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PREFACE

TO LOEB PLOTINUS IV-V

The text of these volumes, except in a few places, is that of the second volume of the revised edition of Plotinus Opera II Oxford Classical Texts, 1977. The editors, translator, and publishers have agreed that somewhat fuller critical notes should be appended to the Greek text than in the first three volumes of the Loeb Plotinus. These critical notes show clearly all places where the printed text departs from the manuscripts and all places where the text of these volumes differs from that of the Oxford Plotinus (H-S2): as a result of the extensive critical revision of the text of their first edition which the editors undertook in the preparation of the Oxford text, and in which the translator to a modest degree participated (hence the use of the first person plural in the notes where the changes are agreed by all), these latter are very few (26 in the Fourth Ennead, 7 in the Fifth). A number of them are corrections adopted by the editors after the publication of the Oxford Plotinus II and recorded in Addenda et Corrigenda ad Textum et Apparatum Lectorum in III (1982) pp. 304-325.

A word of explanation and apology is due to the reader for the long interval between the publication of the first three volumes and that of these two. The translator's work was completed (except for
minor corrections and revisions) in 1976: but as the result of the agreement between the Oxford University Press and the Loeb Classics the volumes could not have been published with the Greek text before 1979. The subsequent delay was due to the financial stringencies which beset all academic publishing at the present time.

A. H. ARMSTRONG.

SIGLA

A = Laurentianus 87, 3.
A1 = Codex A primus corrector.
E = Parisinus Gr. 1876.
B = Laurentianus 85, 15.
R = Vaticanus Regnensia Gr. 97.
J = Parisinus Gr. 2082.
U = Vaticanus Urbana Gr. 62.
S = Berolinensis Gr. 375.
N = Monacensis Gr. 215.
M = Marcianus Gr. 240.
C = Monacensis Gr. 440.
V = Vindobonensis philosophicus Gr. 226.
Q = Marcianus Gr. 242.
L = Ambrosianus Gr. 607.
D = Marcianus Gr. 209.
w = AE
x = BRJ
y = USM
z = QL
Enn.a = wxUC
Enn.b = A[æ]gUC
mg = in margin
ac = ante correctionem
pc = post correctionem
* = consensus editorum sequentium cum editorio nominato
ital. = cod. vel ed. Eusebii
H-S = Henry-Schwyzer, editio maior
H-S = Henry-Schwyzer, editio minor (= OCT)
B-T = Beutler-Theiler
Dodd = CQ 28 (1934) 47-53
V. I. ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

Introductory Note

This treatise is the tenth in Porphyry's chronological order, in which the first great treatise on the One (VI. 9) is the ninth. It is a fine example of the way in which metaphysical reflection and personal spiritual life are always indissolubly united in Plotinus. The treatise does indeed, as its title indicates, give an account of the "three primary hypostases", the three great realities of Plotinus's world, in ascending order, Soul, Intellect, and the One, and argues vigorously, if sometimes obscurely, for Plotinus's distinctive views of their differences and derivations one from the other. But it is not a textbook exposition of an abstract metaphysical system which does not involve or commit writer or reader, but an "ascent of the mind to God" which recalls man to an understanding of his true nature and dignity and guides him on his way to his ultimate goal. The first two chapters give a vivid picture of the soul's alienation and self-forgetfulness here below and remind it of its true nature in language of a power unsurpassed in the Enneads; then we are shown how, having returned to an understanding of our true nature as soul, we find transcending it Intellect and the One or Good, and are brought to see how the Good must transcend and generate Intellect. After a doxographical digression in Chapters 8 and 9 designed mainly to show (probably against contemporary objections) that what Plotinus is expounding is the true doctrine of Plato, we return in the last three chapters to a reminder of how we, being soul, can find Intellect and the One within us, and a final
ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

exhortation not to be distracted by our superficial mundane consciousness but to turn inwards and "listen to the voices from on high".

Synopsis

The souls of men have forgotten their Father and their true nature in their desire to belong to themselves which has led them into self-alienation and self-contempt and a servile admiration of material things. Two ways to convert them and lead them back up to God: one is to show how contemptible material things are, the other, better one, is to remind the soul of its high birth and value. Soul must know itself to know whether it is capable of knowing higher things (ch. 1). Every soul must remember that it made the whole universe: if it frees itself from illusion and attains to true peace it will see the great soul to which it is akin giving life and light and beauty to the world which is dead and worthless without it, keeping the heavens in motion and giving divinity to the sun and other heavenly bodies (ch. 2). When you have understood the nature of soul, go on to the next stage on the way to God, and grasp Intellect, the soul's upper neighbour, and see how soul is an image of Intellect and depends on it and is perfected by it (ch. 3). Intellect is the archetype of this visible universe, containing all that is in it in the eternal fulness of which Kronos is a symbol. How its eternal living reality is properly expressed in the categories of Plato's Sophist (ch. 4). Where does Intellect come from? The One. Number is posterior to and produced by the One and it is number (and so in another way the One) which gives Intellect its structure (ch. 5). How the One produces Intellect without movement or turning away from itself, as an eternal radiation from its perfection, and how Intellect determines itself as the perfect unity-in-diversity of the intelligible world by its return to the One, and in its turn produces Soul, as all that is perfect must produce (chs. 6–7). Confirmation that this is the true doctrine of Plato, and of Parmenides, at least as improved by Plato (ch. 8). Anaxagoras, Heraclitus and Empedocles also agree in essentials, but Aristotle, though he makes the first principle separate and intelligible, makes the mistake of thinking it a self-knowing intellect and introduces incoherence into the intelligible world by his doctrine of the plurality of unmoved movers (ch. 9). How we find Soul, Intellect, and the One within ourselves (chs. 10–11). Final exhortation to turn inwards and concentrate our attention so that we hear the voices from on high (ch. 12).
V. 1. ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

1. What is it, then, which has made the souls forget their father, God, and be ignorant of themselves and him, even though they are parts which come from his higher world and altogether belong to it? The beginning of evil for them was audacity and coming to birth and the first otherness and the wishing to belong to themselves. Since they were clearly delighted with their own independence, and made great use of self-movement, running the opposite course and getting as far away as possible, they were ignorant even that they themselves came from that world; just as children who are immediately torn from their parents and brought up far away do not know who they themselves or their parents are. Since they do not any more see their father or themselves, they despise themselves through ignorance of their birth and honour other things, admiring everything rather than themselves, and, to Intelec's coming into separate existence at VI. 9. 5. 29 (where the word ἀνεγίματος is used); cp. III. 8. 8. 32-6. And the passage here about the ὀνόμα of soul is closely parallel in thought to that on the origin of time in III. 7. 11 (the word ὀνόμα is not used there, but cp. ὁ ἄρειος ἀνεγίματος καὶ ἄρα ὁ ἄρειος ἄρα χρόνος ἀρχής). And the passage here about the ὀνόμα of soul is closely parallel in thought to that on the origin of time in III. 7. 11 (the word ὀνόμα is not used there, but cp. ὁ ἄρειος ἀνεγίματος καὶ ἄρα ὁ ἄρειος ἄρα χρόνος ἀρχής). And the passage here about the ὀνόμα of soul is closely parallel in thought to that on the origin of time in III. 7. 11 (the word ὀνόμα is not used there, but cp. ὁ ἄρειος ἀνεγίματος καὶ ἄρα ὁ ἄρειος ἄρα χρόνος ἀρχής)
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1.

Plotinus seems to have in mind the sort of melancholy commonplace, contrasting the transitoriness of human life with the ceaseless self-renewal of non-human nature, which found its finest expressions in the Latin poetry of the first century b.c., e.g. Catullus 5, Horace Gmts IV. 7; cp. [Moschus] Elegy on Bion 99-104 (which may have inspired Catullus).

Editors disagree on where, if anywhere, in the Enneads this fuller treatment is to be found, and it seems better to suppose with Harder that Plotinus may never have carried out his plan for a full-scale discourse on contempt of this world, as any rate in writing—perhaps because he found it very hard really to despise our world of sense, though he sometimes felt he ought to do so, and when challenged by people who really despised and hated it (the Gnostics) he defended its beauty and goodness passionately (cp. ff. 9).

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PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1.

... 

ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

is as an investigating soul, so that it may learn first about itself, whether it has the power to investigate things of this kind, and if it has an eye of the right kind to see them, and if the investigation is suitable for it. For if the objects are alien, what is the point? But if they are akin, the investigation is suitable and discovery is possible.

2. Let every soul, then, first consider this, that it made all living things itself, breathing life in them, those that the earth feeds and those that are nourished by the sea, and the divine stars in the sky; it made the sun itself, and this great heaven, and adorned it itself, and drives it round itself, in orderly movement; it is a nature other than the things which it adorns and moves and makes live; and it must necessarily be more honourable than they, for they come into being or pass away when the soul leaves them or grants life to them, but soul itself exists for ever because "it does not depart from itself." This is how soul should reason about the manner in which it grants life in the whole universe and in individual things. Let it look at the great soul, being itself another soul which is no small one, which has become worthy to look by being freed from deceit and the things that have bewitched the other souls, and is established in quietude. Let not only its encompassing body and the body's raging sea be quiet, but all its environment: the earth quiet, and the sea and air quiet, and the heaven itself at peace.
ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

this heaven at rest let it imagine soul as if flowing in from outside, pouring in and entering it everywhere and illuminating it: as the rays of the sun light up a dark cloud, and make it shine and give it a golden look, so soul entering into the body of heaven gives it life and gives it immortality and wakes what lies inert. And heaven, moved with an everlasting motion by the wise guidance of soul, becomes a “fortunate living being” and gains its value by the indwelling of soul; before soul it was a dead body, earth and water, or rather the darkness of matter and non-existence, and “what the gods hate”, as a poet says. The power and nature of soul will become still clearer and more obvious if one considers here how it encompasses the heaven and drives it by its own acts of will. For soul has given itself to the whole magnitude of heaven, as far as it extends, and every stretch of space, both great and small, is ensouled; one body lies in one place and one in another, and one is here and another there; some are separated by being in opposite parts of the universe, and others in other ways. But soul is not like this and it is not by being cut up that it gives life, by a part of itself for each individual thing, but all things live by the whole, and all soul is present everywhere, made like to the father who begat it in its unity and its universality. And by its power the heaven is one, though it is multiple with one part in one place and one in another, and our universe is a

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1 The phrase is used of Hades in Iliad 20. 65.
ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1.

god by the agency of this soul. And the sun also
is a god because it is ensouled, and the other heavenly
bodies, and we, if we are in any way divine, are so
for this reason: for “corpses are more throwable
away than dung”.

1 But that which is for the gods
the cause of their being gods must necessarily be a
divinity senior to them. But our soul is of
the same
kind, and when you look at it without its accretions
and take it in its purified state you will find that very
same honourable thing which [we said] was soul,
more honourable than everything which is body.

2 For all bodily things are earth; and even if they are
fire, what would its burning principle be [but soul]
And the same is true of all things compounded of
these, even if you add water to them, and air as well.

3. Since the soul is so honourable and divine a
thing, be sure already that you can attain God by
reason of its being of this kind, and with this as your
motive ascend to him: in all certainty you will not
look far; and the stages between are not many.

Grasp then the soul's upper neighbour,
2 more divine
than this divine thing, after which and from which
the soul comes. For, although it is a thing of the
kind which our discussion has shown it to be, it is
ensouled, why does one let oneself go and pursue
another? But by admiring the soul in another, you
admire yourself.

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admire yourself.

The distinction here made between the ηήσος ἄνδρες
(the thought in the mind) and the ηήσος ἀνθρώπου (the thought
expressed) first appears in Stoic logic: see SVF II 135.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1.

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whole activity, and the life which it sends out to establish another reality; as fire has the heat which remains with it and the heat which it gives. But one must understand that the activity on-the level of Intellect does not flow out of it, but the external activity comes into existence as something distinct. Since then its existence derives from Intellect soul is intellectual, and its intellect is in discursive reasonings, and its perfection comes from Intellect; like a father who brings to maturity a son whom he begat imperfect in comparison with himself. Soul’s establishment in reality, then, comes from Intellect and its thought becomes actual in its seeing of Intellect. For when it looks into Intellect, it has within it and as its own what it thinks in its active actuality. And we should call these alone activities of the soul, all it does intellectually and which spring from its own home; its inferior activities come from elsewhere and belong to a soul of this inferior kind. Intellect therefore makes soul still more divine by being its father and by being present to it; for there is nothing between but the fact that they are different, soul as next in order and as the recipient, Intellect as the form; and even the matter of Intellect is beautiful, since it has the form of Intellect and is simple. But what Intellect is like is clear from this very fact that it is superior to soul which is of such great excellence.

4. But one might see this also from what follows: if someone admires this perceptible universe, observing its size and beauty and the order of its ever-

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1 Cp. V. 8. 7. 13, where the phrase οὗτος δὲ μικρὸς ὁ ἄρσε is used of the intelligible and material universes.
ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

lasting course, and the gods in it, some of whom are seen and some are invisible, and the spirits, and all animals and plants, let him ascend to its archetypal and truer reality and there see them all intelligible and eternal in it, in its own understanding and life; and let him see pure Intellect presiding over them, and immense wisdom, and the true life of Kronos, a god who is fulness and intellect. For he encompasses in himself all things immortal, every intellect, every god, every soul, all for ever unmoving. For why should it seek to change when all is well with it? Where should it seek to go away to when it has everything in itself? But it does not even seek to increase, since it is most perfect. Therefore all things in it are perfect, that it may be altogether perfect, having nothing which is not so, having nothing in itself which does not think; but it thinks not by seeking but by having. Its blessedness is not something acquired, but all things are in eternity, and the true eternity, which time copies, running round the soul, letting some things go and attending to others. For around Soul things come one after another: now Socrates, now a horse, always some one particular reality; but Intellect is all things. It has therefore nothing at rest in the same place, and it only is, and its " is " is for ever, and there is no place for the future for then too it is—or for the past—for nothing there has passed away—but all things remain stationary for ever, since they are the same, as if

The quaint etymology of Plato Cratylus 396B6-7 is in Plotinus' mind here: but there ὑπὸ signifies τὸ καθαρὸν ὑπὸ καὶ διἀφανέον τὰς τοῖς. For Plotinus, here and elsewhere, the word ὑπὸ is applied to Intellect or Soul in its two meanings of "satiation" (signifying the plenitude of intelligible being) and "beyld" (the son of the Father, the One): cp. ch. 7 below and III. 8. 11; V. 9. 12-13.

22

1 del. Harder.

23
Plotinus is here paraphrasing what Plato says about eternal intelligible being in Timaeus 37E5-38B3 (though it is not certain whether Plato was thinking like Plotinus of timeless eternity and not rather of changeless duration). Plotinus follows the Timaeus here in insisting that all things in Intelloo: arc stationary, but when he turns, as he so often does, later in the chapter (lines 35ff.) to apply the "Platonic categories" of Sophist 254Dff. to Intellect he has to introduce the motion of thought, into it (lines 36—7); and he sometimes goes much further than here in introducing the movement which seems inseparable from our concepts of life and thought into the intelligible world: cp. V. 8. 3-4 and VI. 7. 13.

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5. This god, then, which is over the soul, is multiple; and soul exists among the intelligible realities in close unity with them, unless it wills to desert them. When it has come near them to him and, in a way, become one with him, it lives for ever. Who is it, then, who begat this god? The simple god, the one who is prior to this kind of multiplicity, the cause of this one’s existence and multiplicity, the maker of number. For number is not primary: the One is prior to the dyad, but the dyad is secondary and, originating from the One, has it as definer, but is itself of its own nature indefinite; but when it is defined, it is already a number, but a number as substance; and soul too is a number. For masses and magnitudes are not primary: these things which have thickness come afterwards, and sense-perception thinks they are realities. Even in seeds it is not the moisture which is honourable, but what is unseen: and this is number and rational principle. Therefore what is called number in the intelligible world and the dyad are rational principles and Intellect; but the dyad is indefinite when one forms an idea of it by what may be called the substrate, but each and with the ἀδύνατος ὑμεῖς; and for a fuller exposition of this very important doctrine VI. 7. 10-17 and V. 3. 11. 1-12; cp. also the account of “intelligible matter” in II. 4. 1-5. For the dyad as ὁ ὅμοιος see Chapter 1, p. 1. For Plotinus’s full treatment of the Platonic doctrine of Ideal Numbers, briefly and obscurely referred to in this chapter, see VI. 6 On Numbers. For the doctrine of the Ideal Numbers and their generation from the One and the Indefinite Dyad in Plato (as reported by Aristotle) and the Old Academy see, in the first instance, F. Merlino in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge 1980) Part I, Chapter 2, and the references there given.

1 The “dyad” here is the indefinite life or sight which is the first moment in the timeless formation of Intellect by procession from and return upon the One. See V. 4. 9. 4-16, where the ἀδύνατος ὑμεῖς of Intellect is explicitly identified with the ἀδύνατος ὑμεῖς; and for a fuller exposition of this very important doctrine VI. 7. 10-17 and V. 3. 11. 1-12; cp. also the account of “intelligible matter” in II. 4. 1-5. For the dyad as ὁ ὅμοιος see Chapter 1, p. 1. For Plotinus’s full treatment of the Platonic doctrine of Ideal Numbers, briefly and obscurely referred to in this chapter, see VI. 6 On Numbers. For the doctrine of the Ideal Numbers and their generation from the One and the Indefinite Dyad in Plato (as reported by Aristotle) and the Old Academy see, in the first instance, F. Merlino in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge 1980) Part I, Chapter 2, and the references there given.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1.

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every number which comes from it and the One is a
form, as if Intellect was shaped by the numbers
which came to exist in it; but it is shaped in one
way by the One and in another by itself, like sight
in its actuality; for Intellect is seeing sight, and
both are one.

6. How then does it see, and whom does it see?
And how did it come into existence at all and arise
from the One so as to be able to see? For the soul
now knows that these things must be, but longs
to answer the question repeatedly discussed also by
the ancient philosophers, how from the One, if it is
such as we say it is, anything else, whether a multi¬
plicity or a dyad or a number, came into existence,
and why it did not on the contrary remain by itself,
but such a great multiplicity flowed from it as that:
which is seen to exist in beings, but which we think
it right to refer back to the One. Let us speak of
it in this way, first invoking God himself, not in
spoken words, but stretching ourselves out with our
soul into prayer to him, able in this way to pray alone
to him alone.1 The contemplator, then, since God
exists by himself as if inside the temple, remaining
quiet beyond all things, must contemplate what cor¬
correspond to the images already standing outside the
temple, or rather that one image which appeared
first; and this is the way in which it appeared:
everything which is moved must have some end to
which it moves. The One has no such end, so we
must not consider that it moves. If anything comes

1 The only explicit reference to genuine prayer in Plotinus
(though his whole philosophy is prayer in this sense). Prayer
to lesser deities for material needs is for him a magical activity:
see IV. 4. 30-39.
ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

into being after it, we must think that it necessarily does so while the One remains continually turned towards itself. When we are discussing eternal realities we must not let coming into being in time be an obstacle to our thought; in the discussion we apply the word "becoming" to them in attributing to them causal connection and order, and must therefore state that what comes into being from the One does so without the One being moved: for if anything came into being as a result of the One's being moved, it would be the third starting from the One, not the second, since it would come after the movement. So if there is a second after the One it must have come to be without the One moving at all, without any inclination or act of will or any sort of activity on its part. How did it come to be then, and what are we to think of as surrounding the One in its repose? It must be a radiation from it while it remains unaltered, like the bright light of the sun which, so to speak, runs round it, springing from it continually while it remains unaltered. All things which exist, as long as they remain in being, necessarily produce from their own substances, in dependence on their present power, a surrounding reality directed to what is outside them, a kind of image of the archetypes from which it was produced: fire produces the heat which comes from it; snow does not only keep its cold inside itself. Perfumed things show this particularly clearly. As long as they exist, something is diffused from themselves around them, and what is near them enjoys their

1 ἢποδον, transpositiones, αἰῶνας genitivas (testatur Theologia): δὲ τοῦτο ἢποδον (Joannes sod. Otobonianus: διὰς H.S.1-9) delevimus; distinctio anto τῇ tellenda.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1.

1. A striking example of the often misunderstood metaphor of "emanation", on which see my contribution to The

ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

existence. And all things when they come to perfection produce; the One is always perfect and therefore produces everlastingly; and its product is less than itself. What then must we say about the most perfect? Nothing can come from it except that which is next greatest after it. Intellect is next to it in greatness and second to it; for Intellect sees it and needs it alone; but it has no need of Intellect; and that which derives from something greater than Intellect is intellect, which is greater than all things, because the other things come after it: as Soul is an expression and a kind of activity of Intellect, just as Intellect is of the One. But soul's expression is obscure—for it is a ghost of Intellect—and for this reason it has to look to Intellect; but Intellect in the same way has to look to that god, in order to be Intellect. But it sees him, not as separated from him, but because it comes next after him, and there is nothing between, as also there is not anything between soul and Intellect. Everything longs for its parent and loves it, especially when parent and offspring are alone; but when the parent is the highest good, the offspring is necessarily with him and separate from him only in otherness.

7. But we say that Intellect is an image of that Good; for we must speak more plainly; first of all we must say that what has come into being must be in a way that Good, and retain much of it and be a likeness of it, as light is of the sun. But Intellect is not that Good. How then does it generate Intellect? Because by its return to it it sees: and

Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy Part III, Chapter 15, 230-41.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1.

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this seeing is Intellect. For that which apprehends something else is either sense-perception or intellect; (sense-perception is a line etc.) but the circle is of a kind which can be divided; but this [intellectual apprehension] is not so. There is One here also, but the One is the productive power of all things. The things, then, of which it is the productive power are those which Intellect observes, in a way cutting itself off from the power; otherwise it would not be Intellect. For Intellect also has of itself a kind of intimate perception of its power, that it has power to produce substantial reality. Intellect, certainly, by its own means even defines its being for itself by the power which comes from the One, and because its substance is a kind of single part of what belongs to the One and comes from the One, it is strengthened

1 Several scholars have thought that the subject of ἐγώ in this sentence is the One or Good, which is certainly the subject of γενέ in the preceding sentence. Henry and Schwizer now accept this view (see their Addenda ad Textum in Plotini Opera III. p. 397). The sentence would then mean "The One by its return to itself sees: and this seeing is Intellect." But this simple identification of Intellect with the self-vision of the One does not agree with anything else which is said about the relationship of the two hypostases in the Enneads; and it seems to me most unlikely that Plotinus would ever have spoken of the One as "returning" upon itself and seeing itself as the unity-in-multiplicity which is Intellect: for in his thought there can be absolutely no

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separation from itself or multiplicity in the One. The development of one side of his thought about this ultimate and mysterious relationship, on the line which appears to have been followed by Porphyry, might lead to a conclusion something like this. But I do not think it should be read back into Plotinus himself without better evidence than the present ambiguous passage supplies. I therefore, with Cilento, Igal and others, suppose an abrupt change of subject (by no means unprecedented in Plotinus) and take ἀντικείμενον as non-reflexive ("it", not "itself") and understand that Plotinus is expounding his normal doctrine that Intellect constitutes itself by returning in vision or contemplation upon the One (cp. ch. 5, n. 1).

2 We need not suppose any corruption of the text here if, with Igal, we assume that Plotinus is briefly reminding his readers of an analogy which would be familiar to them, in which sense perception is compared to a line, intellect to a circle, and the One to the centre of the circle. (These early treatises were written for circulation only to a few intimate associates, for whom this sort of summary reminder would be sufficient: ep. Porphyry Life ch. 4.)

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ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

by the One and made perfect in substantial existence by and from it. But Intellect sees, by means of itself, like something divided proceeding from the undivided, that life and thought and all things come from the One, because that God is not one of all things; for this is how all things come from him, because he is not confined by any shape; that One is one alone: if he was all things, he would be numbered among beings. For this reason that One is none of the things in Intellect, but all things come from him. This is why they are substances; for they are already defined and each has a kind of shape. Being must not fluctuate, so to speak, in the indefinite, but must be fixed by limit and stability; and stability in the intelligible world is limitation and shape, and it is by these that it receives existence. **"Of this lineage** is this Intellect of which we are speaking, a lineage worthy of the purest Intellect, that it should spring from nowhere else but the first principle, and when it has come into existence should generate all realities along with itself, all the beauty of the Ideas and all the intelligible gods; and it is full of the beings which it has generated and as it were swallows them up again, by keeping them in itself and because they do not fall out into matter and are not brought up in the house of Rhea; as the mysteries and the myths about the gods say riddlingly that Kronos, the wisest god, before the birth of Zeus took back and kept within himself all that he begat, and in this way is full and

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1 A phrase from *Iliad* 6.211, applied by Plato (Republic VIII 471A4–5) to the birth of civil strife in his ideal state—another curious case of Plotinus remembering Plato's words but, apparently, forgetting their context (op. ch. 3, n. 2, p. 19).
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1.

... And after this they say he begat Zeus who is then his Koros [that is, boy and satiety] 1; for Intellect generates soul, since it is perfect Intellect. For since it was perfect it had to generate, and not be without offspring when it was so great a power. But its offspring could not be better than it (this is not so even here below) but had to be a lesser image of it, 2 and in the same way indefinite, but defined by its parent and, so to speak, given a form. And the offspring of Intellect is a rational form and an existing being, that which thinks discursively; it is this which moves round Intellect and is light and trace of Intellect and dependent on it, united to it on one side and so filled with it and enjoying it and sharing in it and thinking, but, on the other side, in touch with the things which came after it, or rather itself generating what must necessarily be worse than soul; about these we must speak later. 3 This is as far as the divine realities extend.

8. This is the reason why Plato says that all things are threefold "about the king of all"—he means the primary realities—and "the second about the second and the third about the third". But he also says that there is a "father of the cause", meaning Intellect by "the cause": for Intellect is his craftsman; and he says that it makes Soul in that "mixing-

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1 For this interpretation of the myth and play on Kphes—κόρου see ch. 4 and n. 1 there.
2 Plotinus’s invariable assumption that the product or offspring must be inferior to the producer or parent, which he rather strangely asserts here, is borne out by our experience in this world. Did he consider himself inferior to his parents?
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1.

νοῦ ὄντος σατέρα φυσι τέγαθόν καὶ τὸ ἐπίκειν
νοῦ καὶ ἐπίκεινον ὀδύστα. σαλαχοῦ βδ τὸ ὅ
καὶ τὸν νοῦ τὴν ἴδιαν λέγειν. ὅππετο Πλάτωνα εἰδέναι.
10 ἐκ μὲν τάγματο τῶν νοῶν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν νοῶν τὴν ψυχήν,
καὶ ἐκεῖ οὖσα λόγου τούτῳ μὴ καυνοῦσο μηδὲν νῦν,
ἀλλὰ πάλαι μὲν εἰρήκατα μὴ ἀναπτυκμένους, τοὺς
δὲ νῦν λόγους ἐξηγήτας ἐκεῖνων γεγονότας μαρτυ-
ρίους πιστωσαμένους τῆς δόξας τούτης παλαιός
ἐνείπε τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸν Πλάτωνα γράμμασιν.

15 ἤπειρον μὲν φάναι καὶ Παρμενίδης πρότερον τῆς
τοιούτης δόξας καθόσον εἰς ταύτῳ αναγνώριζον καὶ
νοῦν, καὶ τὸ ὅν οἷον ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐπίθετο
"τὸ γὰρ αὐτό νοεῖν ἐς τι καὶ εὐθῶν" λέγων καὶ
ἀπ'κεινενταν δὲ λέγει τοῖς καὶ προστειδει
τὸ νοεῖν σωματικὸν πάσον κίνησιν εξωμίων ἀπ'
20 αὐτοῦ, ὡς μὲν ἰσαρχών, καὶ δὴ γὰρ σαφέστατον
ἀσκείζων, ὅτι πάντα ἔχει περιελημέναι καὶ ὅτι
τὸ νοεῖν οἷον ἔξω, ἀλλ' ἐν ἑαυτῷ. ἐν δὲ λέγων ὅν
τοις ἐαυτῷ συγχράμμασι ἀκόμη ἐξείν ὡς τώ
ἐνος τοῦ τούτῳ πολλά εἴμακομένων. δὲ παρά Πλα-
25 τοῦ Παρμενίδης ἐκριβεστρον λέγων διαπρεπέ ἀ"π'

1 Plotinus begins his demonstration that his doctrine of the
Three Hypostases is the true doctrine of Plato with a favourable
text from the Platonic Letter II 312B1—4, which he also cites
in I. 8. 2 and VI. 7. 42 and alludes to in III. 6. 8. He goes
on to refer to supporting texts from Letter VI 323D2—5 and
Timaeus 34Bff. and 41D4—5. Plotinus always identifies
Plato's craftsman with his own Intellect, never with Soul,
whose function in making the physical universe he sees as
subordinate and instrumental: cp. V. 8. 7.

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bowl" he speaks of.1 And the father of Intellect
which is the cause he calls the Good and that which
is beyond Intellect and " beyond being".2 And
he also often calls Being and Intellect Idea: so
Plato knew that Intellect comes from the Good and
Soul from Intellect. And it follows that these
statements of ours are not new; they do not belong
to the present time, but were made long ago, not
explicitly, and what we have said in this discussion
has been an interpretation of them, relying on Plato's
own writings for evidence that these views are
ancient.3 And Parmenides also, before Plato,
touched on a view like this, in that he identified
Being and Intellect and that it was not among things
perceived by the senses that he placed Being, when
he said " Thinking and Being are the same". And
he says that this Being is unmoved—though he does
attach thinking to it—taking all bodily movement
from it that it may remain always in the same
state, and likening it to " the mass of a sphere",
because it holds all things in its circumference and
because its thinking is not external, but in itself.4
But when he said it was one, in his own works, he
was open to criticism because this one of his was
discovered to be many. But Parmenides in Plato
speaks more accurately, and distinguishes from each

2 Another very favourite passage from Plato Republic VI
599B8—10.

3 The belief that the true doctrines are present, but often
not explicit, in the writings regarded as traditionally authori-
tative is, for obvious reasons, essential for pagan and Christian
traditionalists of the first centuries A.D. (and for Christian
traditionalists later): cp. Origen De Principiis I 5.

