PLOTINUS

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IN SEVEN VOLUMES

VII
ENNEADS
VI. 6-9

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PREFACE

TO LOEB PLOTINUS VI–VII

The text of these volumes corresponds to that of the third volume of the revised editio minor of Henry and Schwyzer (Plotini Opera III, Oxford Classical Texts, 1982), with correction of printers' errors and a few changes in punctuation, except in the following places, where the changes are indicated in the critical notes:

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Indices have not been provided. The availability of the recently published Lexicon Plotinianum (by J. H. Sleeman and Gilbert Pollet: Leiden, and Leuven 1966) makes the provision of a selective word-index unnecessary and likely to be misleading; and the Index Fontium in Plotini Opera III (see above), while not complete, is very extensive and must be referred to by anyone seriously interested in the sources of
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Plotinus; work on its revision and expansion is continuing.

The preparation of Volumes VI and VII for publication has been assisted by grants from the British Academy and the Leverhulme Trust, which are gratefully acknowledged.

A. H. ARMSTRONG.

SIGLA

A = Laurentianus 87, 3.
A¹ = codicis A primum corrector.
B = Parisinus Gr. 1978.
C = Laurentianus 85, 15.
E = Vaticanus Regiensis Gr. 97.
J = Parisinus Gr. 2082.
U = Vaticanus Urbinensis Gr. 62.
C = Monacensis Gr. 449.
Q = Maronianus Gr. 949.
w = AE
x = RJ
mg = in margine
ac = ante correctionem
pc = post correctionem
H-S¹ = Henry Schwemer, edition major
H-S² = Henry Schwemer, edition minor (— OCT)
VI. 6. ON NUMBERS

Introductory Note

This treatise is number 34 in Porphyry's chronological order. It immediately follows the work now generally referred to as the "Grass-Schriift" or "Great Work", which Porphyry so strangely divided into four and placed in three different Enneads (see Introductory Note to III. 8), so that in his Ennead edition it appears as III. 8 (30), V. 8 (33), V. 5 (32) and II. 9 (33). V. 5 contains a brief account of what Plotinus thought about the One and numbers in chapters 4 and 5, and the present treatise is announced at the end of chapter 4: "If there are any difficulties about this, we will deal with them later." The status of numbers in the intelligible world and the generation of Numbers and Forms from ultimate principles, the One and the Indefinite Dyad, had been matters of interest and importance to Platonists since the lifetime of Plato himself, especially to those who were influenced by that side of their traditional inheritance which goes back to the Pythagoreans. Between the time of the revival of Platonism and Pythagoreanism in the first century B.C. and the time of Plotinus a considerable numerological literature had developed. But his treatise on Numbers is not at all closely related to it. His thought here is outstandingly original and independent and his interest in numbers is subordinate to his great primary concerns, to show how all reality proceeds in due order from its source, the One or Good, and how the human spirit may find its way back to that source, which is also its goal. He looks back to the discussions about the Ideal Numbers which took place in the Academy in the lifetime of Plato (about which he does not appear to know more than the scanty

and hailing surviving evidence permits us to). And he takes account of Aristotle's discussions of the Ideal Numbers in Books A, M and N of the Metaphysics and of such limited light as the Aristotelian commentators read in his school, notably Alexander of Aphrodisias (see Porphyry Life chapter 14), could throw on these passages of Aristotle. But he does not seem to have been very much interested in or affected by the Pythagorean or Pythagorizing numerologists. The differences between their surviving works and the thought of Plotinus about the Ideal Numbers and the One are well described in the introduction to the recent Paris edition of VI. 6: "The two principal themes developed in this treatise, which are the problem of infinite number (chs. 1–3 and 17–18) and the status of number in the intelligible (chs. 4–16), do not derive from the current arithmetical tradition. On the other hand, this tradition is distinguished by two very widespread characteristics: it includes a technical initiation into arithmetic and culminates in a theology and mysticism of numbers... Now Plotinus shows himself very reserved about the number-mysticism which was so much in favour before, as after, his time. As for his arithmetical knowledge, it is indisputable, but it does not seem to have been encumbered by technical detail" (op. Porphyry Life ch. 14, 7–10).

There is however one passage from a Pythagorean numerological writer, Moderatus of Gades, who seems to have been of some philosophical importance and whose thought in some ways anticipated the Neoplatonism of Plotinus, the beginning of which is worth quoting in conclusion as it has something in common with the approach of Plotinus and shows why he would have

2 On Moderatus see J. Dillon The Middle Platonists (London 1977) 344–51.
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thought it necessary to take speculation about numbers seriously. It is to be found in Porphyry’s Life of Pythagoras 49-53. *Moderatus* says that the Pythagoreans, since they were not able to express clearly in words the first forms and the first principles because they were so hard to understand and hard to explain, turned to the numbers for the sake of intelligible instruction.” For Plotinus not only the One but the realities of the intelligible world are strictly beyond the reach of discursive thought and language. But the traditional number-language, like other kinds of language, may instruct us and help us on our way to the direct apprehension of them which is our goal.

Synopsis

Is multiplicity, as a falling away from the One, and an infinity as innumerable multiplicity, evil? Yes, in so far as it is a self-dissipation of a thing’s self, a going outwards instead of inwards. But it can be limited and made good and beautiful by unitary and unifying form (ch. 1). The ‘number of the infinite’ is not in the sense-world. Number is not created by the numberer; it is limited in the intelligible world but we multiply it subjectively (ch. 2). How can the infinite really exist as infinite (or undetermined), when what exists is already determined by number? Multiplicity in the real intelligible world is not evil, though lower than the One, because it is determined and unified by the One; but it is the infinite (undetermined) which is limited. Infinity is not in motion or at rest; difficulty of focusing the mind on this slippery nature (ch. 3). Different ways of thinking about intelligible numbers: are they posterior to the Forms or co-ordinate with them or prior to them? Difficulties in the interpretation of Plato on number (ch. 4). Numbers cannot be simply incidental even if inevitable accompaniments of Forms; they must have some kind of prior independent existence (ch. 5). Refutation of a subjective-idealistic view of Forms and

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Numbers: thought does not make intelligible realities but they make our thought of them (ch. 6). The wonderful unity in diversity of Intellect, in which all realities are together, which Soul loves and aspires to; how to attain to contemplation of that reality (chs. 7-8). The order of the primary triad: Being before Intellect, Intellect before Life; the real numbers are in mind prior to Being; quantitative number is an image of them (chs. 8-9). Continuing argument for the priority and independent existence of all number, not only the one (chs. 10-11). Refutation of the Stoic view that one and number have no real existence but are ways in which the soul is affected when it encounters things; the one and number are prior to thought and to substance (chs. 12-13). Number cannot be reduced to relation (ch. 14). Intellect is the true universal living being in which all living things exist together, and our universe imitates it in both, numbers are prior to and generate beings (ch. 15). Quantitative number is secondary and depends for its existence on substantial number in Intellect and in the soul (ch. 16). The infinity or unlimitedness of intelligible number is not like the subjective unlimitedness of a line; line and figure are posterior to number, but have a real existence in the real living being and in intellect (ch. 17). Number in the intelligible is unlimited only in the sense that it is absolute measure and cannot be measured by anything else. Concluding vision of the beauty and majesty of the intelligible world (ch. 18).
VI. 6. (34) ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΙΘΜΩΝ

1. Ἄρ′ ἦσστι τὸ πλήθος ἀπώστασις τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἡ ἀπειρία ἀπώστασις ποιμένης τῶν πληθῶν ἀνάμιμαν ἔπαι, καὶ διὰ τὸ τὸ κακὸν ἔπαι, ἢ ἀπειρία, καὶ ἡ μείζον κακοῖ, ὡς ἀνάμιμα, καὶ γὰρ πολὺ ἐκαστον, ὡς ἐκαστον αὐτῶν ἕκαστον καὶ ὑπεύθυνοι αἱ ἀπώστασις, καὶ πάντες μὲν ὑπερισσώμενον ὑπὸ τὴν χύσιν τοῦ ἑνός πλῆθος γίνεσθαι, οὐκ ἔπεις τὸ τὸ ἑνὸς πολὺ μέρος ἐκαστοῦ ἐνοῦτοι· εἰ δὲ τὰ γένεστα ἐὰν χειραίμενον μὲν, μέγεθος γίνεσται, ἀλλὰ τὰ δεινὰ τὰ μεγαλέθει, ἢ τὰ μικρότερα, ἢ τὰ ἔνοπλα γὰρ γνώσιμον καὶ
10 ἀπώστασιν εἰς τὸ πᾶρον ἡσθάνειται, ἔκαστον γὰρ οὐκ ἔπαι, ἀλλ' ἐὰν τὸ πολὺ μέρος ἐκαστοῦ ψηφιακης ἡ ἀνάμιμα, μάλλον δὲ ἦσστιν ἔκαστον, αὖθις ὡς ἐκαστος, ἐκαστον καὶ πολὺ μέρος ἐκαστοῦ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐκαστον ἢ ἔκαστον δὲ ἐφείτερος ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς τοῦ πολὺ μέρος τὸ ἑκαστοῦ ἐνοῦτοι. ἢ τὰ μικρότερα ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἀνοῦς μέγα
15 ἀπώστασις ἦσστι τὸ ἑνὸς μέγα καὶ ὑπεύθυνοι μὲν ὑπερισσώμενον αὖθις καὶ δὲι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἑκαστον τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἑκαστον τὸ ἐνόπλα τὸ "μαρτύρων δὲ τὸ γνώσιμον μεγαλότερον, εἰ μὲν ἀπορητικά·

Plato begins here with a traditional Neoc.

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1. Is multiplicity a falling away from the One, and infinity a total falling away because it is an innumerable multiplicity and for this reason is evil in so far as it is infinity, and are we evil when we are multiplicity? For a thing is multiple when, unable to tend to itself, it pours out and is extended in scattering; and when it is utterly deprived of the one in its outpouring it becomes multiplicity, since there is nothing to unite one part of it to another; but if something comes to be which abides in its outpouring, it becomes a magnitude. But what is there dreadful about magnitude? Now, if a thing perceived it, it would be dreadful; for it would perceive that it had come to be out of itself and had gone far away from itself. For everything seeks not another, but itself, and the journey to the exterior is foolish or compulsory. A thing exists more, not when it comes to be many or large, but when it belongs to itself; and it belongs to itself in tending to itself. But the desire to be great in this way is the property of something which does not know what true greatness is and is hazarding not where it should but to the exterior; but the direction towards itself was inward. A sign of this is that when a thing comes to exist in magnitude, if it is by separation of parts, it exists as each

Pythagorean view of the evil of multiplicity and infinity (or indefiniteness), which, in his usual way, he modifies in the direction of a more positive valuation of multiplicity and number as the treatise continues. Op. cit. 5, 7-9.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.

μένον, ὡσ ἐκαστὸν τῶν μερῶν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ἐκεῖνα εἶναι ἐκάστα, ἀλλ' ὢν ἄλοι τὸ ἐξ ἀρχής: εἰ δ' ἐσται 20 αὐτῷ, δεῖ τὰ πάντα μέρη πρὸς ὅν ὑπάρχει αὐτὸ, ὅταν ἀμφιβολεῖς ἐν, μὴ μέγα, ᾧ γίνεται τοῖν διὰ μὲν τὸ μέγεθος, καὶ ὅσον ἐπὶ τὸ μεγέθει οὐκολοκεῖναι αὐτὸν: ὃ 25 τοῦ ἐξελεύσει, ἐχεῖ ἑκεῖνο. καὶ μὴ ὅπως μέρος καὶ καλόν. ὃ ὅτι ὅσι ἀφείηθη φαγεῖν ἐν τῆς ἀπειρίαν, ἀλλὰ 30 περιελθῆθη ἐκ' καὶ καλὸν ὃ τῷ μέγα, ἀλλὰ τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἑξελεύσθη τὸ καλόν, ὃτι ἐγκάκτευσε μέγα. ἐπεὶ ἔχειν ἀν 35 τούτῳ, διότι μέγα, τέσσερ' ἂν κατεθάνην ἀξιόχρον' καὶ ὅπως τὸ μέγα ἢδή τοῦ καλοῦ, ὅτι πολὺ τὸ δεόμενον κάσιμον. μίαν μοι ἄναψαμεν τὸ μέγα καὶ μίαν ἄναψαμεν.

2. Τι ὁν ἐπὶ τοῦ λεγομένου ἀρμονὶ τῆς ἄσειας; ἀλλὰ πρῶτον πῶς ἀρμονὶ, εἰ ἀσεῖας; ὡσ γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀπειρα. ὡστε ὅσι ὃ ἐν' αὐτοῖς ἀρμονίας, ὅπως ὁ ἀρμονίας τῶν ἀπειρίαν ἀρμονίας: ἀλλὰ καὶ διακύμαν ἢ 30 πολλάκισα ποιῆ, οὐδὲν θεῦτα, καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλῳ ἢ τὸ παρελθόναρι καμάν ή καὶ ἕκαστός, ὁ ὅν ὅσι ἀπόλος ἀπειρος, οὖν δεί, ὅτι δει ἑξελεύσει λαμβάνειν: ὃ ὅση ἐπὶ τῷ ἀρμονιοῦ τῷ γενέν, ὅλος ἀρχή χρης καὶ συνεχείς. ἢ ἐν μὲν τῷ νοητῷ ὁστηρα ὅπως ὅτα 10 ὀστα καὶ ὁ ἀρμονίας ἀρμονίας δοσι τὸ ὅντα. ὅμεις δε ὅς τὸν ἀνάρτουσον πολλὰ ποιούσε γαμβραίνοντες πολλάκις καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὀστα μετα τον

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and every one of its parts, and they each of them exist, but not the original thing itself; but if it is going to be itself, all its parts must tend to one: so that it is itself when it is one in some way, not large. So through magnitude and as far as depends on magnitude it loses itself; but as far as it possesses a one, it possesses itself. Yet, all the same, the universe is large and beautiful. This is because it has not been left to escape into infinity, but has been circumscribed by one; and it is beautiful not by largeness but by beauty; and it needed beauty because it became large. For if this universe was destitute [of beauty] it would have appeared as ugly as it was large; and so largeness is the matter of beauty, because what needed ordered beauty was many. Therefore the largeness [of the universe] is rather lacking in ordered beauty and rather ugly [than beautiful].

2. What, then, about what is called the number of the infinite? But first, how is it a number, if it is infinite? For the objects of sense are not infinite, so their number is not infinite either, and the numberer does not number infinity; but, even if he makes them twice or many times as many, he limits them, and even if he takes into account the past or the future or both at once, he limits them. Is then the number not simply infinite, but so that we can always take more? No, the generation of number is not in the power of the numberer, but it is already limited and stands fast. Of, in the intelligible, just as the real beings are limited so is the number limited to as many as the real beings. But we, just as we make "man" many by many times applying beauty and the rest to him, so along with each image we generate an
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image of number, and, as we multiply the town though it does not really exist as multiple, in the same way we also multiply the numbers"; and if we should be numbering times, we apply numbers to them from those which we have, and those numbers still remain within us.

3. But how can this infinite really exist as infinite? For what really exists and is, is already determined by number. But before we consider that, if there is really multiplicity in the real beings, how is multiplicity evil? Now [multiplicity there is not evil] because the multiplicity is unified and not allowed to be altogether multiplicity, being a one-multiplicity. And because of this it is less than the One, because it has multiplicity, and in so far as it is compared with the One, it is worse; and since it does not have the nature of that One, but has gone out from it, has been diminished, therefore it keeps its mastery by the one in it, and it turned back its multiplicity to one and there it stayed. But how about infinity? For if it exists in the real beings it has already been limited, or if it has not been limited, it is not in the real beings, but perhaps in the things which come to be, as also in time. Now even if it is limited, it is by this very fact infinite [or unlimited]; for it is not limit but the unlimited which is limited [or bounded]; for there is certainly nothing else between limit and unlimited which receives the nature of boundary. This infinity, certainly, in itself runs away from the idea of limit, but is caught by being surrounded externally. But it does not run away from one place to another; for it does not even

1 The idea of subjective, imaginary multiplication here derives from Aristotle Physics I. 8. 206a15–30.

have any place; but when it is caught, place comes into existence. Therefore one cannot assume that what is called its movement is movement in place nor does any other one of what are called forms or movement belong to it of itself; so that it would not be in motion. But on the other hand it does not stand still either: for where could it, when “where” came to be afterwards? But the movement of infinity itself seems to mean that it does not stay still. Is it then in a state of being up above in the same place, or swinging to and fro? Certainly not: for both are judged in relation to the same place, what is up there and does not swing towards the same place and that which swings. In what way, then, could one conceive infinity? By separating its form in one’s reasoning, what, then, will one conceive? One will conceive it as the opposites and at the same time not the opposites: for one will conceive it as great and small—but it becomes both—and at rest and moving—for it does really become these. But it is obvious that before becoming them it is neither definitely: otherwise, you have limited [or defined] it. If then it is infinite, and infinitely and indefinitely infinite, it could be imagined as either. And when you come up close to it and do not throw any limit over it like a net you will have it slipping away from you and will not find it any one thing: for [if you did] you would have defined it. But if you approach any of it as one, it will appear many; and if you say that it is many, you will be wrong again: for if each [part] of it is not

1 Aristotle records that Plato spoke of the indefinite principle of multiplicity as a dyed "great and small": see Physics I.4, 203a15–16 and Metaphysics A6, 987b26.
Plotinus: Ennead VI. 6.

Therefore, as he had observed, so now he saw, and also the very idea of the first principle is the same, the same logos, the same wisdom, the same knowledge, the same soul which is self-existent, self-originated, self-perfect, self-satisfied.

4. But it is not true to say that the numbers are in the pre-existent, whether as coming into existence after the other Forms or always accompanying them; for instance, since being is of such a kind as to be itself the first, we conceived it as monad, then, since movement and rest came from it, we at that stage conceived three, and a number for each of the other Forms. No, not like this, but one monad was generated along with each, or a monad for the first existent and for that after it, if there is an order, a dyed or as much as the plurality of each is, for instance a decade if it is ten. Or not like this, but number was conceived itself by itself; and if so, was it prior to the others or posterior to them? Now Plato says that men came to the idea of number by the alternation of day and night, attributing the concept to the difference of the objects; perhaps he is saying that the things numbered are prior and make number by their difference, and that it is coming into existence in the transition of soul as it goes on from one thing to another, and comes into existence when the soul numbers1; that is when it goes over things.

1 Plotinus is expounding here Plato Timaeus 38R-C and 47A on how we come to our knowledge of number and time.
and says in itself "this is one thing and that is another", as, for instance, as long as it thinks something the same and does not think another thing after it, it says "one". But then when Plato says "in the true number", and speaks of the number in substances, he will, on the other hand, be saying that number has an existence from itself and does not have its existence in the numbering soul but the soul arouses in itself from the difference in sensible things the idea of number.

5. What, then, is the nature of number? Is it an accompaniment of each substance and something observed in it—man and one man, for instance, and being and one being, and so with all the individual intelligibles and the whole of number? But how is there a dyad and a triad, and how are all unified, and how could such and such a number be brought together into one? For in this way there will be a multiplicity of unitaries, but no number will be brought into unity except the simple one; unless someone were to say that the dyad is that thing there itself, or rather what is observed in that thing, which has two powers brought together, as if conjoined into one. Or numbers might be as the Pythagoreans said they were; they seem to have spoken of numbers analogically, the tetrad as justice, for instance, and other numbers in other ways; but in that way the number would be coupled with the multiplicity of the thing, which all the same is one, a one which is so many, a decade for instance. We however do not

1 The Timaeus passages might suggest that number only exists in the numbering soul and is posterior to the visible realities numbered. So Plotinus turns immediately to Republic VII 529C-D, where Socrates is insisting that true, philosophical astronomy is concerned not with the visible heavenly bodies but with "true" number and figure perceptible only to thought.

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conceive ten like this, but we bring together things that are separate and say "ten". This indeed is how we say "ten", but when a unity comes to be from many, we say "decad", because this is how it is also in the Pythagorean way of thinking.1 But if this is so, will there still be any real existence of number when it is only observed in things? But, someone might say, what is there to prevent there being a real existence of white in things, though white also is only observed in things? For movement also was observed in being and there was a real existence of movement which is in being. But because movement is a something, in this way a unity was observed in it; but number is not spoken of in the same way as movement. And then a real existence of this kind would deprive number of being substance, and make it rather something incidental. Yet not even altogether an incidental; for the incidental must be something before incidentally occurring, and, even if it is inseparable, all the same be something by itself, a particular nature, like white, and be predicated of something else when it is already what it will be predicated as. So that, if "one" applies to each individual thing and "one man" is not the same as "man", but the "one" is other than the "man" and the "one" is common and belongs to all the other individual things, the "one" would be prior to "man" and all the other individual things, so that man and each of the others might succeed in being one. And so it is prior to movement, since movement also is one thing, and prior to being, so that being

1 I adopt this rendering of ἐκδοσις in agreement with Henry and Schwyzer; most translators take it in the usual sense.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6.

καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ὅτι, ἢν καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦ ἐν ἐννιά τόκης λέγω δὲ οὐ τὸ ἐν ἕκενος οὐ δὲ ἐπεκέικα τὸ ὅντος φαμέν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτῳ τὸ ἐν δὴ κατηγορεῖται τῶν ἐνδικτών ἕκαστόν, καὶ δεσκαίς τοῖς πρὸ τού, καθ’ οὗ κατηγορεῖται δεσκάς καὶ τῶτο ἐστιν αὐτοδικαῖον γὰρ 40 δὴ τὸ πράγματι ἐπεθεωρεῖται δεσκάς αὐτοδικαῖος ἐστιν. ἀλλ’ ἔσται συγκεκριμένοτα καὶ συνέστη τοῖς οὕτως; ἀλλ’ εἰ συγκεκριμένη ὡς μὲν συμβεβηκὼς, οὖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ὑγίεια—δεῖ καὶ καθ’ αὐτὸ ὑγίεια εἶναι. καὶ εἰ ὡς συγκεκριμένον δὲ συνήθετο τὸ ἐν, δὲ πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ 45 τὸ ἐν, ὅσος σὺν ἄλλω εἰστα [εἰ πρῶτον εἶναι] 1 συμμετέχει ἄλλω τῷ γενομένῳ μὲν αὐτὸ ἐν ἕκενος ποιήσει φευγός ἐν, διὸ ποιῶς αὐτῶ, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς δεκάδος ποῦς: τὰ γὰρ δὲ ἐκεῖνο τῆς δεκάδος, δὴ ἐστιν διὰ τὴν τοποθέτησιν ὅπως μετὰ δεκάδος; ἀλλ’ εἰ συγκεκριμένη εἰσιν ἄπερ ἕπερ ἀπὸ καὶ ἄπερ 50 παρευρίζει δεκάδος δεκάς δὲ καθ’ αὐτῷ, δὲ πρῶτον ἐκ’ ἑαυτῆς τῆς δεκάδας ὅλος τίς εἰς ὡς ἔννοιας ἐν δεκάδας μόνον εἶσαι.

