rebirth of culture.

What was the effect upon Schopenhauer of all of this? Goethe once said that artists are attached to their times not by their strength but by their weakness, and we might well say the same of that unique class of literary artists, the philosophers. But we cannot apply this to Schopenhauer. His relation to the Romanticism of his day can best be described as an ambiguous mixture of negative and positive responses, and he was certainly not swept away by the prevailing enthusiasms. In some respects he stands quite apart from the Romantics, and was clearly unimpressed with most of the leading figures of the movement – Fichte, Schelling, Friedrich Schlegel, Franz von Baader, all come in at various times for biting criticism. Indeed, it has been observed that Schopenhauer’s thought was in some respects closer to that of the British than to his contemporaries in Germany: empirical, down-to-earth, and tied to careful observation of the world and of human behaviour. Throughout his life Schopenhauer studied with care contemporary scientific works, especially those concerning medical science. Nor do we find him reacting against the Enlightenment in the manner of the German
Romantics. On the contrary, we frequently encounter references to Voltaire, Hume, Priestley, Wolff, Lessing and other luminaries of the period (not to speak, of course, of Kant), and these, in contrast to his often scornful references to his philosophical contemporaries, are almost always positive in tone. Schopenhauer appreciated clarity of thought; nor did the Creator-God who could permit the Lisbon earthquake seem any more acceptable to him than to Voltaire.

And yet Schopenhauer’s relation to the Romantic movement is not so easily characterized as this; it is deeply equivocal in nature. Arthur Hübser has pointed to three Romantic attitudes which had an abiding effect upon Schopenhauer: the interest in mysticism, the understanding of music, and “the spiritual world of Hinduism”. Safranski tells us that Schopenhauer, in his youth, was clearly affected by the Romantic spirit, climbing mountains to watch the sun breaking through the mists at dawn like the young men in the paintings of Caspar David Friedrich. The manner in which the arts were understood in the new Romantic literature also affected him deeply, and it is noteworthy that the substitution of aesthetic for religious experience in the third book of The World as Will and Representation is very characteristic of Romanticism.

Furthermore, it is clear that Schopenhauer did turn away from the dominating ideas of the Enlightenment, and that he did so in a far more radical fashion than any of his contemporaries. His dethronement of reason as the principal factor determining human action, and elevation in its place of will, was far more destructive of Enlightenment modes of thought than the fulminations of the Romantics. From it flowed a radically different conception of man, of his meaning and ultimate destiny, and of his relation to other living beings and indeed to the entire world. Thus, we may say that, superficially, Schopenhauer was sympathetic to Enlightenment thought and did not react against it in the emotional manner of many of his contemporaries, but that fundamentally his doctrine was a poison to it.

When we turn to India we find a parallel situation: Schopenhauer is not the most extreme, but he is the most tenacious holder of the attitudes of the Oriental Renaissance. He was born too late to share in the initial excitement – Jones’ Śakontalā was published in the year following Schopenhauer’s birth – and in any case did not find the imaginative literature of India especially to his taste. Yet his commitment to the idea of an Oriental Renaissance is both specific
and clear; Von Glasenapp calls him "a genuine Romantic" (echter Romantiker) in regard to India, and while others made greater contributions to philology none of his contemporaries matched Schopenhauer as a champion of Indian thought.

We cannot, however, fully understand Schopenhauer's commitment to India without considering for a moment his views with regard to Christianity. Whereas Novalis, Schelling and Friedrich Schlegel, in various ways and to various degrees, all clung to the hope that Christianity could be restored as the source and sustenance of Europe's spiritual life, Schopenhauer had no such expectation. Consequently his commitment to India as the source of spiritual knowledge and renewal is much more consistent than was that of the early Romantics. They had been attracted to Indian thought in part because they believed or imagined it harmonized with the esoteric truths of Christianity as they understood these to be. With Schopenhauer the position is reversed: what is true and great in Christianity results from its having "Indian blood in its veins," and where it differs from the Indian standpoint (as on the question of a personal Creator-God, or over the attitude to animals) it is in error. Consequently there is something definite and settled about Schopenhauer's approach to India which we do not find in the Romantic writers. Nevertheless, his belief in an Oriental Renaissance and in India as the home of a primordial wisdom is entirely at one with theirs; nor is it confined to Schopenhauer's early years, for in the 1844 edition of The World as Will and Representation we find him writing of:

Those sublime authors of the Upanishads of the Vedas, who can scarcely be conceived as mere human beings ... we must ascribe this immediate illumination of their mind to the fact that, standing nearer to the origin of our race as regards time, these sages apprehended the inner essence of things more clearly and profoundly than the already enfeebled race, "as mortals now are", is capable of doing.

And in the Parerga and Paralipomena of 1851 we find:

In particular, let us not forget India, that sacred soil, that cradle of the human race, or at any rate that part thereof to which we belong, where first Mohammedans and then
Christians furiously and most cruelly attacked the followers of mankind's sacred and original faith.\(^{50}\)

Let me now conclude by briefly discussing Schopenhauer's debt to the *Oupnek'hat*, for it was largely on this book that he rested his hopes of an Oriental Renaissance. Schopenhauer considered the *Oupnek'hat* "the greatest gift to the nineteenth century"\(^{51}\) and despite the fact that he subsequently studied the work of such excellent early Indologists as H.T. Colebrooke and A.W. Schlegel, the *Oupnek'hat* was throughout his life his main source for a knowledge of Hindu religious and philosophical thought. Urs App, after examining Schopenhauer's own copy of the book in the Schopenhauer Archive at Frankfurt, tells us that: "These two magnificent volumes literally teem with traces of Schopenhauer's interest, so much so that on occasion the notes in the margins almost surpass the volume of the printed text".\(^{52}\) Much therefore turns on the question of how reliable a source the *Oupnek'hat* is for a knowledge of Hindu thought. Was Schopenhauer able to obtain a reasonably accurate understanding of the main outlines of *Upaniṣad*ic thought from its pages? Was his prolonged study likely to result in a generally accurate understanding, or, on the contrary, one which was distorted?

Two points have to be considered here: what is the content of the *Oupnek'hat*, and, secondly, how reliable is the translation? The first question can be quickly disposed of: Anquetil's book contains fifty *Upaniṣads* brought together by Prince Dara Shukoh with the help of the most learned pandits of Benares; these include the twelve principal *Upaniṣads*, so that the *Oupnek'hat* is primarily a document of the *Vedānta*. Turning to the translation, the *Oupnek'hat* must, at first sight, be regarded as a very imperfect and unreliable source. To begin with, it is a double translation and therefore, by the standards of modern scholarship, beyond the pale; later Indologists naturally turned away from it, in favour of direct translations.\(^{53}\) A second difficulty is that Anquetil, since he did not have access to the Sanskrit, has retained the Persianised forms of Sanskrit names and technical terms which had been used by Dara. Thus, just as the word *Upaniṣad* became *Oupnek'hat*, so too *Ṛgveda* becomes *Rak Beid*, *puruṣa* becomes *porsch*, *avidyā* becomes *aoudia*, *achārya* becomes *tscharedj*, etc. It is true that Anquetil explains the meaning of these terms in a Glossary, but nevertheless their frequent occurrence in the
text makes it at first almost unintelligible and gives to the entire book, when one first inspects it, a strange and outlandish quality. It seems remote from the Upaniṣads as we now know them, so that when we first turn its pages today it is hard to credit the impact it had. Max Müller, writing in 1879, speaks of it as "fearful jargon", and says that it was "written in so utterly unintelligible a style, that it required the lynxlike perspicacity of an intrepid philosopher, such as Schopenhauer, to discover a thread through such a labyrinth".54

But against these drawbacks we must set the arguments advanced by Schopenhauer in favour of the Oupnek'hat. He considered that it had great virtues, deriving first, of course, from the ancient texts on which it is based, and secondly from the attitudes of the two principal figures involved in the work of translation. Schopenhauer's most comprehensive defense of the Oupnek'hat was set out late in his life, and is found in paragraph 184 of the second volume of Parerga and Paralipomena.55 Here he argues that Dara Shukoh was a scholar and thinker who craved for knowledge, was born and raised in India and "probably understood Sanskrit as well as we understand Latin",56 and that in addition extremely learned Hindu pandits collaborated with him on the translation; that, secondly, Anquetil made his translation from the Persian text with great care and concern for accuracy, and the purest motivation; and that the result is therefore likely to be far superior to the translations from Sanskrit subsequently offered by European scholars.57 The latter works, with rare exceptions (showing good judgement, Schopenhauer names A.W. Schlegel's Bhagavad Gītā and some of Colebrooke's translations) inspire little confidence. The work of both Dara and Anquetil was guided by a personal commitment, a living interest in the texts which made them intensely meaningful to them, and a keen awareness of the great significance of the philosophical ideas they contained. It therefore provides a better guarantee of real understanding and accuracy than the work of "disinterested" European scholars; men whose involvement was merely of a scholarly and professional nature, and who were in essentials groping in the dark. For the latter, not only Sanskrit but the entire cultural context to which the Upaniṣadic texts belong, Schopenhauer claims, is something strange, distant and remote, with the result that the outcome of their labours is a text which is dull, flat, destitute of meaning, and frequently Europeanized; it is even much worse, he adds, in the case of China, where European
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59. Sinologists often grope in total darkness. A page or two later he concludes, "I am firmly convinced that a real knowledge of the Upanishads and thus of the true and esoteric dogmas of the Vedas, can at present be obtained only from the Oupnekhat; we may have read through the other translations and yet have no idea of the subject".60

If we accept Schopenhauer's arguments for the accuracy of Anquetil's translation from the Persian, there nevertheless remains the question of the reliability of the Persian text of the Sirr-i Akbar on which it is based. Is it an accurate rendering of the Upaniṣads Is Dara Shukoh's claim in his Preface to have made "without any worldly motive, in a clear style, an exact and literal translation" justified?62 This question has been investigated by an Indian scholar, B.J. Hasrat, in his valuable and informative study of Dara Shukoh and his writings.63 Hasrat, who is familiar with both Sanskrit and Persian, tells us that after comparing the Sanskrit texts of the major Upaniṣads with the Sirr-i Akbar, he finds that the latter is faithful to the original, "simple and unaffected" in style, and nowhere tries to take liberties with the texts it translates.64

Negative factors mentioned by Hasrat are that in places the translation is too literal or vague; metrical portions of the Sanskrit text are not distinguished from the non-metrical sections, the various adhyāyas and khaṇḍās are not preserved, and, on a few occasions, a section of the Upaniṣadic text has been omitted (for instance, the first Āranyaka of the Aitereya Upaniṣad).65 But the most evident defect of the Sirr-i Akbar (one which, as we have seen, carries over to the Oupnek'hat) is the manner in which Sanskrit terms have been Persianized, to such an extent that the original word is often hardly recognizable. Furthermore, in an effort to make the text more intelligible to Muslims, some Hindu philosophical terms, as well as the names of Indian gods, are rendered by means of equivalents drawn from Islamic phraseology, so that, for example, Mahādeva becomes Isrāfīl, Viṣṇu becomes Mikā'il, and Brahmaloka is rendered as Sadrat-ul-Muntahā.66

These difficulties can be overcome by a dedicated reader. But more important than them and, as Hasrat writes, "a very substantial defect", is the fact that in places sections of Śankara's commentaries on the major Upaniṣads are incorporated along with the Upaniṣadic text, without there being any means of distinguishing between the two. Hasrat affirms that, after making a
systematic comparison of the Persian text with Śaṅkara’s Sanskrit commentary, he has found that the interpolated passages follow the text of the commentary “most faithfully”. Nevertheless, from a scholarly standpoint, these interpolations are clearly unfortunate, since the reader of the Sirr-i Akbar (and therefore of the Oupnek’hát) has no way of knowing which parts of the text belong to the original Upaniṣad and which are drawn from Śaṅkara’s commentary: Schopenhauer himself was deceived by this, as is evident when he writes with reference to the work of Colebrooke and others: “It also appears that Sultan Dara Shikoh had at his disposal much better and more complete Sanskrit manuscripts than had the English scholars”. And yet for someone who is primarily concerned to discover with as much clarity and accuracy as possible the philosophical meaning of the Upaniṣadic texts (as was Schopenhauer), and who is prepared to accept Śaṅkara’s interpretation (as Schopenhauer was), even this defect is not a great one: indeed, Śaṅkara’s comments are often of much assistance in elucidating the obscurities of the Upaniṣadic texts, and it was of course for this reason that Dara and his fellow translators included them.

In summary, we may say that while the Sirr-i Akbar, and consequently the Oupnek’hát, certainly cannot be considered a word for word translation of the Upaniṣadic texts, it nevertheless presents a reasonably accurate rendering of their content according to the interpretation of Śaṅkara and the Advaita Vedānta. When, in addition to this, we remember the fact that the Sirr-i Akbar and the Oupnek’hát were vastly more comprehensive than any other collection of Upaniṣadic texts in translation right up to the time of Deussen’s Sechzig Upanishad’s des Veda in 1897, it becomes difficult to quarrel with Schopenhauer’s own assessment that, in spite of being a double translation, it provided him with a source for the thought of Hindu India which was far superior to any other available during his lifetime. Consequently Dorothea Dauer, in the course of her study of Schopenhauer and Buddhist ideas, writes that Schopenhauer was probably the first German who thoroughly understood Upaniṣadic thought, and this may well be the truth. At all events, Schopenhauer never wavered in his belief in the value of Anquetil’s translation, as his words, written not in the first flush of enthusiasm but late in life and after many years of consideration, testify:
When I see with what profound veneration, in keeping with the subject, Anquetil-Duperron handled this Persian translation, rendering it word for word into Latin, accurately keeping to the Persian syntax in spite of the Latin grammar, and content merely to accept the Sanskrit words left untranslated by the Sultan in order to explain these in a glossary, I read this translation with the fullest confidence, which is at once delightfully confirmed. For how thoroughly redolent of the holy spirit of the Vedas is the Oupnek'hat! How deeply stirred is he who, by diligent and careful reading, is now conversant with the Persian-Latin rendering of this incomparable book! How imbued is every line with firm, definite, and harmonious significance! On every page we come across profound, original, and sublime thoughts, whilst a lofty and sacred earnestness pervades the whole. Here everything breathes the air of India. 71

In this way the ideas of the Oriental Renaissance were carried forward by Schopenhauer, long after the more fragile enthusiasm of its earliest initiates had faded into the past. The initial blaze of Romantic fervour had burnt out, but the fire was by no means extinguished and the idea of India would burn steadily in the mind of Germany throughout the remainder of the century.

References

1. The most notable early students of Sanskrit were Roberto Nobili (1577-1656), Heinrich Roth (1620-1668), Johann Hanxleden (d. 1732), and J.F. Pons, who is thought to be the author of an unpublished Sanskrit grammar of about 1733. All were Jesuit missionaries in India. See W. Halbfass, *India and Europe*, Delhi, 1990, pp. 38-45; J.W. Sedlar, *India in the Mind of Germany*, Washington D.C., 1982, pp. 8-10.

2. Colebrooke’s essay “On the Religious Ceremonies of the Hindus’ appeared in *Asiatick Researches*, vol. 7 (1802), and the important essay “On the Vedas” in vol. 8 (1805).

3. Prince Dara Shukoh was initiated into the Qādiri-order in 1639-40 by Shaykh Mullā Shāh, the disciple of the famous Miyān Shāh Mir of Lahore. See S.A. Rizvi, *The Wonder that was India* (Vol. 2), Delhi, 1993, pp. 266ff.

4. *Mundaka Upanisad*, 3.2.9; the English translation is that of S. Radhakrishnan. Anquetil’s rendering of Brahman as Deus does not
correspond to modern usage, but it was acceptable to Schopenhauer in spite of the latter's dislike of theism.

5. Halbfass, p. 21. Halbfass writes of Anquetil (pp. 64-65): "There is no doubt that he is one of the more impressive and decisive figures in the history of European approaches to Indian and Oriental thought, and in the preparation of a philosophical 'dialogue' between India and the West".


8. Schwab, p. 11.


10. As translated in Schwab, p. 13.


13. Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, Travels in India (1676-79); Niccolao Manucci, Storia do Mogor (1705, in an imperfect edition by F. Catrou); François Bernier, Travels in the Mogul Empire (1670).

14. Voltaire tried to use India in this way, claiming in 1760 that a manuscript newly discovered in India, the Ezour-vedam, was "the most precious manuscript in the entire Orient"; it turned out to be a forgery. See H. von Glasenapp, Das Indienbild deutscher Denker, Stuttgart, 1960, p. 4.

15. At Jena were Schiller, Fichte, Schelling, Novalis, Herder, Majer, Schleiermacher, and the two Schlegel brothers. At Heidelberg, Tieck, Brentano, Arnim, Görres, Quinet and Creuzer. At Weimar, Goethe, Klaproth, Kosegarten, Majer again, and, later and briefly, Schopenhauer.

16. In France the Magasin Encyclopédique, the Décade philosophique, and the Journal des Savants catered for the interest in India. In Germany there was the Oster Taschenbuch of Weimar (1801); Klaproth's Asiatisches Magazin (1802), also published at Weimar; the Schlegel brothers' Athenäum, which ran from 1798 to 1800; and, during the years 1803 to 1805, Friedrich Schlegel's Europa.

17. Forster presented a copy of his book to Herder in homage. After Forster's death, Herder wrote: "Georg Forster's name will, for us Germans, always be fondly remembered, linked with that of Šakuntalā". Cited in A.L. Willson, A Mythical Image: The Ideal of India in German Romanticism, Durham N.C., 1964, pp. 70-71. See also Schwab, p. 59.

18. Schwab, p. 58. F. von Dahlberg also translated Jones' Gita Govinda into German in 1802.

19. Šakuntalā ended its European career as a ballet with a scenario by Théophile Gautier. It was staged at the Opéra de Paris in 1858 (Schwab, p. 64).


22. Rawlinson, p. 32. Subsequently this same passage provided the basis for one of the most famous arias in Donizetti’s opera of the same name.

23. Cited by Rawlinson, p. 33. He translates the verse as follows:

Wouldst thou the young year's blossoms and the fruits of its decline,
And all by which the soul is charmed, enraptured, feasted, fed,
Wouldst thou the earth and Heaven itself in one sole name combine?
I name thee, O Sakontala! And all at once is said.


25. Schelling’s attitude varied. Initially he found Anquetil’s translation “highly incomprehensible” (Sedlar, p. 44), and regarded the Upanisads as “a very unsatisfactory reading” (Halbfass, p. 102). But according to Winternitz, during the 1820s Schelling was, after Schopenhauer, the philosopher most influenced by the Oupnek’hat (cited Schwab, p. 218). Max Müller claimed that Schelling thought highly of the Upanisads, and in 1845 asked Müller to translate several of them for him (Halbfass, p. 486, note 18).


28. As translated by Halbfass, p. 67. The belief that there exists a link between the ancient thought of India and that of Kant may be found not only in Duperron, Schopenhauer and their contemporaries, but persisting later in the century. Thus Max Müller translated into English not only the Rgveda but also Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, and Paul Deussen was both a leading Kantian and the translator of the Sechzig Upanishads des Veda.

29. Schwab, p. 221.


32. Halbfass, pp. 74, 80.


34. Halbfass, p. 81. These lectures appeared in the second number of F. Schlegel’s Europa under the title “Über Literatur, Kunst und Geist des Zeitalters”.

35. Cited by Rawlinson, p. 33. He translates the verse as follows:

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36. As translated in E.J. Millington, The Aesthetic and Miscellaneous Works of Frederick von Schlegel, London, 1849, pp. 519-520. The German original will be found in Behler and Struc-Oppenberg, p. 303 (see note 11 above).
38. M. Winternitz, in A History of Indian Literature, vol. 1, part 1 (reprinted Calcutta, 1963, pp. 6-7) has described some of the main characteristics shared by the two cultures. I am indebted to him for much of what follows.
39. We may cite as examples the passage in the Mahābhārata (1.7.64) describing the delightful forest which King Duṣyanta passes through before first encountering Śakuntalā; or the many passages in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa extolling the beauties of nature amidst which the lilā of Kṛṣṇa and the gopis takes place.
40. B. Magee (The Philosophy of Schopenhauer, Oxford, 1997, p. 154) describes Schopenhauer’s world-view as distant both from Classicism and Romanticism, and sees it instead as unmistakably “modern”.
42. See for example On the Freedom of the Will (tr. K. Kolenda), New York, 1985, pp. 78-83, where Spinoza, Hume, Priestly, Voltaire and Kant are named as “noble and honorable predecessors” with respect to Schopenhauer’s teaching on the question of freedom of the will.
44. Safranski, pp. 50-51. See also the paragraph on the sublime in The World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, pp. 200-207.
46. See Parerga and Paralipomena, vol. 2, p. 395: Schopenhauer is of the opinion that translators should devote their energies less to Sanskrit poetry, and much more to the Vedas, Upaniṣads, and other philosophical works of India.
47. Von Glasenapp, p. 70.
48. On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (tr. E.F.J. Payne), La Salle, 1974, p. 187. Compare The World as Will and Representation, vol. 2, p. 623, where Schopenhauer suggests that Christianity – that is to say, the Christianity of the New Testament, not of the old – is in some unknown way linked to Brahmanism and Buddhism, and that it consequently “belongs to the ancient, true, and sublime faith of mankind”.
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53. Arthur Waley writes: ‘‘It is instructive to reflect that this work, which had so profound an influence on European thought, ought not, according to the current laws of scholarship, ever to have been undertaken’’ (A. Waley, ‘‘Anquetil-Duperron and Sir William Jones’’, in *The Secret History of the Mongols and other Pieces*, London, 1963, p. 27).
56. Schopenhauer is probably right here. B.J. Hasrat, *(Dārā Shikāh: Life and Works*, Delhi, 1982, p. 212) writes, ‘‘Dārā Shikāh’s knowledge of [the] Sanskrit language, notwithstanding the fact that he employed a large number of Sanskrit Pandits in the translation of the *Upaniṣads*, appears to be very considerable’’. See Hasrat, pp. 212-213 for support for this statement.
57. See the footnote Schopenhauer added to *On the Basis of Morality* (tr. E.F.J. Payne, Oxford, 1995, p. 207), in which he compares the *Oupnekḥat* favourably with later translations made by Rammohan Roy, Poley, Röer and even Colebrooke, claiming that it ‘‘is based on an exact and perfect understanding of the words’’.
58. Schopenhauer hazards a guess that, with few exceptions, ‘‘our Sanskrit scholars do not understand their texts any better than do the fifth-form boys of our own schools their Greek texts’’ (*Parerga and Paralipomena*, vol. 2, p. 396).
61. J.J. Bochinger (*La Vie Contemplative chez les Indous*, Strasbourg, 1831, p. 12, note 1), to whom Schopenhauer refers for support in *On the Basis of Morality* (p. 207, note 8), writes that Anquetil’s Latin translation is ‘‘rigorously exact’’ (‘‘rigoureusement verbale’’).
62. Dara’s interesting Preface to the *Sirr-i Akbar* is reproduced, in the Persian original and English translation, in Hasrat, pp. 260-268. The claim to accuracy is found on p. 266.
63. Hasrat, pp. 258-276 (for Hasrat see note 56, above).
69. It is worth noting that Deussen was obliged, in the case of several of the minor *Upanisads*, to have recourse to the *Oupnek'hat* for his text, since the Sanskrit originals were no longer available (Halbfass, p. 35).


Elements of Schopenhauer’s Reception by Western Indologists and Comparativists

Stephan Atzert

Introduction

This paper investigates how scholars of comparative philosophy relate to Schopenhauer and references to Advaita Vedânta and Buddhism. There are several points which have a bearing on this topic, and they will be mentioned here, though the first two only by way of exclusion: firstly, I must confess my ignorance regarding the reception of Schopenhauer in India. In 1981, Halbfass wrote that “the name of that great Indophile, A. Schopenhauer, has received frequent mention, although few Indians were actually acquainted with his philosophy”. (Halbfass, India and Europe, p. 257). Vechiotti, writing in 1976, suggests a generic reception of Schopenhauer in India. Vivekananda and Radhakrishnan are named as exceptions to this rule, although their referral to Schopenhauer was based on their desire to remove from Advaita Vedânta the association with Schopenhauer’s pessimism.

Secondly, a little more than just a word or two about the role of German orientalism as part of colonialism would have been in order. Though Germany did not have the opportunity to develop colonial aspirations in India, in hindsight it seems that the early comparativists participated in the colonial project of recontextualising Indian world views and soteriologies, integrating them into what they thought was a truly universal system of explanation based on Schopenhauer’s philosophy. At the very least — and a number of the essays in the early volumes of the Schopenhauer yearbook reflect this spirit, as we will see later — there was a strong sense of Germany’s special cultural mission with regard to selected Indian religious and scholastic traditions.
Thirdly, there exists by now a body of works about Schopenhauer’s exposure to relevant Indological texts, commentaries and scholars. But they mainly refer to Hübscher’s edition of the manuscript remains in which only a very small amount of the relevant material was published. Here App’s work (1998) deserves a mention, because he concludes, from his study of Schopenhauer’s annotations to the *Asiatick Researches*, that ‘the tirelessly repeated notion about Schopenhauer’s ‘late acquaintance with India’ and his ‘even later knowledge of Buddhism’ [Hübscher, *Denker gegen den Strom*, 1973, p. 50] is entirely without a foundation’. (App, 1998, 12) We may gather from this remark that there is still work to be done in this area of basic historical research. Next to it there is the systematic approach, which is usually at play when it comes to the reception of Schopenhauer by Western comparativists. Comparisons are usually made with reference to four categories: Schopenhauer’s epistemology, his metaphysics, his ethics and last, but not least, his — albeit rudimentary and often allegorical — soteriology. Invariably all newer writers seem to agree that Schopenhauer’s merit lies in ‘‘his acceptance of non-European superior philosophical insights’’ (Halbfass, 1987, 58). It should be added that the Indian sources were a very valuable asset for Schopenhauer. Stressing that liberation from delusion, ignorance and suffering is possible, they lent an ancient credibility to Schopenhauer’s philosophem e of the ‘‘negation of the will’’.

This is not the place for a bibliography, but I should mention von Glasenapp, who revisited the topic of Indian influences on Schopenhauer in the course of three decades, as well as Halbfass, who devotes half of a chapter to Schopenhauer in his book *India and Europe*. Of course there are many others (Dauer [1969], Sedlar [1986], Meyer [1994], Scholz [1996], Son [2001]), as an example of a very recent study I would like to mention Cross’ (2003) comparative study *Schopenhauer and Indian thought: an examination of Schopenhauer’s teaching in the historical context of the ‘Oriental Renaissance’ of the early nineteenth century, and in comparison with certain ideas of Mahāyāna Buddhist schools and Advaita Vedānta*. When we take into account Heinrich Zimmer’s views on the will as shakti (Zimmer, 1938, 266), as well as the early reception of Schopenhauer by Deussen, Grimm and others, this results in a range of different perspectives on the parallels between
Schopenhauer, Vedānta and Buddhism. A brief summary of the main recurring themes of the systematic comparisons follows, and then a discussion of two early comparativists, Paul Deussen and George Grimm. Where necessary, I have translated from the German texts.

Concepts from Advaita Vedānta and Buddhism in Schopenhauer’s Writings

In his writings Schopenhauer refers to concepts like māyā, jiva, prakṛti and puruṣa, karman, saṁsāra and nirvāṇa. Glasenapp lists general and specific concordances (Glasenapp, 1941, 173) and Halbfass also refers to most of them in his chapter on Schelling and Schopenhauer (Halbfass, 1990, 117-120). Of the Vedāntist terms, brahman and māyā receive the most attention, of the Buddhist terms upadana (an intensified form of craving) and nirvāṇa. The general concordances include the world as being full of suffering, the possibility of liberation from suffering by way of a gradual process, reincarnation and many others. From a more analytical point of view, Glasenapp (1960:82) points out that all three schools (i.e. Schopenhauer, Advaita Vedānta and Buddhism) share a doctrine of two levels of truths, or two different degrees of reality, namely an apparent and an ultimate reality. Cross (2003) has recently argued that the Buddhist chain of dependent origination (paticca-samuppāda) and Schopenhauer’s fourfold principle of sufficient reason provide dynamic — though significantly different — models of the constitution of the human experience. A very interesting parallel to the concept of the will may be found — according to Cross — “in the Subconscious Life-continuum (bhāvānga) by the Therāvādins, the continued existence of a very subtle Consciousness of the Sautrantikas, the Root-Consciousness of the Mahāsanghikas, and the Store-Consciousness of the Yogācārins in Buddhism’ (Conze, 1957, 170, in Cross, 2003, 224), as well as in the ‘causal body’ (karana sarira), the state of deep, dreamless sleep (Prajñā), the Unmanifest that ‘is avidyā (ignorance) itself, the seed of the whole multitude of created beings’ (Sastri, 1961, 233, in Cross, 2003, 240) for Advaitins and other Hindus” (Cross, 2003, 240).

All but the earliest scholars agree that Schopenhauer’s philosophy has a greater proximity to the teachings of the Buddha than to
Advaita Vedānta. This is due to his view of liberation as an indestructible sphere beyond the senses and the mind, and to the ethical thrust of his metaphysics. Schopenhauer's metaphysics of the will, however, is considered to be unique, and certainly different from the "philosophy of being" (Vedānta) and the "philosophy of becoming" (i.e. Buddhism) (Glasenapp, 1948, 294). Overall, Halbfass states that "in contrast to Hegel, and in spite of all claims to originality which he made for himself, Schopenhauer did not consign Indian thought to an antecedent and subordinate position with respect to our own" (Halbfass, India and Europe, 115). While Schopenhauer was convinced that he had developed a universal philosophical system by which the human experience could be described more systematically than ever before, Halbfass qualifies this by suggesting that Schopenhauer engaged in a process of negotiation with Indian ideas, a process which was marked by "... openness; there is a certain cautious and implicit readiness to re-examine and re-articulate his own ideas, and perhaps even to 'bring some sense into the matter' of his own thought, by referring to Indian concepts" (Halbfass, India and Europe, 117). Halbfass illustrates this claim by an account of Schopenhauer's development of the "negation of the will" in view of Indian concepts like brahman and upādāna. Halbfass' approach is noteworthy, because — rather than comparing concepts at various levels of abstraction — he considers Schopenhauer's hermeneutics, i.e. the way in which Schopenhauer constitutes his concepts. We could take this a little further and consider Schopenhauer's use of literary tropes, an approach which has been applied convincingly by Neeley in his essay "A Critical Note on Schopenhauer's Concept of Human Salvation", where he argues that Schopenhauer's "discussion of the self-negation of the will through ascetic mortification is metaphorical" (Neeley, 1994, 123). But for now, let us focus on Halbfass' suggestion that Schopenhauer engaged in a process of negotiation with Indian ideas. With this in mind, we shall now consider the role Schopenhauer played in the work of Paul Deussen (1845-1919).

When speaking of the early comparativists such as Deussen and Grimm, we should note that the distinction between scholars and enthusiasts often becomes blurred. Paul Deussen was (and is) respected as a philologist, but less so as a comparativist. Both Deussen and Grimm studied theology, both were strongly influenced.
by Schopenhauer and both wrote an emotionally evocative prose. Despite — or perhaps because of — their idiosyncratic interpretations, their work contributed immensely to the popularisation of Eastern religions in Germany.

Deussen

Paul Deussen’s *Elements of Metaphysics* (1877) attempts a synthesis consisting of Schopenhauer, *Vedānta*, Kant (as understood by Schopenhauer) and Christianity. Deussen’s “pantheistic speculations” (Glasenapp) rested mainly on his interpretation of the *Upaniṣads* and the *Vedānta*. In his comments on the *Upaniṣads* we find Schopenhauerian expressions like the ‘‘pure subject of knowing‘‘, a term which is a definite favourite with the early comparativists. Glasenapp wrote in 1941 about *Elements of Metaphysics*, that “there is no doubt that Schopenhauer would have rejected the attempts of his loyal disciple Paul Deussen to perceive God as the principle of redemption and thereby symbolically incorporate into Schopenhauer’s system the Christian teachings of the holy spirit, of the genesis and of God’s monergism (deliverance through grace, S.A.)”.  

To a lesser degree Deussen’s project also concerned itself with the relationship of Buddhism to Advaita *Vedānta* (or his interpretation thereof). In this regard Deussen’s comparativism exhibits a curious mixture of philology and appeal to natural instinct:

The same expression *brahma-nirvāṇam* is used twice more in *Bhagavad-Gītā* V, 25, 26, and thus is clear proof that this term was used in *brahmin* circles, before Buddhism appropriated it and — through rejecting the first part of the compound — forged the term nirvana (extinction), in which the main point is missing, and of which everyone immediately feels that it is merely a mutilation. (Deussen, 1915, 8)

Whatever the historical relationship between the different schools of Buddhism, Advaita *Vedānta* and the idealised Vedism of the *Puranas* may be (Warder, 1980, 21), it became subordinated to Deussen’s project. As Glasenapp states, Paul Deussen did not stop short of reinterpreting Schopenhauer in order to nominate Śankarachārya (788-820) as Schopenhauer’s (1788-1860) spiritual
ancestor, despite the fact that the epistemological parallel which exists between them is found in many systems of thought. (Glasenapp, 1941, 182)³ Deussen was criticised for not seeking to comprehend Indian culture on its own terms. Betty Heimann, who respected Deussen’s philological work, writes about his comparativism 16 years later:

Deussen, in his later synthesis, forces foreign and disfiguring Western philosophical ideas onto Indian thinking and he also assigns universal validity to specifically Indian traits. [...] Deussen’s work must be criticised philosophically, not because his exceedingly clearly expounded insights are transmitted to the layman in an almost primitive manner, but because he subordinates – in the fashion of a religious messiah – the results of his serious research to his universal idea of truth. In doing so he concocts an extract out of very heterogeneous elements”. (Heimann, 1931, 252)⁴

Halbfass, as mentioned earlier, had characterized Schopenhauer’s critical engagement with Indian ideas as involving a process of negotiation and re-definition. Deussen and many others felt that they continued the work of the master in a similar vein, as Mockrauer’s defence of Deussen from 1927 attests:

Especially in the polemics against Deussen’s preference of the Vedānta over other philosophical and religious systems, against his in this respect consistent interpretation of the Upanisads [...], a criticism is expressed, which is truly an attack on Schopenhauer and his way of approaching Indian thinking. Indeed it is in this very matter that Deussen shows himself to be the loyal disciple of Schopenhauer, whose stimulation provided the guiding light for Deussen’s Indian studies. (Mockrauer, 1927, 16)⁵

At the very least Mockrauer’s defence shows that in the late 1920’s different approaches coexisted in comparativism. But the critics — of which Heimann was a main exponent, until she had to flee Nazi Germany, as Mockrauer had to — may have had some
good arguments, perhaps citing the final sentence of Mockrauer's article, which explains the motivation behind his approach: ‘The way in which he [Arthur Schopenhauer, S.A.] [...] has appropriated and assimilated Indian wisdom, [is the method, S.A.] he may teach to the coming generations of Europe. The goal is the incorporation (Einverleibung) of Indian cultural values to further the unfolding of a new Europe’ (Mockrauer, 1927, 26). It appears that Mockrauer invokes Schopenhauer to justify a project that was not concerned with the process of negotiation which Halbfass detected in Schopenhauer’s approach to specific Indian concepts. By contrast, Mockrauer possesses great certainty as to the nature of Indian thinking.

Grimm

Another example of appropriation and assimilation can be gleaned from Grimm’s essay of 1915 on the teachings of the Buddha. The disagreements between Deussen and Grimm and their respective sympathisers over preferences for Vedānta or Buddhism seem of little consequence compared to their shared trait of a prescriptive approach with Schopenhauer’s ideas as a framework of reference. Georg Grimm writes:

[...] to impart what Schopenhauer calls the genial vision of things by way of pure contemplation is the goal which the Buddha sets for everyone. [...] According to Schopenhauer this occurs when the cognizing part of the mind separates from the willing part, brought about by a deep silence of the will and a strongly focused observation, so that the sense of individuality ceases and the human being remains only as pure subject of knowledge. Similarly the Buddha states that a complete quietude has to be achieved by removing all motions of the will so that “that no thoughts of I and mine arise”, and by an energetic observation, so that the “eye of insight” may open as a result of removing the obstacles of sloth and doubt. (Grimm, 1915, 64)

Here Schopenhauer’s aesthetic theory is translated into a soteriology. While the Buddha’s teaching is purely soteriological, Schopenhauer’s is metaphysical and does not provide a soteriology (apart from a few allegories and anecdotes). In addition, I do not
think that it is possible to find a passage in the Sutta Nikāya (the collection of the teachings of the Buddha) which states that “complete quietude” is achieved by “removing all motions of the will” coupled with an “energetic observation”. By contrast, feeling (which is a manifestation of the Will in the individual, according to Schopenhauer) is inseparable from perception, according to the Mahāvedallasutta, which represents the Buddha as saying “Vedanā, perception, and consciousness, friend – these states are conjoined, not disjoined, and it is impossible to separate each of these states from the others in order to describe the difference between them. For what one feels, that one perceives; and what one perceives, that one cognizes”. (Majjhima Nikāya, 1, 293, in Salkin, 97) Grimm’s associative imagination and does not do justice to the Buddha’s teachings. Instead Grimm employs the powerful imagery associated with schopenhauerian symbolic terms such as “the subject of pure knowing” and “quieting of the will” and takes these concepts as literal realities.