4 The references are to Parmenides Diels B 8 (cited also at
I. 4. 10. 6 and III. 8. 8. 8) and B 8, 26 and 43.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1.

ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

other the first One, which is more properly called One, and the second which he calls "One-Many" and the third, "One and Many". In this way he too agrees with the doctrine of the three natures.

9. And Anaxagoras also, when he says that Intelect is pure and unmixed, posits that the first principle is simple and that the One is separate, but he neglects to give an accurate account because of his antiquity. Heraclitus also knows that the One is eternal and intelligible: for bodies are always coming into being and flowing away. And for Empedocles Strife divides, but Love is the One—he too makes it incorporeal and the elements serve as matter. Later, Aristotle makes the first principle separate and intelligible, but when he says that it knows itself, he goes back again and does not make it the first principle; and by making many other intelligible realities, as many as the heavenly spheres, that each particular intelligible may move one particular sphere, he describes the intelligible world in a different way from Plato, making a probable assumption which has no philosophical necessity. But one might doubt whether it is even probable: for it would be more probable that all the spheres, contributing their several movements to a single system, should look to one principle, the first. And one might enquire whether Aristotle thinks that the many intelligibles derive from one, the first, or whether there are many primary principles in the

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1 Plato Parmenides 137C-142A, 144E5 and 155E5. The interpretation of the Parmenides adopted here may be Neopythagorean: see E. R. Dodds "The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic 'One'", C.Q. 22 (1928) 119-42. Note the sharp distinction made between the historical Parmenides and Plato's Parmenides. Plotinus always cites the Pre-Socratics (including Pythagoras) to provide supplementary corroboration of the doctrines which he finds in Plato. He does not regard them as traditional authorities on the same level as Plato, and often thinks they are wrong.

2 The references are to Anaxagoras Diod. B 12, Empedocles B 26, 6-6, and the sort of general account of the teachings of Heraclitus given in Diogenes Laertius IX 8 (=Diels A 1).
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1.

ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

intelligible world; and if they derive from one, the situation will clearly be analogous to that of the heavenly spheres in the sense-world, where each contains the other and one, the outermost, dominates; so that there too the first would contain the others and there will be an intelligible universe; and, just as here in the sense-world the spheres are not empty, but the first is full of heavenly bodies and the others have heavenly bodies in them, so there also the moving principles will have many realities in them, and the realities there will be truer. But if each is primary principle, the primary principles will be a random assembly; and why will they be a community and in agreement on one work, the harmony of the whole universe? And how can the perceptible beings in heaven be equal in number to the intelligible movers? And how can the intelligibles even be many, when they are incorporeal, as they are, and matter does not divide them? For these reasons those of the ancient philosophers who took up positions closest to those of Pythagoras and his successors (and Pherecydes) held closely to this nature; but some of them worked out the idea fully in their own writings, others did not do so in written works but in unwritten group discussions, or left it altogether alone.

10. It has been shown that we ought to think that this is how things are, that there is the One beyond being, of such a kind as our argument wanted to show, so far as demonstration was possible in these matters, and next in order there is Being and

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1 This criticism of the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover(s) expounded by Aristotle in Metaphysics A looks rather like a Platonic development of that made by Theophrastus in Metaphysics II 7-9 Ross-Jones; but the resemblance is not close enough for us to assume that Plotinus had read Theophrastus.


3 This may possibly be a reference to Plotinus's master Ammonius: cp. Longinus in Porphyry Life ch. 29.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1.

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The phrase comes from Plato Republic IX 587A7. Plotinus uses it again at I. 1. 10. 15 (see my note there). This whole chapter shows clearly Plotinus's sense of the inadequacy of spatial metaphors and the need of using them consciously and critically.

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Top in the head. And his exhortation to separate ourselves is not meant in a spatial sense—this [higher part] of soul is naturally separated—but refers to our not inclining to the body, and to our not having mental images, and our alienation from the body if by any chance one could make the remaining form of soul ascend, and take along with us to the heights that of it which is established here below, which alone is the craftsman and modeller of the body and is actively concerned with it.

11. Since, then, there exists soul which reasons about what is right and good, and discursive reasoning which enquires about the rightness and goodness of this or that particular thing, there must be some further permanent rightness from which arises the discursive reasoning in the realm of soul. Or how else would it manage to reason? And if soul sometimes reasons about the right and good sometimes does not, there must be in us Intellect which does not reason discursively but always possesses the right, and there must be also the principle and cause and God of Intellect. He is not divided, but abides, and as he does not abide in place he is contemplated in many beings, in each and every one of those capable of receiving him as another self, just

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1 The references are to Plato Timaeus 30E2 and 60A (op. cit. 44D–E). Plotinus, probably uses the word ἐκτορόσσω (an emendation, but a convincing one), which suggests deliberate obscurity, because he did not believe, and therefore did not think that Plato believed that the soul, or any part of it, was actually located in any part of the body. For his explanation of the Platonic texts in terms of the activation of the brain and other organs by powers of the omnipresent soul see IV. 3. 22.

2 The exhortation to separation is probably Plato Phaedo 67C–D. Plotinus always interprets this text, as he does here, as referring to inner detachment, not spatial separation: op. cit. III. 6. 5.

3 A striking affirmation of the transcendence of the One over Intellect. (For the problem involved see the beginning of the first chapter of V. 2 and n. 1 there.)

4 Is Plotinus remembering here Aristotle's use of the same striking phrase for a friend, ἤτι γὰρ τὸ ἔν πάντως ἀλήθεια (Nicomachean Ethics IX 4. 1165a31–2; ep. 1169b6–7, 1170b6)?
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1.

The metaphor of circle, centre and radii, referred to in ch. 7 (see n. 2) and often used elsewhere in the Enneads (cp. e.g. IV. 2. 1. 24-9, where it is used of the relationship of immaterial indivisible being to the divisible material quasi-reality of the sense-world). It can be used at any level of the hierarchy to describe the combination of immanent presence and transcendent separateness which Plotinus sees when he is trying to describe the relationship of a relatively complex and multiple derived reality to its simpler and more unified source.

For the doctrine of consciousness mentioned here see IV. 3. 30 and n. 1 there.

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as the centre of a circle exists by itself, but every one of the radii in the circle has its point in the centre and the lines bring their individuality to it. For it is with something of this sort in ourselves that we are in contact with God and are with him and depend upon him; and those of us who converge towards him are firmly established in him.

12. Why then, when we have such great possessions, do we not consciously grasp them, but are mostly inactive in these ways, and some of us are never active at all? They are always occupied in their own activities, Intellect, and that which is before Intellect, always in itself, and soul, which is in this sense "ever-moving". For not everything which is in the soul is immediately perceptible, but it reaches us when it enters into perception; but when a particular active power does not give a share in its activity to the perceiving power, that activity has not yet pervaded the whole soul. We do not therefore yet know it, since we are accompanied by the perceptive power and are not a part of soul but the whole soul. And further, each soul-part, since it is always living, always exercises its own activity by itself; but the discovery of it comes when sharing with the perceptive power and conscious awareness takes place. If then there is to be conscious apprehension of the powers which are present in this way, we must turn our power of apprehension inwards,
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and make it attend to what is there. It is as if someone was expecting to hear a voice which he wanted to hear and withdrew from other sounds and roused his power of hearing to catch what, when it comes, is the best of all sounds which can be heard; so here also we must let perceptible sounds go (except in so far as we must listen to them) and keep the soul’s power of apprehension pure and ready to hear the voices from on high.
V. 2. ON THE ORIGIN AND ORDER OF THE BEINGS WHICH COME AFTER THE FIRST

Introductory Note

This very short treatise, the eleventh in Porphyry's chronological order, is by no means a mere fragment or sketch. It is a brief but carefully considered statement of the basic doctrine of the Three Hypostases, distinguished by a particular emphasis on their continuity. There is one life extending unbroken through all the descending stages from the One to the soul or life-principle in plants. At the beginning Plotinus shows himself vividly aware of the great difficulty which inevitably arises when any attempt is made to state a doctrine of the Transcendent Absolute in discursive philosophical language: how can we sufficiently emphasize the transcendence of the source of reality without cutting it off altogether from the reality of which it is the source? A rather disproportionate amount of the treatise (the last lines of the first of its two chapters and nearly the whole of the second) seems to be devoted to the lowest stage in the expansion of the one life, the "nature," or life-principle in plants. But, as Bréhier saw (see his introductory Notice, Vol. V, pp. 31-2 of his edition), this is because Plotinus thought that it was at this point that objections to his doctrine of continuity might most easily arise because of the apparent discontinuity and fragmentation of soul at this level.

Synopsis

The One is all things and none of them. How Intellect comes from the One and Soul from Intellect, and how...
V. 2. ON THE ORIGIN AND ORDER OF THE BEINGS WHICH COME AFTER THE FIRST

1. The One is all things and not a single one of them; it is the principle of all things, not all things, but all things have that other kind of transcedent existence; for in a way they do occur in the One; or rather they are not there yet, but they will be. How then do all things come from the One, which is simple and has in it no diverse variety, or any sort of doubleness? It is because there is nothing in it that all things come from it: in order that being may exist, the One is not being, but the generator of being. This, we may say, is the first act of generation: the One, perfect because it seeks nothing, has nothing, and needs nothing, overflows, as it were, and its superabundance makes something other than itself. This, when it has come into being, turns back upon the One and is filled, and becomes Intellect by looking towards it. Its halt and turning towards the One constitutes being, its gaze upon the One, Intellect. Since it halts and turns towards the One that it may see, it becomes at once Intellect and being. Resembling the One thus, Intellect produces in the same way, pouring forth a multiple power—this is a likeness of it just as

that which was before it poured it forth. This activity springing from the substance of Intellect is Soul, which comes to be this while Intellect abides unchanged: for Intellect too comes into being while that which is before it abides unchanged. But Soul does not abide unchanged when it produces: it is moved and so brings forth an image. It looks to its source and is filled, and going forth to another opposed movement generates its own image, which is sensation and the principle of growth in plants. Nothing is separated or cut off from that which is before it. For this reason the higher soul seems to reach as far as plants; and in a way it does reach so far, for the life-principle in plants belongs to it; it is certainly not all in plants, but it has come to be in plants in the sense that it has extended itself down to their level, and produced another degree of being by that extension, in desire of its inferior. The part before this, which is immediately dependent on Intellect, leaves Intellect alone, abiding in itself.

2. So it goes on from the beginning to the last and lowest, each [generator] remaining behind in its own place, and that which is generated taking another, lower, rank; and yet each becomes the same as that upon which it follows, as long as it does continue to follow upon it. When therefore soul comes to exist in a plant, what is in the plant is a kind of different part of it, the most audacious and stupid part of it and the one which has proceeded

1 For the relationship of this immanent principle of life and growth, or "nature", to higher soul see III. 8. 1-5; for its relationship to body see IV. 4. 18-20.

2 Cp. IV. 8. 10 (the phrase was perhaps suggested by Plato Timaeus 42E3-6).
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 2.

this far; when it comes to exist in an irrational animal, the power of sense-perception has prevailed and brought it there; but when it comes to a man, either the movement is wholly in the soul’s reasoning part or it comes from Intellect, since the soul has an intellect of its own and a self-originated will to think, or in general to be in motion. Now let us go back [to plant-souls]: when someone cuts off either the side-shoots or the tops of the branches, where has the soul in this part gone? Where it came from; for it did not move spatially away; so it is in its principle. But if you were to cut up or burn the root, where would the soul in the root be? In soul, for it has not gone to another place; but it could be in the same place—but in another if it ran up again [to the higher soul]; if it did not, it would be in another plant-soul, for it is not cramped for room; but if it ran up again, it would be in the power before it. But where is that power? In the power before itself; but that reaches as far as Intellect, not spatially; for none [of these soul-parts] was in space; but Intellect is still more emphatically not in space, so neither is this [higher] soul. Since therefore it is nowhere, but in that which is nowhere, it is in this way also everywhere, but if it proceeds upwards it stops in the middle before completely reaching the highest, it has a medium life and stays in that [middle] part of itself. All these things are the One and not the One: they are he because they come from him; they are not he, because he is in abiding by himself that he gives

2 (τη) τιμή Creuzer (ed. Paris.).  
3 οὗ γάρ coelestius: oike Enn.
THE BEINGS AFTER THE FIRST

them. It is then like a long life stretched out at length; each part is different from that which comes next in order, but the whole is continuous with itself, but with one part differentiated from another, and the earlier does not perish in the later. What, then, about the soul which comes to exist in plants? Does it not generate anything? Yes, that in which it is. But we must investigate how it does so by taking a different starting-point.
V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
AND THAT WHICH IS BEYOND

Introductory Note

This treatise, the forty-ninth in Porphyry’s chronological order, was written towards the end of the life of Plotinus (Life ch. 6). With another very late work which Porphyry placed at the beginning of the Enneads, I. 1 (53) What is the Living Being, and What is Man, it represents the last, most fully developed and clarified stage of Plotinus’s long reflection upon human nature and human thinking (Porphyry’s observation at the end of Chapter 6 of the Life on the failing of his master’s power apparent in these last treatises, written after Porphyry had left him, should not be taken too seriously). It is particularly concerned with the relationship of the intelligent soul which is our true self to the hypostasis Intellect which in one way transcends us, but which in another way we can become, and to the One beyond Intellect and being which the soul seeks to touch and to see by the light which is itself. The last eight chapters of the treatise are a demonstration as powerful as anything in Plotinus of the need to go beyond Intellect to find the first principle of reality and the soul’s true end. The treatise shows, perhaps more clearly than any other in the Enneads, the stimulation of the thought of Plotinus by critical reflection on what Aristotle says about Intellect and the exposition of Aristotelian doctrine by the great commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias, a near-contemporary of his own. (For Plotinus’s knowledge of Aristotle and of the commentaries of Alexander and other Peripatetics see Life chapter 14.)
ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES

Synopsis

If there is to be genuine self-thinking, there must be something simple which thinks itself: for one part of a thing to think another part is not really self-thinking. Perhaps soul does not think itself, but Intellect must do so (ch. 1). An investigation of the activity of reasoning soul, which is what we ourselves are, in its intermediate position between sense-perception below it and Intellect above it (ch. 2-3). How we can transcend ourselves and become Intellect (ch. 4). How the man who has become Intellect sees himself: he finds that Intellect is identical with intelligible reality; both are one single actuality (ch. 5). How we can teach our soul, when we have descended from Intellect, to understand what Intellect is by observing its traces in our own intellectuality and recognizing their derivation from the true Intellect, which is not a practical intellect (ch. 6). Intellect's knowledge of God implies its self-knowledge; its peace and quiet is its own self-directed activity. Soul acts and produces here below in and by its contemplation, which is an image of the entirely self-directed contemplation of Intellect (ch. 7). Intellect's vision of itself is not like perception here below: it is light seeing itself; this light of Intellect shines on the soul and makes it truly intelligent, so that by becoming like Intellect it is able to see Intellect (ch. 8). The highest part of soul is an image of Intellect, a light from Intellect, and by it we can know what Intellect is like and attain to it; but soul has many lives and levels, and one must start one's quest of Intellect from the level one has reached (ch. 9). Is there need to postulate an ultimate principle beyond Intellect? Intellect, since it sees itself, must be in some sense multiple, not absolutely one and simple. If it was absolutely without parts, it could not think itself or say anything intelligible about itself: the One can only be touched, not thought, and has no need to think itself (ch. 10). How Intellect as sight not yet seeing tries to apprehend the One, but only succeeds in attaining a multiple image of it which is Intellect itself; the One or Good is not one of all things, but before all things (ch. 11). There must be unity before multiplicity, the One before the many activities of Intellect. The One remains absolutely at rest, and Intellect springs from it like light from the sun (ch. 12). The One is not a "something" and is therefore ineffable and unthinkable and does not think itself: only a complex whole can say " I am existent " (ch. 13). We cannot speak or think the One, but can be aware of it in the way which those who are possessed by a god are aware of the god possessing them (ch. 14). The One gives or makes Intellect, which is all things together in one; it is the productive power in which the things which are distinct in Intellect pre-exist in absolute unity; this is the opposite of the passive potency of matter (ch. 15). There must be something other than the First, which must be multiple: the perfect life of Intellect, which depends on the Good, better than life and intellect (ch. 16). This dependence on the Good is the reason for the perfect self-sufficiency of Intellect. The birth-pangs of the soul: utter inadequacy of thought and discursive reason to satisfy its longing or express what it experiences in its union with the One. The ultimate sudden illumination, when we see God by his own light, if we let everything go (ch. 17).
V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES AND THAT WHICH IS BEYOND

1. Does that which thinks itself have to be complex, in order that it may with one of its constituents contemplate the rest, and so be said to know itself, on the supposition that the absolutely simple would not be able to return to itself and the intellectual grasp of itself? Or is it possible for that which is not composite also to have an intellectual awareness of itself? For that which is said to think itself because it is composite, just because it thinks the rest with one of its constituents, as in sense-perception we might grasp our own shape and the rest of our bodily nature, would not have true self-intellection; for it would not be the whole which was known in these circumstances, if that thing which thought the others which were with it did not also think itself, and this will be, not what we are looking for, a thing which thinks itself, but one thing thinking another. One must, then, assume that a simple thing thinks itself, and investigate as far as possible how it does so, or else one must abandon the opinion that anything really thinks itself. Now to abandon this opinion is not very possible, since many absurdities follow from its abandonment; for even if we do not attribute self-thinking to the soul on the ground that this is not very absurd, yet it is absolutely

1 For a fuller discussion of this see ch. 5.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3.

absurd not to attribute it to the nature of intellect, and suppose that it has knowledge of everything else but is not in a state of knowledge and understanding of itself. For it will be, not intellect, but sense-perception (and, if you like, discursive thought and opinion) which is aware of external things; and it is appropriate to consider whether intellect has knowledge of them or not; but obviously intellect is going to know everything which is intelligible. Will it then know the intelligibles only, or itself as well, which is to know them? And will it know itself in such a way that it knows the intelligibles alone but does not know who it is, but will know that it knows the intelligibles which belong to it, but will not yet know who it is? Or will it know both what belongs to it and itself? And we must consider in what way and to what extent it know itself.

2. First we must enquire about the soul, whether we should grant it knowledge of itself, and what is that which knows in it, and how. We could say at once that its perceptive part is perceptive only of what is external; for even if there is a concomitant awareness of what goes on inside the body, yet even here the apprehension is of something outside the perceptive part; for it perceives the experiences in its body by its own agency, but the reasoning power in soul makes its judgment, derived from the mental images present to it which came from sense-perception, but combining and dividing them; and, as for

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1. Ficino’s inserted negative (see critical note) seems to me necessary to the sense here. There is an apparent reminiscence of this passage in Augustine De Trinitate IX 3, 3 (PL 42, 982).

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The things which come to it from Intellect, it observes what one might call their imprints, and has the same power also in dealing with these; and it continues to acquire understanding as if by recognising the new and recently arrived impressions and fitting them to those which have long been within it: this process is what we should call the "recollections" of the soul. And does the intellect of the soul come to the end of its power and stop at this point, or does it turn back upon itself and know itself? This must certainly be attributed to Intellect. If, then, we grant self-knowledge to this part of soul—for we shall admit that it is an intellect—we shall also enquire how it differs from the Intellect above; but if we do not grant it [to the intellect in soul] we shall come to that higher Intellect as we advance in our argument, and we shall consider what "itself knowing itself" means. But if we grant it here too, in the lower intellect, we shall investigate what the difference in self-thinking [between lower and higher intellect] is; for if there is none, this part of soul is already pure Intellect.1 Does then this reasoning part of the soul itself return upon itself? No, it does not. It has understanding of the impressions which it receives from both sides. And we must first enquire how it has understanding.

3. Well, then, sense-perception sees a human being and gives its impression to discursive reason. What does reason say? It will not say anything yet, but only knows, and stops at that; unless perhaps it asks itself "Who is this?" if it has met the person...
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before, and says, using memory to help it, that it is
Socrates. And if it makes the details of his form
explicit, it is taking to pieces what the image-making
power gave it; and if it says whether he is good, its
remark originates in what it knows through sense-
perception, but what it says about this it has already
from itself, since it has a norm of the good in itself.
How does it have the good in itself? Because it is
like the good, and is strengthened for the perception
of this kind of thing by Intellect illuminating it:
for this is the pure part of the soul and receives the
reflection of intellect coming down upon it. But
why is this not intellect, and the rest, beginning from
the power of sense-perception, soul? Because it
must be soul that is engaged in reasoning; and all
this is the work of a reasoning power. But why do
not we give self-thinking to this part, and finish with
the subject? Because we gave this part the task
of observing what is outside it and busying itself
with it, but we think that it is proper to Intellect to
observe what belongs to itself and what is within
itself. But if someone is going to say "What pre¬
vents this part of soul from observing what belongs
to itself by another power?" he is not looking for
the power of discursive reasoning or rationality, but
is grasping pure Intellect. What then prevents
pure Intellect from being in soul? Nothing, we shall
reply. But ought we to go on to say that it belongs
to soul? But we shall not say that it belongs to soul,
but we shall say that it is our intellect, being different
from the reasoning part and having gone up on high,
but all the same ours, even if we should not count it
among the parts of soul, yes, really, it is ours and not
ours; for this reason we use it and do not use it—
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But we always use discursive reason—and it is ours when we use it, but not ours when we do not use it. But what is this “using”? Is it when we become it and speak like it? No, in accord with it: for we ourselves are not Intellect. We are, then, in accord with it by our rational power which first receives it. For we perceive through perception, even if it is not we ourselves who are the perceivers: do we then reason like this, and think through Intellect like this? No, it is we ourselves who reason and we ourselves make the acts of intelligence in discursive reasoning: for this is what we ourselves are. The activities of Intellect are from above in the same way that those of sense-perception are from below; we are this, the principal part of the soul, in the middle between two powers, a worse and a better, the worse that of sense-perception, the better that of Intellect. But it is generally agreed that sense-perception is always ours for we are always perceiving—but there is disagreement about Intellect, both because we do not always use it and because it is separate; and it is separate because it itself does not incline towards us, but we rather look up towards it. Sense-perception is our messenger, but Intellect is our king.1

1 See critical note. I agree with Igal in seeing here an etymological explanation of διανοομένη. 
2 Igal: διανοομένη. 
3 Igal: ἐννοομένη.

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The term “separate” (χωριστόν) comes from Aristotle De Anima 480a17. Here as elsewhere Plotinus takes Aristotle’s thought about Intellect as the starting-point of his own reflections. Plotinus goes on to make it clear that his intellect is the divine Intellect which is “king of heaven and earth” in Plato’s Philebus 28C7-8. Though this goes far beyond anything in the text of the De Anima, Alexander of Aphrodisias, whose commentaries Plotinus knew (Life ch. 14, 13), had identified the “active Intellect” of the De Anima with the divine Intellect which is Aristotle’s First Cause, the Unmoved Mover (Alexander De Anima 89, 92-3 Bruns, op. Manitissa 110-13 Bruns, where Alexander is to some extent following an earlier commentator, either Aristotle’s of Messene or, according to Zeller’s not certainly necessary emendation of the text, Aristotle).
4. But we too are kings, when we are in accord with it; we can be in accord with it in two ways, either by having something like its writing written in us like laws, or by being as if it were present to our knowledge. Moreover, when we come to know ourselves, we can do so in two ways, either by having something like its writing written in us like laws, or by being as if tilled with it and aware of it as present. And we know ourselves by learning all other things by such a vision, either learning a vision of this kind according to the knowing power, by that very power itself, or ourselves becoming it; so that the man who knows himself not only, one knowing the nature of the reasoning which belongs to soul, and one up above this man, who knows himself according to Intellect because he has become that Intellect; and by that Intellect he thinks himself again, not only as man, but having become altogether other and snatch¬
ing himself up into the higher world, drawing up only the better part of soul, which alone is able to be winged for intellection,1 with which someone there keeps by him what he sees. But really does not the part which reasons discursively know that it is the reasoning part, and that it gains understanding of the things outside it, and that it judges what it judges, and that it does so by the rules in itself which it has from Intellect, and that there is something better than itself, which does not seek, but totally possesses? But does it not know what, this is itself, when it knows what kind of thing it is and what its works are? If, therefore, it says that it is from Intellect and second after Intellect and an image of Intellect, having in itself everything as if written in it, as the one who writes and has written is the examiner, etc. 2

1 One of Plotinus's continual allusions to the Phaedrus myth, Plato Phaedrus 246ff.

2 del. Theiler, at correctionem ad lin. 17 falso loco insertam.
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...there [in Intellect], will one who knows himself as far as this stops there, but shall we by using another power as well behold also the Intellect which knows itself, or, having a part in that Intellect, since that belongs to us and we belong to it, shall we in this way know Intellect and ourselves? Yes, we must so know, if we are to know what "self-knowledge" in Intellect means. A man has certainly become Intellect when he lets all the rest which belongs to him go and looks at this with this and himself with himself: that is, it is as Intellect he sees himself.

5. Does he then see himself with another part of himself? But in this way one would be the seer, and the other the seen; but this is not "self-knowledge". What, then, if everything of this kind is, in a way, composed of exactly similar parts, so that the seer does not differ in any way from the seen? First of all, the division of itself into parts is absurd: for how will it divide? Certainly not at random; and who is the divider? The one who sets himself on the contemplating or on the contemplated side? Then, how will the contemplator know himself in the contemplated when he has set himself on the contemplating side? For the contemplating is not in the contemplated. Knowing himself in this way, he will know himself as contemplated but not as contemplating; so that he will not know himself completely or as a whole; for what he saw, he saw as contemplated but not as contemplating: and so he will have been seeing another, but not himself. Or perhaps he will add from himself the one who has contemplated, in order that he may have perfect knowledge of himself. But if he adds the one who has contemplated, he at the same time adds what he

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sees. If then the things contemplated are in the contemplation, if what are in it are impressions of them, then it does not have them themselves; but if it has them themselves it does not see them as a result of dividing itself, but it was contemplator and possessor before it divided itself. But if this is so, the contemplation must be the same as the contemplated, and Intellect the same as the intelligible; for, if not the same, there will not be truth; for the one who is trying to possess realities will possess an impression different from the realities, and this is not truth. For truth ought not to be the truth of something else, but to be what it says. In this way, therefore, Intellect and the intelligible are one, and this is reality and the first reality, and also the first Intellect which possesses the real beings, or rather is the same as the real beings. But if the intellection and the intelligible are one, how because of this will that which thinks think itself? For the intellection will in a way encompass the intelligible, or be the same as the intelligible, and Intellect will not yet be clearly thinking itself. But if intellect and intelligible are the same—for the intelligible is something active and actual: for it is certainly not a potentiality (and no: unintellectual either), nor is it without life, nor again are life and thought brought in from outside to something else, as if to a stone or something lifeless—then the intelligible is the primary substance. If then it is active actuality, and the first actuality and the fairest, it is the first intellection and substantial intellection: for it is the truest; but an intellection of this kind which is primary and primarily intellective will be the first Intellect; for this Intellect is not potential, nor is

1 Theiler, textus Epistulae 61: ye νοητον Ἐμν.*
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It is one and its intellection another: for in this way again its substantiality would be potential. If then it is actuality and its substance is actuality, it is one and the same with its actuality; but being and the intelligible are also one with the actuality. All together are one, Intellect, intellection, the intelligible. If therefore Intellect’s intellection is the intelligible, and the intelligible is itself, it will itself think itself: for it will think with the intellection which it is itself and will think the intelligible, which it is itself. In both ways, then, it will think itself, in that intellection is itself and in that the intelligible is itself which it thinks in its intellection and which is itself.

6. The argument, then, has demonstrated that self-thinking in the proper and primary sense is something which exists. The thinking is different when it is in soul but is more properly thinking in Intellect. For the soul [we observed] thought itself as belonging to another, but Intellect did so as itself, and as what and who it is, and [it started its thinking] from its own nature and thought by turning back to itself. For in seeing the real beings it saw itself, and in seeing it was in act, and its actuality was itself: for Intellect and intellection are one; and it thinks as a whole with the whole of itself, not one part of itself with another. Has then our argument demonstrated something of a kind which has the power to inspire confidence? No, it has necessity, not persuasive force; for necessity is in Intellect but persuasion in the soul. It does seem that we seek to persuade ourselves rather than to behold truth by pure intellect. For while we were above in the nature of Intellect, we were satisfied and
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[really] thought and saw, gathering all things into one; for it was Intellect thinking and speaking about itself, and the soul kept quiet and went along with the working of Intellect. But since we have come to be here below again and in soul, we seek for some kind of persuasion, as if we wanted to contemplate the archetype in the image. Perhaps, then, we ought to teach our soul how Intellect contemplates itself, and to teach that part of the soul which is in some way intellectual, since we call it discursively intelligent and by this naming indicate that it is a kind of intellect or that it has its power through and from Intellect. This therefore should know that in its own case too it comes to know what it sees and knows what it speaks. And if it was what it speaks, then it would in this way know itself. But since the things which it speaks are above, or come to it from above, whereas it also comes itself, it could happen to it, since it is a rational principle and receives things akin to it, and fits them to the traces in itself, in this way to know itself. Let it then transpose the image to the true Intellect, the one we observed which was the same as the truths it thought which are really existent and primary, both because it was not possible for it, being of such a kind, to be outside itself—so that if it is in itself and with itself, and that which it is, is Intellect (there could not even be an unintelligent intellect), its knowledge of itself must necessarily accompany it—and because it is in itself and has no other function and no other substance than to be Intellect. For it is certainly not a practical intellect: as the practical intellect looks to the outside and does not stay in itself, it

1 Kirchhoff*: atóς w|BR*JUC.
2 Kirchhoff*: ἀνέπτυχα Ευμ.
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could have a kind of knowledge of the things outside, but if it was altogether practical, there would be no necessity in it of knowing itself. But the Intellect which has no practical activity—pure Intellect does not even have a desire for what is absent from it—for this the return upon itself demonstrates that its knowledge of itself is not only probable but necessary. For [otherwise] what could its life be, being free from practical activity and in intellect?