6. Ἀλλ’ εἰ ἂνευ τῶν πραγμάτων τὸ ἐν αὐτό καὶ ἡ δεκάδα αὐτή, εἶναι τὰ πράγματα τὰ ὕποτε μετὰ τὸ ἐνομίζει διὸπερ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ἐνομίζει εὑρότατα, τὰ δὲ καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ τριάδες, τὰς ἐν ἐν ἑκάστης δύον καὶ ποιῶς ὥσιν, μέχρι ότι δὲ καὶ νομίζει ἕναν τόν ἐνδικτών ποιῶς μεταξὺ τριάδων τίνος ἐν τοῖς τόσον μέγαν ἄσκοπον τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσειν τοῦ κυριακίστος, εἰς τὸν ἱεροπλαστήσεi...
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6.

thinker thinks each of them and so by that very thinking gives them their existence. For it is not because the thinker thought out what righteousness is that righteousness existed, or because he thought out what movement is that movement existed. For in this way this thought would be both posterior to the thing itself which was thought—the thought of righteousness posterior to righteousness itself—and on the other hand the thought would be prior to what existed as a result of thought, if it came into existence by thinking. But if righteousness is the same as the thought of righteousness, first of all it is absurd that righteousness should be nothing except something like its definition: for what is thinking righteousness or movement except grasping their essential nature? And this is the same as grasping the conception of a non-existent thing, which is impossible. But if someone were to say that "in immaterial things the knowledge and the thing are the same",\(^2\) one must understand what is said in the sense that it does not mean that the knowledge is the thing nor the reason contemplating the thing the thing itself, but the other way round, that the thing itself when it is without matter is object of thought and thought, not thought in the sense of being a definition of the thing or an intuition of it, but the thing itself in the intelligible is nothing else but intellect and knowledge. For the knowledge is not directed to itself, but the thing there makes the knowledge, which does not stay like the knowledge of a thing in matter, to be different: that is, makes it true knowledge; that is, not an image of the thing but the thing itself. So the thought of movement has not made absolute movement, but absolute move-

1 A clear statement that a Platonic Form is something very different from a hypothesised Aristotelian universal.
2 Aristotle De Anima \(\Gamma\) 5. 433a2-3 and 7. 431a1-2.
ment has made the thought of it, so that it has made itself as movement and thought; for movement there is also the thought of that of itself, and itself is movement, because it is the first movement—for there is no other before it—and real movement, because it is not incidental to something else, but is the active actuality of what is moved, which exists in actuality. So, again, it is substance; but the mere notion of being is different. And righteousness is not the thought of righteousness, but a kind of disposition of intellect, or rather an active actuality, of such a kind that “the face” is truly beautiful and “neither the morning nor the evening star are so fair”, not at all any object of sense, but like an intellectual statue, as if standing out from itself and manifesting in itself, or rather existing in itself.

7. In general one must think of the intelligible things as in one nature, and one nature holding them all and in a way encompassing them, not each one separate as in the things of sense, the sun in one place and something else in another, but all things together in one; for this is the nature of Intellect; since Soul imitates it in this way, and what we call Nature, according to which and by which the individual things are generated one in one place and one in another, while it is all together in itself. But though all things are together each one, on the other hand, is separate; but Intellect sees them, the things that are in Intellect and Being, not by looking at them but by having, and does not separate each

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1. Euripides Melanippe fr. 486 Nauck, quoted by Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics E 3. 1129b28-9. Plotinus quotes it also at 1. 3. 4. 11–12, where it occurs in his mind, as perhaps it does here, with the vision of the beauty of the moral Forms in Plato Phaedrus 260B.

2. ἐν δὲ φάσιν is a phrase from the beginning of the book of Anaxagoras (fr. B 1 DK) which Plotinus finds particularly applicable to his intelligible world.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6.

10 κεχώρισται γὰρ ἥδη ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ πιστολειμέθα δὲ πρὸς τόσον τεθαμακότας ἐκ τῶν μετεξελθόντων τὸ δὲ μέγεθος αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ψυχῆς ἔρωτος πρὸς αὐτόν 1 καὶ τῶν άλλων [τῶν] 2 εἰς ψυχήν ἔρωτος διὰ τὴν ποιαίην φύσιν καὶ τῶν ἄχαι  ἢ κατὰ τι ὡμολογεῖται καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ 
15 ἄστον τι ἔνδυ 

8. Ἐπειδὴ τοῖνοι καὶ ζῷοι πρῶτοι ἔστι καὶ διὰ τούτου αὐτεξέμενοι καὶ νεώς ἔστι καὶ οὐδὲν ἡ ὠντως καὶ φαίνεται ἔχειν καὶ ἔχει τὰ πάντα καὶ ἀριθμοὶ τῶν σύμπαντα καὶ δικαίων αὐτοῦ καὶ καλῶν καὶ ὀλλα 6 τοιαύτα—ἄλλως γὰρ αὐτοπληθεροποιοῖ φαίνεται καὶ ἀριθμοὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ δικαίων αὐτοῦ—ακεπετέοι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἑκατον καὶ τί ὄν, εἰς ὅποιον ὑπῆρεν περὶ τούτων. πρῶτος τοῖνοι ἄνεκτος πάντων ἀληθῶς καὶ νοῦ τὸς θεωρησθέν καὶ ἐνθυμηθέν, ὡς καὶ ἐν ἰδίᾳ ἔξει καὶ νοῦν ὀυκ ἐν 
10 ὀγκών, ἀλλ’ ἐν δυνάμει ὀγκών, καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν οὐσίαν 1

1 Kierkegaard, U.S. E.ck.
2 delevimus ut correctionem ad oih’ falso hic insertam: τὸν EBXUQ; τὸν AC.

ON NUMBERS

individual thing: for they are already separated in it for ever. We confirm this for those who are surprised at it from the participants: its greatness and beauty by the love of soul for it and by the love of other things for soul because it has a nature of this kind and by its having a nature by which it is in some respect made like Intellect. For it is certainly quite absurd for there to be any beautiful living being if the absolute living being is not of wonderful and inexplicable beauty. It is truly the "complete living being" composed of all living beings, or rather encompassing in itself all living beings, being one as large as all things 1; just as this All is one and is all that is visible, encompassing all things that are in the visible.

8. Since, then, it is the primary living being, and for this reason the absolute living being, and is Intellect and substance, real substance, and we claim that it contains all living things and the whole of number, and the absolutely righteous and beautiful and all other such things—we speak in a different way of absolute man and absolute number and absolute righteousness—we must enquire how each of these exists as an individual and what it is, as far as it is possible to discover anything about these things. First, then, we must put away all sense-perception and contemplate Intellect by intellect and consider that in us also there is life and intellect, not in bulk but in bulkless power, and that often thought of as prior to intellect; but the intelligible living being as the formed, structured whole must be considered posterior to the intellect which eternally forms and structures its life.
the true substance has stripped off these things and is a power standing on itself, no feeble shadowy thing but the most living and intelligent of all, than which nothing is livelier or more intelligent or more substantial; that which touches it has all this in proportion to [the closeness of] its touch, that which is near more nearly and that which is far farther. If then being is an object of desire, that which is most of all being is still more desirable, and that which is most of all intellect, if intelligence in general is desirable; and the same with life. If then one should take being first, since it exists first, then intellect, and then the living being (for it is already established that this contains all things)—but intellect comes second, for it is the active actuality of substance; then number would not be on the level of the living being—for even before it both one and two existed—nor on the level of intellect—for substance was before it, which was already one and many.

It remains then to consider whether substance generated number by its own division, or number divided substance, for certainly either substance and movement and rest and same and other generated number or number generated them. The starting-point of our investigation is: can number exist by itself, or must the two be observed in two things, and the three likewise? And, indeed, also the one which is among the numbers? For if it could exist by itself without the things numbered, it could exist before beings. Then also before being? Well, let us leave this and assume for the present that the one is before number and grant that number comes to exist from being. But if being is one being, and two beings are two beings, the one will precede being.

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1 These are the "very important kinds" of Plato Sophist 254-255A which Plotinus understands as the categories of the intelligible world.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6.

and number will precede beings. Is this, then, in our idea and intuitive conception of it, or in its reality? But we should proceed with the investigation in this way: when someone thinks one man and one beauty, he presumably thinks the one later in each case; and also when he thinks a horse and a dog, it is perfectly obvious here that he thinks the two afterwards. But suppose he was generating man and generating horse and dog, or, when they existed in himself, bringing them out, and not just generating them or bringing them out as they casually occurred to him, will he not say, 'We must go to one, and pass to another one, and make two, and make another one along with me? ' And certainly the beings were not numbered at the time when they came to be; but it was [already clear] how many there had to be. The whole number, therefore, existed before the beings themselves. But, if numbers were before beings, they were not beings. Now number was in being, not as the number of being—for being was still one—but the power of number which had come to exist divided being and made it, so to speak, in labour to give birth to multiplicity. For number will be either the substance or the actual activity of being, and the absolute living being is number, and Intellect is number. Is not Being, then, unified number, and the beings number unfolded, and Intellect number moving in itself, and the Living Being inclusive number? Since, because Being came into existence from the One, as that One was one, Being must also in this way be number: this is why they called the Forms numbers and numbers. And this is substantial number; but the other, which is called monadic, is its image. But the substantial number is that con-

1 Harder: ἕν ἐντὸς.
2 del. Harder, ut correctionem ad 22 δέκα 8ον.
tous eidei kai syngenon auta, protos de o en tis auti kai meta tou autou kai pro touv autou, basiai de exei la ontas en auti kai pugon kai pious kai arxh. kai gar

40 to oti tou en arxh kai empi tou toutou estin de skedasiasen gar an allo euxi emp to en ihei gar an eis en

10. ‘Esoi oon to de en plithi arithmou, debe pol

mén theirete, parastexen de oon en krei to auta kai

protopapous kai oon enades tolon exousia ton eu

autas idrothanomatos. kai gar kai ton "toon dun

boulomai" vnoi "plithos chrouos ou oikion", kai en mi

o chrouos, boilete to oti ton arithmon chronon touzias, an all to chronon arithmon, kai ton anathume "hei chronon

epiteknoi zeti tostou to chronon, anast symperei to

chronon toson twn geinasias. eite to auta mén

egrpeto pro

10 arithmou, o 3' arithmost ep autov episthanetis tosaouta

kéntrina, o 3' arithmous phusis, oso to arithmous,
kata synthiasen frai en tosaouta kai ou kata protheta

tosaouta, oso estin, eic ou souv elixi tosaouta, o arithmos

aitous propon ton tosaouta topon di epov, hen potos

15 arithmous metexhe tis genima tis tosaouta, kai ekastos

men tou en metaexhe, eli en ihei to ou paraph tou autou,
epe kai to de ou par autou de, en de par de

1 Theiler: par autou (vel autou) Enn.
ΠΛΟΤΙΝΟΣ: ΕΝΝΕΑΔ ΙΒ. 6.

τριάς ἐκ, καὶ τὰ πάντα ὄντα οὕτως ἐκ, οἷος ὡς τὸ ἐν τὸ κατὰ τὴν μοῦθα, ἀλλ’ ὅσι ἐν ἡ μοῦθα ἡ ἄλλος τις.

20 ἀριθμὸς. εἶπε καὶ ὁ λέγων ἦδη πράγματα μέρας γενόμενα, ή εἶπε μέρα ὁ ἀριθμός, οὗ παρ’ αὐτῶν ἦν τὰ μέρα προσφωνήσαντι δεικτέων ὅσπερ τὰ χρώματα αὐτῶν. ἀλλὰ τῇ διανοίᾳ λεγόμενης τοιαύτα εἰ γὰρ μὴ λέγων, οὐκ ἦν εἰδέναι, ὅσον τὸ πλῆθος. πῶς οὖν ἢ ἐρεῖ; ἢ ἐπιστάμενος ἀριθμῶσα τις δὲ, εἶ ἀριθμῶν εἰδεῖν, εἰδεῖν ἢ ἐν, εἰ ἐις ἀριθμὸς. ἀγγείων δὲ τὴν φώνην ἐκείνην, ὅπως ἦσσι τὸ πλῆθος, ἄστοι. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀδύνατον τὸν τόν ἐλέγχω τὸ ἀγαθά. ἃ τὰ παρ’ αὐτῶν τοιαύτα λέγει. ἢ κατηγορεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ συμβαθκήσεις αὐτῶν. καὶ εἰ τῷ πρῶτῳ λέγει, ὑπόστασις λέγει τʼ ὑπόπτης εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἑκατέριες τὸ ἀγαθόν, δὲ εἶναι φῶς ἀγαθόν, ὑπὸ καὶ ἀλλος συμβαθήσεις. 30 τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ πεποιθηκός καὶ εἰ ἄλλω δὲ εἰ σὺ ἀνταγαθῶς τῇ γεγονότητι τὸ ἀγαθόν τὸ φῶς οὐκεία. οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὄντων τὸ λέγων ἀριθμῶν, οἷον δεκαδᾶ, ἢ αὐτὴν ἢ ὑποστάσσεις δεκαδὰ λέγει, ἢ οἷα συμβαθήσεις δεκάς λέγων αὐτὸν δεκαδὰ ἑπεξεργάσεται διὰ περαιτέρω καὶ τῆς οὐκ ὁμοίου ὁμοίου τι ἢ δεκάδα ὀνομα. ἀνάγκης τοῖς, εἰ τὰ δεκτὰ δεκαδὰ λέγει, ἢ αὐτὰ δεκαδᾶ εἶναι ἢ πρὸ αὐτῶν ἄλλον δεκάδα εἶναι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ αὐτὸς δεκαδὰ ὀνομα. 35

1 Igal: ὑ Ἐνν.
2 Kirchhoff: εἶνα Ἐνν., II 8′.

ON NUMBERS

together, as the triad is one, and all the beings are one, not like the one of the number one, but as the ten thousand or any other number is one. Since someone who says that things have now come to ten thousand, if he says "ten thousand" as he counts, he is not asserting that the things are called "ten thousand" of and from themselves, as if they were showing their colours, but it is the reason which says there are so many of them; for if it did not say so, he would not know how many there were. How, then, can he say how many? Because he knows how to number, but this is so if he knows number, but he could only know number if there was number. But it would be absurd, or rather impossible, to be ignorant of the nature of number, of how much the amount is. It is, then, as when someone speaks of good things, he either speaks of them as good of themselves, or prediletes the good incidentally of them. And if he is speaking of primary goods, he is speaking of the first real existence; but if of things to which the good is incidental, there must be a nature of good in order for it to be incidental to other things, in that the cause which produces good also in another must be either the Good Itself or something which has generated the good in its own nature. In this way also one who speaks of a number in the real beings, a decad for instance, would be speaking either of the decad which exists as itself, or if he was speaking of the things to which decad is incidental he would be compelled to postulate the decad itself existing by itself and being nothing but decad. It is necessary, then, if one says that the real beings are decad, that they themselves must be the decad or there must be another decad prior to them which is nothing else
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6.

40 καθότι τούτων δεκτέων, ὃτι τάν, ὑπερ ὑπ' αὐτ' ἄλλου κατηγορήσω, παρ' ἄλλου ἐξήλθεν ὡς ἐκέινοι ἦν ἐκείνοι ἦν ἐκείνοι. καὶ εἰ τοιοῦτον, αὖν μὴ ποτὲ μὲν παρείναι, ποτέ δὲ μὴ παρείναι, ἀλλ' ἄει μετ' ἐκείνου εἶναι, εἰ νῦν ἐκείνο, νῦν καὶ αὐτό, καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον ἐκέινο ἦν αὐτό νῦν εἰ δὲ μὴ νῦν ἀπεδωκεν, ἀλλ' αὖν 40 των ὅστιν καὶ ὑπερ ὑπ' αὐτ' καὶ εἰ μὲν ὅσατο τὸ πρᾶγμα ἔκεινο νοεῖται ἡ ἐν ἡς ἐνεργείας αὐτοῦ, ἄμα μὲν εἶναι αὐτοῖν ἐκείνος ὡς ἐκείνο, ἔστερον δὲ τῇ ἐπισκευῇ τάττεσθαι παρ' ἕμοι, εἰ δὲ μὴ παρεπιτείχαθαι, αὖν τε ἄνυ ἐκείνου, οὗ δι' ἐκακοῦσαν ἄνυ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἢ οὐχ ἔστερον αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' 50 συνεπάρχει, ἢ πρῶτον αὐτῶν, ὥσα αὐτὸ δι' ἐκείνο ἕπαρχην ἡ ἐν τής ἐνεργείας ἑαυτοῦ, ἐφαμεν πρῶτον τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸν ἄραβιον.

11. ἄλλ' εἰ τὴν δεκάδα μηδεν εἶναι τοίς λέγων ἡ ἐναδὸς τοιούτος; εἰ μὲν τὴν ἐναδὸν συγχρονα εἶναι, διὰ τὶ μᾶν μὲν συγχρονευμένη ἐναδὸς εἶναι, τἀς δὲ δέκα οὐκετί; ὡς γὰρ ἢ μα τὴν ὑπόστασαν ἔχει, διὰ τὶ οὐ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα; 5 αὐτῷ δὲ συνεπάρχει δι' ἐν τῷ τῶν ὅστιν τὴν μιᾶν ἐναδός; μηδὲν γὰρ ἐναδὸν ἐκακοῦσαν τῶν ἄλλων ἐν εὐθυμία, ἄλλ' εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐκακοῦσαν τῶν ἄλλων ἐν εὐθυμία, κοινὸν τὸ ἐναδὸν δὲ θύρσῃ μία κατὰ πολλὰς κατηγοροῦμεν, ἐκακοῦσαν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἐν πολλοῖς θεωρεῖται δι' αὐτ' αὐτοῦ.

10 αὐτήν ὑπάρχειν, οὕνως δὲ ἐναδὸς ἐν τούτῳ καὶ πάλιν ἐν ἄλλῳ θεωρομένη, εἰ μὲν κακίστην ὑπάρχην, οὐ μᾶς μᾶλλον ἐναδὸς τὴν ὑπόστασαν ἐξεῖ καὶ οὕτως πλῆθος ἔσται ἐναδὸς; εἰ δὲ ἐκακοῦσαν μόνη τὴν πρώτην, ἢτοι τὸ 1

1 Sleeman: δεκτέω Enn.

but that very thing, death. In general, then, it must be accepted that everything, whatever it is, which is predicated of something else came to it from something else or is the active actuality of the thing of which it is predicated. And if it is of such a kind as not to be sometimes and sometimes not, but to be always with that thing, if that thing is substantive, it also is substantive, and what it is predicated of is no more substance than it is; but if one does not grant it substance, at least it belongs to the real beings and exists. And if that thing could be thought of without its actual activity, that activity could none the less be simultaneous to it, but ranked later by us in our thought. But if it cannot be thought except along with what is predicated of it, as "man" cannot be thought without the "one", it is either not posterior to but co-existent with it, or prior to it, so that the thing may exist through the activity; but we maintain that the one and number are prior.

11. But if someone says that the decad is nothing but so many henads [or units], if he agrees that the unit exists, why will he agree that one unit exists and not agree that the ten do? For why do not the other units have existence as the one does? For the one unit must not be yoked to any one being for if it was, each of the others could no longer be one. But if each individual one of the others must also be one, the one is common; this means that there is one nature predicated of many, which we said must exist in itself before being observed in many. If then a unit exists in this thing and is again observed in another, if that other unit also really exists, it will not be only one unit which has existence, and so there will be a multiplicity of units; but if it is said that only that
first unit exists, it will do so as coupled either to that which in the highest degree exists or to that which is in the highest degree one in every way. But if to that which exists in the highest degree, then the other units will have merely their name in common with the first, and will not be ranked on the same level with it, or number will consist of unlike unitaries and there will be intrinsic differences between unitaries even in so far as they are unitaries; but if it is coupled to that which is one in the highest degree, why would what is one in the highest degree need this unity in order to be one? If these suggestions are impossible, there must be a one which is nothing else but bare one, isolated in its essential nature, before each individual one is spoken and thought. If, then, the one without the thing which is called one is going to exist also there in the intelligible, why should not another one as well come into existence?

And each individual taken separately will be many unitaries, that is, many "ones". But if that nature generates in a kind of succession, or rather has generated, or does not stand still at one thing of those which it has generated, but makes a kind of continuous one, when it draws a line and stops more quickly in its outgoing it generates the lesser numbers, but when it moves further, not in other things but in its own movements, it brings the greater numbers into existence; and so it would fit the particular multiplicities and each particular being to the particular numbers, knowing that, if each particular thing was not fitted to each particular number, it could not exist at all or would get away and be something else by becoming innumerate and irrational.

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12. Ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὴν μονάδα μὴ ὑπόστασιν λέγων ἔχω—οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν, δὲ μὴ τῇ ἐν—πάθημα δὲ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς δικαίων τῶν δικών, πρῶτον μὲν τί νοεῖται, καὶ ὅταν λέγῃ δι', πάθημα λέγει εἰσὶ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μηδὲν εἴπαι δι', εἰ δ' ὅτι νόειται τούτῳ καὶ πλήθος καὶ φαντασίαν λαμβάνουσα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ περὶ τὸ ἐν ὀραμέν. ἔπειτα πότερα καὶ τὸ πάθημα καὶ τὸ νόημα τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἑ σῶμα σώματος; ἀλλ' ὅταν λέγωμεν ἡ ὑποθέσεις καὶ

10 ἐκ μὲν τοῦ πράγματος τὸν ὅποι ἔχομεν τὸ ἐν—φαίμεν γὰρ οὐκ ἔκοι ἐν εὐθὺτά ἐν—χέες ἔριξαν ἐν, καὶ ἐστὶν ἐν ψυχῇ οὐκ εἰς τούτῳ ἡγέομαι. ἀλλ' ἔχομεν τὸ ἐν ἑκ τῶν ἐξωθεὶς λαβούσα τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν τόπων, οὖν ἑπονμάμεν ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν λεγομένων παρ' αὐτοῦ ἑπονμάμεν ἐν τῶν ἀριθμῶν καὶ

15 τοῦ ἐνδος ἀπεικονίζεται ὁ ποιήταις καὶ δένεις, εἰσπερ τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐν ὑποστάσει, πρὸς ὅσι περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ ἡμών ἐν λόγῳ. ἀλλ' ὅτι εἰ τοιούτων οὖν ὑτεροῖς ἀπὸ τῶν πράγματων λέγεσθαι γεγονόντοι ἡμῖν πάθημα ἡ νόημα, ὅποι καὶ τὸ τούτο καὶ τὸ τί καὶ δὴ καὶ σχῆνα

20 καὶ ἔρθην καὶ στρατιῶν καὶ πλήθος—καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ τὸ πλήθος παρὰ τὰ πράγματα τὰ πολλὰ λεγομένα οἱ ἐν

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12. But if someone says that the one and the unit have no real existence—nor is there anything that is one which is not some one thing—but the one is a way the soul is affected in regard to each of the real beings, first of all, what is the obstacle to saying that however one says "being" one is speaking of a way in which the soul is affected and there is no such thing as being? But if it is because it stabs and strikes and takes a mental image of being, we see that the soul is also stabb'd by and takes a mental image of the one. Then, do we see this way of being affected and this thinking of the soul as one or many? But when we say "not one", we do not have the one from the thing itself—for we say that the one is not in it—but we do have the one, and it is in the soul without the "some one thing". But we have the one by taking some kind of thought and impression from the things outside us, a sort of idea derived from the thing. For those who posit the idea of number and the idea of the one as one species of what are called in their philosophy ideas, should posit existences of this kind, if any of such things are in existence; and there is much that could appropriately be said against them about this. But if they were to say that this way of being affected or thought arises in us as a kind of after-consequence of the things, like the "this" and the "something" and, for that matter, "crowd" and "feast" and "army" and "multitude"—for just as the multitude is nothing over and above the things which are said to be

1 Plotinus is arguing here against the Stoics: cp. SVF II 884 and 886.
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many, nor the least anything over and above those assembled and enjoying themselves at the ceremonies, so, when we say "one", we do not think of the one as something alone and quite apart from the other things; and there are many others like this, like "right" and "up" and their opposites; for what would there be of real existence about "right" other than that one stands or sits here and the other there? And it would be just the same with "up", that a thing has this kind of position and is more in that part of the universe, which we call "up", and another more in that called "down"—in answer to this sort of argument we must first say this, that there is some kind of real existence in each of these things mentioned, but not the same in all, either of themselves in relation to each other or in the relation of all to the one. So we must consider each of the arguments separately.