Conclusion

Schopenhauer’s respect for Indian wisdom did not stop Deussen and Grimm from using his philosophy as a dogma through which they sought to explain Vedānta and Buddhism. They were not content with parallels – parallels engage scholars to the present day – but proposed as essential identity of world views. Yet they could not claim a direct experience of this singular ultimate truth. However, they attempted to bridge the gap between their scholarship and that elusive experience of revelatory wisdom by way of emotional hermeneutics and poetic invocation.

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Endnotes


4. "Wie Deussen durch Übertragung von Gedankengängen westlicher Philosophie der indischen Ideenwelt fremde und ihre Eigentümlichkeit verweisende Merkmale in seiner späteren Synthese aufzuzwingen sucht, so erweitert er spezifische Eigenschaften Indiens zur Allgemeingültigkeit für die gesamten Denkdisziplinen aller Kulturen. [...] Nicht deshalb darf von philosophischen Standpunkt aus an Deussens Werk Kritik gelebt werden, weil er in fast primitiv einfachen Formen seine bis zur letzten Klarheit durchgearbeiteten Erkenntnisse dem Laien übermittelt, sondern nur, weil er wie ein religiöser Heilsbringer die aus gewissenhafter Quellenarbeit gewonnen Einzelerkenntnisse nachträglich seinem universellen Wahrheits- und Wertbegriff unterordnet, gleichsam einen Extrakt aus heterogenen Elementen, aus diskrepannten Bestandteilen zusammenmischt" (Betty Heimann, "Paul Deussen und die Heutige Indologie", Jahrb. 1931, p. 252).

5. "Vor allen in der Polemik gegen Deussens Bevorzugung des Vedanta vor den anderen philosophischen und religiösen Systemen, gegen seine hiermit zusammenhängende Auslegung der Upanishads und gegen seine Betonung von Übereinstimmungen zwischen Brahmanismus, Buddhismus und Christentum äußert sich eine Kritik, die sich im Grunde gegen Schopenhauer und seine Art, das indische Denken zu sehen, richtet. Denn gerade in diesem Punkte ist Deussen der getreue Schüler Schopenhauers, dessen Anregungen seinen indischen Studien Ziel und
Richtschnur gaben’ (Franz Mockrauer, ‘‘Schopenhauer und Indien’’, *Jahrb.* 1927, p. 16).


7. ‘‘...; und eben die Vermittlung dieser von Schopenhauer sogenannten genialen Betrachtungsart der Dinge in Form der reinen Kontemplation ist das Ziel Buddhas, das er jedem vorsteckt‘‘. (p. 64) [...] Ganz eben so nämlich, wie sie bei Schopenhauer dadurch eintritt, daß sich im Bewußtsein der erkennende Teil vom willenden ganz ablöst, ganz ebenso, wie sie nach ihm durch ein so tiefes Schweigen des Willens einerseits und eine solche Energie der anschauenden Tätigkeit andererseits bedingt ist, daß sogar die Individualität aus dem Bewußtsein verschwindet und der Mensch als eines Subjekts des Erkennens übrigbleibt, muß auch nach Buddha durch Beseitigung aller und jeder Willensregung eine derart vollständige Gemütsruhe — samatho — herbeigeführt werden, daß ‘‘die Gedanken des Ich und des Mein sich nicht mehr erheben‘‘. und andererseits die äußerste Energie in der Anschauung erzeugt werden, wenn ‘‘das Auge des Erkennens‘‘ aufgehen soll, indem insbesondere die ‘‘Hemmungen‘‘ der geistigen Schlaffheit und des Schankens aufgehoben werden müssen (Georg Grimm, ‘‘Thema und Basis der Lehre Buddhas‘‘, *Jahrb.* 1915, p. 65).
A Question of Influence: Schopenhauer, Early Indian Thought and A Critique of Some Proposed Conditions of Influence

Douglas L. Berger

Introduction: Criteria and Conditions of Influence

That Arthur Schopenhauer appropriated certain concepts and themes from pre-systematic Hindu and Buddhist philosophical and religious thought has always been clear to those interested in Schopenhauer's philosophy. One ongoing issue with regard to this appropriation has been in what manner it took place and what interests Schopenhauer entertained in incorporating concepts and themes from the Indian philosophical tradition into his own reflection. For the past fifty years, scholars interested in the problem of the relationship between Schopenhauer and classical Hindu and Buddhist thought have in the main tended to separate Schopenhauer's philosophical appropriation of Indian thought from the possibility that it influenced the formulation and thematization of his philosophical system. The consensus which seems to have been reached as a result of this scholarship has been that Schopenhauer first formulated his own philosophical system and then selectively chose, for a variety of hermeneutical reasons, whatever ideas from the Indian tradition he could as supportive illustrations of his existing beliefs. Schopenhauer has in this way become an enigmatic case study of someone who appropriated certain philosophical ideas without having been influenced by them, a situation which, despite all of the historical, textual and hermeneutic evidence solicited to demonstrate it, seems curious. As a preliminary justification for reexamining the
problem of Schopenhauer’s appropriation of classical Indian religious and philosophical thought, this paper will attempt to reopen the possibility that his studies of the Indian tradition did have a measurable effect upon the formulation and thematization of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. For the present, an effort will be made here to ascertain what criteria have heretofore been applied to the investigation of this question of influence, and by seeing how they have been (in most cases inadvertently) misapplied, provoke in a more general way a rethinking of the notion of philosophical influence, especially in a cross cultural context.

The two strands of scholarship through which we shall approach the relationship between Schopenhauer and India’s pre-systematic religious and philosophical thought present to us similar negative conclusions regarding the degree to which the systematic formation of Schopenhauer’s philosophy was influenced by his encounter with them. But these conclusions have been reached with different conceptions of what precisely constitutes influence. Given the varying objects of research of these two strands, this is understandable. The historians of both Indian and nineteenth century German philosophy have posed questions which focus on the accuracy of Schopenhauer’s understanding of Indian philosophy given the resources available to him as well as questions meant to discover his own hermeneutical-situation in the environment of German Idealism and Romanticism. The Western philosophical commentary on Schopenhauer on the other hand has tended to limit itself to what it considers the marginal role played by Schopenhauer’s knowledge of Indian thought and how inconsistently it fits into the large-scale systematic structure of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. In order to pose once again the question of influence with clarity, we must examine and assess the conflicting criteria of influence employed by these strands of research.

1. On Interpretive Accuracy
Turning to the historical examination of the impact of Hindu and Buddhist thought on Schopenhauer to start, we find that the first major criterion applied to the investigation was that of interpretive accuracy. The initial confidence in Schopenhauer’s understanding of Indian thought, indeed his capacity to represent it to the Western philosophical tradition exhibited in Nietzsche and Paul Deussen, has been significantly undermined. It appears that Nietzsche, a self-proclaimed one-time disciple of Schopenhauer turned
philosophical opponent, trusted him as a perfectly reliable interpreter of Vedānta and particularly Buddhism. From Nietzsche’s early ruminations on Greek tragedy and how it typified an antipode of a Schopenhaurian and “Buddhist negation of the will” (Birth 59) to his late oft-repeated attacks on Buddhism and Schopenhauer, as “nihilistic” and “under the spell and delusion of morality” (Beyond 68), Nietzsche never felt the need to make any fundamental distinctions between them. They are both made to fit into his typological classification of philosophies of “life-denial” and are dichotomized against those of “life-affirmation”, among the latter of which are included ancient Greek thought and surprisingly some elements of an “affirming Aryan religion” of Manu (Samtliche 380).1

Nietzsche praised his friend and former Schulpforta classmate Paul Deussen for “keeping the faith” of Schopenhauerian pessimism in his Indological studies (qtd. in Halbfass India 129). Nietzsche took great pride in having converted Deussen to Schopenhauer, the crucial turning point in the latter’s decision to pursue Indological research. Deussen’s formidable body of historical and philological work on Indian philosophy, including his 1883 System of Vedānta along with his independent 1887 translation of the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya and Sixty Upaniṣads of the Veda, is accompanied by a philosophical corpus just as large, most notably represented in his 1877 Elements of Metaphysics and six volume General History of Philosophy. His devotion to Schopenhauer, though it did not prevent him from engaging in his own philosophical speculation, was consistent from his self-labeled “conversion” to Schopenhauer in 1868 (Deussen Jahrbuch 14) to his editing of a third critical edition of Schopenhauer’s works as well as the Yearbook of the Schopenhauer Society. He dedicated his 1887 translation of sixty Upaniṣads to “the manes of Arthur Schopenhauer” and expanded a great deal of synthetic effort in an attempt to show how Schopenhauer’s philosophy brought with Śaṅkara’s a perfect revival of the “idealism” of the Upaniṣads from the “atheism of the Sāṃkhya system and the aspsychism of the Buddhists” (Vedānta 17-24)2 Nietzsche’s and Deussen’s penchant for constructing historiographies of philosophy which, despite their respective differences, were thematically typological allowed them to see Schopenhauer’s idealism and pessimism as falling within a philosophical continuum leading back to the very premises of pre-systematic Hindu and classical Buddhist thought. They never questioned Schopenhauer’s understanding of these
traditions, and given Deussen’s unquestionable Indological expertise and reputation, such an assessment of Schopenhauer’s understanding of Indian thought carried special weight.

This confidence in Schopenhauer’s understanding was however contested even by contemporaries of Deussen. Though he wrote of Schopenhauer that “if he had done nothing else but decipher the awful translations of Anquetil Duperron, this would be enough to assure him, even among philosophers, an honorable place as interpreter” (417), Max Mueller personally disputed with Schopenhauer over whether the Vedas or Upanisads were more “worthy” of historical research. Max P. Hecker, though he persisted in finding few fundamental substantive differences between the respective soterologies of Schopenhauer, Vedānta and Buddhism, was able to make some distinctions between what he saw as the idealistic metaphysical monism of the former two and the realistic pluralism of the latter (34).

In 1928, Franz Mockrauer had to concede that most present Indologists, in rejecting Deussen’s privileging of Śankara’s Vedānta over all other systems of Indian philosophy and his superficial correlations between Vedānta, Buddhism and Christianity, implicitly rejected Schopenhauer’s characterizations of Indian thought (17). This did little to affect Mockrauer’s own praise of Schopenhauer as “the great European who uncovered for us the soul of India, who gives us the key to understanding the greatness of one Mahatma Gandhi” (22). ³

Mockrauer listed eight supposed affinities between Schopenhauer and various Indian schools including everything from idealism to the doctrine of the imperishability of the soul, the ethical necessity of compassion and the ascetic practice of the renunciation of the will-to-live (9). He defends Schopenhauer’s comprehension of Indian thought on very peculiar generalist grounds.

If he was unable to understand the details of Indian literature, if to a certain degree his distance from Indian culture was so great, we could still ask whether he was for these very reasons in a much more fortuitous situation than the contemporary specialists of Indology. Could he not in errantly and more clearly grasp the characteristically essential forms of the Indian world out of this distance than those who lose themselves in details and fail to gain the measure of the essential? If he acknowledged and prized as the most important
movements in Indian thinking idealism, the doctrine of the unity of brahman and māyā, the tat tvam asi and samyāsin ideals and the later pessimism, atheism and nirvāṇa of Buddhism, there is little that could contradict this (Mockrauer 18).

This essentialist picture of the Indian religious and philosophical tradition along with the interpretive privilege it confers on cultural distance doubtless represent the hermeneutical naiveté which is at one side of the polarized interpretation of Schopenhauer’s conception of Indian thought that must be rejected.

In 1955 the Indologist Helmuth von Glasenapp was able to identify serious shortcomings in Schopenhauer’s assessments of Indian history, culture and thought. He points out the inaccuracy of Schopenhauer’s chronological placement of the Upaniṣads before any of the Vedic texts (Glasenapp 490-91), his failure to make clear distinctions between Vedānta and Buddhism (493) or clear distinctions between the different kinds of monism found fragmentarily in the Upaniṣads and his own metaphysics of will (498-99). Schopenhauer is also blind to the fundamental differences between the metaphysical absolutization of will in his own system and the relegation of will to a merely phenomenal and contingent status by the Buddhists (501). Glasenapp concludes:

Schopenhauer was interested in India solely for its religion and philosophy. Furthermore, he restricted himself to systems such as Vedānta and Buddhism, in which he believed could be found confirmations of his own philosophy. That his views do not correspond to the findings of modern research is not surprising, for in the hundred years that separate us from the works of the sage of Frankfurt, Indology has not only gained an enormous range of new material, but also numerous methods which have improved upon and enriched earlier representations of the course of Indian spiritual history. It can certainly be said that, in the last decade of Schopenhauer’s life, some researches were already available which would have necessitated corrections in his views. But Schopenhauer was much too subjective a thinker to have been able to change those views he had already formed at some later time (501).
In spite of all this however, Glasenapp believed a debt of gratitude is owed to Schopenhauer for having inspired so many European scholars, Deussen, Neumann and Grim not least among them, to pursue Asian studies. He also believed Schopenhauer had captured the quintessential foundations for the ethics of non-violence as taught by both Buddhism and Gandhi in his own thought (Glasenapp, 502).

The belief that Schopenhauer, despite any other misunderstandings of the Indian spiritual tradition he may have entertained, accurately characterized the ethical spirit of both Hindu and Buddhist thought was in fact widely held until Paul Hacker, one of the great twentieth century European scholars of traditional and modern Vedânta, subjected the contention to a rigorous textual, hermeneutical and conceptual critique. Schopenhauer had, Hacker showed, cited very few passages from the Upaniṣads and the Gītā in very incidental and superficial ways to support his belief that the Upaniṣadic formula tat tvam asi ("thou are that") serves as a basis for an ethics of compassion (qtd. in Halbfass Philology, 273-4). He went on to demonstrate that Schopenhauer's understanding of the passages in question was not contextually appropriate, for this formula was originally understood to be a metaphysical teaching on the true relationship between the human being and brahman in the Upaniṣads and Krṣṇa in the Gītā and not an ethical maxim. Though Schopenhauer's interpretation, what Hacker referred to as the "tat tvam asi ethic", had been espoused by Deussen and even appropriated by Neo-Vedântic thinkers such as Vivekananda, Bal Ganghadhar Tilak and Sarvapali Radhakrishnan, it was simply impossible to support the interpretation by reference to any source texts or commentaries of the Indian tradition (299). Furthermore, Hacker maintained, any ethic premised on a monism such as Schopenhauer's, a monism which ultimately denies the reality of the individual and consequently any real relationship between persons, can only be a "logical monstrosity" (306). Rather that having been genuinely influenced by classical Indian thought, it was Schopenhauer who was attempting to validate his own ethical doctrines with isolated and badly understood passages from the ancient texts, and the subsequent reappropriation of Schopenhauer's 'tat tvam asi ethic' by Neo-Vedântic thinkers was only one of many modern examples of "the deep wound which is left in the Indian mind" in the midst of the colonial period (308). Hacker looked forward to the day when twentieth century Indian philosophers would be able to contribute to the growth
of their intellectual and spiritual tradition with ideas taken from their own roots rather than with those taken from the West.

Wilhelm Halbfass has pointed out that the association of Schopenhauer’s philosophy with irrationalism and pessimism has led to a silent or antagonistic reaction to his thought by twentieth century Indian philosophers (India. 120). Indeed Schopenhauer, on the rare occasions he is mentioned by twentieth century Indian thinkers, is treated tentatively and with ambivalence. Vivekananda’s project of transforming the ancient monism of Advaita into engaged ethical social action, the establishment of a “practical Vedânta”, while it was ostensibly based solely on traditional Hindu teachings, did incorporate Schopenhauer’s “tat tvam asi ethic”. Hacker chronicled in great detail Vivekananda’s 1896 visit with Paul Deussen and convincingly demonstrated that, while before their encounter Vivekananda had preached an ethics totally consistent with the Gîtâ’s doctrine of karmayoga, he was all-too-willing after his discussions with Deussen to advocate Schopenhauer’s moral interpretation as if it had come from the Vedântic tradition itself (Halbfass Philology 291-98). This interpretation, which subsequently appears in Neo-Vedantic thinkers from the preachers of the Ramakrishna mission to Tilak and Radhakrishnan as well as in the works of the most careful commentators like M. Hiriyanna, is introduced in ways which according to Hacker either subtly attempt to represent the “tat tvam asi ethic” as belonging to classical Hindu teaching or by suggestively calling for its incorporation into contemporary Vedântic thinking (Philology 298-305). This would seem to imply that twentieth century Neo-Vedântic thinkers, while having been reluctant to openly discuss the issue of how well or inadequately Schopenhauer understood the Upaniṣads or the Gîtâ, tacitly accepted his understanding by their willingness to adopt his interpretation. For Hacker this acceptance was unfortunate and symptomatic of the colonized mentality of the Neo-Vedântins in their representation of their tradition to the West. But if any such acceptance of Schopenhauer’s ethical reading of tat tvam asi existed on the part of Neo-Vedântins, their silence as to the source of this reading in a Western philosopher reveals their ambivalence about Schopenhauer’s hermeneutical circumstances. Even Radhakrishnan, on whom Hacker was particularly harsh for defending the “tat tvam asi ethic” of Schopenhauer, made references to the inadequacy of Schopenhauer’s reading of Vedânta and Buddhism. “The modern pessimistic philosophy of Germany”, he wrote, “that of Schopenhauer
and Hartmann, is only a revised version of ancient Buddhism. It is sometimes said to be "little more than Buddhism vulgarized" (Radhakrishnan *Indian Philosophy* 342). He also criticized Deussen for being overly eager to regard the fundamental doctrine of the *Upaniṣads* as the doctrine of māyā; "having come to that conclusion on independent grounds, he is anxious to find support for his doctrine in the philosophic systems of ancient India, the *Upaniṣads* and Śaṅkara ... and modern Germany, Kant and Schopenhauer" (Indian Philosophy 189). Even those then who have been most receptive to the so-called "*tat tvam asi* ethic" have not been uncritical of the accuracy of its founder's interpretation of their tradition. In fact, there has never been any directly articulated confidence in the reliability of Schopenhauer's understanding of ancient Indian thought by Indian philosophers, particularly given the limitations of the resources on Indian philosophy available during his lifetime combined with his seemingly fanatical enthusiasm for the subject.⁵

The initial response to Schopenhauer's reception of pre-systematic Hindu and classical Buddhist thought which we find in Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries exhibits a historical and hermeneutical naiveté. The thematic equivocation of various concepts such as *brahman*, māyā and the *tat tvam asi* formula with equally generalized notions such as the absolute in the Western tradition presuppose the essentialist definitions of philosophy as well as the rudimentary historiographies of philosophy which thinkers the caliber of Nietzsche and Deussen advocated without skepticism.⁶ But with the compilation and translation of a steadily increasing number of texts and commentaries of the Indian religious and philosophical tradition which revealed their complexity and sophistication, such a naiveté was naturally abandoned by Western Indologists. The discoveries of Glasenapp and Hacker of Schopenhauer's misunderstandings of many of the broad outlines and specific details of the Indian spiritual and intellectual tradition ruled out for them the possibility of genuine influence. Instead, Schopenhauer's assertions about Indian thought began to seem much more his own philosophical presuppositions, and his willingness to idealize the Indian tradition in his works seemed symptomatic of his desire to have his own doctrines confirmed by classical Hinduism and Buddhism.
2. On Hermeneutic Preclusion

The few scholars who remained concerned with the question of the extent to which classical Hindu and Buddhist thought influenced Schopenhauer turned to the issue of his own hermeneutical situation. The general consensus which emerged from the researches of this new generation of scholars was that, far from being influenced by his beloved *Upaniṣads* or the early texts of Buddhism, Schopenhauer selectively appropriated whatever ideas he could from available materials which served to confirm positions he had already arrived at in the context of his own philosophical environment. The irrationalism, vitalism and pessimism of the Romantic movement were seen to be even greater influences on his philosophical development than the idealism of Kant and Fichte in which he was formally trained, and these influences both directed and infected all he chose to highlight of the Indian tradition. One of the overriding concerns with Schopenhauer was no longer whether he understood anything of the Indian tradition, but rather to what extent and in what ways he could be considered to have been an Orientalist.

Jean W. Sedler praises Schopenhauer for his remarkable ability to comprehend the ungrammatical Latin translations of the *Upaniṣads* by Anquetil Duperron he cherished so dearly (15-16) and admits a number of general but considerable similarities between Schopenhauer’s ethical and soteriological principles of compassion and renunciation of will and various Hindu and Buddhist doctrines. But even these similarities were ones which Sedler believes Schopenhauer himself overestimated, owing to his “propensity to find corroborations between his own ideas with as many thought-systems as possible” (180). Schopenhauer’s philosophy is much more informed by his own intellectual environment. Sedler proposes that Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of will was influenced not by the *Upaniṣadic* notion of brahman but rather by F.W.J. Schelling’s so-called “ground of God”. the unconscious urge of God to manifest himself into the plurality of the world which is opposed to the purity of God’s intellectual nature (71-3). She points out further that Schopenhauer’s notion of denial of the will-to-live was not a product of his acquaintance with Indian asceticism, but rather “may well have been suggested by his own pronounced aesthetic sensibility” (Sedler 213). More importantly however, Sedler believes that the historical development of Schopenhauer’s thinking, outlined very clearly in the writings of the philosopher himself, rules out the possibility that Indian thought could be considered to have influenced
the formation of his system. Even though Schopenhauer’s acquaintance with Indian thought dates back to the inception of his system, she points out, the references to India in his notes from 1814 to 1818 are "few and far between... incidental" and "offer no evidence that he owed any of these notions to India in the first place" (Sedler 221). Considering Schopenhauer’s later studies of Buddhism, she notes that the increase of his knowledge, while it led him to more frequent mention of Buddhism and Hinduism, did not in any way change the principles upon which he first based the system (Sedler 222). The most characteristic feature of Schopenhauer’s ethics, his notion of denial of the will, was worked out before he ever had any knowledge of Buddhism, and in fact could not have been influenced by what he later learned of Buddhism through the inadequate scholarly writings of Spence Hardy and Izak Schmidt combined with the murky traveler’s reports he read (212-14). Sedler concludes that “Schopenhauer did not derive his philosophy from Indian prototypes, but rather employed Indian ideas as illustrations or conformations of his existing beliefs” (231).

J.I. Gestering agrees with Sedler that Schopenhauer’s interest in Indian thought can be better explained through reference, not only to his own philosophical environment, but also to his cultural Zeitgeist. It is all too evident for Gestering that Schopenhauer’s inordinately high praises for Duperron’s translation of the Upaniṣads was due to the fact that their Latin appealed to his Romantic taste for classical literature (34). He cannot help but have been effected by the Romantic obsession with cultural and philosophical origins which inspired so much interest in India among German literati of the period, among whom in fact Schopenhauer first gained acquaintance with Indian thought in Weimar. But more problematic still for Gestering is the fact that Schopenhauer, given his anti-historical biases against Hegel’s progressivist views of history, dwells in a cultural unreflectivity which leads him to engage with Indian thought as if it needed “no hermeneutic” (59). Schopenhauer has no idea that “India, objectively speaking, behaves culturally in some incompatible manner” (Gestering 58). Schopenhauer’s major legacy then becomes the association of Indian thought with his own pessimistic views of the egocentric culture in which he lived and participated, for he extracts from his study of India only concepts of anthropological “negativity” such as suffering and denial of the will-to-live. This leads him to treat India “as if it were some other European philosopher” (Gestering 59), and shows how blind he is to the fact that his own involvement with the Indian tradition “reflects axiological principles inherited from his own culture” (58).
Schopenhauer's appropriation of Hindu and Buddhist ideas not only cannot count as a genuine influence for him, but rather the manner in which he employs these ideas to serve his own philosophical interests is a sure sign of his ethnocentricity. Gesterling's account, while in some ways insightful in its exposition of Schopenhauer's characterological judgments of culture, cannot really be said to be an altogether fair picture of the matter. While Schopenhauer does display a good deal of hermeneutical naivety in his equations of so many thinkers from so many time periods such as Plato, Kant, Eckhart and himself as well as his imputation of a fundamental pessimism to Hinduism and Buddhism, he at times levels sharp criticisms at what he feels are hermeneutically unreflective approaches to Indian culture and thought. He belittled the Christian missionaries of England who believed they could replace the age-old religions of India with their own (Schopenhauer WWRI: 356-7). He found certain translations of the *Upanisads* by Colebrooke, Rver and even Rammohan Roy, even though they unlike Duperron's were made directly from Sanskrit, contemptible for the European "theism" which he believed had been injected into them (PP II: 348). The notion that he treated India as if it were another European philosopher, always projecting familiar philosophical conceptions onto an alien tradition, is also mistaken. At one point in the midst of a detailed discussion on Kant's Transcendental Dialectic, Schopenhauer questions whether the three "unconditionals" to which Kant believes human reason necessarily comes, namely soul, world and God, are really universal conceptions:

Accessible and familiar as these concepts have become... through the philosophers of pure reason (*Vernunft*), it is by no means certain from this that, even without revelation, they were bound to result from the development of everyone's faculty of reason, as a creation peculiar to the nature of this reason itself. To decide this it would be necessary to make use of historical research, and to find out whether the ancient and non-European nations, especially those of Hindustan, and many of the oldest Greek philosophers, actually arrived at those concepts, or whether only we, by translating the *Brahma of the Hindus* or the *Tien* of the Chinese quite falsely as "God", charitably ascribe such concepts to them, just as the Greeks encountered their gods everywhere; whether it is not rather the case
that theism proper is to be found only in the Jewish religion, and the two religions that have sprung from it. (Schopenhauer WWRI: 486)

Nonetheless, Gesterin’s suggestion that Schopenhauer’s legacy was the association of Indian thought with German pessimism certainly rings historically true, especially when one considers the extent to which this association was taken up by Eduard von Hartmann and Philipp Maindlnder, two nineteenth century pessimistic philosophers who took their departures largely from Schopenhauer (67-89).

Wilhelm Halbfass, who devoted a great deal of careful study to Schopenhauer’s appropriation of Indian philosophy and religion, shows that Schopenhauer prided himself on having brought conceptual and systematic clarity not only to the religious teachings of the Buddha and the “Hindu sages” but also to those of Meister Eckhart and Christianity. Hence for Schopenhauer, “Indian philosophy appears not so much as a source of inspiration or revelation, but rather as a mirror and medium of self-representation and self-confirmation” (Halbfasss India 114). Schopenhauer’s frequent invocation of the vocabulary of Vedāntic and Buddhist thought such as māyā, brahman, tat tvam asī, jīvātman and nirvāṇa are meant not to give an accurate textual explication of what these concepts mean within their ancient Indian philosophical contexts, but rather to “illustrate and express his own thoughts” (Halbfasss India 110). His faithfulness to Duperron’s translations of the Upaniṣads was not merely a commitment to their various ideas, but also to Duperron’s own parallelization of the Upaniṣads with Kantian philosophy (Halbfass India 110). The encounter with Indian thought was for Schopenhauer also a very European encounter, for with the help of his appropriation of Indian thought in the clarification of his own ideas, Schopenhauer marshaled a radical critique against both Judeo-Christian theological, anthropological and historical presuppositions and more contemporary Western rationalism and progressivism, which can very easily be seen as a prolepsis to a similar critique raised by Heidegger some hundred years after him (Halbfass India 120). Thus, even though Halbfass makes some important distinctions between Schopenhauer’s interest in Indian thought and that of his Romantic contemporaries, it is perhaps in this radical critique of the present that Schopenhauer’s idealization of Indian thought can be seen to be hermeneutically
aligned with similar critiques by Herder and Schlegel, which Hegel so vehemently opposed in his own reception of Indian thought.

It is these criticisms of Western "rationalist and materialist philosophy" which puts Schopenhauer in tune with the Romantics, according to J.J. Clarke (68). He argues that "Schopenhauer's own understanding of Indian philosophy, however inadequate, is an outstanding representative of the Orientalist aspiration to use Eastern thought in pursuit of a fundamental rethinking of the Western intellectual tradition" (Clarke 69). Schopenhauer merits inclusion among the number of thinkers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries whom one can justifiably label an "Orientalists", but for Clarke this designation signifies a cultural phenomena more diverse and less pernicious than what Edward Said believed to have identified in his work, Orientalism. Far from being merely a homogenous Occidental discourse which masked its interest for colonial domination under the rubric of cross-cultural research, the Orientalist movement in Germany in the nineteenth century, Clarke maintains, had virtually no colonial interests in either India or China; the Romantic thinkers and Indologists of the period were more interested in using Indian thought as a "corrective mirror" of the deficiencies and degeneration of their own culture (25-28). There is much in such an achievement if indeed it can be supposed that Schopenhauer used Indian thought in such a way, and indeed many of the historians cited above praise Schopenhauer for his extraordinarily unique openness to the Indian religious tradition. But such praise would have to be balanced against Schopenhauer's stigmatization of Hinduism and Indian Buddhism as fundamentally "pessimistic" and excessively "mythological", assessments that had such a great effect on Nietzsche and the many subsequent generations of historians of Western philosophy who for these very reasons refused to even confer the title "philosophy" upon the intellectual productions of the Indian tradition.

What became important for this generation of scholars interested in Schopenhauer's relationship to India was not the issue of whether there were inadequacies in his comprehension of Upaniṣadic and Buddhist thought, but rather how he misunderstood them. Schopenhauer's inextricable relationship with the Romantic movement, his conceptual immersion in the Idealist philosophy into which he was educated, his insistence on seeing his own ideas confirmed by the reflections of philosophers of such tremendous cultural and historical diversity defined his hermeneutical situation. They also precluded the possibility
for them that Indian thought could have in any way influenced the course of Schopenhauer’s philosophical thinking.

3. The Problem of Consistency

The relationship between Schopenhauer and Indian thought in the secondary literature on his philosophy is often almost entirely ignored. John Atwell cited Schopenhauer’s acknowledgment of the influence of Plato, Kant and “ancient Indian wisdom” on the formation of his system, but then explicated only the roles played by the former two (Character 76-80). D.W Hamlyn mentions the “veil of māyā” as it was used by Schopenhauer when he discusses Schopenhauer’s metaphysics and ethics, but only in passing and with no explication (146). Bryan Magee, though he acknowledges some general affinities between Schopenhauer’s theses of epistemological construction and those of Vijñānavādha, states that Schopenhauer could not have been influenced “to any decisive degree” by Buddhist thought and that, where affinities do exist, they were reached “independently” in German Idealism (340-44). Patrick Gardiner maintains that the doctrines of “metempsychosis” and “resignation of the will” had influenced Schopenhauer, but finds Schopenhauer’s “mystical” tendencies problematic given his oft-repeated Kantian conviction that knowledge is restricted to the phenomenal (293-300). The great Jesuit historian of Western philosophy Frederick Copleston also believed Hinduism and Buddhism were primarily the areas where Schopenhauer found validation for his ascetic doctrine of renunciation, which for Copleston himself was inferior to the more “dynamic” and “active” ethical teachings of Christianity, which contrary to the religions of India was for Copleston “a religion of life” (178-180).

Where some space has been devoted to the instrumental role which may have been played by the Upaniṣads and Vedānta on Schopenhauer’s systematic development, it has been suspected that the doctrine of “illusion” appropriated by Schopenhauer through his understanding of māyā runs counter to the rest of his epistemology. Early in the century, the German scholar Hans Naegelsbach concluded that Schopenhauer’s conflation of Kantian and Upaniṣadic “idealism” was contradictory and unfaithful to the senses of both doctrines in their specific contexts. He wrote:
Schopenhauer reinterprets Kantian idealism and Indian illusionism by setting them into a correlative relationship. Kantian idealism in connection with the doctrine of the thing-in-itself grows into an idealistic tension between world and self, with the knowing subject on one side and the thing-in-itself on the other, such that both reality and knowledge become problems for a critical epistemology. ... In India the transparent consciousness of the highest knowledge becomes one with final reality. In the certain knowledge of unity, plurality becomes an illusion. Illusionism is charged with the most powerful religious sentiment carrying the metaphysical idea of the reality of all things, which of course later on strives toward a philosophical justification through a theory of knowledge. The Indian's knowledge ... becomes for him the highest reality, while on the other side, no illusionism exists for Kant which originates in the consciousness of universal oneness. Schopenhauer attempts a synthesis between Kantianism and Indian wisdom without himself being clear about the origin of Kantian idealism within a strictly epistemological inquiry nor about the origin of illusionism in a fundamental religious and metaphysical conviction ... Both standpoints, originating from entirely different relationships, run next to one another in Schopenhauer and intersect in a wholly contradictory fashion (Naegelsbach 151-2).

Naegelsbach believed that this untenable correlativity between illusionism and idealism was merely used by Schopenhauer to find an inroad to his metaphysics of will and the "pessimistic feeling of life" to which it led (152-56). While Naegelsbach conceded that Schopenhauer was undoubtedly influenced by Indian thought, more so by Hinduism than Buddhism, this influence consisted ultimately in allowing him to find a voice and phraseology for his pessimistic "religiosity" (147-9).

The only contemporary Western Schopenhauer scholar to have paid serious attention to the question of influence has been Christopher Janaway. After presenting a short but accurate chronology of Schopenhauer's acquaintance with Indian thought, Janaway concludes
rightly that Buddhism could not have had any initial impact on Schopenhauer's philosophy and that Schopenhauer was later gratified to have found so many correspondences with it (29). He concludes further that, if Schopenhauer can be trusted in his claim that his system was conceptually finished by 1814, his acquaintance with the Upanisads could have only "dovetailed with the rest of his thoughts towards the end of the process of completion" (Janaway 29). Whatever impact the Upanisads may have had on Schopenhauer, Janaway feels that its consequences were unfortunate as regards the consistency of Schopenhauer's epistemology. The "leitmotif of the veil of māyā" creates an obsession on Schopenhauer's part that the world of representations was a mere "illusion", which is not only entirely un-Kantian, but pushes idealism towards a Berkeleyan subjective solipsism which Schopenhauer actually explicitly rejects (Janaway 168-9).

For most of the philosophical commentators on Schopenhauer, the effects of Hindu and Buddhist ideas on him are so negligible that they do not even deserve mention. For those who do attend to the matter, it is either Schopenhauer's religious and ascetic tastes that explain his enthusiasm for India, which at best is incidental to the conceptual structure of Schopenhauer's thought and at worst at positive odds with it; or it is his fancy with the "illusionism" of the Upanisads which not only fails to add anything to his system, but distorts his comprehension of idealism and corrupts the consistency of his own epistemology. Nothing instrumental or philosophically constructive results from any influence Indian philosophy may have had on Schopenhauer according to these views.

4. A Reappraisal of the Criteria

Having considered the various criteria applied to the investigation of the influence of Indian thought on Schopenhauer's philosophy, we now turn to the question whether these criteria, either separately or taken together, constitute sufficient grounds for either accepting or rejecting the possibility of influence in this specific case. Does the fact that Schopenhauer had a merely fragmentary and superficial understanding of both the rich and diverse tradition of Indian philosophy as a whole and the context and content of those ideas with which he was familiar preclude us from saying that it was really Indian philosophical and religious speculation which affected him? Does Schopenhauer's hermeneutic immersion into the cultural
and philosophical contexts of the nineteenth century, colored as these contexts were by the German Orientalists, entail that everything from his selection of materials to his understandings of their meanings was so inescapably European as to compel the conclusion that Schopenhauer, far from being influenced by Hinduism and Buddhism, projected his own ideas into their vocabulary from the start? Does the conjecture, held by many scholars, that Indian thought contributed nothing but inconsistency to the conceptual content of Schopenhauer’s systematic philosophy justify the reluctance to treat Indian thought as influential to it?