7. "But it contemplates God", we might say. But if anyone is going to admit that it knows God, he will be compelled to agree that it also knows itself. For it will know all that it has from him, and what he gives, and what his power is. But when it has learnt and knows this, then in this way also it will know itself: for it is itself one of his gifts, or, rather, itself all of his gifts. If then it comes to know that [Good], learning by his powers, it will come to know itself since it comes from there and has received what it can; but if it cannot see him clearly, since perhaps that seeing is the sight itself, then especially in this way it will remain for it to see and know itself, if this seeing is being the sight itself. For what else should we give it? Peace and quiet, of course. But peace and quiet for Intellect is not going out of Intellect, but the peace and quiet of Intellect is an activity taking its rest from all other

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1 The idea that God can only be known through his powers was widespread: cf. Cicero De Divinatione 1 70; Philo De Posteritate Caini 167. It did not, of course, satisfy Plotinus, for whom direct vision of and union with God (the One or
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3.

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activities, since for other beings also, which are left in peace and quiet by other things, there remains their own proper activity, above all for those whose being is not potential but actual. The Being of Intellect, therefore, is activity, and there is nothing to which the activity is directed; so it is self-directed. Thinking itself, it is thus with itself and holds its activity directed to itself. For if anything comes from it, it is in itself and directed to itself. For it had to be first in itself, then also directed to something else, or with something else coming from it made like itself, just as it is since fire is previously fire in itself and has the activity of fire that it is able to produce a trace of itself in another. Again, Intellect is an activity contained in itself; and, as for soul, the part of it directed to Intellect is, so to speak, within, and the part outside Intellect directed to the outside. In one part, then, it is made like that from which it comes, in the other even in its unlikeliness it is made like, even here below in its action and production; for its action is simultaneously contemplation, and in its production it produces forms, which are like intellections carried out in practice, so that all things are traces of intellect and Intellect proceeding according to their archetype, the ones near it representing it closely, and the last and lowest keeping a faint image of it.

1. But as what sort of thing does Intellect see the intelligible, and as what sort of thing does it see itself? As for the intelligible, one should not look for something like colour or form in bodies; for last and lowest activities of soul, see the first seven chapters of the treatise On Contemplation (III. 8).
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the intelligibles exist before the existence of these; and the rational forming principle in the seeds which produce these are not form and colour; for both these and still more the intelligibles are naturally invisible. And they and those which possess them have the same nature, as do also the rational principle in the seed and the soul which possesses these [invisible principles of colour and form]. But the soul does not see what it possesses; for it did not even generate them, but this soul as well as the rational forming principles is an image; but that from which it came is the clear and the true and the primary, and so belongs to itself and exists for itself; but this [image], if it does not belong to something else and exist in something else, does not persist; for “it is proper to an image, since it belongs to something else, to come to exist in something else”, unless it is in close dependence on that original. It does not even see, therefore, because it does not have enough light, but if it does see, it does not see itself but another thing perfected in something else. But there is none of this in the intelligible world, but there seeing and the seen coincide, and the seen is like the seeing and the seeing like the seen. Who then will tell what it is like? The seer: and Intellect is the seer. For here below also sight, since it is light, or rather united with light, sees light: for it sees colours; but in the intelligible world seeing is not through another [medium], but through itself, because it is not [directed] outside. Intellect therefore sees one light with another, not through another. Light then sees another light: it therefore itself sees itself. And this light shining in the soul illuminates it; that is, it makes it intelligent; that

1 From Plato Timaeus 53C2-4.

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is, it makes it like itself, the light above. For if you consider that it is like the trace of light that comes to be in the soul and still more beautiful and greater and clearer, you will come near to the nature of Intellect and the intelligible. And again, this illumination gives the soul a clearer life, but a life which is not generative; on the contrary it turns the soul back upon itself and does not allow it to disperse, but makes it satisfied with the glory in itself; and it is certainly not a life of sense-perception either: for sense-perception looks outside and perceives the external world; but he who has received that light of the true realities sees, so to speak, the visible things no better, but their opposite. The remaining possibility, then, is for the soul to have received an intelligent life, a trace of the life of Intellect: for the true realities are there. But the life and activity 1 of Intellect is the first light shining primarily for itself and an outshining upon itself, at once illuminating and illuminated, the truly intelligible, both thinker and thought, seen by itself and needing no other that it may see, supplying itself with the power of seeing—for it is itself what it sees—known to us by that very power, so that the knowledge of it comes to us through itself; otherwise from where should we have the ability to speak about it? It is such a kind that it apprehends itself more dearly, but we apprehend it by means of it; by reasonings of this kind our soul also is led back up to it, considering itself to be an image of Intellect: as its life is a reflection and likeness of

1 Again a reminiscence of Aristotle's description of divine Intellect: cp. Metaphysics Α. 7. 1072b27.
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It, and when it thinks it becomes godlike and intellect-like; and if one asks it what sort of thing is that perfect universal Intellect which has primary knowledge of itself, it first comes to be in Intellect or makes room for Intellect to exercise its activity, and shows itself really in possession of the things of which it has the memory in itself, so that through soul which is its image one can in some way see Intellect, through the soul which is brought more precisely to likeness, as far as a part of soul can come to likeness with Intellect.

9. It is probable, then, that he who intends to know what Intellect really is must know soul, and the most divine part of soul. This could happen also in this way, if you first of all separated the body from man (and, obviously, from yourself), and then the soul which forms it and, very thoroughly, sense-perception and desires and passions and all the rest of such fooleries, since they incline so very much towards the mortal. What remains of soul is this which we said was an image of Intellect preserving something of its light, like the light of the sun which, beyond its spherical mass, shines around it and from it. Now one would not concede that the light of the sun exists by itself which is around the sun itself, springing from it and remaining around it, though one light comes from another, always going forth from that before it until it reaches us on the earth; but one will place all of it, including that which is around the sun itself, in something else, so as not to assume that there is a space, that under the sun, which is empty of body. But the soul has arisen from In-

1 Kirchhoff*: στοιχ Ειπ., H-S 1.
2 Kirchhoff*: Σε Ειπ., H-S 1.
3 Kirchhoff*: έστω Ειπ.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3.


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tellect as a light around it and is immediately dependent on it and not in something else but around it, and has no place, for neither has intellect. So the light of the sun is in the air, but the soul itself which is of this kind is pure, so that itself and any other soul of the same kind can see it by itself. And soul must draw conclusions about what intellect is like, starting its investigation from itself, but intellect knows itself without drawing conclusions about itself; for it is always present to itself, but we are only so when we attain to it; for our life is divided and we have many lives, but intellect has no need of another life or other lives, but the lives which it gives, it gives to others, not to itself: for it has no need of the worse, nor does it give itself the less when it has the all, nor the traces of reality when it has the primary realities, or rather does not have them, but is them itself. But if someone is unable to grasp this kind of soul which thinks purely, let him take the soul which forms opinions, and then ascend from this. But if he cannot even do this, let him take sense-perception which acquires the forms in broader extension and sense-perception by itself with its powers which is already in the forms. But if someone wants to, let him descend to the generative soul and go right on to what it makes, and then ascend from there, from the ultimate forms to the forms which are ultimate in the opposite sense, or, rather, to the primary forms.

10. So much for this. But if there were only the things which are made, there would be no ultimate realities. But in the intelligible world the principles which make are primary; it is because they make that they are primary. The primary principle, then,
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3.

and the making principle must coincide, and both must be one: if not, there will be need of yet another. What then? Is there not a need of that which is beyond Intellect? Or is Intellect this? What then? Does it not see itself? This one has no need of seeing.

But this we will deal with later. Now let us say again—for our investigation is not about some casual matter—we ought to repeat that this Intellect needs to see itself, or rather to possess the seeing of itself, first because it is multiple, and then because it belongs to another, and must necessarily be a seer, and a seer of that other, and its seeing is its substance; for the existence of something else is a necessary condition of seeing, and if there is nothing else seeing is useless. There must, then, be more than one, that seeing may exist, and the seeing and the seen must coincide, and what is seen by itself must be a universal multiplicity. For what is absolutely one has nothing to which to direct its activity but since it is " alone isolated " it will remain absolutely immobile. For in so far as it is active, there is one thing after another: but if there is not one thing and then another, what will it make, or where will it proceed? Therefore that which is active must either be acting on something else, or must itself be a multiple thing, if it is to be active within itself. But if a thing is not going to go forth to something else, it will be immobile; but when it is altogether immobile, it will not think. The thinking principle, then, when it thinks, must be in two parts, and either kinds of knowledge. Plotinus does not always remember or advert to the context of the Platonic phrases which come into his mind.

1 Müller: <Δικαιοκρίτης> Volkmann, H-S 1.
2 An inappropriate reminiscence of Plato Phaedrus 33D-5, where Plato seems to be saying that the "class" of pleasures should not be kept alone and isolated from the "class" of

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one must be external to the other or both must be in the same, and the thinking must be in otherness, and necessarily also in sameness; and the proper objects of thought must be the same and other in relation to the intellect. And, yet again, each of the things which are being thought brings out along with itself sameness and otherness; or what will the thinker think which does not contain one and then another? For certainly if each one is a rational principle, it is many. So it comes to know itself by being an eye which sees a variety of images or by being an object of varied colours. For if it directed its gaze to a single object without parts, it would be without thought or word: for what would it have to say about it, or to understand? For if the absolutely partless had to speak itself, it must, first of all, say what it is not; so that in this way too it would be many in order to be one. Then when it says “I am this”, if it means something other than itself by “this”, it will be telling a lie; but if it is speaking of some incidental property of itself, it will be saying that it is many or saying “I am” or “I am”. Well then, suppose it was only two things and said “I and this”. It would already be necessary for it to be many: for, as the things are diverse and in the manner of their diversity, number is present and many other things. Therefore the thinker must apprehend one thing different from another and the object of thought in being thought must contain variety; or there will not be a thought of it, but only a touching and a sort of contact without speech or thought, pre-thinking because Intellect has not yet come into being and that which touches does not think. But

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1 Again the “Platonic Categories”; cp. Plato Sophist 254D-E.
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45 µνῆς αὐτῶ ἀλλάζων ἀπλοῦν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἐν μάλιστα αὐτῷ νοῇ: διαχάσει γὰρ αὐτῷ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ κύκλου δὴ τὴν σωματίων. 1 εἴη οὖν δήθη σύνει ὁλον ποιητογραφεῖν ἑαυτῷ: τὸ γὰρ καὶ μαθήσαι νοῆσαι; πρῶς γὰρ νοῦν νοήσων ὑπάρξῃ ἕπειτ' ἑκτὸν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ πόθος τῆς καὶ η γνώσεως ἐστι καὶ οἷον ζητήματος εἰρέοις, τὸ τοῦν διάφορον πάντη αὐτὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ μένει, καὶ οἷον ζητεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ, οὗ ἐξελέτει ἑαυτῷ, καὶ πολλὰ γὰρ εἰπ.  

50 τὸν καὶ αὐτὸν νοῦς ὅποι οἱ πολλοὶ, ὅταν τὸ ἐπέκεκα ἐδέξα νοεῖν, ἐς 2 μὲν οἷον ἑαυτῷ ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλ' ἐπιβαλλείς θέλων ὡς ὡλὴ ἐξείων ἄλλο ἃ ἠμβάλλεις εἰς αὐτῷ πληθυνόμενον; ὅπερ ὁρισθεῖ 3 μὲν ἐν' αὐτῷ ἑνός ἡ μέν ἡς ὥσπερ ἦρεται θυσία, ἐξήλθε δὲ ἡμοῦ ὅπερ αὐτῷ ἐπήρεθεν ὡς τὸν καὶ μὲν ἐπηθύμησεν ἁπάτως ἡμοῦ ὑπεζ. ἡμᾶς αὐτῇ φαντασμά τι, ἐξήλθε δὲ ἄλλο λαβόμενα ἐν αὐτῇ αὐτῷ πολυποιόμενα. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖ ἐκ τοῦν τοῦ ὁρίσματος: ἦ γὰρ περιθέοτα ἐν αὐτῇ γνώσθαι.  

10 τοῖς καὶ πολλοῖς ἐς ἑνὸς ἐγένετο, καὶ αὐτῶς 4 γνῶς ἐδέξαντο αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸν ἐγένετο θυσία ὡστ. τοῦτο δὲ ἡμῖν νοεῖ, ὡς ἐξῆς, καὶ ὅσῳ νοεῖ; πρὸ δὲ τοῦτον ἐθέθην μόνον καὶ 

1 Page: σουτων Ἑκκ.  
2 Schwyzer: ζοὺς μὲν τοιαύτα υπάρχῃ Ἠ.-S.; πρὸ γὰρ ἑνὸς ἡμῶν ὑπάρχῃ Ἑκκ.  
3 Dodds (loc. cit.): ἡ Ἑκκ.: καὶ Kirchhoff*: εἰς ἑκκ.  
4 Kirchhoff*: αὕτως δὲ Ἑκκ., Ἠ.-S.  

1 H.-R Schwyzer now wishes to read in line 2, instead of ἐπήρεθεν, the better attested MS reading ἐπέβλεψεν. "to flower upon the One in its simplicity" instead of "to attain to the One in its simplicity". His reasons seem to me strong.

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the thinker must not itself remain simple, especially in so far as it thinks itself: for it will duplicate itself, even if it gives an understanding which is silent. Then [the One] will not need to make a kind of fuss about itself: for what will it learn by thinking itself? For what it is will belong to itself before Intellect thinks. Also, knowledge is a kind of longing for the absent, and like the discovery made by a seeker. But that which is absolutely different remains itself by itself, and seeks nothing about itself; but that which explicates itself must be many.

11 Therefore this multiple Intellect, when it wishes to think that which is beyond, [thinks] that itself which is one, but in wishing to attain to it in its simplicity 1 comes out continually apprehending something else made many in itself; so that it moved to it not as Intellect but as sight not yet seeing, but came out possessing the multiplicity which that sight itself made; so that it desired one thing, having vaguely in itself a kind of image of it, but came out having grasped something else which it made many in itself. The sight, again, certainly has the impression of what is seen: otherwise it would not have allowed it to come into existence in itself. But this impression became many out of one, and so Intellect knew it and saw it, and then it became a seeing sight. It is already Intellect when it possesses this, and it possesses it as Intellect; but before this but not certainly convincing, and the change might have considerable implications for our understanding of Plotinus's thought about the relationship of the One and Intellect. But it certainly deserves serious consideration.

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PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3.

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Of the many conjectures which have been made to replace the corrupt MSS reading ἐφίδιαιος (see H-S critical note) Igal's ἐδίδειον seems to me the best, and I adopt it in the text. Intellect only constitutes itself as Intellect because it eternally falls short in its endeavour to reach the One and therefore is perpetually in need of and perpetually desires the One: cp. III. 3, 11. 23-4 καὶ ἐδίδειον καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τούχων.
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12. Kai τι καὶ ως οὕτω πλήθος εἶναι, ἐξος ἐστὶν οὐδεὶς ὁμοία μᾶλ; τὸ γὰρ πλήθος οὐ συνθέως, ἀλλ' αἱ ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ τὸ πλήθος. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ μὴ ὁμοίαι, ἀλλ' ἐκ δυνάμεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἔρχεται, οὐ πλήθος μὲν, ἀλλὰς δὲ πρὶν ἐνέργησα τῇ ὁμοίᾳ. εἰ δὲ τῇ ὁμοίᾳ αὐτοῦ ἐνέργεια, ἢ δὲ ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ τὸ πλήθος, τοσοῦτον ἐστὶν ἡ ὁμοία αὐτοῦ, ὅσον τὸ πλήθος. τοῦτο δὲ τῷ μὲν ὁμοίῳ συγχρωμένοι, ὥς καὶ τῷ νοεῖν ἐπεξεργαζόμεν, τῇ δὲ ἐρχῇ πάντων ὁμοίως. δειται δὲ πρὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ τὸ ἐν εἶναι, ἂφ' οὐ καὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐν τῷ ἀρίθμῳ γὰρ παντὸς τὸ ἐν πρῶτον. ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ἀρίθμῳ μὲν οὕτως βασὶ συνθέως γὰρ τὰ ἐξής ἐπί δὲ τῶν ὄντων τὰ αὐτάκι ἐδέω καὶ ἐναι δέων ἐν τῇ ὁμοίᾳ, ἂφ' οὐ τὰ πολλά; ἡ διοικημάτων ἐστί σπ' ἀλλήλων ταῦτα τολμά, ἂλλο ἠφθανεν ἐπὶ τὴν σύνθεσιν 10 κατὰ τὰ μακρόν λέον, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐνός τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐκλογής ὁμοίως φήσας τὸς ἐνέργειας προειλθεῖν τῇ ἐξής τε ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὄντων τὰ ἐνέργειαν τῇ ὁμοίᾳ. εἰπα τὸν ἐνέργειας μενοῦς ἀνελεῖ καὶ ὁποστάσεις αἰ δηθονταί ὁποστάσεις δὲ ὁμοίως ἐνεκα τῇ ὁμοίως, ἂφ' οὐ εἶναι, ἐξουσία, μὲνντος μὲν ἐκείνῳ ἀπολλοῦ, τοῦ τοῦ δὲ ε' αὐτοῦ ἂφ' ἂνελθοῦν ὑποκρυπτεὶ καὶ

1 Enn., def. 9, Thes.: oδ' Kirchhoff*, H-S 1.
2 δὲ ἄριθμον διακόσιως: αἰθηθήσεται: Ενν. Α' 1.

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12. But what prevents it from being a multiplicity in this sense, as long as it is one substance? For the multiplicity [of Intellect] is not a plurality of compositions, but its activities are the multiplicity. But if its activities are not substances, but it passes from potency to active actuality, it is not a multiplicity, but imperfect before it becomes actual and active in its substance. But if its substance is activity, and its activity is its multiplicity, then its substance is just as large as the multiplicity. But we allow this to Intellect, to which we attributed self-thinking, but not any more to the principle of all things. But there is a need for the One from which the many derives to exist before the many: for every number-series the one comes first. But in the case of a number-series people do say this; for the successive numbers are [the result of] composition; but in the series of realities, what necessity is there now for there: to be some one here too from which the many derive? [If there is not] the many will be separated from each other and will each come by chance from a different direction to their composition. But they will say that the activities proceed from the one Intellect which is simple: so already they assume that what comes before the energies is something simple. Then of course they will always assume that the activities abide for ever and are substantial realities; but, being substantial realities, they will be other than that from which they come, since that remains simple, but what comes from it is in itself multiplicity and depends on

1 "They" are the Peripatetics, who asserted the simplicity of the Divine Intellect: cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Monitae 109, 37-116, 3 Bruns.
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that [simple principle]. For if these activities come into existence because the principle started to be active from some point, then there will be multiplicity there in the principle; but if they themselves are the first activities, then, making the second reality, and allowing that which is before these activities and exists by itself to remain [inactive], they would cede the activities to the second reality which has come together out of the activities: for it itself is one thing, and the activities proceeding from it another, since they do not proceed from its activity. If this is not so, Intellect will not be the primary activity; for the One did not in some sort of way want Intellect to come into being, with the result that Intellect came into being with the wanting as an intermediary between the One and the generated Intellect; for if this was so, the One would be incomplete, and also the wanting would have nothing to want; and again, it could not have one part of the thing [which it wanted] and not have another; for there was not anything at all to which the impulse could be directed. But it is clear that, if anything came into existence after him, it came into existence "while he remained in his own proper state": therefore, in order that anything else may exist, it is necessary that the One should keep absolutely quiet by itself: otherwise, it will move before there is movement, and think before there is thinking, or its first activity will be incomplete, since it will be only an [objectless] drive. For at what is it to aim, as if it was missing something? If we are to make body to the younger gods. It is interesting that Plotinus applies it to the One, who exercises no activity at all, though he is the source of all subsequent creativity.

1 The text of this sentence is corrupt. I adopt provisionally Igual’s conjectures in lines 23 and 35. See critical note.

2 The reference is to Timaeus 426e—5, where the Demiurge ends his own activity and leaves detailed work on the human
40 ἥρμομέθα, τὴν μὲν ἄλλην αὐτοῦ οὖν ῥυόσαν ἐνέργειαν ὡς ἀπὸ θηλίου φῶς νουὶ 1 ἤρμομέθα καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν νοητὴν φύσιν, αὐτοῦ δὲ ἐς ἀκροὶ τῆς νοητῆς ἀρτικάστας βασιλείαν ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἐξώσανα αὐτῷ τὸ ἐκφαν—ἡ ἁλλὰ φῶς πρὸ φωτὸς ποτίσομεν ἐπιλάμβανεν δὲ ἀεὶ μένοσα ἐπὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀποτέραμία τὸ ἄλλονα οὖθεν αὐτῷ οὖθεν τοὐτὸν οὖν μὴ οὕσια εἶναι οὗτος ἀδ οἷον τυφλὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἀρίστον καὶ γνώσικον ἐαυτὸ καὶ πρῶτον γνώσκον, τὸ δὲ ὀστρακεῖα ἐπέκεινα νοῦ, αὐτῶς καὶ ἐπέκεινα γνώσεως, οὕτω δεόμενον ὀστρεῖν οὖθεν, οὕτως οὖθεν τοῦ γνώσκεσθε.

50 ἀλλὰ ἠστὶν ἐν δευτέρᾳ φύσει τὸ γνώσκεσθαι. ἐν γὰρ τί καὶ τὸ γνώσκεσθαι τὸ δὲ ἤπειρον ἄκου τοῦ "τί" ἐν τί γὰρ ἐν οὗ ἀνεί δικό τὸ γὰρ "ἀλλὰ" πρὸ τοῦ "τί".

13. Λέγε καὶ ἄρρητον τῇ ἀλήθειᾳ: ὁ τί γὰρ ἐν ἐπιτής, τί ἐρέης. ἀλλὰ τὸ "ἐπέκεινα πάντων καὶ ἐπέκεινα τοῖς συμπαθήτοις τοῦ ἐποίησεν" ἐν τοῖς πάσιν μόνοις ἀληθεῖς οὐκ ἄνωμοι μιᾷ ἢ ἄλλῃ ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν πάντων οὕτω ἄνωμοι αὐτοῦ, ὅτι μὴ λέγεις καὶ αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἐνδεχεσθαι, ἣν ἀυτοῦ σημαίνεις ἐπηχείοντες τετραχός αὐτοῦ. ἀλλὰ ὅταν ἀποροῦμεν "ἀναπληρῶσον σὺν ἀνωτῷ καὶ οὐδὲ συμπαθεῖν ἐαυτῷ οὐδὲ οἷον μονῇ", ἔκοψε νη καὶ ἀπελευθήσατο, ὅτι τίτι λέγοντες ἐαυτῷ παραπρέπομεν ἐπὶ

1. Rēse (intellectum Ficinus): τι σὸν Ἐνν.

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a rational statement, we shall state that the first activity, which, so to speak, flows from it like a light from the sun, is Intellect and the whole intelligible nature, but that he himself, staying still at the summit of the intelligible, rules over it; he does not thrust the outshining away from himself—or we shall make another light before light—but he irradiates for ever, abiding unchanged over the intelligible. For what comes from him has not been cut off from him, nor is it the same as him, nor is it the sort of thing not to be substance, or to be blind, but it sees and knows itself and is the primary knower. But the One, as it is beyond Intellect, so is beyond knowledge, and as it does not in any way need anything, so it does not even need knowing; but knowing has its place in the second nature. For knowing is one thing; but that is one without the thing; for if it is one thing it would not be the absolute One: for "absolute" comes before "something".

13. It is, therefore, truly ineffable: for whatever you say about it, you will always be speaking of a "something". But "beyond all things and beyond the supreme majesty of Intellect" is the only one of all the ways of speaking of it which is true; it is not its name, but says that it is not one of all things and "has no name", because we can say nothing of it: we only try, as far as possible, to make signs to ourselves about it. But when we raise the difficulty "Then it has no perception of itself and does not even know itself", we should consider that by saying this we are turning ourselves round and going in the opposite

1 A free paraphrase of Plato Republic VI 509B9-10, with ὁδὸς (quite naturally for Plotinus) replacing ὁδὸν. This is followed by a reference to the other great source-text in Plato for the doctrine of the One, the First Hypothesis of the Parmenides (142A3).
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10 τάναντια. πολύ γὰρ αὐτῷ ποιεῖται γνωστόν καὶ γνωσις ποιεῖται καὶ διδάσκεσαι νοεῖν δεῖον τοῦ νοεῖν ποιεῖται. κἂν σὺν αὐτῷ τὸ νοεῖν ἦλθε, περιττῶν ἦσσται αὐτῷ τὸ νοεῖν. κινδυνεῖ γὰρ ὅλου τοῦ νοεῖν πολλών εἰς ταύτα 1 συνελθόντων συναιθήσεσιν εἶναι τοῦ ὅλου, ὅταν αὐτὸ τί ἔστω νοεῖ, ὡ δὲ καὶ κυρίως ἐστὶ νοεῖν. ἔν δὲ εἰσαναν αὐτῷ τί ἔστω καὶ ὡδὲν ἐξεσελ. εἰ δὲ τοῦ ἐξεσελ ἔσται ἡ νόησις, ἐνδεές τε ἔσται καὶ ὁ κυρίως τὸ νοεῖν. τὸ δὲ πάντη ἀπλοῦν καὶ αὐταρκής ὡστὶς ὡδὲν δεῖσαι: τὸ δὲ δεύτερος αὐταρκής, δεύτερων δὲ ἀυταρκής, τούτο δεῖσαι τοῦ νοεῖν εὐστοί· καὶ τὸ ἐνδεῖσθαι πρὸς αὐτὸ.

20 ὅτι ὅλα πεποίησε το αὐταρκῆς ἰκανόν ἐξ ὁμάνατος γενόμενον, αὐτὸν ἐσταί, καὶ εἰς ἀυτὸ ἰκανόν. εἰπ. καὶ ἡ συναίθησις τούτου τῶν αὐθαίρετοι ἐστί· καὶ μαρτυρεῖ καὶ τοῦνομα, καὶ ἡ νόησις προτέρα ὀόσο εἰσὶ αὐτῶν ἐπιστρέφει δηλοῦται πολὺν ὄντα· καὶ γὰρ ὅσον ὅστο τοῦτο μονον.


1 Harder B-T: αἰτίο Επ. 4.
2 Scheler: σοπτ. Επ. 4.

1 The reference is to the αἰτίο of συναίθησις which is not literally translatable into English. At the beginning of his writing period Plotinus does not see this reference to multiplicity in συναίθησις and uses it of the One (with ὅλα: cp. V. 4. 2. 18.

2 The emphasis here on the intrinsic multiplicity of Intellect is very striking.

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direction. For we are making it many when we make it object of knowledge and knowledge, and by attributing thought to it we make it need thought: even if thought goes intimately with it, thought will be superfluous to it. For in general thought seems to be an intimate consciousness of the whole when many parts come together in the same thing: [this is so] when a thing knows itself, which is knowing in the proper sense: each single part is just itself and seeks nothing; but if the thinking is of what is outside, the thoughts will be deficient, and not thought in the proper sense. But that which is altogether simple and self-sufficient needs nothing; but what is self-sufficient in the second degree, but needs itself, this is what needs to think itself; and that which is deficient in relation to itself achieves self-sufficiency by being a whole, with an adequacy deriving from all its parts, intimately present to itself and inclining to itself. For intimate self-consciousness is a consciousness of something which is many: even the name bears witness to this. And thinking, which is prior, turns inward to intellect which is obviously multiple; for even if it only says this, “I am existent”, it says it as a discovery, and says it plausibly, for existence is multiple: since if it concentrated its gaze on itself as something simple and said “I am existent”, it would not attain either itself or existence. For it does not mean something like a stone by existence, when it is speaking the truth, but says many things in one word. For this being—which is meant to
be real being and not what has a trace of being, which would not even be called being because of this trace, but is as image to archetype—contains many things. Well, then, will not each of these many things be thought? Now if you want to grasp the “isolated and alone”, you will not think; but absolute being is multiple in itself, and if you speak of something else, being contains it. But if this is so, if anything is the simplest of all, it will not possess thought of itself: for if it is to possess it, it will possess it by being multiple. It is not therefore thought, nor is there any thinking about it.