13. How could it be reasonable to suppose that the thought of the one originated from what underlies it, which is a man or some other living thing, or even a stone, in the realm of sense, since what appears is one thing—the man—and the one is another and not the same? Otherwise reason would not predicate "one" in the case of a thing which is not man. And then, just as in the case of "right" and the like reason was not moved without any cause, but because it saw a different position it said "here", so in this case it is because it sees something that it says "one"; for it is not reporting on empty way of being affected and saying "one" about nothing. For it is certainly not saying that the thing is alone and there is no other thing; for in the "no other thing" it is saying another "one". And then the "other" and

1 Theiler.
2 Del. Brautler.
the "different" come later; for if the reason does not rest on the one it will not say "other" or "different", and when it says "alone" it says "one alone"; so that it says the "one" before the "alone". And then what speaks is one before it says "one" of something else, and that about which it speaks, before anyone speaks or thinks about it, is one, for it is either one or more than one and many, and if many, one must exist before it. For also when it says "multitude" it says "more than one", and it thinks an army as many men armed and brought together into one order, and does not allow what is a multitude to be a multitude; the reason which gives the "one" which the multitude does not have makes it clear [that it is not only a multitude], or, by seeing the "one" which results from its order, gaughters the nature of the many into one; for the one is not falsely predicated here any more than it is of a house which is one from many stones; though the "one" of the house is more one. If then it is more one in the continuous and [still] more one in the indivisible, it is clearly because the one is a particular nature which has existence. For it is not possible for there to be a "more" in non-existent, but just as when we predicate substance of each individual sense-object, and also predicate it of the intelligibles, we predicate it more appropriately of the intelligibles, putting the "more" and the "more appropriately" in the realm of real beings, and say that there is more being in the category of substance, even sensible substance, than in the other genera, in the same way also we see that the one, which differs in respect of more [and less] also in the sense-objects, is also more and more appropriately in the intelligibles—and in all these ways it must be
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eînai phatéωn. Ὅσπερ δὲ ἡ υἱόπαι καὶ τὸ εἶναι νοητόν καὶ
οὐκ αἰσθητόν ἐστιν, κἂν μετέχῃ τῷ αἰσθητῷ αὐτῶν, 
οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐν περὶ αἰσθητῷ μὲν ἂν καὶ μεταφέρῃ
θεωροῦντα, νοητόν μὲν καὶ νοητός ἡ διάνοια αὐτὸς.

40 λαμβάνειν ἦσσον ἄποθελλον νοεί, δὲν όµώς προθείνει
ἀρα· ἐν δὲ προθείνει ἐν τῷ μεταφέρῃ, ταῦτα τῷ ὄντι καὶ ὅταν τι,
ἐν αὐτῇ λέγειν Ὅσπερ ὅταν τινά, δύο καὶ ὅταν τινά, 
pολλάκις. ἐν ταύταις μηδὲν ἐν τού ἐν ἡ
τὸν δόλον οὐκ αἰσθανοµένω, πᾶς οἷς τέ οὖν ὁ σιχοὶ λόγος τέ

45 τι νοήσαι ἦ εἰπεῖν μὴ ἐναι, όχ γὰρ μὴ δύναι οὐ γλύκον ἔσται,
ἐν αὐτῇ λέγειν, καὶ λέγειν μὴ ἐναι ἀδύνατον. ἄλλα ὃ ἐχειν παρακατό 
σπορετος νοικοτός ἡ λόγου 
γένους, προσάρχειν δὲ καὶ λόγου 
καὶ νομήσων. όυτω 
γὰρ ἐν πρὸς τὴν τοῖς γένους παραλαβάναιν, εἰ δὲ

50 καὶ εἰς ἀλλας εἰκαστης ὑπόστασιν—οὐδὲν γάρ δυνη, δὲ µὴ
ἐν—καὶ πρὸ ὡς αἰσθανεῖν εἰς καὶ γενναὶ τὴν ὑπάρχειν. δόλο
καὶ ἐν δὲ, ἄλλοι οἷς ὃς, ἐστι ἐν μὲν γάρ τῷ ὅντι καὶ ἐν
πολλὰ ἐν εὐθεία, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἠπτέον ὅντι, εἰ µὴ καὶ
ποτή βίος αὐτῷ προσπέθειν αὐτῷ τῇ γενεσί. καὶ τὸ

55 ἡ τούτων ὡς οὐκ ὑποστασιν για τινοµένων λέγει

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affirmed that there is a reference to one. But just as
substance and being is intelligible and not per-
ceptible, even if the perceptible participates in it, in
this way also the one might be perceived in the
perceptible by participation, but the reason grasps it
as intelligible and does so intellectually; so that it
thinks one thing, which it does not see, from an-
other; so it knew it before. But if it knew it before as
being this particular thing, it is the same as being,
And when it says it is something, it says as well that
there is one; just as when it says "some" in the dual,
it says that there are two; and when in the plural,
that there are many.1 If, then, it is not possible to
think anything without the one or the two or some
number, how is it possible for that not to exist
without which it is not possible to think or speak?2
For it is impossible to say that something does not
exist: of which, since it does not exist, you cannot
think or say anything at all. But that which is
needed everywhere for the coming into existence of
every thought and statement must be there before
statement and thinking; for this is how it can be
brought to contribute to their coming into existence.
But if it is needed for the existence of each and every
substance—for there is nothing which is which is
not one—it would also exist before substance and as
generating substance. For this reason also it is one-
being, but not first being and then one: for in that
which was being and also one there would be many;
but being is not present in the one except in the
sense that it might make it by inclining to its
generation. And the "this" is not an empty word; for

1 H-S: μιθή Επι
2 Isgk: διακούσων wRUCQ: διηκένει Kirchhoe: διηκένει H-S: om. x.

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1 Cp. Plato Sophist 23D6-10.
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it is used to speak of a real existence which is pointed out instead of its name, and of a presence, a substance or some other of the things which really are; so that the "this" would indicate something which is not empty, and it is not a way in which the reason is affected about nothing existent, but a thing underlying the thought, just as if it said the proper name of a thing itself.

14. One might reasonably reply to what has been said under the head of relation, that the one is not the kind of thing to lose its own nature when something else is affected and it is affected in no way; but if it is going to escape from the one it must experience the deprivation of the one by being divided into two or more. If therefore the same bulk becomes two by being divided without being destroyed as bulk, it is clear that besides the underlying bulk the one was in it as something added, which it lost when the division destroyed it. Now, how can we avoid ranking among things which exist, wherever it may be, what is sometimes present to and sometimes absent from one and the same thing? And we shall affirm that it is present to these things incidentally, but exists by itself, when it appears both in perceptible and intelligible things, incidentally to the later order, but on its own in the first [order of being], when it is first one and then being. But if someone were to say that the one also, without being affected in any way, when something else comes to it will no longer be one but two, he will not be speaking correctly. For it was not the one which became two, neither the one which was added nor the one it was added to, but each of them remains one, as it was; but the "two" is predicated of both, but the
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κατ’ ἁμφοῖν, χωρίς δὲ τὸ ἐν καθ’ ἑκατέρου μένοντος, οὐκ οὖν τὰ δύο φύσει ἐν σχέσει καὶ ἡ διάν. ἄλλ’ εἰ μὲν 20 κατὰ τὴν σύνωσιν καὶ τὸ συνόδοι εἶναι ταῦτα τῷ δύο ποιεῖν, τάχ’ ἂν ἦν ἡ τοιαύτη σχέσις τὰ δύο καὶ ἡ διάν. 

ὥστε καὶ ἐν τῷ ἑκατέρῳ πάλιν ἄλλοτε πάλιν αὖ διέσει ἄλλοτε, σχισθέντα τῷ ἐνός τινος γίνεται δύο· ὠ τοίνυν αὖτε σύνοδος οὔτε σχέσις τὰ δύο, φ’ ἂν ἦν σχέσις. ὁ αὐτός δὲ 25 λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ. ὅταν γὰρ σχέσις ἦ οὔτε γεννώσα τι, ἀδύνατο τὴν ἑναντίαν τῷ αὐτῷ γεννᾶν, ὡς ποιότατο καὶ τή πράγμα τὴν σχέσιν. τι σώζε τό κάθισμα αὐτῶν; ἐν μέν εἶναι τοῦ ἐν παρουσίᾳ, δύο δὲ διὰδος, ὧσπερ καὶ λευκὸν λευκόν καὶ καλὸν καλόν καὶ διακόλον κάθισμα. ἢ οὔτε ταῦτα ἑξαίτως εἶναι, ἀλλὰ σχέσεις καὶ ἐν τούτοις αἰτιατέον, ὡς διὰκοινοὶ μὲν διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὰ ποιλάρχη σχέσιν, καλῶν δὲ, ὧστε αὐτῶν δικαίως οὐδὲν ὧστε ἐν αὐτῶ τῷ ὑποκείμενῳ αὐτοῦ διαθέπαι ἡμᾶς οὔτε ἔκομπτος τῆς καλῆς φαινομένου. ὧστε τοῖς ἑξης 30 τι ἐν ἄ λέγεις, πάντως δὴ πάντων ἐστὶ καὶ μέγα καὶ καλὸν καὶ μικρὸν ὅ τι ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ αὐτοῦ. ὡς ἄν τὸ μέγα καὶ μέγεθος ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ γλυκὸ καὶ σοφόν καὶ ἅλλο

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"one" separately of each, which remains what it is. The two and the dyad is not therefore naturally relative. But if two was by coming together, and coming together was the same thing as making two, perhaps the two and the dyad would be a relation of this kind. But as it is the dyad is also observed on the other hand in the opposite way of being affected; for when some one thing is cut, it becomes two; so that the two is neither a coming together nor a cutting, so as to be a relation. And the same argument applies to every number. For, when it is a relation which produces something, it is impossible for the opposite relation to produce the same thing so that this thing can be the relation. What then is the proper cause of number? A thing is one by the presence of the one and two by the presence of the dyad, just as it is white by the presence of the white and beautiful by that of the beautiful and just by that of the just. Otherwise, one would not be able to maintain that these exist either, but would have to make relations responsible for these two, as if the just was so because of this particular relation to those particular things, and the beautiful because on are so disposed, with nothing existing in the underlying reality of a kind to dispose us, and nothing coming from outside to what appears beautiful. Whenever, then, you see something which you call one, it is of course also in every way great and beautiful and there would be a vast number of other things to say about it. Therefore, as the great and greatness are in it, and sweet and bitter and other

as a particular kind of Forms, with the same objective reality and causative power as other Forms.

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1 Cp. Plato Phaedo 96E8-97E1. Plotinus here is following the Phaedo very closely. i.e. he is treating numbers simply

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qualities, why not also the one? For there will certainly not be every possible kind of quality, but not quantity, in the real things; nor will the continuous be quantity and the discrete not, although the continuous uses the discrete as a measure. As therefore a thing is great by the presence of greatness, so it is one by the presence of one and two by the presence of dyad, and the rest in the same way. But the problem of how the thing participates [in number] is common to the enquiry about participation in all the Forms. But we must affirm that the decad is observed in one way in things that are discrete and in another in things that are continuous, and in other ways in the many unified powers of this particular number; and that we have already ascended among the intelligibles, and that there are the true numbers, no longer observed in other things but existing themselves on their own, the absolute decad, not the decad of some intelligibles.

16. Now that this has been said, let us say again, starting at the beginning, that total being, that true being, is both being and intellect and perfect living thing, and is all living things together. This universal living thing here below has imitated its one, as far as it could by [its own] one; for the nature of the perceivable escaped the one there, since it was going to be perceivable by the senses. It must certainly be total number; for if it was not perfect, it might be deficient in some number; and if the whole number of living things was not in it, it would not be the "complete living thing".¹ Number therefore exists

¹ Again Plato Timaeus 31B1.
prior to every living thing and to the "complete living thing". Man is certainly in the intelligible, and the other living things in that they exist, and that intelligible exists in that it is the "complete living thing". For in fact the man here below also, in that the All is a living thing, is part of it; and each individual thing, in that it is a living thing, is there in the Intelligible living thing. And in Intellect, in so far as it is Intellect, all the intellects exist individually as parts; but then there is a number of these also. Not even in Intellect then does number exist primarily; but it is in Intellect as the sum of the active actualities of Intellect: and, as it is the number of Intellect, it is righteousness and self-control and the other virtues and knowledge and all the things by the possession of which Intellect is really Intellect. How then is knowledge not in something else? It is because the knower, the known and the knowledge are the same and all together, and it is just the same with the rest; for this reason each exists primarily and righteousness is not incidental but is incidental to soul in so far as it is soul; for in soul these things are rather potential, but are actual when it is directed to Intellect and with Intellect. But immediately after Intellect comes being, and number is in this, and with its help it produces the real beings when moving according to number, setting the numbers before their existence as the One stands before its own, joining being itself to the first (but the numbers no longer join the other beings to the first; for it suffices that being is joined to it). But being, when it has become number, joins the beings to itself; for it splits (not in so far as it is one, but its one abides); and when it has split according to its
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nature into as many as it wished, it looked to see how many it had generated according to number, which were therefore in it; for it was split by the powers of number and generated as many as the number was. Therefore the first true number is the principle and spring of existence for the real beings.¹ And so here below too the coming into being of every individual thing takes place with the help of numbers, and when something takes another number it generates something else or nothing comes to be at all. And these are the first numbers, as numbered; but those in the other things already have both; in that they come from these first, they are numbered numbers, but in that they are according to these, they measure the other things, numbering both the numbers and the things numbered: for by what could they say “ten” except by the numbers in themselves?

16. Now, these which we affirm are the first and true numbers—someone might ask “Where do you put them, and in which of the genera of beings? For everybody puts them in the quantitative, and you did mention the quantitative in what you said before, when you claimed that one must put the discrete like the continuous among beings.”² But again on the other side you say that these are the numbers of the first real beings, and again you say that there are other numbering numbers besides these. So tell us how you arrange all this. For there is a great deal of difficulty here; since the one also which is in per-

1 con. neceínas có Enn.

¹ In this chapter Plotinus has moved from the simple Platonism of the Phaedo to a position more in accord with the later discussions in the Academy, alluded to by

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ceptible things—is it something quantitative, or is it a number of times one quantitative, but it itself the principle of the quantitative and not quantitative? And, being the same genus, or something else? You owe us an explanation of all this." So, starting from this point, we must say about all this that when—we must base our discussion first on perceptible things when, therefore, you take one thing after another and say “two”, a dog and a man for instance, or two men, or more when you say “ten” and “a decade of men”; this number is not a substance, not even the kind of substance which occurs among perceptible things, but purely quantitative. And when you divide into ones and make them part of this decade you make and posit the ones as principle of the quantitative, for one of the ten is not one in itself. But when you say that man in himself is a particular number, a dyad for instance, animal and rational, your way of proceeding here is not one single way, but in so far as you are counting and numbering you are making something quantitative, but in so far as the underlying realities are two and each of them is one, if each one is an essential completion of the substance and unity is in each, you are speaking of a different and substantial number. And this dyad is not posterior, nor just as much as it says merely, outside the thing, but that which is in the substance and looks the nature of the thing together. For you certainly do not make number here when you go through one after another things which have their own existence and do not come together in the numbering: for what difference does it make in substance to one man if he is counted along with another? For there is no unity either, as
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there is in a chorus, but this decad of men would have its existence in you, the numberer, but in the ten which you number, which are not ordered together into one, one could not even speak of a decad, but you make ten by numbering, and this ten is quantitative; but in the chorus there is also something outside you, and also in the army. But in what way is the number in you? Now, that which is latent in you, before the numbering is there in a different way, but that which comes from the outward appearance to the number in you is the actualisation either of these numbers in you or according to them, when you number and at the same time generate number and in this actualisation produce a real existence of the quantitative, just as in walking you produce a real existence of a kind of movement. What, then, about the number which is in us in a different way? It is the number of our substance; for, Plato says, since it participates in number and melody it is again number and melody; for, one says, it is not body or magnitude; the soul therefore is a number.1 If it is a substance, the number of body is certainly substance, in a bodily way, but the number of soul is substances in the way souls are. And indeed generally among the intelligibles, if the living being there is itself more than one, a triad for instance, this triad in the living being is substantial. But the triad which does not yet belong to the living being, but is in a general way a triad in real being, is a principle of substance. But if you number “living being” and “beautiful”; each of them is one, but you Xenocrates: see Aristotle Metaphysics A 5. 965b50 and Xenocrates fr. 69 Heinez; for Xenocrates the soul was a self-moving number.

1 Plato Timaeus 36E6-37A1. In considering Pythagorean and Platonic thought about numbers it is most important always to remember that, from Pythagorean onwards, the numbers are musical numbers, the numbers of melody and rhythm.

2 A Pythagorean doctrine accepted by Plato’s pupil...
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μὲν ἐν, τὸ δὲ γενοῦσα ἄρματον ἐν οὐκ οὐ καὶ ἐπεργείει ποσόν καὶ διάδο. εἰ μέντοι ἄρετὰ τίτταρα λέγεται καὶ τετράδες ἐστὶ τις ὑπούς τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς εἰς ἐν καὶ ἐνάδα τετράδας οὐκ ἡ ὑποκείμενον καὶ σὺ τετράδα ἐφαρμόστες τὴν ἐν οὐ.

17. Ὅμως λέγειν τὸ ἀπειρον ἀμφότερο πῶς πέμπτων καὶ ὁμοίως διὰ τὸν ὁποίον διδόσαν οἱ λόγοι, ἦ καὶ ὁμοίως, εἰπέρ ἄρματον ἄρματον· τὸ γὰρ ἀπειρον μάχης τὸ ἀμφότερον, διὸ τί ὃν Λεύκησε τὸ ἄρματον ἐστίν ἄρματον ἀπειρον, ᾠδὴ ὅπως ἐστὶ τὰς τοιαύτας, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐξεστὶ ἐπὶ τῇ μεγάλῃ ἀπειρον ἀπειρον εἰς τὸν ποιητὴν, ἐπιφέρεται μὲν ἀρχή, ὡστε ἑνὸς καὶ ἔτη τῶν ἀρμάτων· γνωσθέντος γὰρ ἐκείνῳ ἐστιν ἐκείνῳ αὐτῶν διδάσκατον τῇ διανοίᾳ ὧν ἔκλεισεν.

10. αὐθάντως. τὸ γὰρ ἐν οὐκ ἔρξατο τοὺς καὶ φαντασμάτων ποὺ τοῖς οὐδὲν προσάμαλισα; ἠφημένῳ ἄπειροι ἐν τοῖς νοητώι εἰσί γραμμαῖ. οἰ ἐν γὰρ οὐκ ἦν ἂν ἔκειν γραμμαῖς, ἀλλ' εἰ ἂν οἴκητι εἰς ἄρματον, ἄπειροι ἀν ἐκρ. γὰρ ἄπειροι ἄλλων πρῶτον, οὐκ ὡς ἄδιακτημέναι. ἀλλ' ποὺ

15. ἄπειροι, ἃ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῆς αὐτογραμμάτων οὐκ ἐν πρωτεύνωνν αὐτῶν. τί ὃν ἔχει γραμμάτων ποὺ τοῖς ἄπειροι μὲν γὰρ ἐμάθον ἐναρκάται γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ τό ἐν καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἐνός καὶ πρῶς μιᾶν διάδοται ποσόν δὲ τὸ

1. Here Plotinus returns to the question raised in ch. 2 and deferred at the beginning of ch. 3.

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generate number in yourself and actualise the quantitative and the dyad. If however you say that virtue is form—and it is a kind of tetrad, as its parts come together into one—and a tetradic [or fourfold] unity like the underlying reality, then you are fitting to it the tetrad which is in you.

17. But what about the number called unlimited? For these arguments of ours give it limit. And this is correct, if it is going to be a number; for unlimitedness clashes with number. Why, then, do we say "The number is unlimited." Is it with number as it is when we say a line is unlimited?—but we say a line is unlimited not because there is any line of this kind but because it is possible with the longest line, that of the universe for instance, to think of a longer. For when it is known how much a number is it is possible to double it in thought without connecting it to that original number. For how could you attach a thought and mental image which is only in you to things which really exist? Or are we going to assert that there is an unlimited line among the intellibles? For [otherwise] the line there will be of a certain length; but if it was not of a certain numbered length, it would be unlimited. But its unlimitedness may be of another kind, not like something which you cannot get to the end of. But how is it unlimited? Now in the definition of the absolute line limit is not thought as included. Then what is the line there in the intelligible, and where? It is certainly posterior to number; for the one is observed in it: it proceeds from one point and over one

2. This is Aristotle's account of mathematical infinity; see Physics 177. 207b28-34.
PLOTinus: ENNEAD VI. 6.

τῆς διαστάσεως μέτρον σοῦ ἔχει. ἀλλὰ τοῦ τούτου ἢ τοῦ
μόνου ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅτι ἐμφανὶ ἡ καὶ πράγμα, νοεῖς
20 μέρος, πάντα γὰρ αὕτως, ὡς καὶ νοεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ τὸ
πράγμα. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἐκείνου καὶ στρεφόντα
πάντων τῶν σχῆματων, καὶ νῦν καὶ ὅτι κύριον ἄλλον
τὰ σχῆμα ἑπιστολεῖ. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ τοῦ πάντος
σχῆμα πρὸ ἡμῶν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, δυνατὰ σχῆμα ἐν
25 τοῖς ὕστεροι ὄλοι, δὴ ἂν ἀναγκῇ ποιὸν τῶν σχῆματων ἐν
ἀσχημάτωτα ἕκατες καὶ πρῶτα σχῆμα. οὗ γὰρ
μορφῆν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἀλλ' ἂντ' αὔτῶν ὃν τὸν ἔκθλιον
ἐκθέσθη τὰ γὰρ ἐκλήτων ἄλλως. πάντως ὃν σχῆμα ἐν ἐν τῷ
30 ὑπὲρ, διεκρίθη δὲ ἦτοι ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ ἡ τῆς τοῦ ζωῆς λέγει
δη ἄλλος ὃς ὑπὲρ, ἂλλ' ὃτι ἐκεῖνον
ἐμείσθη πρὸς ἐκεῖνον, όσο τοῦ ζωῆς, καὶ τοῦ σώματος
ἐκτοθῆ τοις ἔκτη, ὁποῖος ἐκεῖς ζωῆς ἐν πυρόμειοι, διὸ καὶ τούτο μερισθεῖς ἠθελεῖ μη διαμέρεσθαι
ὅλος αὐτίκα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀνάλογα, ὡς λέγεται περὶ τῶν
35 τῆς. ἀλλ' ὃν ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ καὶ τῷ τοῦ
ζωῆς ἢ ἐν τῷ νῷ προτεροῦν ἄτοι μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ ζωῆς ἢ μὲν αὖν τῷ ζωῆς

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distance; but it does not have a quantitative measure of
that distance. But where is this? is it only in a
kind of defining thought? No, it is a thing, but an
intellectual thing. For all [beings there] are like
this, so as to be intellectual and, in some way, the
real thing. And indeed [we must also ask] where and
how about plane and solid and all the figures: for it is
certainly not we who merely think the figures. The
figure of the universe, which was before us, is
evidence of this, and the other natural figures in the
things which exist by nature, which must exist
before the bodies as unfigured figures there in the
intelligible, and primary figures. For they are not
shapes in something else, but since they are them-
selves belonging to themselves there was no need for
them to be extended; the extended figures belong to
other things. Figure, then, is always one in real
being, but it has distinctions in it either in the living
being or before the living being. But I mean "has
distinctions" not in the sense that it has acquired
size, but because it has been divided, each part of it
in correspondence to each being, and given to the
bodies there in the intelligible, as to fire there, if you
like, to the pyramid there. This is why this fire here
below wants to imitate it, though it cannot by reason
of matter, and the other elements in a similar way, as
is said about the elements here below. But is figure,
then, in the living being in that it is living being,?
No, it is in Intellect before. For it is certainly in the
living being; if therefore the living being was incul-
scive of Intellect, it would be primarily in the living

1 The pyramid is the "unit and seed" (στοιχεῖον καὶ στέρμαν)
of fire in the mathematical physics of the Timaeus: see
66b4-5. Plotinus' whole way of thinking about the

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PLOTinus: ENNEAD VI. 8.

being; but if Intellect has priority in rank, it is
primarily in Intellect. But if in the complete living
being there are also souls, Intellect is prior. But,
Plato says, "as many as Intellect sees in the living
being"; if then it sees, it is posterior. But it is
possible that the "sees" is meant in this sense, that
the real existence of the living being comes about in
the seeing; for Intellect is not other, but all are one,
and intellection has the bare sphere but the living
being the sphere of the living being.