The answer to the first of the above questions must be “no”. The correct interpretation of a body of philosophical texts, even if one single such interpretation were naively supposed to exist, cannot be a condition for the influence of those texts upon the course of one’s own reflection, misguided or not. Schopenhauer admitted three major sources of philosophical inspiration aside from his own personal observations, the *Upaniṣads*, Plato and Kant (MR1, 467). Almost all the philosophical secondary literature on Schopenhauer accuses him of misunderstanding and distorting both Plato’s theory of Ideas and Kant’s epistemology, putting his own questionable interpretations of these theories to the service of his own system, and yet no student of Schopenhauer’s works would deny that both were of immense importance for the formation of his own philosophy. There could be no more *a priori* reason to exclude Schopenhauer’s contact with Indian thought through Duperron’s translations of the *Upaniṣads* and the early studies of *Asiatic Researches* from those ideas which influenced him than there could be such an exclusion of Platonic or Kantian philosophy from the sphere of influence. There can be no question that Schopenhauer’s understanding of Indian philosophical and religious ideas was in many cases inadequate. But even granting this objection, it would nonetheless be much better to say that thorough knowledge of both Sanskrit and the historical richness and diversity of its philosophical tradition would have been the ideal circumstances under which to have been influenced by classical Hindu and Buddhist thought, but such circumstances are not a condition of influence, and the fact that Schopenhauer did not have such knowledge does not preclude the possibility that his early acquaintance with the materials which were available to him affected the course of his philosophical development.
It is certainly true that Schopenhauer first gained acquaintance with India through information he imbibed from nineteenth century European Orientalists, that some, though certainly not all, of his idealizations of ancient India carry Romantic sentiments. He most certainly did employ Indian religious and philosophical concepts as a "mirror" to confirm a wide variety of his own philosophical beliefs, though saying this does not necessarily imply that all of these beliefs were inherited from the European tradition. The scholarship of Sedler, Gesterling and Halbfass has been invaluable in correcting the hermeneutical naiveté with which Schopenhauer's relationship to Indian thought had often been previously approached and brought the historical realities of this relationship to light. However, if it was hermeneutically naive to once suppose that Schopenhauer had an inerrant grasp of the Hindu and Buddhist traditions as Nietzsche and Deussen once did, it would also be naive to suppose that Schopenhauer should or could have had any understanding of these traditions which was not bound and conditioned by those very historical realities which led him to their study. Though Schopenhauer may indeed have often been entertaining his own philosophical preconceptions in the ways he appropriated ideas of the Upaniṣads, the Gītā and early Buddhist texts, these "prejudices" must at least in part be, as Gadamer put it, "conditions whereby ... what we encounter says something to us" (Hermeneutics 9). Our historical belonging to a tradition, and for Gadamer the ontological structure of our very understanding, means that not only the way a given text "addresses" us as significant is mediated by the sedimented meanings available to us through our own tradition, but that this tradition itself ensures that "the significance exists at the beginning of any such research ... in choosing the theme to be investigated, awakening the desire to understand" (Gadamer Truth 282). From the intriguing encounters between Alexander's soldiers with the Indian "gymnosophists" to the attempted synthesis of Roman and Indian gods in the sixth book of Caesar's Gaelic Wars, from the Christian missionary ventures in India to Jones' pioneering grammatical studies, from Schelling's ruminations on Hindu mythology to Hegel's dismissal of the same as an empty "religion of substance", the encounter of the West with India had been charged with many-faceted and often self-searching meanings in the history of the Western tradition. That Schopenhauer's reception of Indian thought was first prompted and later developed within this history and these acquired meanings does not constitute an apology for the pessimistic,
world-denying and obfuscating stereotypes with which he stigmatized Indian religion and philosophy. Neither does it entail that Schopenhauer accepted all of the sedimented meanings which his contemporaries, the Romantics, cherished in their respective views of India. In point of fact, Halbfass and Clarke show some admiration for Schopenhauer precisely because his openness to Indian thought prompted him to fundamentally rethink many of the central philosophical and religious ideas of the Western tradition. The hermeneutical naiveté of Deussen and Mockrauer need not however be replaced with a hermeneutical suspicion which reduces the entirety of Schopenhauer’s encounter with Indian thought into either a masked expression of his ethnocentricity or an attempt to mirror a set of independently arrived-at and fixed beliefs. Hermeneutically situated as he was and as any interpreter must be, the historical circumstances and many-layered contexts through which he came to value the new translations of Hindu and Buddhist literature as well as the growing scholarship devoted to their research need not have been what prevented their influence upon his own philosophy, but rather were inevitably the very conditions for such influence. As unfortunate as his misunderstandings of the Indian philosophical tradition may have been, the fact that Schopenhauer’s own appropriations of Indian ideas were European appropriations is nothing more than a hermeneutical truism, not a fact that would rule out the possibility of influence.

Addressing briefly the final issue of how consistently Indian concepts such as māyā, brahman, tat tvam asi and nirvāṇa fit in with the rest of Schopenhauer’s philosophical system, we must also deny that formal consistency is a condition for influence. Consistency may indeed be an ideal for systematic philosophical thinking, and Schopenhauer himself prizes it as belonging to his own system above all others. This latter claim can and has been much contested and with very good reason; the number of thinkers who figure prominently in Schopenhauer’s early philosophical development is extraordinarily diverse, ranging from Plato and Kant to the skeptic G.E. Schultze, his first philosophical advisor, to Fichte, a onetime teacher, to the writings of the French physiologist Flourens and the theologian Matthias Claudias. Heterogeneous elements were being combined in his reflections from the beginning and as a result conflate oddly with one another in his system’s actual thematization. They were nonetheless fundamental to his philosophic development, and remained so throughout his writings.
It must be noted that the considerations of the degree of accuracy in Schopenhauer's interpretation of the Upaniṣadic and Buddhist concepts which he most often referred to, such as brahman, māyā, tat tvam asi and nirvāṇa, and the nature of his own hermeneutical situation were not always initially held to be criteria of influence. They were sometimes used as methodological criteria aimed at answering the question of how faithful or mistaken Schopenhauer's understanding of the content and context of these various concepts happened to be. Nonetheless, the answers to these questions, with the initial investigators positive and with most recent scholars negative, over time transformed these objects of inquiry into actual criteria of whether or not Indian thought had any positive influence on Schopenhauer or not. We have found them as criteria of influence wanting.

5. Concluding Observations on Criteria of Influence

As a general consideration, some care needs to be taken with the issue of whether one text, set of ideas or tradition had an influence on a given thinker. In the case of an interpreter and a text, we may often be tempted to speak of influence in psychological parlance by saying that an interpreter was compelled by some particular idea or passage in the text. When Gadamer speaks of the interpreter and the text as partners in a hermeneutic dialogue, he wishes to stress much more the content, subject matter or issue (Sache) of the text and how it "addresses" the reader, or alternatively, what sort of "question" the text puts to the interpreter which forces the interpreter to requestion the text. Nevertheless, Gadamer still speaks on occasion of "our being perplexed by the traditionary word", (Hermeneutics 373) which becomes the impetus, as it were, for this dialogue to proceed. Hence, it would be very difficult even in this context to avoid the language of psychologism when discussing influence. For Gadamer, we may not be able to get inside the head of the author of the text to discover his or her original intention, but the various meanings the text presents prompt a reaction in the reader which furthermore must be a reaction of a certain kind in order for reader and text to become diologic partners.

Perhaps such language is to a certain degree unavoidable, for influence as it may exist between text and interpreter would seem to involve some sort of positive valuation on the part of the latter, a mental act accruing worth. However, with respect to the present case, it would be best to make the texts in question the final court of appeal as to
whether Indian thought had an influence on Schopenhauer or not. Perhaps a more minimal set of criteria would be more helpful in deciphering from Schopenhauer’s published philosophical writings, his notes, his correspondence whether he came into contact with Indian thought during a period which would have allowed him to have incorporated some ideas from that tradition into his own philosophy, and whether those ideas measurable effected the fabric and movement of his own thought. Furthermore, criteria of influence are best applied sensitively to specific cases and contexts, as they do not appear to be assignable to some kind of a priori cognitive, linguistic or textual status.

A particular interpretive danger, at any rate, can be apprehended from the present study. By positing that interpretive misunderstanding and hermeneutic distance precluded the possibility that Schopenhauer was influenced by ideas from the pre-systematic Indian philosophical tradition, the scholars who for the last forty years have been interested in this problem have apparently forgotten that it is precisely the diversity of possible interpretations and distanitation that make hermeneutic appropriation possible in the first place. The common penchant to see Schopenhauer’s appropriations of concepts, not only from the Indian philosophical tradition but also from the European, as mere exercises in assimilation to his own philosophical doctrines betrays a persistent historicism masquerading as hermeneutical explication. Schopenhauer is taken to task for having not understood the “original meanings” of the religious and philosophical ideas of the Indian tradition to which he makes reference (as if those ideas were in their respective “original” contexts synonymous), and then identifying his misunderstandings of these concepts with the utterly alien conceptions of his own tradition and his own specific philosophical teachings. It is then claimed that these hermeneutical circumstances preclude the possibility that Indian thought influenced Schopenhauer’s philosophical thinking, but they somehow did allow him to use his understanding of Indian thought to “rethink” and “critique” his own tradition (Halbfass India 120; Clarke 69). Hence the curious but persistent view that Schopenhauer appropriated ideas by which he was not actually influenced. Little consideration is entertained that Schopenhauer’s own philosophy becomes thought and rethought through his studies of the Indian tradition because the interpretive premises of this kind of critique have lost sight of the most basic facets of a hermeneutical approach and have fallen back into the assumptions
of historicism. That notions such as brahman, māyā, karma and so on are not understood by Schopenhauer as they were within the Indian philosophical tradition, but rather from the works of Romantic Orientalists, is taken to be conclusive evidence that Schopenhauer’s own philosophical reference to these notions can only amount to the results of his own historical projections. This is precisely, according to Ricoeur, the error of historicism: “to conceive of appropriation in terms of the primacy of the original audience with which one seeks to coincide, to discover to whom a text was addressed and to identify oneself with that original audience” (190). The idea that Schopenhauer or anyone else could appropriate philosophical ideas without having been directly or indirectly influenced by them can only be considered a hermeneutical impossibility. Rather, the two are merely two moments in the dialectical process of interpretation as hermeneutics understands it.

The above is not meant to invalidate the difficulties and complexities which have been found by generations of scholars to problematize Schopenhauer’s encounter with Indian thought. For it is undeniable that Schopenhauer did not in many cases have an understanding of philosophical and religious notions that would resemble the corresponding thematizations of those notions from within the Indian tradition. Neither is it meant to excuse him for the stigmatizations he burdened the perception of Indian thought in the West with by linking it to his own existential “pessimism”. Complicating matters are the hermeneutical circumstances of the early German Romantic Orientalists themselves from whom Schopenhauer learned so much about Indian thought, as well as his own apparent acceptance of the Romantic ideas about interpretation as a direct understanding of the intentions of the author, a transition of meaning from “genius to genius” as it were. What it is rather meant to illustrate is that a true hermeneutic assessment of Schopenhauer’s appropriation of ideas from the Indian philosophical tradition does not merely stop with these issues, does not merely rest with the fact that Schopenhauer uses Indian ideas to “illustrate” or “mirror” or “confirm” his own, but goes on to discover why he believed such confirmations were possible. A more thorough investigation would indeed show that Schopenhauer does not only in his appropriations redefine Indian ideas in terms of his own thought, but just as often redefines his own thought in terms of his understandings of some select classical Indian ideas. In all fairness, Schopenhauer’s extraordinary openness to and ready appropriation of
concepts from the Indian tradition into his own system, unique in the Western tradition, deserve better than the mostly platitudinous rejection they have so far received. This appropriation allowed Schopenhauer not only to critique his own philosophical heritage in unprecedented ways, but also helped to contribute to the living conversation of the Indian tradition itself, regardless of how much ambivalence the results of that contribution are met with today. For despite Paul Hacker’s despair at the Neo-Vedàntins having employed a Schopenhauereian interpretation of one of the central formulas of the early Upaniṣads which did not belong to the commentarial tradition, their very use of it is not only disclosive of their own hermeneutical interests, it also seems to reveal that Schopenhauer as a creative thinker receptive to their tradition was able at least in this instance to contribute to that conversation, which for a person with no understanding of or insight into that tradition would hardly have been possible. We should thus be wary of these criteria of influence, interpretive accuracy, hermeneutic preclusion and consistency, being used too forcefully against the possibility of cross-cultural philosophical influence. While not necessarily legitimating every interpretive reading as consonant with a given historical text, hermeneutics was conceived as showing how new readings can be and are actualized through the historical process.

Endnotes

1. For Nietzsche’s interpretation of Manu, see Twilight of the Idols, (1990), 188-191.

2. This seemed to echo Schopenhauer’s own belief that he had brought to a definitive end the age-old debate in Western philosophy between idealism and realism (see Schopenhauer, “Skizze einer Geschichte der Lehre vom Idealen und Realen” (PPI, 9-17). Please note that all translations are, unless otherwise indicated, my own.

3. Mockrauer’s views on the ideal cultural exchange between India and the West are relevant to his interpretation, thinking as he did that Europe should be the “protector of Indian culture” (22); offering its own scientific and technological achievements (19-26), while itself benefiting from India’s spiritual wisdom.

4. Hacker identifies some basic differences between Schopenhauer’s and Vedànta’s views of the person, among which are the former’s “monism of will” as opposed to the latter’s “monism of consciousness” (277) as well as the former’s final irreducible dualism between will and intellect as opposed to the latter’s stricter monism of cognition (279). These are issues to which we shall return.
5. Perhaps even the most charitable reading could only grant that Schopenhauer belongs to a group of nineteenth century German thinkers "whose enthusiasm or attention did not match their knowledge of the philosophical literature" (Mohanty, 1997, 164).

6. This hackneyed method of thematic classification still enjoys a place in more recent works on Schopenhauer and Buddhism. Most notable in this regard is Dorothea Dauer’s short book *Schopenhauer as Transmitter of Buddhist Ideas*. This book made an attempt to show how Schopenhauer’s philosophy fit into the scheme of the “Four Noble Truths” taught by Gautama Buddha with little regard for the systematic contexts either of those concepts it extracts from Schopenhauer or those of various strands of *Theravāda* and *Mahāyāna* Buddhism which are mentioned. Important distinctions between *Vedānta* and Buddhism are blurred (13-14), Schopenhauer’s rejection of an “intellectual soul” and the Buddhist doctrine of *anātman* are pronounced the same (17) and Schopenhauer is said to be in agreement with the ancient Hindus in believing in “the cyclic or repetitive concept of time” (30). Dauer concludes that, “while each point of Buddhist philosophy finding its counterpart bearing a more or less similar connotation in the system of the German philosopher” (35), the latter refused to acknowledge Buddhism as his major intellectual inspiration because of psychological “repression” (9).

7. Historians of Western philosophy have more and more taken this view. See for example the section dedicated to Schopenhauer in W.T. Jones, 144-157.

8. The three aspects of Orientalism according to Edward Said’s ground breaking *Orientalism* are first the academic study of the Orient, second the positing of a fundamental “ontological and epistemological distinction” between “Orient and Occident ... East and West” and finally the establishment of a “discourse” which is manufactured ultimately for the intellectual “construction” and political “domination” of the Orient by the West (2-3). Schopenhauer of course clearly is an Orientalist in the first sense and to some degree in the second, though he was vituperative in his condemnation of European attempts to dominate the “Orient”, and in particular the “missionary” justification given for such attempts. However, even with these considerations in mind, Schopenhauer’s life did not exceed that “first two thirds of the nineteenth century”, when “at no time in German scholarship ... could a close partnership have developed between Orientalism and a protracted, sustained national interest in the Orient”, even though German Orientalism during this time, due to its indebtedness to British Orientalist scholarship, exhibited “a certain intellectual authority over the Orient within Western culture” (Said, 19). But Said clearly considered Schopenhauer an Orientalist in the sense that, with the other Romantics, he only appreciated India for the “intellectual” and “spiritual Renaissance” it held open before Europe as a counter-pole to traditional European
philosophical doctrines (115). This suggestion is taken up and assessed in different ways by Gestering, Halbfass and Clarke, as we shall see below.

9. Sedler emphasizes Schopenhauer’s understanding of the doctrine of guilt and *karma* (170-1), his notions of desire and suffering which are so “astoundingly close” to those of Theravāda Buddhism (190) as well as his agreement with Buddhism that there is no “soul” or individual consciousness which survives death, necessitating a this-worldly salvation (205). Schopenhauer also shares, not insignificantly according to Sedler, an “a-historicism” with the thinkers of the classical period in India (122).

10. Schopenhauer’s many references to the kinship of his thinking with figures as disparate as Plato, Kant, the authors of the *Upaniṣads* and Eckhart supports this contention.

11. This very suggestive observation seems corroborated by the stress Schopenhauer placed on art as a temporary escape from the will, which so closely resembles Kant’s notion of the disinterested contemplation of aesthetic judgment (see Desmond, 101-122).

12. See also HN 5, 324, 341ff.

13. In one of the appendices to his translation of the *Oupnek’hat* entitled *De Kantismo*, Duperron wrote that the return of human beings to a reflection upon their own inner nature was what Kant and the *Upaniṣads* emphasized most.

14. Halbfass argues that Schopenhauer in no way shared the common Romantic interest in returning to the lost cultural and spiritual origins of Europe thought to lie in particular in India (1988, 108).

15. The two foremost contemporary German commentators on Schopenhauer, the late Rudolph Malter and Volker Spierling, never refer to Schopenhauer’s acquaintance with Indian philosophy.

16. While Schopenhauer appears to espouse the Romantic idealization of the Indians as the “oldest and noblest of peoples” (Glaserapp, 489) and certainly believes with the Romantics that the Christian religion has its spiritual roots in India (*Ibid.*, 492), he thoroughly rejects the idea that India is the land of pure and lost beginnings of Western and particularly German culture (Halbfass, 1988, 108).


18. Schopenhauer is fond of comparing the structure of his system to a living organism in which each part supports the functioning of all the others (WWI, xii).

19. As we saw in the preceding chapter, J.J. Gestering has made a compelling case for this. This dissertation will not enter into the interesting debate that has emerged in recent years as to whether any such term as “pessimism” can philosophically describe Schopenhauer’s system. The two sides of this argument have been well laid out by Bryan Magee (13-14) and John E. Atwell (1990, 143-79).
References


Schopenhauer and Vedānta
In this paper I would like to discuss Schopenhauer's metaphysics of human existence, time and the world from the Vedāntic point of view. It is well known that Schopenhauer was influenced by the Vedāntic philosophy, especially the Upaniṣads, in his formulations of the metaphysics of man and the world. Though he belonged to the European philosophical tradition, especially to the Kantian tradition, he did consider it worthwhile to take into account the Indian philosophical traditions such as Vedānta and Buddhism to arrive at his own metaphysical world-view. He did not find any incompatibility between the European and the Indian philosophical traditions on the nature of man and the world.

Schopenhauer has arrived at a metaphysics of man and the world by imbibing the best in the Indian philosophical traditions and integrating it to the European tradition thus offering a new synthetic metaphysical world-view. For him, though man is rooted in the phenomenal world in space and time, he seeks liberation from this world by denying the will-to-live which is the very spring of human existence. Schopenhauer's metaphysics of will shares the same monistic urge of the Advaita Vedāntins which accounts for the world in terms of one ultimate principle, Brahma. It also shares the Advaitic demand for the transcendence of the phenomenal world for freeing the human soul from bondage.

My argument in this paper is not to engage in a textual exegesis either of Schopenhauer's metaphysics or of the metaphysics of Advaita Vedānta. My aim is to show the parallel between these two
systems so as to highlight the meeting of ideas from two divergent traditions.

Man in a Godless World: Schopenhauer’s Metaphysical Presuppositions

Human existence, according to Schopenhauer, is pitted against a Godless world in view of the fact that man is not created by God, the supreme Divine Agency. Man’s existence is the manifestation of the will-to-live³ which is at the root of all existence. Schopenhauer takes man and the world as constituting the phenomenal reality that is rooted in the transcendental reality, the thing-in-itself, i.e. the will-to-live. Will is the ultimate reality that is incessantly striving to express itself in the material and the non-material world. The will is at work not only in the conscious world of man and the other lower animals, but also in the material world of objects and plants. Schopenhauer elevates will to the status of a semi-divine creative force which as a blind and unknowing principle works in the universe. He writes:

The will, as the thing-in-itself, constitutes the inner, true, and indestructible nature of man; yet in itself it is without consciousness. For consciousness is conditioned by the intellect, and the intellect is a mere accident of our being, for it is a function of the brain.⁴

Schopenhauer has banished God from his universe precisely for the reason that man is created by Nature rather than by any super-natural Agency. Man’s existence is a part of the natural order of things which is underlined and conditioned by the will-to-live. The latter is, according to Schopenhauer, a blind force that has the potency of bringing into being the phenomenal world. He writes:

What is primary is that which appears, namely the thing-in-itself, which we shall afterwards learn to recognize as the will. In itself this is neither the representor, nor the represented, but is quite different from its modes of appearance.⁵

The thing-in-itself is the will that manifests itself in the phenomenal world, i.e. the world as representation. Thus, there is the duality between the world as will and the world as representation.
Schopenhauer follows Kant in making a distinction between the phenomenal world as the world of representation and the noumenal world as the will. He takes the will as the thing-in-itself in the Kantian sense but converts it into the metaphysical principle from which the phenomenal springs.

Schopenhauer has departed from the theo-centric world-view by denying the existence of God as the source of the world. He rejects the theory of creation of the world. Instead, he postulates the will-to-live as the metaphysical ground of the world. Since the will-to-live is the transcendent metaphysical reality, the world as we know it in space and time is reduced to a phenomenal world based on the human intellect. Human existence itself is phenomenal as it is a manifestation of the will. Man embodies the will in its most conscious form in view of the fact the will itself is not primarily conscious. Schopenhauer writes:

... consciousness presupposes individuality; but this belongs to the mere phenomenon, since, as the plurality of the homogeneous, it is conditioned by the forms of the phenomenon, time and space. On the other hand, our inner nature has its root in what is no longer phenomenon but the thing-in-itself, to which therefore the forms of the phenomenon do not reach; and in this way, the chief conditions of individuality are wanting, and distinct consciousness ceases therewith.

Thus human existence is conditioned by the phenomenal world and is subject to the laws of the phenomenal world. The emergence of individual consciousness is conditioned by the human ego and the intellect.

Man and world thus both share the same fate of being conditional in origin having no divine backing behind them. This ensures the transitoriness of the existence of man and the world. God’s absence from the world is inevitable if we keep in mind Schopenhauer’s comments on the “vanity and suffering of life”. Life, according to him, is a vain and deceitful adventure signifying nothing. “Everything in life proclaims that earthly happiness is destined to be frustrated, or recognized as an illusion”. The world itself has a groundless existence and has no ultimate justification. Schopenhauer writes:

Therefore, if any one ventures to raise the question why there is nothing at all rather than this world, then the world cannot be
justified from itself; no ground, no final cause of its existence can be found in itself; it cannot be demonstrated that it exists for its own sake, in other words, for its own advantage.\textsuperscript{11}

Thus he brings out the fact that world exists as a matter of fact without any ultimate justification or ground. This sums up Schopenhauer's theory that both man and the world are not ultimately real and have to be understood only in the light of their origin in the will-to-live

Time and Contingency

Schopenhauer recognizes the fact that man's life is enmeshed with time and contingency as a part of the larger order of the universe. The universe is itself a spatio-temporal phenomenon based on the laws of nature. But from the metaphysical point of view, the universe is a changing, impermanent and ephemeral phenomenon based on 'the wheel of time'.\textsuperscript{12} Schopenhauer writes:

\begin{quote}
... our temporal existence is the mere image of our true inner being. This must lie in eternity, just because time is only the form of our knowing; but by virtue of this form alone we know our own existence and that of all things transitory, finite, and subject to annihilation.\textsuperscript{13}
\end{quote}

The temporal nature of the world presupposes that there is eternity beyond the shadow of time. Time is a mere image of eternity because without the latter time itself would have lost its significance. Schopenhauer continues:

\begin{quote}
... the thing-in-itself remains untouched by time and by that which is possible only through time, that is, by rising and passing away, and that the phenomenon of time could not have been that restless, fleeting existence that stands next to nothingness, unless there were in them a kernel of eternity.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

Time itself is a product of the human intellect in that man's reason or intellect arranges the objects and the events of the universe in time and constructs a unitary universe That is to say, time itself has no absolute reality of its own; it is subjective in the sense that it is the form of our knowledge of the world.

Schopenhauer, following Kant, argues that the world that we know or represent is limited because it is circumscribed by a
noumenal reality. He characterizes the noumenal reality as the will that is the ground of all existence. The will is something indestructible and eternal,\(^{15}\) while the phenomenal world is temporal and contingent. The latter is relative to the human mind and consciousness, whereas the thing-in-itself is beyond the vagaries of time and history. It is the contingency of the process of time which engages the attention of Schopenhauer in his understanding of the origin of man and the universe. Both man and the world are limited beings in time and history thus signaling the fact that there is something greater and more significant than the world. Everything in the world is subject to death and destruction; nothing is permanent in this world.

Schopenhauer is averse to the Christian conception of eternal life which is granted to man as grace or boon of the Providence. From the Christian point of view, God ensures the eternal life of man in history by making history itself the manifestation of the Divine Will. History is God’s manifestation of Himself in time and the world from the Christian point of view. But Schopenhauer opposes this world-view which promises Heaven on Earth by virtue of leading a Godly life on earth. His apparent pessimism follows from the fact that he is not in sympathy with the Judeo-Christian conception of man and the world. He repeatedly comes back to the idea that man is not destined to be the master of the universe because the universe itself is māyā or illusion\(^{16}\) and that the salvation of man lies in transcending the world and not in owning it.

The Veil of Māyā

The Vedāntic notion of māyā has influenced Schopenhauer to a great extent so much so that he treats the world as a mistake,\(^{17}\) a false move on the part of the will. While the Vedānta, especially Advaita Vedānta, would take the world as the creation of māyā out of the Brahman, through a superimposition\(^{18}\) of the world on Brahman, the Sat-Chit-Ānanda. Schopenhauer considers it as the superimposition of the intellect on the will. Thus the world ceases to be eternal and permanent for both the Advaita Vedāntins and Schopenhauer. However, the Advaita Vedāntin would, unlike Schopenhauer, like to take the world as sublated in the realization of the Brahman.

The Vedāntin describes the world in terms of sorrow and suffering and thus emphasizes the ephemerality of the worldly life.\(^{19}\)
The Upaniṣads speak eloquently of the non-eternal character of the human existence and of the final dissolution of everything in time. This has influenced Schopenhauer in his conception of the world as vain and sorrowful. "Thus our existence resembles nothing but the consequence of a false step and a guilty desire", says Schopenhauer. The Vedāntin discovers the origin of sorrow in ignorance which causes man to be attached to the world. Ignorance is due to man's lack of understanding of his own self, which is different from the human body and is identical with the universal self (Ātman).

Schopenhauer takes the Vedāntic message seriously in view of the fact that he himself considers the world as phenomenal and ephemeral in character. He also associates this world with sorrow and suffering. He writes:

... continual deception and disillusionment, as well as the general nature of life, present themselves as intended and calculated to awaken the conviction that nothing whatever is worth our exertions, our efforts, and our struggles, that all good things are empty and fleeting, that the world on all sides is bankrupt, and that life is a business that does not cover the costs; so that our will may turn away from it.

Thus Schopenhauer finds the world full of suffering and disappointments because of the fact that it is transitory and impermanent.

Schopenhauer agrees with the Vedāntins and the Buddhists that the world is not a place for unalloyed happiness and that that it is full of torment and suffering. As Schopenhauer puts it, "This world is the battle-ground of tormented and agonized beings who continue to exist only by each devouring the other". However, as it is obvious, he does not accept the Vedāntic affirmation that the ultimate reality is of the nature of Brahman which is of the nature of consciousness and bliss. According to him, the ultimate reality is will which is not a conscious being like the Vedāntic Brahman. For him, the will gives rise to consciousness in the human individual which has intellect as its instrument of representing the world.

It is very evident that Schopenhauer does not take the world as illusion in the literal sense of the term. The world is real in space and time and obeys the laws of Nature. It is only ideal from the
transcendental point of view. He follows Kant in taking the space-time world as the mental representation without reducing it to the Berkeleyan world of ideas. He also avoids the Vedântic implication that the world is dissolved in the realization of the ultimate reality. However, he remains a committed idealist in his metaphysical beliefs. Schopenhauer writes:

There can never be an existence that is objective absolutely and in itself; such an existence, indeed, is positively inconceivable. For the objective, as such, always and essentially has its existence in the consciousness of a subject; it is therefore the representations of this subject, and consequently is conditioned by the subject, and moreover by the subject’s forms of representation, which belong to the subject and not to the object.  

Thus, the world is made transcendentally rooted in the subject’s consciousness. The subject is the key to the ultimate nature of the world. This confirms his affinity to the Vedântins who affirm that the world is of the nature of consciousness in the ultimate analysis.  

The Knowing Subject

Schopenhauer makes a distinction between the will and the knowing subject insofar as the latter is only a manifestation of the former. The knowing subject has the knowledge of the world but is not itself an object of knowledge. It is timeless and eternal as it is the very condition of time and the world. Schopenhauer does not take the knowing subject as identical with the individual human knower because he finds the latter tied to the conditional world, while the former is the very condition of the world. The knowing subject is the timeless and transcendental subject to which the world appears as its representation. Schopenhauer writes:

By making the objective world dependent on us, idealism gives the necessary counterpoise to the dependence on the objective world in which we are placed by the course of nature. The world, from which I part at death, is, on the other hand, only my representation. The center of gravity of existence falls back into the subject.  

The subject thus brings the world into existence by virtue of its conceptual forms through the intellect. That is how the world appears as the representation of the human
intellect, for "the intellect and matter are correlative, in other words, one exists only for the latter; both stand and fall together; the one is only the other's reflex. They are in fact really one and the same thing, considered from the opposite points of view; and this one thing ... is the phenomenon of the will or the thing-in-itself". 28

The knowing subject as opposed to the material world is, however, central to Schopenhauer's metaphysics since it is this subject to which the world appears as a representation. Both the subject and the worlds are phenomenal manifestations of the will which is the thing-in-itself. The subject itself is not in space and time since space, time and the world are all representations of the knowing subject. "This subject is not in time, for time is only the more direct form of all its representing". 29 Schopenhauer further explains:

We can therefore regard the permanence of matter as the reflex of the timelessness of the pure subject, that is simply taken to be condition of every object. Both belong to the phenomenon, not to the thing-in-itself; but they are the framework of the phenomenon. Both are discovered only through abstraction; they are not given immediately, pure and by themselves. 30

Thus it is evident that the knowing subject is not itself in the world though it is embodied by the individual knowing beings as conditioned by the principium individuationis.

What is characteristic of the individual knowing subject is that he or she is conscious of the fact that he or she is born and is subject to death. Death is the complete annihilation of the individual being. What is beyond death is the will and the knowing subject itself which are transcendentally real. The universal will is the ground of all existence and hence cannot be annihilated. Schopenhauer admits that death is inevitable for the human individuals so far as they are subject to the laws of nature. But there is still something immortal, which is not annihilated and that is the universal will in man. That is why he says that the knowing subject does not fear death for the reason that the universal will in man is beyond death and destruction. He writes:

Accordingly, from the standpoint of knowledge, there appears to be absolutely no ground for fearing death; but consciousness consists in knowing, and for consciousness death is no evil. 31
The idea of death haunts the ordinary mortals for the reason that he or she does not know that the death of the individual is not the end of the matter. There is still a higher self that does not die as it is not in time.

Schopenhauer reiterates the Vedantic affirmation of the immortality of the Ātman or self which does not die even when all the individual beings die in the course of nature. He refers with approval to the Bhagavadgītā's statement that "life or death of individual is of absolutely no consequence". The Gītā holds that there is no death of life as such in the sense that the universal self or the Ātman is immortal. That is to say, "the destruction of such a phenomenon does not in the least disturb its true and real inner being".

Schopenhauer, however, does not take the Vedantic leap in identifying the universal will with the Brahman, the Sat-Chit-Ānanda. For him, it is enough that there is universal will which never dies and is eternal in the sense of being above birth and death. "The true inner being of everything, which, moreover, evades our glance everywhere and is thoroughly mysterious, is not affected by that rising and passing away, but rather continues to exist undisturbed thereby". Thus there is a metaphysical continuity of life and will which is under no threat from the forces of destruction which engulf the world of the individual beings. What is to be noted here is that Schopenhauer shares the Vedantic belief that everything is not annihilated in the world so far as we know that there is a higher reality that defies death and destruction.

**Samsāra and Nirvāṇa:**
Schopenhauer's Metaphysics of Salvation

The individual subject is capable of rising above his or her own state in the world by not only utilizing his or her own reason but also by overcoming the will itself, that is, by denying the will-to-live. What Schopenhauer means by the denial of the will is that it leads to a negation of the pursuit of desire on the part of the individual human beings. It blunts the fierceness with which the will makes man attached to his desires in the world. Denial of the will does not mean denying the existence of the will but denying man’s surrender to it. Schopenhauer writes:

Therefore that great fundamental truth contained in Christianity as well as in Brahmanism and Buddhism, the need for salvation
from an existence given up to suffering and death, and its attainability through the denial of the will, hence by a decided opposition to nature, is beyond all comparison the most important truth there can be.35

The will has to be resisted in the sense that the demands of the will can be renounced by resorting to the ascetic denial of the body and its desires. Renunciation is the hallmark of this ascetic denial.

If man achieves this renunciation of the will by being indifferent to it, then life could get new significance and thus free itself from suffering. Suffering comes to an end only when the desires cease to overpower man. This ascetic ideal is espoused not only in Christianity but also in Buddhism and Vedântism, according to Schopenhauer. He says:

For not only the religions of the East, but also true Christianity has throughout this fundamental ascetic character that my philosophy explains as the denial of the will-to-live, although Protestantism, especially in its present-day form, tries to keep this dark.36

The fact of the matter is that Schopenhauer has discovered the ideal of salvation through asceticism which is the common ideal of many religions the world over. The essence of this ideal is the denial of the will-to-live, that is, the denial of the desires arising out of the will.

The road to salvation lies through knowledge as it awakens man to the realization of the ultimate futility of human life in the world and its transcendence through rational reflection and renunciation. Schopenhauer finds the road to salvation in renunciation of desire and the will-to-live and thus paves the way for the cessation of suffering. The world itself is symbol of the ceaseless flow of time and of the unending flow of suffering. This is the equivalent of the Vedântic notion of samsâra which is marked by ceaseless suffering. Schopenhauer writes:

The way in which this vanity of all objects of the will makes itself known and comprehensible to the intellect that is rooted in the individual, is primarily time. It is the form by whose means that vanity of things appears as their transitoriness, since by virtue of this all our pleasures and enjoyments come to nought in our hands, and afterwards we ask in astonishment where they have remained.37
This transitoriness is the hallmark of the Vedantic samśāra in view of the fleeting character of the human life and its activities. Schopenhauer is emphatic that this state of existence is regrettably poor and disappointing. "Everything in life proclaims that earthly happiness is destined to be frustrated, or recognized as an illusion".  

Schopenhauer does not consider salvation to be a gift of a Divine Being because he does not accept the existence of such a Being. All that he accepts as a means of salvation is the denial or renunciation of the worldly desires which promises to take man out of his misery in the world. On this point he agrees with the Vedantic-Buddhistic ideal of renunciation (sannyāsa) which has been well laid down in the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā. The Vedāntic and Buddhistic literature is full of detailed account of the process of renunciation which has been part of the religious lore of these two traditions. Schopenhauer recognizes the importance of these doctrines while he enunciates his own doctrine of salvation. He writes:

The holiness attaching to every purely moral action rests on the fact that ultimately such action springs from the immediate knowledge of the numerical identity of the inner nature of all living things. But this identity is really present only in the state of the denial of the will (Nirvāṇa), as the affirmation of the will (Samśāra) has for its form the phenomenal appearance of this in plurality and multiplicity.

For him, as for the Vedāntin and the Buddhist, Samśāra consists in the affirmation of the will and all that follows from the will, while Nirvāṇa or Mokṣa consists in the denial of the will, that is, in the renunciation of the desires of clinging to life in the world. In this perspective, Samśāra represents the entanglement of man with history and time and Mokṣa is the cessation of the human involvement in history and the world. It does not mean death or annihilation but the cessation of the passionate involvement with the world. Schopenhauer seems to be in agreement with this view. He does not consider life in the world as the final stage of man’s existence. Therefore he accepts the possibility of liberation from the world or the samśāra by denying the will-to-live itself. Liberation consists in the release from the stranglehold of the will which chains the human individual to the world. According to Schopenhauer, it is
the affirmation of the will-to-live that binds man to the world and therefore only by denying this will can there be liberation. "The affirmation of the will-to-live, the phenomenal world, diversity of all beings, individuality, egoism, hatred, wickedness, all spring from one root. In just the same way, on the other hand, the world as thing-in-itself, the identity of all beings, justice, righteousness, philanthropy, denial of the will-to-live spring from one root. .... moral virtues spring from awareness of that identity of all beings; this, however, lies not in the phenomenon, but in the thing-in-itself, in the root of all beings. If this is the case, then the virtuous action is a momentary passing through the point, the permanent return to which is the denial of the will-to-live". 41 The permanent return is the liberation or the Nirvāṇa which is the final aim of man’s philosophical and moral endeavour.