14. How then do we ourselves speak about it? We do indeed say something about it, but we certainly do not speak it, and we have neither knowledge or thought of it. But if we do not have it in knowledge, do we not have it at all? But we have it in such a way that we speak about it, but do not speak it. For we say what it is not, but we do not say what it is: so that we speak about it from what comes after it. But we are not prevented from having it, even if we do not speak it. For we say what it is not, but we do not say what it is: so that we speak about it from what comes after it. But we are not prevented from having it, even if we do not speak it. For we say what it is not, but we do not say what it is: so that we speak about it from what comes after it. But we are not prevented from having it, even if we do not speak it. But just as those who have a god within them and are in the grip of divine possession may know this much, that they have something greater within them, even if they do not know what, and from the ways in which they are moved and the things they say get a certain awareness of the god who moves them, though these are not the same as the mover; so we seem to be inferior to the clear knowledge of the philosopher, a suitable analogy for our highest awareness, that of the One, and that it is for him a kind of knowledge (though not knowledge of the One) which it certainly is not for Plato.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3.

15. 'Allā πᾶς παρασχόμεν; η τῷ έχειν (η τῶς μή έχειν). ἀλλ' η μή έχει, πῶς παράσχειν; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν έχειν, οὐχ ἄλλος εἰ δὲ μη έχειν, τόσο εἰ αὐτοῦ τὸ πλήθος: ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰ αὐτοῦ ἄλλοι τὸ κάτω ἀν τὸ πάντα ἐνός; ἀλλ' ὁμοίως δὲ ἐστὶν ἐπίσης ὅλου ἐκ φυσικά τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ περιλαμβάνει—πῶς δὲ πολλά; ἡ οὔ ταύτων ἐμελέτη τὸ εἰκέναι εἰκέναι. εἰ δὲ μη ταύτων, οὐδέν γε βέλτιον τί γὰρ ἐν τού ἐνός βέλτιον ἢ ἐπέκειναι ὄλως; χείρον ἥρα τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν εἰκόνιερον. τί oύν εἰκόνιερον τοῦ ἐνός; ἢ τὸ μή ἐν πολλά ἄρα ἐφείμενον δέ ὅμοιο τοῦ ἐνός; ἐν ἀπο πολλά. πάν γὰρ τὸ μή ἐν τὸν σφαστών καὶ ἐστὶν, ὅπερ ἢτο, τοῦτο: μὴ γὰρ ἐν γενόμενον, κἂν ἐν πολλάν γη, ἀπὸ σωτέρι δὲ ἐν τοῦτο ἐς ἅμα εἰκόνι ημῖν εἰχη λέγειν τις ο νοῦς, καὶ ἐκαίτων εἰχη λέγειν τις ο νοῦς,

1. Δημήτριος οσον λατινότατον Περαίαν, Creuzer, cf. Epistola 139; η μη έχειν Peri, Kirchhoff*. 
2. δέ αν de Strycker optimum: δν Emm.: δν Kirchhoff δ ν Ιγαλ.

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disposed towards the One, divining, when we have our intellect pure, that this is the inner intellect, which gives substance and everything else which belongs to this level, but that he is not only of a kind not to be these, but something higher than what we call "being ", but is more and greater than anything said about him, because he is higher than speech and thought and awareness: he gives us these, but he is not these himself.

15. But how does he give them? By having them, or by not having them? But how did he give what he does not have? But if he has them, he is not simple; if he does not have them, how does the multiplicity come from him? One might perhaps grant that he gives one simple thing from himself—yet there would be room for enquiry how this could come from the absolute One; but all the same one can speak of the radiance from him, as from a light—but how can he give many things? Now what comes from him could not be the same as himself. If then it is not the same, it cannot of course be better: for what could be better than the One or in any way transcend him? It must then be worse; and this means more deficient. When then is more deficient than the One? That which is not one; it is therefore many; but all the same it aspires to the One: so it is a one-many.1 For all that is not one is kept in being by the one, and is what it is by this "one"; for if it had not become one, even though it is composed of many parts, it is not yet what one would call "itself".2 And if it is possible to say of each individual part what it is, one says it because each

of them is one and it is one because of this very fact. But that which does not already have many parts in itself is not one by participation in the One, but is the One itself, not the “one” predicat of something else but because it is this One from which, somehow, the others derive their oneness, some [in a greater degree] because they are near and others [in a lesser degree] because they are far away. For that which comes immediately after it shows clearly that it is immediately after it because its multiplicity is a one-everywhere; for although it is a multiplicity it is at the same time identical with itself and there is no way in which you could divide it, because “all things are together” 1; for each of the things also which come from it, as long as it participates in life, is a one-many: for it cannot reveal itself as a one-all. But [Intecl] does reveal itself as a one-all, because it comes after the origin: for its origin is really one and truly one. But that which comes after the origin is, somehow, under the pressure of the One, all things by its participation in the One, and each and every part of it is both all and one. What then are “all things”? All things of which that One is the principle. But how is that One the principle of all things? Is it because as principle it keeps them in being, making each one of them exist? Yes, and because it brought them into existence. But how did it do so? By possessing them beforehand. But it has been said that in this way it will be a multiplicity. But it bad them in such a way as not to be distinct: they are distinguished on the second

1 Anaxagoras Diels 3 1 (the original mixture of all things, which was not in the least like the Plotinian World of Forms).
Plotinus: Ennead V. 3.

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Level, in the rational form. For this is already actuality; but the One is the potency of all things. But in what way is it the potency? Not in the way in which matter is said to be in potency, because it receives: for matter is passive; but this [material] way of being a potency is at the opposite extreme to making. How then does the One make what it does not have? It does not do it casually, nor reflecting on what it will make, but all the same it will make. Now it has been said that, if anything comes from the One, it must be something different from it; and in being different, it is not one: for if it was, it would be that One. But if it is not one, but two, it must necessarily also be many: for it is already the same and different and qualified and all the rest. And that what comes from the One is certainly not one, may be taken as demonstrated; but it is worth querying the proposition that it is a multiplicity, and a multiplicity of the sort which is observed in what comes after it; and the necessity of there being anything after the One remains to be enquired into.

16. It has been said elsewhere that there must be something after the first, and in a general way that it is power, and overwhelming power; and the point has also been made that this is to be believed on the evidence of all other things, because there is nothing, even among the things on the lowest level, which does not have power to produce. But we now have to add this further point, that, since in things which are generated it is not possible to go

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1 A good clarification of what Plotinus means when he uses the ambiguous phrase δύναμις μορφής of the One (cp. III. 8. 10. 1; V. 4. 1. 36; VI. 7. 32. 3).


3 Cp. e.g. II. 9. 3; IV. 8. 6. For the One as δύναμις see n. 1 above.
Plotinus: Ennead V. 3.

μάλλον εἶς πλῆθος ἑναὶ, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐκάστων ἄπλοοστέρα ἡ αὐτὰ.1 κόσμον τούν τὸ ποῦραν ἀιωνιῶν οὐκ ἦν εἰς κόσμον ἀοιδητός αὐτό, ἀλλὰ 10 μαζὶ καὶ κόσμος νοητός· καὶ τὸ πρὸ τοῦ τούτων τὸ γεννήσαν αὐτὸ οὕτῃ νοισὶ οὕτῃ κόσμω νοητός, ἀπλοοστέρον δὲ ναὸ καὶ ἀπλοοστέρον κόσμου νοητοῦ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ πολλῶν πολὺν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολὺ τοῦτο ἐξ όι πολλῶν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸ πολὺν, οὐκ ἀρχὴ τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ ἀλλο πρὸ τούτων· παστῆναι οὐν δει εἰς

16 εν οὐτω παντὸς πλῆθους ἐξω καὶ ἀπλοοστέρον ἠτυνασθούν, εἰπερ οὕτως ἢπλον. ἀλλὰ πῶς τὸ γενόμενον ἐξ αὐτοῦ λόγος πολὺς καὶ πᾶς, τὸ δὲ ἢν δηλονότι οὐ λόγος; εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο ἢν, πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἐκ λόγου λόγος; καὶ πῶς τὸ ἀγαθεῖδες ἐξ ἄγαθον;

20 τί γὰρ ἐχον αὐτοῦ ἀγαθεῖδες λέγεται; ἢ εἶχον τὸ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἰοναίτως· καὶ τί τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ἄγαθον; τὸ γὰρ ἰοναίτως ἐκτοίρμεν οὖν τῶν ἰοναίτων. ἡ πρῶτην ἔκεισι, οὐ μὴ εξαποτάξαθε δεσφει, ὅτι ἰοναίτων· εἰ δὲ μὴ βελτίων ἀποστέρματι· ἢ τί σὲ καὶ τὸ χίλιον ἰοναίτως μένμαντα ἐπὶ τοῦτον ἑκοικίας· εἰ

25 σὺν ἐναποτῶν τοῦτω τὸ χίλιον, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐπεκτείνει τοῖς βασιλεύσαι τοῖς τούτοις τὸ ἰοναίτως, ἵνα ἀρκέι τὰ παρόντα. ἀλλὰ πάντων ἢνα παρόντων τούτωρ

1 Kirchhoff*: ἡ αἰσθ. Εκκ., Κλεόντα, Ἡ.Σ.
2 Rr*, Kirchhoff* (Illus. Ficinus): ἡ αἰσθ. wBR*JUC, Perns, Creuzer, H.S.

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upwards but only to go downwards and move further towards multiplicity, the principle of each group of things is simpler than they are themselves. Therefore that which makes the world of sense could not be a world of sense itself, but must be an intellect and an intelligible world; and that which is before this and generates it could not be intellect or an intelligible world, but simpler than intellect and simpler than an intelligible world. For many does not come from many, but this [intelligible] many comes from what is not many: for this would not be the principle if it was also many itself, but something else before it. There must therefore be a concentration into a real one outside all multiplicity and any ordinary sort of simplicity, if it is to be really simple. But how is what comes from it a multiple and universal rational form, when it is obviously not a rational form? And if it is not this why does rational form come not from rational form [but something else]? And how does what is like the Good come from the Good? What has this to do with the Good? For we seek stability because it is one of the goods. We seek that before stability from which it will not be necessary to depart, because it is the Good; but if it was not the Good, it would be necessary to go away from it. Is it then having a stable life and abiding willingly with it [which is “desirable”]? If then its life is satisfactory to it, it is clear that it seeks nothing; so its stability seems to be for this reason, that what is there present to it is sufficient for it. But its life is satisfactory because all things are present to it,
On the Knowing Hypostases

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 3.

and present in such a way that they are not other than it. But if it has all life, and a clear and perfect life, then every soul and every intellect is in it, and no part of life or intellect is absent from it. It is sufficient then for itself and seeks nothing; but if it seeks nothing, it has in itself what it would have sought, if it was not present. Therefore it has in itself the Good, which is either something of the sort which we called life and intellect, or something else which is an incidental accompaniment of these. But if this is the Good, there would be nothing beyond life and intellect. But if there is that something beyond, it is clear that the life of this other is directed to that and dependent on that, and has its existence from that and lives towards that; for that is its principle. That, therefore, must be better than life and intellect; thus the other will turn towards it both the life which is in it, a kind of image of the life in that in so far as this lives, and the intellect in it, a kind of representation of what is in that, whatever this may be.

17. What then is better than the wisest life, without fault or mistake, and than intellect which contains all things, and than universal life and universal intellect? If we say “That which made them”—well, how did it make them? And, in case something better may appear, our train of thought will not go on to something else but will stop at intellect. But there are many reasons for going higher, particularly the fact that the self-sufficiency of intellect which results from its being composed of

1 If we keep here, as we should, the MSS reading καί, this sentence expresses very well that shrinking from the doctrine of the One beyond intellect with which Plotinus was quite familiar (it was shared by his fellow-pupil of Ammonius, Origens the Platonist). It was probably felt by many Platonists (and of course all Aristotelians) in his time, as it was by Christian theologians then and later.
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all things is something which comes to it from outside; each of the things of which it is composed is obviously insufficient; and because each of them has participated in the absolute One and continues to participate in it, it is not the One itself. What then is that in which it participates, which makes it exist, and all things along with it? If it makes each individual thing exist, and it is by the presence of the One that the multitude of individual things in Intellect, and Intellect itself, is self-sufficient, it is clear that it, since it is the cause of existence and self-sufficiency, is not itself existent but beyond it and beyond self-sufficiency.

Is that enough? Can we end the discussion by saying this? No, my soul is still in even stronger labour. Perhaps she is now at the point when she must bring forth, having reached the fulness of her birth-pangs in her eager longing for the One. But we must sing another charm to her, if we can find one anywhere to allay her pangs. Perhaps there might be one in what we have said already, if we sang it over and over again. And what other charm can we find which has a sort of newness about it? The soul runs over all truths, and all the same shuns the truths we know if someone tries to express them in words and discursive thought; for discursive thought, in order to express anything in words, has to consider one thing after another: this is the method of description; but how can one describe the absolutely simple? But it is enough if the intellect comes into contact with it; but when it has done so, while the contact lasts, it is absolutely impossible, nor has it time, to speak; but it is afterwards that it is able to reason about it. One must believe one has seen,
when the soul suddenly takes light: for this is from him and he is it; we must think that he is present when, like another god whom someone called to his house, he comes and brings light to us: for if he had not come, he would not have brought the light. So the unenlightened soul does not have him as god; but when it is enlightened it has what it sought, and this is the soul's true end, to touch that light and see it by itself, not by another light, but by the light which is also its means of seeing. It must see that light by which it is enlightened: for we do not see the sun by another light than his own. How then can this happen? Take away everything!

1 The suddenness and unexpectedness of the final vision is an important feature of Plotinus's descriptions of it—it is not something one can plan for and bring about when one wishes: ep. VI. 7. 36. 16-9. It has antecedents in Plato Symposium 210E4-5 and Letter VII 341C7-D1.
V. 4. HOW THAT WHICH IS AFTER THE FIRST COMES FROM THE FIRST, AND ON THE ONE

Introductory Note
This little treatise is the seventh in Porphyry's chronological order. It deals with much the same subject-matter as the tenth treatise in the chronological order, On The Three Primary Hypotheses (V. I), and may be a kind of preliminary study for it, but the treatment is very different, much more schematic and scholastic, and without the "proteptic" element, the exhortation to the soul to rediscover its true nature and origin and so ascend to the Good.

In the second chapter the One or Good is spoken of, in a way unusual in Plotinus, as the Intelligible, and is said to have a higher sort of thinking than that of Intellect. In his later writings Plotinus avoids this sort of language, and is careful to rule out any suggestion that the One is a sort of higher Intellect.

Synopsis
There must be a hierarchy of beings, ascending in order to the First Principle. This must be the absolutely simple One, and because it is absolutely perfect, and everything which is perfect produces, it must produce the next reality, the One-Many (ch. 1). How and why the One produces Intellect: explanation of the Platonic doctrine of the derivation of Forms and Numbers from the One and the Indefinite Dyad. The conscious inner life

THAT WHICH IS AFTER THE FIRST

of the Intelligible (the First Principle). Besides its primary activity which is itself it has, like all things, a secondary activity distinct from itself: this is Intellect, which is all things, the whole world of living being; the One is therefore beyond being (ch. 2).
V. 4. HOW THAT WHICH IS AFTER THE FIRST COMES FROM THE FIRST, AND ON THE ONE

1. If there is anything after the First, it must necessarily come from the First; it must either come from it directly or have its ascent back to it through the beings between, and there must be an order of seconds and thirds, the second going back to the first and the third to the second. For there must be something simple before all things, and this must be other than all the things which come after it, existing by itself, not mixed with the things which derive from it, and all the same able to be present in a different way to these other things, being really one, and not a different being and then one; it is false even to say of it that it is one, and there is "no concept or knowledge" of it; it is indeed also said to be "beyond being". For if it is not to be simple, outside all coincidence and composition, it could not be a first principle; and it is the most self-sufficient, because it is simple and the first of all: for that which is not the first needs that which is before it, and what is not simple is in need of its simple components so that it can come into existence from them. A reality of this kind must be one alone: for if there was another of this kind, both would be

1 Again the two foundation texts from Plato’s dialogues
Plotinus: Ennead V. 4.

The absence of selfish, grudging wish to keep one's good to oneself which is the opposite of truly divine generosity, is a cardinal feature of Plato's thought about the First. For we are certainly not talking about two bodies, or meaning that the One is the first body. For nothing simple is a body, and body is what comes into being, but not the first principle; and the first principle has not come into being.

One. For we are certainly not talking about two bodies, or meaning that the One is the first body. For nothing simple is a body, and body is what comes into being, but not the first principle; and the first principle has not come into being.

If then there is something else after the First, it cannot still be simple: it will therefore be a One-Many. Whence, then, does this come? From the First: for it certainly does not come about by chance, and if it did the First would no longer be the principle of all things. How then does it come from the First? If the First is perfect, the most perfect of all, and the primal power, it must be the most powerful of all beings and the other powers must imitate it as far as they are able. Now when anything else comes to perfection we see that it produces, and does not endure to remain by itself, but makes something else. This is true not only of things which have choice, but of things which grow and produce without choosing to do so, and even lifeless things, which impart themselves to others as far as they can: as fire warms, snow cools, and drugs act on something else in a way corresponding to their own nature—all imitating the First Principle as far as they are able by tending to everlastingness and generosity. How then could the most perfect, the first Good, remain in itself as if it grudged to give of itself or was impotent, when it is the productive power of all things? How would it then still be the divine (and a conscious challenge to older Greek ideas): cp. Plato Phaedrus 247A7 and Timaeus 29E1-2.
That which is after the First Principle? Something must certainly come into being from it, if anything is to exist of the others which derive their being from it; that it is from it that they come is absolutely necessary. That which is generated by it must certainly also be most honourable, and though it is second to the Principle it must be better than all else.

2. If, then, the generator itself is Intellect, what is generated by it must be more defective than Intellect, but fairly close to it and like it; but since the generator is beyond Intellect, it is necessary that what is generated should be Intellect. But why is the generator not Intellect, whose active actuality is thinking? Thinking, which sees the intelligible and turns towards it and is, in a way, being perfected by it, is itself indefinite like seeing, but is defined by the intelligible. This is why it is said: from the Indefinite Dyad and the One derive the Forms and Numbers: that is, Intellect. For this reason Intellect is not simple but many; it manifests a composition, of course an intelligible one, and already sees many things. It is, certainly, also itself an intelligible, but it thinks as well: so it is already two. And it is also a different intelligible by being posterior to the One itself. But how does this Intellect come from the Intelligible? The Intelligible remains by itself and is not deficient, like that which sees and thinks—I call that which thinks deficient as compared with the Intelligible, but it is not like something senseless; all things belong to it and are in it and with it. It is completely able to discern itself; it has life in itself and

1 See note 1 to ch. 5 of V. 1.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 4.

20 aitwv en aitwv yivtrai, ap' aitwv toutw yivtrai, otiav ekeivn maliwv, iae esti, mevntos oun aitwv en tv oikeiow oihai ev aitwv mev to' yivmenvon yivtrai, mevntos de yivtrai. Ep' ev de ekeivn mevei nvpwv, to' yivmenvon yivtrai nvpwv de oivna kai ypouda de' ou ev genwstw—allo

25 yivwv ev de ekeivn yivtrai, allo oivna yivtrai kai oivna ekeivn kai myxa kai edwlon ekllwv. Allla pou mevntos ekllwv yivtrai; evnykia iae mev esti tvs oivnas, iae 8i ek tis oivnas evnykian kai 'i mev tis oivnas aitwv estin evnykia ekllwv, iae de al' ekllwv, de' evi nakti evnykia ev anavjckw.

30 evpraw oivnas aitwv: oivna kai evi toutw yivw kai mev tvs esti yivmpnegwvca tis oivnas thermphtwv, iae de al' ekllwv yvh gnwmphtht evnykian ekllwv tis vpmwvou tis oivna ev tis mevewn tv. Oivna de' kakei de' nakti proteron ekei mevntos aitwv

35 en tv oikeiow oihai ev tv' en aitwv telecOito vs kai oivnas ekeivn yivmpnegwvca y evmyvthsta y evnykia ypt-

1 This passage stands alone in the Enneads in the clarity with which it attributes a kind of thinking to the One: cp. Introductory Notes and c. 1 (p. 119) to ch. 13 of V. 3. The view which Plotinus adopts here is close to that of Numenius, whose First God is an Intellect (chs. 16 and 17 des Places, 26 and 26 Leumann), but an Intellect, it would seem, whose thinking is ineffably superior to that of the Second God or Demiurge who contemplates the Forms and makes the world.

2 Plato Timaeus 42E5-6 (quoted again below).
THAT WHICH IS AFTER THE FIRST

a great power, the greatest indeed of all, and arrives at being and substance: for that Principle is "beyond being". That is the productive power of all things, and its product is already all things. But if this product is all things, that Principle is beyond all things: therefore "beyond being"; and if the product is all things but the One is before all things and not on an equality with all things, in this way too it must be "beyond being". That is, also beyond Intellect: there is, then, something beyond Intellect. For being is not a dead thing, nor is it not life or not thinking; Intellect and being are one and the same thing; for Intellect does not apprehend objects which preexist it—as sense does sense-objects—but Intellect itself is its objects, granted that it does not get their forms from somewhere (for where could it get them from?). But it is here with its objects and the same as and one with them: the knowledge of things without matter is its objects.¹

¹ Here again Plotinus is taking Aristotle's doctrine of intellect as its starting-point: *Categories* 7. 8a1 (on the priority of sense-objects to sense) and *De Anima* 4. 430a2-5 and 7. 431b17 (on the identity of intellect with its objects).
In this treatise, the third section of the great work comprising III. 8 (30), V. 8 (31), V. 5 (32) and II. 9 (33), which Porphyry divided and inserted in various places in the *Enneads* without regard to the original order (see Introductory Note to II. 9 and III. 8), it is best read after V. 8 with which it is completely continuous: the last sentence of V. 8 directly introduces the argument which occupies the first three chapters of V. 5. The two treatises together form the second "ascent to the Good" in the great work. The first, in III. 8, starts at the bottom, with Nature, the lowest form of Soul. This one begins at the stage immediately below the Good, with Intellect, Real Being or the World of Forms, which we discover within ourselves as soon as we make any progress in genuine contemplation. In V. 8 the beauty of the intelligible world was considered in depth, and it was already clearly indicated that its intelligibility was non-discursive. In the first three chapters of the present treatise we pass from the beauty to the truth of Intellect, and its absolute identity with the intelligible objects, the Forms, is powerfully argued. Then follows a demonstration that the One or Good beyond Intellect and Being must exist, leading into one of the most impressive accounts in the *Enneads* of its transcendent and ineffable nature and the strange kind of direct awareness by which we apprehend it. In Chapter 12 there is a return to the theme of intelligible beauty and it is shown how, wrongly apprehended, it can distract us from the Good. Chapter 13 sums up the argument, and prepares the way for the polemical appendix refuting Gnostic ideas of spiritual reality which occupies II. 9.

**Synopsis**

The truth of Intellect (and what can be truer than absolute Intellect) depends on its identity with its objects (ch. 1). These intelligible objects which are Intellect are real, living, thinking being: no proof of their absolute truth is necessary or possible (ch. 2). The image of the court procession in which Intellect immediately precedes the King (ch. 3). Demonstration that the One must exist from a consideration of the nature of number (chs. 4-5). That Being proceeds from the One is confirmed by etymology (ch. 5). The One is beyond form and substance, for if it was form or substance it would be a particular being, not the origin of all: it is therefore unknowable and ineffable (ch. 6). Intellect sees it by an inner light identical with itself (ch. 7). The mysterious coming and going of the vision of the One, which is not a movement of the One, but of Intellect (ch. 8). The One is not in anything, therefore it is everywhere: body is in Soul, Soul in Intellect, Intellect in the One (ch. 9). The One is the transcendent source of all else, unlike all which he produces (ch. 10). The infinity of the One: he is utterly unlike the sense-perceived objects which most people think are real (ch. 11). The Good and intelligible beauty: indifference of the Good to all he has made (ch. 12). We must not think that the Good has anything in himself, even good: this would detract from his absolute simplicity (ch. 13).
1. Could anyone say that Intellect, the true and real Intellect, will ever be in error and believe the unreal? Certainly not. For how could it still be Intellect when it was being unintelligent? It must, then, always know and not ever forget anything, and its knowing must not be that of a guesser, or ambiguous, or like that of someone who has heard what he knows from someone else. Nor, certainly, can it depend on demonstration. For even if anyone did say that some of the things it knows were known by demonstration, some, all the same, would be immediately self-evident to it. (The argument in fact says that all things it knows are self-evident: for how is one going to distinguish those which are from those which are not?) But anyhow, as regards the things of which they agree that Intellect's knowledge is immediate, where do they say that the self-evidence comes to it from? From where will it acquire the confidence that things are so? For there is a lack of confidence about even those objects of sense-perception which seem to inspire the strongest confidence in their self-evidence, whether their apparent existence may be not in the underlying realities, but in the ways the sense-organs are affected, and they need intellect or dis-
...
Here Plotinus is arguing against those who see the knowledge of Intellect in terms of discursive logic, whether Aristotelian or Stoic. For "premises" cp. Aristotle Anal. Prior A 1, 24a16; for "axioms" and "expressions" ep. STF II 132 and 136.

In this passage Plotinus is arguing against contemporary Platonists like Longinus, who held that the Platonic Forms were external to and separate from Intellect (ep. Proclus In Tim. I. 322. 24 Diehl and, for Porphyry's original acceptance of this position and conversion, Life of Plotinus 18). He seems to have in mind particularly a very literal interpretation of the vision of the Forms in his favourite Phaidrus myth: ep. Plato Phaedrus 247D-E.
FLOTUS IS: ENNEAD V. 0.

Plotinus is here deriving δόξα from δέχομαι, by way of the adjective δέχομαι.

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tellect, and that Intellect contemplates them as absolutely outside it, then it cannot possess the truth of them and must be deceived in everything it contemplates. For they would be the true realities; and on this supposition it will contemplate them without possessing them, but will only get images of them in a knowledge of this sort. If then it does not possess the true reality, but only receives in itself images of the truth, it will have falsities and nothing true. If, then, it knows that what it has is false, it will admit that it has no part in truth; but if it does not know even this, and thinks it has the truth when it has not, the falsehood in it will be doubled and will set it far away from the truth. (This is the reason, I think, why there is no truth in the senses, only opinion: opinion is opinion because it receives, and what it receives is different from that from which it receives it.)

If there is not truth in Intellect, then an intellect of this sort will not be truth, or truly Intellect, or Intellect at all. But then truth will not be anywhere else either.

2. One must not, then, look for the intelligibles outside, or say that there are impressions of the real beings in Intellect, or by depriving it of truth make the intelligibles unknowable and non-existent and finally abolish Intellect itself. But, since one must bring in knowledge and truth and watchfully preserve reality and the knowledge of what each thing is—but not [only] the knowledge of each thing's qualities, since [if we only had that] we should have an image and a trace of realities, and not possess...
and live with and be fused with the realities themselves—we must attribute all real existences to the true Intellect. For in this way it will also know them, and know them truly and will not forget them or go round looking for them, and the truth will be in it and it will be the foundation of all realities and they will live and think. All this must belong to the most blessed nature: or where will its honour and majesty be? And then again, it will need no proof and no confirmation that it is so, for it is so, and is manifest to itself—and if there is anything before it, Intellect knows clearly that this is what it derives from, and if there is anything after it, it knows clearly that this is itself—and nobody can confirm this about it better than itself—and it knows clearly that all this is there in the intelligible world, and really there. So that the real truth is also there, which does not agree with something else, but with itself, and says nothing other than itself, but it is what it says and it says what it is. Who then could contradict it, and where would he bring his contradiction from? Or the contradictory answer would coincide with the preceding statement, and even if one introduces it as different, it is brought into conformity with and is one with the original statement: for you could not find anything truer than the truth.

3. We have here, then, one nature, Intellect, all realities, and truth: if so, it is a great god; or, better, not just a god, but it demands os of right that this which it is is universal god. This nature is god, and the second god revealing himself before we see that other one: he, the First, is enthroned above and set firm on high on Intellect in this its

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1 Theiler.
The remarkable correction of the metaphor here should be noted. The First tower above Intellect like a statue on its pedestal or an Oriental king on his throne, but is in no way supported or elevated by it. Intellect is totally dependent for its existence on That of which it is called the “pedestal”.

1 The usual identification of the Three Hypostases with the successive mythological chief gods, Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus.

3 In the first part of this work, III. 8. 10-11.
that is not one by participation and is not as much many as one—and that the intelligible universe and Intellect are more one than all other things, and there is nothing nearer the One itself, but all the same this is not the pure One. Now we long to see, if it is in any way possible, what is the pure, real One, unrelated to anything else. At this point, then, you must rush to one, and not any longer add anything to it, but stand absolutely still in fear of departing from it, and not progress the least little way towards two. If not, you get two, and not a two which contains the One, but [a two of which] both units are posterior to it. For it will not be included in the count with another one, or another number of any size; it will not be counted at all: for it is a measure and not measured, and it is not equal to the other units so as to be one of their company; otherwise, there will be something in common between it and those which are included in the count with it, and that something in common will be before the One itself, but there must be nothing [before the One itself]. It does not even belong to the category of essential number, and so certainly not to that which is posterior to it of quantitative number (substantial number is that which continually gives existence, quantitative number is that which gives quantity when it is with other numbers, and still when it is not with other numbers, if this [which is not with other numbers] really is a number). Since the nature which belongs to the numbers in the class of quantitative number, imitating in relation to the one which is their principle the relationship of the nature in the prior [substantial]
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 6.