18. But certainly number there in the intelligible
is limited; but we think of a number greater than
that which is before us, and the unlimited belongs to
us numbering in this way. But there it is not possible
to think of more than what is thought of; it is already
there; no number is deficient, nor will any be de-
cicient, so that any number could be added to it. But
number might be unlimited there also, because it is
not measured: for what could it be measured by? But
what it is it all is, being one and all together and,
certainly, a whole, and not bounded by any limit but
by its own agency being what it is: for in general
none of the real beings is in a limit, but what is
limited and measured is what is prevented from
running on into indefiniteness and needs a measure;
but those real beings are all measures, and therefore
are all beautiful. For in that it is a living being it is
beautiful, having the best of life, deficient in no life,
nor again having life mixed with death; for nothing
is mortal or dying; nor again is the life of the living
being itself strengthless, but the first and clearest
life, having the pure essence of living, like the first

1 Timaeus 38E7-8.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6.

light, from which the souls live there, and those which come down here bring it with them. But it knows for what reasons it lives and towards what it lives, towards that from which also it lives; for that from which its life comes is also that to which it goes. But the thought of all [the beings in it] and universal Intellect is upon it and accompanies it and is closely together with it and by giving it a colour of greater goodness and mixing thought into it makes its beauty more majestic. For even here below a thoughtful life is majesty and beauty in truth, though it is dimly seen. But there it is seen clearly; for it gives to the seer sight and power to live more, and by living more intensely to see and become what he sees. For he below most of our attention is directed to lifeless things, and when it is directed to living beings what is lifeless in them stands in the way, and the life within them is mixed. But there all are living beings, living as wholes and pure; and if you take something not to be a living being it immediately itself flashes out its life. But when you contemplate the substance running through them, giving them a life which does not move by changing, and the thought and the wisdom and knowledge in them, you will laugh at the lower nature for its pretension to substantiality. For by this substance life abides and intellect abides, and the real beings stand still in eternity; nothing puts it out of itself or alters it or makes it deviate; for there is nothing beside it to get a grip on it; but if there was anything, it would exist because of it. And if there was anything opposed to it, it would be unaffected by this very opposed thing; but, existing itself, it would not have made this opposite exist, but some other com-

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PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 6.

ἐποίησαν ὅ, ἀλλ' ἔτεραν πρὸς αὐτοὺς κοινάν, καὶ ἦν ἕκεινο τὸ ὅ, ὅτε τούτη Παρμενίδης ἄρθρον ἐν εἰσάγει τὸ ὅ, καὶ εὖ δὲ ἐρημίαν ἀλλοι ἀποθέαν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὅ τὸν μόνον γὰρ τούτω παρ' αὐτῶν ἐστὶν εἰσα. πῶς ἂν ὄν ὁ ποιείς

45 τὸ ὅ παρ' αὐτῶν ἀφέλοιτο. ὅ ὁποῖον ἄλλο, ὅσα ἄλλοι ἐνεργεία καὶ ὅσα αὐτοὺς; ὃς γὰρ ὅ, ὁ κομίζει ὅσι. ὅ ὁ ποιεὶ. ὅ ὁποῖον ἔστως. ἀνθρώπων καὶ κάλλες μέγα, ὅσον δέχεται καὶ τὰ πάντα ἀνφόρηθαι αὐτῶν καὶ ἔνοχος αὐτοῦ παρ' αὐτῶν ἐξεπαίδευτο καὶ

50 μετὰ τοῦτο σύγκλητον ἔκτειν· τὸ γὰρ εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτῷ ὡς πρὸς θράσος. καὶ ὁ πᾶς δὲ κόμων αὐτοῦ καὶ ζῆσαι καὶ φοιμεῖται. ὅτι τί, ἡ καλὴ, καὶ πάσα ψυχή καὶ πᾶς νους δὲ ἐστιν εἰσα. τὸ δὲ εἶναι αὐτορρίκτικα εἰσιν.
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which somehow contains time and movement and change and process. In the end we are left with the very strong impression that for Plotinus there are not two worlds but one real world apprehended in different ways on different levels. It is from our highest and truest apprehension of this intelligible world of which we ourselves are parts that we ascend to the Good. For, as Plotinus shows here with particular care and clarity, ascends we must. The intelligible world which he has displayed in all its beauty is not our goal. Intellect and the intelligible cannot finally satisfy us. The demonstration of transcendence culminates in Plotinus' fullest and strongest account of the soul's union with the Good in the self-transcendence of intellect, an account which shows more clearly than anything else in the Enneads the consonance of his mysticism and his metaphysics. The treatise concludes with a section which confirms the transcendence of the One or Good above intellect by a full demonstration that the One does not think.

Synopsis

When God or the gods were making man, did they plan his senses with a view to self-preservation in the sense-world? No, there is no planning in the intelligible; but everything is there in such a way that when it is unfolded into time here below it looks as if it had been perfectly planned (ch. 1). In the intelligible the thing and the reason why it is so are one (ch. 2). Man in the intelligible has senses so that the whole may be complete and everything may be there; but does not this mean that Intellect inclines to and plans for the sense-world (ch. 3)? The complexity of man, not just a soul but also the formative principle of body and the soul in body (chs. 4 and 5). All his complexity exists in the intelligible, including senses and perhaps bodies, and the possibility of existing on different levels, from god to beast (ch. 6). There is nothing unnatural about the making of the lower animals, cooperation of universal and
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21-22. Necessity of the supreme Good, before all evils, which is before all things and makes all things (ch. 23). But what, after all, is this Good? What does it do for us and why do we desire it (ch. 24)? Exegesis of Plato's conclusion about pleasure in the *Philebus*: ascent through the scale of goods to the ultimate (ch. 25). The Good cannot be an illusion or a subjective feeling (ch. 26). The good for anything is not simply what is most akin to it (ch. 27). Could matter, which is evil, choose and desire the Good (ch. 28)? Difficulty of the unintellectual man with talk about Intellect as good: perhaps he has some dim awareness of a Good beyond Intellect (ch. 29). Return to and full explanation of Plato's mixture of pleasure and intelligence in the *Philebus* (ch. 30). The light and life which come to Intellect and Soul from the Good; the soul, moved by the Good to love, is carried by its love from bodies to the Forms in Intellect (ch. 31). The unbounded, formless, source of the beauty of the Forms (ch. 32). Rejection of discursive reasoning about the Forms as a hindrance to the love which must go on beyond form to the formless (ch. 33). The experience of the final union or vision, in which the soul attains to the Good in the eternal self-transcendence of Intellect (ch. 34-6). The Good does not think: rejection of the Peripatetic idea that the First Principle thinks its own thinking, and full working out of the implications of saying that the Good is beyond being and intellect (chs. 37-42).
VI. 7. HOW THE MULTITUDE OF THE FORMS CAME INTO BEING, AND ON THE GOOD

1. When God or one of the gods was sending the souls to birth he put "light-bearing eyes" in the face and gave them the other organs for each of the senses, foreseeing that safety would be ensured in this way, if one saw and heard beforehand and by touching could avoid one thing and pursue another. But really, where did this foreseeing come from? For it certainly was not because others had come into existence before and then perished because of the absence of senses that he afterwards gave what human beings and other living things were going to avoid suffering by having. Now someone might say that he knew that the living being would be in heats and colds and other affections of bodies; and because he knew this, so that the bodies of living things might not be easily destroyed he gave them

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1 Plotinus is here commenting on the whole account of the making of the material universe, the sending of souls into it, and the preparation of their bodies. In the Timaeus. He writes "God or one of the gods" because in the Timaeus (44a25 b1) it is not the great Craftsman but his children, the younger gods, who make the human body and its organs (the "light-bearing eyes" 44b3). Plato's whole description of the activity both of Craftsman and of younger gods is in terms of reasoning (e.g. 34a8-81) and planning. The exegetical problem for Plotinus is to show that this is not to be taken literally.

2 Plotinus may have in mind here the curious "natural selection" of temperies as reported by Aristotle Physics B 8. 196b29-33, in a context (the discussion of the appearance of purposiveness in the processes of nature) very relevant to his argument here.

3 This is exactly what Plato does say in Timaeus 33a, though he is speaking here not of individual human bodies, but of the necessity of including all of each of the four elements in the body of the universe.
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sense-perception and organs for the senses to work through. But he either gave the organs to souls which already had the powers or gave both at once. But if he gave the senses also, then, although they were souls before, they did not have sense-perception; but if they had sense-perception when they came into being as souls, and came into being that they might go to birth, then going to birth was consonant to them. So it would be against nature for them to be away from birth and in the intelligible, and they would actually have been made in order to belong to something else and to be in evil, and the purpose of the forethought would be that they might be kept safe in the evil, and this would be God’s planning, and it would be altogether planning. But what are the principles of plane? For even if they derive from other planes, they must be directed to an end or ends prior to planning. What then are the principles? They are either sense-principles or intellect. But there is no sense-perception yet, therefore intellect. But if the premises are intellect the conclusion is knowledge: not, then, about any sense-object. For how can that of which the beginning is from the intelligible and which comes in its end to the intelligible, being a disposition of this kind, come to the understanding of a sense-object? Therefore neither forethought for a living thing nor forethought for this universe in general derived from a plane; since there is no planning at all, but it is called planning to show that all things there are as they would be as a result of planning at a later stage, and foresight because it is as a wise man would foresee it. For in things which did not come to be before planning, planning is useful because of the
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lack of the power before planning, and foresight, because the one who foresees did not have the power by which there would be no need of foresight. For foresight is in order that there should not be this but that, and there is in it a kind of fear of what is not just so. But where there is only this, there is not foresight. And planning is "this instead of that". But when there is only one of them, why should there be a plan? How then can the alone and the one and the simple contain explicitly the "this that there should not be that", and "there had to be this if not that" and "this appeared useful and this preservative when it came to be"? So then it saw beforehand and planned beforehand, and indeed—as was said at the beginning of the present discussion—also gave the senses because of this, no matter how puzzling the giving. But all the same, if every divine activity must not be incomplete, and it is not permitted to suppose that anything which is of God is other than whole and all, then everything must exist in any thing which is his. So existing for ever must be there also.

So the future must also be already present there. For there is certainly nothing which comes later in that [divine world], but what is already present there comes to be later in another [world]. If then the future is already present, it must necessarily be present as if it had been thought out beforehand with a view to what comes later; but this means so

1 δείκνυον καὶ τοῦτο ἐπεί οὐς εἶναι is found only in the quotation in Philoponus De Aeternitate Mundi II.5 p. 39 ff., H-S² omits it in the text. H-S² omit it as being a comment of Philoponus, but there seems no sufficient reason for being certain that it is so.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

ἔστιν, ὡς μοι δέν σωθεῖ καθάπερ τότε, τούτο δὲ ἐστὶν μηδέν ἐξαφαντώς. πάντα ὧν ἦδη ἦν καὶ ἦν καὶ ἦν ἦν, ὃς εἰσίν ἔστερον τότε μετὰ τότε· ἐκεῖνοί μὲν γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι ἀπλωμένιοι ἔχει δεικνύσιν τῷ μετὰ τότε, ὡμοίός δὲ ἐν πάν τόθε· τούτο δὲ ἐστὶν ὑπὸ ταύτα καὶ τὰ ταύτα.

2. Διὸ καὶ ἐνερέθη ὅτι τις ὁδὸς θετοῦν καταμάθαι τὴν νοῦν ὑάσιν, ἤτι καὶ πλέον τοὺς ἄλλους ὁρῶν. οὐδὲ ὁς ὡς ἢ τοῦ χρόνος ὁρῶν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου ὁρῶν τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀπαντήσεως. εἰ δὲ διότι ἔστη, ἤ, εἰ δοκίμων, ὡς εἰρετός. καὶ ὁρῶν ἀποτελεῖν ἡ ὁμολογία, εἰ τώγοι, ὡς εἰρετός. ἀποβαλλός· τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου ὁρῶν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀπαντήσεως. εἰ δὲ διότι ἔστη, καὶ συνεργός ἄλλον δεί τὸν έκείνον. καὶ ὁμολογία 1 καὶ διὰ τῆς οὐκ ὡς ὅτι ἦν ὀνείρεσιν, εἰ μὴ διὰ τῆς εὐπρόσδειας δὲ ὡς εἰρετός ἐκατέρω 2 τῶν μερῶν χωρίς, ἀποβαλλός καὶ τὸ "διὰ τῆς τε τῆς ἐκατέρων. διὰ δὲ ἐν ἐνὶ πάντα, ὡς τῶν διὰ τοῦ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ "διὰ τῆς τοῦ πρῶτον. πολλαχότα πρῶτον καὶ τοῦ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ τοῦτο. ἡ ὁμολογία καὶ ἐκατέρω διὰ τῆς εὐπρόσδειας καὶ τοῦ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ταυτόν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκατέρως. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπάγηται καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οurrence of time in the higher world. On this see S. Samuelsky and S. Pines The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism (a selection of texts with translation and commentary). Jerusalem 1971.

that there will be no need of anything then, and this means that there will be no deficiency. All things, then, existed already and existed for ever, and existed in such a way that one could say later "this after that"; for when it is all together it is entirely this; but this means having its cause also in itself. 2. And so even starting from here one could none the less come to know the nature of intellect, which we see even more clearly than the others; but not even so do we see how great intellect is. For we grant that it has the "that" but not the "why"; or, if we do grant it the "why", it is as separate. And we see man, or, if it happens so, eye, as an image or belonging to an image. But in reality there in the intelligible there is man and the reason why there is man, if the man there must also himself be an intellectual reality, and eye and the reason why there is eye; or they would not be there at all, if the reason why was not. But here below, just as each of the parts is separate, so also is the reason why. But there all are in one, so that the thing and the reason why of the thing are the same. But often here below also the thing and the reason why are the same, as for instance "what is an eclipse"? What then prevents each and every thing being its reason why, in the case of the others too, and this being its substance? Rather, this is necessary; and when we try in
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15 σπευδάμενοι οὕτως τὸ τί ἦν εἰκαύ παρὸν συμβαίνει. δρήματί ἐπείνα τὸν κυρίον, ὡς καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο ὁ τὸ εἴδος ἐκάστῳ αἴτιον τοῦ εἴδος—τούτο μὲν γὰρ ἀλήθειαν—ἀλλ' ἢ ὅτι, εἰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἴδος ἐκαταρτωτός πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀποκτήτως, εἰρήγησας ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ διά τί'.

20 ἀργῶς μὲν γὰρ διὸ καὶ ξυπή (μὴ) ἔχον τὸ διά τί' αὖ πάντως ἔχει, ἐνδοὺ δὲ ὅν καὶ καὶ πόθεν ὡς καὶ ἄλλον ἄλλον τὸ διά τί'. εἶ δὲ παρὰ νῦν τις λέγει, οὐ χωρίς ἐκείνη, εἰ γε καὶ αὐτὸ ἐστιν εἰ οὐν δὲ δὲ ἔχει ταῦτα μηδὲν ἐλλείποντα, μηδὲ τῷ "διά τί" ἐλλείποντα. νοῦς δὲ ἔχει τῷ διά τί οὕτως ἐκαταρτῶς τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ

25 αὐτὸς ἐκαταρτῶς ἄν εἶν τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ). δὲ ὡστε μηδέν προολογίσαται τοι διὰ τί γέγονεν, ἀλλ' ὅμως γέγονεν καὶ ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν τῆς ὑποστάσεως αἰτίαν. γεγονός δὲ οὐκ εἰκῇ οὖσαν ἐν παράλληλος εῖχος τὸ "διά τί'", ἀλλὰ νὰ ἔχει πρὸς καὶ τὸ καλῶς ὑμνὲς τῆς αἰτίας. καὶ

30 τοῖς ἄρα μεταλαμβάνοντες οὐσίαν διάδοσιν, οἷς τὸ "διά τί'", ἔχειν, καὶ μεν, ἀπερ ἐν τοίς τοῖς παντὶ εἰκὸν οἰκοδομήνα τὰ διὰ τὰ διὰ τὰ διὰ τὰ τὰ. καὶ ἐν τῷ πάντα ἐντούτως ἀντὶ καὶ καὶ τῷ διάτοτο ἐκαταρτῶς—ἀπερ καὶ ἐκάστῳ τῷ μέρος πρὸς τὸ διόν ἐχον ὀράτως—ἐν

35 τοῖς ἄκουσιν γενεμένου, εἰτα τοῦτο μετα τάδε, ἀλλα πρὸς ἄλλην ὑμνὴν τῆς αἰτίας καὶ τῷ αἰτιατῶν συμπάθους, οὐσία χρή σωλήναλ λέει το ἀπὸ τὰ τὰ παντᾶς πρὸς τὸ διόν ἐκαταρτῶς καὶ ἐκαταρτῶς πρὸς αὐτό. εἰ ὅτι ἄν συμπάθησαν

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this way to grasp the essential nature of a thing, it comes out right. For what a thing is is the reason why it is. But I do not mean that the form is cause of existence for each thing—that is of course true—but that, if also you open each individual form itself back upon itself, you will find the reason why in it. For a thing which is inert and does not have life does not at all have the reason why, but if it is a form and belongs to Intellect, where would it get its reason why from? But if someone were to say “from Intellect”, it is not separate, supposing that it is also itself Intellect, if then Intellect must have these things in no way deficient, they must not be deficient in the reason why. But Intellect in this way has each and every reason why of the things in it; but it is itself individually all the things in it, so that none of them has come to be in need of a reason why, but it has come to be along with it and has in itself the cause of its existence. But since there is nothing casual in its coming to be it would not have any of its reason why left out but in having everything it has that of its cause which makes it exist beautifully. So it also gives to the things which participate in it in such a way that they possess their reason why. And truly, just as in this All here below, which is composed of many things, all of them are linked to each other, and each individual reason why is contained in their being all—just as in each individual the part is seen relating to the whole—it is not that this comes to be, and then this after that, but they jointly establish cause and caused together in relation to each other, so much more there in the intelligible must all things be each of them related to the whole and each to itself. If therefore there is a joint

1 Thuleer.
2 delenirus.
existence of all things together, of all things without nothing random about it, and there must be no separation, then the things caused would have their causes in themselves, and each would be of such a kind as to possess its cause causelessly. If then the intelligibles have no cause of their being but are self-sufficient and independent of cause, they would be in possession of their cause in themselves and with themselves. For again, if nothing there is purposeless, and there are many things in each, you could say that all the things which each individual has are each individual reason why. So there in the intelligible the reason why was before and with the things and was not a "why", but a "that"; but rather both are one. For what could an intelligible have over and above intellect, so as not to be of such a kind being a thought of intellect, as to be a perfect production? If then it is perfect, it is impossible to say in what it is deficient, nor why this is not present in it. If then something is present, you could tell the reason why it is present; so the reason why is contained in its existence; in each thought, then, and active actualisation of intellect, man for instance, the whole man is manifest, bringing himself along with the thought of him, and, since all he has he has all together from the beginning, he is all ready as a whole. Then, if he is not whole there, but something has to be added to him, this belongs to something generated; but he exists for ever; and so he is all complete. But the man who has come to be is generated.

3. What, then, is there to prevent there being previous deliberation about him? Now he is according to that intelligible man, so that one must not
take away or add anything, but deliberation and reasoning are due to [Plato's] assumption: for he assumed that things had come into being. And this is why there is deliberation and reasoning; but by saying "always coming into being" he also abolishes the idea that God reasons. For it is not possible to reason in what is always; for to do so would belong to someone who had forgotten how it was before. And then if things were better afterwards, they would not have been beautiful before; but if they were beautiful, they keep the same. But they are beautiful because they are with their cause; since now also a thing is beautiful, because it is everything—for this is what form is, being everything—and because it controls matter; but it controls matter if it leaves no part of it unshaped; but it does so leave it if any shape is wanting, an eye, for instance, or something else, so that when you tell the cause, you toll all. Why then eyes? That there shall be everything. And why eyebrows? That there shall be everything. For even if you say "for preservation", you are speaking of a safeguard of the substance which exists in it; but this means you are saying that it contributes to its essential nature. Thus, then, the substance existed before this safeguard and the cause therefore was a part of the substance; and this safeguard, then, is something other; but what it is belongs to substance. All things therefore are for each other, and the whole is perfect and all-complete and its existing beautifully is with the cause and in the cause, and the substance and

1 Ròmē (deliberatio Ficinus); bológes Etm.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

ἐνε, εἰ τοίνυπ ἐγκεκριμένη τὰ αἰσθητικά εὐθὺς καὶ αὐτῶν ἀισθητικών ἐν τῷ εἴδει ἦν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνάγκης καὶ τελευτήτων νοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχουσιν, εἶτε ἡλίκες. τὰ 25 οίκια, ὡς ἡμὸς υπέρτερον ἠκού, ὡς ἁρὰ ὅρθος ἀότως ἔχει—ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἐν καὶ συμπληρωμάτων τὸ αἰσθώματι καὶ καθι ὁ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐκεῖ μάκανον νοῦ ἢ, προσεκίθη ἢ τὰ αἰσθητικά, ὡς εἰς γένεις ἀπάλληλος—πῶς ὁ σάκον ἐκείνος ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὰ τρήκεις; τί γὰρ ἄν εἰγ 30 αἰσθητικῶν ἢ ἀναθεωρήτων αἰσθητῶν; πῶς οὔ ὡς ἀοιδος, ἐκεῖ μὲν αἰσθητικῶν ἢ ἀδίδω, ἐπικαθαρισθαί καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ διάμετρος τῆς ἐνέργειας πληρώσας ἔντασθαι, ὡς χείρων ἢ ψυχή γένεσθαι;

4. Πάλαι, ἄν, πρὸς τοῦτο τὴν ἀπειρίαν ὅλην ληπτὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων διὰς ἕκειν ἔστιν. ἦνας δὲ πρότερον χρὴ τῶν τρίδυς ἀνθρώπων διὰς ποτὲ ἐστὶν ἐπίθει—μεῖστοι ὡς τῶν ἀμφίλθει καθ' ὑπὸ διακεχρωσθῆ ὡς 5 ἔχοντο τοῖσ' ἐκείνοις ἔχοντος, φανερῶς δὲ ἂν ἅπα τοις ὁ αὐτός ἀοιδός τε χαίνης ἕκειν, ἀρχή δὲ τῆς ἐπέκεισθαι ἐπέτευρα· ἦν ὁ ἀνθρώπῳ αὐτὸς λόγος ἕστιν ψυχή· ἔστερον ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοῦτον ποιούσῃ καὶ ἦν αὐτόν καὶ λογίζεσθαι παραπροσήκεις; ἢ ἡ ψυχή ἢ 10 τοὐαντὴ ὁ ἀνθρώπῳ ἄστυ; ἢ τῷ σώματι τῶν τοιούτων φυσικά προσαχρηστή ἄλλοι εἰ μὲν ἤξον λογιζόν ὁ

1 The Platonic text with which Plotinus is concerned here is the conclusion drawn in Alcibiades I 126E-130A that man is a soul using a body, which acquired a rather disproportionate weight and importance in later Greek thought. It was an important source of sharp body-soul dualism not only for later Platonists but for Stoics and

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the essential nature and the reason why are one. If, therefore, having senses, and senses of this kind, is contained in the form by eternal necessity and the perception of Intellect which, if it is perfect, possesses the causes in itself, so that we afterwards see that this then is the right way for things to be—for there in the intelligible the cause is one with and an essential completion of the substance—and if man is there not only an intellect, sense-perception being added when he was sent to birth, how could that Intellect not incline to the world here below? For what could sense-perception be except the apprehension of sense-objects? But how would it not be absurd for there to be sense-perception from eternity, but for it to do its perceiving here below, and for the power there in the intelligible to accomplish its activity here below, when the soul becomes worse?