The Vedāntic teachings regarding liberation tell us to transcend the bodily desires by withdrawing from the propensities of the bodily existence. The Upaniṣads and the Gītā teach us the way to the higher life by withdrawal (nivṛtti) 42 from the body and thus teach us sannyāsa or renunciation as the pathway to liberation. Schopenhauer considers this as the greatest wisdom that mankind has received from the Indian sages. He adopts this as the only way to salvation because, according to him, unless the bodily desires are extinguished, there can never be any release from the worldly existence. Schopenhauer writes;

Quetism, i.e., the giving up of all willing, asceticism, i.e., intentional mortification of one’s will, and mysticism, i.e., consciousness of the identity of one’s inner being with that of all things or with the kernel of the world, stand in the closest connexion, so that whoever professes one of them is gradually led to the acceptance of the other, even against his intention. 43

Thus Schopenhauer finds close affinity of liberation with the feeling of being one with the rest of the universe such that one who has denied his will-to-live necessarily feels one with the world. This is the highest point of salvation according to him.

Vedānta, especially Advaita Vedānta, is well known for the emphasis on the identity of the Ātman in all beings. According to this view, all beings in the world are essentially the Ātman or the Brahman. This is implicit in the Upaniṣadic statement: Tat Tvam
Asi. This view emphasizes that all beings are essentially one. It is a cardinal belief of the Vedántins that Brahma\textit{n} is the source of all reality including the human beings. Hence it is a matter of ignorance if any one sees differences at all. All differences are due to \textit{Māyā} which envelops our intelligence and does not allow us to see the oneness of all reality.\footnote{45} Schopenhauer accepts this oneness in the whole world including the human beings and thus derives his ethics of compassion from this metaphysical oneness of all reality.

Schopenhauer, like the Vedántin, is aware of the fact that the oneness of all reality cannot be expressed in the language because it is something that cannot be captured in ordinary categories. Schopenhauer therefore accepts that there are limits of our language and thought which cannot be crossed if we have to retain the intelligibility of what we express. He resorts to the idea that there is an element of the mystical\footnote{46} which stands for all that we cannot express in negative terms. He writes:

\begin{quote}
... knowledge is serviceable to the aims of the will, and in this way reflects the will in its affirmation, whereas true salvation lies in the denial of the will, we see all religions in their highest point end in mysticism and mysteries, that is to say, in darkness and veiled obscurity. These really indicate merely a blank spot for knowledge, the point where all knowledge necessarily ceases. Hence, for thought this can be expressed only by negations ... in \textit{Brāhmanism} even by the required suspension of all thought and perception for the purpose of entering into the deepest communion with one’s self, by mentally uttering the mysterious Om.\footnote{47}
\end{quote}

Thus, mysticism gets a foothold in the philosophy of oneness which is common to Schopenhauer and the Vedántins. This is by virtue of the fact that our language and thought are incapable of expressing that which is higher and transcendent. One is thus forced to recognize that scientific knowledge of the phenomenal world is all too limited to express that which is beyond the phenomenal world.

\section*{The Mystical and the Beyond: Schopenhauer’s Ultimate Vision}

Now the question arises: Does Schopenhauer believe like the Vedántins that there is a higher life beyond the worldly one? It is the
case that he considers the worldly existence as nothing of sort of evil, and therefore he is ready to sacrifice it for the sake of a higher life free from evil and unhappiness. Schopenhauer, in spite of his initial pessimism about human life, accepts the fact that there exists a better life in not pursuing the life of desires springing from the will-to-live. He, of course, does not speculate over whether there is a realm of existence in which man can attain unalloyed happiness. But he agrees with any true Vedāntin that liberation of man does not lie beyond the world but in this very world when he attains freedom from desires and the necessary peace of mind. Liberation is the release of the mind from the worldly attachments and so it has nothing to do with the admission or otherwise of a world of happiness beyond this world of sorrow and suffering. Patrick Gardiner expresses the Schopenhaurian position on the state of liberation in the following words:

Thus we can certainly refer to the utterly different attitudes towards everyday life and experience characteristic of the man in whom the will has turned; the change in the viewpoint from which he regards the world, so that things which to most of us present themselves as motives for action or 'interests' appear to him to be matters of no consequence. One can speak, too, of the altered vision that allows him to see in death, not an event to be feared, but rather something to be welcomed as breaking the 'last slight bond' that holds him to the world and to the individuality which he recognizes as being no more than the phenomenal expression of the will he rejects.48

This throws light on the changes which have taken place in the person who has rejected the phenomenal expression of the will resulting in bondage to the world and to his own ego. This amounts to liberation from bondage which the Vedantins have emphasized in their conception of Mokṣa.

It is not the essence of Vedānta to postulate an ontological realm of Ātman beyond the human reach. It is never the intention of the Vedāntin to search for moksa or release only in death. Were it so, then Vedānta would have long ceased to be a philosophy of life and would have closed the possibility of higher ethical and spiritual life. Therefore it is justified if Schopenhauer has interpreted Vedānta as a
way to higher moral and contemplative life without the attachments and desires issuing from the will. Besides, he is right in taking Vedānta as emphasizing the unity of all life and of all existence in one single Reality, the thing-in-itself. In this unity lies the ethical virtues of compassion and love which are the fundamentals of the ethics of Vedānta and Buddhism. This is also the source of moral life, according to Schopenhauer.

It will be too presumptuous to believe that Schopenhauer shaped his metaphysical doctrine on the basis of the teachings of Upanisads. But it cannot be denied that he derived inspiration from the Upaniṣadic metaphysics in working out his metaphysics of the will and the ethics of compassion based on the unity of life in the universe. He admits the world as phenomenal, i.e., as some sort of Māyā. The ultimate reality is one, though it is will for him, in contrast to the Vedantic idea of the Brahman. Nevertheless, the will is the sole creative force underlying the universe resembling the Brahman. The only difference is that the will is not of the nature of consciousness. It is a blind force. But the fact of the matter is that the will is a universal and eternal principle very much like the Vedantic Brahman.

Schopenhauer goes to the extent of saying that the will as the timeless reality is one without a second and that it objectifies itself in the multiplicity of the world. Even the individual man and his intellect are manifestations of the will. In this sense, the will cannot be a material principle at all; it is a principle that gives rise to consciousness, intellect and reason. Therefore will must be closer to the Spirit or Ātman in Vedānta. Otherwise, how can an unconscious and blind principle give rise to the conscious phenomena? Schopenhauer leaves it open as to whether we can know all the attributes of the will by our intellect which is just an instrument of the will. Therefore we have no reason to withdraw from the will the attribute of being more than a blind principle. In that sense we can say that the will has more affinity with the Vedantic Ātman than we have realized so far.

The salvation through the denial of the will is nothing more than realizing the will in its universal and timeless form and not in its narrow confinement to the individual will-to-live. This individual will has to be negated to attain moksa or liberation, but not the universal will. The universal will cannot be denied in any case because that is the primal reality. Only the individual will has to be
turned around to make it possible to bring an end to suffering which is caused by the individual will. Schopenhauer does not rule out the possibility of a higher life by virtue of identifying oneself with the universal will. No moral and spiritual life is possible without this identification.

To conclude: there is close similarity or family resemblance between Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of will and human existence and that of the Vedanta as reflected in the teachings of the Upaniṣads which Schopenhauer regarded as containing the supreme wisdom.

Notes and References

1. Vedānta is the system of philosophy contained in the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā and the Brahmasūtras. In this wider sense, the concept of Vedānta is used in this paper.
2. Advaita Vedānta is a system within the school of Vedānta advocating monistic metaphysics propounded chiefly by Ādi Śaṅkarāchārya, though there are many sub-systems within Advaita Vedānta itself.
4. Ibid., p. 201.
5. Ibid., p. 16.
8. Cf. Ibid., Chapter XLVI.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 573.
11. Ibid., p. 579.
12. Ibid., p. 481.
13. Ibid., p. 484.
15. Cf. Ibid., Chapter XLI.
16. Cf. Ibid., Chapter XLVI.
17. Ibid.
19. Ibid.


24. Ibid., p. 581.

25. Ibid., p. 5.


28. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

29. Ibid., p. 15.

30. Ibid., p. 15.

31. Ibid., p. 468.

32. Ibid., p. 473.

33. Ibid., p. 474.

34. Ibid., p. 474.

35. Ibid., p. 628.

36. Ibid., p. 615.

37. Ibid., p. 574.

38. Ibid., p. 573.


41. Ibid., p. 610.


44. Chhāṇḍogyaopaniṣad, VI. 8-16.

45. Isha Upaniṣad, 5-8; Kena Upaniṣad, 2.5.


Schopenhauer's Concept of Will and the Veil of Māyā

Indu Sarin

The present paper analyzes Schopenhauer's concept of will. A comparison is drawn between Schopenhauer's concept of will shaping the illusory phenomenal world and the Advaitic concept of māyā. The quest for timeless reality as against the illusory phenomenal world brings Schopenhauer close to Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara. Both are critical of vyāvahāric attitude towards the world that brings attachment to it resulting in suffering. Enlightenment for both of them is attained through detachment from the world, dissolution of ego and non-duality. They hold that masks of all kinds of unreality be thrown off completely. The collapse of such world making is the realization of reality. Luminosity shines by itself unmediated. However, they follow different paths to encounter reality.

Will connotes urge or desire, it is a "primeval incessant impulse, an endless striving" in the words of Schopenhauer. It is the ultimate, uncaused, irreducible principle of being. It is the source of all phenomena, cause of all human actions but itself is uncaused. It is "thing-in-itself". It is absolutely free and entirely self-determining. Schopenhauer says,

Apart from the fact that the will as the true thing-in-itself is actually original and independent, and that feeling of its originality and absoluteness must accompany its acts in self-consciousness ...

Schopenhauer shows the primacy of will over knowledge. The will can neither be explained through intellect nor the latter can control the former. The individual does not will what he knows but rather he knows what he wills. The subject cannot become an idea or an object. It knows itself never as knowing but as willing. The intellect
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follows the “secret purpose of an underlying will”. Intellect can alter the direction of the will but not will-itself. Schopenhauer states,

The intellect knows the conclusions of the will only a posteriori and empirically; therefore when a choice is presented, it has no data as to how the will is to decide.²

Schopenhauer continues,

The intellect can do nothing more than bring out clearly and fully the nature of the motives; it cannot determine the will itself; for the will is quite inaccessible to it ... and cannot be investigated ... Will is the first and original; knowledge is merely added to it as an instrument belonging to the phenomenon of will. Therefore every man is what he is through his will, and his character is original, for willing is the basis of his nature.³

The will as thing-in-itself cannot be known through the principle of sufficient reason. It does not depend upon intellect for its existence, it is prior to any rational enterprise. It does not have any antecedent therefore it is not a consequent. It cannot be grasped through an idea. It is not in space and time. It is one not like an individual or a concept but is the experience of unity that cannot be divided in multiplicity. Schopenhauer states,

... the will, since it is not a phenomenon, is not the idea or object, but thing-in-itself, and is not subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason, the form of all object, thus is not determined as a consequent through any reason, knows no necessity, i.e., is free.⁴

The metaphysical will [thing-in-itself] manifest itself in the phenomenal will as will-to-live, which turns into a struggle for existence. The latter is present in all living beings but man in distinction to other beings is characterized in terms of self-consciousness. The world is the mirror of the will. The phenomenal will has psychological connotation i.e., it involves the psychic involvement of the individual. It is the source of ego [individuality] as well the world.

The individuality is formed through the illusion of egocentricity. The individual does not see the world as it is but only through the eyes of the phenomenal will. The things, which affect the
individual's desires favorably, are perceived with greater intensity. The things, which affects the individual minutely are either overlooked or given very little importance. The result is that we do not see the world as it really is but only as it appears to us. This is the illusory concept of the world.

The world is governed by necessity and law of the sufficient reason. All the parts in space and time stand in a relation. In space, every position is determined with reference to the other position. In time, each subsequent moment is conditioned by the preceding moment. Thus each part in space and time is determined and conditioned by another and the law that determines one another is called as the law of sufficient reason. The law of sufficient reason can only explore the phenomenon but cannot penetrate into the inner nature of things. Since the individual is a part of the world, he is also determined by the motives, which result in causal actions. Schopenhauer argues.

The phenomenon ... we recognize as absolutely subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason in its four forms. And since we know that necessity is throughout identical with following from given grounds, and that these are convertible conceptions, all that belong to the phenomena, i.e., all that is object for the knowing subject as individual, is in one aspect reason, and in another aspect consequent; and in this last capacity is determined with absolute necessity, and can, therefore, in no respect be other than it is.

The whole content of nature according to Schopenhauer is governed by necessity because of the principle of sufficient reason. It is the objectivity of will and is in the chain of causation. Man like other things of the nature, is objectivity of the will and is governed by the principle of sufficient reason. Schopenhauer maintains,

... the whole nature of man is will, and he himself only a phenomenon of this will, and that such a phenomenon has, even after the subject itself, the principle of sufficient reason as its necessary form, which here appears as the law of motivation ...

There is a necessary connection between the individual's motives and actions. They reveal man's empirical being. In distinction to
other beings, man enlightens himself with knowledge and understands his nature and the world in terms of ideas while mirroring himself in the world.\(^8\) But to know the world through idea is not knowing the reality. The reality cannot be known through theoretical reason, which conceives the world as idea.

The phenomenal will governed by the principle of sufficient reason, expresses itself as the *principium individuationis*. The causal chain produces immense misery to the individual. The fulfillment of one desire leads to another and thus there is a chain of desires. The individual relates himself to others in accordance with his own desires. The dichotomy between the other and myself is created. In order to serve one's own ends, the individual can exploit the other to any extent. This creates duality and multiplicity and the result is suffering. The ordinary consciousness of man suffers and remains in bondage.

In contrast to the ordinary consciousness, there is better consciousness that sees the illusion as illusion making a difference between appearance and reality. This is the state of dissolution of ego. The illusion is not ontic. When the ego disappears, illusion also disappears and vice versa i.e., when illusion disappears, ego also disappears. This can occur only through denial of the will-to-live. The denial is possible only through will — the turning of the will is through will only. Schopenhauer says,

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\text{... the will relates it to itself, a suppression and self-denial of the will in its most perfect manifestation is possible. So that the freedom which otherwise, as belonging to the thing — in-itself, can never show itself in the phenomenon, in such a case does also appear in it, and, by abolishing the nature which lies at the foundation of the phenomenon, while the latter itself still continues to exist in time, it brings about a contradiction of the phenomenon with itself, and in this way exhibits the phenomena of holiness and self-renunciation ... how man is distinguished from all other phenomena of will by the fact that freedom, i.e., independence of the principle of sufficient reason, which only belongs to the will as thing-in-itself and contradicts the phenomenon ... man ... may certainly be called free, and thus distinguished from other beings.}\]

\(^9\)
The turning of the will through will cannot happen through intention or planning. It comes spontaneously. Too much suffering makes one to drop will-to-live. Schopenhauer maintains that suffering is the purifying process through which man is sanctified. It enables him to turn from the path of “error of the will-to-live”. How can one be free from the bondage of the desires, which put one in the chain? Schopenhauer suggests aesthetic attitude and path of morality.

The aesthetic attitude of psychical distance that rises above one’s own desires make the genius [artist] to penetrate into the real being of things. He completely identifies himself with what he creates. The artist is in a “state of resignation, true composure and will-less, blissful state of aesthetic contemplation”

The better consciousness dissolves its ego by following the path of morality also and leads saintly life. The moral values of love, sympathy and compassion make the individual to be one with the other. He rises above his selfish interests by encompassing the other within him. He does it with overwhelming compassion.

The artist [genius] and the moral man [ascetic] overcome the duality by renunciation of their ego, stepping aside the struggle for existence. The enlightenment does not come through rational procedures but is spontaneous and intuitive. For Schopenhauer, no moral theory or abstract knowledge can generate virtue, it springs from intuition. He holds,

... no genuine virtue can be produced through moral theory or abstract knowledge in general, but that such virtue must spring from that intuitive knowledge, which recognizes in the individuality of others the same nature as in our own. Schopenhauer adds, “Virtue ... can neither be reasoned away, nor arrived by reasoning ... because it is not abstract ... but must arise in each for himself”. Schopenhauer argues that both in aesthetic and moral perspectives, there is disappearance of the *principium individuationis*. He argues that vanishing of the *principium individuationis* and the removal of *māyā* is the same. Egoism creates duality – dichotomous relationships with others.
The disappearance of ego and illusion is the disappearance of duality and multiplicity—difference between the other and myself. It brings out justice and benevolence springing moral virtues. It is the appearance of will as the ultimate reality and sympathy as the ultimate ethical principal that lead to unity.

The will to deny the will-to-live resulting into dissolution of individuality may give an impression of cynicism and pessimism in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. He states that non-existence is better than the life full of suffering. This however should not be taken as negative attitude as it is interpreted by many thinkers. It is interesting to understand Schopenhauer in the light of Advaita Vedanta because what appears to be life-negating is in reality an acceptance of life in its fullness and not to mistake it only with the physical life.

Schopenhauer’s concept of individuation producing illusion, non-dualism, emphasis on intuition in contrast to rational knowledge brings him close to Advaita Vedanta of Śaṅkara. Both of them bring out the illusory concept of the world-making, calling it as veil of māyā. Māyā is a mistaken apprehension and a mistake can be potentially corrected. The individual at the phenomenal level is caught up in the veil but metaphysically, he has a possibility to uncover it and attain reality. Both Schopenhauer and Śaṅkara make a shift from the empirical to the metaphysical, through renunciation and asceticism. The glory of both lies in making everything luminous purging all the entanglements and getting away from the coils of time.

Both Schopenhauer and Śaṅkara believe that uncovering the veil is not through rational knowledge [vṛtti jñāna in the words of Śaṅkara] but through intuition i.e. the immediate apprehension of true nature of things [aparoksa jñāna in Śaṅkara’s words]. Any rational endeavor to know the world ends up in subject-object dichotomy. The dichotomy remains both at the psychic and rational levels. I as psychic ego distinguish myself from the other. At the rational level, the knower is also distinguishable from the known. Both Schopenhauer and Śaṅkara advocate oneness and unity. They are critical of duality and multiplicity. But they differ in their explanations of the nature of Reality and adopt different paths to realize it.

Schopenhauer comes close to Śaṅkara’s viewpoint that the universe comes into being through will. Śaṅkara arrives at the above standpoint by the following verse of Chhāndagyopaniṣad,
All these verily have will as their one resort, are identified with will and abide in will. Heaven and earth willed, air and akasa willed, water and fire willed.\textsuperscript{14}

Schopenhauer’s concept of phenomenal will strikes a similarity to Śaṅkara’s notion of \textit{jiva}. The latter is an agent and acquires merit and demerit, experiences pleasure and pain. It is governed by the false notions of the ‘I’ and ‘mine’, which arise when mind through senses comes into contact with the ideas.\textsuperscript{15} It [\textit{jiva}] is a subject-object complex. Its subjective aspect is pure consciousness and is called \textit{sāksina}. Its objective aspect consists of internal organ called as \textit{antahkarna} [composed of five material elements].

\textit{Jiva} absorbs itself in the world, carried away by the appearance and loses sight of the real self. It feels all the limitations of locality, temporality, history and is overwhelmed by ups and down, rise and fall and other infirmities of world creating immense agony and exhilaration, all of course within the cosmic ramifications of \textit{avidyā}.

The world of multiplicity and change for Śaṅkara is not real but it is not wholly unreal too. The wholly unreal object cannot be perceived. \textit{Māyā} is the material cause of the universe. The first evolute of \textit{māyā} is \textit{buddhi} [intellect], the second \textit{ahāṅkāra} [ego], the third \textit{manās} [mind] and so on, until the five gross elements of matter – ether, earth, water, fire, air in their different combinations constitute the objects of the material world.

The world is mere appearance and its perception is illusory. \textit{Avidyā} is the epistemological principle that vitiates perceptual experience. The appearance cannot be real because it gets cancelled [later]. It cannot be unreal, as it is perceived even though by mistake. This is \textit{māyā} [neither real nor unreal: \textit{sadasadvilaksana}].\textsuperscript{16} To call it both real and unreal is logically contradictory.

The concept of \textit{māyā} is to be understood both at the individual and cosmic levels. At the individual level, it is \textit{avidyā} and at the cosmic level, it is the power [\textit{śakti}] of \textit{Brahman}. In the latter’s case, \textit{māyā} appears as the qualified \textit{Brahman} [\textit{saguna} or \textit{apara Brahman}] or the Lord [\textit{Īśvara}] who is the creator, preserver and destroyer of this world, which is His appearance.

The universe of names and forms [\textit{nāma rūpa}] is superimposed by \textit{māyā} on \textit{Brahman} like a mirage on the desert. The mirage arises from the desert, rests on it, and when the truth is known, it disappears in the desert. Similarly the universe arises from \textit{Brahman}, rests on it and ultimately disappears in \textit{Brahman}. As the mirage is
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...ceived to be unreal when the truth regarding the desert is known. So also the universe of names and forms is perceived to be unreal when the truth regarding Brahman is known.

The Real according to Śaṅkara, is above the mutations of names and forms. Śaṅkara statement that “Brahman alone is real and the world is unreal” is to be grasped through the well known analogies of the Chhāndogypaṇiṣad – “clay alone is real and not the jar made of clay; or gold alone is real and not the ornaments made of gold”. Śaṅkara makes frequent references to the above analogies.

Like Schopenhauer, Śaṅkara upholds the world to be illusory, it is avidyā [ignorance] that takes to be real. The function of avidyā for Śaṅkara is two-fold:

2. Superimposition [vikṣepa] – imposition of something else in place of the actual thing, it is mistaken ascription of one thing for another.

Avidyā conceals the truth and projects names and forms [vikṣepa]. The mistaken perception of reality is illustrated with the example of superimposition of snake on the rope. The qualities of snake are wrongly attributed to the rope. Thus perceiving it for a snake veils the reality of rope. Avidyā thus veils the reality and creates the world of appearance. It brings the world of names and forms.

The appearance is not just unreality, it is unreality presented as reality. So long avidyā is there, it is real, when avidyā disappears, it is realised as unreal. Since the object is negated, it cannot be real. But it cannot be unreal because it was perceived to be real though by mistake.

The illusion is to be contrasted with hallucination. In case of illusion, the object is there but it is mistaken to be real. In case of hallucination on the other hand, there is no object. Though the real object is not present in the illusory perception yet it is a perception. Though snake is not actually there yet it is a perception. The object is there as long as illusion lasts. The illusory perception is also to be distinguished from the veridical perception. In the veridical perception, the object perceived is actually present there – one perceives rope as rope. In the above perception, the finite object has an idea, which is a modification of ego or mind. It is evolute of māyā caused by an empirically real object.

The idea of the snake is not the idea of antahkarna through which the empirically real object is perceived. It is the modification of
avidyā. The empirical subject thus has two epistemologically different types of ideas – the modifications of mind and modifications of avidyā. Avidyā conceals the real object and projects the unreal object, thus producing illusory perception.

The veridical perception of the external objects as mentioned above, is represented through ideas. The mind catches the image of the external object and intellect [buddhi] judges it. This is how the finite subject gets an idea of the external object. Thus the empirical object is known through the interpretation by the intellect. There can be a gap between what the object really is and how it is interpreted. Therefore the empirical knowledge may not capture the reality of the external object. The object appears to be situated out-there but in fact, it is mind-dependent. It is a construction or idea of the mind. In this sense, every perception is illusory. But how this idea to be known? This idea is known by other ideas that will lead to infinite regress.

The inner depth of one’s being cannot be known through the ideas. It is to be visualized through direct knowledge [vidyā], which is witnessing [sāksīna]. Vidyā cancels avidyā, it negates representational knowledge and discloses the Reality. The illusory perception of both the internal [ego, individuality, intellect] and external [world] vanish in the same way as the illusory snake vanishes when one knows it to be a rope, giving way to real self-illuminous Ātman.

Epistemologically, there is no qualitative difference between illusory and veridical perceptions. According to Śaṅkara, all perceptions are illusory because the world known through perception is not real, as snake is in the illusory perception.

The difference between veridical perception and illusory perception can be made in case of the particular objects of the world, which can be tested and corrected. But the perception of the world as a whole does not allow us to do the same. We have no ground to test the perception of the world itself. Therefore we do not have any independent ground to decide whether our perception of the world as a whole is veridical or illusory. The perception may or may not be true. Since there is doubt, one cannot claim to know the reality. Therefore the perception of the world is illusory.

For Śaṅkara, the reality of Ātman is veiled by jiva through the superimposition of the attributes of the latter on the former. The individual identifies himself with his psychophysical being and takes
it to be real. He completely involves himself in the phenomenal world of multiplicity and overlooks the Ultimate Spirit behind the universe i.e., Brahman. The result is that the false ego is created that is the source of the dichotomy between other and myself. The world of duality, plurality and antinomy come into being.

The association with caste, community, role, place etc. forms the part of egocentricity. Jiva identifies itself with the above ascription. It relates itself to the world in one way or the other. It distinguishes itself from others, thus duality is created through egocentricity. It is caught up with the hustle and bustle of everyday living, which lead to suffering.

The picture of the world is created by ego, it does not have ontic status. If ego disappears, picture also disappears. It is avidyā that generates ego. The Absolute Reality is Brahman, which is concealed through avidyā.

Śaṅkara underlines the following levels and types of the objects of unreality of everyday experience:

1. Jāgrat [waking] is the veridical perceptual world of knowledge and action. It refers to one’s everyday world-making awareness comprising of desires, needs, aspirations, and relations with things and persons.

2. Swapna [dream] – the dormant state of consciousness wherein one witnesses and enjoys imaginatively its unfulfilled desires of the awakened stage. It is disturbed state of consciousness.

3. Susupati [deep sleep] denotes state of consciousness where there are no ripples or disturbances of desires, thoughts or images. Analogically it is described as a calm lake in which there are no waves. It is subject to return to jāgrat. It involves momentarily withdrawal from the theatre of nāma-rūpa and principles of their individuation – desh [space], kāl [time], nimitta [causality].

In perception, when a sense organ comes into contact with an object, it assumes the form [vritti] of that object. This vritti inspired by the sāksīna takes the form of empirical knowledge. In waking state, the internal organ is aided by the senses. In dream, it functions by itself. In deep sleep, it is lost in its cause avidyā. But in this state too the individuality persists because the sāksīna is associated with avidyā. In liberation, avidyā is destroyed by jñāna and sāksīna is realized as the Brahman. This is Pārmārthic state of consciousness.
Turiya [Pārmārthic state of consciousness] is marked by transcendental self-awareness. It views the above three stages as unreal. In this metaphysical stance, the masks of all kinds of reality are thrown off completely and luminosity shines by itself unmediated. The collapse of such world-making process is the realization of Ātman where no return to the world makes sense. Ātman is unaffected by the different grades of unreality of everyday experience of particularity, multiplicity and transience.

Like Schopenhauer, Śaṅkara's approach is non-dualistic. The Pārmārthic level dissolves all the vyavāhāric levels and the question of their contrast or connection come only from our misunderstanding. When one is under the influence of avidyā, one is incapable of being sensitive to the luminosity and once it shines forth, the cosmic influence with its products vanish. For Schopenhauer also, disappearance of the phenomenal will is the realization of will as thing-in-itself.

It appears that Schopenhauer's explanation of metaphysical will beyond space, time and causality comes close to Śaṅkara's concept of Ātman. Ātman for Śaṅkara is self-luminous, which is timeless and ever quiescent. There is impossibility of giving any attribute to it. It does not have any past, present and future. It was never in bondage or can ever get in bondage, therefore there is no occasion for its striving for liberation.

Śaṅkara's concept of Ātman and Schopenhauer's concept of metaphysical will may appear to be similar but they are different too. Ātman as substantial self is identical with Brahman. Schopenhauer's concept of will as thing-in-itself does not have such metaphysical presuppositions. So the question of its union with any other Ultimate Reality does not arise.

Śaṅkara asserts that the veil of māyā is to be removed through knowledge – realizing the true nature of Ātman and its union with Brahman. It is attained through detachment, contemplation and samādhi. Moreover the unity with the whole universe is fully realized. There is neither a subject nor an object of experience, it is pure consciousness without subject-object duality. Pure consciousness is disembodied and indistinguishable. It is the spiritual union that makes no room for difference of any kind.

Like Śaṅkara, Schopenhauer also advocates non-dualism. Schopenhauer argues that unity be realized through aesthetic contemplation of the artist and by following the moral path of love,
sympathy and compassion. But the complete unity cannot be realized through aesthetic contemplation and moral values.

No doubt the artist identifies himself with his artifact but there is a difference between the being of the artist and his creations. Similarly love, sympathy and compassion unite human beings by turning I-It [instrumental] relationship into I-Thou [intrinsic] relationship. However, the identity of one’s being can be differentiated from the other. Although the relationship is not dichotomous or antagonistic and there is a feeling of belongingness with the other yet it is not a complete fusion. This belongingness is not exactly the same as Śaṅkara’s metaphysical union.

The non-dualism is not fully dissolved through the path provided by Schopenhauer. No doubt he speaks of the renunciation of the phenomenal will but this renunciation is through will only. The other-orientedness is implicit in the very idea of will. Schopenhauer has not explicitly highlighted the above point. The will or desire to see the world [though in its purity] may not be dismissed completely. The complete dismissal perhaps is not possible through following the aesthetic and moral paths.

No doubt Schopenhauer condemns the illusory world but he is not rejecting the world of authentic relationships. What needed is change in the attitude of looking at human relationships. Human actions become fruitful through significant human interactions.

Śaṅkara’s union of Ātman with Brahman is ultimate and there is no return from this position. The state of pure consciousness is attained through knowledge without any tinge of will or desire in it. It is fully self-directed and shines by its own light. The duality between subject and object therefore is fully overcome through Śaṅkara’s path of spiritual union. The world in all its forms [real or unreal] loses its significance. Moreover for Śaṅkara, the reality can be realized by taking sanyās i.e. withdrawing oneself from the world.

There is another difference between Schopenhauer and Śaṅkara. The former speaks only of the present life, the death is the end of man. For Śaṅkara on the other hand, the death of jīva in the present life is not an end. The latter undergoes the cycle of birth and death till he attains mokṣa. The veil of māyā is not confined only to the present life, it extends to various pasts and future lives. It is not located in the psychophysical being of the present only.
One can say in the end that Schopenhauer's position can be explicitly understood by Śaṅkara's theory of non-dualism. Śaṅkara's aim of achieving non-dualism can be realized in a more fulfilling way by Schopenhauer. The latter shows the path of putting into praxis non-duality through moral human encounters based on love, sympathy and compassion. Though the moral values are realized in time yet they are eternal.

References

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 233-34.
4. Ibid., p. 228.
7. Ibid., p. 231.
8. Ibid., p. 229.
12. Ibid., p. 302.
16. Ibid., 1.1.1.
The problem of will and intellect relationship plays a very important role in Schopenhauer's philosophy of will. The problem in essence is the primacy of the will over the intellect. Schopenhauer had put in a lot of efforts to establish the primacy of the 'will' over the 'intellect' but was not successful in establishing a unique relationship of the kind.

This paper will try to examine the 'will-intellect relationship problem' in Schopenhauer's philosophy and try to argue that a possible solution might be sought through Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta.

Obviously, a question might arise as to why do we choose Śaṅkara? The answer lies in the fact that the Indian ethics is to a large extent the derivatives of the Vedāntic views. Moreover, we observe that in recent years academic professionals in different disciplines like Social Sciences and Philosophy & Religious studies have shown increasing concern to examine the influence of Indian culture including Philosophy and Literature in the philosophical thinking of Germany particularly in relation to Arthur Schopenhauer. And indeed there are very good reasons for this.

First of all, the contribution of German thinkers such as Max Müller and Paul Deussen in popularizing Indian philosophy and culture in the orient is now been well recognized. But it is still a mystery that the person who had been the first to be so deeply influenced by the tenets of Indian philosophy as reflected in Buddhism and Vedas, Vedānta and Upaniṣads are still not well
appreciated in India. It is claimed that the moral tenor of his philosophy is in fact a mirror image of certain moral, social views in Indian philosophical culture. Interestingly, and also ironically this discovery and its many faceted elaboration is flourishing only in the West while Indian scholars seem to be still not much aware of it. He is none other than Arthur Schopenhauer, a nineteenth century German thinker and a prolific writer whose influence is to be found immensely in the life of the famous writers like Thomas Mann, Leo Tolstoy, Ivan Turgenev, Emil Zola, Guy de Maupassant, Marcel Proust, Thomas Hardy, Joseph Conrad on the one hand and on the other on the great thinkers of 21st century such as Wittgenstein, Freud, Nietzsche and many others. Arthur Schopenhauer was the first major Western thinker who was so much influenced by the Upaniṣads that he wrote “With the exception of the original text, it is the most profitable and sublime reading that is possible in the world; it has been the consolation of my life and will be that of my death”.¹

This view of Schopenhauer about the Upaniṣads not only shows his familiarity with the Eastern thought but also it reflects his adoration for Indian philosophy, religion and culture, which influenced him in a significant way. Thus, in the World As Will and Representation Schopenhauer clearly states that the readers can understand his writings better with prior acquaintances with the philosophy of – Plato, Kant and that of Hindus.² Unfortunately not much work has been done so far to find out the connection between Schopenhauer and Indian thought particularly in India.

Being so motivated I intend to examine in this paper the will-intellect relationship in Schopenhauer’s philosophy which plays a significant role in determining different aspects of his philosophy including the ethical issues and then to give a solution to the problem of this relationship from Indian philosophical point of view. It is important in the sense that the ethical issues or any other issues in Schopenhauer’s philosophy cannot be explained or understood without first comprehending the complicacy of this relationship that he uses in his argument to show that the will is the ultimate reality and the whole world of phenomena which he calls “world of representations” is only a manifestation of that reality. Like Buddha in Indian philosophy, Schopenhauer also accepted the fact that the world is the world of sufferings only. There is no escape from sufferings in this world. This is the reason why Schopenhauer is
more famous as a pessimist thinker rather than as any other metaphysical or ontological thinker in the West. However that does not mean that he has not put forward any epistemological or metaphysical or ethical theories in order to rescue the human beings from this world of sufferings. It is interesting to know that he has accepted the concept of *Nirvana* of Buddhism as the ultimate respite from the world of suffering. He has accepted the fact of compassion for all as the road to salvation. Nevertheless Schopenhauer’s ethical, epistemological and other discussions are debatable as the ultimate source of everything is accepted as a blind, restless and struggling ‘will’ which is full of strife and conflict and so is aimless. There is no reason given as to why the will has to be manifested in this world at all. The whole debate starts from the complicated relationship between the will and the intellect as given by him in his ‘philosophy of will’.

The problem of will-intellect relationship appears to be a fundamental question of philosophical inquiry since Scholasticism. To the Scholastics, this problem has basically been a part of their much broader question relating to ‘faith and reason’. Similarly, in the development of the post-scholastic philosophical thought it has received considerable importance in the writings of many philosophers. In the History of Philosophy we find different theories regarding the relationship between the will and the intellect. Perhaps many modern thinkers too are concerned with the problem of will-intellect relationship but it was during Arthur Schopenhauer’s time that it took a sensational turn in philosophy. It may be therefore interesting to examine the will-intellect relationship in Schopenhauer’s philosophy in the following perspectives: first, what is the nature of will-intellect relationship in his philosophy, and secondly, how to attain a solution to the problem of the will-intellect relationship in his philosophy as he has given different patterns of this relationship in his philosophy.

The logical system of Schopenhauer allows for only one particular and unique relationship between will and intellect and he was perfectly clear in his mind that any allowance for multiplicity of this relationship will break down his logical system. But as one goes through his writings one nevertheless cannot help confronting with different relationships at various stages in the development of his argument. While it is important to recognize that in Schopenhauer’s philosophy the relationship between will and intellect assumes a
very important role since it determines to a large measure his Epistemology, Metaphysics and Ethics, it is also true that Schopenhauer was not successful in portraying a single and unique relationship between the two.

We shall discuss the different patterns here: Firstly we will present the different patterns in Schopenhauer’s philosophy as discovered by Wayne Sheek and then we will examine the solution to this problem as given by him towards the end of the paper. In his process Wayne Sheek finds out ‘five patterns’ in the relationship between the will and the intellect in Schopenhauer’s philosophy and he believes that even some more ‘patterns’ could be discovered from careful observation. These five patterns are –

1. The intellect cannot know the will as the thing-in-itself by the usual method of acquiring knowledge.
2. The intellect can know the will as the thing-in-itself.
3. The intellect is a servant of the will.
4. The intellect can function free from service to the will.
5. The intellect can quiet and stifle the will.

We shall discuss these patterns at appropriate places along with different interpretations of this relationship as given by Schopenhauer in his argument.

Schopenhauer had encountered with the ‘will-intellect problem’ in its most specific and concrete form because it is such an inseparable element in his philosophy that his system would collapse without any reference to it. What is perhaps the purely Schopenhauerian about this problem is the very fact that it is the central focus of his philosophy that the will, and not the intellect, is the driving force of life.

A couple of simile is given by him to explain the relationship between the will and the intellect. The most significant relationship is the one where he calls the intellect to be a servant of the will (pattern no 3 of Wayne Sheek that “the intellect is a servant of the will”), which merely serves the end of self-preservation of the individual will. However, Schopenhauer could not maintain this ‘master servant’ relationship all throughout his argument. At times he seems to assume quite different patterns while at other time he tries to reinterpret his earlier views. Necessarily this may lead to various ambiguities in his philosophical standpoint. This forces us to think that perhaps Schopenhauer had something in his mind that
might have played a unifying role in view of the existence of apparently different patterns of the will-intellect relationship. Needless to say that one of the objectives of this paper is to find out whether there really exists such a unifying principle.