1. Αλλ' ἐπ' ἐκείνο ἐπανέστησε λέγοντας, ὅτι μένε τῷ πρῶτῳ τῷ αὐτῷ, κἂν ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίνεται ἐτερα. ἐν μέν ὦν τοὺς ἀμβλομούς μένοντος μὲν τοῦ ἑν, ποιοῦσι τῇ ἄλλῳ, ὁ ἀμβλομός γίνεται κατ' αὐτό. 2

5 ἐν δὲ τῷ οὗτῳ πρὸ τῶν ὀντων μένε μὲν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐνταλθα τῷ ἑν, μένοντος δὲ αὐτοῦ ὦν

1. B.T.: το Ἐκκ., H.S.·

1. (idem atque 3 ἄλλω) w. Perna, Müller: κατ' αὐτόν ΒαΤUC, H.S.·: κατ' αὐτό (το ἑν) Vollmann·: κατά το (το) Theiler.

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numbers to the real One, does not exist by expending
or breaking up its one, but when a dyad comes to be,
the monad before the dyad exists, neither each of
the two units in the dyad nor one of them is the
monad in the dyad. For why should it be one of
them more than the other? If then it is neither of
them, it is different, and remains where it remains.
How then are those [two units of the dyad] different?
And how is the dyad one? and is it the same one,
which is in each of the two terms comprised in the
dyad? It must be maintained that they participate
in the first monad, but are other than that in which
they participate, and the dyad, in so far as it is one,
also participates, but not in the same sense: for an
army and a house are not one in the same way. A
house is one in virtue of its continuous structure, not
by substantial unity or quantitative unity. Are then
the monads in the number five and the number ten
different, but is the one in the number five the same
as the one in the number ten? Now if every ship
is the same as every other ship, small the same as
great, and every city the same as another city or
army the same as another army, then here also the
one is the same; but if not in those other cases, then
not here either. If there are any difficulties about
this, we will deal with them later.

5. But we must go back to that point where we
said that the First remains the same even if other
things come into being from it. In the case of
numbers, then, the one remains unchanged, but
another one makes number, and number comes into
existence on the model of it; but in the case of
that which truly exists, here the One still more
remains unchanged before the real beings; but
while it remains unchanged, it is not another which makes, if the real beings are modelled on the One, but the one itself is sufficient to generate reality. And, as there in the case of numbers, the form of the first, the monad, was in all of them primarily or secondarily, and each of the numbers which come after the monad did not participate in it equally, so here too each of the beings which come after the First has in itself a kind of form of it. Their participation made the quantity of the numbers exist, but here it gives beings substantial existence, so that being is a trace of the One. And if someone says that this word ὑν [being]—which is the term which signifies substantial existence—has been derived from the word έν [one] he might have hit upon the truth. For this which we call primary being proceeded, so to speak, a little way from the One, but did not wish to go still further, but turned inwards and looked its stand [καθή], and became substance [οὐσία] and hearth [κατα] of all things; it is like what happens in the utterance of the sound: when the utterer presses on the word Ί [one] is produced which manifests the origin from the One and signifies that which uttered, as best it can. Thus that which came to exist, substance and being, has an image of the One since it flows from its power; and the [soul] which sees it and is moved to speech by the sight, imaging what it saw, cried out "οὐσία" and "ίενα" and "κατα", For these sounds intend to signify the real nature of that produced by the birth-pangs of the utterer, imitating, as far as they are able, the generation of real being.
3. 'Alla tauta mén, ou tis éthlai, lelexhio. 

6. But these [etymologies] are to be taken as anyone wishes. Since the substance which is generated [from the One] is form—one could not say that what is generated from that source is anything else—and not the form of some one thing but of everything, so that no other form is left outside it, the One must be without form. But if it is without form it is not a substance; for a substance must be some one particular thing, something, that is, defined and limited; but it is impossible to apprehend the One as a particular thing: for then it would not be the principle, but only that particular thing which you said it was. But if all things are in that which is generated [from the One], which of the things in it are you going to say that the One is? Since it is none of them, it can only be said to be beyond them. But these things are beings, and being: so it is “beyond being”. 1 This phrase “beyond being” does not mean that it is a particular thing—for it makes no positive statement about it—and it does not say its name, but all it implies is that it is “not this”. But if this is what the phrase does, it in no way comprehends the One: It would be absurd to seek to comprehend that boundless nature; for anyone who wants to do this has put himself out of the way of following as all, even the least distance, in its traces; but just as he who wishes to see the intelligible nature will contemplate what is beyond the perceptible if he has no mental image of the perceptible, so he who wishes to contemplate what is beyond the intelligible will contemplate it when

1 Yet again the phrase from Plato Republic VI 509B5: its usual companion, the negative conclusion of the First Hypothesis of the Parmenides, appears below (line 12).
he has let all the intelligible go; he will learn that it is by means of the intelligible, but what it is like by letting the intelligible go. But this “what it is like” must indicate that it is “not like”: for there is no “being like” in what is not a “something”. But we in our travail do not know what we ought to say, and are speaking of what cannot be spoken, and give it a name because we want to indicate it to ourselves as best we can. But perhaps this name “One” contains [only] a denial of multiplicity. This is why the Pythagoreans symbolically indicated it to each other by the name of Apollo, in negation of the multiple. But if the One—name and reality expressed—was to be taken positively it would be less clear than if we did not give it a name at all: for perhaps this name [One] was given it in order that the seeker, beginning from this which is completely indicative of simplicity, may finally negate this as well, because, though it was given as well as possible by its giver, not even this is worthy to manifest that nature; since that cannot be heard, nor may it be understood by one who hears, but, if at all, by one who sees. But if the seer tries to look at a form, he will not know even that.

7. For, again, actual seeing is double; take the eye as an example, for it has one object of sight which is the form of the object perceived by the sense, and one which is the medium through which the form of its object is perceived, which is also itself perceptible to the eye; it is different from the form, but is the cause of the form’s being seen; it is seen concurrently in the form and with the form; this is the

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1 For this Pythagorean etymology cp. Plutarch Isis and Osiris 381F.
1 Here Plotinus is assuming, for the purposes of his illustration, the common doctrine, that sight takes place through a medium. But in his fuller (and earlier) discussion of the

reason why it affords no clear perception of itself, since the eye is directed to the illuminated object; but when there is nothing there but the medium, the eye sees it by an instantaneous immediate perception, though even then it sees it based upon something different, but if it is alone and not resting on something else the sense is not able to grasp it. For even the light of the sun which it has in itself would perhaps escape our sense of sight if a more solid mass did not lie under it. But if someone said that the sun was all light, one might take this as contributing to the explanation of what we are trying to say; for the sun will then be light which is in no form belonging to other visible things, and will be, perhaps, purely visible: for the other visible objects are not pure light. This, then, is what the seeing of Intellect is like; this also sees by another light the things illuminated by that first nature, and sees the light in them; when it turns its attention to the nature of the things illuminated, it sees the light less; but if it abandons the things it sees and looks at the medium by which it sees them, it looks at light and the source of light. But since Intellect must not see this light as external, we must go back again to the eye; this will itself sometimes know a light which is not the external, alien light, but it momentarily sees before the external light a light of its own, a brighter one; it either springs out from itself at night in the dark or, when the eye does not want to look at anything else, it lowers the

problem in IV. 5 (20) he rejects the medium theory and holds that sense-perception takes place through the universal sympathy of the All.
eyelids before it and all the same sends out light, or the eye’s possessor squeezes it and sees the light in it. For then in not seeing it sees, and sees them most of all: for it sees light, but the other things which it saw had the form of light but were not light. Just so Intellect, veiling itself from other things and drawing itself inward, when it is not looking at anything will see a light, not a distinct light in something different from itself, but suddenly appearing, alone by itself in independent purity, so that Intellect is at a loss to know whence it has appeared, whether it has come from outside or within, and after it has gone away will say “ It was within, and yet it was not within.”

8. But one should not enquire whence it comes, for there is no “ whence”: for it does not really come or go away anywhere, but appears or does not appear. So one must not chase after it, but wait quietly till it appears, preparing oneself to contemplate it, as the eye awaits the rising of the sun; and the sun rising over the horizon (“ from Ocean”, the poets say) 1 gives itself to the eyes to see. But from where will he of whom the sun is an image rise? What is the horizon which he will mount above when he appears? He will be above Intellect itself which contemplates him. For Intellect will be standing first to its contemplation, looking to nothing but the Beautiful, all turning and giving itself up to him, and, motionless and still, it sees first of all itself become more beautiful, all glittering, because he is near. But he did not come as one expected, but as one who did not come:

1 Cp. e.g. Homer: Iliad 7, 421-2.
for he was seen, not as having come, but as being there before all things, and even before Intellect came. It is Intellect which comes, and again Intellect which goes away, because it does not know where to stay and where he stays, that is in nothing. And if it was possible for Intellect to abide in that nowhere—I do not mean that Intellect is in place: it is no more in place than he is, but [in that sense] absolutely nowhere—it would always behold him, or rather not behold him, but be one with him, not two. But as it is, because it is Intellect, it sees him, when it does see him, with that of it which is not Intellect. It is really a wonder how he is present without having come, and how, though he is nowhere, there is nowhere where he is not. One can, certainly, be surprised in this way at the first moment, but one who knows would be surprised if the opposite was true; but, rather, the opposite could not even happen for one to be surprised at. For this is how it is:

9. Everything which is brought into being by something else is either in that which made it or in another thing, if there is something after what made it; for, in that it is brought into being by something else and needed something else for its coming into being, it needs something else at every point: and this is why it is also in something else. The last and lowest things, therefore, are in the last of those prior to them, and these are in those prior to them, and one thing is in another up to the First, which is the Principle. But the Principle, since it has nothing before it, has not anything else to be in; but since it

1 This passage is one of the most difficult in the Enneads to reconcile with the imposing descriptions of the changeless eternity of Intellect which we find elsewhere, notably in the
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 5.

mu ἔχουσα δ' ἐν ὅσι εὐτη τῶν ἄλλων ὅσιον ἐν
10 τούς ἐν αὐτῶν τὰ ἄλλα ἑπερασθέντα πάντα αὐτήν
tερπαλαβόντα δε οὖν ἐπεκέκληθη εἰς αὐτά καὶ ἔχει
οὐκ ἔχομεν. ἔχουσα δὴ καὶ αὐτῇ οὐκ ἔχομεν οὐκ
ἔστων ὅποις μὴ ἔστων: εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔστω, αὐτὶ ἔχει.
dε δὲ μὴ ἔχεισιν, οὐκ ἔστων. οὐκ ἔστιν καὶ οὐκ
ἔστι, τῷ μὲν μὴ περιέχεσθαι οὐκ ἄδασ, τῷ δ' ἐν
15 ἄλλω συντός ἐπελθέραν ὁμοδοιοι καλυπτόμενη εἶναι.
εἰ γὰρ αὐτό κακολατοῦσι, ὄρισται ὅτι ἄλλον, καὶ τὰ
tεφεξῆς ἀμορφα αὐτοῦ, καὶ μέχρι τουτού δὲ θεῶς, καὶ
οὐδὲ ἐν ἐν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἄλλα δουλεύοντα τοῖς μετ'
αὐτοῦ. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐν τινὶ ἐκεῖ ἐστὶν, οὐ ἐστιν
δὲκ μὴ ποιό, οὐκ ἔστων ὅποιο. εἰ γὰρ μὴ
20 ἐνθαῦτα, δήλον ὅτι ἄλλος αὐτὸν κατέχει τόπος, καὶ
ἐνθαῦτα ἐν ἄλλῳ, ὡστε τεθέν τὸ αὐτῷ. εἰ οὖν
ὁλθές τὸ οὐ ποικαί φεύγος τὸ ποιεῖ, ἢν μὴ ἐν
ἀλλῷ, σῶματος ἐν ἀποστασίᾳ. εἰ δὲ μὴν αὐτὸ
αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἀποστασίᾳ, ὁλθὲ τὰ οὖν ποικαί
tεθέντα ὥστε ἐστὶν ἐν τούτου. εἰδὲ γὰρ τὸ μὲν τι αὐτοῦ ὅποι, τὸ δὲ ὅποι ὡς μὴ
25 οὐδὲ ὁλον ὃδε ὡστε ἐν τούτῳ ποικαί οὐδενὸς
[ἐνὸς] ἐχοστος αὐτὸ οὐδὲ μὴ ἐχοστος ἔχομεν ἄρα ἲτε
ὑποστάθην. ὅρα δὲ καὶ τὸν κόσμου. ὅτι, ἐπεὶ
1 om. Q. del. Kirchhoff*.

INTELLIGIBLES NOT OUTSIDE INTELLECT

has nothing else to be in, and the other things are
in those which come before them, it encompasses all
the other things. But in encompassing them it is
not dispersed into them and it possesses them
without being possessed. But certainly, if it possess¬
ses and is not itself possessed, there is nothing in
which it is not: for if it is not in anything, it does not
possess it. But if it is not possessed, it is not there.
So it is there and not there; it is not there because
it is not in the grasp of anything, but because it is
free from everything it is not prevented from being
anywhere. For if, on the other hand, it was pre¬
vented, it would be limited by something else, and
what comes next would be without a share in it, and
God would go just so far, and would not be indepen¬
dent but a slave to the beings which come after him.
The things, therefore, which are in something are
there where they are; but everything which is not
somewhere has nowhere where it is not. For if it
is not here, it is clear that another place contains it,
and it is here in something else, so that the " not
somewhere " is false. If therefore the " not some¬
where " is true and the " somewhere " is false (so
that it may not be in something else), it will not be
absent from anything. But if it is not absent from
anything and is not anywhere, it is everywhere
independent. And one part of it is not here and
another there: it is not even here as a whole; so
that it is everywhere as a whole; nothing possesses
it or does not possess it; that is, everything is
possessed by it.1 Observe the universe also, that,

1 The starting-point of this discussion of the placelessness of
the One is to be found in phrases of Plato's Parmenides: op.
138B5, 144B2, 131B.
PLOTinus: Ennead V. 5.

Intelligibles not outside Intellect

since there is no universe before it, it is not itself in a universe, nor again in place: for what place could there be before a universe existed? But its parts are dependent on it and in it. But Soul is not in the universe, but the universe in it: for body is not the soul's place, but Soul is in Intellect and body in Soul; and Intellect in something else: but there is nothing other than this for it to be in: it is not, then, in anything; in this way, therefore, it is nowhere. Where then are the other things? In it. It has not, then, gone away from all other things, nor is God himself in them, nor is there anything which possesses the First, but it possesses everything. Therefore it is in this way also the Good of everything, because all things have their being directed towards it and depend upon it, each in a different way. Therefore some things are better than others, because some things have more existence than others.

10. But do not, I beg you, look at it through other things: otherwise you might see a trace of it, not itself: but consider what this might be which it is possible to grasp as existing by itself, pure, mixed with nothing, in which all things have a share, though nothing has it: for there is nothing else like this, but there must be something like this. Who, then, could capture its power all together as a whole? For if one did capture it all together as a whole, why would one be different from it? Does one then grasp it partially? But when you concentrate on it, you will do so totally, but you will not declare

1 That body is in soul is Platonie doctrine: cp. Plato Timaeus 31E. Plotinus here develops it powerfully to 184

8 A remarkable example of the ease with which Plotinus interchanges masculine and neuter, “personal” and “im personal” ways of speaking of the First Principle.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 5.

10 τόθη, δεικτός σε ¹ ἑκεῖνες, μάλλον δὲ νῦν αὐτόν. ἀλλ' ὅταν μὲν ὁμήρης ὅλον βλέπει· ὅταν δὲ νοθκὺς, ὃ τι ἐν μορφωτικῷ αὐτῶν, νόει, ὅτι ἁγαθῶν· ἐκδρομὴ γὰρ ἐμφανισθεὶσαν καὶ νεφέρας ἐποίησας δύναμις ὄν, ἀφ' ὧν καὶ νοθοῖς ὃ (τε) ² αὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ὅποτος—

15 αὐτῶν γὰρ πάντων: ἀν' αὐτῶν κόμης ἡ πρᾶξις—οὐ γὰρ ³ ἐν αὐτῶ· ἀπ' αὐτῶν στάσας, ὅτι αὐτὸς μὴ ἔδειται σοὶ γὰρ κνίσσεσθαι ὠς ὡς κινήσεις. οὐδὲ γὰρ εἶχον ὁμοίως ὃ ἀντῆκεν ὁμοίως ὃ ἀναπληρώθηκεν περὶ τῷ γὰρ ἡ πρὸς τῇ ἑν τίνι· πρώτος γὰρ αὐτῶς. ἀλλ' ὁποία ἐπερασμαίνει (ἐφαί) ⁴ ἕπει ² διὸς γαρ; ἀλλ' ὁποία ἄνευς ὡς μέγεθος· ποὺ γὰρ δεῖς προσθήκην δ' αὐτῶν ἡ νὰ γίνομαι σωματικὸς δημοκράτης· τὸ δ' ἄνευρεν ἢ δ' διόνυσος ἔχει οὐ γὰρ ἄλλως ποτὲ δὲ οὖπερ οὕτως ἐπιλείψεις, ὅπως καὶ τὰ μὴ ἐπιλείπεστα δὲ αὐτῶν.

11. Καὶ τὸ ἄνευρον τούτο τὸ μὴ πλέον ἐνός εἶναι μηδὲ ἔχειν πρὸς ὃ ἀρετή τῶν ἱερῶν· τῶν γὰρ ἐν αὐτὶ ἐν μερίτητα αὐτοῦ ἢ ἐν ὁμοίωμα ἢ ἐν μερίτητα ἢ τῷ ὁμοίῳ· σοτ' ὅποιος ὁμοίως ὁμοίως πρὸς αὐτὸ περιστρέφει· ὃ ἐπετείνης ἢ ἔχειν καὶ διός. ὁποία ἀκραία λεγέναι, ὃτι μηδὲ μέσον, ὃ δὲ μορφή. μὴ τῶν ἐγένετο ἡντηνός ὃμισος τόσον· ὅπως ἐφεύγει ὁ λόγος, μηδὲ ἔτει αὐτίκος ὅτι δὲ ἐκεῖνος τὸ ὅμοιον πρῶτον ἀνεύρετον ἢ ἐκεῖνος, ἢ ἐκεῖνος ἢ ἐκεῖνος ἢ ἐκείνος. ³ δὲ ἄνευς ὡς μέγεθος. ⁴ ἄνευς ὡς μέγεθος. ⁵ ἄνευς ὡς μέγεθος.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 5.

10. That is why, then, one should see that it is in the way in which someone would expect: it to be who assumes that all things are perceived by the senses, by which supposition he eliminates that which is most real of all. For the things which one thinks are most real, are least real; and the [materially] large has less genuine existence. But the First is the principle of existence and, again, more authentic than substantial reality. So reverse your way of thinking, or you will be left deprived of God, like the people at festivals who by their gluttony stuff themselves with things which it is not lawful for those going in to the gods to take, thinking that these are more obviously real than the vision of the god for whom they ought to be celebrating the festival, and take no part in the rites within. Yes, in these our rites also the god, since he is not seen, creates disbelief in his existence in those who think that that alone is obviously real which they see only with the flesh; as if people who slept through their life thought the things in their dreams were reliable and obvious, but, if someone woke them up, disbelieved in what they saw with their eyes open and went to sleep again.

12. One must perceive each thing by the appropriate organ, some things with the eyes, others with the ears, and so on. One must believe, also, that one sees other things with the intellect, and not think that intellectual perception is seeing or hearing, which would be like insisting that the ears should see and that sounds do not exist because they are not visible. And we must consider that men have forgotten that which from the beginning until now they want and long for. For all things reach out to that and long for it by necessity of nature, as if
divining by instinct that they cannot exist without it. The grasp of the beautiful and the wonder and the waking of love for it come to those who, in a way, already know it and are awake to it. But the Good, since it was there long before to arouse an innate desire, is present even to those asleep and does not astonish those who at any time see it, because it is always there and there is never recollection of it; but people do not see it, because it is present to them in their sleep. But the passionate love of beauty, when it comes, causes pain, because one must have seen it to desire it. Beauty is shown to be secondary because this passionate love for it is secondary and is felt by those who are already conscious. But the more ancient, unperceived desire of the Good proclaims that the Good itself is more ancient and prior to beauty. All men think that when they have attained the Good it is sufficient for them: for they have reached their end. But not all see beauty, and when it has come into existence they think it is beautiful for itself and not for them; this applies also to beauty here: it belongs to the one who has it. And it is enough for people to seem to be beautiful, even if they are not really; but they do not want to have the Good in seeming only. 1 Then they dispute the first place with beauty and wrangle contentiously with it, considering that it has come into being like themselves. It is as if someone who holds the lowest rank at court were to want to attain equal honour with the man who stands next to the king; and they both derive from one and the same source: he does

1 Cfr. Plato Republic 503D.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 5.

For a full discussion of this remarkably account of how intelligible beauty can distract us from the Good and an attempted reconciliation of it with the equally remarkable VI. 7. 22, in which intelligible beauty considered without the

not realise that though he too depends on the king the other ranks before him. The cause of the error is that both participate in the same and the One is before both, and that in the higher world also the Good itself does not need beauty, though beauty needs it. The Good is gentle and kindly and gracious, and present to anyone when he wishes. Beauty brings wonder and shock and pleasure mingled with pain. It even draws those who do not know what is happening away from the Good, as the beloved draws a child away from its father; for Beauty is younger. But the Good is older, not in time but in truth, and has the prior power: for it has all power; that which comes after it has not all power, but as much as can come after it and derive from it. The Good then is master also of this derived power. He does not need the things which have come into being from him, but leaves what has come into being altogether alone, because he needs nothing of it, but is the same as he was before he brought it into being. He would not have cared if it had not come into being; and if anything else could have been derived from him he would not have grudged it existence; but as it is, it is not possible for anything else to come into being: all things have come into being and there is nothing left. He was not all things: if he was he would have needed them; but since he transcends all things he can make them and let them exist by themselves while he remains above them.

1 For a full discussion of this remarkably account of how intelligible beauty can distract us from the Good and an attempted reconciliation of it with the equally remarkable VI. 7. 22, in which intelligible beauty considered without the...
13. But since he is the Good and not a good, he must have nothing in himself, since he does not even have good in himself. For what he will have is either good or not good; but that which is not good cannot be in the Good, the authentically and primarily Good, nor does the Good have the good. If then he does not have what is not good or what is good, he has nothing. If then he has nothing he is "alone and isolated" from all other things. If then the other things are either goods, but not the Good, or not goods, and he has neither of these, he has nothing and is the Good by having nothing. But then if anyone adds anything at all to him, substance or intellect or beauty, he will deprive him of being the Good by the addition. If then one takes away everything and says nothing about him and does not say falsely about anything that it is with him, he allows him his "existence" without attributing to him anything which is not there, as those do who compose inartistic panegyrics, and diminish the reputation of those who are being praised by adding matters inferior to their worth, since they are incapable of making true speeches about their subjects. We also, then, must not add any of the things which are later and lesser, but say that he moves above them and is their cause, but not that he is them. For, again, it is the nature of the Good not to be all things and not to be any one of them; for [if he were] he would come under one and the same classification as all of them, and if he came under the same classification, he would differ only

1 Again the inappropriate reference to Philebus 33B7-8. See V. 3. 10, note 2.
by his individuality and specific difference and some added attribute. Then he would be two and not one, and one of the two, what was common to him and the others, would be not good, and one would good; he would, then, not be purely and primarily good, but that would be by participating in which, over and above what was in common, he became good. So the nature of the Good would be good by participation; and what it participated in would not be any one of all things. But if this Good was in the composite thing—for it would be the specific difference by which the composite was good—it would have to derive from something else. But it was simply and solely good; so, much more, that from which it derived was good. That which is primary and the Good has therefore been revealed to us as above all realities, and only good, and having nothing in itself, but unmixed with all things and above all things and cause of all things. For the beautiful and the real beings certainly do not come from the bad, or from things indifferent. For the maker is better than what is made, because more complete.
V. 8. ON THE FACT THAT THAT WHICH IS
BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK, AND ON
WHAT IS THE PRIMARY AND WHAT THE
SECONDARY THINKING PRINCIPLE

Introductory Note
This treatise, the twenty-fourth in Porphyry's chronological order, immediately follows in that order the great work VI. 4-5 (22-3): On the Reason why Being is everywhere all present, One and the Same. In this Plotinus had laid less emphasis than he did anywhere else in the Enneads on the distinctions between his three hypostases, and had allowed the First, the One beyond Being, to fall very much into the background. In the present treatise he seems concerned to make clear that the distinctions between the hypostases were still real and important to him, and in particular to insist on the sharp differentiation of the First Principle, the One which does not think, from the Second Hypostasis, the living Intellect which forms a unity-in-duality with Being. He knew this to be one of the most controversial parts of his philosophy, and argues his position here, as he often does elsewhere in the Enneads, against both Aristotle and his followers and those Platonists who had made the First Principle a transcendent Intellect. The Third Hypostasis, Soul, is mentioned rather incidentally, and only to help his readers to see how the primary thinking of Intellect, from which the unthinking perfection of the One is to be distinguished, differs from the secondary thinking of human minds in their normal state.

WHAT IS BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK

Synopsis
The difference between thinking something else and thinking oneself: the latter is more of a unity, though still a unity-in-duality (ch. 1). Reasons why before this self-thinking unity-in-duality there must be a pure unity, which because it is simply one does not think (ch. 2). There must be something absolutely simple before any one-in-many or whole of parts (ch. 3). Further reasons why there must be the Good before Intellect: comparison of Good, Intellect and Soul to light, the sun and the moon (ch. 4). The Good does not think itself because thought is always a movement of something else towards the Good in which the thinker is established in being and attains self-knowledge (ch. 5). The Good is pure actuality without any secondary activity: the essential multiplicity of the Second Hypostasis, at once being, living and thinking, which the Good transcends and is beyond thinking as he is beyond being; his gift to all others is not an impossible knowledge of him, but to be with him, who is their Good, and to grasp him as far as they can (ch. 6).
V. 6. (24) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΤΟ ΕΠΕΚΕΙΝΑ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ ΜΗ ΝΟΕΙΝ ᴾΑΙ ΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΩΣ ΝΟΕΥΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΙ ΤΟ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΩΣ

1. Τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ νοεῖν ἄλλο ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ αὐτό, ἦ ἐστὶν φεύγει μᾶλλον τὰ δύο εἶναι. τὸ δὲ πρῶτον λεγόντας βοᾶςται καὶ εἰς τὸ, ἀλλ' ἔστων δύναται· παρ' αὐτῷ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει σὲ ὑπάρχει, ἐγερθέν γε μὴν ἐν ὑπάρχειν. ὃ τὸ δὲ οὐ κεχώρισται τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἀλλὰ συνὸν αὐτῷ ἴσα ἔστω. ἄμφοτε οὖν γίνεται ἐν ὑπάρχει. μᾶλλον οὖν νοεῖ, ὃτι ἔχει, καὶ πρῶτος νοεῖ, ὃτι τὸ νοεῖν δεῖ ἐν καὶ δύο εἶναι. ἐάν γὰρ μὴ ἔναι, ἄλλο τὸ νοεῖν, ἄλλο τὸ νοοῦμενον ἐσται· οὐκ ἐν οὖν πρῶτος νοοῦν εἴη, ὃτι ἄλλον τὴν νόσον λαμβάνον οὐ τὸ πρῶτος νοοῦν ἐσται, ὃτι νοεῖ νοεῖν ἄμφως· ὃτι εἴη ὃς αὐτὸς· ἦ ἐνεργεῖ ὃς αὐτὸς, ἵνα κυρίως νοεῖ, τὰ δύο ἐν ἐσται· ὃτι ἄρα ἐν εἴναι ἄμφως· ἔστι ἐν μὲν, μὴ δύο δὲ αὖ ἐσται, ὃ τι νοεῖ· οὐχ ἔχει· ἵστε οὐδὲ νοεῖν ἐσται· ἄπλοῦθι ἄρα καὶ οὐχ ἄπλοῦθι· ὃτι ἐναι· μᾶλλον δ' ἂν τις αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον ἄν ἐλοι ἄπο

V. 6. ON THE FACT THAT THAT WHICH IS BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK, AND ON WHAT IS THE PRIMARY AND WHAT THE SECONDARY THINKING PRINCIPLE

1. There is a difference between one thing thinking another and something thinking itself; the latter goes further towards escaping being two. The former wants to escape being two and think itself, but is less capable of it; for it has what it sees with itself, but none the less it is different from it. But the latter is not substantially distinct [from its object], but keeps company with itself and so sees itself. It becomes a pair, therefore, while remaining one. It thinks more genuinely, therefore, and thinks primarily, because the thinking principle must be one and two. For if it is not one, that which thinks and that which is thought will be different—it would not therefore be the primary thinker, because if the thought it had was of something else it will not be the primary thinker because it does not have what it thinks as [thought] of itself, so that it does not think itself; or if it has what it thinks as itself, so that it may think authentically, the two will be one: it must therefore be one and a pair—but if it is, on the other hand, one and not two, it will have nothing to think: so that it will not even be a thinking principle. It must, then, be simple and not simple.
WHAT IS BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK

One could get a better idea of its being like this if one made the ascent from soul; for in soul it is easy to make the distinction, and one could see the doubleness more easily. If then one were to imagine a double light, the soul as lesser and that which it thinks as purer light, and then imagine that the seeing light is equal to the seen, one would not be able any more to separate them by the difference [in quality] and would suppose the two to be one, thinking that they were two, but seeing them as one; in this way one will grasp Intellect and its object. Now we in our discourse have made one out of two; but [in reality] the reverse is true and two came from one, making itself two because it thinks, or, better, because it thinks it is two and because it thinks itself, one.