4. To deal with this difficulty, therefore, we must go back and take up the question of who that man in the intelligible world is. But perhaps we should first say exactly who this man here below is—in case we go looking for that man on the supposition that we have got this one, though we do not even know this one accurately. But perhaps it may seem to some people that this man and that man are the same. This is the starting-point of our investigation: is this man a rational forming principle belonging to soul other than the soul which makes this man and provokes him with life and reason? Or is the soul of this kind the man? Or the soul which uses a body of such a kind? But if man is a rational living being, but a Gnostics. On its history in Greek philosophy see J. Pépin Idées Grecques sur l’Homme et sur Dieu (Paris 1971), Part I La Tradition du 1er Alcibiade.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

άνθρωπος, ζητον δὲ τὸ ἐκ φυσῆς καὶ σώματος, οἷς ἐν ἐκ οὐλογοῖς οὐτοῖς τῇ φυσῆ ἐκ αὐτῶς. ἀλλὰ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκ ψυχής λογικῆς καὶ σώματος ἐλάθητος τοῖς ἀνθρώποισι, τῶς ἐν ἐκ ἐκ τούτων αἰώνιος, τοῦτο τοῦ λόγου τοῦ τοιούτου

15 ἀνθρώπου γνωμένου, ὅταν σώμα καὶ ψυχή συνάδεθα, ἦσται γάρ ὁ λόγος οὗτος δηλωτικός τοῦ ἐκείνου, οὗχος ὁποῖος ἐν φαμαν αὐτοκτήτῳ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐοικώς ὁ τοῦ ἐν τοιαύτῃ, ὡς μὴν δηλωτικός τοῦ· τῷ ἐν εἶναι. οὕτως γὰρ εἶδος ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐνελύον, ἀλλὰ τὸ συναμφότερον

20 ἀνθρώπων, ὁ ἐστιν ἡ ἐκείνη. ἡ δὲ τοῦτο, οἷς ἐρημία τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· ἣν ἀνθρώπου· ἢ τὸ ἐκ τῆς λογίας. ἡ δὲ τοῦτο, ἢ τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι συναμφότερον· τῷ τῇ ἐκείνη ἐτὸς· καὶ ἢ τῷ ἐκείνη ἐτὸς, οἷς ἐκείνη συναμφότερον· χρή δὲ, καὶ ἢ τῷ μάλιστα τῶν ἐνελύον εἶδος καὶ μετὰ ἑλθη

25 τοῦτο λογίας χρή λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον αὐτῶν τοῦ ἐκείνου· ἦντο τοιοῦτος ἀνθρώπων. ἦν τὸ ἀνθρώπου· ἦν τὸ συναμφότερον. τοῦτο τῇ ἐκείνῃ· τῷ τῇ ἐκείνῃ· τῷ τῇ ἐκείνῃ· τῷ τῇ ἐκείνῃ· τῷ τῇ ἐκείνῃ· τῷ τῇ ἐκείνῃ· τῷ τῇ ἐκείνῃ.

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living being is what is composed of soul and body. this rational form would not be the same as soul. But if what is composed of rational soul and body is the rational form of man, how could it be something eternally existent, since this rational form of this kind of man comes into existence when body and soul come together? For this rational form will be explanatory of what is going to be, not the sort we say is absolute man, but more like a definition, and the kind of definition which does not explain the essential nature. For it is not even a definition of the form in matter, but explains the composite, which already exists. But if this is so, the man is not yet found; for he was going to be the one according to the rational form. But if someone were to say "The rational form of such beings must be something composite, this is this", he does not think fit to say by what each exists; but one must, however much one must also speak of the rational forming principles of forms in matter as including matter, grasp the forming principle itself which makes, for instance, man; this applies especially to those who claim to define the essential nature in each case, when they define strictly and properly. 1 What is it, then, to be a man? That is, what is it which has made this man here below, which exists in him and is not separate? Is, then, the rational forming principle itself a rational living being, or is the living being the composite, but the principle itself one which makes the rational living being? What is it then

1 Plotinus is here critically concerned with Aristotle's discussion of essence and definition in Metaphysics Z 4–5. 1095b1–1096a14.

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itself? Or does “living being” stand for “rational life” in the form? Then man is rational life. Is he then life without soul? For either soul will provide the rational life and the man will be an activity of soul and not a substance, or the soul will be the man. But if the rational soul is going to be the man, how is the soul not man when it goes into another living being?

5. Man, therefore, must be a rational forming principle other than soul. What is there to prevent man from being a composite, a soul in a particular kind of forming principle, the principle being a sort of particular activity, and the activity being unable to exist without that which acts? For this is how the forming principles in seeds are; for they are neither without soul nor simply souls. For the rational forming principles which make things are not soulless, and there is nothing surprising in substances of this kind being rational forming principles. Of what kind of soul, then, are the forming principles which make man activities? Of the growth-soul? Rather of that which makes a living being, a clearer one and just because of that more alive. And the soul of this kind which enters into matter of this kind, just because this is what it is, being in a way disposed like this even without the body, is man, it makes shapes in body according to itself, and makes another image of man as far as body allows, just as the painter in his turn makes yet another image of this, a kind of still lesser man; it has the shape and the forming principles or traits of character, the dispositions, the powers, all dim because this man is not the first; and it also has other senses, which seem to be clear, but are dimmer in comparison with those before them and are images. But the man over this...
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one belongs to a soul already more divine which has a better man and clearer senses. And this would be the man Plato was defining, and by adding "using a body" he indicated that it rides upon the one which primarily uses a body, and the one which does so secondarily is diviner. 1 For when the man who came to be already had sense-perception, this soul followed on and gave a brighter life; or rather it did not follow, but in a way attached itself; for it does not go out of the intelligible, but united to it has the lower soul in a way hanging from it, mixing itself in, forming principle to forming principle. And so this man, who is dim, becomes clearly visible by the illumination.

6. How, then, is there a power of sense-perception in the better soul? It would be a power of perceiving the sense-objects there, and would correspond to the sense-objects there. This is the way, therefore, in which the better soul perceives the melody of sense, when the man of the sense-world receives it by sense-perception and comes into tune, the last and lowest degree, with the melody there in the intelligible, and fire is tuned to the fire there, of which that better soul had a perception which corresponded to the nature of the fire there. For if there were bodies there, the soul had perceptions and apprehensions of them, and the man there, the soul of this kind, was able to apprehend these bodies; and that is why the later man, the imitation, had their forming principles in imitation; and the man in Intellect apprehends the men before all men. But this man shines on the second, and this second on the third; and the

1 Schweder, l'eschat de Theologia in exis thetis tòv àvssà, in exp. (EDUC) tòv àvssà àvssà xw. 2 Beuller

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PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 5.

15 ἔκτασις, οὐ γανέμενος ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ παρακατάκι κατὰ τὸν ἔκτασις, τῷ δὲ τι καὶ παρὰ τῷ πρὸ ἀυτοῦ, τῷ δὲ καὶ παρὰ τὸν τρίτον ἢ ἐνεργεία, καὶ έστιν ἐκατοστός καὶ δὲν ἐνεργεί, καί τοῦτον εἶχεν καὶ αὐτὴν ἔχει. τοῦ δὲ ἄνωτος μὲν θορυβός, μὲν ὡς μη χωρισθεῖσα τῶν ἀνω, Ὡμόεκπεν καί αὐτὴ λέγεται εἶναι. μεταλαβομένη δὲ θέρειον σώμα θυμοζευτᾶτα δὲ, πῶς λόγος οὗτος ἀνθρώπος, ἢ πάντα ἤτο, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἐνεργεί καὶ άλλον, καθαρά μὲν οὖν ἄλλος καὶ πρὸ πακονδήματι.

25 ἀνθρώπον θέλει καὶ ἀνθρώπον ἐστι καὶ γὰρ κάλλιον τούτο, καὶ τὸ κάλλιον ποιεῖ. ποιεὶ δὲ καὶ δαιμόνιος τετράες, καὶ περί αὐτὴς δαιμονίων, μαλλον ἀνθρώπος, καί ἐστι μέρος, καὶ ἐστι μέρος θεοῦ δαιμόνιος. ὡστε ἀνθρώπος εἰς 30 δαιμόνια ᾧ γὰρ λέγεται θεὸς, εἰς ὥν ὁ ἄνθρωπος: ἔχει γὰρ διαφορά, ἂν ἔχει φύσιν πρὸς ἀνθρώπον καί ἐκ τοῦ ἄνθρωπον ὁ σκότους. 6 λέγει δὲ δε δαιμόνια εἰς δαιμόνια, οἷς φάνηκεν ο Πλάτων δαιμόνια, ὅταν δὲ συνέπτυγμα τῇ 6 θύρᾳ φύσιν ἐπλημμέρησεν φύσις. ή 35 συνεργημένη τῇ ἐν αὐτῇ.

1 Geiger, Testament Theologiae. in loco Emn.
2 coniscimus: ἐν συνεργημένη τῇ ἐν αὐτῇ.
3 τῇ ἐν συνεργημένη τῇ ἐν αὐτῇ.
4 Volkmann: διάθετον ἐν αὐτῇ.
5 Volkmann: στήνων ἐν αὐτῇ.
6 Theiler: τῇ ἐν αὐτῇ.

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last man somehow possesses all men, not becoming those other men, but set alongside them. And one of us is active according to the last and lowest man, but another has something also from the one before him, and another's active actuality comes even from the third, and each is the man according to whom he is active, though each of us has all of them and again does not have them. And when the third life and the third man are separated from the body, if the third life follows the second, and follows it without being separated from the things above, then this life is said to be also where that life above is. But when the soul takes the body of a beast, one wonders how it does it when it is the forming principle of man. Now it was all things, but is active at different times according to different ones. When it is pure, then, and before it is spoilt it wills man and is man; for this is finer, and it does better. But soul makes the spirits which come before man, which are of the same kind as the soul which makes man; and who is before the soul is more of a spirit, or rather a god, and a spirit is an imitation of a god, dependent on the god as man is on the spirit: for the being on whom man is dependent is not called a god. He has the difference from a god which souls have from each other, even if they belong to the same order. But, one must call spirits that kind of spirits whom Plato calls spirits. But when the soul which was joined to it when it was a man follows the soul which has chosen the nature of a beast, it gives the forming principle in it which different accounts of the nature of spirits: in the Timaeus the personal σώμα or guardian spirit is demythologised and said to be the highest part of our soul, the immortal reason. Plotinus reconciles the two in III. 4. 5.
PLATONUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

λόγος ἐκάνον τοῦ ξύλου θαύμαν ἔχει γάρ, καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς χειρὼν.

7. Ἀλλ' εἰ πανεπιστέα καὶ χειρὼν γενομένη πλάτει τίμειν φόροι, οὐκ ἂν δобрεχής μιᾶς ἐπιτεύχει ἡ ἔστησις, καὶ οὐκ ὁ λόγος ἃ ἐπιτεύχει παρὰ φύσιν. ἢ ἅλλοι ταῦτα, οὐ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἐπικαταλήφθη καὶ ἡ ἐξαιρήσις ἐπιτεύχει τὴν κάλλιον. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἔχει, ποιεῖ τὸ κάλλιον, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὁ δίκαιος, ἢ γαὶ ποιεῖν προσταθείαν: αἱ καὶ ἡ πολλά εἰπές ποιεῖν εἰδότες δημιουργεῖα, εἰτά τούτῳ ποιεῖν, ἢ τὴν προσταθείαν, ἢ τὴν ἐλπὶς ἔθελε τὴν ἐπικαταλῆφθην. τι γάρ κολύει τὴν μὲν δύναμιν τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς προοιμογράφει, ἢτο λόγον πάντα οὖσαν, πρὸς καὶ παρὰ αὐτῆς ἢκεν τὰς φυκικὰς δυνάμεις. καὶ τὴν προοιμογράφην ἢν προμαχήσεις εἰλίμασις εἰς τὴν ἐλπὶς, ἢτο δὲ τοῖς τούτης ἑκάσις ἐπικαταλήφθην τὴν ἐξαιρήσιμήν ψυχήν κατὰ μέρη.

13 τὰ ἵνα διερμηνέων ποιήσαι καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκάστην τοῦτο, ὁ προσθήκη σχηματίσας ἐκεῖνη, ἡτοι τὸν ἐν ὑπόσχεσιν πρὸς τὸ δεδεμένων ὑπόσχεται ἄλλα γάρ ἐπιπλοῦντας τῷ ἐφεξῆς εἰς τοῦτο ἔκρουν. ὃν δὲ ἤμισιν ὁ λόγος, τὸ αἰσθητικόν ὑπὸ τῶν ᾠρώσων καὶ ποὺς ἡ ἐκείνα πρὸς γένεσιν βλέπει καὶ ἡμῖν ἐφανέτω καὶ οὗτος

20 λόγος ἐκείνης ὑπὸ ἐκείνα πρὸς τὸ πάντα βλέπειν, ἀλλὰ ταύτα εἰς ἔκειν ἀνορθίθησαι καὶ μεμείσθαι ἕκειν, καὶ

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belongs to that living thing in the intelligible world. For it possesses it, and this is its worse form of activity.

7. But if it is when it is spoilt and has become worse that the soul makes a beast-nature, it was not from the beginning the principle which made horse or ox, and the forming principles of horse, and horse, were against nature. No, a lesser thing, certainly not an unnatural one, but that which made them was somehow from the beginning horse or dog. And if the soul has the opportunity, it makes what is finer, but if not, what it can; it is foreordained to make in any case: it is like the craftsmen who know how to make many forms and then make just this one, for which they had the order or which their material by its particular characteristics required. For what is there to prevent the power of the Soul of the All from drawing a preliminary outline, since it is the universal forming principle, even before the soul-powers come from it, and this preliminary outline being like illuminations running on before into matter, and the soul which carries out the work following traces of this kind and making by articulating the traces part by part, and each individual soul becoming this to which it came by figuring itself, as the dancer does to the dramatic part given him? Well, by following up one line of thought after another we have arrived at this point. But our discussion was about how the power of sense-perception belongs to man and how those intelligible realities do not look to coming to birth; and it appeared to us, and our argument showed, that those realities do not look to the things here below but these are dependent on those and imitate those, and that this man here below has his

1 Here and in what follows in ch. 7 Plotinus is explaining Plato's doctrine of animal reincarnation as stated in Timaeus 42b-4. 106
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

powers from that intelligible man and looks to those realities, and these sense-objects are linked to this man and those others to that; for those sense-objects, which we called so because they are bodies, are apprehended in a different way; and that this sense-perception here below is dimmer than the apprehension there in the intelligible, which we called sense-perception because it is of bodies and which is clearer. And for this reason this man here has sense-perception, because he has a lesser apprehension of lesser things, images of those intelligible realities; so that these sense-perceptions here are dim intelllections, but the intelllections there are clear sense-perceptions.

3. But so much for the power of sense-perception. But all the same, how do "horse" and each and every one of the animals not intend to look to the things here below? But supposing God discovered the thought of horse in order that a horse (or some other animal) might come into being here below? Yet how would it be possible for him when he wanted to make a horse to think a horse? For it is already clear that the thought of horse existed if he wanted to make a horse; so that it is not possible for him to think it in order to make it, but the horse which did not come into being must exist before that which was to be afterwards. If then it existed before its generation and was not thought of that it might be generated, he who possessed the horse there in the intelligible did not possess it in himself in looking to the things here below, nor that he might make the things here transposable. And so with Theiler. The presence of bodies in the intelligible world is suggested in the previous chapter, lines 7-9, and clearly affirmed in VI. 2. 21. 52-53.
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below, but those intelligibles existed and these things here necessarily followed upon them; for it was not possible to stop at the intelligibles there. For who could bring to a stop a power able both to abide and to go forward? But why are these animals there in the intelligible? For why should they be in God? Rational animals, yes; but what majesty does so great a multitude of irrational ones have? Why does it not have just the opposite? Now it is clear that this one must be many, because it exists after the altogether One; or it would not have been after that One, but it would have been that One. But, being after it, it could not be above it in the direction of being more one, but had to fall short of it; but, as the best was one, it had to be more than one; for multiplicity is deficient. But what prevents it from being a dyad? Now each of the ones in the dyad could not be absolutely one, but must again be at least two, and again it is the same with each of those, and then there was in the first dyad movement as well as rest, and there was also intellect, and life was in it: and perfect intellect and perfect life. Then it was not one as Intellect but all, and possessing all the particular intelligents, and as many as all of them and more; and it lived not as one soul, but as all, and as possessing more power to make all the individual souls, and it was the "complete living being"; not having only man in it: for otherwise there would only be man here below.

9. "But yes," someone will say, "I grant the valuable living beings, but on the other hand, how could

1 Cop. Plato Sophis: 249A-C.
2 Plato Timaeus 31B1.
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the cheap and irrational ones be there?" Their cheapness obviously comes by irrationality, if being valuable comes by rationality; and if they are valuable by their intellectual quality, they are the reverse by their unIntellectuality. And yet how can anything be unIntellectual or irrational when it is that Intellect in which each and every one exists or from which they come? Before, then, beginning the arguments about and against this position, let us grasp that man here is not like that intelligent man, so that the other living beings are not the same here and there, but one must have a greater and nobler apprehension of those there; and then too there is no rationality there: for here perhaps man is rational but in that world there is the man before reasoning. Why, then, does this man here reason, but the others do not? Now, there in the intelligible, intelligence is different in man and the other living beings, and reasoning is also different for there are present somehow also in the other living beings many works of deliberate thought. Why then are they not equally rational? And why are men not equally so in comparison to each other? But one must consider that the many lives, which are like movements, and the many thoughts should not have been the same, but different lives and in the same way different thoughts; and the differences are, somehow, in brilliance and clarity, firsts and seconds and thirds according to their nearness to the first principles. And for this reason some of the thoughts are gods, and some of a second kind, in which is included what we call rational here below, and in sequence from these what is called irrational. But there what we say is irrational was also a rational principle, and

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

οὔ τά εἰστὶν καὶ τά ἄλογα ἢ; τοῖς εἰσθανόντεσιν τῷ ἄλογῳ ἔρχεται, εἰ τῷ λογικῷ τῷ τίμιον καὶ εἰ τῷ νοστρῷ τῷ τίμιον, τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ τῷ ἐναπόκοιτε. καὶ τοιὸς ἄνθρωπος ἢ?

5 ἄλογον ἐκείνον δύον ἐν ἧν ἑκαστή ἢ ἂς οὖν; πρὸ δὴ τῶν περὶ ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς ταὐτα λεγοῦσαν ἐλεφθοῦσαν λάβωμεν, ὡς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐνταῦθα οὐ τοιούτοις ἔστι, οὖν ἄκειν, ὅστε καὶ τὸ ἄλλο ζώα οὐκ ὠλῳ τῇ ἑνταὐθὰ κάκει, ἀλλὰ μετέχως δεὶ ἑκείνα λεμβάνων ἔρντω ὧν τὸ λογικὸν.

10 ἐκεῖ: ὁδὲ γὰρ ἴσως λογικός, ἐκεῖ δὲ ὁ πρὸ τοῦ λογιζομένῳ: διὰ τὸ οὐν ἑνταὐθὰ λογίζεται οὕτως, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα οὐ: ἡ διαφορὰ δύον ἐκεῖ τοῦ νοεῖν ἐν τῇ ἄνθρωπῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις, διαφοράς καὶ τὸ λογιζομένῳ ἔνα γὰρ ποὺ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις πολλὰ διαφοράς ἐγένετο, διὰ

15 τὸ οὖν οὐκ ἐπίσης λογικός: διὰ τὸ δὴ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς ἄλλης οὐκ ἐπίσης; διὰ τὸ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς τὰς πολλὰς ζῴοις οὖν, κινήσεις οὕτως καὶ τὰς νοούσες οὐκ ἐχθην τὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ζώας διαφοράς καὶ νοούσης οὕτως τὰς διαφορὰς ποὺς διευκρινιστέεις.

20 καὶ ἐναργεστέρας, κατὰ τὸ ἄλλον ἐν τῶν πρώτων πρώτας καὶ δεύτερας καὶ τρίτας, διὰ τοὺς νοούσας αἱ μὲν θεοὶ, αἱ δὲ δεύτερον τὰ γένη, ἐν τῷ λογικῷ ἐπικλημένοι λειτουργεῖ, ἐξ ὧν οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν τῷ ἄλογῳ οἰκὴν; ἕκει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον λεγόμενον λόγος ἢ, καὶ τὸ ἄνθρωπον.

1 H-S: τοῖς Ἐνν.
FLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

\[\text{νόησις ἦν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἵππος νοητὸς ἐστι, καὶ ἡ νόησις}
\[\text{25 ἵππος νοῦς ἦν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν νόησις μένον, ἀπευρότας ὑπὸ τῆς νόησις αὐτῆς νόησις ὑπόν ἀνόητον ἦν δὲ εἰ ἀνόητος ἡ νόησις τῷ πράγματι, πῶς ἢ μὲν νόησις,}
\[\text{ἀνόητον δὲ τὸ πράγμα; οὕτω γὰρ ἄν νοῦς ἀνόητον ἐστὶν πουλώ. ἢ οὐκ ἀνόητον, ἀλλὰ νοῦς ἰμαθὼς ζωῆ}
\[\text{30 γὰρ τοιάδε. ὡς γὰρ ἦταν ὁ ζῷος οὐκ ἀπῆλθεν τοῖς ἐκεῖνοις, αὐτοὶς οὐδὲ νοῦς τοιοῦτος ἀπῆλθεν τοῖς ἐκεῖνοις; ἢ ὁ θάνατος ἦν ὁ κατὰ σπορεῖον ἦπτος ἀπῆλθεν τοῖς τοῖς ἐκεῖνοις ἐκεῖνοις, οἶνοι καὶ ἀνθρώποι, εἴπερ ἐκείνοις μέρος, δὲ τὰ ἐν λάβῃ, πάντα ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι ἀλλοι. ἐνεργεῖα μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖνο, ἀναιτία δὲ}
\[\text{35 πάντας λαμβάνομεν δὲ καθ' ἐκείνοις τὸ ἐνεργεῖα: τὸ δ' ἐνεργεῖα ἐγκαταστάτω, ωστε τοιὸς τοῦ ἤν τὸ ἐγκαταστάτω ἐπεφέρει, καὶ ἢ ἠλθὲ προῖν διὰ εἰς ἐλέησιν ζωῆ, ὑπὸν ἐκεῖνον, ἀλλόν ἐπὶ καταστήσας λαβῇ. ἐνεργεῖας γὰρ τοῖς ἀναμένεις καταλείπουσιν ἐνεργεῖας τῆς ἐπεφέρεις διὰ εἰς τὸ ἀναμένεις, τοῖς ἐπὶ ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἀλλὰ ἄλλα. διὰ τὸ ἐνεργεῖας τοῦ ἐκεῖνος τοῦ ἐγκαταστάτου ἐνεργεῖας προσέφθησαι: ὅπως ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνος ἐν τῷ ἐκεῖνος εἰς ζωῆς, ἀνεβαίνει διὰ καὶ τὸ γιαμψώνουν ἢ τὸ}

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the mindless was mind, since the thinker of horse is mind and the thought of a horse was mind. But if it was only a thought, there would be nothing out of the way in the thought itself as a thought being of something thoughtless; but as things are, if the thought is the same as the thing,\(^1\) how can the thought be thought and the thing thoughtless? For in this way thought would make itself thoughtless. But now it is not thoughtless but a particular kind of intellect: for it is a particular kind of life. For just as any particular life does not cease to be life, so neither does an intellect of a particular kind cease to be intellect: since the intellect appropriate to any particular living being does not on the other hand cease to be the intellect of all, of man also, for instance, granted that each part, whichever one you take, is all things, but perhaps in different ways. For it is actually one thing, but has the power to be all, but we apprehend in each what it actually is; and what it actually is, is the last and lowest, so that the last and lowest of this particular intellect is horse, and being horse is where it stopped in its continual outgrowth to a lesser life, but another stops lower down. For as the powers unfold they always leave something behind on the higher level; and as they go out they lose something, and in losing different things different ones find and add on something else because of the need of the living being which appeared as a result of the deficiency; for instance, since there is not yet enough for life's purpose, nails appeared, and having claws and fangs, and the principle of the identity of perfect immaterial thought with its object are startlingly different.

\(^1\) Cp. Aristotle Metaphysics A 9. 1075a1–5. Both in Aristotle and Plotinus it is divine thought which is being considered, but the conclusions they draw from the

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καρχαρύδον ἢ κέρατος φύσις-δος, ἢ κατήλθεν ὁ νοῦς,
45 ταύτῃ πάλιν ὁδ τό αὐτάρκει τῆς φύσεως ἀνακώφαν καὶ
ἐξερεύνε φαντασμό τοῦ ἀλλοπάθους καμάτητος ἤσοσ.