The most striking comparison in Schopenhauer's opinion regarding the relationship between the two will be that of "the strong blind man who carries on his shoulder the lame man who can see". To some extent this example definitely does justification to some of the points Schopenhauer wants to say about the relationship, about the fact that the will is blind and unconscious but having the efficacy whereas the intellect though knowing is unable to take action by itself.

But his own view seems to be contradicted when he further states that the intellect or the so-called servant can at times rule its master - the will (pattern no 5 of Wayne Sheeks that "the intellect can quiet and stifle the will"). Yet, one must admit that in establishing his faith on will over intellect Schopenhauer has given a highly sophisticated argument which has enlivened the whole will-intellect debate into a new ontological height.

As noted above, the will-intellect relationship plays a complicated role in the philosophy of Schopenhauer - firstly, because it is such a relation which is just opposite to an usually accepted relationship between the will and the intellect in other philosophers' systems (where intellect is accepted as superior to will); secondly, it determines his basic philosophical standpoint. So one of the main aims of this paper will be to examine how far Schopenhauer was successful in providing an unique relationship between the will and the intellect that is quite consistent with his philosophy.

Schopenhauer believed that the 'Will' is the thing-in-itself and the whole world is the objectification or manifestation of the same will. Any philosopher before him, as Schopenhauer himself thinks, never appreciated this point. Undoubtedly this was a drastic change in the prevailing mode of thinking dominated by the great rationalist tradition in German philosophy. So dominating was this tradition that the two great pillars of this tradition - Kant and Hegel - almost overshadowed Schopenhauer. During his own lifetime Schopenhauer was rated only as a minor post-Kantian philosopher. But yet one must recognize his courage and an overwhelming boldness in presenting his anti-intellectualism when the whole of European philosophy was under the spell of intellectualism.
etc. Hence, this strife is universal. Schopenhauer remarks: "[...] the will to live everywhere preys upon itself [...]". However, Schopenhauer's doctrine of the will, the same will objectifying in different grades in different degrees is quite confusing since there is no common denominator.

In order to explain the external universe and the world process as the objectification of the same will, Schopenhauer analysed first the human body as the highest and the clearest manifestation of the will. He assigns the privilege of knowing the will to the human beings alone (pattern no 2 of Wayne Sheeks that 'the intellect can know the will as the thing-in-itself'). It is possible for us to know the thing-in-itself because we are something more than mere subjects who can perceive this world of appearance. And that is the reason, which makes this transition from the world as representation to what it is a representation of possible. Nevertheless one cannot help but saying that this transition is an abrupt one and also it appears as if the transition is made possible by force only.

According to Schopenhauer, we being the knowing subject know everything in this world as representation; similarly we perceive our body also as representation. This is a special relation which means that the body is given to the knowing subject in two ways – firstly, it is given as an object among objects, hence given as representation; secondly, it is also given as that which is known directly, that is, as will (pattern no 2 of Wayne Sheeks, that "the intellect can know the will as the thing-in-itself"). The two are, according to Schopenhauer, one and the same thing, but are given in two different ways – that is immediately given as will and also given as representation in perception. For Schopenhauer, "the whole body is nothing but objectified will, i.e., will becomes idea". And this is the peculiarity that distinguishes us from other objects; since in other respects there is no difference. This happens only because we can have a double knowledge of our body, that is, we know our body as representation and we know also it as it is in itself, i.e., will.

Schopenhauer has given us an interesting teleological explanation of the human body so as to convince us that it is nothing but the objectified will. This teleological explanation needs a special emphasis with regard to the will-intellect relationship in Schopenhauer's philosophy. Because each and every part of the human body is taken as visible expression of our principal desires. He tries to show that the desire of hunger and sex are objectified in teeth, throat, bowels and the organs of generation.
Let us discuss the probable solution given by Wayne Sheeks here: (it is for the convenience of the readers that I am reproducing the patterns already mentioned above once more here).

The five patterns as given by him as mentioned earlier are given below –

1. The intellect cannot know the will as the thing-in-itself by the usual method of acquiring knowledge.
2. The intellect can know the will as the thing-in-itself.
3. The intellect is a servant of the will.
4. The intellect can function free from service to the will.
5. The intellect can quiet and stifle the will.

According to Wayne Sheeks, if we examine all these five patterns carefully we can see that ‘pattern 1’ and ‘pattern 2’ are not opposed to each other. Because a combination of both these patterns will mean that the intellect though cannot know the will as the thing-in-itself in the ordinary way of acquiring knowledge, yet it can know the thing-in-itself in an unusual manner. So, there is no inconsistency, according to Wayne Sheeks, amongst the ‘pattern 1’ and the ‘pattern 2’.

Then, the third pattern which maintains that the intellect is a servant of the will seems to be contradicted by the 4th and 5th patterns when it is said that the intellect, the servant can function free from service to the will and even that the intellect can quiet and stifle the will at times. Can the intellect being a servant function free from service to the will or is it true that the intellect can even deny the will at times? If it is true, then, does it allow the will to maintain the same position of being the ‘master’ to the intellect?

The explanations given by Wayne Sheeks to show that there is no logical inconsistency between the 3rd pattern on the one hand and the 4th and the 5th pattern on the other hand, is the humble acceptance of Schopenhauer’s own position regarding the feasibility of master-servant relationship between the will and the intellect in his philosophy.

Schopenhauer’s own position, however, is as follows – the intellect is given some degree of autonomy but is ultimately in the service of the will. The intellect also like everything else is a mere objectification of the will and therefore is subject to its dominance. Although like other organs objectifying our other needs, the brain is also objectifying our need of knowing, however its functioning may
be different from others. And yet the brain’s functioning also depends on the functioning of the organisms as a whole since the organism as a whole is the objectification of the will. Therefore, the intellect though empowered with some sort of autonomy in its function is ultimately dependent on the will. Thus still the intellect is servant to its master—the will.

But Hamlyn’s treatment of this problem is different. He calls it a ‘paradox’ to which there is no answer. According to him the very metaphor “the accident (intelect) mastering and abolishing the substance (will)’’ brings out the paradox that is really there. For him it is just impossible to see why the will has to make it possible for the intellect to master itself (will). It is really difficult to understand why the intellect is there and why the phenomena are there. But if we accept the fact that the will of Schopenhauer is blind and irrational and hence we cannot expect any ‘rationale’ explanation for its activities that does not help us to resolve the paradox.35

As it is obvious from the above, one has either to accept Schopenhauer’s own argument that the will is the ultimate reality and so is primary of which the intellect is a mere objectification and hence secondary. Also we have to accept his explanation why intellect can at times deny the will of which it is a mere objectification since the intellect is finally under the control of the will though having some degree of autonomy to function in its own way at times. And this is the kind of relationship between the will and the intellect as given by Schopenhauer in his philosophy or we take it as a paradox as said by Hamlyn.36

So we see that it is difficult to find a logically consistent and a single but unique relationship between the will and the intellect in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Hence we can try to find out a logical solution to this problem through Śaṅkara’s philosophy as we can find a rational and logical consistency in his philosophy and then perhaps we may try to apply the same logic in Schopenhauer’s philosophy and see if the paradox can be resolved.

Accordingly, if we consider Schopenhauer’s problem from the perspective of Indian philosophy then there is one possible way out to resolve the paradox. For this we consider the Advaita Vedānta system of Śaṅkara37 of Indian philosophy. To try to resolve the paradox from the standpoint of the Indian philosophy we need to consider Schopenhauer’s Transcendental Idealism, which is essentially Kantian. In Schopenhauer’s Transcendental Idealism, the
world is both will and representation. The whole phenomenal world including the intellect, according to Schopenhauer, is a manifestation of the same will, which is the *thing-in-itself*.

Schopenhauer’s Transcendental Idealism brings us close to the Transcendental Idealism of Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta. According to Śaṅkara, the *Brahman* is the ultimate reality, the Noumenon, Who is beyond this world of phenomena. This world is a mere appearance of *Brahman*. As long as we are ignorant about the ultimate Truth, the whole world of perception seems to be real for us. But when we realize the Truth that the Brahman is the ultimate reality and this world is *mitthyā* (false) or illusion and that we are non-different from the *Brahman*, then the world of phenomena cannot delude us any more.\(^{38}\) We understand the falsity of this phenomenal world and the fact that we are not different from the *Brahman*. So, one has to understand the magic\(^ {39}\) show of the creation of this world. The *Brahman* has created the world of phenomena through His magical power of *Māyā*.

Śaṅkara has explained the world of appearances from two standpoints:

1. the *vyāvahārika* or the empirical (practical) standpoint and 2. the *pāramārthika* or the transcendental (absolute) standpoint. While from the practical standpoint the phenomenal world is real, the same world becomes false from the transcendental standpoint. And this is how the phenomenal world which is otherwise so real, becomes explicable in Śaṅkara’s philosophy.

Applying the same logic in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, it may be possible to find a solution of the will-intellect paradox. Let us consider the will-intellect relationship in Schopenhauer’s philosophy from the same two standpoints. Thus, from the empirical standpoint, we see that the denial of the will by the intellect is possible because it takes place in a human organism, which is an objectification of the transcendental Will. So the intellect can always deny the will at the empirical level only. But when we consider the human being as a manifestation of the will, then it appears as if there is another transcendental Will beyond this phenomenal world and ‘that Will’ can never be denied. Because there is no distinction between will and intellect in that transcendental Will. So ‘That Will’ which is transcendental and real, can never be denied by this empirical intellect. ‘That-Will’ always remains undeniable. Thus, it is quite possible that Schopenhauer had a similar interpretation in his mind.
as that in Śaṅkara as he was the first Western philosopher who was so well versed with Indian Philosophy.  

Foot Notes

3. Hamlyn writes, "The all important question why it (will) objectifies itself in phenomena at all, let alone why it should ever get into the position of denying itself, receives, and can receive, no answer. Nor is it clear how Schopenhauer can speak, as he sometimes does, of the will being deceived by the intellect, its phenomenon, so as to turn, so to speak, against itself.”
6. One can put those patterns in a different way also.
   (a) The Intellect cannot know the will.
   (b) The Intellect can know the will.
   (c) The intellect is a servant of the will.
   (d) The intellect can function independently of the will.
   (e) The intellect can deny the will temporarily or permanently.
   (f) The intellect can quiet and stifle the will, etc. etc.
7. “... the intellect is a mere [...] fruit, a product, nay, so far, a parasite of the rest of the organism; for it does not directly enter into its inner constitution, but merely serves the end of self-preservation by regulating the relations of the external world”, WAI, Vol. II, p. 411; WAR, Vol. II, p. 201.
   Prof Kossler, however, emphasizes on the fact that unlike Nietzsche and other thinkers Schopenhauer had also focused on the ‘species’ and
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Also: Barua, A., *Schopenhauer*, p. 77.


It is such ideas of Schopenhauer that we see a direct relationship between his ideas on sexual instincts and Freud's concept of Libido.


22. "[...] the intellect is a mere [...] fruit, a product, nay, so far, a parasite of the rest of the organism; for it does not directly enter into its inner constitution, but merely serves the end of self-preservation by regulating the relations of the external world", *WAI*, vol. II, p. 411; *WAR*, vol. II, p. 201.

23. "... the brain controls the relations with the external world; this alone is its office, and in this way it discharges its debt to the organism that nourishes it, since the latter's existence is conditioned by the external relations". *WAI*, vol. II, p. 411, *WAR*, vol. II, p. 201.


According to Prof Kossler by immediate appearance Schopenhauer means "idea". Phenomena in this sense, are inadequate and not immediate. Body, even the brain also is phenomenon in this sense but intellect is not. Rather intellect falls under a third category so to say.


27. *Ibid*.

28. "Therefore here we find the will as the substance that persists, but the intellect conditioned by its organ, as the changing accident. It can be described as the regulator of the will". *WAI*, vol. II, p. 470; *WAR*, vol. II, p. 246.


Schopenhauer writes: "[...] In fact, the will constitutes the metaphysical substratum of the whole phenomenon, and thus is not, like the intellect, a posterius, but the prius, of the phenomenon; [...] the will, which appears as one of the last results in all previous systems, so different in other respects, is with me the very first". *Ibid*.


Steinhauer, H., however, calls this as an apparent paradox. He writes: "In everyday life the intellect is the slave of the will; but during artistic contemplation this state of affairs is reversal, and the intellect becomes master of the will. Translated into everyday language this means that in our daily life we see things as we want to see them, while the artist or the work of art shows things as they really are. Schopenhauer thus arrives at what is apparently a paradox: far from looking upon art as an illusion of life, he regards it as truer than life". In "A concrete interpretation of Schopenhauer's notion of the Will", in *The Monist*, No. 2, p. 167, 1929.
33. see the different patterns given by Wayne Sheeks.
34. Mandelbaum writes: ‘‘To understand Schopenhauer’s position regarding this point, it is necessary to note that he granted a degree of autonomy to the operations of the intellect: the brain, unlike the sexual organs, did not function under the direct and immediate needs of the organism as a whole [...]’’ (320). The relationship can be clarified if we [...] return to Schopenhauer’s biologically oriented doctrine of the objectifications of the Will in nature [...] The brain, [...] is to be regarded as the objectification of the intellect [...]; on the other hand, the organism as a whole is the objectification of the will. Thus, the brain may function in ways which are different from the ways in which other organs, objectifying other needs, will function, and we may attribute a degree of autonomy to it. However, the brain’s functioning obviously depends on the functioning of the organism as a whole, and in that sense the intellect, in the end, is utterly dependent upon the will which manifest itself as the organism’s will-to-live’’ (323).


35. Hamlyn, *Schopenhauer,* p. 169, In response to Hamlyn’s question ‘why the will has to make it possible for the intellect to master itself (will)’, (p. 169, *Schopenhauer*) John Atwell also puts the same question – “But why, one may ask, would the will allow one of its forms, namely, the intellect, to gain mastery over it?”


37. ‘‘Śaṅkara’s main problem was to reconcile the Upaniṣadic accounts of creation with the denial of plurality. The disappearance of all multiplicity on the realization of Brahman cannot be understood because the world, if it were real then how can it disappear? The knowledge of Reality can dispel only the unreal appearing as real, but not what is really real. This fact gives clue to Śaṅkara about the mystery of the world. If the world is appearance, like an object in dream or illusion, then the present appearance of the world and its disappearance on the knowledge of Reality become intelligible. This reconciliation is suggested by the Upaniṣads themselves. Even in the *Rigveda* (Rik 6.47.18) the one Indra (God) is said to appear in many forms through powers creating illusion (māyā). The Brhadāraṇyaka also accepts this (‘Indro māyābhīḥ puru rūpa iyate’ Vide Brhd. 2.5.19 and Śaṅkara thereon). The Śvetāsvatara clearly states that the origin (prakṛti) of the world lies in the magical power (māyā) of God (Māyam tu prakṛtim vidyat, māvinam tu Maheśvaram’ Vide Śvet., 4.10.)’’. Dutta, D. M. and Chatterjee, S. C., p. 369, *Indian Philosophy.*
Schopenhauer and Buddhism
Arthur Schopenhauer’s relation to Indian thinking is most times expressed as a parallel of the two ways of thinking, something which is accepted with certain satisfaction. In this regard there is seldomly any attempt – and even more seldomly any successful attempt – of occidental philosophy at looking at Schopenhauer’s way of thinking from the – as we may say – ‘Indian’ aspect, something which is probably due to insufficient knowledge of Indian philosophy. For the unskilled Westerner, there is a considerable risk of trapdoors, as how, for instance, should he philosophically deal with things like ‘intuitive’ or even ‘meditative’ cognition?

It is truism of course, though it is still astonishing, that generally speaking Arthur Schopenhauer, who was neither to India nor studied Indian first hand sources, in his reception hits some typical ideas of the ‘Buddhist’ way of thinking in a wider sense. Of course, more recent research on Buddhist philosophy demands massive corrections of Schopenhauer’s idea of Buddhism in some fields, but his merits, achieved by spreading a so called ‘Indian philosophy’ in the occident, are not the smaller. In the following, I would like to show how Schopenhauer takes hold of some Buddhism which he believes to sharply divide an exoteric message for the masses from esoteric doctrine for the chosen, as far as man’s life after death is concerned.

But before I will go deeper into this matter and explain how Schopenhauer still uses this, his basic misunderstanding of Buddhism, in a creative way, how in front of the background of the sometimes terribly wrong ideas of Buddhism in the Europe of his time he intuitively recognizes correct relations – thus anticipating 150 years of occidental reception of Buddhism, if unfortunately without lasting result – I would like to trace this occidental
misunderstanding by ways of history of philosophy. For we are
definitely allowed to presume one thing: this division was not
introduced by Siddhārtha Gautama Śākyamuni, the Buddha, as he
speaks these more than clear words:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{kim pan' ānanda bhikkusaṅgho mayi paccāsiṁsai!} \\
\text{desito ānanda māyā dhammo anantarāṁ abāhirāṁ karitā!} \end{align*}\]

Thus, the question now is: how came the supposed knowledge of
a division of Buddha’s doctrine into an exoteric and an esoteric part
to the modern occident and in what way was it understood before
Schopenhauer’s time?

Long before their interest in India, Europe and most of all
German thinkers were under the spell of China and her culture.
Accordingly, already Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) wrote:

\[\text{‘[...] wie man von dem Quietismus des Fo berichtet. [...]} \]
\[\text{als er sich dem Tode nahe fühlte, seinen Schülern} \]
\[\text{erklärte, er habe ihnen die Wahrheit unter dem Schleier} \]
\[\text{des Gleichnisses verborgen, und alles sei auf das Nichts} \]
\[\text{als das erste Prinzip aller Dinge zurückzuführen’}.\]

But how did Leibniz come to this statement of the buddhadharma
having been covered by a veil, as it was spoken out at this place and
in this way for the first time in modern Europe?

All what Europe was knowing in this time about Chinese philosophy
and culture, it knew from the Jesuits’ mission to Peking in the 17th and
18th centuries, whose success attracted great attention even among
Protestants. In 1689, Leibniz met the Jesuit father and member of
the mission to Peking, Claudio Filippo Grimaldi, in Rome and thus an
exchange of letters to Peking started via Paris which would last until
Leibniz’s death. Today we know that these letters were motivated by
the Jesuits in the sense of religious policy to work against certain plans
of the Curia in Rome. To this purpose, they were partly written and
manipulated in Paris by Jesuit fathers at the Maison de Professe.\(^3\)

And here we must recognize the origin of the division of the buddhadharma,
as 30 years before the pioneers of this mission to China, Matteo Ricci
(1552-1610) and Adam Schall von Bell (1592-1666), had not reported
anything about it.

But from where did the Jesuits get their knowledge of this
division of the buddhadharma? Unfortunately, today it is only
possible to speculate about this in front of the background of the following three aspects:

1. For 1000 years, from 129 BC to 845 AD, a lot of knowledge was brought from the East to the West by merchants via the Silk Road and with doing this it was really amalgamised. Accordingly, today we own funny fragments of texts from Dunhuang and Turpan, where Jesus finds his way to the *nirvāṇa* and the Buddha is crucified.

2. Although the *yogacāra*-philosophy of Buddhism was dominating in China, of course the *mādhyamika*, coming via Tibet, was also known. In his basic work *Lam-rim chen-mo*, Je Tson-kha-pa (1357-1419) didactically divides his explanation of the *buddhadharma* into those for ‘small, middle, and big beings’. Also, the *mādhyamika*-philosopher *Nāgārjuna* (2nd/3rd cent.) speaks of absolute and relative reality.

3. The *Mahāparinibbānasutta* (*Dīghanikāya* XVI), where this scene of the Buddha dying as described by Leibniz is written, was known in Europe as late as in the early 19th century. Before this, the occident knew only its ten times longer Chinese adaption from Sanskrit: the *Mahāparinivānasūtra*. The Chinese *tripitaka*, on the other hand, counts 13 *mahāyānasūtra*’s of the *nirvāṇa*-class, some of them closer to the *hinayāna*.

Due to the immense popularity of the *Mahāparinirvānasūtra*, the missionaries must have known it. Surprisingly, in chapter III we find something superficially new: *mahātman*. Never before there had been talking about any *ātman* or even *mahātman* which was of equal value to *nirvāṇa* and *tathāgata*. If we look only at this part, the idea of heresy or at least of a division of the *buddhadharma* seems plausible – concerning this matter, also Leibniz very cryptically speaks of an “*alle andern verschlingende Weltseele*”.

If the latter is true, the former two aspects may play some role – here there is a project for research.

But now, what did Arthur Schopenhauer know and adopt from the mission to Peking? Unfortunately, it was the common prejudices of his time, like: the ‘‘Jesuitischen Missionarien des 17. und 18.
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scholars of his time. This way, some Buddhism of western interpretation was formed very fast which again and again was changed and corrected whenever new fragments were included. At Schopenhauer’s time, Buddhology was only in its very first beginning, i.e., its statements are defined by the coincidences of the texts which were found and at hand, mostly coming from Nepal and Sri Lanka and in the best cases being interpreted incorrectly, but unfortunately completely wrong in most cases. In this early period, the texts of the hinayāna are almost inaccessible for Schopenhauer. By a translation from 1855 he learns about the Dhammapada. But his knowledge of Indian philosophy is too far from being sufficient for qualitatively dividing Brahmanism from Buddhism, just as also philosophical trends within Buddhism must stay completely unknown to him. Although in the last two decades of Schopenhauer’s life there are several results of research which should have made him correct part of his views on India, but self-confidently he does not accept anything differing from his own point of view, even if it comes from Schmidt himself.

Today we may presume that big parts of Schopenhauer’s general understanding of Buddhism are based on Schmidt’s handing over and the latter’s very special interpretation of the mahāyāna. Schmidt’s personal preference is the hinayāna but he also studies the mahāyāna, which later leads to several mistakes in terms of content when he was interpreting terms from the mahāyāna according to the hinayāna – Schopenhauer takes them up. Schmidt also loves it to define Buddhist terms in a philosophical way, something which Schopenhauer likes very much, only that they were hinayāna-versions for defining mahāyāna-terms. This is also true for the idea of ‘nirvāna’ contrasting ‘samsāra’ which is so important for him and which he likes to use for giving evidence of concordances of ideas of his thinking.

But let us go back to Schopenhauer and his doctrine of exoteric and esoteric Buddhism.

“Wenn mich ein Hochasiate früge, was Europa sei, so müβte ich ihm antworten: es ist der Weltheil, der gänzlich von dem unerhörten und unglaublichen Wahn besessen ist, daß die Geburt des Menschen sein absoluter Anfang und er aus dem Nichts hervorgegangen sei”.

12
In contrast to Gottlob Friedrich Majer, for Schopenhauer the division into exoteric and esoteric is a qualitative statement, as in his opinion ‘esoterisch’ is the same as ‘wahr’ and as for his division of the buddhadharma he refers to Reverend Robert Spence Hardy (1803-1868) – only that unfortunately this source does not offer this information in this way. Just the opposite, here Schopenhauer seems to combine Hardy’s understanding of upādāna/karman Majer’s explanation of metempsychosis/transmigration and esoteric/exoteric interpretation of Buddhism, as well as Schmidt’s melting together mahāyāna/hinayāna. This means that here in a modified way a philosophy of reincarnation gets to be the core of Schopenhauer’s anthropology and salvation philosophy although this has never been explained systematically.

Schopenhauer does not postulate transmigration of the soul, no metempsychosis. For him, soul is an “Alt-Weiber-Wort” and “Unding”, also the Buddha had expressed himself in a similarly resolute way when speaking of a “sabbo bāla dhammo”. After the being has fallen apart, i.e., the five skandhas (rupa-, vedanā-, saṃjñā-, saṃskāra-, vijñāna-), only karman stays, the ‘one will within all phenomena’, even the living ones. For Schopenhauer this is palingenesis, the empirical truth of reincarnation. Control of this karmic causality is based on ethic decisions. Here Schopenhauer sees the centre of Buddhist palingenesis, of re-creation. And this is why Buddhism cannot and does not want to speak of metempsychosis (transmigration of souls). Schopenhauer at once recognized this decisive difference. For him it is just the Prajñāpāramitā-texts, those texts “Jenseits aller Erkenntniss (Pradschna-Paramita)”, which express the conditions of the individual where that “one will” manifests. During Schopenhauer’s lifetime, the collection of texts of the Prajñāpāramitā are heavily under attack as their statements are contradictious. Next to the most popular statement from the Mahāprajñāpāramitāḥṛdayasūtra: “rupam śūnyā śūnyātaiva rūpam”, it is statements like: ‘nirvāṇa is saṃsāra and saṃsāra is nirvāṇa’ with which Schopenhauer agrees and which provokes him into wordings like for example: “der Tod [kann angesehen werden] als ein Erwachen” or “die Sätze: “Ich gehe unter, aber die Welt dauert fort” und “Die Welt geht unter, aber ich dauere fort”, sind im Grunde nicht eigentlich verschieden.”

According to Schopenhauer, Brahmanism only knows metempsychosis, the exoteric doctrine, Buddhism knows exoteric
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\[\text{...} \]

... doctrine as far as further existence after death is concerned but also and especially the “difficult to understand esoteric doctrine of palingenesis”. Following his own mind, Schopenhauer would surely have liked to keep silent about this as he would have liked to understand Buddhism to be completely esoteric, i.e. as representative of pure palingenesis, not teaching any soul or intellect but will. But despite all his efforts of interpretation the decisive specialised literature does again not support his favourite view and thus — against all odds — this one time he accepts the verdict.

“Der moralische Sinn der Metempsychose in allen indischen Religionen, ist nicht bloß, daß wir jedes Unrecht, welches wir verüben, in einer folgenden Wiedergeburt abzubüßen haben; sondern auch, daß wir jedes Unrecht, welches uns widerfährt, ansehn müssen als wohlverdient, durch unsere Missethaten in einem früheren Daseyn”.

And that “dem Menschen seine guten und schlechten Thaten aus einer Existenz in die andere, wie sein Schatten, nachfolgen [...]”.

Here again Schopenhauer intuitively hits the correct meaning when debating life before instead of after birth, also when he cheekily remarks that anyway everyone is already interested in life after death. Just as also Buddhism accepts both temporariness and retrospectiveness of causality and analyses the past only for understanding structural connections and for using them in future.

This seems to be trivial at first, but for an occidental philosophy, which is fixed towards some final end of undefined character, this is really revolutionary. And here Schopenhauer does even go one step further. Not only the dogma of metempsychosis came from a feeling that the past is not by definition different from the present but he takes temporariness and retrospectiveness, cause and effect as one, by speaking of a ‘shadow’ man cannot shake off. Karman is cause and effect of one action. The effect of any action must necessarily follow. Thus, it is not possible to speak of rewarding the good deed and punishing the bad deed, of credit and guilt as far as karman is concerned. Punishment needs a punisher and the latter is not known in Buddhism. The effect of each action is according to its cause: the cause is its own effect and thus it expresses the inadequacy of both action and acting person.

However, if applied to Schopenhauer’s thinking, my assessment of this approach is somewhat less euphoric, as deeds must be really
our own, i.e. will and deed must possibly be attributed to an individual, something which most probably can not be constructed for Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer’s idea “daß der Lebenslauf des Einzelnen, so verworren er auch scheinen mag, ein in sich übereinstimmendes, bestimmte Tendenzen und belehrenden [sic!] Sinn habendes Ganzes sei” is Buddhistically correct but the idea of the moral meaning of our life is incompatible with Schopenhauer’s deterministic thoughts. Thus, Buddhism speaks out decisively against any absolute determinism. Very well, karman determines the condition of one individual existence but the future is hit by acts of will, if free choice is restricted (attachment, hostility, and ignorance) are the opposite numbers to be mentioned here). Karman is a causal nexus which must be recognized and used in the right way, not a kind of slavery. Karman is not a metaphysical part of will, as Schopenhauer understands it. From such a freedom of the individual there necessarily deduces the lack of freedom, i.e., the non-existence of a universal will of Schopenhauer’s provenance. Already early Buddhist philosophers were of the opinion that accepting a binding law and at the same time accepting the existence of a universal will produced massive difficulties: thus, Nāgārjuna, as far as the mādhyamika is concerned, turns down such a thing as being absurd, as expected, the yogācāra-philosophers’ Sāramati (Kein houei, about 250) and Maitreyānātha (approx. 270-350) attitude is a bit more positive.

Such a will in Schopenhauer’s sense had a kind of memory in the widest sense, so that there was a memory of the past without brain, without intellect; a memory which primarily was not related to a remembering person. In the sense of such a memory Schopenhauer writes about reincarnation:

“[…] im Kreislauf der Geburten [beschränkt sich] das Wiedererkennen […] dabei freilich auf eine dunkle Ahndung, eine nicht zum deutlichen Bewuβtseyn zu bringende und auf eine unendliche Ferne hindeutende Erinnerung; – mit Ausnahme des Buddha selbst, der das Vorrecht hat, seine und der Anderen früheren Geburten deutlich zu erkennen; – […]”.

This is a Buddhist triviality and in so far as Schopenhauer refers to a kind of ‘meta-consciousness’ he is very close to yogācāra-philosophy. For according to the central idea of the
yogācāras, everything perceptible is 'only mind' (Skt.: cittamātrā) and things are nothing but perception. Objects outside of this perception do not possess any reality and are non-existent. In front of this background, the outside world is pure mind and just like there are no objects of perception, there is no subject of perception. Thus, perception becomes an act of creative imagination which is interpreted by help of a so called 'store or accumulator consciousness' (Skt.: ālayavijñāna). There, as the basis of everything perceptible and memory of all earlier impressions, 'seeds' (Skt.: bija) develop which create spiritual phenomena. Their interaction creates illusions and is interpreted from the outside as karman. Often, the ālayavijñāna itself is compared to a stream whose waters are renewed again and again and which after a being's death runs on and thus depicts continuity from existence to existence.

Thus, we could harmonize Schopenhauer's will with the ālayavijñāna and his idea of the intellect with the consciousness of the five skhanda. But for Schopenhauer himself such ideas are no great help, as here he seriously undermines his metaphysics of will. A doctrine of reincarnation working with a monism of will which is all but clear must turn out to be difficult or even contradictory in the following.

As a summary, I feel free to state the following on Schopenhauer's view at reincarnation:

1. the metempsychoysis of Brahmanism, or more exactly that of the Vedānta-schools, does not provide any division of man's spiritual-moral forces but an entity which wanders around within the circle of existence.
2. the palingenesis of Buddhism describes ethically directed spiritual karman-potentials in the sense of relations of cause and effect.
3. Schopenhauer's palingenesis is based on the one will which manifests itself in space and time - quasi wandering - and on an intellect which is dying in each case.

In the last paragraph I want to collect the few concrete and scattered statements on the course of palingenesis in Schopenhauer's works and confront them with a philosophical practice which was definitely unknown to Schopenhauer: the anuttarayogatantra. Whenever in the following I will speak of tantra I am talking only about this class of Buddhist systems.
Issac Jacob Schmidt does not refer to *tantra* in detail, and the early phase of receiving these class of texts in Europe did Schopenhauer firstly not see to happen, secondly it was based on purposeful misunderstanding to such a degree that – thirdly – Schopenhauer’s sources would have completely torn them to pieces for being dubious if they had known them. But still, Schopenhauer’s fragmentary explanation of death and palingenesis comes close to this way of thinking in a surprisingly detailed way, if as so often in his works with the superior self-confidence of an artistic genius.

Starting out from the experience of fear of death, Schopenhauer in his script *Ueber den Tod und sein Verhältnis zur Unzerstörbarkeit unseres Wesens ans sich*\(^{30}\) starts powerful polemics against the idea of individual immortality as expressed in metempsychosis and favours a palingenesis in the sense of unchangeable existence within a consciousness-transcendent original will. As far as Schopenhauer debates the question of death in front of the background of a moral world order, he refers to the doctrine of reincarnation in each case:

"Solange keine Verneinung jenes Willens eingetreten, ist was der Tod von uns übrig läßt der Keim und Kern eines ganz andern Daseyns, in welchem ein neues Individuum sich wiederfindet, so frisch und ursprünglich, daß es über sich selbst verwundert brütet".\(^{31}\) "[...] nun also stirbt nichts von Allem, was da stirbt, für immer; aber auch Keines, das geboren wird, empfängt ein von Grund aus neues Daseyn. Das Sterbende geht unter: aber ein Keim bleibt übrig, aus welchem ein neues Wesen hervorgeht, welches jetzt ins Daseyn tritt, ohne zu wissen woher es kommt und weshalb es gerade ein solches ist, wie es ist. Dies ist das Mysterium der Palingenesie, [...] Danach leuchtet uns ein, daß alle in diesem Augenblicke lebenden Wesen den eigentlichen Kern aller künftig leben werdenden enthalten, diese also gewissermaßen schon jetzt da sind".\(^{32}\) "Und doch kann unmöglich ein physischer Kausalnexus seyn zwischen meinem früheren Tode und der Fruchtbarkeit eines fremden Ehebettes, oder umgekehrt".\(^{33}\)

Unfortunately, Schopenhauer does not tell us the answer to this "seed and core" beyond subject and object. But it seems logical to
think of a causality of some kind, of cause and effect; just in the sense of Schopenhauer’s statement that “dem Menschen seine guten und schlechten Thaten aus einer Existenz in die andere, wie sein Schatten, nachfolgen”.

Is this a figure of speech and thus a coincidental expression by Schopenhauer or is it more? For in Buddhism and there especially for the process of dying, the “shadow of a body” (Skt.: aṅgachāyā, Tib.: su lus grib ma) is a specialized term:

śī ba ’i rjes su lau daṅ grib ma bzin dkar nag las 'bras phyi bzin ’brañ ba la.

From the esoteric doctrine of Buddhism Schopenhauer learns about decomposition and re-formation of the individual, where the will stays and, by taking on the form of a new being, grows to be a new intellect. By defending his doctrine that our nature is not consciousness respectively intellect but perceptionless will, Schopenhauer shouldered a heavy burden. One gets the impression that now and then he tries to get rid of it, when he says that in the end it was the same if I existed only for the time of my life or for eternity and that also there was no difference between one conscious existence and infinitely many ones. But he insists: “[...] und man eben so leicht eine Verdauung ohne Magen glauben kann, wie ein erkennendes Bewußtsein ohne Gehirn”.

For Schopenhauer, consciousness and individuality cannot be immortal; but on the other hand the forces within cannot change to nothing after death. Schopenhauer never understood consciousness to be a cause but always to be product and individuality, a feature of organic life; and now they say “weil hier das organische Leben aufgehört hat, deshalb auch jene dasselbe bisher aktuierende Kraft zu Nichts geworden sein [...]” – No! And once again Schopenhauer does this one decisive step further and includes this division of will and intellect also into genetics. Thus, in the genetic sense the female principle stands for intelligence and the male principle for will. And almost in passing, at two passages which are far away from each other Schopenhauer remarks:

“[…] alle Zeit hindurch, das männliche Geschlecht der Aufbewahrer des Willens, das weibliche aber der des Intellekts der Menschengattung sei, wodurch dann diese immerwährenden Bestand erhält. Danach nun hat Jeder
And:

"In der Stunde desselben [des Todes] drängen alle die geheimnisvollen (wenn gleich eigentlich in uns selbst wurzelnden) Mächte, die das ewige Schicksal des Menschen bestimmen, sich zusammen und treten in Aktion. Aus diesem Konflikt ergibt sich der Weg, den er [der Mensch] jetzt zu wandern hat, bereitet nämlich seine Palingenesie (Wiedergeburt) sich vor, nebst allem Wohl und Wehe, welches in ihr begriffen und von dem an unwiderruflich bestimmt ist. – Hierauf beruht der hochernst, wichtige, feierliche und furchtbare Charakter der Todesstunde. Sie ist eine Krisis, im stärksten Sinne des Worts [...]". 42

Empirically, the act of procreation results in new life: here, the creators are before the created. 43 But seen metaphysically, creators and created are identical for Schopenhauer. 44 And thus, as far as the created is concerned, procreation is not the reason of will which appears in him but it is only the coincidental cause of the appearance of this will. 45

Without any problem we could find more of such statements in Schopenhauer’s works but we will leave it with this, as the direction has become clear. Now, let us shortly, superficially, and only with regard to Schopenhauer turn to the *anuttarayogatantra*.

The philosophy of *tantra* has a very special physiology of death and there its own anatomy of man’s so called ‘very’ subtle body (Tib.: *bskyed-rim sku*) – or better: layers of consciousness. It is about the changes which happen in the winds (Tib.: *rluri*), channels (Skt.: *nāḍī*), and drops (Skt.: *bindu*) during the death. As each layer of consciousness, characterised by different density and humidity, is dependent from the winds belonging to it like a ‘shadow of a body’, the dissolving or the loss of these winds as bearers of consciousness
leads to a radical change of conscious experience. On the other hand, also the inner wind necessarily focuses exactly at the place in the channel where one's own 'imagination' is just staying. As the content of consciousness and its carrier energy, the inner wind, are indissolubly connected to each other ('like a body and its shadow'), this means that the inner wind must follow to that place at which the attention is being directed.