2. If then one is the primary thinking principle, and the other is already thinking in a different way, that which is beyond the primary thinking principle will no longer think; for in order to think it would have to become intellect, and if it was intellect it would have to have an object of thought, and if it was thinking in the primary sense it would have to have its object in itself. But it is not necessary for everything which is an object of thought to have a thinking principle in itself and to think: for [then] it will be not only an object of thought but a thinker, and, since it is two, will not be the first. And the intellect which has the object of thought would not exist if there was not a reality which is pure object of thought; it will be an object of thought to the intellect, but in itself it will be neither thinker nor object of thought in the proper, authentic sense; for the object of thought is object for something else,
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 6.

What is beyond being does not think

and the intellect has its intellectual effort empty of content if it does not grasp and comprehend the object which it thinks; for it does not have thinking without its object of thought. Is (the One), then, perfect when it has it? But it must, before thinking, have a perfection derived from its own reality. That, then, to which perfection belongs will exist before thinking; it will therefore have no need of thinking; for he is sufficient to himself before this; so he will not think. This, then, does not think, and the other is the primary thinking principle, and another again will think in a secondary way. Again, if the First thinks, something will belong to it; it will then not be the First, but second, and not one, but already many things, that is all the things which it thinks; for even if it only thinks itself it will be many.

3. But if people are going so say that nothing prevents one and the same thing from being many, there will be a one underlying these many; for there can be no many if there is not a one from which or in which these are, or in general a one, and a one which is counted first before the others, which must be taken alone, itself by itself. But if it was together with the others, since it was taken with the others but all the same was different from the others, we should have to let it go because it was with the others and look for what underlies the others and is no longer with the others, but itself by itself. For that one and the same which was in the others would be like this One by itself, but would not be it.

1 The other which thinks in a secondary way is Soul, the primary thinking principle Intellect: cp. the end of ch. 1.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 6.

μελλον καὶ ἐν ἄλλως ἐράσατε; εἰ μὴ τις αὐτάν ἄργαν τὸ εἶναι σὺν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὴν ὕποστασιν έχειν· οὐκ ἄρα ἀπολογία ἀπτή ἐστί, οὐδὲ τὸ συγκείμενον ἐκ πολλῶν ἐστιν: τὸ τε γὰρ ὁ δυναμένων ἀπολογία ἐστὶν ὑπὸ σύντομα σὺν έχει, τὸ τε συγκείμενον ἐκ

16 πολλῶν ἀπολογία οὐκ ὅπτως οὖθεν αὐτό ἐστιν· ἐκάστου γὰρ ἀπολογία ὁ δυναμένων εἰσίν οὐχὶ άρτι έκθετες τινὸς ἔνος ἀπολογία υφί έαυτοῦ τὸ συγκείμενον ἐκ πολλῶν.2 oδύνασαν αὐτῶν ὕποστασιν έχειν καὶ έαυτῷ [οὗ] 2 δυναμένου οὐδὲ παρέχειν αὐτὸ μετ’ ἄλλων εἰσίν τὸ ὄλος μὴ εἰσίν, ποὺ 20 ἄν τὸ συγκείμενον ἐκ πολλῶν.3 ἐκ πάντων εἶπη αὐτὸν ἐκ μὴ έντον γεγενεμένον, οὐ τι μὴ έντον; ἄλλ’ ἄλλως μὴ έντον; εἰ ἄρα πολλὰ τί ἐστιν, δι’ πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐν εἰσίν. εἰ οὖν τὸ νοσοῦν πλήθους, δεῖ εὖ τῷ μητ’ 4 πληθεῖ τὸ νοσεῖν μὴ εἰσίν. ήδε δὲ τούτο τὸ πρῶτον. εὖ τῶν ὦντεσιν 25 ἄρα αὐτοῦ τὸ νοεῖ καί νοεῖ ἐστιν.

4. Ἐστι εἰ τὸ άγαθῶδεν ἀπολογία καὶ άνευθεις δὲ εἰσίν, οὐδ’ ἂν τῷ νοεῖν διόπτοι· οὐ δὲ μὴ δει αὐτῷ, οὐ παρέσται αὐτῷ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος οὐδὲν πάρεστιν αὐτῷ· οὐκ ἀρὰ πάρεστιν αὐτῷ τὸ νοεῖ. καὶ νοεῖ· 5 οὐδὲν, οτι μηδὲ ἀλλ. ἢτι ἄλλο νοείς ταῦ άγαθῶδεν άγαθοὶ άγαθοὶ γὰρ τῷ άγαθῶν νοείν. ἦτα οὐς ἐν τοῖς δυναμεῖν έντον ὁ αὐτό καὶ ἄλλως οὐδὲν ὁ οὖν τῇ τούτῳ τῷ τοῦ μετ’ ἄλλου τὸ εἶν εἰσίν, ἄλλ’ ἐδεί εὖ ἐφ’ έαυτοῦ τρὸ τοῦ μετ’ ἄλλου εἰσίν, οὔτω δει καὶ εὖ φί

Kirkhoff*: οὖθ’ Enn. 4 del. Kirkhoff*,

1 Flac. 4 Fp (= Finius); om. Enn.

WHAT IS BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK

But it must be alone by itself if it is also to be seen in other things; unless someone is going to say that its being depends on its co-existence with other things; it will not then be simple, and the composite of many parts will not exist itself; for that which is unable to be simple will have no existence, and the composite of many parts will not exist itself if the simple does not. For if each and every simple thing cannot exist, since there is no simple one coming into existence by its own agency, and no one of the parts is able to have existence by itself, or to give itself to be with another because it does not exist at all, how then could the composite of many parts be a compound of all [these parts] which has come into being from non-existent things—not from things that are not something particular, but from things that do not exist at all? If, then, something is many, there must be a one before the many. If, therefore, there is multiplicity in the thinking principle, there cannot be thinking in what is not a multiplicity. But this is the First. Thinking and Intellect, then, will be in what comes after.

4. Again, if the Good must be simple and without need, it will not need thinking; but what it has no need of will not be present with it: since nothing at all is present with it, thinking is not present with it. And it thinks nothing, because it does not need anything else. Again, Intellect is something other than the Good; for it has the form of the Good by thinking the Good. Again, just as in the number two there is a one and another, and it is not possible for this one with another to be the number one, but it is necessary for there to be a one by itself before the one with another; in the same way it is necessary

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that, when a thing has immanent in it something simple along with something else, the simple thing should be simple in and by itself, having nothing in itself of all that it has in its association with other things. For what could make it something else in something different, if there was not something before it from which this something else comes? For the simple could not derive from something else, but that which is many, or two, must itself depend on something else. The First, then, should be compared to light, the next, to the sun, and the third, to the celestial body of the moon, which gets its light from the sun. For Soul has intellect as an external addition which colours it when it is intellectual, but Intellect has it in itself as its own, and is not only light but that which is enlightened the power to be what it is. Why then would it have need of anything? For it is not the same as that which is in something else: for that which is in something else is different from that which is in and by itself.

5. And again, the multiple might seek itself and wish to converge on and be conscious of itself. But by what way will that which is altogether one go to itself? At what point will it need self-consciousness? But it is one and the same thing which is better than self-consciousness and better than all thinking. For thinking does not come first either in reality or in value, but is second and is what has come into being when the Good [already] existed and moved what had come into being to itself, and it was moved and saw. And this is what thinking is, a movement towards the Good in its desire of that Good; for

1 Harder, Cilento, B.T: εἰς ἑνεάδα Εἴνας, I-81.
2 inserimus.
WHAT IS BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK

the desire generates thought and establishes it in being along with itself: for desire of sight is seeing. The Good itself, then, must not think anything: for the Good is not other than itself. For when what is other than the Good thinks it, it does so by being "like the Good" and having a resemblance to the Good, and it thinks it as Good and as desired by itself, and as if it had a mental image of the Good. And if it is like this for ever, it thinks the Good for ever. And again, in thinking the Good it thinks itself incidentally: for it is in looking to the Good that it thinks itself; for it thinks itself in actual activity: and the actual activity of all things is directed to the Good.

6. If this is correctly said, the Good would certainly not have any place for thinking: for the Good for the thinking principle must be something different from itself. So the Good is without activity. And why should actuality be active? For in general no active actuality has yet another actual activity. But even if some philosophers are able to attribute yet another activity to the other active actualities which are directed to something else, yet the first one of all, on which the others depend, we must let be what it is, adding nothing further to it. So an actual activity of this kind is not thinking; for it has nothing to think: it is itself the first. And further, it is not thinking that thinks, but what has the thinking: so again there comes to be a two in second actuality": cp. Aristotle De Anima B 412a-b. This applies only to human minds which exercise their activity of thinking intermittently; the Aristotelian Divine Mind is always completely active and actual, and no distinction of "first and second actuality" can apply to it.

1 PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 6.
25· What is beyond being does not think. 508 A 8 (knowledge and truth are "like the good" but not the Good).
3 The reference is to the Aristotelian doctrine of "first and

1 212
2 213
the thinking principle; but this [Good] is in no way two. Again, one would see this better if one grasped how in all thinking this double nature is more clearly there. We maintain that the real beings as real beings, and each individual one of them, the ones which truly exist, are in the "intelligible region," and we do so not only because they abide the same in essence but the other things, all of them which are in the realm of sense-perception, flow and do not abide—for perhaps there are things which abide among those perceived by the senses—but rather because they have the perfection of existence from themselves. For that which is called essence in the primary sense must not be a shadow of being, but have the fulness of being. And being is fulfilled when it has the form of thinking and living. So thinking, living and being are all together in what is real. If then it is being, it is also intellect, and if it is intellect, it is also being, and the thinking and the being go together. Thinking therefore is many and one. That, then, which is not like this cannot be thinking. And as we go over things individually, there is man and thought of man, and thought of horse, and horse, and thought of righteousness, and righteousness. All things then are double, and the one is two, and again the two come together into one. But the Good is not one of all these things, nor is it the product of all the twos; it is not two at all. But how the twos come from the One has been discussed elsewhere. But what is "beyond being"

1 A phrase taken from Plato Republic VII 517B5.
2 The question was discussed in the earlier treatise V. 4, ch. 2. Again a reference to the passage on the transcendence of the Good in Plato Republic VI 509B9 follows.
What is beyond being does not think

must be beyond thinking; it is not then absurd if he
does not know himself; for he has nothing in himself
which he can learn about, since he is one. But other
things need not know him either; for he gives them
something better and greater than that they should
know him—he is the Good of the others—he gives
them rather to be in the same place with him and
to lay hold on him, as far as they are able.
ARE THERE IDEAS OF PARTICULARS

Introductory Note

This short treatise, the eighteenth in Periphrus's chronological order, is the clearest statement in the Enneads that there are Platonic Ideas of particulars. (The general opinion of Platonists before Plotinus seems to have been that there were only Ideas of universals, not of particulars. The Stoics, though they did not believe in transcendent Ideas, held that no individual thing was exactly like any other; each had its own particular qualitative differences.) There has been much dispute about whether Plotinus held the doctrine expounded here, that there are Ideas or Forms of individuals, continually and consistently: there are a number of other passages in the Enneads which seem to deny it. Perhaps the safest conclusion is that he consistently held that there were Ideas of individual human selves in addition to (and included in) the Idea of Man. Socrates is something more than a mere instance of humanity (though he may be incarnate at various times as Pythagoras and many other empirical personalities). As regards Ideas of other individual things (including human bodies) his opinion may have varied; he was probably prepared to postulate them if and when he thought the facts required him to do so, but was not always sure that they did. In this treatise (especially in chapter 3) he goes further than anywhere else in the Enneads towards accepting the full Stoic position that each individual thing differs essentially from every other (acceptance of this by a Platonist would involve postulating a Form for each individual).

Synopsis

Is there an idea of each particular? It would seem so, in spite of all the difficulties which can be raised, at least in the case of individual men: this does not involve any objectionable kind of infinity in the intelligible world (ch. 1). Problems about differences between children of the same parents: if the children have different kinds of beauty this must be due to different forming principles (which are all present in the souls of the parents) (ch. 2). One needs to postulate different forming principles only where the individuals are really different; not perhaps therefore in cases where animals have litters of large numbers of apparently exactly similar offspring. But are two individuals ever really exactly the same? The Stoic doctrine of recurring world-periods, each exactly similar in every detail, will (as already suggested in ch. 1) make it unnecessary, even if there is a Form for every individual, to postulate an infinite number of Forms; but we must not be afraid of the infinity contained in a single intelligible reality (ch. 3).
V. 7. (18) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΙ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΚΑΘΕΚΑΣΤΑ ΕΙΣΙΝ ΙΔΕΑΙ

1. Εἰ καὶ τοῦ καθέκαστάν ἐστιν ἰδέα; ἐὰν καὶ ἐκάστῳ τῷ ἰδεατικῷ ἐστὶ τὸ νοητὸν ἔχει, καὶ ἐκάστῳ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐκεῖ. ἢ εἰ μὲν ἐνι Σωκράτης καὶ ψυχῇ Σωκράτους, ἐσται Αὐτοσωκράτης, καθά ἢ 1 ψυχῇ καθέκαστα καὶ ἐκεῖ [ὁς λέγει] ἢ καθέκαστα καὶ ἐκεῖ[ὁς λέγειν ἐκεῖ].2 εἰ δὲ ὅπερ ἀδει, ἀλλὰ ἄλλα ἀλλή γίγνεται ὁ πρῶτον Σωκράτης, ἐὰν Πυθαγόρας ἢ τις ἄλλος, ἀλλάτι τὸ καθέκαστα καὶ τὸ ἐκεῖ. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ἢ ψυχῇ ἐκάστου ὑπὸ διεξάγεται τοὺς λόγους ἔχει πάντως, πάντες αὐτ ἐκεῖ: ἐπεὶ καὶ λέγειν, ὅπως δ 10 κόσμος ἔχει λόγους, καὶ ἐκάστῃ ψυχῇ ἔχειν. εἰ ὅπως καὶ ὁ κόσμος μὴ ἀνυθρώπων μόνω, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν καθέκαστά ζώων, καὶ ἡ ψυχή ἀπεραν ὅπως τῷ τῶν λόγων ἔσται, εἰ μὴ ἀνακύρισις περιόδων, καὶ ὅπως ἡ ἀπεραν ἐσται πεπερασμένη, ὅπως τῷ πάθι ἀποδοθάτο. εἰ ὅπως ὁ λόγος πλείω τὰ γυμνά τὰ 16 παραδείγματος, τὰ δὲ εἰσὶ τῶν ἐν μιᾷ περιόδῳ

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1 scripsimus: ἢ Ρημ.
2 transpomimus.
ARE THERE IDEAS OF PARTICULARS

principles and models of all the things which come into being in one period? One man as model would do for all men, just as souls limited in number produce an infinity of men. No, there cannot be the same forming principle for different individuals, and one man will not serve as a model for several men differing from each other not only by reason of their matter but with a vast number of special differences of form. Men are not related to their form as portraits of Socrates are to their original, but their different structures must result from different forming principles. The whole revolution of the universe contains all the forming principles, and when it repeats itself it produces the same things again according to the same forming principles. We ought not to be afraid of the infinity which this introduces into the intelligible world: for it is all in an indivisible unity and, we may say, comes forth when it acts.

2. But if the mixtures of the forming principles of male and female produce different children, there will no longer be a forming principle of every individual child that is born, but one of the parents, the male, for instance, will produce it, not according to different forming principles but according to one, his own or his father's. No, nothing prevents it from being according to different principles, because the parent has them all, but different ones are ready for use at different times. But what are we to say when different children come from the same parents? It is because of unequal dominance [of the two parents]. But there is this further point, that it is not the case—even if it appears so—that sometimes the larger quantity of formative principle is on the male
This brings out clearly that matter for Plotinus is always a principle of resistance to nature (the immanent creative principle in the physical world which is the lowest form of soul). A child would be an unnatural creature if it owed its differences from the other members of its family to matter, not to the forms in nature.

Plotinus is here considering as a possibility (not definitely accepting) the full Stoic doctrine of the _Ibous toisóv_, the unique individual characteristic of every entity in any one world-period: cp. _SVF II_ 385; Seneca _Epistulae Morales_ CXIII, 16. Here and in the following chapter he is inclined to think that acceptance of the Stoic doctrine of recurrent world-periods in which every detail repeats itself exactly might be a useful way of accepting Forms of individuals while rejecting the idea that there is an infinite number of Forms, as he normally does, though at the end of chs. 1 and 3 in this treatise he seems at least prepared to consider it, and it was held by his closest associate Amelius (Syrianus _In Metaph._ 147. 1ff).
3. How, then, can we assert that the forming principles are different in the case of many children born at one birth? And suppose one also turns to the other living beings, and especially to the ones which have litters? Now in the cases where the offspring are indistinguishable, there is one forming principle. But if this is so, the forming principles are not equal in number to the individuals. Yes, they are equal to the number of individuals which are different, and different not by reason of failure to dominate the matter on the side of the form. Or what prevents there being different forming principles even when the individuals are not different? Supposing, that is, that there are any individuals at all totally without difference. For, as the craftsman, even if he is making things which do not differ from each other, must apprehend the sameness by means of a logical difference, according to which he will make the thing another by bringing some difference to its sameness, so in nature, where the other thing does not come into being by reasoning but only by rational forming principles, the difference must be linked with the form; but we are unable to grasp the difference. And if nature’s production contains a random number of individuals, that is a different story; but if it is precisely determined how many there are, the quantity will be defined by the unrolling and unfolding of all the forming principles; so that, when all things come to an end, there will be another beginning: for how large the universe ought to be, and all that it will pass through in its

3. "Seven, Cousin Peter, and all of them twins!" (Beatrix Potter The Tale of Mr. Tod 23), which may do something to justify my translation of διάφορος here.
Are there Ideas of Particulars

Life, is established from the beginning in that which contains the forming principles. Are we then in the case of the other living beings, which produce a great many offspring from one birth, to assume an equal number of forming principles? Now we have no need to be afraid of the infinity in seeds and forming principles, since Soul contains them all. Yes, in Intellect, as in Soul, there is again the infinity of these principles which come out ready for use in Soul.
ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY

Introductory Note

This treatise is the second section of the great work comprising III. 8 (30), V. 8 (31), V. 5 (32) and II. 9 (33) (see Introductory Notes to II. 9, III. 8 and V. 5). It should be read before V. 5, with which it is particularly closely linked (see Introductory Note to V. 5). Its purpose is to give us the most vivid and powerful understanding of the true nature of Intellect possible in a written work: not a merely external understanding but one which will enable us to become Intellect and see its world from inside. The two great linked themes by developing which Plotinus tries to bring us to this inner understanding are: (i) that all beauty and order, both of nature and art, here below are due to living form deriving immediately from Intellect: our material cosmos is an image or reflection of the world of Intellect; (ii) that both the creative activity of Intellect here below and its own inner life are totally non-discursive, an eternal productive life immediately aware of itself in a way which has nothing in common with the reasoning from premises to conclusions and planning which most people generally consider as thinking.

Synopsis

The beauty of art consists in living form, originating in the intelligible world, to which the mind of the artist has direct access (ch. 1). The beauty of nature is also due to form, and so to a still higher degree is moral beauty (ch. 2). How to rise to contemplation in Intellect, through the contemplation of the purified soul, or, better, of the gods (ch. 3). The heaven of the intelligible gods displayed in all its glory, its perfect unity and its endless living moving diversity, a universe of supremely real beings, not of theorems and propositions (chs. 3-4). The higher wisdom of Intellect which knows realities more like images than propositions (ch. 5). Egyptian hieroglyphics as an example of the expression of non-discursive thought (ch. 6). The unplanned immediate spontaneity with which Intellect creates its image, this visible cosmos (ch. 7). The beauty of the intelligible world (ch. 8). The method of dematerializing our contemplation of the visible cosmos so that we see the intelligible (ch. 9). The true, godlike contemplation of the intelligible world from within (chs. 10-11). Kronos and Zeus as symbols of the intelligible and sensible worlds; necessity of the eternal existence of the sensible image of the intelligible (ch. 12). Further exposition of the way in which Ouranos, Kronos, Zeus and Aphrodite symbolize the Three Hypostases. All beauty comes from the world of Intellect. Transition to V. 5 (ch. 13).
1. Since we maintain that the man who has entered into contemplation of the intelligible world and understood the beauty of the true Intellect will be able also to bring into his mind its Father which is beyond Intellect, let us try to see and to say to ourselves, as far as it is possible to say such things, how it is possible for anyone to contemplate the beauty of Intellect and of that higher world. Let us suppose, if you like, a couple of great lumps of stone lying side by side, one shapeless and untouched by art, the other which has been already mastered by art and turned into a statue of a god or of a man, of a Grace or one of the Muses if of a god, and if of a man not just of any man but of one whom art has made up out of every sort of human beauty. The stone which has been brought to beauty of form by art will appear beautiful not because it is a stone—for then the other would be just as beautiful—but as a result of the form which art has put into it. Now the material did not have this form, but it was in the man who had it in his mind even before it came into the stone; but it was in the craftsman, not in so far as he had hands and eyes, but because he had some share of art. So this beauty was in the art, 


1 There is a reference back here to the end of the first section (in Porphyry’s division) of this same treatise, III. 8 (30). 11—i.e. the chapter in the original immediately preceding this one.

2 Compare and contrast the earlier treatise I. 6 (1). 2. 25-7, where sometimes art gives beauty to a whole house with its parts, and sometimes nature gives beauty to a single stone.
and it was far better there; for the beauty in the art did not come into the stone, but that beauty stays in the art and another comes from it into the stone which is derived from it and less than it. And even this does not stay pure and as it wants to be in the stone, but is only there as far as the stone has submitted to the art. If art makes its work like what it is and has—and it makes it beautiful according to the forming principle of what it is making—it is itself more, and more truly, beautiful since it has the beauty of art which is greater and more beautiful than anything in the external object. For a thing is weaker than that which abides in unity in proportion as it expands in its advance towards matter. Everything which is extended departs from itself: if it is bodily strength, it grows less strong, if heat, less hot, if power in general, less powerful, if beauty, less beautiful. Every original maker must be in itself stronger than that which it makes; it is not lack of music which makes a man musical, but music, and music in the world of sense is made by the music prior to this world. But if anyone despises the arts because they produce their works by imitating nature, we must tell him, first, that natural things are imitations too. Then he must know that the arts do not simply imitate what they see, but they run back up to the forming principles from which nature derives; then also that they do a great deal by themselves, and, since they possess beauty, they make up what is defective in things. For Pheidias too did not make his Zeus from any model perceived by the senses,
but understood what Zeus would look like if he wanted to make himself visible.

2. But let us leave the arts; and let us contemplate those things whose works they are said to imitate, which come into existence naturally as beauties and are so called, all the rational and irrational living creatures and especially those among them which have succeeded since the craftsman who formed them dominated the matter and gave it the form he wished. What then is the beauty in these? Certainly not the blood and the menstrual fluid; rather, the colour of these is different and their shape is either no shape or a shapeless shape or like that which delimits something simple. From what source, then, did the beauty of Helen whom men fought for shine out, or that of all the women like Aphrodite in beauty? Then again, what is the source of the beauty of Aphrodite herself, or of any

1 The **"Pheidias commonplace"**, on the basis of which Plotinus develops his own view of the artist's direct access to the intelligible world, goes back at least to the age of Cicero (cp. Cicero *Orator* 11. 8-9 and, for the continuance of its use down to the time of Plotinus, Philostratus *Life of Apollonius* VI. 19. 2). Plotinus is of course here in disagreement with Plato, for whom the artist is merely a copyist of the realities of the sense-world (cp. Plato *Republic* 577Bf.). On the question of whether this disagreement was conscious and deliberate, see J. M. Rist, *Plotinus* (Cambridge 1967) 153-240.

2 del. Armstrong, ut ineptum simplicitatis exemplum.
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other beautiful human being or of any god of those who appear visibly, or even of those who do not appear but have in themselves a beauty which could be seen: Is not this beauty everywhere form, which comes from the maker upon that which he has brought into being, as in the arts it was said to come from the arts upon their works? Well, then, are the things made and the forming principle in matter beautiful, but the forming principle which is not in matter but in the maker, the first immaterial one, is that not beauty? But if it was the mass which was beautiful in so far as it was mass, it would necessarily follow that the forming principle which was the maker, since it was not mass, was not beautiful; but if the same form, whether it is in something small or something large, moves and influences the soul of one who sees it in the same way by its own power, beauty is not to be attributed to the size of the mass. It is further evidence of this that we do not yet see a thing while it is outside us, but when it comes within, it influences us. But it comes in through the eyes as form alone: or how could it get through something so small? But the size is drawn in along with it, since it has become not large in bulk but large in form. Further the maker must be either ugly or neutral or beautiful. Now if it was ugly it would not make the opposite, and if it was neutral why should it rather make something beautiful than something ugly? But certainly nature which produces such beautiful works is far before them in beauty, but we, because we are not accustomed to see any of the things within and do not know that it is that within which moves us: as if someone looking at
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his image and not knowing where it came from should pursue it. But the beauty also in studies and ways of life and generally in souls makes clear that what is pursued is something else and that beauty does not lie in magnitude: it is truly a greater beauty than that when you see moral sense in someone and delight in it, not looking at his face—which might be ugly—but putting aside all shape and pursuing his inner beauty. But if it does not move you yet, so that you call someone like this beautiful, you will not when you look inward at yourself be pleased with your beauty. It would be in vain for you to seek beauty when you are in this state, for you will be seeking with something ugly and impure. This is why discussions about these sorts of things are not for everybody; but if you have seen yourself beautiful, remember them.

3. There is therefore in nature a rational forming principle which is the archetype of the beauty in body, and the rational principle in soul is more beautiful than that in nature, and is also the source of that in nature. It is clearest in a nobly good soul and is already advanced in beauty: for by adorning the soul and giving it light from a greater light which is primarily beauty it makes us deduce by its very presence in the soul what that before it is like, which is no longer in anything else but in itself. For this reason it is not an expressed forming principle at all, but is the maker of the first forming principle which is the beauty present in the matter which is soul; but this [primary principle of beauty]
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...νοῦς καὶ οὐ ποτέ νοῦς, ὅτι μὴ ἑπακτὸς αὐτὴ. 

...διὰ ἂν οὐν εἰς υἱὸν τοῦ αὐτοῦ λέβαι; μᾶς γὰρ 

...ἐστιν ἐν χείρονος. ἀλλὰ γὰρ δὲ τὴν εἰς υἱὸν ἐν 

...πον γενέσθαι, ὡστε μὴ δὲ εἰς υἱὸν, ἀλλὰ οὖν χρυσὸν 

...παντὸς χρυσοῦ ται δέγμα λαβεῖν, καὶ εἰ μὴ καθ-

...ἀρῶς εὖ το ληθεῖς, καθαίρειν αὐτῶν ἢ ἔργῳ ἢ λόγῳ 

...δεικνύεις, ὡς οὔ πάν τοῦτο ἕστι χρυσός, ἀλλὰ 

...τοι τὸ ὑπὸ ὄγκων μοῦνα ἀυτὸ καὶ ἑντάθια ἀπὸ 

...νοῦ τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν κεκαθαρμένου, εἰ δὲ βοήθει, ἀπὸ 

...τῶν θεῶν, οὐδὲ ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῶν νοῦς. σεμνοὶ μὲν 

...γὰρ πάντες θεοὶ καὶ καλοὶ καὶ τὸ κάλλος αὐτῶν 

...ἀμφίχαλον; ἀλλὰ τί ἐστι δὲ τοιοῦτοι εἰσῶν; ἡ 

...νοῦς, καὶ ὅτι μάλλον νοῦς ἐνεργῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὡστε 

...ἀρκεῖ. οὐ γὰρ δὲ, ὅτι αὐτῶν καλὰ τὰ σώματα. 

...καὶ γὰρ οὔ ἔστι σώματα, οὔ τοι ἔστιν αὐτῶς τὸ 

...ἐντάθια, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν καὶ οὐκ θεών. 

...καλοὶ ὅτι ἂς θεοὶ; ὁ γὰρ δὲ ποτὲ μὲν φρονισθεί.

...ποτὲ δὲ ἀφροίνουσα, ἀλλὰ δεῖ φρονισθῆναι ἐν ἀσθενεῖ 

...τῷ νῷ καὶ σταυρώμα καὶ καθαρῷ καὶ ἑσαχτί πάντα καὶ 

...γενώσκομεν οὐ τὰ ἐνθρόνους, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐντάθια τὸ 

...θεῖο, καὶ ὡσον νοῦς ὁμα. τῶν δὲ θεών οἱ μὲν ἐν 

...οὐρανῷ ὄντες—συνόλο γὰρ αὐτῶς—θεοῦ τε νόθει, οὐ 

...δὲ σάρκωθαι, τὰ ἐν ἑκείνῳ ἃ τῷ ὄντος ἐπιχεῖ.

...τῆς ἑωτῶν κεφαλῆς. οἱ δὲ ἐν ἑκείνῳ ὄντες, δοσεῖ ἂς

1 MacKenzi: καλοὶ δὲ οἱ θεοὶ Εἰμ., H-S  

2 Cilento, B-T: del. Müller, Harder.

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is Intellect, always and not just sometimes Intellect, 

...because it does not come to itself from outside. 

...What image of it, then, could one take? For every 

...image will be drawn from something worse. But the 

...image must be taken from Intellect, so that one is 

...not really apprehending it through an image, but it 

...is like taking a piece of gold as a sample of all gold, 

...and, if the piece taken is not pure, purifying it in 

...act or word by showing that not all this sample is 

...gold, but only this particular portion of the whole 

...mass; here it is from the intellect in ourselves when 

...it has been purified, or, if you like, from the gods, 

...that we apprehend what the intellect in them is like. 