10 Ἀλλὰ πῶς ἔστη ἐνέελαι τε γὰρ κέρατα ἕκατα
πρὸς ἄρμασις; ἢ πρὸς τὸν ἀπειρός ἢ τὸν ἄξον καὶ τὸ
τέλεος, ὡς γὰρ ἄξον ἔδει τέλεον ἐκεῖνο, καὶ ὡς νοῦν ἐκ
tέλεους, καὶ ὡς ἄξον ἐκ τέλεουν ἄστε, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ
tοῦτο. καὶ ἡ διάφορα τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀστο ἄλλῳ, νὰ ἐκ
tαύτων μὲν τὸ τελειώτατον ἄξον καὶ τὸ τέλεος νοῦς καὶ
ἡ τελειώτατη ἄξον, ἐκατέρω ὡς ἐκατέρω τέλεος, καὶ
μὴ, εἰ ἐκ τολλῶν, δει εἰκαί οὔ ἐν ἡ ὧν ἐάν τε ἐκ
tολλῶν μὲν εἰκαί, τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ κανόνων; ἐκατέρω ἡ
15 ἄν ἐν, δει ταύτων ἡ ἐπὶ ἑντὸς, ἴσον καὶ
tῶν σύμμετρων, καὶ συμφωνίων ἐκατέρω, οἷοι καὶ αἱ
μορφαὶ καὶ οἱ λόγοι, αἱ τὸ γὰρ μερισματικά, αἵαν αὐθαίρετον,
ἐξ ὧς καταλαμβάνομεν, καὶ τὸ τὸ ἐν τῷ πάντω ἐν, καὶ βελτίων
καὶ ἐκείνων ἀλλήλων, ἐνθαλμός καὶ δικτύοις, ἀλλ’ ἐνὸς
καὶ οἱ κείμενο τὸ πάν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐκ, βελτίων καὶ οἱ
λόγοι δὲ ἄξον καὶ ἄλλα τι, δὲ μαίντον τῷ ἄξον”, καὶ
ἀρετῇ δὲ τὸ κοινό καὶ τὸ ἄνευ καὶ τὸ ἄνευ καλὸν
ἀκαθωρία τοῦ κανόνων ὁντος.

11 Λέγεται δὲ εἰσόδ’ ὁ ὄρθανος—καὶ πολλά δὲ
φανερώς—οὐκ ἀτιμάσατι τὴν τῶν ὄρθων πάντων φύσιν.

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ture of horn; so that where the intellect came down
to, at that very point it comes up again by the self-
sufficiency of its nature and finds stored in itself the

cure for the deficiency.

10. But how was it deficient there in the intelli-
gible? For why should there be horns for defence
there? They are for its self-sufficiency as a living
being and its completeness. For it had to be complete
as living being and complete as intellect and com-
plete as life; so that if it did not have this, it must
have that. And the difference is by having one thing
instead of another, so that from all living beings
there may be composed the most perfect living
being and the perfect intellect and the perfect life,
and each individual may be perfect as an individual.
And certainly, if it is composed of many, it must on
the other hand be one; now it is not possible for it to
be composed of many and all of them the same: if it
was, it would be a self-sufficient one. It must then be
composed of things again and again differing in
form, like every composite being, and each indi-
vidual must be preserved, as their shapes and forming
principles are. For the shapes also, of man for in-
stance, are composed of so many different elements,
thought that over all is one. And they are better and
worse than each other, eye and finger, but they
belong to one; and the whole is not worse but,
because it is so, is better; and the rationally defined
forming principle is living being and something else,
which is not the same as "living being". And it is a
virtue to be both general and particular, and the
whole beautiful—the general is not differentiated.

11. But it is said that even the heaven—and many
living beings are manifest in it—does not think
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

επεις καὶ τὸ δὲ τὸ πᾶν πάντα ἔχει, πάθος οὐν ἔχει; πάντα οὐν ἔχει διὰ ἐνταῦθα τάκεις; γὰρ λόγος πεπαιδημέναι καὶ κατ᾽ εἶδος ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν πῦρ ἔχει, καὶ ὅπως ἔχει, ἔχει δὲ πάντως καὶ φυσά. τῶς οὖν τὰ φυτὰ ἕκεις; καὶ πῶς πῦρ ἔξω, καὶ μὰς γῆ; γὰρ ἐξ ἐκείνων ἐπέτηθεν. ἐκεῖς μὴ πᾶν τὸ ἔν πῦρ ἔξω, καὶ τὸ ἐν πολύς ἐκεῖς καὶ τοῦτα; τὰ μὲν οὖν φυτὰ δόκει καὶ τὸ λόγος συναρμόσαι: ἐπεις καὶ 10 τὸ ἔν τὶ διὰ φυτῶν λόγος ἐπάν ζωὴ κείμενος. εἰ δὴ ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν λόγος οὐν τὰ φυτῶν, καὶ ὅταν τὸ φυτῶν ἐστὶ, ζωὴ τίς ἐστιν. τοῦτο καὶ φως ποιεῖ, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἐν τῇ ἡτος τὸ πρῶτον φυτῶν ἐστιν ὁ αὐτὸς οὐχ οὔ, ἀλλὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ φυτῶν τὸ πρῶτον, ὁ οὗ καὶ τοῦτο. καὶ γὰρ ἐνέκειν ἐν τοῦτο, ταῦτα 15 ὡς πολλὰ καὶ αὐτῷ ἐν τούτῳ εἰναι, ἐκ εἰκόνος πιθανόν τίς καὶ τοῦτο κατ᾽ ἓρμος ἐκείνον ἐξ ὁδὸς καὶ συνεκαίρος. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο, δει πολὺ πρὸ τοῦ ἐντοῦ τοῦ ὁδοῖς καὶ κατὰ ἓρμος ἐκείνον ἐξ ὁδὸς καὶ συνεκαίρος. γὰρ δὴ πῶς; καὶ τὸ τῇ γῆν ἐναι. καὶ τῷ ἃ ἐκεῖ ἡ πολὺ πρὸ τοῦ ἐντοῦ τοῦ ὁδοῖς καὶ κατὰ ἓρμος ἐκείνον ἐξ ὁδὸς καὶ συνεκαίρος. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο, δει ὡς πολὺ πρὸ τοῦ ἐντοῦ τοῦ ὁδοῖς καὶ κατὰ ἓρμος ἐκείνον ἐξ ὁδὸς καὶ συνεκαίρος. 20 τὸ εἶναι τοῦτον; δει δὲ μαρτύρημα των ἐνεκαίροις καὶ λόγους. ἐκεῖ μὲν δι᾽ αὐτῷ τὰ φυτῶν ἔδα διὰ τὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ λόγους. ἐκεῖ δὲ οὖν καὶ ἐν τῇ γῆς νηθῇ, καί εἰ λαμβάνει τὰ μελίστα γῆς γεννώμενα καὶ πλαστάζεται ἐν αὐτῇ, εὑρομεν οὐ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τῷ γῆς φύσις. λίθων τοίνυν 118

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worthless the nature of all living things, since also this All here has all of them. From where, then, does it have them? Does then the world there have everything that is here? Yes, everything that is made by forming principle and according to form. But when it has fire, it also has water, and it most certainly also has plants. How then are there plants there? And how does fire live? And how does earth? For it either lives or it will be a kind of dead body there, so that not everything there lives. And how in general can these things here be there in the intelligible? Well, the plants could fit into the argument; for the plant here is a rational forming principle resting in life. If then indeed the forming principle in matter, that of the plant, by which the plant exists, is a particular life and a soul, and the forming principle is some one thing, then this principle is either the first plant; or it is not, but the first plant is before it, and this plant here derives from it. For that first plant is certainly one, and these plants here are many, and necessarily come from one. If this is really so, that plant must be much more primarily alive and be this very thing, plant, and these here must live from it in the second and third degree and from its traces. But how does earth live? And what is it to be earth? And what is the earth there which has life? Or rather, first, what is this earth here? That is, what being does it have? It must certainly even here below be a pattern and a forming principle. Well, in that case of the plant, its forming principle here too was alive. Does it then so live in the earth here? Now, if we were to take the most earthly things generated and shaped in it, we should find here below too the nature of earth. The growth, then, and shaping of
plotinus: ennead vi. 7.

25 αὐξήσεις τε καὶ πλήσεις καὶ ὄρμον ἀναφορέμενον ἐνδον μορφόσεις πάντως που λόγον ἐμφανίζουσαν διεσχόμενοι καὶ ἐξακολουθοῦν χρὴ νομίζειν γνώσεις καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ εἶδος τῆς γῆς τὸ ποιεῖν, ὡσπερ ἐν τῶι δάσῳ τῶν λαμπάνων φῶν, τὸ δὲ ἐξίσου τοῦ δάσους

26 ἀνάλογον τῆς λεγομένης εἶναι γῆς, καὶ ἀποτέλεσά τοῦ λάθους αὑτῶν ἐχειν, ὡς εἰ τοῦ δάσους τί καται, μὴ παθάνοις δὲ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ συναντώμενοι, ὡς τὸ μή κοπῆι εἰ τοῦ ζωτοῦ φυτοῦ, τῆς ἴδιας ἡμιορρόδους ἐπικαθημένης, τῇ γῇ φῶν, ἔσωθεν ἐν λόγῳ ἀνεφάρθη ἐκεῖναι μισοῦμεθα ἂν τὸ οὐκέτιρρον σχῆμα τῷ ἐνικεῖ γῆν πολὺ

26 πρότερον ἔσωθεν εἶναι καὶ ζωὴν ἐλλογον γῆς, αὐτηγον καὶ πάντως γῆν, ὡς ἢ καὶ ἡ ἐνεμέθη γῆ, εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ πυρ λόγος τις ἐν ὑπὲρ ἐστι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ τοιοῦτα καὶ σύκω τούτου αὐτοματον πῦρ—ποιεῖ τόν γῆ οὐ γὰρ ἐκ παρατρείψεως, ὡς ἐν τοῖς αἰείθει, ἔνθα γὰρ διότι

40 ἐν τῷ παντὶ ποιεῖ ἡ παραπόρισις ἀξίαμον τῶν παραπραγμενῶν σωμάτων, οἵτινες καὶ ἡ ἐνθα ἐνθαυσάμενης, ὡστε παρ’ αὐτῆς—ἐὰν δὲ κατὰ λόγον δει τὸ ποιεῖν ἐναὶ ὡς μορφαν, τὸ τούτῳ τοῖς καὶ τὸ πυρ τοῦ παραπραγματευτικοῦ πολύ ἐνταῦθα καὶ λόγος, ἐν καὶ ταῦτα ἀρμόδιο. δει τὰ τοῖς ἐκδοτῶσιν τοῦτον πυρ, τά ἐστιν καὶ τὸ ἐνταύθα ποιεῖν πῦρ ζωή τοῖς

1 Re² (minimum Feinum), Kirchhoff.

4 In IV. 4, 27 (where Plotinus also speaks, as he does here, of the living rock growing) it is strongly asserted that earth here below not only has a soul, but a divine soul. She is, in accordance with all Greek tradition, a goddess.

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Stones and the inner patterning of mountains as they grow one must most certainly suppose take place because an ensouled forming principle is working within them and giving them form; and this is the active form of the earth, like what is called the growth-nature in trees, and what we call earth corresponds to the wood of the tree, and when the stone is cut out it is in the same state as if something is chopped from a tree, but if this does not happen to it and it is still joined on it is like what has not been chopped off from a living plant. Now surely when we have discovered the world's nature seated in earth as a life in a forming principle we shall easily be confident about what comes next, that the earth there in the intelligible is much more primarily alive and is the life of earth in its forming principle, absolute earth and primary earth, from which the earth here below derives. But if fire also is a forming principle in matter, and so are the other things of this kind, and fire is not spontaneously generated—for where could it come from? Not from friction, as one might think: for friction occurs when fire is already in the All and the bodies being rubbed together have it; also, matter is not able to be fire in such a way that fire can come from it—if then what makes fire must do so by forming principle, as structuring it, what could it be except a soul able to make fire? But that is a life and a forming principle, both one and the same. This is why Plato says that there is a soul in each of these elements, in no other way than as making this perceptible fire. So then what

2 Plotinus here appears to be thinking of Epinomis 981E–C and 984B–C.
makes the fire here below is also a fiery life, a truer fire. The transcendent fire, then, since it is more fire would be more in life; so then absolute fire also lives. And the same argument applies to the others, water and air. But why are these too not ensouled like the earth? Now it is clear, I suppose, that these are in the universal living being, and that they are parts of the living being; but life is not apparent in them, as it is not in the case of the earth; but one could deduce the presence of life there too from the things which came into being from it, but in fire also living things come to be, and more obviously in water; and there are living organisms in the air. But the individual fire which comes to be and is quickly quenched moves past the soul in the whole and has not come to be static in a bulk, when it would have shown the soul in it; and it is the same with air and fire; since, if they were naturally fixed, they would show their soul; but since they had to be flowing, they do not show the soul which they have. It is likely that their state resembles that of the liquids in us, blood for instance; for the flesh and whatever becomes flesh from the blood seems to have soul, but the blood because it does not give a sense-perception does not seem to have it—though it must exist in it also—since also nothing violent happens to it. But it is easily liable to separate from the soul which exists in it, as one must think is so with the three elements; since all the living beings which are composed of air¹ coming together do not have any sense-perception which affects them. For just as the air

¹ These are σαλπικες, who, Platonista generally believed, had bodies of air. Cp. III. 5, 6, 37 and the passages there referred to.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

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itself moves past the light which does not give way and abides as long as it abides, in this way it passes round its soul and does not pass; and the same with the other elements.

12. But again, let us put it this way: since we maintain that this All exists after the pattern (so to call it) of that, the universal living being must exist there you first, and, if its existence is to be complete, must be all living beings. And certainly the sky there must be a living being, and so a sky not bare of stars, as we call them here below, and this is what being sky is. But obviously there is earth there also, not barren, but much more full of life, and all animals are in it, all that walk on and belong to the land here below, and, obviously, plants rooted in life; and sea is there, and all water in abiding flow and life, and all the living beings in water, and the nature of air is part of the universe there, and aerial living things are there just as the air itself is. For how could the beings in what lives not being live, when they most certainly are so even here below? How then can every living being not be there of necessity? For as each of the great parts of the universe is there, so is of necessity the nature of the living beings in them. As, therefore, the sky is there, and in the way in which it is there, so and in that way all the living beings in the sky are there, and it is impossible for them not to be; or else those great parts would not be there. If one enquiries, therefore, where the living beings come from, one is enquiring where the sky there comes from; and this is to enquire where the [universal] living being comes from, and this is the same as where life comes from, and universal life and

1 An allusion to Timaeus 31B1.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

καὶ ψυχή πάσα καὶ νοῦς ἐξ ἡμῶν, μεθεμισμένης ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος μηδὲ ἐποριασμένη ὑλῆς, ἀλλὰ πάντως ἐνῷ πεπληρωμένης καὶ ὑλῶν ζωήν. ἔστι δὲ ἀυτῶν ἢ ὁ ὁδός ἡ μιᾶς
25 σεισμὸς, αὐτὸ ὁμοία ἕνας τυφλός πνεύματος ἡ θερμότητος μιᾶς, ἀλλὰ ὁμοία ἐὰν τὸ ἀντίκειται μιᾶς πάσης ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἡμών ἢ ἄλλης, ἀλλὰ ὁμοίας τὰς παιδίτες, ἀλλὰ ὁμοίας ταῖς εὐδοκίαις, καὶ ὁμοίας σωτήριος καὶ ἡμῶν ἀπάνων δυνάμεις καὶ χρωμάτων ὄφεις καὶ ὃσα ἀπειλεῖν γινομένους ἐμοίες ὢν δὲ καὶ ὅσα ἀκούει ἀκούοντος.
30 πάντα μέλη καὶ θρηματίς πᾶς.

13. "Εστι γὰρ ὡσεὶ νοῦς ὑπολογεῖ, οὗτος ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὑπολογεῖ, ἀλλὰ ποικίλα πάντα διὰ ἀλλα, τούτω δὲ διὰ μῆ καὶ σύνθετα καὶ ἁρμα δραχαὶ καὶ ὑδαν θρεπτεῖ. οὐ δεν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀνέγερτε ὡς ἀλλήλοις ἀλληλον, τοῦ δὲ πρῶτον πάντως γενὲς τῆς κυρίας καὶ περιτρέχουσας μὲν ὀμοίως καὶ κατὰ ταύτα καὶ ὄμοιο διεῖ, οὐ μόνοι ταῦτα καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐν τῷ μέρει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀνερον διαιρομένων. ἀλλά τίνος δὲ φανέρως ἀν καὶ πάντως ἐπὶ τῷ ἐστίν χρῦσατο, τοῦ δὲ μεταξύ πάν ἀν θρεπτεῖς γραμμή, ἢ θρεπτεῖς ἐπερυθρών ποιήσαμεν εἰς ἀπόκλισιν; ἀλλὰ τὶ τῷ σωμάτι?

1 This remarkably powerful phrase is perhaps suggested to Plotinus by De Anima A 2. 406b56-29, where Aristotle says that Pre-Socratic ideas about soul and life followed their etymology: some connected ψυχή (lives) with ψυχή (soul) and so thought of soul as something like. (This is the sense of ψυχή πάσα.)

2 Plotinus may be suggesting here that the life of the intelligible world in its complex unity is not to be thought of in terms of Stoic ψυχή.

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universal Soul and universal Intellect, when there is no poverty or lack of resource there, but all things are filled full of, and, we may say, boiling with life. 3 They all flow, in a way, from a single spring, not like one particular breath or one warmth, 4 but as if there was one quality which held and kept intact all the qualities in itself, of sweetness along with fragrance, and was at once the quality of wine and the characters of all tastes, the sights of colours and all the awareness of touch, and all that hearings hear, all tunes and every rhythm.

13. For neither is Intellect simple, nor the soul which derives from it, but all are varied in proportion to their simplicity, that is, in so far as they are not composites and in so far as they are principles and in so far as they are activities. For the activity of the last and lowest is simple as coming to a stop, but of the first is all activities; and Intellect in its movement moves along in the same way and on one same and identical course, but still is not the same one partial thing, but all things: since also the partial thing is in its turn not one, but this too is infinite when it is divided. But from what should we say that it began, and to what does it move as the ultimate point? And is all in between like a line or like another body, homogeneous and unvaried? But what majesty would there be in that? 5 For if it has
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16 εὐρταὶ μνημείων ἔχει ἐξαλλαγῆς μηδὲ τις ἐξεγερίει οὐκότως εἰς τὸ ζῷον ἐπερήμης, εὐθὺς ἀν ἐνέγηε τάς οὐδὲν γὰρ ἣν τις κατατάσσεις μη ἐνεργεῖαν διαφέρει. καὶ καίνης δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ, οὐ πανταχόσοι, μοισθεὶς δ᾽ ἐν εἰς ἔτως δεῦ.

20 πᾶν πάντα ζῷον καὶ πάντα χάλα ταῖς γειτονίαις μη ζῷον. ἐπὶ πάντα οὐν κινεῖσθαι δεῖ, μάλλον δὲ κεκινηθεῖς. ἄποιόν δὴ εἰ κυνότα, ἵκειν μόνον ἔχει: καὶ ἡ αὐτό καὶ ὁ προθότος ἐκ σιδήν, ἡ εἰ προθότος, ἀλλὰ μένεν ὡστε δόντι καὶ εἰ τοῦτον τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, μένει ἐν καὶ συν

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no change in it, and no otherness wakes it to life, it would not even be an active actuality: for such a state would be undistinguishable from non-actual inactivity. And even if it were a movement of this [simple and straightforward] kind it would not be one, but in one way only; but it must live all things and from all directions and there must be nothing it does not live. It must therefore move to all, or rather have moved to all. Certainly if it moves a simple movement it has that one alone; and it is either itself and it has not gone forward to anything, or, if it has gone forward, it is another thing as staying behind; so there are two, and if this one of the two is the same as that, it remains one and has not gone forth; but if it is other, it has gone forth with otherness and from a same and another has made a third one. Now certainly if what has come to be has come to be from the same and the other, it is in its nature to be the same and the other; and not just any other, but universal other: for its same also is universal. But since it is all that is the same and all that is other, there is no one of the others that it leaves out. Its nature therefore is to become other in every way. If then all the other things exist before it, it would already be affected by them; but if they do not, then this Intellect generated them all, or rather was them all. It is not then possible for the real beings to exist if Intellect is not actively at work, for ever working one thing after another and, we may say, wandering down every way and wandering in itself, as it is natural for the true Intellect to wander in itself; and it is natural for it to wander among substances while the substances run along with its wanderings. But it is everywhere itself; so its wan-
Plotinus: Ennead VI. 7.

35 ἐχει τῶν πλάνων. ἢ δὲ πλάνη αὐτῶς ἢ τῷ τῆς Ἀλήθειας πεδίον, οὐδὲν ἔχοντες ἔγειρε ἔνας καταλαβόντας πᾶν καὶ αὐτῶς ποιήσας εἰς τὸ κινεῖσθαι οὐκ ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ὁ τόπος ὁ αὐτὸς τῷ οἷῳ τότες. ποικίλον δὲ ἐστι τὸ πεντάτομον παύτων, ἰσόμετρός ἦν, μὴ δὲ μὴ κατὰ πᾶν καὶ μὴ ποικίλον, καθόσον μὴ ποικίλοις. ἔστηκεν. ἢ δὲ

40 ἔστηκεν, οὐκ ἔστω καὶ, ἢ ἔστη, ἢ νοεῖν ἥνεκαν εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ ἐστιν. ἐστιν οὐκ ὁρίσις. ἢ δὲ κύριος πᾶσα πληροῦσα οὐσίαν πᾶσαν, καὶ ἡ πάσα οὐσία νόησις πᾶσα ζωῆν περιλαβόντας πάσας, καὶ μετὰ ἅλλα ἄλλα ἄλλα καὶ δὲ τι αὐτῶν ταῦτα καὶ ἅλλα καὶ διαφθοράν ἄλλο τὸ ἄλλο ἀναφαίνεται. πᾶσα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ πορεῖ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πᾶσα

45 πάσα. ὡσπερ καὶ τῷ τῷ δίῳ γὰρ ἢντι πάντα, ἡ διέξεισιν, γῆς, καὶ διαφθοράς ἂν γυν. καὶ ἔκει ἡ μὲν ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἡ αὐτὴ, ἡ δὲ δὲ ἄλλοι, οὐχ ἡ αὐτή, ἡ δὲ δὲ ἄλλοι, καὶ δὲ ἄλλοι τὴν ἄλλην διά τῶν οὐκ αὐτῶν διά άλλων, ὡς ἄλλοι καὶ τὰ ταῦτα. ἦν

50 γὰρ κηρεί τὰ ἅλλα τὸ ἀμαίνως καὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ, ἄργει πάντως καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεία καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια οὐδαμῶς. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἅλλα αὐτῶς, ἦστε πάντας αὐτοῖς. καὶ εἰπερ αὐτῶς, πᾶσι, εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ αὐτοῖς, εἰ δὲ πᾶσι αὐτοῖς καὶ πᾶσι, ὡς τὰ πάντα, καὶ οὐδέν ἄστιν, ὡς τι μὴ συνελεῖ εἰς τὰ

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dering is an abiding one. And its wandering is in "the plain of truth", which it does not leave. And it encompasses and possesses it all, and makes a kind of place for its movement, and the place is the same as that of which it is the place. But this plain is varied so that Intellect may travel through it; but if it was not in every way and for ever varied, in so far as it was not varied, Intellect would stand still. But if it stands still, it does not think; so that if it came to a standstill, it has not thought; but if this is so, it does not even exist. It is, then, thought; that is, all movement filling all substance, and all substance is all thought encompassing all life, and always one thing after another, and whatever it is the same is also other, and as one is dividing it the other is always appearing. But all its journeying is through life, and all through living beings, as when someone travels through the earth, all he travels through is earth, even if the earth has its differences. And there in the intelligible, through which [the journey goes], the life is the same, but because it is always other, not the same. But Intellect keeps always the same journeying through the things which are not the same, because it does not change, but unaltering sameness is present with the things which are other; for if unaltering sameness is not in the things which are other. Intellect is altogether inactive and its actuality and activity are nowhere. But it is also itself the other things, in that it is all itself. And if it is itself it is all, and if it is not, it is not itself. But if it is itself all, and all because it is all things, and there is no thing which does not make its contribution to

1 Plato Phaedrus 248B6.
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the totality of things, then there is nothing of it which is not other, that by being other it may make this contribution. For if it is not other, but the same as something else, it will diminish the substance of Intellect by not bringing to its completeness its own particular nature.