Now, as a phenomenon at the surface of such a thinking just waking up (Skt.: samvrddhibodhicitta), in most cases — and here again we are coming closer to Schopenhauer — 'White' is named, whose concretization is male semen. This is expressed as a 'feeling of happiness' which every man has already experienced in the moment of his procreation, when his mother's 'Red' (blood) and his father's 'White' (semen) were flowing into each other and thus became the starting point of new life. This original picture of all that which is related to the limits of one's own individuality is expressed by Nā-ro-pa (1016-1100) as follows:

"Im Entstehungsschritt in der Gebärmutter, wenn die beiden Grenzpunkte von Mutter und Vater zusammengekommen sind, empfindet das zur Entstehung drängende Urgrundbewusstsein im verborgenen Lotos der Mutter für einen Augenblick Glück. Und sein Körper, der einem Goldfischchen gleicht, ist das eine Urbild. Das ist das völlige Erwachen für einen Augenblick".47

This bodhicitta or 'Mind of Clear Light', as it is also called, shows a double aspect: on the one hand, it is the absolute (Skt.: vivrddhi) and on the other hand it is the conventional (Skt.: samvrddhi) essence of samsāra in the sense of a life-creating force. Again, the conventional aspect is of double meaning: masculine as the male principle, method (Skt.: upāya), and feminine as the female principle, wisdom (Skt.: prajñā). Wide parts of the tantra are based on this highly complex structure of 'two in one' (Tib.: gzung mchog, 'the bow-end', Gen.: 'the two ends of a bow') and it is an integral part of the whole theory and practice.

Unfortunately, here I could only sketch this parallelisation of tantra and Schopenhauer's less concrete idea of palingenesis. To explain this in all its multitude, deeper reviewing would be necessary. But in spite of all superficiality the parallelism of the two
worlds of ideas is astonishing. Although in the *tantra* the unity of male and female (Tib.: *yab yum*) *śūnyatā* is represented in its absolute aspect, i.e., the not inherent existence of all phenomena, on the conventional or relational level the described division is similar to Schopenhauer’s, if the level of consideration is shifted for one step.

Finally, I would like to point out that the division of the *buddhadharma* into esoteric and exoteric was once more to get seriously relevant with the ‘Schopenhauer disciple’ Phillip Mainländer (1841-1876) in the history of occidental philosophy after Schopenhauer. For if a pair of terms has once been invented, no matter how true or false it is, there will always be somebody to supply it with content.

But at this place I do not want to withhold the fact that in the occident there is also a dubious reception history of this pair of terms. This is going on still today but comes from a completely different source. Here, I am talking about the intentional misrepresentation and fraud by Helena Blavatsky (1831-1891) with her occult-theosophical work *Esoteric Buddhism* from the year 1883 (Brit. 1. edition). This success story of a gigantic synkretism – in a double meaning – with its affected and intellectually poor popularity and know-all entertainment is hardly to understand these days. Early but without success, Blavatsky’s pathetic effort was resisted among academics by leading authorities like Max Müller* and Hermann Oldenberg.*

If for once we look at the fact that Arthur Schopenhauer quite often mixes the religious and the philosophical and if we do not consider the religious aspects in his system a foreign body, then concerning the soteriological question of meaning, of happiness, and of suffering, especially in the ontic parts of his system, there is a wealth of ideas which deserves to be studied in an appropriate, constructive, and critical way. Basically, this was my subject.

Philosophers like Arthur Schopenhauer may lead to serious philosophical reception of Indian philosophemes in the occident and to self-confidence of original Indian philosophy. For on the basis of a rich and ancient tradition India has many an answer to the philosophically relevant questions of the present. Arthur

11. ' [...] only very few, most incomplete and poor reports [...], almost completely restricted to some essays in the early volumes of *Asiatic Research* and mostly on the Buddhism of the people of Birma'.


12. 'If an Asian [Hochasiat] asked me what Europe is, I would have to answer: it is that part of the world which is completely haunted by the outrageous and incredible delusion that the birth of a human is his absolute beginning and that he comes from nothing'.


13. ' ... 'esoteric' is the same as 'true'  


15. *upādāna* (skt): adherence to the ties of *samsāra*  


17. 'expression of old hags' and 'absurd'  

18. 'complete doctrine of fools’  
*Alagaddāpamasutta, Majjhimanikāya* XXII.

19. Five Aggregates: of form, of feeling, of perception, of compositional factors, of consciousness.


21. 'beyond all cognition (Pradsha-Paramita)’  

22. 'Form is empty and emptiness is form.'  
*Mahāprajñāparamitāhṛdayasūtra* III.

23. 'death [can be regarded] as awakening'  

24. 'the sentences: ‘I perish, but the world endures’", and "The world perishes, but I endure", are not really different at bottom’.


47. ‘With the step of creation in the uterus, when the limiting points of mother and father have come together, the original consciousness which is just pushing towards creation feels a moment of happiness in the mother’s hidden lotos. And its body, which is similar to a small gold fish, is the one original picture. This is complete waking up for one moment’. Nāropā: *Schoddeśatiyā. in Schoddeśatuṇā Naḍapāda*. (Nāropā). Ed. by Mario E. Carell, Oriental Institute: Baroda, 1941, p. 6, line 18 ff.


Schopenhauer is evidently a distinguished figure in India, otherwise we would not have the pleasure of being here. Needless to say, it is Buddha who is more prominent in this country. We know that Schopenhauer was called the “Buddha of Frankfurt”. He lived for his work, which he regarded as being in direct line with the teachings of Buddha, remarking that: “My teachings and those of Buddha and the medieval Christian mystic Eckhard are virtually the same. However, while Eckhard is constrained by his Christian mythology, the same ideas are more openly propounded in Buddhism, with simplicity and clarity, as far as any religion is able to arrive at clear concepts at all. In my work, clarity is finally achieved”.¹

But who is Kamadamana? A figment of Thomas Mann’s imagination, a saint who plays a decisive role in Mann’s novel “The Transposed Heads”. The novel, which, as we shall see, is based on an Indian legend, draws together strands of Schopenhauer’s philosophy with a certain type of ascetic rooted in the Buddha’s negation of the world. However, the literary style makes it more comprehensible and much more vivid than in its form as an abstract concept. The novel, written 1940 when the exiled author had been compelled to confront “the clash of tyranny and freedom”,² is worth reading. Primarily, as a landmark of world literature, second, for its attempt at humanizing the mythology, as well as for its ironic criticism of fundamentalism and ultimately because the story opens
a "Verständnisraum", a common basis for understanding the different cultural mechanics which therefore may serve as an antidote to the clash of civilizations. In short, the novel highlights the question behind the title of Huntington's famous book, which unfortunately has been all too often ignored.³

Having outlined the novel, I shall be discussing Schopenhauer's ideas concerning the saint and Nietzsche's comments on this issue. In a third step, I shall be turning briefly to the relationship of Thomas Mann to Goethe, who first created the term "world literature". A final step takes us to the Vetalapantca-Vimsatika, "the 25 stories of the demon and the king", the literary background of the legend which inspired Thomas Mann. The need for an intercultural approach obliges us to give serious consideration to the reality of this other world.

1. The Novel "The Transposed Heads" ⁴

Having recently completed "Lotte in Weimar", Thomas Mann's diary entry for November 12, 1939 reads: "In the afternoon I read Zimmer's book on the Indian world mother and I also re-read his book, "Māyā The Indian Myth". Thinking about an Indian novel...".⁵ The author is referring to the study "The Indian World Mother" by one of the most brilliant German indologists, Heinrich Zimmer, which was published in 1939. In particular, Mann marked the pages dealing with an Indian legend in which two friends on a business trip to another village come upon a bathing place, where they happen to observe a beautiful young woman. One of them, the intellectual, is deeply impressed and falls in love. However, it is the other, a more straightforward but physically attractive boy, who succeeds as the marriage broker. After six months we see all of them once again on a journey, losing their way and arriving at a sanctuary of the cruel goddess, Kali. The married man enters and is enlightened, meaning he decides to sacrifice himself to the goddess, cutting off his own head with a sword at hand. The friend follows him and suffers the same fate. Finally the beautiful woman steps into the sanctuary, and seeing both lying in their own blood, tries to kill herself too, but the voice of the goddess does not allow this. Kali commands her to set the heads on the bodies again, however, in her haste she confuses the heads, putting that of her plainer husband on the more attractive torso of the friend and vice versa. Now the important question is: to whom is she married? Who is the happy
husband? The king, who must answer the question, decides that the husband is the person with the head of the husband. Zimmer comments: "The bloody sacrifice, the frightening willingness to die for the goddess are shocking and alien to a western reader of those popular Indian stories".6

Thomas Mann started writing the novel at the beginning of January 1940 and completed it in July. It was published in German in October the same year and in 1941, the English translation, which was dedicated to Zimmer, followed. In a letter to Käte Hamburger (dt. 19.4.1941) he explained why he was fascinated by the legend: "I was looking for pastures new and was attracted by the blend of sensuality and metaphysics, the confusion of identities, the issue of the bloodthirsty jest, the question of love and personality, and so I became preoccupied, and I do not regret it, because the result is a charming and supreme piece of literature".7 Mann is sometimes inclined not to take the novel all that very seriously, calling it an "intermezzo" or "divertissement". However, although the novel may be a minor work, it is generally regarded as an important milestone for the completion of the Joseph quartet, of which the fourth volume was still outstanding. In broad terms, both works represent Mann's endeaver to humanize mythology and create flesh and blood people out of mythological figures, to make them reasonable and understandable as human beings", as Peter de Mendelssohn surmises.

And he succeeds, by way of expanding the few sentences of Zimmer's abstracts to twelve chapters. He transforms the two friends and the girl into individuals caught in a charming love triangle, comparable to his early novel "Tonio Kröger". In this way, the motives behind the sacrifice in the sanctuary of Kali appear reasonable and comprehensible. A real innovation in the novel is Kamadamana, the saint, who is expected to end the controversy surrounding the question, as to whom the beautiful Sita really belongs. The figure of the ascetic saint is Mann's own creative accomplishment.

The depiction of the ascetic is ironic. He lives in a forest, which is "densely populated with holy men", all of whom believe they are living a solitary hermit-like existence in a desert. There are men of varying degrees of holiness, ranging from married householders to yogis "of all shades of opinion", so to speak. The three friends finally meet Kamadamana doing his exercises, "his hoary white
head with its roll of braided hair and his arms like withered branches rearing up heavenwards, rising out of a swampy pool” (79). Emerging from the mud, he “sweeps the ground before his feet with a broom ... in order not to crush any living creature that might be there” (80). His first answer shows a strange overestimation of his own powers, supposing Nanda’s transformation to be the result of earlier conversations with himself. He only agrees to talk because he is struck by Sita’s beauty, of which he evidently has a great appreciation, describing her appearance without missing a detail. She is the only one of the party who is expressly welcomed: “Good day, O woman!” (81). This is hardly conceivable for a Western or even an Eastern saint taking his job seriously and following the path of mortification and abstention. Kamadamana sums up his ideas saying: “Ascetism is a bottomless vat, wherein the temptations of the spirit are mingled with the temptations of the flesh” (82 s). Only now is he ready to listen to ‘all life’s many taints’ as brought by the trio and give an ascetic response. On hearing the details of the story leading up to the “vexed question”; it is then for him to decide to whom this “all round fine-limbed woman”, belongs. Moved by Sita’s beauty, he pours forth some verses of love poetry, which once again are not very appropriate to asceticism. Having strayed in this way, he finally declares: “Husband is, who wear’s the husband’s head. Here lies no doubt at all, must it be said, As woman is the highest bliss and borne of songs. So among limbs to head the highest rank belongs” (87). No objections were raised against his sentence, based on this “noblesse beyond reproach”. The three friends bow low before the saint and depart. Nanda has meanwhile resigned himself to the verdict and withdraws into the forest to become a hermit himself, while Shridaman and Sita head for their village where they will spend their days and nights together.

2. Schopenhauer and the Saints

The picture of Kamadamana which Thomas Mann depicts is based on Schopenhauer’s pronouncements on the saints, taking into consideration Nietzsche’s critique of the “ascetic ideals” in his “Genealogy of Morals”. Schopenhauer’s work *The World as Will and Representation* ultimately arrives at morality via epistemology, metaphysics and aesthetics. Schopenhauer offers the hypothesis that the saints might represent the potential for elimination of the will
and all desires, positing that only the saints are able to liberate themselves from the yoke of the will, which must be regarded as the "Weltunwesen", or taint of the world. Of the Western and Eastern saints, it is the Eastern saints which seem to take precedence. "We find what we have called denial of the will to live still further developed, more variously expressed, and more vividly represented in the ancient works of the Sanskrit language than is the case for the Christian Church and the Western world". Schopenhauer cites a number of studies in a footnote and indicates that he was extremely interested to learn more about the East. In fact "it was Schopenhauer, who inspired the whole first generation of European Buddhists", as Urs App states in his famous article "Schopenhauer and Buddhism". According to Schopenhauer, "Hindu literature" enshrines an entire set of rules concomitant with the ostensible denial of the will to live: "love of one's neighbour with complete denial of all self-love; love in general, not limited to the human race, but embracing all that lives; charity even to the point of giving away one's hard won daily earnings; boundless patience towards all offenders; responding to all evil, however bad, with goodness and love; voluntary and cheerful endurance of every insult and ignominy; abstaining from eating meat; perfect chastity and renunciation of all sensual pleasures for anyone aspiring to real holiness; the rejection of all property; the forsaking of every dwelling place and of all kinsfolk; deep unbroken solitude spent in silent contemplation with voluntary penance and terrible slow self-torture for the complete mortification of the will..." (ib. 388). He concludes his overview with the remark that these "precepts... are still lived up to by individuals to the utmost extreme". This intention "must have its foundation in the very nature of mankind". So much agreement between East and West "in spite of such differences in age and race is practical proof that here is expressed not an eccentricity or mental aberration... but an essential side of human nature which appears only rarely because of its superior quality" (ib. 389). These remarks are intended to encapsulate the meaning of the entire work: "To a certain extent, this is the most important point of our whole discussion". The denial of will is not intended to remain theoretical, but must become, as Rudolf Malter has put it, a "physical reality" ("Leibereignis") and this phenomenon is generated by the discipline of the virtuoso exponents of asceticism. Malter maintains: "The denial of the will is present
only in the manifestation of the contradiction between the actual body and the negation to fulfil his sensual desires". Holiness is proven only by the life actually lived. Abstract philosophical reflections may occur, but not necessarily and indeed, they may even prove a hindrance to ascensis. To avoid misunderstandings, Schopenhauer argued: "It is therefore just as little necessary for the saint to be a philosopher as for the philosopher to be a saint" (ib. 494). The everyday life of the saint still remains subject to desires and temptations, as the Christian paternoster recalls.

This struggle should not be regarded with contempt. Nietzsche did not intend to dismantle the "ascetic ideals" as a whole, preferring instead to trace the different functions of these ideals. His question: "Ascetic ideals: what do they mean?" provoked a variety of responses. "For artists, they mean nothing or too much, for philosophers and scholars, they mean a kind of propensity and instinct for the most successful conditions of spirituality". In personal terms with reference to Schopenhauer, he nonetheless stated he wanted "to eliminate the torture of sexuality", which determines and terrorizes human beings. Here we have the motives of the hermit and also the reason why they go astray, as Kamadamana does. This saint in the crowded forest has retained much of his sensuality, and he is aware of it. Thomas Mann did not mock him, but empathized with the ascetic, because as an artist, he saw himself as a kind of hermit as well, who had to chain the dogs of desire every day ("... die Hunde im Souterrain an die Kette legen") and who had to adhere to a very strict set of rules to manage his daily work. He makes ironic references to sainthood, although he recognised some of the characteristics in himself in his strange encounter with the East.

Not only the saint in the novel has Schopenhauerian origins, there are many other ideas which relate to the "Buddha of Frankfurt". Taking just one of these, let us look at "tat tvam asi", which is one of Schopenhauer's core phrases. How Shridaman tries to overcome jealousy with the benefit of the "tat tvam asi" appears to us very strange. He is aware that his wife Sita left him to live with his friend, Nanda, since the head and thus intellect of the husband had subtly transformed the friend's physical persona. And so he meditates and finds consolation in the "knowledge of the nature of things which has taught him that it was in principle unimportant with whom Sita slept, with him or with his friend, since even though in either case,
"The Transposed Heads": the strong influence of love upon the body, the transposition of the heads and the heavy impact of the head upon the mind and vice versa. Thomas Mann made a "love triangle" out of Zimmer's anecdote and he gave us Kamadamana. In his novel "Lotte in Weimar", he had focused on Goethe, and, referring to the pariah poem which had been on Goethe's mind for so long, he said: "Put this into verse!" as an exhortation referring to the second part of his yet to be completed pariah trilogy.

Goethe loved the Indian literature of which he was aware. He had praise for the Sakontala, the Gita Govinda and the Meghaduta and their translators, but shrank from Indian religion and philosophy, which he considered as "most absurd" and "really monstrous" (1821; XII. 301 ss).

The exiled Thomas Mann saw himself as the successor to Goethe in his time, the representative of German culture in opposition to Hitler. Looking back over the Indian legend, he wrote that "he did not recall a single occasion when he thought of Goethe", whilst writing it (letter to Käte Hamburger, 19.4.1941). He said he himself had received a good enough grounding in metaphysics from Schopenhauer for the encounter with India, while Goethe did not succeed in reading the whole of "The World as Will and Representation". Marking the difference very strongly, Mann commented on the sensual world: "Goethe had a strange aversion to the Indian horror masks. Nonetheless, he had to finish the "pariah" story, which he picked up from somewhere". Thomas Mann was not afraid of the gruesome masks. On the contrary, he humanized the cruel and "unapproachable" (57) goddess Kali, making her more comprehensible and giving her a "deep harsh voice" which spoke Prakrit, rather than the holy language of Sanskrit. Thomas Mann goes as far as to identify with the strange hermit, who is unwittingly drawn towards the sensual, just as Mann, to the horror of his colleagues, had done two years before, calling Hitler, his "brother" in opposition. He said: "Far better, more righteous, productive and serene than hatred is self knowledge, the willingness to unite with the object of hatred, however dangerous". The German scholar Edo Reents has underlined how important this is in times of rising fundamentalism.

We see that Thomas Mann practised "tat tvam asi" as a poet with an extremely expansive identity which reached far out to the tyrant on the one side and to the ascetic standing in the swampy
hollow on the other. "We artists are like saints sitting on columns: we live in our desert all alone like the hermits in my novel of the 'Transposed Heads' and no one is interested to know anything from another, experiencing the truth of the sentence: 'Do you live at all, if others live?" (letter to Hans Mayer, 23.6.1950).21 Citing this sentence from Goethe's "West Eastern Divan", Mann legitimizes his own asceticism, which allowed him to reinvent himself in the figure of the Indian saint.

4. The Vetala-panca-vimsatika as the Background for the Novel

A final step brings us to the Indian collection, where we first find the story of the intricate love triangle. The work is called the: "Vetala-panca-vimsatika", five-and-twenty-stories about the demon (vetala) and the king, still today a very popular collection called "Raja Vikramaditya and the Beta)", as I was kindly told by Arati Barua. Here, we find our story among 23 other stories, all of which end with a riddle which has to be answered by the king. The popular collection exists in at least 7 versions, and we have translations into various Indian dialects, as well as Tamil and Telugu.22 The context of the story is as remarkable as the end. In the eldest version by Sivadasa, we hear of a yogi who tries to persuade the king to submit to his will. Every morning, he attends the audience, bringing a fruit as a present, which contains a very precious stone, which is then discovered, as if by accident. The yogi persuades the king to come to a graveyard at night, to cut the corpse of a hanged man down and to bring it to him in his magic circle. But the corpse is inhabited by a demon, who starts speaking as soon as the king is on his way. He tells one story after another, ending with a riddle, which the king must answer to avoid having his head blown off ("head" acc. to Zimmer, acc. to Uhle the "heart" will break). Having given the right answer, the corpse once again returns to the tree. The king answers 23 questions correctly. Being unable to answer the 24th question breaks the spell and the demon, now released from the corpse, reveals the evil intentions of the yogi, who only used the king to obtain the eight magic spells ensuring absolute power. The king now realises the situation, beheads the yogi, fulfils a last sacrifice for the benefit of the demon and finally obtains the magic for himself. Indra now offers him sovereignty over the whole world,
by: the king claims just one wish: that the collection of stories and riddles he had to answer should be told all over the earth, and also that the demon should serve him in the future. Both wishes were generously granted by Indra. The final words of the collection are: “Whether clever or foolish, old or young, whoever knows these stories by heart will be a really wise man”. In fact, to answer all the questions correctly requires a great deal of experience and knowledge of the world. Some of the questions relate to where the guilt for a crime without an obvious culprit lies, (1, 12), some refer to the legality of a marriage, i.e., to whom a woman really belongs, like in the “Transposed Heads” (2, 5, 6, 7, 14), or to the moral condition of the male and female gender (3). The demon is asking for reliable indications for nobility and good character (4, 8, 9, 15, 16), for sensitivity (10) and courage, or why someone is laughing (19) or weeping or both at once (13, 22), for the cause of death in a strange situation (11), perhaps why a spell did not work (17), who the spiritual and who the real father is (18), and how the greatest extremes of dullness or sharpness of mind and body must be recognized (20, 21, 23). Only the last question, referring to extremely intricate genealogical issues, could not be answered by the king, however, as we have seen, the effect of this was ultimately beneficial.

At first glimpse, the Western reader may be surprised by the strange stories and other-worldliness of the Vetala-panca-vimsatika. However, Thomas Mann immediately addresses the “gruesome guiles of Maya” (3), before inviting the reader to join him on his very special journey to India, well prepared as he was by Schopenhauer’s metaphysical teachings. Research of this collection had tended to imply that this work seemed “too dependent upon the Indian background and mentality to be understandable worldwide”. Yet by giving the bloodthirsty myth of the cruel goddess Kali a human dimension, Mann was aiming to unlock the door to an understanding of the stranger aspects. In conclusion, let us turn to the constellation in which Schopenhauer, Buddha and Kamadamana are prominent.

In general terms, the philosopher admired Buddha, positing ascetic ideals which are hard to achieve, as Thomas Mann has shown with the character of Kamadamana.

He may have invented the hermit, but he also found another evil being in the character of the yogi in the story, whose thirst for power
was finally eliminated and corrected for the benefit of the public good. While "ascetic ideals" may be fashionable, the real motives need to be checked, as far as the public is concerned.

The riddles which decide life or death refer to the entire collection and hint at the intimate correlation of philosophy, literature, science and the problems of the world we experience ("Lebenswelt"), which is somewhat peculiar to Indian literature.

In the end, the demon is free and the famous king Vikramaditya, who was known as the "sun of valour", owes his reign to help from the demon. And so the perfect government of the good king is founded on demoniacal help and magic spells.

Zimmer pointed to the "frightening willingness to die", which he saw as a particular feature of Indian literature. However, the same phenomenon was identified by an Arab writer at the time of the crusades, when Christians were characterized as people "who were yearning for death, like moths attracted to the flame".26

In his book "The Clash of Civilizations", Samuel Huntington has proposed three rules for "peace in the multicultural world". The third one is called the "rule of commonalities", and it prescribes that: "Peoples of all civilizations should search for and attempt to expand the values, institutions and practices they have in common with peoples of other civilizations".27 Included in these "values, institutions and practices" is literature, especially if it explicitly aims at opening up a new basis for common understanding of myths articulating issues which would otherwise remain silent and suppressed. Needless to say, literature has a "weak position". However, as another German author visiting Delhi in 1961, said: "Any literature worthy of the name must by nature be committed to human beings",28 whose humanization remains the great task of literature and philosophy.

References

4. Thomas Mann, *The Transposed Heads – A Legend of India*. Translated by H. T. Lowe-Porter (1941), Reprint New York 1969 – This edition was used; references to be found in the text.


9. Urs App, *Schopenhauers Begegnung mit dem Buddhismus*, in: Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch, 1998, p. 35-56, here p. 55 – It is hardly possible to emphasize strongly enough the importance of this article, which definitely has opened new dimensions for the scientific community interested in “Schopenhauer and Buddhism”. This refers to the following publications of this author as well (see Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch of 2003 and 2006). His last article, “Schopenhauer’s Initial Encounter with Indian Thought”, in: 87. Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch (2006), p. 35-76 presents valuable new insights.


23. *Vetalapantschavinsati* (see above), p. 129.
24. cf. Uhle in: *Vetalapantschavinsati* (see above), p. XXI.
Suffering and *Nirvāṇa* in Schopenhauer’s Trans-cultural Philosophy

*R. Raj Singh*

1. Introduction

Trans-cultural philosophy is a variant of the so-called comparative philosophy. The value of comparative philosophy is increasingly being recognized, and its methods reflected upon in philosophical circles today. The dialogue among the various philosophical traditions, labeled on the basis of their origins in distinctive civilizations and/or geographical regions of the world, is deemed extremely valuable at present. For the most part, individual philosophers have philosophized in response to the history of ideas and concepts of their own respective traditions and have enriched their own traditions as well as contributed to the body of human knowledge. However, there have been from time to time in all traditions, certain thinkers who did not confine themselves strictly to their own heritages in the name of some assumed and self-glorified standards of purity and rigour. The ability to borrow from and contribute to the so-called foreign traditions was not only exemplified by some great classical thinkers and literary masters such as Plato and Shakespeare but also by many creative minds in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when more and more translations of foreign texts were becoming available. The loves of the intellectual lives of this class of modern thinkers was not confined within cultural boundaries as they identified themselves and their work beyond the limits of their own traditions. A trans-cultural thinker is one who not only compares and contrasts the ideas and concepts of different traditions but treats a chosen foreign tradition as his own, makes it his own by employing its concepts within his own philosophical projects and problematics. Such a
thinker shows the ability to transplant philosophical concepts of two or more traditions in a creative and thoughtful manner and somehow treats world philosophy as one body of knowledge.

Schopenhauer (1788-1860) was a pioneer in trans-cultural thinking. Philosophies of India particularly Vedanta and Buddhism were his favourite sources for composing and revalidating the universality of his own system. He admired philosophies and religions of India and cited extensively from their texts, which were beginning to be known in Europe in his times. His chief work *The World as Will and Representation* was published in 1819 and two subsequent enlarged editions appeared in 1844 and 1859. The second edition contained fifty supplementary chapters on the themes discussed in the first edition. The later editions of this chief work and Schopenhauer’s other later works contain numerous citations, illustrations and comparative analyses of Indian concepts.

In this paper, I will trace the connection between Schopenhauer’s thought and the systems of Vedanta and Buddhism with special reference to the problems of suffering and its final remedy proposed by Schopenhauer. This exposition will illustrate the trans-cultural nature of Schopenhauer’s method for philosophizing. At the same time, this exercise in comparative philosophy will hopefully overcome some problems and misunderstandings of Schopenhauer’s thought that abound in contemporary Schopenhauer scholarship largely due to the inability of his several interpreters to fully acknowledge his eastern way of thinking.

2. Suffering or ‘Dukkha’

Schopenhauer is widely recognized as a pessimistic thinker and he himself is never shy of rejecting optimistic notions such as this being the best of all possible worlds, as well as optimistic systems and optimistic thinkers of all hues. Nevertheless, for the most part, the secondary literature on Schopenhauer makes him even more pessimistic than he is and caricatures both his life and work as odd, eccentric and puzzling. This has happened largely due to a lack of appreciation of Schopenhauer’s sources, especially his eastern sources.

What is suffering according to Schopenhauer. How and to what extent it is part and parcel of human existence? Schopenhauer gives us both theoretical and descriptive answers to these questions. Before beginning his discussion of the denial of the will-to-live in
the fourth book of the WWR, he defines suffering in terms of his central concept of the will-to-live:

We have long since recognized this striving that constitutes the kernal and in-itself of everything, as the same thing that in us, where it manifests itself most distinctly in the light of the fullest consciousness, is called "will". We call its hinderance through an obstacle placed between it and its temporary goal, "suffering"; its attainment of the goal, on the other hand, "satisfaction", well-being, happiness (W, I, 309).

According to Schopenhauer, striving penetrates everything that is, including ourselves. Every entity, every organism is on its way, evolving, striving toward its own telos and its own goals. These goals are repeatedly thwarted and goallessness remains an elusive state.

All striving springs from want or deficiency, from dissatisfaction with one's own state or condition, and is therefore suffering so long as it is not satisfied. No satisfaction is, however, lasting; on the contrary, it is always merely the starting point of a fresh striving. We see striving everywhere impeded in many ways, everywhere struggling and fighting, and hence always as suffering. Thus, that there is no ultimate aim of striving means that there is no measure or end of suffering (W, I, 309).

It may seem like life contains possibilities of accomplishments and happiness, just as it has pitfalls of suffering. But, in fact, suffering is the rule and happiness exceptional, elusive and short-lived. The existence both human and non-human is imbued with striving. This striving in itself is endless and meaningless, for one is born incomplete and one dies incomplete. The ground of existence is therefore appropriately called the will, for existence is never bereft of willing this or that. Besides this theoretical account of suffering Schopenhauer refers to various kinds of sufferings that this so-called best of all possible worlds is replete with. In Vol. II of the second edition of WWR, he reflects on the sufferings of human life:
We feel pain but not painlessness; we feel care but not the absence of care; fear, but not security... We do not become conscious of the three greatest blessings of life, health, youth and freedom so long as we possess them, but only after we have lost them (W, II, 575).

Human life is beset by poverty and/or boredom. Poverty is the bane of the poor man, whereas boredom, customary pleasure being no pleasure, assails the rich man. “Nine-tenths of mankind live in constant conflict with want, always balancing themselves with difficulty” (W, II, 584).

The truth is that we ought to be wretched and are so. The chief source of the most serious evils affecting man is man himself. Man is a wolf for man... The archfiend is fitted more than the rest, and appears in the form of a conqueror, he sets several hundred thousand men facing one another and exclaims to them: “To suffer and die is your destiny; now shoot each other with musket and cannon” (W, II, 578).

Schopenhauer cites human beings’ injustice toward each other and their boundless egoism that necessitates state and legislation. He also refers to slavery and child labour as instances of man’s cruelty toward man.

At bottom optimism is the unwarranted self-praise of the real author of this world, namely of the will-to-live which complacently mirrors itself in its work. Accordingly optimism is not only a false but also a pernicious doctrine, for it presents life as a desirable state and man’s happiness as its aim and object... It is far more correct to regard work, privation, misery and suffering, crowned by death as the aim and object of our life (as is done by Brahmanism and Buddhism, and also by genuine Christianity) since it is these that lead to the denial of the will-to-live (W, II, 584).

Schopenhauer’s descriptions of the suffering and undesirability of this world are graphic, creative and comprehensive, spanning through his chief work, its supplements and in his later works. A few pages of exposition cannot summarize them all. It is obvious that he makes frequent references to Vedānta and Buddhism and invokes
is ‘dukkha’, sorrow, lamentation, dejection and despair are ‘dukkha’. Contact with unpleasant things in ‘dukkha’, not getting what one wishes is ‘dukkha’. In short, the five skandhas are ‘dukkha’.

Now, this O monks, is the noble truth of the cause of ‘dukkha’: that craving (txšnā) that leads to rebirth, combined with pleasure and lust, finding pleasure here and there, namely craving for passion, craving for existence, craving for non-existence [Sourcebook, 274].

The Buddha gives a list of inevitable events of dukkha in life, thereby implying that, of course, there are pleasant moments in life too. If he wished to say all of human life is dukkha, he could have easily said so (monks, life is dukkha). He said birth is dukkha because nirvāna means release from saṃsāra not coming back into it and staying in it. What is at stake is overcoming of saṃsāra vs. clinging to it, both as possibilities of this very life, life of dharma vs. vulgar worldly life. Of course, Schopenhauer takes condemnation of saṃsāra and condemnation of dukkha as one and the same thing, and pays scanty attention to the Buddha’s emphasis on moderation, middle path and his optimistic and firm belief in nirvāna. Not only the notion of dukkha, a philosophical translation of which is ‘unsatisfactoriness’ rather than pain, but also the term for the identified cause of dukkha, that is, tanha or trishna can be misunderstood by extreme interpretations. Trishna (that causes dukkha) is immoderate desire or craving rather than desire as such. Thus, a literal and extreme understanding of these two central concepts of early Buddhism can lead one to the wrong conclusion that Buddhism is pessimistic and the Buddha paints a black picture of life.

In the same way the undesirability of saṃsāric existence as emphasized in Vedānta as well as in the Hindu myth of reincarnation does not mean a pessimistic outlook. The presence of brahman (Being) and its everlasting replica (ātman) in human existence makes it an optimistic doctrine. The yoga or path of bhakti or loving devotion to the deity is not exactly asceticism but a joyful contemplation of God in the Hindu systems.

3. Will-to-live or ‘Trishna’

Whether Schopenhauer freely adopted the eastern concepts in his later supplementary writings or he simply found in Vedānta and
complex. However, it should not be overlooked that will-to-live was not propounded primarily for the purpose of comparative philosophy. Halbfass seems to have hit the nail on the head:

Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the will (primarily) implies a critique of the European tradition of representational and rational thinking of calculation and planning, ... which foreshadows more recent developments ... He continued a radical critique of some of the most fundamental pre-suppositions of the Judeo-Christian tradition such as the notion of personal God, the uniqueness of the human individual and the meaning of history (Halbfass, 120).

This means that while Indian concepts did cast a spell on Schopenhauer’s thinking, he did not simply borrow them to build his own system. He used them primarily to reauthenticate his world-view and enrich its exposition. The concept of the will-to-live was enunciated to critique and correct the Judeo-Christian and western metaphysical assumptions, which had taken both Christian religion and western philosophy in its grip. Hegel’s system being one example of a full adoption of these assumptions.

Indeed the Vedic notions of māyā, moha (passionate love) aham (ego) all illustrate the nature of the will-to-live and so do the Buddhist notions of trishna (craving) and upādāna (attachment). However, it will be most objectionable to equate the will-to-live with the Vedic notion of brahman (Being). The ever enduring (sat), pure consciousness (chitta) and blissful (ānanda) reality as defined by Śāṅkara, has hardly anything in common with the blind, irrational urge to live as conceived by Schopenhauer.

Furthermore, the concept of the denial of the will-to-live touches a degree of metaphysical dualism and advocates extreme asceticism combined with a pessimistic dismissal of the world. This is not exactly the true message of Vedānta and Buddhism. To wean the human entirely away from excessive worldliness (sāṁsāra), the Vedic tradition proposes a fusion (yoga) of karma (action), bhakti (devotion, love) and Jnana (knowledge) as enunciated by the Bhagavadgītā. The method of bhakti (love) is not merely a denial of the world (sāṁsāra) but a spontaneous reorientation of the mind toward the loved and loving deity, a drive that leaves sāṁsāra behind. Schopenhauer’s reading of Vedānta is almost silent on the method of bhakti.
Similarly, as mentioned earlier, idea of moderation, middle path and non-metaphysical thinking, so central to the Buddhist world-view, and emphasized by the Buddha in his first sermon, seems to be absent in Schopenhauer’s concept of the denial of the will-to-live and in his project to construct an all-encompassing metaphysical system as well as in his dualistic account of the will and its denial.

Thus, the traditions of Vedānta and Buddhism clearly transcend metaphysics, pessimism and extreme asceticism of the kind that Schopenhauer seems to uphold in his system. Nevertheless, Indian philosophy is but richer with the contribution made by Schopenhauer. He transmitted its insights in the western metaphor in a manner that is unmatched by any other western thinker. The bridge that he built between the western and eastern shores is still standing. At the same time perhaps no other modern philosopher can combine more skillfully the seriousness of a philosophical insight with the simplicity and beauty of expression. See, for example, how he sums up the problem and lessons of death through his east-west thinking: “you are ceasing to be something which you would have done better never to become” (W, II, 500).

4. Denial or Nirvāṇa

Will-to-live that appears in the human entity has a unique possibility which is unavailable to animals, plants and inanimate things. It is the possibility of will’s knowledge of itself. In man, the will has the potential of not only knowing itself but denying itself or rendering itself quiet.

Knowledge of the whole, of the inner nature of the thing-in-itself ... becomes the quieter of all and every willing. The will now turns away from life; it shudders at the pleasures in which it recognizes the affirmation of life. Man attains to the state of voluntary renunciation, resignation, true composure and complete will lessness [W, I, 379].