...For all the gods are majestic and beautiful and their 

...beauty is overwhelming: but what is it which makes 

...them like this? It is Intellect, and it is because 

...Intellect is more intensely active in them, so as to be 

...visible. They are certainly not like this because 

...their bodies are beautiful. The godhead even of 

...those who have bodies does not consist in this, but 

...these too are gods because of their intellect. They 

...are surely beautiful just because they are gods. 

...For they certainly do not sometimes think rightly and 

...sometimes perversely: their thinking is always right 

...in the calm and stability and purity of Intellect, and 

...they know all things and are acquainted, not with 

...mortal matters, but with their own divine ones, with 

...all which Intellect sees. The gods who are in heaven, 

...since they are free for contemplation, continually 

...completely, but as if at a distance, the things in 

...that higher heaven into which they raise their

1 Cp. the remarkable development of this image, where the 

..."living gold" purifies itself, in IV. 7. 10. 47-52. 

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οἴσις εἰν’ αυτῷ καὶ εἰν’ αὐτῷ, εἰν τοῖς αἰκονίζοντες τῷ ἐκείνῳ οὐρανῷ—πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνῳ οὐρανῷ καὶ ἡ γῆ οὐρανός καὶ θάλασσα καὶ ζώα καὶ φυτὰ καὶ ἄνθρωποι, πάν οὐρανὸν ἐκείνου τοῦ οὐρανοῦ—οἱ δὲ θεοὶ δὲν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀλλ’ ἄλλο τῶν ἐκείνων ἐκεῖνος ἀπαξιώμενος ἀλλ’ ἄλλο τῶν ἐκείνων ἐκεῖνος, στὶς τῶν ἐκείνων, πάντων μὲν διεξάγοι τὴν ἐκείνη χώραν καὶ τὴν τόσον ἀναπαύμενοι.

4. —καὶ γὰρ τὰ βεία χώρα εἰς, καὶ ἀλλοτία δὲ ἄλλως καὶ γενέτειρα καὶ τροφῆς καὶ ὀσμῶς καὶ τροφῆς καὶ ὀσμῶς πάντα, εἰδ’ οἷς γένεσις πρὸς τόκου, ἀλλ’ οἷς ὀσμῶς, καὶ ἐαυτῶς εἰς ἄλλως.

διαφανῆ γὰρ πάντα καὶ ἀκοπευμένα ὀσμῆς ἀντίτυπον ὠδέν, ἀλλ’ πᾶς πάντα ὁμορφός εἰς τὸ εἰσόμεναι καὶ πάντα: φῶς γὰρ φωτί. καὶ γὰρ ἔχει πᾶς πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ αὐ ό ρὸς ἐν ἑλλεί πάντα, ὡστε πανταχοῦς πάντα καὶ πάν πᾶν καὶ ἐκαστὸν πᾶν καὶ ἀνείρισθ’ ἐκαστὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν μέγα, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν μέγα, καὶ ἡμῶς ἐκεῖ πάντα ἄστρα, καὶ ἐκαστὸν ἡμῶς αὐτῷ καὶ πάντα. εἴχει δὲ ἐν ἑκαστῷ ἄλλο, ἐμφαίνει δὲ καὶ πάντα. ἔστε δὲ καὶ κύριες καθαρὰς οὐ γὰρ συγχέει αὐτῇ λόγους ὁ καὶ κύριες εἴρον αὐτῆς ὑπάρχει καὶ ἡ στασίς οὐ παρακομοῦμεν, ὥστε μὴ μειμωται τοῖς μὴ πασχομενοῖς καὶ τὸ καλόν

καὶ ὡς, ὅτι μὴ ἐν τῇ μιᾷ. 1 καὶ. δειχτε ἐκαστὸν αὐτός ἐπ’ ἐλλογρίαις οἶον γῆς, ἀλλ’ ἐστιν

1 Boeic. testatur Theologia

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heads 1 : but the gods in that higher heaven, all those who dwell upon it and in it, contemplate through their abiding in the whole of that heaven. For all things there are heaven, and earth and sea and plants and animals and men are heaven, everything which belongs to that higher heaven is heavenly. The gods in it do not reject as unworthy men or anything else that is there; it is worthy because it is there, and they travel, always at rest, through all that higher country and region—

4. For it is "the easy life" 2 there, and truth is their mother and nurse and being and food—and they see all things, not those to which coming to be, but those to which real being belongs, and they see themselves in other things; for all things there are transparent, and there is nothing dark or opaque; everything and all things are clear to the inmost part to everything; for light is transparent to light. Each there has everything in itself and sees all things in every other, so that all are all and the glory is unbounded; for each of them is great, because even the small is great; the sun there is all the stars, and each star is the sun and all the others. A different kind of being stands out in each, but in each all are manifest. Movement, too, is pure: for the mover does not trouble it in its going by being different from it. Rest is not disturbed, for it is not mixed with that which is not at rest. Beauty is just beauty, because it is not in what is not beautiful. Each walks not as if on alien ground, but each one's place is its very self and when it

visionary experience of Plotinus himself (ep. VI. 7. 12-3).

2 δειχ. αὐτὸν Ὀνόρας is a stock Homeric phrase for the gods; cp. e.g. Iliad 6. 138.

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ascends (so to speak) the place it came from runs along with it, and it is not itself one thing and its place another. The thing itself is Intellect: and its ground is Intellect; it is as if one were to suppose that in the case of this visible heaven of ours which is luminous that the light which comes from it was born to be the stars. Here, however, one part would not come from another, and each would be only a part; but there each comes only from the whole and is part and whole at once: it has the appearance of a part, but a penetrating look sees the whole in it, supposing that someone had the sort of sight which it is said that Lynceus 1 had, who saw into the inside of the earth, a story which speaks in riddles of the eyes which they have there. They do not grow weary of contemplation there, or so filled with it as to cease contemplating: for there is no eminence which would result in their being satisfied when they had filled it and reached their end; and things are not different from each other so as to make what belongs to one displeasing to another with different characteristics; and nothing there wears out or wearsies. There is a lack of satisfaction there in the sense that fullness does not cause contempt for that which has produced it: for that which sees goes on seeing still more, and, perceiving its own infinity and that of what it sees, follows its own nature. Life holds no weariness for anyone when it is pure: and how should that which leads the best life grow weary? This life is wisdom, wisdom not acquired by reasonings, because it was always all present, without any failing which would make it need to be

1 For the legend of Lynceus see Cypria XI Allen and Apollonius Rhodius I 151-5.
searched for: but it is the first, not derived from any other wisdom; the very being of Intellect is wisdom: it does not exist first and then become wise. For this reason there is no greater wisdom: absolute knowledge has its throne beside Intellect in their common revelation, as they say symbolically Justice is throned beside Zeus. All things of this kind there are like images seen by their own light, to be beheld by "exceedingly blessed spectators." The greatness and the power of this wisdom can be imagined if we consider that it has with it and has made all things, and all things follow it, and it is the real beings, and they came to be along with it, and both are one, and reality is wisdom there. But we have not arrived at understanding this, because we consider that the branches of knowledge are made up of theorems and a collection of proportions; but this is not true even of the sciences here below. But if someone wants to dispute about these, let them go for the present; but about the knowledge there—which Plato observed and said "that which is not a knowledge different from that in which it is," but how this is so, he left us to investigate and discover, if we claim to be worthy of our title [of Platonists]—perhaps it would be better to start from this point: 5. Some wisdom makes all the things which have come into being, whether they are products of art or nature, and everywhere it is a wisdom which is in charge of their making. But if anyone does really make according to wisdom itself, let us grant that the arts are like this. But the craftsman goes back 1 Justice is throned beside Zeus in Sophocles Oedipus Coloneus 1381—2 (in Antigone 451, for obvious dramatic reasons, she dwells with the gods below, in the world of the 2 The greatness and the power of this wisdom can be imagined if we consider that it has with it and has made all things, and all things follow it, and it is the real beings, and they came to be along with it, and both are one, and reality is wisdom there. But we have not arrived at understanding this, because we consider that the branches of knowledge are made up of theorems and a collection of proportions; but this is not true even of the sciences here below. 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The "images in the soul of the wise man" (and probably the "images" in ch. 4, line 43) come from the speech of Alcibiades in praise of Socrates at the end of the Symposium, where he speaks of the wonderful images which are concealed within his Silenus-like outside: Plato Symposium 215B1-3 and 216E3-217A1. The form of reference ("someone imagined") is curious for a reference by Plotinus to a Platonic passage, but Plotinus is probably attributing the imagination of the Silenus-figure containing divine images to Alcibiades himself rather than to Plato. It brings out excellently that

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again to the wisdom of nature, according to which he has come into existence, a wisdom which is no longer composed of theorems, but is one thing as a whole, not the wisdom made into one out of many components, but rather resolved into multiplicity from one. If then one is going to make this the first, that is enough: for it no longer comes from another and is not in another. But if people are going to say that the rational forming principle is in nature, but its origin is nature, from where shall we say that nature has it—is it perhaps from that other? If it is from itself, we shall stop there; but if they are going on to Intellect, we must see at this point if Intellect generated wisdom; and if they assent to this, from where did it get it? If from itself, this is impossible unless it is wisdom itself. The true wisdom, then, is substance, and the true substance is wisdom; and the worth of substance comes from wisdom, and it is because it comes from wisdom that it is true substance. Therefore all the substances which do not possess wisdom, because they have become substance on account of some wisdom but do not possess wisdom in themselves, are not true substances. One must not then suppose that the gods or the "exceedingly blessed spectators" in the higher world contemplate propositions, but all the Forms we speak about are beautiful images in that world, of the kind which someone imagined to exist in the soul of the wise man, images not painted but real. This is why the ancients said that the Ideas were realities and substances.

the Forms in Intellect are concrete living realities, not mental abstractions like propositions, a point on which Plotinus is much concerned to insist in this treatise.
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6. The wise men of Egypt, I think, also understood this, either by scientific or innate knowledge, and when they wished to signify something wisely, did not use the forms of letters which follow the order of words and propositions and imitate sounds and the enumerations of philosophical statements, but by drawing images and inscribing in their temples one particular image of each particular thing, they manifested the non-discursiveness of the intelligible world,1 that is, that every image is a kind of knowledge and wisdom and is a subject of statements, all together in one, and not discourse or deliberation. But [only] afterwards [others] discovered, starting from it in its concentrated unity, a representation in something else, already unfolded and speaking it discursively and giving the reasons why things are like this, so that, because what has come into existence is so beautifully disposed, if anyone knows how to admire it he expresses his admiration of how this wisdom, which does not itself possess the reasons why substance is as it is, gives them to the things which are made according to it. That, then, which is beautiful in this way, and which is with difficulty or not at all discovered by research to be necessarily like this, if one were to find it out, exists before research and before reasoning; for instance—for let us take one great example of what I am saying, which will also fit all other cases—

7. this All, if we agree that its being and its being what it is come to it from another, are we to think speaks of temples, not of sacred writings, and is therefore not misunderstanding the semi-alphabetic hieroglyphics of the sacred books but speaking of the purely ideogrammatic symbols which do appear on the temple walls.

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1 On the kind of images of which Plotinus is speaking here see E. de Keyser La Signification de l'art dans les Ennées de Plotin (Louvain 1955) 60-2, who points out that Plotinus
that its maker conceived earth in his own mind, with
its necessary place in the centre, and then water and
its place upon earth, and then the other things in
their order up to heaven, then all living things, each
with the sort of shapes which they have now, and
their particular internal organs and outward parts,
and then when he had them all arranged in his mind
proceeded to his work? Planning of this sort is
quite impossible—for where could the ideas of all
these things come from to one who had never seen
them? And if he received them from someone else
he could not carry them out as craftsmen do now,
using their hands and tools; for hands and feet come
later. The only possibility that remains, then, is
that all things exist in something else, and, since
there is nothing between, because of their closeness
to something else in the realm of real being something
like an imprint and image of that other suddenly
appears, either by its direct action or through the
assistance of soul—this makes no difference for the
present discussion—or of a particular soul. All
that is here below comes from there, and exists in
greater beauty there: for here it is adulterated, but
there it is pure. All this universe is held fast by
forms from beginning to end: matter first of all by
the forms of the elements, and then other forms
upon these, and then again others; so that it is
difficult to find the matter hidden under so many
forms. Then matter, too, is a sort of ultimate form;
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so this universe is all form, and all the things in it are forms; for its archetype is form; the making is done without noise and fuss, since that which makes is all real being and form. So this is another reason why the craftsmanship of Intellect is also without toil and trouble. And it is the fashioning of an All, so an All is the maker. There is nothing to hinder the making, and even now it has the mastery, and though one thing obstructs another, nothing obstructs it; for it abides as an All. But I think also that if we were archetypes and real being and forms all at once, and if the form which makes things here below was our real being, our craftsmanship would have the mastery without toil and trouble. And even now, man also is a craftsman, of a form other than himself since he has become something else, what lie is; for he has ceased to be the All now that he has become man; but when he ceases to be man he "walks on high and directs the whole universe"; for when he comes to belong to the whole he makes the whole. But to return to our main theme: you can explain the reason why the earth is in the middle, and round, and why the ecliptic slants as it does; but it is not because you can do this that things are so there; they were not planned like this because it was necessary for them to be like this, but because things There are disposed as they are, the things here are beautifully disposed: as if the conclusion was there before the syllogism which showed the cause, and did not follow from the premises; [the world-order] is not the result of following out a train of logical consequences and

1 Ez., Perna, Kirchhoff: εἶδος τὸ δὲ ABR=JUC, Perna#: εἶδος τὸ δὲ Creuzer.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD Y. 8.

καὶ πρὸ ἐπιστολής: ὡσπερ γὰρ πάντα πάντα, καὶ λόγος καὶ ἀπολογία καὶ πίστις, ἐπι γάρ
ἀρχή, αὐτῷ πάντα πάντα καὶ ὅδε· καὶ τὸ μη
ζητεῖν αὐτά αὐτάς ἀρχής ὡσπερ καλὸς λέγεται, καὶ τῆς
tου ἀρχής τῆς τελείας, ἤτοι ταῦτα τῶν τελεί

8. Καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν πρῶτον, καὶ ἄλλον δὲ καὶ παντοκοῦσθι δοκίμο, ὥσπερ μὲν ἀποδείκτηται τῷ καλῷ

καὶ συνειδήσει, τῷ ὡν εἰς ὑπόνοιαν καλῶς, γὰρ ἡ ἀρχή

8. Who, then, will not call beautiful that which is

beautiful primarily, and as a whole, and everywhere

as a whole when no parts fail by falling short in

beauty? Certainly [one would not call beautiful]

that which is not as a whole beauty itself, but has a

part of it, or not even any of it. Or if that is not

beautiful, what else is? For that which is before

it does not even want to be beautiful; for it is this

which first presents itself to contemplation by being

form and the contemplation of intellect which is

also a delight to see. For this reason Plato, wishing
to indicate this by reference to something which is

clearer relatively to ourselves, represents the Crafts-
man approving his completed work, wishing to show
by this how delightful is the beauty of the model,
which is the Idea. 2

For whenever someone admires a thing modelled on something else, he directs his
admiration to that on which the thing is modelled.
But if he does not know what is happening to him,
that is no wonder: since lovers also, and in general

1 Kirchhoff: ἡμερ. Εἰκόν., H.S.1.
2 L. Kirchhoff: ἡμερ. v.BAUQ.

Cp. Aristotle Physics A 5. 188a27–30, though Plotinus is
an usual very much adapting Aristotle’s doctrine to his own
system and his own purposes.

The reference is to Plato Timæus 27C7–DI. But there
is nothing in Plato to suggest the interpretation given by
Plotinus here, which is wholly based on his own doctrine that
all perfect activity is contemplation, and that creation or

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purposive thought: it is before consequential and

purposive thinking; for all this comes later, reasoning

and demonstration and the confidence [produced by

them]. For since [the intelligible world-order] is a

principle, all these follow immediately and just as they
do; and in this sense it is well said that we

should not enquire into the reason why of a principle; and of a principle like this, the perfect one,

which is the same as the goal; but that which is

principle and goal is the whole all together and is

without deficiency.

8. Who, then, will not call beautiful that which is

beautiful primarily, and as a whole, and everywhere

as a whole when no parts fail by falling short in

beauty? Certainly [one would not call beautiful]

that which is not as a whole beauty itself, but has a

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But if he does not know what is happening to him,
that is no wonder: since lovers also, and in general

This was fully expanded in the first part of the present work, III, 8, and applied to the creation of the universe in ch. 7 of

this treatise.

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oi ἐρωτεύματι καὶ ἔλευς ὅπος τὸ τέλειον τεθαμμα-κότας ἐγκωμίαιν ὅτι δὲ' ἐκεῖνον. δὲ ἐκείνον γάρ. ὅτι δὲ εἰς τὸ παράδειγμα ἀνάγει τῇ ἡγάθει, δῆλον ποιεῖ ἐπίτροπο τὸ ἐξής τῇ λέξεως λαβῆν. εἰπε γάρ: ἡγάθει τῇ καὶ ἐπὶ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸ παράδειγμα αὐτῷ ἐβουλήθη ἀφομοιώσαται, τὸ κάλλος τοῦ παράδειγματος οἶον ἐστιν ἀναπαρασπέν-νος διὰ τὸ ἐκ τούτου τὸ γενόμενον καλὸν καὶ αὐτῷ ἐκεῖνον, ἀφομοιώσαται: ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐκεῖνον ἦν τὸ ὑπέρκαλον κάλλεις ἠμιχώρι; τι ἂν τούτου τοῦ ὀρμωμένου ἦν κάλλος; δὴν οἷς ἄρθροις οἱ μερό-μενοι τοῦτον, εἰ μὴ ἄρα καθὼς μὴ ἐκεῖνον ἀναπαράσπεν. 15

9. Τοῦτο τοῖν τὸν κόσμον, ἐκάστου τὸν μερᾶς μύσων δ᾽ ἐστι καὶ μὴ συγχωρεμένοι, λάβωμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ, εἰς ἐν ὅμοι πάντα, ὡς οὖν τοῖς, ὅστε εὐδοκιμούμενι προφανείοις, οὐδὲν ἔστι σαφῆς, ὁμοίως ἀκολουθεῖν εὐθέως καὶ τὴν ἡλίουν καὶ ὀμοίως τῶν ἄλλων ἀστράν τὴν φαντασίαν, καὶ γῆ καὶ ἥλιον καὶ πάντα τῇ ἑξαίρεσι πρὸς τί; εἰ μὴ σαφής διαφάνεις καὶ ἔρχεται ἐν γένοις πᾶντα ἐν τρόπῳ. ἔστω οὖν καὶ ἐν τῇ φυσικῇ τῆς φαντασίας σαφῆς ἄκουσα πάντα ἐν αὐτῇ, εἴτε 20 καὶ μὲν κατακρίνεις, τὰ δὲ ἀπαθητικὰ, φυλάτταται, διε τούτων ἄλλην παρά σαφῆν ἀφελέων τῶν ὄντων λαβῆ; ἄφθει δὲ καὶ τοῖς τῶν καὶ τῇ ἡλίῳ ἐν σοὶ φαντασίᾳ, καὶ μὴ περιών ἀρτίς ἄλλην ὀμφάλον λαβῆν τῷ ὄντι, δὲν δὲ καλόστας τὸν πανθεοτότος ἐγένεις τῇ φαντασίᾳ

1  wQ, Perna: om. ExUCL, H-S.
come. And may he come, bringing his own universe with him, with all the gods within him, he who is one and all, and each god is all the gods coming together into one; they are different in their powers, but by that one manifold power they are all one; or rather, the one god is all; for he does not fail if all become what he is: they are all together and each one again apart in a position without separation, possessing no perceptible shape—for if they did, one would be in one place and one in another, and each would no longer be all in himself—or does each god have parts different from himself belonging to other gods than himself, nor is each whole like a power cut up which is as large as the measure of its parts. But this, the [intelligible] All, is universal power, extending to infinity and powerful to infinity; and that god is so great that his parts have become infinite. For what place can we speak of where he is not there before us? This [visible] heaven is indeed great, and so are all the powers together within it, but it would be greater, even indescribably great, if there was not present with it a petty power of body. One might certainly call the powers of fire and the other bodies great; but it is by mere inexperience of true power that they are imagined burning and destroying and crushing and working as servants for the production of living things. But these destroy, because they are destroyed, and help to generate because they are generated themselves; but the power in the intelligible world has nothing but its being and its being beautiful. For where would its beauty be if it was deprived of its being? And where would its reality be if it was stripped of its being beautiful?
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For in deficiency of beauty it would be defective also in reality. For this reason being is longed for because it is the same as beauty, and beauty is lovely because it is being. But why should we enquire which is the cause of the other when both are one nature? This reality here below, which is not genuine, does indeed require a phantasm of beauty brought in from outside in order to appear and in any way to be beautiful, and it is beautiful in proportion as it has a share in the beauty which is according to form, and when it has it it is more perfect: the more of it it has: for it is more reality in so far as it is beautiful.

10. For this reason Zeus, although the oldest among the gods whom he himself leads, advances first to the contemplation of this god, and there follow him the other gods and spirits and the souls who are capable of seeing these things. But he appears to them from some invisible place and dawning upon them from high illuminates everything and fills it with his rays, and dazzles those of them who are below, and they turn away unable to see him, as if he was the sun. Some endure him and gaze upon him, but others are troubled in proportion to their distance from him. But all those who are able to see look at him and what belongs to him when they see; but each does not always gain the same vision, but one, gazing intensely, sees the source and nature of justice, another is filled with the vision of moral integrity, not the kind which men have here below, when they do have it, in this sense it is some sort of imitation.

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of that other, but that glory over all, playing upon what we may call the whole extension of that world, is seen at the end by those who have already seen many clear visions, the gods individually and every one together, and the souls who see everything in the intelligible world and originate from everything, so as to include everything themselves from the beginning to the end; and they are there in the intelligible, in so far as they are naturally able to be there—but often the whole of them is there, when they are not divided. Zeus then sees these things, and with him any one of us who is his fellow-lover, and finally he sees, abiding over all, beauty as a whole, by his participation in the intelligible beauty; for it shines bright upon all and fills those who have come to be there so that they too become beautiful, as often men, when they go up into high places where the earth has a red-gold colour, are filled with that colour and made like that upon which they walked.

But there in the intelligible world the colour which blooms on the surface is beauty, or rather all is colour and beauty to its innermost part: for its beauty is not something different from itself, like a surface bloom. But those who do not see the whole only acknowledge the external impression, but those who are altogether, we may say, drunk and filled with the nectar, since the beauty has pene-

Nile and, as the Theselo Aristotelis (VIII. 146. 26-9) and Brühler in his Notice to the treatise interpret it, becoming suffused with the intense light so that they took the same colour as the red hills on which they walked (a less romantic explanation in terms of being covered with desert dust might also be possible but would be less appropriate to the context).

Cp. Plato Symposium (the drunken Poros in the garden of Zeus, used for various allegorical purposes by Plotinus).
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trated through the whole of their soul, are not simply spectators. For there is no longer one thing outside and another outside which is looking at it, but the keen sighted has what is seen within, although having it he for the most part does not know that he has it, and looks at it as if it were outside because he looks at it as if it was something seen, and because he wants to look at it. But one looks from outside at everything one looks at as a spectacle. But one must transport what one sees into oneself, and look at it as one and look at it as oneself, as if someone possessed by a god, taken over by Phoebus or one of the Muses, could bring about the vision of the god in himself, if he had the power to look at the god in himself.

11. Further, one of us, being unable to see himself, when he is possessed by that god brings his contemplation to the point of vision, and presents himself to his own mind and looks at a beautified image of himself; but then he dismisses the image, beautiful though it is, and comes to unity with himself, and, making no more separation, is one and all together with that god silently present, and is with him as much as he wants to be and can be. But if he returns again to being two, while he remains pure he stays close to the god, so as to be present to him again in that other way if he turns again to him. In this turning he has the advantage that to begin with he sees himself, while he is different from the god; then he hastens inward and has everything, and leaves perception behind in his fear of being different, and is one in that higher world; and if he wants to see by being different, he puts himself outside. While he is coming to know

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the god he must keep to an impression of him and
form distinct ideas of him; as he seeks him and dis-
cern what he is entering into; and when he has
learnt with confidence that it is into the highest
blessedness, he must give himself up to what is
within and become, instead of one who sees, an
object of vision to another who contemplates him
shining out with thoughts of the kind which come
from that world. How then can anyone be in beauty
without seeing it? If he sees it as something dif-
ferent, he is not yet in beauty, but he is in it most
perfectly when he becomes it. If therefore sight:
is of something external we must not have sight, or
only that which is identical with its object. This
is a sort of intimate understanding and perception
of a self which is careful not to depart from itself by
wanting to perceive too much. We must consider
this also, that the perceptions of evils have more
violent impacts, but produce less knowledge because
it is driven out by the impact; for illness strikes our
consciousness harder, but the quiet companionship
of health gives us a better understanding of it; for
it comes and sits by us as something which belongs
to us, and is united to us. Illness is alien and not
our own, and therefore particularly obvious because
it appears so very different from us. We have no
perception of what is our own, and since we are like
this we understand ourselves best when we have
made our self-knowledge one with ourselves. In
the higher world, then, when our knowledge is most
perfectly conformed to Intellect, we think we know
nothing because we are waiting for the experience of
sense-perception, which says it has not yet seen;
and it certainly has not seen, and never will see things

1 consicimus: καὶ πίστεν Ἐμμ.: καὶ ἐπιστήμων Kirchhoff,
Müller: καὶ πίστεν (ἔστε): Volkmann*: καὶ ἐπιστήμων πίστεν
Harder: καὶ πίστεν Oellner.
2 Theiler: προσέβα Ἐμμ.: προσέβα suspic. Volkmann.
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In these last two chapters the myths of Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus are explained as symbolically referring to the Three Hypostases, the One, Intellect and Soul. Plotinus does not often indulge in this sort of allegorization, and when he does it is somewhat tortured and he finds it difficult to be consistent.

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like these. It is sense-perception which disbelieves, but it is the other one who sees; and for him to disbelieve would be to disbelieve in his own existence: for he cannot after all put himself outside and make himself visible so as to look at himself with his bodily eyes.

12. We have explained how he can do this as another and how as himself. But when he sees, whether as another or as one who remains himself, what does he report? He reports that he has seen a god in labour with a beautiful offspring all of which he has brought to birth within him, and keeping the children of his painless birth-pangs within himself; for he is pleased with what he has borne and delighted with his offspring and so keeps all with him in his enjoyment of his and their glory; all the others who are beautiful, even more beautiful, have remained within and Zeus, one son alone of all, has appeared outside. From him, even though he is the youngest son, one can see as if from a likeness of him how great his father is and the brothers who have remained with him. But he says that it was not without purpose that he came forth from his father; for his other universe must exist, which has come into being beautiful, since it is an image of beauty; for it is utterly unlawful that there should be no beautiful image of beauty and reality. This image imitates its archetype in every way: for it has life and what belongs to reality as a representation of it should, and it has its being beauty since it comes from that higher beauty; and it has its everlastingness in the way...

For another rather confusing and fluctuating allegorization see III. 5 On Love.
ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY

proper to an image; otherwise [the intelligible universe] will sometimes have an image and sometimes not—and this image is not the product of art, but every natural image exists as long as its archetype is there. For this reason those are not right who destroy the image-universe while the intelligible abides, and bring it into being as if its maker ever planned to make it. For they do not want to understand how this kind of making works, that as long as that higher reality gives its light, the rest of things can never fail: they are there as long as it is there; but it always was and will be. We must use these [temporal] words because we are compelled to want to signify our meaning.

13. The god therefore who is bound so that he abides the same, and has conceded the government of this universe to his son—for it would not have been in character for him to abandon his rule in the intelligible world and go seeking a later one because he had had enough of the beauties there—lets this world go and establishes his father in himself, extending as far as him on the upper side; and on the other side he has established what begins with his son in the place after himself, so that he comes to be between the two, by the otherness of his severance from what is above, and by the bond which keeps him from what comes after him on the lower side; he is between a better father and a worse son. But since his father was too great to be beauty, he remained primarily beautiful; soul is certainly beautiful, but he is more beautiful than soul, because soul has a trace of him and is naturally beautiful by reason of this, but still more beautiful when it looks to that which is above it. If then, to speak more
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plainly, the Soul of the All is beautiful, that is Aphrodite is beautiful, what is Intellect? For if Aphrodite's beauty comes from herself, how great must that higher beauty be? But if it comes from another, from whom does Soul have its beauty, that which comes to it from outside and that which belongs to its real nature? For when we ourselves are beautiful, it is by belonging to ourselves, but we are ugly when we change to another nature: when we know ourselves we are beautiful, but ugly when we are ignorant of ourselves. Beauty therefore is in that higher world and comes from there. Is what we have said, then, enough to lead to a clear understanding of the 'intelligible region', or must we go back and take another way, like this?

1 Plotinus likes to identify Aphrodite with Soul (cp. III. 5. 2ff.). But so far in this treatise Zeus has been Soul, who leads the contemplation of Intellect (ch. 10) and comes out from the intelligible world to make the sense-world (ch. 12). Aphrodite manages to be daughter of Kronos as well as of Ouranos in III. 5. 2. 15-20, and perhaps Plotinus is also thinking of her as daughter of Kronos (Intellect) here, and has dropped Zeus out of the allegory for the moment.