14. But it is also possible by using examples taken from the intellectual realm to understand what Intellect is like, that it does not endure to be not other like a unit. For what forming principle of plant or animal would you like to take as an example? For if it was one thing and not this one varied thing, it would not be a forming principle, and what came to be would be matter. If the principle did not become all things so that by penetrating every point of the matter it allowed nothing of it to be the same. A face, for instance, is not one lump, but has both nostrils and eyes; and the nose is not one thing, but there is one part and again another of it, if it is going to be a nose; for if it was simply and solely one thing it would be a lump. And the unbounded is in Intellect in this way, that it is one as one-many, not like one lump but like a rational forming principle multiple in itself, in the one figure of Intellect holding as within an outline outlines inside itself and again figurations inside and powers and thoughts; and its division does not go on in a straight line, but moves always to the interior, as the natures of living beings are included in and the universal living being, and again other natures going on to the smaller living things and the weaker powers, where it will come to a stop at the indivisible form. But the division which is in Intellect is not of things confused, though of things existing in unity, but this is
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what is called 1 the love in the All, not the love in this All; for this is an imitation, since it is a loving of things which are separate; but the true love is all things being one and never separated. But Empedocles says that what is within this our sky is separated.

15. This life then, multiple and universal and primary and one—who is there who when he sees it does not delight to be in it, despising every other life? For the other lives, the lives below, are darkness and little and dim and cheap; they are not pure and pollute the pure lives. And if you look at them you no longer either see or live the pure lives, These lives all together in which there is nothing which does not live, and live purely, having no evil. For the evils are here below, because there is [only] a trace of life and a trace of Intellect; but there, Plato says, is the archetype, which "has the form of good" 2 because it possesses the Good in the Forms. That then is the Good, but Intellect is good by having its life in that contemplation; and it contemplates the objects of its contemplation as having the form of good and as the ones which it came to possess when it contemplated the nature of the Good. But they came to it, not as they were there, but as Inellect itself possessed them. For that Good is the principle, and it is from that that they are in this Intellect, and it is thus which has made them from that Good. For it was not lawful in looking to him to think nothing, nor again to think what was in him; for then Intellect itself would not have generated them. In

1 By Empedocles; cp. e.g. frs. B 17. 7 and 26. 5 DK.
2 Plato Republic 509A3.
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tellect therefore had the power from him to generate
and to be filled full of its own offspring, since the
Good gave what he did not himself have. But from
the Good himself who is one there were many for this
Intelecct; for it was unable to hold the power which
it received and broke it up and made the one power
many, that it might be able so to bear it part by part.\footnote{1}
Whatever it generated, then, was the power of the
Good and had the form of good, and Intellect itself is
good from [the many] which have the form of good, a
good richly varied. And so, if one likens it to a living
richly varied sphere,\footnote{2} or imagines it as a thing all
faces, shining with living faces, or as all the pure
souls running together into the same place, with no
deficiencies but having all that is their own, and
universal Intellect seated on their summits so that
the region is illuminated by intellectual light—if
one imagined it to be seeing it
somehow as one sees another from outside; but one
must become that, and make oneself the
contemplation.

16. But we must not remain always in that mani-
fold beauty but go on still darting upwards, leaving
even this behind, not out of this sky here below, but
out of that, in our wondering about who generated it
and how. Now each thing there is a form, and each
has a kind of distinctive character of its own; but
being in the form of good, all of them have in
the true surface of the earth in the myth of the Phaedo
(110B7). What follows is strangely reminiscent of Indian
many-faced representations of the gods (it is possible,
thought of course by no means certain, that Plotinus might
have seen some small Indian image of this kind in
Alexandria or elsewhere).
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common what reigns over them all. They of course have also being over them all, and each has the living being as there is a common life over all, and perhaps they have other things [in common]. But, what is it according to which and by which they are good? For this kind of enquiry perhaps it would be profitable to begin from here. Did Intellect, when it looked towards the Good, think that One as many, and because it was itself one being think him as many, dividing him in itself by not being able to think the whole at once? But it was not yet Intellect when it looked at him, but looked un-intelligently. Or rather we should say that it did not ever see the Good, but lived towards it and depended on it and turned to it, and its movement was fulfilled because it moved there and round that Good and filled Intellect, and was not just movement but movement sated and full; and thereupon it became all things, and knew this in its own intimate self-consciousness and was now at this point Intellect, filled full that it might have what it was going to see, but looking at them in a light, receiving this light too from the giver of them. This is why that Good is said to be the cause not only of substance but of its being seen. And just as the sun, which is cause for some objects both of their being seen and their coming into being, is also in some way cause of sight—and therefore is neither sight nor the things which have come to be—in this way also the nature of the Good, which is cause of substance and intellect and light, according to our analogy, to the things seen there and the seer,

shines upon Intellect from the Good, which becomes important later (chs. 21 and 22).
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is neither the real beings nor intellect but cause of these, giving by its own light thinking and being thought to the real beings and to intellect. So then intellect came to be by being filled, and when it was filled it was, and simultaneously it was perfected and saw. Its principle was that which it was before being filled, but another principle, in a way external to it, was the one that filled it, from which it received its character in being filled.

17. But how can these be in intellect, and be intellect, when they are not there in what fills it, nor, again, in it itself which is filled? For when it was not yet filled, it did not have them. Now, there is no necessity for anyone to have what he gives, but in this kind of situation one must consider that the giver is greater, and what that is given is less than the giver; for that is how coming to be is among the real beings. For that which is actual must be first, and those that come after must be potentially those before them; and the first transcended the seconds and the giver transcended the gift; for it was stronger. So if there is anything prior to actuality, it transcends actuality, so that it also transcends life. If then there is life in this intellect the giver gave life, but is nobler and worth more than life. Intellect therefore had life and had no need of a giver full of variety, and its life was a trace of that Good and not his life. So when its life was looking towards that it was unlimited, but after it had looked there it was limited, though that Good has no limit. For immediately by looking to something which is one the life is limited by it, and has in itself limit and bound and form; and the form was in that which was shaped, but the shaper was shapeless. But the boundary is
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not from outside, as if it was surrounded by a largeness, but it was a bounding limit of all that life which is manifold and unbounded, as a life would be which shines cut from a nature of this kind. And it was not the life of this or that; or it would be limited to being the life of an indivisible minimum, but all the same it was limited and defined; it was therefore defined as the life of one manifold thing—and each individual of the many things in the manifold was certainly also defined—and it was defined as many because of the multiplicity of its life, but on the other hand as one because of the defining limit. What then does "it was defined as one" mean? Intelllect: for life defined and limited is intellect. And what "as many"? Many intellects. All then are intellects, and all as a whole Intellect, and the individuals intellects. But does the whole Intellect in comprehending each individual comprehend each as the same? But if it did, it would comprehend only one. If then the intellects are many, there must be difference. Again: then, how did each one have difference? It had its difference in altogether becoming one: for what is the same in any intellect is not the all. The life of Intellect, then, is all power, and the seeing which came from the Good is the power to become all things, and the intellect which came to be is manifest as the very totality of things. But the Good sits enthroned upon them, not that it may have a base but that it may base the "Form" of the first "Forms", being formless itself. And in this way Intellect is to soul a light upon it, as that Good is a

1 Νοῦς is said to be εἰδός εἰδον by Aristotle. De Anima Γ 8. 433a2.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

νοῦν καὶ ὅταν καὶ αὐτὸς ὁρᾷ τὴν ψυχήν, λογικὴν ποιεῖ δοῦν αὐτῷ ὅν ἐσχεν ὡς. οὐκ όν καὶ νοοῦν ἔσχεν. 

40 ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἔδοξε καὶ ἐν ἐκτάσει καὶ πλήθει, ἐκείνος ἀμορφός καὶ ἀνέδειος, οὔτος γὰρ ἐπιδοσκεῖ, εἰ δὴ ἂν ἐκείνος ἔδοξε, ὁ νοῦς ἂν ἦν λόγος. ἔθει δὲ τὸ πρῶτον μὴ πολὺ μυθωμάς ἦν, ἀνήρρητο γὰρ ἂν τὸ πολὺ αὐτόφι 

18. Ἀλλ' ἀγαθειδή κατὰ τί τὸ ἐν τῷ νῷ, ἄρα ὡς ἔδοξε ἐκατον ἢ ἢ καλὰ ἢ τίς, εἰ δή τὸ παρὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἦκον πᾶν ὡς καὶ τόσον ἔχει ἐκεῖνον ἢ ὡς ἕκεινον, διότι μὲν ἀπὸ παρὰ Ἰχνος πᾶρ ὡς καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ ἱλικίως 5 γλυκάιος ἰχνος, ἦκε δὲ εἰς νοῦν καὶ ὡς ἐκεῖνον—ἐκ γὰρ τῆς παρ' ἐκείνου ἐνέργειας ἑπετεύχθη—καὶ νοῦς δὲ δὲν ἔκεινον καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐδοκιμάσα ἐκείνην, πάντα ἂν ἀγαθειδή εἰς καὶ ἱλικία καὶ νοῦς καὶ ἱλικία. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ κοινὸς; εὖ γὰρ δὴ ἁρκεῖ τὸ ἕκειν ἐπὶ τοῦ ταῦταν. 

10 ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ δεῖ τὸ κοινὸν εἰς καὶ γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ με ταῦτα ἢ καὶ ὡσικαὶ ὡς ἐν τοῖς δεικταίοις ἄλλο γένοιτο ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλο τὸ ἰχνοῦς ἐνεργείας, ἀλλὰ δὲ τὸ τῆς πρώτης ἐνεργείας δοθὲν, τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦτοις ἄλλο δόθη. οὐδὲν καλὸς καὶ ἐκατον μὲν ἐν̄ 

16 ἀγαθειδής εἰς, μᾶλλον μὴν καὶ ἄλλο, τί οὐκ καθ' ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον ἐκείνο ἀναγκαῖον ἢκιν. ἄρα γε

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light upon Intellect; and when Intellect also defines and limits the soul it makes it rational by giving it a trace of what it has. Therefore Intellect too is a trace of that Good; but since Intellect is a Form and exists in extension and multiplicity, that Good is shapeless and formless; for this is how he makes forms. But if that was a form, Intellect would have been [only a derived] rational principle. But the first must be not in any way multiple: for its multiplicity then would depend on another again before it.

18. But in what way do the things in Intellect have the form of good? Is it in that each of them is a Form, or in that they are beautiful, or what is it? Certainly, if everything which comes from the Good has a trace and an imprint which is his or derives from him, as what comes from fire is a trace of fire and what comes from a sweet thing a trace of sweet, and if also life comes from that Good to Intellect—

for it came to exist from the activity derived from him—and Intellect exists through him and the beauty of the Forms comes from there, all would have the form of good, life and intellect and idea. But what is it that is common to all? For coming from that Good does not suffice for sameness; for what is common should be in them themselves; for what is not the same could come to be from the same, or, also, what is given in sameness might become different in the things which are going to receive it; since, too, what pertains to the first activity is one thing and what is given by the first activity another, and what depends on these another again. Now, nothing prevents it having the form of good in each way, but more in one of them. What then is it by which most of all it is this? But first of all it is necessary to look at

1 Theiler: ἀναγκαῖον ἢκιν.
the following: is life a good in that it is this very thing, life considered bare and stripped of all else? Rather, in that it is the life which comes from the Good. But does this “from the Good” mean anything else but that it is of a particular kind? Again, then, what is “life of a particular kind”? It is life of the Good. But it was not life of the Good, but deriving from the Good. But if in that life the authentic life from that Good has entered and is, and nothing from that is valueless, it must be said to be good also in that it is life, and it is necessary to say also of that true and first Intellect that it is good; and it is clear also that each individual Form is good and has the form of good, in that, therefore, it has some good, either common, or more particularly one rather than another, or one primarily and another by succession and secondarily. For, since we took each Form as having something good in its substance, and it was good for this reason—for its life was not good simply as life, but because it was called true life and because it came from that Good, and Intellect because it was real Intellect—something of the same must be visible in them. For, as they are different, when the same thing is predicated of them there is nothing to prevent this being immanent in their substance, but all the same it is possible to take it separately in thought, as, for instance, “living thing” in man and horse, and “hot” in water and fire, in the one case as the genus, and in the other as the one primarily and the other secondarily; otherwise each of them or each particular one of them would be called good equivocally. Is then the good immanent in their substance? Now, each of them is good as a whole; its good does not depend on just one constitu-
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40 ὡς μὲν ἔρῃ ἄλλο ἀμερῆς τὸ ἀγαθόν. ἦ ἐν μὲν αὐτῷ, ὡς τυχεῖ δὲ τόδε, ὡς τυχεῖ δὲ τόδε. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρη ἡ πρώτη ἀγαθόν καὶ τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτῇ ὀρισθὲν ἀγαθόν καὶ τὸ συνήμφων καὶ τὸ μὲν ὁτι γενόμενον ὡς αὐτό, τὸ δ’ ὁτι κόσμος ἀπ’ αὐτό, τὸ δ’ ὁτι συνῆμφων. ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ὦν, καὶ οὐδὲν ταὐτόν, ὦν εἶ ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φεύγη καὶ βάδας καὶ ἀλλαὶ τι, πάντα καταρθηθέννα. ἡ ὑπακοή, ὡς τάκι καὶ μονής ἐκεί δὲ τί; ἀλλὰ ἐπειδὴ τοὺς τοὺς ὄς ἐνταῦθα ὄλων εἰς τὸ καλὸν ἐξωθεὶν διὰφόρων δύσων τῶν περὶ ὁ ἡ τάξεις. ἐκεί δὲ καὶ αὐτά. ἀλλά διὰ τὶ καὶ αὐτά, οὐ γὰρ ὁτι ὅπις ἐκεῖνος δὲ πιστεύεται ὁδείνα. δεὶ μὲν γὰρ συνεχείριν ὑπ’ ἐκεῖνον ὄντα ἔδωκε τίμας, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐλεγόν λαβέν, κατὰ τὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν αὐτὸν.

19. ἢρ’ οὖν τῇ ἐφέσω καὶ τῇ φιλιᾷ ἔνικείσθησεν ἡν κρίειν καὶ τῷ ταύτῃ πάθει πιστεύεται τῷ ταύτῃ ἐφεσώ ἀγαθόν ἐφίσομεν, διότι δὲ ἐκεῖνα ὁτι ἔφημοςομεν; καὶ τί μὲν ἐκατοπιν τοῖς ἐνδεικτικοῖς κοινοῖς, τὸ δ’ ἀγαθόν τῇ ἐφεσώ δύσωμεν; ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἐτοπά ἑμῖν γινέσθαι. πρῶτοι γὰρ μὲν, ὡς καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐν τε τῶν περὶ. ἐπείκεια, ὡς πολλὰ τὰ ἐφέσαν καὶ ἀλλα ἄλλους.
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desirer whether the desired is better [than other objects of desire]? But perhaps we shall not even know the better if we are ignorant of the good. But shall we then define the good according to each thing's excellence? But in this way we shall refer to Form and reason-principle, certainly a correct manner of proceeding. But when we have got there, what are we going to say when we enquire how these very Forms are good? For in the things which are inferior, it seems likely, we might recognise the nature of this kind, though it is not in a pure state, since it does not exist primarily, by comparison with things which are [still] worse. But where there is nothing evil but the Forms themselves by themselves are the better things, we shall be in difficulties. Is the difficulty, then, there for this reason, that, since our rational discourse seeks the reason why but these are good in themselves, the "why" is the "that"? Since even if we also assert another cause, God, the difficulty remains all the same while our discourse has not arrived there. We must certainly not give up while there is any chance of something appearing if we proceed by another way.

20. since, then, we do not at present rely on our impulses for establishing what a thing is or what it is like, should we then turn to judgements and the oppositions of things, for instance order, disorder, symmetrical, asymmetrical, beauty, sickness, form, shapelessness, substance, destruction, and in general coherence and dissolution? For who is there who would argue that the first of these in each pair is not in the form of good? But if this is so, it is

1 This is how Aristotle defines human good in Nicomachean Ethics A 7. 1096a16-17.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

...a\textsuperscript{152}

10 καὶ τὸν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχήν, ἀν ἀρχόμενοι, ἐν ἀγάθῳ ἐιδοὶ καὶ ὁ ἐφίμηται τοῖς ἐμφάνεις ψυχή, τῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ σμαραγδοῦ κοίτης, καὶ γὰρ ἐνυπηρέτου ἡ ζωὴ, καὶ τὸν ἐφίμηται ψυχή, καὶ κράτει τοῖς καὶ ἐφίμηται νοῦ, κρίνοντο μὲν δικαίους ἀνίκειας ἀμείνον καὶ

15 ἐκαστον εἶδος ἀρτήρητος πρὸ κακίας εἶδου, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἡ πρωτήσεις, ὅταν καὶ ἡ ἀρείας ἡ. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τοῦ πλούσιον ἐφίμηται, τάχα ἰτο πλείονος ἔθεσε λόγον δεικνύοντα, ἢ καὶ τὸ ἔθεσεν ἡ νοῦς καὶ τοῦ μὲν τὰ πάντα, ἄρα ἐδεικνύει καὶ τῶν μὲν μὴ ἐφίμηται τοῦ πάντα νοτοῖν

20 κατάστασις ἐξεταί τὰς ἡ τ' ἐθεμανα νοῦν ὡς ἱσταται ἦδη, ὅλα πάλιν τὸ ἀγάθῳ ἐξεταί, καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐκ λόγισμοι, τὸ δὲ ἀγάθῳ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ λόγου, ἐκ δὲ καὶ κοίτης ἐφίμηται καὶ τῶν καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἐνεργεῖαι, ὡς ἢ νοὺς ἢν εἶπ τὸ ἐφίτον, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀγάθῳ καὶ ἀπὸ ἐνεργείας καὶ ἐκ ἠγάθῳ ἐπεικεὶ καὶ ἡ ἴσων ἔστως.

21. Τό εἴπει τοῦτοι τοιεὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐκαστον; ὡς τοῖς τετομήτοις εἶναι μὲν τῶν νοῦν καὶ τὴν ζωὴν ἐκαστῆς ἀγαθολογίας, ἐφαίνει δὲ εἶναι καὶ ταῖς τοις διὰ τῆς ἄγαθον ἐκαστῆς ἀγαθολογίας βούλημα τῇ ἡ μὲν τάγαθον ἐνεργείας, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐκ τάγαθον ἐνεργείαις, τὸν δὲ ἤδη ὁραθείσαν ἐνεργείαις. εἰναι δὲ
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are pursued by the soul because it comes from them and again is directed to them; as akin then, but not so good; but since they are in the form of good, not to be rejected for this reason. For what is akin to one, if it is not good, is indeed akin, but one avoids it; since [if it was otherwise] other things also which are far off and deep below might move one to desire. But there comes to be the intense kind of love for them not when they are what they are but when, being already what they are, they receive something else from there beyond. For just as with bodies, though light is mixed into them, all the same there is need of another light for the light, the colour, in them to appear, so with the things there in the intelligible, though they possess much light, there is need of another greater light that they may be seen both by themselves and by another.

22. When anyone, therefore, sees this light, then truly he is also moved to the Forms, and longs for the light which plays upon them and delights in it, just as with the bodies here below our desire is not for the underlying material things but for the beauty imaged upon them. For each is what it is by itself, but it becomes desirable when the Good colours it, giving a kind of grace to them and passionate love to the desirers. Then the soul, receiving into itself an outflow from thence, is moved and dances wildly and

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is all stung with longing and becomes love. Before this it is not moved, even towards Intellect, for all its beauty; the beauty of Intellect is inactive till it catches a light from the Good, and the soul by itself "falls flat on its back" and is completely inactive and, though Intellect is present, it is unenthusiastic about it. But when a kind of warmth from thence comes upon it, it gains strength and waxes and is truly winged; and though it is moved with passion for that which lies close by, yet all the same it rises higher, to something greater which it seems to remember. And as long as there is anything higher than that which is present to it, it naturally goes on upwards, lifted by the giver of its love. It rises above Intellect, but cannot run on above the Good, for there is nothing above. But if it remains in Intellect it sees fair and noble things, but has not yet quite grasped what it is seeking. It is as if it was in the presence of a face which is certainly beautiful, but cannot catch the eye because it has no grace playing upon its beauty. So here below also beauty is what illuminates good proportions rather than the good proportions themselves, and this is what is lovable. For why is there more light of beauty on a living face, but only a trace of it on a dead one, even if its the light which comes from beyond them, from the Good. On the significance of this chapter and its relationship to some equally startling remarks on the beauty of the World of Forms in V. 5. 12 see my "Beauty and the Discovery of Divinity in the Thought of Plotinus" (Platonism and Christian Studies XIX).

1 Plotinus in this chapter is, as an often, inspired by the myth in Plato's Phaedrus 246A E. He refers here particularly to the description of the soul in love in 21.16.

2 This is the clearest statement by Plotinus of something implicit in his whole system, that our desire to return to the Good is given by the Good.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

τοῖς σωρεῖ καὶ τοῖς συμμετρίσι μεμπαραμένης καὶ
30 τῶν ὁγαλμάτων δεῖ τὰ ξυστικότερα καλλίως, καὶ συμμετρότερα τὰ ἔτερα ἢ, καὶ αἰσχρῶς ξών καλλίως τοῦ ἐν ὁγάλματι καλλοῦ; ἢ δὴ τοῦ ἱφτενον μᾶλλον τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι φυσικὴ ἔχει τοῦτο δ' ὅτι ἀναγκασθείσην τοῦτο δ' ἢ ὅτι ἀγαθοῦ ἀμείκτῃ φωτὶ κέρασται καὶ χρωσθέα
35 ἐγνήεται καὶ ἀνακουφίσται καὶ ἀνακούνθει τ' ἔχει, καὶ ὁσοὶ ἡν τε αὐτῶ ἀγαθοποιεῖ ἀυτὸ καὶ ἐγνήει.

23. Ἡκεὶ δὴ, ὅ φυσικὴ διώκει, καὶ ὃ νῦν φύσει παρέχει καὶ ἐμπεσθον αὐτῶν ἔρην κοιν, ὅποιοι δει δαιμόζων, εἰ τοιαύτῃ δύναμιν ἔχει ὅλον πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ ἀνακαλοῦμεν ἐκ πάσης πλάνης, ἢ να πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀναπαύσασθος, εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ τά πάντα, οὐδὲν ἐστὶν κρείστων αὐτοῦ, ἐλάττων δὲ πάντα τοῦ ἢ ἀκούσων τῶν ἀντίων ὅποι ὅτι ἀγαθᾶν ἐστιν καὶ μὴν εἰ δεὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φωνὴν ἀνακεκρηκτᾶται τι εἰναι αὐτῇ καὶ ἀνεφεξῃ ἄλλου ὧσείν παντὶ, τίνα ἂν ἄλλην ἢ ταύτην οὐδὲν ἔχοι πεσε ἢ, ἢ πρὸ τῶν ἀλλων ἢ ὧς ἢ ὧς, ὅτε μιθὲ κακία
40 εἰρθοι τοίς, ἢ πρὸ τῶν ἀλλων ἢ ὧς ἢ, ὅτε μιθὲ κακία πην ἢ, εἰ δὲ τὰ κακά ἔστερον εἰ τοῖς μηδὲ καθ' ἐν τούτων μετειπαθή καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις καὶ οὐδέν ἐπέκειται τῶν κακῶν πρὸς τὸ χείρον, ἐναντίως ἂν ἔχω τὰ κακὰ πρὸς αὐτὸ οὐδὲν ἔχων μὲνοι τοῖς ἐναντίωσιν. τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ταύτην ἢ εἰρθὲ ἢ γὰρ ὧς
50 ἐστὶν ἄλως ἀγαθὸν, ἢ, εἰ ἀνάγκης εἴη καὶ τοῦτο ἢ καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο εἰρθ. εἰ δ' τις λέγει σο φύν ὧς, οὐδὲ κακῶν ἢ αὐτὸ.

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flesh and its proportions are not yet wasted away. And are not the more lifelike statues the more beautiful ones, even if the others are better proportioned? And is not an uglier living man more beautiful than the beautiful man in a statue? Yes, because the living is more desirable; and this is because it has soul; and this is because it has more the form of good; and this means that it is somehow coloured by the light of the Good, and being so coloured wakes and rises up and lifts up that which belongs to it, and as far as it can makes it good and wakes it.