This voluntary denial of the will involves indifference to all worldly goals and projects, one “gives lie to one’s phenomena” that is, refuses to be act in subservience to the world, and “gives lie to the body”, that is, seeks no sexual satisfaction and/or comforts for the body. Schopenhauer says that such asceticism also necessitates
downright worldliness ought not be valued. Thought and thoughtful life must overcome immoderate worldliness. To desire perpetuation of individuality, to give in to self-love (mamta) ego (aham) and moha (attachment) is the same thing as saying yes to saṁsāra, and hence neither desirable nor praiseworthy. Schopenhauer’s statement that “at bottom every individuality is a special error, false step, something that it would be better not to be” is a reiteration of the Vedāntic message that taking ego (aham) as real is to dismiss one’s larger and real self (atman). All individualities and diversities are superficial in contrast to the one-ness of atman says Vedānta. To remain caught up in individuality is to overlook the one-ness of subjects and objects or the truth of “that though art” (tat twam asi). Agreeing with Vedānta, Schopenhauer maintains that the real purpose of human life is to bring ourselves back from the individuality based, narrow-minded living that affirms and remains involved in the rational pursuits of the irrational and blind urges of the will-to-live that produce saṁsāra for us from moment to moment.

Bibliography


Part 1: Pessimistic Religiosity in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy and in Buddhism

The Schopenhauerian philosophy is often called pessimistic. This term derives primarily from the philosopher’s own characterisation. Considering the small number of instances of this expression in his own works however, the widespread use of the term to give a totalising classification of his thought appears curious. The term “pessimism” was employed in a more general sense with increasing popularity during the rapid growth of modern civil society in the second half of the 19th century, and Schopenhauer’s philosophy was being criticised ever more vehemently as the quintessential representative of pessimism. The term pessimism was therefore mostly used in a pejorative sense.

Behind this evaluation of pessimism lurk the thought and behaviour patterns of the modern individual, who makes self-determination (autonomy) the highest value. However, he does not stand only in self-preserving defence against foreign rule (heteronomy), but turns as it were to attack mode, since this self-determination of man can come to completion only by the simultaneous determination of his world. The will to live changes into the will to power. He posits first the clear difference between himself and his world, in order then to take over and pacify it by the activity of will (practice) initiated by himself, until he can deal with his world in a “childlike” and playful manner (Nietzsche: Thus spoke Zarathustra). As long as the whole world facing him serves as the object of his will, the will wanting to conquer all must progress in the endless circle of expansion.
In order to make this perpetuum mobile of the self-affirmation of the will possible however, the covering and hiding of this structure of the affirmation of the will are indispensables. Therefore, the will to live, on the way to the will to power, had to dispense with the realisation of the nature of the world, i.e. the insight into the structure of the affirmation of the will, by means of the pejorative label of pessimum. This insight after all contains the question about the condition of the possibility of the affirmation of the will and thus also draws attention to the possibility of asking for the condition of the possibility of the quietening of the will (so called “denial of the will”).

European pessimism developed in a pessimistically-inclined society, which directed toward its egocentric and anthropocentric purpose of self-affirmation, yet frustrated constantly by the fear of the actual or alleged failure, needed a concrete sign upon which to derogate its fears, and that sign was given by labelling Schopenhauer a pessimist.

Schopenhauer’s pessimism proceeds from the clear insight into the egocentric structure of the blind and ignorant affirmation of the will, which causes various conflicts and suffering in the charmed circle of desire-production and desire-satisfaction, as he states in the 4th book of the World as Will and Representation. After this knowledge alone has illuminated the cause of suffering and thus also the possibility of liberation from suffering by knowledge, ignorance is identified as a basic factor of suffering. Schopenhauer says expressly that philosophy presents only the structure of the affirmation and denial of the will, without recommending the one or the other. Nevertheless Schopenhauer is confident that the realisation of these structures already illuminates and reduces the ignorance of blind will-affirmation.

In this contention, Schopenhauer follows the thought-tradition of the ancient religions, which developed since the end of Jasper’s “axial age”, in many cultures of the world. Despite the differences between the theories among these religions, the realisation of the danger of the ignorant and uncontrolled affirmation of the will to live, particularly the desire – production and satisfaction, seems to be a common feature of their doctrines, insofar as desire is seen as the cause of human suffering and its abolition through knowledge brings man a peace of mind and of community.

The nature of pessimism, which Schopenhauer noticed in the ancient religions, lay in its critical view of egocentrism and
not only be treated and dealt with as a single outward happening, but as an affair of representation in the total context of life as it is imagined. Therefore, Buddha and Schopenhauer could say that life does not only contain suffering, but life is suffering.

The dharma analysis (Abhidharma) of early Buddhism outlines both the elements of representing in the broadest sense (citta) as well as the elements of the represented (rūpa) next to each other. At this seam of mind and things several points of issue developed. The argument between the Sarvāstivādins' and Sautrāntikas' over the carrier of the karma can be understood also in this context. This was how Vasubandhu understood it anyway, who belonged to the Sarvāstī School but also had a thorough comprehension of the Sautrāntikas'. He postulated in his Trimśaka Vijñāptimatratasiddhi [thirty verses establishing that only representation is] following the Sautrāntikas' "process of the transformation and origin" (saṃtati-parināma-viśeṣa) his thesis of representation transformation (vijñānaparināma), in order to combine the entire range of topics on the level of the mere representation. However, in order to do this, the acceptance of the substantial existence of the object categories had to be given up. A parallel idea developed in the Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy, even if it was completely different in its basic intention, though even this difference is eliminated by Schopenhauer. I will return this at the end of this paper.

The structure of the world as representation, in Vasubandhu's Trimśakavijñāpti, is a circular endless transformation of the processes of representation (vijñānaparināma), i.e. of the hidden transformation of representation, within the storehouse representation (ālayavijñāna), and is presented as the visible appearance (pratibhāsa) with its multifarious distinctions. The storehouse representation determines the basic forms of appearance, i.e. the subject-object split, and due to this split appears then the tendentious self-attached self-consciousness as a virtual subject of representing and the concrete-individual representation as the virtual object of representing. However, the storehouse representation is not an absolute substance like a creator God, from which all being would flow. It is rather the retention of the past acts in unconscious-latent processes (therefore the designation: storehouse), it is a representation itself, remaining however hidden for the individual-concrete self-consciousness, since this only recognises
what is conceivable as its object. In the storehouse representation, not only the shapes and connections of the world as representation are kept as invisible seeds and brought to maturity, but also the dispositions or inclinations are strengthened to their maturity. In other words, to the extent this transformation of the representation is stained by self-attachment (will affirmation). If this inclination of self-attachment is strong, the storehouse representation is led to a further transformation, where the inclination to the self-attachment (usually) continued to accumulate. However, if this process is deactivated and quieted by right insight and practice (therefore the term yogācāra), this deactivation can lead to nirvāṇa: Thus, Vāsubhandu modified the traditional Karma teachings in his theory of representation transformation.

This relation of the concrete representations (including self-consciousness) and the latent storehouse representation has a structural parallel to the Schopenhauerian “World as Will and Representation” according to the generally lucid model of the emanation as objectivation of the will. On this first stage the will makes visible to itself the basic form of representation, namely the splitting of subject and object as well as the species of things. The idea is then subjected to the principle of sufficient reason (consisting of time, space and causality), splintered in the individual perceptions, which accounts for how concrete-individual things develop. This embracing doctrine of ideas is one-sided, though. The Schopenhauerian doctrine of ideas has yet another aspect, which stems from the post-Kantian German idealistic tradition, according to which the idea is a representation, which develops in co-operation of imagination and reason and serves as archetype (original) for the identification of the concrete things (as representation). Since imagination is, however, according to Schopenhauer the effect of the will on the imaginative faculty, one can recognize the will underlying the idea. Hence, the expression: the idea is the objectivity (Objektität, totally different from Objektivität) of the will is justified, but not to be understood in the sense of the emanation model but in the actual sense of the “visibility”, while the will for the normal representation activity (without philosophical meditation) remains invisible and incalculable, therefore the designation “the blind will to live”, which can be enlightened only in the world as representation. Thus, here also a self-supporting or self-affirming cycle structure of will, idea and representation is recognisable.
This extreme monism of representation has the advantage of giving a clear answer of yes to the question about the possibility of the nirvāṇa and/or the turning of the will, since it does not have to assume anything behind the world as representation, which after the vanishing of the world as representation could let another world as representation develop.

Vāsubandhu's Trimśakavijñāpti provided for further discussions and even a schism of the school. One could also say that Vāsubandhu’s thinking always gave many competing philosophical views inspiration, so why did this not also ensue from Schopenhauer research?

The discussion with the Vijñāna School offers the further possibilities to intensify Schopenhauerian philosophy. Furthermore, the discussion of Schopenhauerian philosophy, which is investigated now increasingly in the context of post-Kantian philosophy, can extend the representation and redemption teachings of the Vijñānavāda beyond the psychological, in particular deep-psychological analytical hermeneutic common in the Western world today, into the social and world theory.

The fusion of will and representation is not original with Schopenhauer, but has a long tradition in the history of European philosophy. Nevertheless Schopenhauer is probably the first philosopher, who saw in this fusion the condition of the possibility of the self-abolition of the will, i.e. at the same time also of the representation and the world: “No will: no representation, no world”.

Conceiving the world as will and representation does not always entail pessimism. In the case of a pessimistic religion (to which tradition Schopenhauer belongs) the notion of the world as representation transcends the unsubstantial and pulls the world towards the abolition of the blind and uncontrolled attachment to the will to live. But knowing the world as mere representation can also be led by a completely different interest: the affirmation of the will. The modern European era took up and even assumed its lack of substance, although this led humans to the experience of the death of God and nihilism and accordingly into loneliness, at the same time willingly, since this lack of substance legitimised the revolution of traditional values to new ones, which now praise the pursuit of desire-production and satisfaction. Thus, capitalism, which was from the outset ascetically oriented, now received a moral authorisation to
transform into consumer society. There its engine, perpetuum mobile of desire – production and satisfaction, i.e., blind will to live, remains sealed even in the intended hiding of the world as simulacra (Baudrillard).

From this point of view the Mahayana Buddhist critique of the early Buddhist schools as "Hiinayana", which allegedly presupposes the substantiality of dharmas\(^6\) and therefore unable to rid itself of the habit of self-attachment as such, is not fully valid. It is true that this kind of thought, the belief to be in possession of the ultimate truth, has been the origin of many suppressive regimes and dangerous fanatical movements. The original intention of the assumption of the universal substance was not primarily to stress the existence of this absolute being itself but to render relative the individual ego and to liberate it from its self-attachment and finally to make it humble and considerate to other beings. The restrictive manner of exact definitions about what they were or claimed to be increased the contradiction between Early Buddhism (Theravada) and Mahayana Buddhism. Maybe a different way of thinking about what they are not or claim not to be (neti), in other words: about what they try to avoid in order to find their common space of communication, will open a space for the community of different doctrines, and this could apply to many more schools than merely Theravada and Mahayana.\(^7\)

References

1. In The World as Will and Representation the expression "denial" is often used in order to make a contrast to "affirmation of the will". Schopenhauer also uses the expressions "quietening" (Quietiv in contrast to Motiv), "turning" (sich wenden) and "abolishing" (sich aufheben), also frequently in his Manuscript Remains.

2. We have to be very careful in using the term thing in itself. Schopenhauer changed his understanding of "thing in itself" at least twice before he wrote The World as Will and Representation cf. Y. Kamata, "Platonic Idea and the World of Perception in Schopenhauer". http://dekansho.de/idea.html original: "Platonische Idee und die anschauliche Welt bei Schopenhauer". Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch, 70 (1989), 84-93. Also: Y. Kamata, Der junge Schopenhauer, Freiburg/München, 1988, p. 178-187 (§36).

3. I am not very content to translate "vijñāna" as "representation", sometimes better into "idea", "cognition" or "consciousness". In any event, we should be aware of the intention of the school, not to
presuppose any substances behind the representation. At the same time I
would like to stress, that the Schopenhauerian philosophy is also a strict
idealism. The translation of "Vorstellung" into "representation", 
"idea" etc. is not adequate either.
4. For instance in the schools of Dignāga and Sthiramati, later
Sākarajñānavāda and Nirakarajñānavāda.
Vorstellung, keine Welt" (WI, 486).
6. The Sarvāstivādins' ontological arguments for the substantiality of
dharmas were vehemently criticised by Mahāyāna, though this critique
cannot be limitlessly applied to the earlier Buddhist dharma doctrine. On
the contrary the Buddha's many statements prohibiting inquiry into the
substantiality and non-substantiality of the world were normative. The
Buddha taught repeatedly that this kind of questioning would not liberate
man from his self-attachment.
7. Cf. Y. Kamata: "Die Schopenhauersche Wende der Philosophie –
Einführung in die Philosophie als sanfte Wissenschaft", *Schopenhauer in
The Inference from Effect to Cause due to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika – Tradition and Schopenhauer’s Philosophy

Eberhard Guhe

Among the Brahmanical systems in classical Indian philosophy Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika are renowned for their preoccupation with the concept of causality and its relevance to logic, epistemology and ontology. In the present paper the views of Nyāya- and Vaiśeṣika-philosophers concerning the inference from effect to cause will be compared with comments on this type of inference by Arthur Schopenhauer. As regards the concept of causality we will see that Schopenhauer is closer to modern philosophical biases than the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-tradition, which was unknown to him. However, the character of causal relations is described by both in a similar way. It is interesting to note that the early Nyāya-philosophers’ recognition of common sense inferences from effect to cause which are however not foolproof coincides with non-monotonic theories in modern logic, whereas Schopenhauer fails to recognize the significance of such inferences, because he is rather committed to the timeworn ideal of absolute reliability in logic. Before examining these observations in detail we will give an overview over the most important representatives of the Nyāya- and the Vaiśeṣika-school, their works and their favourite philosophical domains:

1. Brief Introduction to the Nyāya- and the Vaiśeṣika-School

The Vaiśeṣika-system, which is especially committed to ontological problems, was founded not long after the death of Buddha (560-480
Its name might derive from one of the ontological categories stipulated by Vaiśeṣika-philosophers, namely “particularity” (viṣeṣa). According to this explanation “Vaiśeṣika can be interpreted as “the system associated with the category particularity”. As viṣeṣa can also mean “distinction” or “specification”, “the system based on distinctions (or specifications)” might be another connotation of “Vaiśeṣika”.

According to doxographic sources Kanāda (“atom-eater”), the mythical founder of the Vaiśeṣika-system, is supposed to be the author of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra, the standard textbook on Vaiśeṣika-tenets. But the Vaiśeṣika-system is actually much older than the Vaiśeṣikasūtra which was probably written around 200 AD.

None of the early important representatives of the system is known to us. There are, however, two authors dating from the late classical era of the system whose works have been preserved, namely, the Daśapadārthasāstra (“Textbook on the 10 Categories”) by Candramati (5th century AD) and the Padārthadharmasamgraha (“Synopsis of the Properties of the Categories”) by Praśastapāda (2nd half of the 6th century AD). The latter is almost a commentary on the Vaiśeṣikasūtra. It became the subject of other commentaries such as the Nyāyakandali (“Blossoming Tree of Logic”) by Śrīdhara (10th century AD) and the Kīraṇāvali (“Succession of Rays of Light”) by Udayana (2nd half of the 10th century AD), who was also an important Nyāya-philosopher.

The Nyāya-system is closely affiliated to the Vaiśeṣika-system, because it adopted the latter’s ontological tenets. Independent achievements by Nyāya-philosophers are to be found especially in the realm of logic and epistemology. The Nyāya-system owes its name to the Sanskrit-word nyāyā, which the Nyāya-philosopher Pakṣilasvāmin paraphrases by “investigation supported by the efficient tools of knowledge acquisition”. Accordingly, Oberhammer translates nyāyā by “nachprüfendes Verfahren” (“verification”) or “argumentative Reflexion” (“argumentative reasoning”) (Cf. Oberhammer 1996: 147). So, nyāyā was actually used in a wider sense than the term “logic”, which is often regarded as an equivalent to nyāya in modern studies on the Nyāya-system.

The standard textbook on Nyāya-tenets is the Nyāyasūtra (ca. 200 AD) and Akṣapāda, a descendant of the Gautamas, is named as
its author by doxographic sources. It is probably a compilation of originally independent treatises on dialectics and natural philosophy.

The oldest commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra*, the *Nyāyabhāṣya* ("Detailed Commentary on the Nyāya-System") by Paśīlasvāmin (1st half of the 5th century AD), became the subject of many sub-commentaries. Only one of them has been preserved, namely the *Nyāyavārttika* ("Supplementary Commentary on the Nyāya-System") by Uddyotakāra (7th century AD). Udayana (whom we mentioned already), the last outstanding representative of the Nyāya-system, wrote the *Nyāyavārttikatātipārvapariśuddhi* ("Clarification of the True Sense of the Nyāyavārttika"), a sub-commentary on Vācaspati Miśra's commentary on the *Nyāyavārttika*. Moreover, he is the author of several independent works such as the *Nyāyakusumāṇjali* ("A Handful of Logic-Flowers") and the *Ātmatatttvaviveka* ("Investigation of the True Nature of the Self").

2. The Nyāya-Vaiveśiṣṭa – Concept of Causality in Contrast to Schopenhauer’s Ideas

(a) The Nyāya-Vaiveśiṣṭa – Typology of Causes

One of the oldest Sanskrit-equivalents to ‘causality’ is the compound *kāryakāraṇabhāva*, which literally means ‘The state of being (bhāva) cause (kāraṇa) and effect (kārya)’ (Cf. Oberhammer 1996: 76). According to Böhtlingk/Roth *kārya* can refer to any kind of outcome of a causal process (‘was hervorgebracht wird’). (Cf. Böhtlingk/Roth 1855, s.v. *kārya*) Apte paraphrases *kāraṇa* by ‘that which is invariably antecedent to some product’ (Cf. Apte 1890, s.v. *kāraṇa*). So, the terms *kārya* and *kāraṇa* can be applied to states and events as well as to living beings and things.

In the *Nyāyasūtra* and in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* (cf. ND p. 80) we find an example of a *kāryakāraṇabhāva* between events or states, namely the causal relation between rainfalls (*vrīṣī*) and the high tide (*pūrṇatva*) of a river. However, from the point of view of Nyāya- and Vaiśeṣika-philosophers it is more appropriate to consider living beings and things as causes and effects, because they fit in the categories of Vaiśeṣika-ontology, whereas states and events cannot be classified according to this system.
be illustrated by a cloth and its material cause, the threads. According to Vaiśeṣika-ontology a substance like a cloth is endowed with a universal (sāmānya), which accounts for the fact that "numerically different entities can be associated with an identical concept, referred to by a common term, and identified as members of the same class (Halbfass 1992: 115f). The cloth, where the universal cloth-ness (paṭatva) is supposed to reside, is qualitatively different from its material cause, the threads, because they cannot be a locus of cloth-ness. On account of this qualitative difference between a material cause and its effect Vaiśeṣika-philosophers are committed to the doctrine that the effect does not pre-exist in its material cause (asatkāryavāda).

There is a closer connection between modern philosophical intuitions and Schopenhauer’s concept of causality, which is more restrictive than its Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-counterpart, because Schopenhauer admits only states and events as causes and effects. Causality is defined by him in the following way: "Wenn ein neuer Zustand eines oder mehrerer realer Objekte eintritt; so muß ihm ein anderer vorhergegangen sein, auf welchen der neue regelmäßig, d.h. allemal, so oft der erste da ist, folgt. Ein solches Folgen heißt ein Erfolgen und der erstere Zustand die Ursache, der zweite die Wirkung ..." (Schopenhauer (2): 1986: 48).²

The idea that living beings or things can be causes and effects is explicitly rejected: "Es hat aber gar keinen Sinn zu sagen, ein Objekt sei Ursache eines anderen; zunächst, weil die Objekte nicht bloß die Form und Qualität, sondern auch die Materie enthalten, diese aber weder entsteht noch vergeht; und sodann, weil das Gesetz der Kausalität sich ausschließlich auf Veränderungen, d.h. auf den Ein- und Austritt der Zustände in der Zeit bezieht, als woselbst es dasjenige Verhältnis reguliert, in Beziehung auf welches der frühere Ursache, der spätere Wirkung heißt und ihre notwendige Verbindung das Erfolgen" (Schopenhauer (1): 1986: 50).³

(b) The Character of a Causal Relation

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-tradition causality is a necessary relation: A given "causal aggregate" (sāmagrī) inevitably yields the effect to which it is prerequisite. Fire in combination with wet fuel, for example, necessitates the production of smoke.

Although we perceive just the successive appearance of the entities related to each other as cause and effect, causal relations
are not merely a product of the mind superimposed on the empirical reality due to our experience, but they are entrenched in the external world according to \textit{Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika}-ontology (cf. Potter 1977: 65f).

Similarly, Schopenhauer argues "... daß wir empirisch bloß \textit{Wirklichkeit} der Succession erkennen: da wir aber außerdem auch Nothwendigkeit der Succession in gewissen Reihen der Begebenheiten erkennen und sogar vor aller Erfahrung wissen, daß jede mögliche Begebenheit in irgend einer dieser Reihen eine bestimmte Stelle haben müsse; so folgt schon hieraus die Realität und Apriorität des Gesetzes der Kausalität. ..." (Schopenhauer (1): 1986: 114f). However, there is still a difference between Schopenhauer's position and \textit{Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika}-realism: According to Schopenhauer causality is an objective fact because of its apriori character, but he does not regard it as part of the empirical reality.

3. The Reliability of Inferences from Effect to Cause

In \textit{Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika}-logic inferences from effect to cause are accepted as efficient tools of knowledge acquisition (\textit{pramāṇa}) despite their occasional lack of absolute reliability:

As a given effect may often be attributed to a large variety of potential causes, one can easily fail to make the right guess. Moreover, the alleged causal aggregate might contain something which incidentally accompanies the production of the effect without being involved in the causal process.

Some late \textit{Nyāya}-philosophers tried to overcome these intricacies by adducing several rather unconvincing arguments: According to Udayana the outward appearance of a fire should give a clue to the instrumental cause involved in its production. Fire produced by means of a burning glass is supposed to look different from fire produced by means of drill sticks (cf. Potter 1977: 64f). Keśava Miśra, another late \textit{Nyāya}-philosopher, claims that it is always possible to find out whether a member of the alleged causal aggregate is involved in the causal process, but he does not offer any convincing proposal how this is to be done (cf. Potter 1977: 67).

Unlike Udayana and Keśava Miśra, who tried to enforce the ideal of absolute reliability in logic, early \textit{Nyāya}-philosophers acknowledged the fact that inferences from effect to cause are usually not foolproof. But, nevertheless, they can be very useful in
common sense reasoning and were therefore classified as admissible tools of knowledge acquisition in early Nyāya.

Inferences from effect to cause are mostly very convincing, when there is an inductive backup argument known as statistic generalization. Fingerprints on a knife, for example, unfailingly betray the person who caused them, because we know by experience that every person possesses individual fingerprints. Therefore we conclude by statistic generalization that the same applies to the fingerprints on the knife. Whenever such an inductive backup argument is available an inference from effect to cause is unobjectionable according to Schopenhauer, as we will see below.

Early Nyāya-philosophers approved of common sense inferences from effect to cause, even if they are not confirmed by an inductive argument. According to C. Oetke our understanding of the treatment of such inferences in early Nyāya can be enhanced by taking recourse to a branch in modern logic called ‘non-monotonic reasoning’, which was founded ca. 20 years ago and has been very influential in AI-research (cf. Oetke 1996).

The gist of non-monotonic reasoning can be illustrated by the above-mentioned inference of previous rainfalls from the observation of an unusually high tide in a certain part of a river. In Nyāyasūtra II, 1, 37-38 (cf. ND p. 80f), where this example is to be found, an opponent argues that the unusually high tide might rather be owing to a dam than to previous rainfalls, but his objection is refuted in the following way: The opponent is just referring to an exceptional case, because an unusually high tide in a certain part of a river can mostly be causally related to previous rainfalls. In order to make sure that the conclusion of this inference is correct, one should try to find out whether there is an unusually high tide in other parts of the river as well. If this is the case, a dam can almost be excluded as a potential cause.

Obviously, no statistic generalization is involved in the inference of the Nyāyasūtra, because previous experience does not teach us that hitherto an unusually high tide in the part of the river referred to has always been caused by rainfalls. It is rather admitted that exceptional cases like the damming-situation can invalidate the inference. But non-monotonic reasoning involves the presupposition of ordinary circumstances. Moreover, one tries to find premises as additional evidence that exceptional cases, which would falsify the intended conclusion, can be excluded.
The Inference from Effect to Cause Due

weiß, daß die Folge jenen und durchaus keinen anderen Grund haben kann; außerdem aber nicht. Der Irrende setzt entweder der Folge einen Grund, den sie gar nicht haben kann; worin er dann wirklichen Mangel an Verstand, d.h. an der Fähigkeit unmittelbarer Erkenntnis der Verbindung zwischen Ursache und Wirkung, zeigt: oder aber, was häufiger der Fall ist, er bestimmt der Folge einen zwar möglichen Grund, setzt jedoch zum Obersatz seines Schlusses von der Folge auf den Grund noch hinzu, daß die besagte Folge **allemaal** nur aus dem von ihm angegebenen Grunde entstehe, wozu ihn nur eine vollständige Induktion berechtigen könnte, die er aber voraussetzt, ohne sie gemacht zu haben: jenes Allemaal ist also ein zu weiter Begriff, stattdessen nur stehen dürfte bisweilen, oder meistens; wodurch der Schlußatz problematisch ausfiele und als solcher nicht irrig wäre (Schopenhauer 1986 (2): 131).5

We will certainly agree to Schopenhauer’s rejection of inferences from effect to cause which rest on undue hidden inductive arguments. But he disregards that in common sense reasoning inferences from effect to cause need not always be confirmed by an inductive argument. Their conclusions are mostly not foolproof, but nevertheless they can be useful as working hypotheses. Schopenhauer, who was rather committed to the timeworn ideal of absolute reliability in logic, would probably not have appreciated the idea of a logical system based on such inferences. The Nyāyasūtra represents a more progressive state of development in logical theory, because common sense inferences from effect to cause which we nowadays classify as non-monotonic are fully approved in the relevant passages on efficient tools of knowledge acquisition.

References


Footnotes

1. E. Frauwallner translates samavāyikārāṇa by “inhärierende Ursache” (Frauwallner 1956: 169).

2. ‘The principle is that, if a new state of one or several real objects appcars, another state must have preceded it upon which the new state follows regularly, in other words, as often as the first state exists. Such a following is called ensuing or resulting, the first state is called the cause, the second the effect’’ (Payne 1974: 53).

3. ‘But there is absolutely no sense in saying that one object is the cause of another, first because objects contain not merely form and quality, but also matter which does not arise or pass away; and then because the law of causality refers exclusively to changes, in other words, to the appearance and disappearance of states in time. Here it regulates that relation in reference whereof the earlier state is called the cause, the later the effect, and their necessary connection the resulting or ensuing of the one from the other’’ (Payne 1974: 55).

4. ‘... that empirically we know only reality of succession. But we know also necessity of succession in certain series of events, and know even prior to all experience, that every possible event must have a definite place in one or another of these series, the reality and the a priori nature of the law of causality follow from this’’ (Payne 1974. 132).

5. ‘My opinion is (and this gives that explanation its place here) that every error is a conclusion from the consequent to the ground, which indeed is valid when we know that the consequent can have that ground and absolutely no other; otherwise it is not. The person making the error either assigns to the consequent a ground it cannot possibly have, wherein he shows actual want of understanding, i.e., deficiency in the ability to know immediately the connexion between cause and effect. Or, as is more often the case, he attributes to the consequent a ground that is indeed possible, yet he adds to the major proposition of this conclusion from the consequent to the ground that the aforesaid consequent arises always only from the ground mentioned by him. He could be justified in doing this only by a complete induction, which however he assumes without having made it. This ‘always’ is therefore too wide a concept, and should be replaced by sometimes or generally. The conclusion would thus turn out to be problematical, and as such would not be erroneous’’ (Payne 1969: 79).
Schopenhauer and Tagore on Will: A Parallel Study

Sitansu Ray

Introduction
This paper is an attempt at a clearer understanding of the concept of will, the vital centre of Arthur Schopenhauer's (1788-1860) whole range of philosophy. Yet, towards the realization of full potentiality of will itself we must also study Rabindranath Tagore's (1861-1941) discourses and creativity on will. While Schopenhauer had associated will with pessimistic note of suffering and pain, it is Tagore who experienced profound joy and bliss in will, individual and cosmic.

Both Schopenhauer and Tagore were pioneer votaries of will and both studied the Vedas and Upanisads. While Schopenhauer had studied the Upanisads in Latin (in twofold translated editions from Sanskrit to Persian, and from Persian to Latin), Tagore on the other hand, by virtue of his family tradition, learnt the Vedas and Upanisads in original along with exact diction and intonation of the Vedic Sanskrit.

Will, the inner vibrant reality within a human being, nay, within every creature and plant, or rather within the whole creation, is felt deeply and dynamically by both Schopenhauer and Tagore. Their expositions, somewhere similar, somewhere different, are obviously complementary for the total understanding and realization of will.

Chronologically viewing, Tagore was ushered into the world one year after Schopenhauer and left it. They belonged to two different continents and two different cultures. Their lives are not parallel at all. We are rather making a parallel study of their dealing with will.

Where there is a universal truth within a concept, it excavates everything upto the depth of its centre, which is ultimately equated with will, microcosmic as well as macrocosmic in its forceful
dynamism resulting in pluralistic representations. Thus, the world in Schopenhauer’s scheme is entirely will in one hand and entirely representation or represented idea of that will on the other. Though not an atheist, neither does he talk of God in any of his discourses. He discards pantheism too. The Upaniṣadic Brahman and Schopenhauer’s concept of will are not absolutely identical. But Schopenhauer is very much interested in the Upaniṣadic phrase Tattvamasi (you yourself are that), obviously corresponding to ‘Soaham’ (I myself am that). Schopenhauer starts from the felt and experienced will and proceeds as science must proceed from the known to the unknown. His method is empirical and analytic. From personal will he realizes the universal will. He considers one and all belonging to one cosmic organism. This thought is close to the Vedāntic monism.

The next important point is that Schopenhauer is quite decided on the principle of supremacy of the knowing subject over the phenomenal and material objects at least so far as epistemology is concerned. That is why materialism is outrightly discarded by him. Suns and planets without our eyes to see them and without our understanding to know them are inconceivable and absolutely meaningless.

This contention is akin to the following lines from Tagore’s poem ‘Ami’ of his book Shyamali:

Amari chetanar range panna holo subuj,
Chuni uthlo ranga hoye.
Ami chokh mellum akashe,
Jwole uthlo alo pube paschime.
Golaper dike cheye bollum ‘sunder’
Sundar holo se.

Let me get it approximately translated:

By virtue of the colour of my consciousness
The emerald is green and ruby becomes red.
I glance at the sky, instantly it becomes lit with light.
As soon as I glance at the rose and exclaim ‘beautiful’!
It becomes beautiful.

I don’t know whether Tagore had read Schopenhauer. Not a single book of Schopenhauer is there in Tagore’s personal library, preserved in Uttarayan. We may assume and confirm that a universal truth is not confined to a particular author.
Let me come back to Schopenhauer again. Schopenhauer never denies the existence of matter. To nullify matter would be lunacy. He rather finds out the attributes of matter such as solidity, impenetrability and extendibility as well as contractibility and so on in space and time. But, he asserts that matter has no essence independent of our conscious perception. Existence and perception are convertible terms.

But, what was there prior to man's emergence? The existence of the material world has remained dependent upon the first eye that opened, even if it were that of a little creature like an insect or so. Such an eye is a necessary condition of the possibility of knowledge. The whole creation exists only in and for knowledge. Schopenhauer's assertion reminds us of *Satyam Jnanam anantam Brahma* (*Taittiriya Upaniṣad* 2.1.1), though not in exactly identical terms. In Schopenhauer's analysis the world is entirely an idea and demands the knowing subject as the resort of its existence. Inwardly, it is the vibrant will, outwardly it is the representational idea.

The existence of the whole span of matter and energy had been waiting as it were, for the first conscious being, how much ever undeveloped it might have been. On the other hand, this conscious being, ever present in some insolent form or other, had been necessarily depending upon a long chain of physico-chemical causes and effects which had been preceding it. Will and idea are also interdependent on each other. Will, for its exposition, depends upon its emerging idea. Idea again has all its source in will. This is the summum bonum of the *The World as Will and Idea*.

**Will in Comparison with Idea**

For clearer understanding of will it may be more and more compared with idea from various angles. Very often Schopenhauer uses simile, analogy and metaphor for shortening analytic argumentation. Sometimes he points to the intensities and grades of the objectifications of will. He loves comparison, which saves him from many an explanation. Will is compared with the root and idea with the corona of a plant, will with the subconscious life-force and idea with the conscious projection of the human soul. The root remains underground, whereas the corona is exposed to light and air. The heart, the premium mobile of a human being or rather of any animal, is rightly chosen as the symbol or rather as the synonym of will. The head or the brain, identical with intellect, is connected with the
realm of all ideas. Will as the thing-in-itself constitutes the subconscious region of man. Consciousness is conditioned by intellect, which is the function of brain. The inner nature of everything is will and Schopenhauer calls it the thing-in-itself. However, from the obscure depth of our inner nature, will emerges towards the exposed world of phenomena. In this sense, Schopenhauer calls will metaphysical and all the emerging ideas phenomenal.

It is obvious that the power of will and intellect differs in degrees from person to person. A large corona springs out from a strong root. Similarly, fruitful intellectual display depends upon a strong, vehement and passionate will.

Will is the radical part of our nature and automatically acts with its original power. Intellect, on the other hand, can act only in subordinate manner since it is conditioned and restricted in many ways.

That is why, the brain, the generator of intellectual pursuits, gets tired, sometimes as if exhausted. Will, as the thing-in-itself, is tireless.

Intellect is like the ministerial council of the sovereign will and very often obeys the will. But, some occasions may come when intellect refuses to obey the sovereign will. Then will gets angry with intellect. It some cases again, when will get astray and perturbed, it becomes the duty of intellect to guide will. In Tagore’s drama Raja/Arupratan, we see that when the Queen Sudarshana becomes overwhelmed, perturbed and mistaken, it becomes the duty of her intelligent and aristocratic maid-servant Surangama to rectify and guide her.

From another angle, will, as a metaphysical reality, is above time and space, and free from causality. Idea, on the other hand, is within time and space, and bound by causality. Will is eternal, idea temporal.

From another perspective, will is most often irrational and disturbed by the faculty of reason. Idea, on the other hand, is rational; at least it poses to be. Will corresponds to the inner excitement, idea to the calculated outer manifestations. Will is not guided by knowledge, idea is guided by knowledge. Will objectifies itself directly in irritability not in sensibility. A bit hyperbolically Schopenhauer asserts that the whole body is will itself. The metaphysical substratum of the inner vibration, which moves the
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muscle, is will. The metaphysical substratum of the inner force, which causes formation of blood and its circulation most involuntarily, is will.

Will does not like to remain dormant. Its tendency is to be objectified externally. The will to know, when objectively perceived, is our brain; the will to walk is objectified in the pacing of our feet; the will to grasp any thing results in the grip of our hand. The will to digest food automatically works in our stomach. On the whole, the brain belongs to the objectification of will. Will itself is groundless but its multifarious objectifications are subject to the principle of sufficient reason.

Will in Nature

Will is rampantly active in nature. Masses of water rushed downwards with irresistible impulse. Magnet always turns to the North Pole with persistent determination. Iron-pieces fly to the magnet with keen desire as it were. The positive and negative poles of electric current vehemently strive for reunion. Likewise the vehemence of human desires is increased by resistance and obstacle.

By the by, Schopenhauer considers gravitation and electricity as original forces, not effects of any cause. However, their manifestations take place according to the law of causality.

Will is very much prominent in every animal too. Birds build their nests for their eggs. The spider spins its cobweb to catch its prey. Ants assemble together to carry and store their food. Will to live, will to mate, will to beget can be seen in every living being.

In the vegetative kingdom too, will has its play from sprouting, vegetating, blooming, cropping and so on. It reminds us of "Yo oshadhishu yo vanaspatishu tasmai devaya namonamah" from the Shwetashwatara Upanishad (2.17). Of course, in Schopenhauer’s treatment, will takes the place of Devah (God) and the question of namonamah does not arise at all.

"Ishavāśyamidam sarvam" (Ishopaniṣad 1) will have its meaning in Schopenhauer’s corpus if Isha is taken as the universal will.

Estasmajjayate prano manah sarbendriyāni chā Kham vayajyutirapah prithivi vishvasya dharini.

(Mundakah 2.1.3)
The keenest expression of will is in love. The fulfillment of will lies in the termination of will into love, both human and divine.

Tagore’s “Dui Ichchha” (Two wishes) from the book Pather Sanchay provide us with his discourse on the twofold will, one fold concerning necessity and the other fold relating to the surplus, i.e. beyond worldly requirements. A prudent one aspires to have the whole. Bhumaiva sukham nalpe suchamasti (Bliss lies in the All pervading One, not in inadequate fragments). This sukham is celestial blissfulness, not sensual or worldly pleasure. Human will is after all directed towards the Infinite. Just worldly contentment cannot be the be-all and end-all. Man aspires after Bhumananda, which must accept and assimilate some doses of pain and suffering too along with that celestial bliss. Tagore refers to Shiva, who had to accept a great portion of poison without being affected.