2 For the 'intelligible region' cp. Plato Republic VII 517B5. This sentence leads straight into the beginning of V. 5 and makes it clear that the two treatises are parts of a single work.
V. 9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING

Introductory Note

This early treatise, the fifth in Porphyry's chronological order, is the first of Plotinus's "ascents of the mind" from the material world to Intellect: the One or Good is only mentioned incidentally in this treatise and the subject of its relation to Intellect is left for future development (chs. 2 and 14). The object of the treatise is to display the true nature of Intellect, and to show how Soul and the material world in which our souls find themselves depend on it, and so to teach us to live in it as our true home. It stays fairly close to the traditional school-Platonism which Plotinus had inherited, but already shows clear evidence of his original development of the tradition, especially in his insistence throughout on the living unity of thought and the Forms in the Intellect which is also Being, and the clear indication in ch. 13 that souls and their virtues here below continue to belong to the higher world of Intellect which is everywhere, not spatially separated or cut off from the lower world. The treatise gives the impression of having been rather hurriedly written: the later chapters are very summary in their treatment of the contents of the world of Intellect, and the last (ch. 14) is little more than a series of notes for further discussion.

Synopsis

Three kinds of philosopher, Epicurean, Stoic and Platonist: only the Platonist is capable of seeing and rising to the world of Intellect (ch. 1). The Platonic ascent of the mind from the derived beauty below to the original beauty above: should it stop at Intellect? (ch. 2). The nature of Intellect and the Forms in Intellect, and the necessity that they must exist, argued from the works of human and divine art here below (ch. 3). Superiority of Intellect to Soul, and Soul's dependence on Intellect (ch. 4). The unity of thought and Forms in the living reality of Intellect (chs. 5-8). The contents of the world of Intellect: it is a true intelligible universe containing everything which exists as form in the world of sense (but not, therefore, any defect or evil) (chs. 9-10). The arts considered and distinguished according to the degree to which they exist in the intelligible world or derive their principles from it (ch. 11). If the Form of man and the intellectual arts are in the intelligible, then so must the universal Forms be which are the subject-matter of those arts; a quick glance at the problem of physical individuality (ch. 12). Soul and its excellences exist in both worlds: so everything which exists in the intelligible world is also here below (ch. 13). Notes on a variety of problems about the intelligible world—the origin of its multiplicity, the question of Forms of casual compounds and products of putrefaction etc. (ch. 14).
V. 9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING

1. All men from the beginning, as soon as they are born, employ sense-perception before intellect and sense-objects are necessarily the first which they encounter. Some of them stay here and live through their lives considering these to be primary and ultimate, and since they consider what is painful and pleasant in them to be evil and good respectively, they think this is enough, and pass their lives pursuing the one and contriving to get rid of the other. And those of them who claim rationality make this their philosophy, like the heavy sort of birds who have taken much from the earth and are weighed down by it and so are unable to fly high although nature has given them wings. Others have risen a little from the things below because the better part of their soul has urged them on from the pleasant to a greater beauty; but since they were unable to see what is above, as they have no other ground to stand on they are brought down, with the name of virtue, to practical actions and choices of the things below from which they tried to raise themselves at first. But there is a third kind of godlike men who by their greater power and the sharpness of their eyes as if by a special keen-vision. For the Stoic doctrines of choice referred to here cp. St.P F III 64 and 118.
sightedness see the glory above and are raised to it as if above the clouds and the mist of this lower world and remain there, overlooking all things here below and delighting in the true region which is their own, like a man who has come home after long wandering to his own well-ordered country.

2. What, then, is this region? And how could one reach it? The man could reach it who is by nature a lover and truly disposed to philosophy from the beginning, in travail over beauty, since he is a lover, not enduring the "beauty of body" but escaping from it up to the "beauties of soul, virtues and kinds of knowledge and ways of life and laws"; and again he ascends to the cause of the beauties in soul, and again to anything there may be beyond this, till he comes to the ultimate which is the first, which is beautiful of itself. When he has arrived there he ceases from his travail, but not before. But how will he ascend, and where will his power come from, and what reasoning will guide this Love on his way? This one: this beauty which rests on bodies comes to the bodies from elsewhere; for these beauties are forms of bodies which rest upon them as if on their matter. At any rate what underlies them changes, and becomes ugly instead of beautiful. Its beauty comes by participation, then, our reasoning says. What then is it which makes a body beautiful? In one way it is the presence of beauty, in another the soul, which moulded it and put this particular form in it. Well, then, is the soul beautiful of itself? No, it is not. For [if it was] one soul would

1 For the Homeric allusions here and their significance see I. 6. 8, n. 1.

2 Plato's Phaedrus and Symposium are here, as often, combined: cp. Phaedrus 248D3-4 and Symposium 210B3-C6. For the possible passage from musician to lover and lover to
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 9.

Not be wise and beautiful and another stupid and ugly. So beauty in the soul comes by wisdom. And what is it, then, which gives wisdom to the soul? Intelect, necessarily, an intellect which is not sometimes intellect and sometimes unintelligent, but the true Intelect. This, then, is beautiful of itself. Should we then stop at Intelect as the first, or must we go beyond Intelect, and does Intelect stand from our point of view in front of the first principle, as if in the porch of the Good, proclaiming to us all that is in it, like an impression of it in greater multiplicity while the Good remains altogether in one?

3. We must consider the nature of this Intelect, which our reasoning tells us is the genuine reality and true substance, when we have first confirmed by following a different course that something of the sort must exist. It is perhaps ridiculous to enquire whether there is intellect in the world; though there are, it may be, people who would dispute even this. But it is more disputable if it is the sort of Intelect we say it is, and if it is a separate one, and if it is the real beings and if the nature of the Forms is there: this is our present subject. We certainly see that all the things that are said to exist are compounds, and not a single one of them is simple; [this applies to] each and every work of art, and all things compounded by nature. For the works of art have bronze or wood or stone, and they are not brought to completion from these until each art makes one a statue, another a bed, and another a house by putting the form which it has in them.

And again you will be able to resolve the things put together by nature, those of them which are multiple compounds and are composed, into the form imposed on all the elements of the composition: man, for instance, into soul and body, and the body into the four elements. And when you have found that each of the elements is a compound of matter and what forms it—for the matter of the elements is in itself formless—you will enquire from where the form comes to the matter. And then again you will enquire whether the soul is one of the simple entities, or whether there is something in it like matter and something like form, the intellect in it, one intellect being like the shape on the bronze, and the other like the man who makes the shape in the bronze. And one will transfer these same observations to the whole universe, and will ascend there also to Intellect and suppose it to be the true maker and craftsman, and will say that the underlying matter receives the forms, and part of it becomes fire, and part water, and part air and earth, but that these forms come from another: and this other is soul; then again that soul gives to the four elements the form of the universe, but Intellect provides it with the forming principles, as in the souls of artists the forming principles for their activities come from their arts; and that one intellect is like the form of the soul, the one which pertains to its shape, but the other is the one which provides the shape, like the maker of the statue in whom everything that he gives exists. The things which Intellect gives to the soul are near to truth; but those which body receives are already images and imitations. Some editors supply a phrase to make up the deficiency, but Plotinus is quite capable of such an omission.
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4. Why, then, must we go on up when we have reached the level of soul, and not suppose that it is the first reality? First of all, intellect is other and better than soul: but the better is naturally the first. For certainly soul does not when it is made perfect generate intellect, as they think; for in what way will the potential become actual, if there is no cause to bring it to actuality? For if it happens by chance, there is a possibility of its not coming to actuality. So we must assume that the first realities are actual and without deficiencies and perfect; but the imperfect ones come after and derive from the first, being perfected by their begetters as fathers perfect their originally imperfect offspring: and we must assume that soul is matter to the first reality which makes it and is afterwards given shape and perfected. But certainly if soul is a thing subject to affections, but there must be something not subject to being affected—otherwise everything will be destroyed by time—there must be something before soul. And if soul is in the universe, but there must be something outside the universe, in this way too there must be something before soul. For if what is in the universe is what is in body and matter, nothing will remain the same: so that man and the other rational forming principles will not be eternal or the same. One can see then from these and many other arguments that there must be an intellect before soul.

1 "They" are the Stoics: ep. IV. 7. 8, 8-9 and for the Stoic doctrine attacked here 

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1 Dodds (Select Passages 15), Harder: μένα Ἐκκ.*
Plotinus: Ennead V. 9.

5. But if we are to use the word in its true sense, we must take this intellect to be, not that in potentiality or that which passes from stupidity to intelligence—otherwise we shall have to look for another intellect before it but that which is actually and always intellect. But if it does not have its thinking from outside, then if it thinks anything it thinks it from itself and if it has anything it has it from itself. But if it thinks from itself and derives the content of its thought from itself, it is itself what it thinks. For if its substance was other [than its thinking] and the things which it thought were other than itself, its substance would itself be unintellectual: and, again, potential, not actual. Therefore one must not be separated from the other. But it is our habit, derived from the things in our world, to separate the things of that higher world in our conceptions of them. What then is its active actuality and its thinking, that we may assume it itself to be what it thinks? It is clear that, being Intellect, it really thinks the real beings and establishes them in existence. It is, then, the real beings. For it will either think them, as being somewhere else, or in itself as being itself. Now elsewhere is impossible: for where could it be? It thinks, therefore, itself and in itself. For what it thinks is certainly not in the realm of sense-perception, as they suppose. For each and every primary reality is not what is perceived by the senses: for the form on the matter in the things of sense is an image of the real form, and every form which is in something else comes to it from something else and is a likeness of that from which it comes. But also, if there

1 The Stoics again: cp. SVF II 88.
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must be a “maker of this All”, he will not think what is in the not yet existent universe in order to make it. The objects of his thought must exist before the universe, not impressions from other things but archetypes and primary and the substance of Intellect. But if they are going to say that rational forming principles are enough, they must clearly be eternal; but if they are eternal and not subject to affections, they must be in Intellect, and in an intellect of this kind, one which is prior to condition and nature and soul: for these are potential.

2 Intelect therefore really thinks the real beings, not as if they were somewhere else: for they are neither before it nor after it; but it is like the primary lawgiver, or rather is itself the law of being. So the statements are correct that “thinking and being are the same thing” and “knowledge of immaterial things is the same as its object” and “I searched myself” (as one of the real beings); so also are “recollections”; for no one of the real beings is outside, or in place, but they remain always in themselves and undergo no alteration or destruction: that is why they are truly real. If they come into being and perish, they will have their being from outside themselves, and it will not: any more be they, but that being which will be reality. The objects of sense are what they are called by participation, since their underlying nature receives its shape from elsewhere: for instance, from earlier philosophers of very varied significance in their original contexts to support his own doctrine: e.g., Parmenides fr. B 8 Diels; Aristotle De Anima 1.14. 430a3-4 and 7. 431a1-2; Heraclitus fr. B 101 Diels; and (e.g.) Plato Phaedo 72E5-6.

1 Cp. Plato Timaeus 58C3-4 (the famous and much used text about the difficulty of finding “ the maker and father of this All ”).

2 Again a Platonic criticism of Stoic doctrine: cp. SVF II 1013 p. 302, 30-7 Arnim.

3 The name “lawgiver” for Intellect may be taken from Numenius: cp. fr. 13 Des Places (22 Leemans), where it is used of the second God or Demiurges, whom Numenius by the use of this name may be consciously trying to identify with the God of the Jews.

4 An excellent example of how Plotinus collects texts from...
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An interesting combination of Aristotle, Plato, and Plotinus's own views on art. Examples of craftsmen, especially sculptors, are frequently used by Aristotle when discussing causation: e.g. Physics B 1-3. The "true bed" (the Form of bed) comes from Plato Republic X 597C3. But it is only in Plotinus that the art of the human artist possesses the true Forms: cp. V. 8, 1, n. 1 (p. 241).

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the art of sculpture and wood from the art of carpentry, the art passing into them through an image, but itself remaining in self-identity outside matter and possessing the true statue or bed. 1 This is also true of [natural] bodies; and this All shows by its participation in appearances that the real beings are other than they; the real beings are unchanging, but the appearances change, the real beings are set firm on themselves and need no place: for they are not magnitudes; they have an intelligent existence sufficient to themselves. For the nature of bodies wants to be preserved by something else, but Intellect upholds by its wonderful nature the things which fall down by themselves, and does not look for a place to be set in.

6. Let it be granted, then, that Intellect is the real beings, possessing them all not as if [they were in it] as in a place, but as possessing itself and being one with them. " All things are together " 2 there, and none the less they are separate. For even soul has many kinds of knowledge in it but does not contain any confusion, and each kind of knowledge does its own work 3 when the need arises without dragging in the others along with it, and each individual thought is clear of the other thoughts which remain within the mind when it comes into activity. In this way, and much more than this, Intellect is all things together and also not together, because each is a special power. But the whole Intellect...
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encompasses them as a genus does its species and a whole its parts. The powers of seeds give a likeness of what we are talking about: for all the parts are undistinguished in the whole, and their rational forming principles are as if in one central point; and all the same there is one principle of the eye and another of the hand, known from the sense-object which is produced by it to be distinct. As for the powers in the seeds, then, each of them is one whole formative principle with the parts included in it; it has the corporeal as its matter, for instance all which is moist in the seed, but is itself form as a whole and a formative principle which is the same as the form of soul which produced it, which is the likeness of another better soul. Some people call the soul in the seed “nature” which starts from above, from the principles before it, like light from fire, and flashes out and shapes the matter, not pushing it or using all that levering they keep on talking about, but giving it a share in its forming principles.

7. But as for the kinds of knowledge which exist in a rational soul, those which are of sense-objects—if one ought to speak of “kinds of knowledge” of these; “opinion” is really the suitable name for them—are posterior to their objects and likenesses of them; but those which are of intelligible objects, which are certainly the genuine kinds of knowledge, come from intellect to rational soul and do not think any sense-object; but in so far as they are kinds of knowledge, they are each and all of the active objects.

1 An allusion to the Stoic doctrine from which Plotinus develops his own view of nature, the lowest immanent form of soul, fully expounded in the first chapters of III. 8; cp. SVF II 748.

2 This seems to be an allusion to stock and often repeated Epicurean objections to the divine creator of the physical universe, for an example of which see Cicero De natura Deorum I. 8. 19, which may be paraphrased “Where did God get his construction machinery and labour force from?”
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Plotinus, as you know, thinks that the object of thought and the thought, because Intellect is within, which is the actual primary realities, and always keeps company with itself and exists in actuality and does not seek to apprehend its objects as if it did not have them or was trying to obtain them, or was going through them discursively as if they were not ready to hand before any discursive process—these are experiences of soul—but it stands firm in itself, being all things together, and does not think each thing in order to bring it into existence.

For it is not true that when it thought a god, a god came into existence or when it thought motion, motion came into existence. It is, then, incorrect to say that the Forms are thoughts if what is meant by this is that when Intellect thought this particular Form came into existence or is this particular Form; for what is thought must be prior to this thinking [of a particular Form]. Otherwise how would it come to thinking it? Certainly not by chance, nor did it happen on it casually.

8. If, then, the thought [of Intellect] is of what is within it, that which is within it is its immanent form, and this is the Idea. What then is this? Intellect and the intelligent substance; each individual Idea is not other than Intellect, but each is Intellect. And Intellect as a whole is all the Forms, and each individual intellect is a part of the whole, not as being spatially distinct, but as having its particular power.

An important early indication of the sense in which Plotinus accepts the common Middle Platonist doctrine that the forms are the "thoughts of God".

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An important early indication of the sense in which Plotinus accepts the common Middle Platonist doctrine that the forms are the "thoughts of God".

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in the whole. This Intellect therefore is in itself, and since it possesses itself in peace is everlasting fullness. If then Intellect was thought of as preceding being, we should have to say that Intellect by coming to active actuality in its thinking perfected and produced the real beings; but since we must think of being as preceding Intellect, we must assume that the real beings have their place in the thinking subject, and that the active actuality of thinking is in the real beings, as the active actuality of fire is in fire already existing, in order that they may have Intellect in its unity in them as their active actuality. But being is active actuality; so both have one active actuality, or rather both are one thing. Being and Intellect are therefore one nature; so therefore are the real beings and the active actuality of being and Intellect of this kind; and the thoughts of this kind are the form and shape of being and its active actuality. But they are thought of by us as one before the other because they are divided by our thinking. For the dividing intellect is a different one, but the undivided Intellect which does not divide is being and all things.

9. What then are the things in the one Intellect which we divide in our thinking? For they are in repose, but we must bring them forward, as one examines in order the contents of a unified body of knowledge. Since this universe is certainly a living being containing all living beings and deriving its being and its being as it is from another, and the origin of that from which it derives is traced back to
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Intellect, its whole archetype must necessarily be in Intellect, and this Intellect must be an intelligible universe, which Plato says exists in "the absolute living being." For just as, if there exists the rational forming principle of a living creature, and the nature which receives the seminal forming principle, the living creature must necessarily come into being, in the same way also when an intelligent and all-powerful nature exists and nothing hinders it, since there is nothing between it and what is able to receive it, it is necessary that one should be formed into the order and beauty of the universe and the other should form it. And that which is formed into the universe has its form divided, men in one place and the sun in another; but the forming nature has all things in one.

10. All the things, then, which exist as forms in the world of sense come from that intelligible world; those which do not, do not. Therefore none of the things which are contrary to nature are there, just as there are none of the things which are contrary to art in the arts, and there is no lameness in seeds. (Congenital lameness of the feet occurs when the forming principle does not master the matter, accidental lameness by damage to the form.) There are certainly [in the intelligible world] qualities which harmonize with nature and quantities, and numbers and dimensions and relations, and actions advantage: Plato: The Written and Unwritten Doctrines (London 1974) 41-5 and 374-5. The Middle Platonists generally denied the existence of such Forms (cp. Alcinous [Albinus] Didascalikos IX), and Plotinus is simply following the common opinion of the school (which he very often does not).

1 Cp. Plato Timaeus 30E3; there is an allusion above (line 4) to 33B2-3.
2 The doctrine of Plotinus in this chapter differs from that of Plato, whose dialogues contain many allusions to Forms of negation, defect and evil (see the full discussion in W. D. Ross Plato’s Theory of Ideas (Oxford 1951) 167-8, where references are given to the passages where Forms of this kind are mentioned). What Plato meant by asserting their existence, and how they are to be fitted in with other aspects of his Theory of Forms, are questions which have often puzzled ancient and modern commentators. J. N. Findlay makes most interesting philosophical sense of Forms of this kind, and contrasts Plato’s doctrine on this point with that of Plotinus, to Plate’s
and experiences which are according to nature, and both universal motion and rest and the motion and rest of parts of the intelligible. But there is eternity instead of time. And place there exists in the intellectual mode, the presence of one thing in another. There, then, since all things are together, whichever you take of them is substance and intelligent, and each shares in life, and is same and other, and motion and rest, and in motion and at rest, and substance and quality, and all of them are substance. For each real being is actual, not potential; so that the quality of each substance is not separated from it. Are there, then, in the intelligible world only the things which are in the sense-world or are there others over and above them? But we must first enquire about works of art: for there is no Form of Evil; since evil here is the result of want and deprivation and failure and is a misfortune of matter and of that which is like matter.

11. Are the works of art and the arts there then? As for all the imitative arts, painting and sculpture, dancing and mime, which are in some way composed of elements from this world and use a model perceived by sense and imitate the forms and movements and transpose into their own terms the proportions which they see, it would not be reasonable to trace them back to the intelligible world except as included in the forming principle of man. But if any artistic skill starts from the proportions of [individual] living

1 On substance and quality in the intelligible world see the much fuller discussion in the treatise On Substance, or on Quality (II. 6); cp. also VI. 2. 14 and the very thorough investigation of the whole subject in Klaus Warm Substanz und Qualität (Berlin-New York 1973).
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things and goes on from there to consider the proportions of living things in general, it would be a part of the power which also in the higher world considers and contemplates universal proportion in the intelligible. And certainly all music, since the ideas which it has are concerned with rhythm and melody, would be of the same kind, just like the art which is concerned with intelligible number. 1 And as for the arts which produce artificial sense-objects, for instance building and carpentry, in so far as they make use of proportions, they would have their principles from the intelligible world and the practical thinking there; but since they mix these up with what is perceived by the senses they would not be altogether in the intelligible world, except in the [Form of] man. 2 There would certainly not be farming there which helps the plants of the sense-world to grow, or medicine which has as its object of contemplation health here below, or the art which is concerned with strength and good bodily condition; for power in the intelligible world is different, and so is the health by which all living things there are undisturbed and adequate. And rhetoric and generalship, and the arts of administration and kingship, if any of them communicate excellence in the field of action, supposing that they contemplate that intelligible excellence, they have some part for their knowledge derived from the

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1 delevimus: si nunc legendum, nam exorditur variam lectionem: si nunc Kirchhoff (quodam Plotinum).

2 On art in the intelligible world and the access of the artist's mind to the Forms op. V. 8. 1 There is no reason to suppose that Plotinus intends to abandon there the distinction which he makes here between art which is simply unintelligent copying of sense-objects and the truly intellectual visual art and music which has its origin in the intelligible world.

+ Forms of artefacts are mentioned several times in the Dialogues, but the question whether Plato really believed in their existence (or changed his mind about them) has been vigorously discussed since Aristotle: see the good summary of the discussion (with full references) in Ross Plato's Theory of Ideas 171-5 (op. ch. 10, n. 2, p. 306). Most Middle Platonists rejected them: see the passage from Alciatus [Allinus] cited in ch. 10, n. 1. Plotinus is here again following school tradition in this rather summary early treatise.
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25 ἔχωσιν ὅτι τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς ἑκείνῃ γνωρίσματα δὲ νοημών ὄνομα τακτά ἑκείνῃ, σοφία τε ἀνωτάτον περὶ τὸ ὑπό ὅνομα. καὶ περὶ μὲν τεχνών καὶ τῶν κατὰ τέχνας των μην τεχνών τυπία.

12. Εἰ δὲ ἀνθρώπου ὑποκατάστασις καὶ λογικοῦ ἑκείνη καὶ τεχνικοῦ καὶ τῆς τεχνίτης καὶ τῶν καθὸς λόγον τὰ ἑκείνῃ, ἀλλὰ ἀνθρώπου. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ περὶ ἀνθρώπου, εἰ καὶ ἐὰν καθέκασται τὸ ἐκ καθέκαστων, ὅτι [μή] 9 τὸ ὑπὸ ἄλλο ἄλλων ὅνω ὅτι ὅ μὲν ἀνθρώπου, ὅ δὲ γρηγορότερον ἀνθρώπων, ἀποτελουσά ἐκ τῶν ὑποκατάστασις, τῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ὑποκατάστασις, τῶν ὑπὸ καθέκαστων, καὶ ἀρχὴ ἀρχήν; τὰ δὲ ἐκ λόγου ὕποκατάστασις, τὰς ἐκ καὶ ἀλλην καὶ τόσον διάφορον ὑπάρχει νώτα ποιεῖν.

1 Blumenthal: E Enn.*
2 del. Müller.

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knowledge there. And since geometry is concerned with intelligibles, it must be placed there, and wisdom, which is on the highest level and concerned with being. This is enough about the arts and their works.

12. But if the Form of man is there, and of rational and artistic man, and the arts which are products of Intellect, then one must say that the Forms of universal are there, not of Socrates but of man. But we must enquire about man whether the form of the individual is there; there is individuality, because the same [individual feature] is different in different people: for instance, because one man has a snub nose and the other an aquiline nose, one must assume aquiline and snubness to be specific differences in the form of man, just as there are different species of animal; but one must also assume that the fact that one man has one kind of aquiline nose and one another comes from their matter. And some differences of colour are contained in the formative principle but others are produced by matter and by different places of abode.

1 With the older punctuation of Perna and Creuzer, to which Henry-Schwyzter have now returned, the sense of this passage and its relevance to its context is clear, as Igal has pointed out (he has kindly communicated his conclusions to Schwyzter and me by letter, and published them in Spanish in Emerita XXI, 1773, 92-9). The subject of discussion is still intellectual and artistic man and his arts and sciences: Plotinus is pointing out that if they are there the universal Form which intellectual and artistic man seeks about individual Forms. We cannot assert their existence because the intellectual arts and sciences exist in the intelligible, but the question of their existence is left open. Plotinus is free to assert the existence of individual Forms on different grounds, as he did later in V. 7 (18), without any inconsistency with the present passage. It should be noted that in what immediately follows Plotinus is not considering man's souls, selves or personalities but the bodily differences between individuals, exemplified as usual by Socrates's snub nose. But in the next chapter he reminds us that, whether there are Forms of individual selves in the intelligible world (a question he does not raise here) or not, our souls have a permanent footing in the intelligible world. On the whole subject of Forms of individuals in Plotinus see my article "Form, Individual and Person in Plotinus" (Diogenes 1, 1977, 48-58) and the references to other literature there given.
13. It remains to say whether only the Forms of things in the sense-world exist in the intelligible, or if also, just as there is an Absolute Man different from man, there is an Absolute Soul different from soul and an Absolute Intellect different from intellect. It must be said first that not all things which are here below ought to be considered as images of archetypes, and soul should not be considered as an image of Absolute Soul, but one soul differs from another in honour, and there is Absolute Soul here below, though perhaps not as if here below. And there must belong to an individual soul that is really a soul some kind of righteousness and moral integrity, and there must be true knowledge in the souls which are in us, and these are not images or likenesses of their Forms as things are in the sense-world, but those very Forms themselves existing here in a different mode: for they are not separated off in a particular place; so that when the soul emerges from the body, those virtues too are in the higher world. For the sense-world is in one place, but the intelligible world is everywhere. Everything then which a soul of this kind has here below is there in the intelligible world; so that if one takes "things in the sense-world" to mean "things in the visible realm", there are not only the things in the sense-world there, but more; but if one means "things in the universe", including soul and the things in soul, all the things are here below which are in the intelligible world.

14. This nature, therefore, which includes all things in the intelligible is to be taken as the principle. But how is this possible, when the real principle is one and altogether simple, but there is...
5 καὶ πῶς πλήθει, καὶ πῶς τὰ πάντα ταῦτα, καὶ διὰ τί νοῦς ταῦτα καὶ πόθεν, λεκτέον ἢ ἄλλης ἁρχῆς δογματίζων.

Πρὶν δὲ τῶν ἐκ σφέσεως καὶ τῶν χαλεπῶν, ἦν κάκει ἐλθός, καὶ ἐρίς καὶ πρότειν, λεκτέον, ὅσον κομιζέται νοῦς ἀπὸ τοῦ πρῶτου, πάντα ἁριστά.

6 ἐν ὅσοι εἶδοιν οὐ ταῦτα· οὐδὲ ἐκ τοῦτων νοῦς, ἀλλὰ ἰσχύς παρὰ νοῦ, λαμβοῦσα παρὰ υἱὸν ἄλλα, ἐν ὅσο ταῦτα.

Πρὶν δὲ τῶν ὑποτετειρῶν λεξικοῖτα ἐπισφαλθοῦσιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπορίαν, πως ἕνεκεν πλήθος.

"Ὅτι δὲ τὰ σύνθετα εἰς ἄντα, οὐ νῦν, ἀλλ’ ἐνάνθιν "

ἐπισφαλθοὺσιν, ὥσ ἐν εἰδέναι τὰ τέκνα καὶ σφέσεως ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ τι ύποκατοικίας· ἦν δὲ μή, ἐποίησαν ἄν τι τῶν ψυχῶν· τοιαύτη, ὅπου δύναται.

Πρὶν δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν, ὦτ τέκνα ἀνθρώπως περιέχονται, ὅσα τέκνα ἀνθρώπως περιέχονται τὰ κατὰ φύσαν ἄνθρωπο.

15 Οὗτοι καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς, καὶ τὰς καθάλους, καὶ τὰς καθάλους, αὐτοφύλακται γῆς τῶν ζῴων· ἦν νῦν πρὸς γενεαλ. ψυχῆς, ἐνα καὶ γένεις, αὐτοφύλακται ἑκάστη λέγειν.

20 Πρότερον δὲ ἄλλην καθάλου, καὶ τῆς καθάλου αὐτοφύλακτης ἦτο τὴν ζωήν· ἦν νῦν πρὸς γενεαλ. ψυχῆς, ἐνα καὶ γένεις, αὐτοφύλακται ἑκάστη λέγειν.

The references forward here and at lines 12-13 may well be to V. 4 (7) not that Plotinus thought that what he said in this little treatise by any means exhausted the subject, which he deals with again and again in later treatises.

* Here again Plotinus is following Middle Platonist school tradition, probably against Plato's real thought: op. ch. 10, n. (p. 309) and ch. 11, n. 2. The much fuller and profounder discussion of Forms of animals in the intelligible world in VI. 7. 7-10 should be contrasted with the casual dismissal of "savage beasts" from that world here.

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multiplicity on the level of the real beings? We must begin from another starting point our explanation of how there is anything besides the One, and how it is a multiplicity, and how it is all these [intelligible] beings, and why Intellect is all these beings and where it comes from.¹

But about the creatures which originate from putrefaction and savage beasts, whether there is a Form of them in the intelligible, and if there is one of dirt and mud, we must say that all things which Intellect gets from the First are the best; and among these Forms there are not the things we have just mentioned; nor does Intellect take them from these Forms, but Soul which derives from Intellect, which takes other things, including these, from matter.

We shall speak more clearly about these questions when we return to the problem of how multiplicity comes from one.

But we must say that casual composites, which are not produced by Intellect but are things of sense coming together by themselves, are not among the Forms; and the products of putrefaction occur, perhaps, because the soul was unable to produce anything else; if it had been it would have produced something natural; it does so, at any rate, wherever it can.

About the arts we must say that all the arts are included in the Absolute Man whose subject-matter is in accordance with human nature.

But is there, before the individual soul, another universal soul, and before the universal soul the Absolute Soul or Life? [We must] say that Absolute Soul must be in Intellect before Soul comes to be in order that it may come to be.