Tagore points to two perilous human follies which are ati ichchar sankat (the peril of over-willing) and adha ichchhar sankat (the peril of half-hearted willing) in his poem-cum-song:

Ami bahu basanay pranpane chai
Banchita kori banchale more. (Gitanjali 2)
(You have saved me by depriving me of my over-willing).

Examples of Funny Sides of Will

The funny parable Ichchhapuran (wish-fulfillment) depict the utter folly of mal appropriation of will. The reverse roles granted by Ichchha-thakrun (will-goddess) to the father and son have taught them sufficient lessons that revival of boyhood and premature maturity cannot be enjoyable at all.

The humorous drama Taser Desh, but by no means a farcical one, eulogizes the glory of human will which in the long run wins over all lifeless moral codes.

Ichchhe: Ichchhe:

Sei to bhangehhe, sei to gorche
Sei to dichchhe nichchhe.
Sei to aghat korchhe talay.
Sei to bandhan chhinde palay.
Bandhan porte sei to abar phirchhe.

Let me get it approximately translated:
Will: Will:
That will is breaking and creating things.
That will is yielding as well accepting all possessions.
That will is hitting the lock,
That will is fleeing away tearing all bondage.
That will is coming back again for reconciliation.

Optimistic Glimpse in Schopenhauer’s Poems

It is very much interesting to note that Schopenhauer too had written a few excellent poems mainly in his youth. While compiling them in later age, he hopes to come "nearer to his readers". He says, "A man under the guise of metre and rhyme ventures to show his true subjective nature more freely in poems than in prose".

In most of his poems we can discover the optimistic inner will of this pessimist philosopher. The sonnet written in Weimer in 1808 starts with the description of "Perpetual winter's night", terrible and tempestuous, but concludes as:

"The morning star is ushering in.
Soon it is light .......... in the darkest depths:
Radiant colour will the world suffuse,
And boundless space is bathed in brightest blue".

In the poem "The Rocks in the valley of Schwarzburg" (Rudolstadt, 1813), Schopenhauer addresses the rocks, "the oldest sons of creation", as "brothers" and tells them:

"Unite and raise your heads to the sun,
That he may long throw light on you:"

In the next stanza the mountain is metaphorized in this unique way:

"The sage is calm and serene
in the storm and stress
of troubled and tormented life."

Two lines of the next stanza provide more optimistic note:

"And then came forth the sun to smile,
And all was filled with mirth and love."

Seeing Raphael's picture of "Madonna with sixtens"

Schopenhauer writes the poem "To the Sistine Madonna" (Dresden 1815). The philosopher-poet's reaction is very noteworthy:
“She bears him to the world, ......

... ... ...
Triumphant glory radiate from his eye, already heralding the abiding certainty of salvation”.

Schopenhauer’s chief work had appeared in November 1818. Thereafter, during his journey from Naples to Rome in April 1819, he writes the poem titled as “Bold Verses”. About his chief work *The World as Will and Idea* he writes:

From long and deeply harbored pains it was unfolded from my very heart.
Long did I strive to hold it firm, and yet I know success is finally mine.
However you view the work, its life you cannot imperil
It you may hold up but never will destroy.
Posterity will erect a monument to me”.
It may be said that his words have come true.

After Kant’s death, Schopenhauer writes in the poem “To Kant” (1820):

“Thy word and thy book my only solace.”

After reading A.W. von Schlegel’s poem on war-tragedy, Schopenhauer writes under the title “Chest-Voice”:

“When all is broken and destroyed,
A return to nature’s fount is all we have”.

This “Chest-voice” is nothing but the metaphysical reality of will itself.

Conclusion

Both Schopenhauer and Tagore have enormously contributed to the burning concept of will. A comparative study of Schopenhauer and the will-related works of Tagore reveals that they temperamentally differ from each other. While Schopenhauer is pronouncingly a pessimist, Tagore is a great optimist even during crisis of civilization. In Schopenhauer’s outlook, evil overpowers good, enmity outweighs love. In Tagore’s outlook, good always overpowers evil, bond of love wins over enmity. As a disgusted misanthrope, Schopenhauer has no hesitation to utter, “At bottom man is a wild beast”. Tagore, on the other hand, as a great lover of
Some Reflections on
Schopenhauer’s Philosophy
It is very instructive to note that while Wittgenstein spends so much time and devotes so much attention to a theoretical picture of the world and of its knowledge, he never fails to take sustained interest in indicating the serious issues of life, which do not fall inside the world and are not objects of knowledge. He speaks of conscience as the voice of God. What this voice conveys to him is neither thinkable nor logically communicable. And yet he seems to be very anxious to hear the voice of God. The question pertaining to God, willing of good and feeling of the beautiful are in the nature of “how” and not in the nature of “what”. These are not questions of fact or of science but of aesthetic and ethico-religious sensibility. The questions relating to what makes an attitude aesthetic and a sensibility ethico-religious, though very pertinent, cannot be gone into details here. The connections between scientific facts and value discourse are indeed very complex.

My reference to Wittgenstein and, through him, to Kant remains incomplete without the perceptive views expressed on the subject by Schopenhauer. All these thinkers addressed themselves to the problems of value-fact connections with critical richness. In fact, Wittgenstein’s acquaintance with Kant and use of his ideas are essentially mediated through Schopenhauer. According to the latter, reality is not representable either picturesquely or even very clearly through concepts and categories. What we have of the world in the representations is always coloured and oriented by will. Will has two aspects in it: phenomenon and thing-in-itself. The individual phenomenon of the will has its origin and dissolution in time. But as thing-in-itself it is not affected by it and the causaf claim. Nor is it co-related to every object of knowledge. The will to live is the primordial subject and it is in that capacity that man is not only
timeless and beginningless but also endless or immortal. "His exemption from death, which belongs to him only as thing-in-itself, coincides for the phenomenon with the continued existence of the rest of the external world".¹

Our primordial will to live as such is not cognitively available to us. We have it only in and as the body. Though death is unknown to the will-to-live as such yet we, as objective and embodied representations of that will, are seized of by the fear of death. The ground of this really ungrounded fear is "our" attachment to the body. It is a real-unreal attachment. Ontologically it is not there, i.e., not factually traceable. But it is very much there in our feeling and attitude.

Schopenhauer's difference from Kant is primarily to be understood in terms of the former's view that Kant's notion of the object of perception is incoherent and untenable. To speak of "object of perception" is to imply that object has a presentable objectivity of itself accomplished outside the human body-as-will, without being presented to it and interpreted by it. Schopenhauer also rejects Kant's notion of concept as available in finished form and meant for application and use. He is against understanding reality via concept. He is for grasping it directly i.e., perceptually, not conceptually. Schopenhauer likens Kant "to a person who measures the height of a tower from its shadow" and himself to "one who applies the measuring-rod to the tower itself". He accuses Kant of skipping over the richness and the multifariousness of the world of perception. "Philosophy, therefore, is for him a science of concepts, but for me a science in concepts, drawn from knowledge of perception, the only source of all evidence".²

Schopenhauer's starting point of philosophy is evidently subjective and what he calls anti-materialistic. But his is an intriguing sort of subjectivism. It highlights the unity of man through his inner nature, i.e., will, with the world. Only the phenomenal appearances of the world are available in representations or ideas. Time is only a form of representation of the phenomenal world. But time itself is eternal. Death is said to be "the temporal end of the temporal phenomenon". And when time is taken away, life knows no end. In other words, in the timeless frame of reality life and death interpenetrate. One might even say: they are identical. Like the Buddhist, Schopenhauer in a sense is inclined to agree that samsāra is nīrvāṇa. We are simultaneously subject to and yet free from the
causal chain. The subjection of our knowledge of the world to the form of time represents it as transitory, and destructible; but in their true nature they can be taken to be eternal. Repeatedly referring to Hinduism and Buddhism and the ideas of Plato and Plotinus, one of the basic points that Schopenhauer tries to make out is that time is an image of eternity and body is an image of the will-to-live. We are afraid of death because we think that we are identical with our images and fail to realize our primordial will. I am afraid to think of my own physical destruction or non-existence. But if I reflect on my non-existence as such, it is not fearful. I was non-existent before I was conceived in my mother’s womb. Why am I not afraid to think of that non-existence of mine? This reflection brings to light that our fear of death and craving for immortality is essentially body-based, i.e., due to our attachment to and identification with the body. According to Schopenhauer “it is I or ego .... by which the world is first brought about, and for which alone the world exists”. It is in and through this I or ego that the proclaimed “destructibility of our true nature” and “the identity of macrocosm and microcosm” become intelligible. It is therefore through this point of I or ego that Wittgenstein speaks of our will’s ability to penetrate into the metaphysical or transcendental without leaving the empirical or phenomenal behind. It is at this point that the two realms meet. Schopenhauer’s answer to the “riddle” is: “the center of all existence (I or ego), this kernel of all reality, is to be abolished, and yet the world is to be allowed to go on existing”.

If this view is accepted, both the question of immortality of the soul and that of scientific world appear in a favourable and emotionally satisfying light. Understandably, this view was not available to Wittgenstein, at least not in a straightforward manner. Nor am I sure whether this is the truth. The connection between the metaphysical and the empirical, or between the provable and the perceptible, is not a matter of proof or demonstration. The dualistic difficulties have been expressed in various ways. Such pairs of concepts as value/fact, teleological/mechanical, free/caused, and practical/theoretical are expressive of this ambivalence or essential tension of human life. The experiences of our life do not at all lend themselves to clear formulation and communication. That is why in the realm of values we simultaneously find satisfaction and controversy – satisfaction of experience and controversy over the possibility of judgment. Analogously, it may be pointed out that the
explicit other-orientation, i.e., is marked by an intention to communicate it to others and, on demand, prove it successful. Our preoccupation with the idea or representation of reality, when it gets better of our feeling of reality and our yearning towards it, lands us in skepticism in relation to the objects of feeling and willing. If the paradigm of cognition is uncritically or mechanically transferred to, and imposed upon, the paradigm of feeling or that of willing, we are bound to get stuck up in some sort of what may be called intellectual confusion. For example, freedom or its absence may somehow be experienced but cannot be convincingly communicated. What I mean to say is this. If I say "I am not free" and someone is not convinced of the truth of what I say, I have no logical means at my disposal to convince him. From some of my utterances and behaviour he may be persuaded of the truth of my statement. But if he feels otherwise, I remain helpless. It is not an infrequent experience for many of us that in complex and delicate practical affairs our communication is not as successful and effective as it generally is in the case of the exchange of scientific ideas through well-established logical and experimental methods. When by practical affairs we mean, among other things, religious and aesthetic experiences, the problem of communication presents itself more acutely and persistently.

I have already mentioned earlier that when it comes to the question of talking about liberation or nirvāṇa, many saints (muni) and philosophers realize the futility of normal discourse and prefer to remain silent (mauna). This silence is to be distinguished from the legendary sceptic’s silence. The cognitive sceptic feels inclined to remain silent primarily because of his realisation that whatever he is able to affirm or deny is bound to be so questionable that it is practically advisable to keep silent. But when Buddha decides to keep silent on the nature of nirvāṇa, his underlying consideration is different. He feels that the richness or fullness of experience of nirvāṇa is such that words by their nature are incapable of expressing it. It is analogous to the musician’s silence, silent gaps or spaces, in between his sonic articulation of a symphony or rāga. Pauses between ordered or harmonic sounds, though silent, weave or contribute to weaving a musical pattern, and are meaningful and communicative.

Non-existence of the self before birth, its temporary existence and its non-existence after death ..... are somehow continuous,
therefore be interpreted, shared and understood by others. Meaning
is co-sharable even before it is linguistically articulated. In a sense,
meaning, like man, stands disclosed. Language is a totality of words
and has a life of its own. Although we make use of it in different
ways, yet our uses do not destroy the life of the language in the
world. By our action, inaction, intention, silence, etc. we may throw
into language some added contents but all these we succeed in doing
as enveloped by and living within language. As a symbolic system,
language penetrates into our neuro-physiological system, interrupts
and interprets its incomings and outgoings. Given the above view of
language, the concept of communication requires more depth and
comprehension. It is not to be construed merely, or even primarily,
as an information-conveying process. Rather, Heidegger claims,
communication is primarily an experience of co-sharing.
"Communication is never anything like a conveying of experiences,
such as opinion or wishes, from the interior of one subject into the
interior of another. Dasein-with is already essentially manifest in a
co-state-of-mind and co-understanding". In oral communication
what constitutes communication is not only what is talked of but
also the act of talking itself. Strictly speaking, in a real life-situation
the two are hardly distinguishable. The communicative unity of talk
and what is talked of are clearly evident in dramatic arts.

Thirdly, besides oral and non-oral communication, the other most
important mode of it is silence. Silence is a part of language and not
dissociated from it – does not stand outside of it. It may look like a
dark and rugged island encircled by a boundless and bottomless sea
but in fact it is always supported by submarine firm territory of
unheard and unspoken language.

Language has its different levels of functioning, communicative
and non-communicative. That language is intended to be
communicative is obvious and need not be stressed at length unless,
of course, we are very interested in bringing out the variety of its
nuances. But, the non-communicative language does not cease to be
a language is a point which deserves our special attention in the
context of our understanding of silence as a mode of
communication. Take the case of our communication with the
persons who are deaf and dumb. To them we do not talk. But with
them we communicate without talking or using words. They can feel
as well as know what we intend to communicate. Our
communication with them comprises not only thing-words but also
value-words. Even the shades of difference in the value-discourse are communicable to and sharable with them. Interestingly enough, this situation of successful communication, viewed externally, may appear silent – a silent situation. I say "silent", because it need not necessarily be the case. A silently communicative situation as described above discloses its human and meaningful character very naturally, but not always very correctly or exactly. In other words, the possibility of diverse interpretation is never completely ruled out.

At times we find ourselves in situations where we speak or hear or both but do not communicate. We may talk at length in a diplomatic way giving the impression (at least to the uninitiated) that one is communicating something and expressing one's self. But the initiated here may well understand that the speaker's diplomatic words are "idle" or non-communicative. Strictly speaking, the said idle character of pseudo-communicative words has a message of their own, namely, the speaker is not meaning what he is saying by using the words. It is in this sense that one is justified in affirming that words by the very nature are incapable of remaining idle in a discourse.6

References

5. M. Heidegger, Being and Time, Section 161.
6. M. Heidegger, op. cit, Section 165.
Philosophy and Religion in Schopenhauer

Matthias Kossler

Beginning in the Middle Ages – more precisely in the 14th century – it became typical in western culture to separate philosophy from religion. A separation of this type had not been undertaken before, and as far as I know is also unusual in Indian culture - at least in the way in which it is in Europe. So if we are speaking of philosophy and religion in Schopenhauer we ought to bear in mind that he looks at religion from the point of view of a philosopher to whom it is something quite different from philosophy. However, although the separation of philosophy from religion has become almost common place in western philosophy, following the enlightenment, it is not at all settled as to how to explain the difference between both.

According to Schopenhauer religion is inseparably linked to the idea of a personal, individual God (or Gods). But philosophy – which always relates to Schopenhauer's own philosophy – expresses the fact that individuality and thus personality are to be found merely in the world as representation and cannot be attributed to the thing in itself. So, in Schopenhauer's eyes, every religion depends on theism, i.e., the concept of a personal god, and each theism is revealed to be untrue by rational reasoning. True philosophy on the contrary has, for exactly the same reason, to be atheist. For this reason Schopenhauer has been called the "prince of atheism".¹

In this respect Schopenhauer infers that philosophy and religion are two "fundamentally different things which for their mutual advantage must remain strictly separate so that each may go its own way without taking any notice of the other".² Therefore claiming that rationality – and not belief – is the criterion of truth. Or as he puts it metaphorically: that "knowledge consists of a more solid stuff than belief so that when they run into each other the latter will break down".³
However, although religion is revealed to be untrue in one sense, according to Schopenhauer this does not make religion out to be a lie but in fact into “the truth appearing in the guise of a lie”. Religion offers essential truths but while doing so, chooses to use fables without admitting to their fictional character, which is also misleading. This point is crucial in understanding Schopenhauer’s attitude to religion and raises several questions, which I would like to discuss later. Let us first of all go down the path which leads to the claim that rational knowledge is more solid than belief, and which attaches Schopenhauer to the European enlightenment. From this point of view, philosophy is able to express the truth in a strict sense, while religion can only achieve this within an allegorical framework. With the development of rational knowledge religion thus becomes superfluous, and according to Schopenhauer, will one day perish.

Schopenhauer’s attitude towards religion can therefore – at least at first sight – be called pragmatic. The extent to which people are incapable of philosophical reflection, is the extent to which they are lead to religiousness so as to satisfy their “need for metaphysics”. This is the result of man’s awareness of death and his ability to reflect on the fact that the world might not exist, or even should not exist, that his thinking can look beyond the phenomenal world. Religions tell tales about the “other world”, which lies beyond the phenomenal world, whilst philosophy provides the true explanation of it, stating that the world is not merely presentation but in its very core Will, and that therefore beyond nature’s order there is another order of the thing in itself, which has ethical meaning. Whilst the philosophy of metaphysics presents the plain truth in abstract terms and has its verification in itself, religion gets its verification from the outside world having only the function of satisfying metaphysical needs and supporting moral conduct. Schopenhauer therefore calls religion “popular metaphysics”.

As a consequence of the pragmatic attitude with which Schopenhauer views religion, it allows him to compare religions in regard to how they fulfil the function attributed to religion in general. It is this impartial and objective point of view that makes Schopenhauer one of the main precursors of the modern Science of Religion. It is also this view that leads to Schopenhauer’s claim that Buddhism and Hinduism take first rank among all world-religions, followed by Christianity, while Judaism and Islam make up the end
of the scale. Schopenhauer’s scientific treatment of different religions is not limited to the comparison of them. He also considers Christianity to have been influenced by far eastern religions, especially in those elements that he esteems highly. Thus Schopenhauer was one of the first to pursue the history of religions as well as the phenomenology, psychology and sociology of religion—long before these sciences had themselves been established.7

The rank Schopenhauer attributes to a religion depends on the extent to which it expresses philosophical truth, that is, how far it corresponds with his own doctrine laid down in the World as Will and Representation. Since there are aspects of a religion which correspond with it and those which do not, Schopenhauer’s opinion pertains first and foremost not to religion as a whole but to its different doctrines: in a second respect religion itself is judged from the sum of its corresponding aspects. For instance Christianity is right in professing that human nature lives in guilt due to an original sin, but is wrong when it claims God’s creation to be good. In the same way, in Indian mythology dualistic tendencies are refuted by Schopenhauer while those doctrines which he calls “the main dogmas” are cherished as, for example, the necessity that we be redeemed from this deplorable existence.8 Nevertheless Indian religions are held to be closest to philosophical truth.

But Schopenhauer does not simply compare religions with regard to their hierarchy. He also sees conformity in several aspects of different religions. And since he is interested merely in the philosophical core of a religion he has no reason for getting involved with the different mythological guises. Thus in Schopenhauer’s writings one finds statements like “Schakia Muni and Master Eckhard teach the same”9 or “At the root and apart from the mythologies on both sides Buddha’s Sāṃsāra and Nirvāṇa are identical with Augustine’s two cities into which the world is divided, namely the city of earth and the city of god ....”.10

To sum up this first consideration of Schopenhauer’s opinion on the relation between philosophy and religion, one has to say that they are two totally different things which have to be clearly separated from each other. Philosophy is a rational method to achieve truth and to articulate truth in a strict sense. Religion is a means of providing a great mass of people with truth disguised in myths and allegories. Even if Hinduism and Buddhism are esteemed highly owing to “the greater ... content of truth that it has in itself
under the veil of allegory'' and of ``the greater distinctness with which it becomes visible through the veil'' the fundamental difference remains that philosophy asserts immediate (direct) truth while religions only possess mediated (indirect) truth.

This kind of distinction reminds us of the relation between esoteric and exoteric forms of religion itself. But in Schopenhauer’s conception of religion there cannot be an esoteric form of religion. If theology begins to recognize and to admit that its myths and tales are mere allegories it turns into philosophy. This is the path the development of knowledge follows: ‘‘Religions are necessary for the people of a society and of inestimable benefit to them. But if they oppose the progress of mankind in the pursuit of truth, they must be moved aside as carefully as possible’’. 12

Schopenhauer seems not to be thinking of the possibilities of mythological and poetical language that exceed those of scientific language when he claims philosophy to be ‘‘the complete recognition, so to say, reflection of the world in abstract concepts’’. 13 He seems not to be aware of the advantage of symbols and allegories to provide a variety of interpretations while abstract concepts are limited to one single meaning. Since religious myths are nothing but fictions people deem to be the literal truth, there is according to Schopenhauer, no path in the development of human knowledge that leads from logos to myth but only from myth to logos, that is to precise rational cognition. This is all the more astonishing as Schopenhauer is a philosopher whose style of writing is rather more poetic than scientific and who himself considered philosophy to be nearer to art than to science. 14 In his essay On Writing and Style he says that words should have an effect on a reader ‘‘just like a perfect oil-painting’’. 15

In order to reconcile these opposing statements we have to turn from the consideration of religion to that of philosophy in Schopenhauer. Up to now philosophy has been regarded as rational knowledge and as the counterpart to religion. Certainly rationality is not limited to philosophy; rather it is divided into science and philosophy. Sciences are limited to the world as representation. Since they ask why something happens and how it does, sciences are bound to the principle of sufficient reason as to their fundamental principle. ‘‘Representation under subjection to the Principle of Sufficient Reason’’ (as it is called in the subtitle of the first book of World as Will and Representation) is the proper realm of human
intellect, the sole function of which is — normally — to perceive causality.\(^{16}\)

Philosophy has in common with sciences that it depends on the normal function of the intellect following the principle of reason of knowledge. Nevertheless the question philosophy poses is not why or how something in the world happens but what the world itself is. And what the world is in its inner essence is not subordinated to the principle of reason which is limited to mere relations within the world. Thus philosophy has to answer its question by inadequate means. As a consequence the philosopher can at first only assign negative predicates to the essence of the world: it is not representation, it lies not within space and time, it does not fall under the principle of individuation etc. But because the philosopher is able to recognise that the innermost core of every representation is the will, experienced in his own acting, he goes beyond the world of representation to another, underlying order of things.

This, which in terms of Hinduism, Schopenhauer calls the lifting of the “veil of \(Māyā\)^{17}” places philosophy in common with art, and sometimes Schopenhauer claims philosophy to be the work of a genius in the same way as it is in art. Yet, a work of art is created as a result of adequate intuitive knowledge of the Idea that presents the essence, while philosophy infers the essence of the world from the experience of self-consciousness. Whatever philosophy declares positively about the essence of the world is an interpretation of the world, not an intuition of the essence itself. It is the only way to go beyond the reach of the principle of reason by reflecting according to this principle. Hence Schopenhauer defines philosophical truth as “the reference of a judgement to the relation that a perceptive representation, namely the body, has to that which is not representation at all but is something *toto genere* (totally) different therefrom, namely Will”.\(^{18}\)

Returning to the question of the relation between philosophy and religion we might ask why Schopenhauer prefers philosophical truth taking into account that it is ‘only’ an interpretation and not a scientific explanation of the world. In his own interpretation of the world Schopenhauer uses metaphors, and even when he calls the essence of the world “will” he points out that this is merely a “denominatio a potiori”,\(^{19}\) that is, a name, adopted from the clearest appearance of the essence but not a term that defines essence exactly. And what is more: he uses concepts taken from religions to
philosophy is to reflect upon the internal and external experience that everybody has, and to combine the data given within both. Thus the philosopher is able to convince others while the mystic is not: That person, who has never himself experienced the mystic view may believe in it or may not. Hence Schopenhauer warns the philosopher "not to fall into the manner of mystics ... trying to simulate a positive knowledge of what is unattainable to any knowledge at all and at best may be indicated by a negation". 26

A negative qualification of this type is put forward by Schopenhauer himself in the doctrine of the denial of the will-to-live in the last parts of the World as Will and Representation, which concludes with the single word "Nothing". The "deciphering" 27 of common experience – as Schopenhauer calls his method - leads to the result that the essence of the world is the "Will". But as we have seen, this is only an interpretation of the world using the concept of will metaphorically. The denial of the will-to-live is a step forward in the direction of pure truth, since the relation to appearance is thereby denied, from which the name "will" is taken. But this step towards truth exceeds the capability of conceptual thinking. At its zenith Schopenhauer's philosophy assumes a "negative character", 28 talking only about what is denied while that which remains in the denial of the will is called "nothing". Nevertheless, Schopenhauer claims that that which is nothing to philosophy is something positive from another angle, namely the mystical. But how can a philosopher, who should beware of falling prey to the mystics, maintain even the possibility of a positive meaning of this type? If we concede the fact that mystical experience is a reason for maintaining this thesis, philosophy would get its verification from the outside world in the same way as religion does, and the difference between both would vanish. Indeed Schopenhauer seems to argue in this fashion in his later writings when he claims mysticism to be complementary to his philosophy - first and foremost in the form in which it is contained in the Upaniṣads.

Notwithstanding this, there is a method of upholding the difference between philosophy and religion, and this, I think, is Schopenhauer's real opinion. As we have seen in this exposition of Schopenhauer's understanding of philosophy, the philosopher goes beyond the world of representation by reflecting upon his self-consciousness. Thus he is not restricted to negative predication
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One should not forget that the opponent of Demopheles in this dialogue, Philaletes, the ‘friend of truth’, does not share this opinion; and of course he is the one who represents the attitude of the philosopher much more than Demopheles. On the other hand, Schopenhauer leaves the result of the whole dialogue open and in this sense does not exclude the possibility that Demopheles might be right after all. Cf. Alfred Schmidt, loc. cit., p. 51, 131 sqq., who sees this passage as an indication to an ‘immanent religiousness’ in Schopenhauer. Cf. also Karl Werner Wilhelm, *Zwischen Allwissenheitslehre und Verzweiflung. Der Ort der Religion in der Philosophie Schopenhauers*, Hildesheim: Olms 1994, p. 18-29, who, following Schmidt, connects this thesis to Schopenhauer’s affinity with ‘Indian Religiousness’, which in his eyes not only affects what his thinking portrays but modifies it in its very intrinsic consistency.
vorgeblicher unmittelbarer Vernunftwahrnehmungen, positive Erkenntnis von Dem vorspiegeln zu wollen, was, aller Erkenntnis ewig unzugänglich, höchstens durch eine Negation bezeichnet werden kann’’.


29. Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, loc. cit., vol. 2, p. 642 (p. 560): “Für Das, was er [der individuelle Wille in der Verneinung des Willens zum Leben – M.K.] sodann ist, fehlt es uns an Begriffen, ja an Datis zu solchen. Wir können es nur bezeichnen als Dasjenige, welches die Freiheit hat, Wille zum Leben zu seyn, oder nicht’’. Cf. *Parerga und Paralipomena*, vol. 2, loc. cit., p. 331 (p. 312): “Gegen gewisse alberne Einwürfe bemerke ich, daß die Verneinung des Willens zum Leben keineswegs die Vernichtung einer Substanz besage, sondern den bloßen Aktus des Nichtwollens: das Selbe, was bisher gewollt hat, will nicht mehr. Da wir dieses Wesen, den Willen, als Ding an sich bloß in und durch den Aktus des Wollens kennen, so sind wir unvermögend zu sagen oder zu fassen, was es, nachdem es diesen Aktus aufgegeben hat, noch ferner sei oder treibe: daher ist die Verneinung für uns, die wir die Erscheinung des Wollens sind, ein Übergang in’s Nichts (To counter certain foolish objections I would note that the denial of the will-to-live does not in any way assert the annihilation of a substance; but that which hitherto willed no longer wille. Since we know this essence, the will as thing in itself merely in and by the act of willing, we are incapable of saying or comprehending what it still might be or do after it has given up that act: That is why for us who are the phenomenon of willing the denial is a passing over into nothing)’’.


31. *Ibid.*: “Dieses ist eben auch das Pradshcha-Paramita der Buddhaisten, das ‘Jenseit aller Erkenntnis’, d.h. der Punkt, wo Subjekt und Objekt nicht mehr sind’’.


1. **Honorable Shri Arjun Singh** (born November 5, 1930, Madhya Pradesh) is the Human Resources and Development (HRD) minister in the current Indian government headed by Shri Manmohan Singh, the same post that he held in the early 1990s in the Narasimha Rao government. He served as a minister in the Rajiv Gandhi government, and held the post of Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh and Governor of Punjab. He was awarded the Outstanding Parliamentarian Award for the year 2000.

2. **Matthias Kößler**, Professor at the dept. of philosophy at the University of Mainz. Founder and Director of the Schopenhauer Research Centre at the University of Mainz. President of the International Schopenhauer Society. Managing editor of the *Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch*. Co-editor of the series "*Beiträge zur Philosophie Schopenhauers*" and "*Schopenhaueriana*". Member of the scientific advisory boards of the Schopenhauer Foundation, of the Centro interdipartimentale di ricerca su Arthur Schopenhauer e la sua scuola and of the International Philipp Mainländer Society. Research interests: theories of cognition, ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, history of philosophy, philosophy of sports, (historically): Kant, German Idealism, Schopenhauer, Augustinus, Luther, Philosophy of the middle ages.

3. **Urs App**, Born in Switzerland, University education in Switzerland (Freiburg), Japan (Kyoto) and U.S.A. (Philadelphia). Doctorate in religious studies (Buddhism) at Temple University, Philadelphia. Professor of Buddhism and Associate Director at the International Research Institute of Zen Buddhism (Hanazono University, Kyoto) from 1989. Numerous publications in the field of Zen Buddhism, the
European discovery of Buddhism, and the philosophical encounter between East and West.


Chattopadhyaya is currently the Project Director of the multidisciplinary ninety-six-volume Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy and Culture (PHISPC) and Chairman of the Centre for Studies in Civilizations (CSC). Among his thirty-five books, he has authored eighteen and edited seventeen. Besides, he has published numerous articles in various national and international journals. He has also held high public offices, namely, Union Cabinet Minister and State Governor.

5. **S.R. Bhatt** is an eminent philosopher, Sanskritist and profound thinker. He retired as Professor and head of the department of Philosophy and Coordinator of UGC’s Special Assistance Programme in Philosophy in the University of Delhi. He is an internationally known authority on Ancient Indian Philosophy and Culture, having specialization in Nyāya, Buddhism, Jainism and Vedānta. He has been the general President of Indian philosophical Congress and All India Philosophy Association (Akhil Bharatiya Darshan Parishad). He has authored and edited several books and research papers on themes pertaining to philosophy, culture, values and society.

6. **Douglas L. Berger** is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, USA, where he teaches courses in Indian, Chinese and Cross-Cultural Philosophy. He is the author of “*The Veil of Maya: Schopenhauer’s System and Early Indian Thought*” (Global Academic Publications, Binghamton University, New York, 2004) and a number of scholarly articles on the Indian philosophical traditions of Mādhyamika Buddhism, Nyāya and Vedānta. Berger has done extensive research and
teaching internationally, in both Tuebingen, Germany and Tokyo, Japan.

7. **Ramesh Chandra Pradhan** is Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Hyderabad. He specializes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, Philosophy of Language and Philosophy of Mind. He has written books and papers in these areas. He was the Member-Secretary of Indian Council of Philosophical Research in 2000-2003.

8. **R. Raj Singh**, Professor and Chair of Philosophy, Brock University, Canada. Books: "*Death, Contemplation and Schopenhauer*" (Ashgate, 2007), and "*Bhakti and Philosophy*" (Rowman and Littlefield, 2006). Published several articles on Contemporary Continental Philosophy, Heidegger, Schopenhauer, History of Western Philosophy, Vedānta, Buddhism, Gandhi and the Bhakti movement. Delivered many lectures in academic events in India, China, Japan, Australia, USA, Germany, France, Italy, Trinidad and many other countries.

9. **Sitansu Ray** (retired Professor) belonged to the Department of Tagore Music of Sangeet Bhawan, Visva-Bharati. His specialization is Aesthetic Philosophy of Music. He has traveled wide. His publication includes four books and more than one hundred papers.

10. **Yasuo Kamata**, Professor of Philosophy, School of Policy Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University. Visiting Professor, Faculty of Literature, Department of Japanese Culture and Language, Cairo University, sent by Japan Foundation, March–April 2004. Visiting Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Mainz, Germany, April 2005 – March 2006. Founding member and research adviser of the Japan Schopenhauer Association, April 1988 – March 1998. Member of the executive board of the Japan Schopenhauer Association, April 1998 to now.

11. **Thomas Regehly** is the head of the Frankfurt-section of the Schopenhauer Society and a member of the Board of the Schopenhauer-Society (since 1992). He has published two books ("*Was nie geschrieben wurde, lesen – Frankfurter Benjamin-Vorträge*", 1992, and "*Namen, Texte, Stimmen*", 1992, as editor), and formed part of the editorial-board which published the volume "*Phänomenologie des religiösen*
Lebens”, as part of the works of Martin Heidegger (“Heidegger-Gesamtausgabe”, 1995). Another volume comprising the manuskript remains regarding the “Philosophy of Art and Language” for the Heidegger-edition – work is in progress.

12. **Michael Gerhard**, born 1963, studied Philosophy, Indology with the major in eastern Philosophy generally, Philosophy of Religion, Existentialism, German Idealism at Johannes Gutenberg-University of Mainz (JGU, Germany) and Buddhism Philosophy at Manjushri Institute for Buddhist Studies in Cumbria (Great Britain), Institute of Buddhist Dialectics in Dharamsala (Himachal Pradesh / India), bLi kir bGom pa (Ladhak / India). He is assistant of the Department of JGU “Practical Philosophy, Ethic and Anthropology” and the LSI-Group “BIOS – Boundary Questions of Life”, Managing Director of the Schopenhauer-Society (registered association), Member of the Directorate of the “International Philipp Mainlaender Society” (registered association).

13. **Stephan Atzert** B.A. (Hons), Ph D (Melbourne), M Ed (Monash) is Lecturer in German in the School of Languages and Comparative Cultural Studies at the University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia. He wrote his Ph D on the appropriation of Schopenhauer in the late novels of the modernist Austrian writer Thomas Bernhard, published as *Schopenhauer and Thomas Bernhard. On the literary appropriation of Philosophy*. Freiburg: Rombach, 1999. He currently explores the reception of Schopenhauer by Freud, Nietzsche and Western Orientalists, reflected in some of his recent publications (in German).

14. **Indu Sarin** is a Professor in the department of Philosophy, Panjab University, Chandigarh, India. She has published a book on *Kierkegaard – A Turning Point* and about 25 papers in Indian and International Journals and Volumes. She contributed 99 entries for the book, *Dictionary of Philosophy*. She has also participated in various national and International Conferences. The areas of her interest include Existentialism [Jaspers and Kierkegaard in particular], Philosophy of Religion and Ethics.

15. **Arati Barua** is the Founder Director of the Indian Division of the Schopenhauer Society (IDSS). She is Reader,
Department of Philosophy, Deshbandhu College, Delhi University. Book: ‘The Philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer’ (Intellectual publishing, New Delhi, 1992). Published research articles in reputed journals (national and international) of philosophy, particularly on Schopenhauer, Michael Krausz, George Grant and Gandhi. She has also participated in various national and International Conferences. She is a member of the Scientific advisory board of the Schopenhauer Jahrbuch, Germany.

16. **Eberhard Guhe** (Ph D 1999) studied Indology, mathematics and logic at the Universities of Münster (Germany) and Vienna. He majored in Indian philosophy and completed his M.A. thesis on Sasadhara’s Nyayasiddhantadipa and his Ph. D-thesis “Die Lehre von der zusätzlichen Bestimmung im Upadhidarpana” under the guidance of Prof. G. Oberhammer (Indology) and Prof. M. Goldstern (mathematics) in Vienna. He was an assistant at Vienna University (Institute for Indology) and a lecturer at the Universities of Stuttgart, Tübingen and Zürich. In 2002 he got a position as research associate at the University of Mainz in Germany (Institute for Indology), where he is currently teaching Sanskrit, Pali and Indian philosophy. His research projects include a post-doctoral thesis on “Elusandäslakuna” (a Sinhala treatise on metrics dating from the 13th century) and a Sanskrit primer in German.

The essays in this anthology exemplify the fruitfulness of international exchange among Schopenhauer scholars, and they should further stimulate additional research concerning the intersections between Schopenhauer's philosophy and Indian thought. One could well imagine that Schopenhauer would have been delighted that these essays, which were presented in India, are likely to promote greater reflection on both his thought in the very country that he saw as the home of some of the most profound insights ever articulated by the human mind.

David E Cartwright, USA.

As themes of Indian philosophy are becoming increasingly popular in the West, Schopenhauer is more and more remembered as one of the first European thinkers to familiarise both intellectuals and the general public with Indian thought. The papers of this volume, written by international experts in the field, document the lasting interest of Schopenhauer's achievement as a mediator between East and West.

Dieter Birnbacher, Germany.