23. There, surely, one need not wonder if that which the soul pursues and which gives light to intellect and in falling upon it stirs a trace of itself has so great a power, and draws to itself and calls back from all wandering to rest beside it. For if there is something from which all things come, there is nothing stronger than it, but all things are less than it. How can the best of realities possibly not be the Good? And furthermore, if the nature of the Good must be completely sufficient to itself and without need of anything else at all, what other nature than this could anyone find, which was what it was before the others, when there was not yet any badness? But if the evils come later, in things which do not participate in this Good in any way at all, and on the very last and lowest level, and there is nothing beyond the evils on the worse side, the evils would be opposed to it without any middle term for the opposition. This then would be the Good; for either there is no Good at all, or, if it is necessary that there is, it would be this and not something else. But if someone says that there is not, then there would be no evil either; so things would be by nature indifferent for
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our choice: but this is impossible. But what others call goods are referred to this, but it itself is referred to nothing. What then does it make, if it is like this? It made Intellect, it made life, and from Intellect the souls and all else that has a share in reason or intellect or life. Then, surely, what is "source and principle"1 of these, how could one say in what way and how greatly it is good? But what is it making now? Now as well it is keeping those things in being and making the thinking things think and the living things live, inspiring thought, inspiring life and, if something cannot live, existence.

24. But what does it make us? Either let us speak again of the light and say what that light is by which Intellect is illuminated and in which Soul has a part. Or else let us leave this till afterwards2 and, as is reasonable, deal first with the following difficulties. Is the Good good, and does it have that name, because it is desirable for another, and is it good for one because it is desirable for one, but because it is this for all we say that it is the Good? Now one might offer this as evidence that the Good exists, but surely the object of desire itself must have such a nature that it is right to call it this. And so its desire is desire because they receive something, or because they delight in it. And if they receive something, what is it? But if it is because of delight, why do they delight in this not in something else? And in this the question is certainly involved whether the good is so by kinship or by something else. And, indeed, the further question whether the good is altogether the good of another, or whether the good is good for

1 The phrase is taken from Phaedrus 245C9. But Plato uses it there of soul as "source and principle" of movement to all else.

2 Ch. 31 onwards.
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itself; or is whatever may be good not good for itself, but necessarily the good of another? And for what nature is it good? And is there any nature for which nothing is good? And we must not leave out the following remarks which some cantankerous person might make, 1 "Really, you people, why do you use this pompous language up and down and all around, saying life is good, and intellect is good, and something transcending these? For why should intellect be good? Or what good could the thinker of the Forms have as he contemplates each of them? If he takes a deceptive pleasure in them he might perhaps say intellect was good, and life, because it was pleasant; but if he is stuck in a pleasureless state, why should he say they are good? Is it because he exists? What then would he gain from existence? What difference would there be in existing or altogether not existing, unless one makes affection for oneself the reason for all this? In that case it would be this natural deception and the fear of dissolution which would account for the acceptance of the supposition of goods."

26. Plato, then, who mixes pleasure into the end-object and does not posit the good as simple or in intellect alone, as it is written in the Philebus, perhaps because he was aware of this difficulty was not inclined to place the good altogether in the pleasant—and in this he was right—nor did he think character have at least this in common, that the good of Intellect is not enough for them by itself.

1 Plotinus is rather more sympathetic than might be expected to this down-to-earth and anti-anthropocentric person. He gives him here a good, forcible statement of his case, and answers him seriously and carefully in ch. 29, where he indicates (lines 21-22) that he and this awkward

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that he ought to posit intellect which was without pleasure as the good, since he did not see what there was in it to move [as to desire it]. But perhaps it was not for this reason, but because he thought it right that the good, since it had such a nature in itself, should of necessity be delightful, and that the desired object must altogether hold delight for the one who is attaining or has attained it, that who does not have delight does not have good, and so that, if delight belongs to the desirer, it does not belong to the First; so that neither does the good. And this is not unreasonable; for Plato himself [here] was not looking for the First Good, but for our good, and since this is altogether different, there is for him a Good other than it; for it is deficient, and perhaps composite; this is why he says that the "solitary and alone" has nothing good in it, but is [the Good] in another, greater way. The Good, therefore, must be desirable, but must not be good by being desirable, but become desirable by being good. It is then so that the good for the last and lowest among beings is what lies before it, and there is a continuous ascent which gives that above a thing to be good for what is below it, on the assumption that the ascent never gets beyond relative proportion, but goes on for ever to greater good? But it will come to a stop at the ultimate, at that after which one cannot grasp anything higher, and this is the First and the really good and the Good in the strictest sense, and the cause also of the other goods. For form is the good for matter—for if it were conscious, it would welcome it—and soul for body—for without it it could receive form or be changed by it from its own evil nature. Cp. ch. 28 lines 1-12 and n. 1, p. 173.
Plotinus: Ennead VI. 7.

ei̇n ou̇s de̍n po̱ṟo̱mato-fw̱xh de̍n àṟe̍ṯh. ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἀνωτέρω νους καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἦν δὴ φαμεν πρότην φό̄σιν. καὶ δὴ καὶ τούτων ἐκαστὸν ποιεῖ τι εἰς τὰ ἄν ἀγαθὰ ἑστὶ, τὰ μὲν τὰέων καὶ κόσμων, τὰ δὲ ἤδη ξυ̊νή, τὰ δὲ φρονεῖν καὶ ζῆν εὖ, τὰ δὲ νῦν τὸ ἀγαθὸν, δὴ φαμεν καὶ εἰς τούτῳ ἥκειν, καὶ ὅτι ἐνέργεια ἐξ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὅτι καὶ νῦν διδωσὶ (τι) φῶς λει̊γ̱μενον; δὴ δὴ τί ποι̊ ἕστὶ, ὑστερον.

26. Καὶ δὴ τὸ πεθαίνοι αἰσθάνεσθαι παρ’ αὐτῶν, εἰ ἥκει αὐτῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, γινώσκει καὶ λέγει ἑ̊χειν. τὸ οὖν, εἰ ἦσσές τε δὲ ἄρα ἐναὶ ὁμοίων, καὶ οὔ ἦν ἦσσές τε δὲ τούτῳ ἐκαστῷ ἐν αὐτῷ ἥκει [ἀφ'] 5 ἦς ἦσσές τε δὲ ἦσσές τε καὶ οὔ ἦσσές τε. καὶ οὔ ἦσσές τε καὶ οὔ ἦσσές τε οὔ καὶ ἦσσές τε παρ’ ἄλλων τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ αὐτῶν ἡ δύσει, τὸ δὲ φαμεν ἐξοντι ἐξέφεσι τὴν διάλεξιν ἔγραψατι, ὑστερον καὶ τοῖς νεκροῖς γεγενημένοις οὐδένα παρὰ τῶν ζῶντων ἡ ἐπιμέλεια καὶ οὔ κάκωσι, τοῖς δὲ ἄνω τις πολύν οὔ τρῶν. οὗτος δὲ ἡ κακοῦσι, πιστεύουσι, ὅτι τὸν βλέπων τι γίνεται καὶ οἵτιντι ζῇ καὶ πεπληρώθησθαι αὐτῷ γίνεται καὶ ἐν ἐκαστίνῳ μὴν καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ἐξή, διὸ καὶ 10 δὲφυτεύουσιν ἀπὸ τὸ αἰόμεθα ταῦτα, ὅτι γὰρ ἀγαθὰ ταῦτα, ὅτι γὰρ, ὅ

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not exist or be preserved—and virtue for soul. And now, still higher, there is intellect, and above this what we call the first nature. And certainly each of these effects something for those of which they are the good, some arrangement and ordered beauty, some already life, and some thought and living well, but for Intellect the Good effects something, the Good which we maintain comes also to this, both because its active actuality comes from it and because now also it gives something called light: what this is, we shall see later.¹

26. And surely what has by itself the natural power to perceive, if the Good comes to it, has the power to know and to say that it has it. Well then, what if it is deceived? There must then be some likeness to the Good which accounts for the deception. But if there is this, that would be the good for it: since also, when that [Good] comes, it leaves that which was the origin of its deception. And each and every thing’s desire and birth-pangs of longing bear witness that there is some good for each. For to things without soul the gift of the good comes from another, but for that which has soul it is the desire which brings about the pursuit, just as when bodies have become corpses they are tended and prepared for burial by the living, but the living take thought for themselves. But the attainment is confirmed when a thing becomes better and has no regrets, and fulfillment comes to it and it remains with the Good and does not seek something else. This is why pleasure is not self sufficient; for one is not satisfied with the same thing; for what pleasure is satisfied with

¹ Ch. 32 ff.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

Again is not the same; for that which gives one pleasure is always something else. Certainly the good which one chooses must be something which is not the feeling one has when one attains it; that is why the one who takes this for good remains empty, because he only has the feeling which one might get from the good. This is the reason why one would not find acceptable the feeling produced by something one has not got; for instance, one would not delight in a boy because he was present when he was not present; nor do I think that those who find the good in bodily satisfaction would feel pleasure as if they were eating when they were not eating or as if they were enjoying sex when they were not with the one they wanted to be with, or in general when they were not alive.

27. 'Alla tòn, genomènous ékasths to úntí prosphóron enhe; èi eidos tov phìsìs kai gýr ò òn, µé eidos, kai òn òn òn òn. Allá to eidos tóutò àrti ge to oikieión èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi èi
PLOTinus: NEEnad VI. 7.

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higher than it, that is its good. And matter is the
needless of all, and the last and lowest form is next to
it; for it comes after it in the upward direction. But
even if a thing is a good for itself, its perfection end
its form and what is higher than it would much more be
a good, both because it is such by its own nature
and again because it makes the thing good. But why
will anything be a good for itself? Is it because it is
the most akin to itself? No, but because it is a part
of good. This is why those who are pure and more good
have a closer kinship with themselves. It is therefore
absurd to enquire why a thing which is good is good
for itself, as if it would have as regards itself to get
out of its own nature and not be content with itself
as good. But when something is simple we must
consider this question, whether, where in no way
there is in it one part and another, there is kinship
to itself, and if it is a good for itself. But now, if these
conclusions are correct, the movement upwards
grasps the good present in a particular nature, and it
is not the desire which makes the good but there is
desire because there is a good, and something comes
to those who possess it, and also pleasure in the
possession. But we must also enquire into the saying
"even if pleasure did not follow, the good should be
chosen."

28. Now we must look at what follows from the
discussion. For if everywhere what comes as a good
is form, and one single form is the good for matter,
would matter wish, if it had the power of wishing, to
come only form? But if so, it will wish to perish;

1 A paraphrase of Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics K 3.
1174a6-8. Plotinus discusses this in ch. 29.
but everything seeks what will be good for itself. But perhaps it will not seek to be matter, but to be, and in possessing this to let its evil go. But how can evil have a desire of the good? But we did not assume that matter was desirous, but our argument framed a hypothesis by giving it perception—if it was possible to give it and still keep it as matter; but we assumed that when form came upon it, like a good dream, it came to be in a fairer order. If then matter is [absolute] evil, enough has been said; but if it is something else, badness for instance, if its essential being acquired perception, will what is akin to it on the higher side still be the good? Now it was not [on this supposition] badness which chose, but what had become bad. But if its being and evil were one and the same, how can this choose the good? Well then, if evil acquired a perception of itself, would it be satisfied with itself? And how could what is not good be satisfactory? For we certainly did not identify the good with the kindred. And so much for that. But if form is everywhere the good, and the higher the ascent goes the more there is form—for soul is more form than the form of body, and one part of soul more form, and another very much more, and intellect more than soul—the Good would come to that which was opposed to matter, and, we may say, which was purified from it and had put it away, according to the capacity of each, and most to that which put away everything belonging to matter. And certainly the nature of the Good, which has escaped from all matter, or rather never in any way

1 This is Plotinus' own view; this passage is his amplification and correction of a possibly misleading general remark in ch. 25, lines 24–5; see n. 2 there, p. 165.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

μάλλον δὲ οὐδαμὴ οὐδεμιός πλησίον γενομένη, ἀναπεφυγεία ἂν εἰς εἰς τὴν ἀνείδος φύσιν, ἢ, ἢ, τὰ πρῶτον εἴδος. ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦτον ὑστερον.

29. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ἡπτοτο ἡμοιον τῷ ἀγαθῷ, γίνοιτο δὲ πρὸ τῆς ἡμοιον τῷ, δι' ἢ καὶ ἡ ἡμοιον, διὰ τὰ αὐξ ἀσπαστῶν; ἢ εἰπότος ἀσπαστῶν ἡμοιον ἡμοιον ἢ, εἰπότος εἴποτος.

ἀλλ' εἰ ὑπάρχει μὲν, ὑπάρχεις δὲ δυνάμεν μή δ σωφροσύνη εὑσαί, ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, παρόντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ αἰθήσεων ἔχων τὸ ἔχων οὐ γνώσεσαι, ὅτι, ὅ, τι καλάqει καὶ γνώσεσθαι καὶ μὴ καθεσθαι ἔρως μετά τὸ αὐτῶ ἔχων; ὃ μάλλον ἂν τῷ σωφροσύνης ὑπάρχει καὶ μάλλον τῷ μὴ ἕπεξει, δια τοῦτο τῷ πρῶτο, οὐ μόνον μὴν ἁπλοῖς ἡ καθής δεξίθως ἡδος. ἀλλ' καὶ τούτο καταφθάνει ἐσται τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα λοιπὰ προανακαθηρημένους καὶ ἐκείνου τὸν ἀντίττητον λόγον ἀπωσαμένωσιν, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἡμῖν <καίνα> οὐ ὄντες, ὃ ἐν ἐκατόμοι αὐτῶν ἔχων οὐδεὶς εἰς ἀγαθοῦ μορίαν, οὐδὲν πληρόμενοι, ὅτεν ταῦτα ἄκομα, τῷ μὴ σύνει συνεισκόντων

10 ἔχων, ἢ, ἄνυμα ἀκόμα ή, ἄλλο τοῦ ἐκατομμύριων ὑπολογισμῶν ἢ αἰθήσεαν τῆς ἡμέραν καὶ τὸ ἠγαθὸν ἐν χρήματι ἢ, τῶν τούτων τις εἰδικῶς, πρὸς ὅν λεκτένοι,

1 Harder: ςο. 2. Thesiger

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at all come near it, will have escaped up into the formless nature from which the first form comes. But we shall speak of this later.\(^1\)

29. But if pleasure does not follow upon the Good, but there comes to be something before pleasure through which there is also pleasure, why is it not to be welcomed? Now in saying “to be welcomed” we have already said “pleasure”. But suppose that it exists but, though it exists, there is a possibility of its not being welcome. But if this is so, when the Good is present, what has it, though it has a perception of it, will not know it is there. Or what is to prevent it from knowing and not being moved in any other way going beyond the actual possession? This would be more likely to happen to a more self-controlled person, and more likely if he was without need. This is why the First has no pleasure, not only because it is simple but also because it is the acquisition of something needed which is pleasant. But this will be luminously clear when we have first cleared up all the remaining difficulties and repelled that opposing argument. This argument is that of someone\(^2\) who has a difficulty about what a man with intelligence would get out of it in the way of good, being in no way disconcerted when he hears these arguments of ours because he does not know what they mean; he either hears only the words or understands each thing [spoken of] differently or is looking for something perceptible [by the senses] and locating the Good in property or something of the sort. One must

\(^1\) In chs. 32 and 33.

\(^2\) This is the objector who states his position forcibly in ch. 24: see n. 1, p. 162.
say to him that when he despises those things he admits that he does posit some good for himself, but, since he finds it difficult to see how [the Good is good], he fits these things to his own idea of it. For it is not possible to say "not this" if one has no experience or conception of "this". But perhaps also he has a prophetic intuition of what is above Intellect. But then, if when he applies his mind to the Good or that which is near it he does not recognise them, let him come to some idea of them from the things opposed to them. Or will he not even regard unintelligence as evil? Yet everyone prefers to be intelligent and is proud of himself when he uses his intelligence. And our sense-perceptions bear witness to this when they want to be knowings. But if intellect is honourable and beautiful, and above all the first Intellect, as what would one image, if one could, this Intellect's generator and father? But if [our opponent] despises existence and life, he brings evidence against himself and all his own experiences. But if anyone is dissatisfied with life with which death is mixed, it is this kind of life he is dissatisfied with, not true life.

30. But whether pleasure must be mixed with the good and life is not perfect, if someone contemplates the divine things and above all their principle, is a question which it is in every way appropriate to keep in sight now that we are getting into touch with the Good. Well then, to think that the good consists of Intellect as underlying reality and of the experience of the soul which comes from thinking does not belong to one who posits the composite of both as the goal or the Good itself, but Intellect would be the Good, and ourselves in the enjoyment of possessing...
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

the Good. And this would be one opinion about good. But there would be another contrary to this, which mixes pleasure with intellect as one thing made from both and posits this as the underlying reality, so that we, by possessing, or even seeing, this kind of intellect may possess the Good, for what is "isolated and single"? I could not come to be or to be chosen as the Good. How then could intellect be mixed with pleasure into one composite perfection of nature? Well, it is, I suppose, clear to everyone that nobody would think that bodily pleasure could possibly be mixed with intellect; but neither could all the irrational joys of the soul which may occur. But, since a sort of something extra and external must follow upon and accompany every activity and disposition and life, in so far as to one of them going its natural way there will be a hindrance and something of its opposite mixed into it, which does not allow the life to be independent, and it will have its activity "pure and unmixed" and its life will be a state of luminous clarity, the philosophers, assuming that such a state of intellect is most pleasing and acceptable, say that it is mixed with pleasure because they cannot find an appropriate way of speaking about it; this is what the other words which we are fond of do metaphorically, like "drunk with the nectar" and "to feast and entertainment," and what the poets say, "the father smiled," and thousands and

1 Again Philebus 63D7-8, but here in a more appropriate context (see ch. 25, n. 1, p. 164). In this chapter Plotinus is concerned to explain and justify Plato's doctrine in the Philebus that the good life must be a mixture of pleasure and intelligence, taking account also of Aristotle's discussion of pleasure in Nicomachean Ethics K 1-5. 1172a-1176a.

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Plato's Phaedrus 247A5 (with etainos for heous).

A formula-phrase from Homer (not very appropriate in this context): Iliad 5. 426; 15. 47.
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thousands of others. For there in the realm of Intellect is true delight and the greatest satisfaction, the most loved and longed for, which is not in process of becoming nor in movement, but its cause is what colours and shines upon and glorifies the intelligibles. This is why Plato adds truth to the mixture, and puts what measures it before it, and says that from there the good proportion and beauty in the mixture come to the beautiful. So we should be according to this and have our parts in it; but in another way what is really worth aspiring to for us is our science, bringing themselves back for themselves to the best of themselves; this is the well-proportioned and beautiful and the form which is not part of the composite and the clear, intelligent, beautiful life.

31. But since all things were made beautiful by that which was before them and held its light. Intellect held the resplendence of its intelligent activity, with which it illuminated its nature, and soul held power to live, since a greater life came to it. So Intellect was raised to that height and stayed there, happy in being around that Good; but the soul also which was able turned to it and, when it knew and saw, rejoiced in the vision and, in so far as it was able to see, was utterly amazed. It saw, as if in utter amazement, and, since it held something of it in itself, it had an intimate awareness of it and came into a state of longing, like those who are moved by an image of the loved one to wish to see that same beloved. And just as here below those who are in love shape themselves to the likeness of the beloved, and make their bodies handsomer and bring their souls into likeness, since as far as they can they do
PLOTinus: ENNEAD VI. 7.

15 τοι ορωμένοι συγκορύση τε και ἄρετή τῇ ἐλλα—ἡ ἀπάθεια τοι τοις ἐρωμένοις τοῖς τοιούτοις—καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰσὶν οἱ ὑστερούντος, τοῖς τὸν τρόπον καὶ φύση ἐφ’ ἐκείνην ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τὸ ἔρως κυμήθησαν. καὶ ἡ πρόοδος ἔχουσα τὸν ἔρωτα ὑπόκειται.

20 μενειν ὅτι θυμεῖται ἐκ τῶν καλλίων τῶν τίθεν, ἐχουσα δὲ τὸν ἐρωτα, καὶ ἂν ἐγνω τῇ ἐχεῖ, ζητεῖ αὐτό καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον φέρεσθαι θέλοντα ἐπερημάτων τῶν τῆς ἐχει, καὶ ἴσας τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐς τἈνακτίνα καὶ ὅπως ἐκεῖνο πρὸς αὐτά, ὅτι ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ σῶμα ἄρα αὐτά ὅπως καὶ μιμοῦσα τῇ παροῦσῃ οἴκηται καὶ τοῖς μεγάλοις.

25 διευλυμένα καὶ οὐκ αὐτὰ τὰ καλά ὡς μὴ γὰρ ἄν τιλαμβάνειν ἐκεῖνα οἷα ἐστὶν εἰς βόρβορον σωμάτων ἐμβήκαν καὶ μιμότα: ἐνατά καὶ ἀπαντάτα ὅταν δὲ καὶ παραρέχοντα ἤδε, ἢ ἢ παντελῶς γενόμενος, ὅτι ἔλαβαν ἐχει, δὴ αὐτοῖς ἐπέθελον. εἰς ἐκεῖ φέρεται δεινὴ

30 ἀθικοῖς οἴποτε ἐρὰ γὰρ τὸν καὶ οὐκ ἐν πρὸς ἐποιεῖται, εἰς μὴ χωρὶς τοῖς ἐκείνοις ἐζητεῖν ἦνα ὅτι εἰς μὲν καλά τῶν καὶ ἀληθῶς διότα, καὶ ἐπερημάτων πλῆθος τῶν τῆς ἐκείνος ἐπερημάτως, καὶ δύο: ὅταν καὶ ἄκτος γενόμενοι καὶ οὐκέπτες ὅτας λαβοῦσα ἐγγὺς πάνω ὑπάρχει καὶ οἰκῆται αὐτῶν ἐκείνων.

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not want to fall short of the integrity and all the other excellence of the loved one—if they did they would be rejected by loved ones like these—and these are the lovers who are able to intercourse1; in this way the soul also loves that Good, moved by it to love from the beginning. And the soul which has its love ready to hand does not wait for a reminder from the beauties here, but because it has its love, even if it does not know that it has it,2 it is always searching and in its wish to be borne away to that Good has a contempt for the things here, and when it sees the beauties of this world it distrusts them, because it sees that they are in bodies of flesh and polluted by their present dwelling and disintegrated by magnitudes and are not the true beautiful things themselves; for those, being as they are, would never bring themselves to enter the mud of bodies and dirty themselves and disappear. But when it sees the beauties here flowing past it, it already knows completely that they have the light which plays on them from elsewhere. And then it is borne away there, skilled in finding what it loves, and not leaving off till it catches it, unless someone were to take even its love away. There certainly it sees that all things are beautiful and true and gains greater strength, since it is filled with the life of real being; and has become truly real itself also, and has true awareness, and it perceives that it is near to what it has long been seeking.

1 Plotinus is thinking of the philosophic lovers in Phaedrus 250-267. But here, as in I. 8. 9, it is himself, not as in Plato the beloved, whom the lover shapes to the divine likeness: this of course suits the present context considerably better.

2 Here, as in V. 5. 12, the unperceived presence and unconscious love of the Good are prior to the conscious recollection of the beauty of the World of Forms aroused by the beauties here.
PLATONUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

32. Πού οὖν ὁ ποιήσας τὸ τοσοῦτον κάλλος καὶ τὴν τοσαῦταν ἐννέα καὶ γεννήσας σώσις; ὄρθος οὖν ὁ αὐτὸς ἦσσα, οὐκέτας οὖν εἶδος κάλλος. καλῶν μὲν ὁδικῶν μένει, ἀλλ' ἐν καλῶ ὅστα δεῖ βλέπειν, ὅθεν ταῦτα καὶ 5 ὅθεν καλά. δεῖ δ' ἀεὶ εἰπεῖν τούτων μηδέ ἐν τί γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐστιν μέρος τε ἐστιν. ὦτι τούτων ὁμοίως ἡ μορφὴ μου ἐν τῷ δύναμις οὐδ' αὐτὸ πάσας αἱ γεγενημέναι καὶ ὅσις ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ὑπὲρ πάσας εἶναι δυνατῆς καὶ ὑπὲρ πάσας μορφῶν. ἀρχὴ δὲ τὸ ἀμαθεῖον, οὐ τὸ 10 μορφῆς δεδομένων, ἀλλ' ἄφ' οὐ πάσας μορφῆς νοστρά. τὸ γὰρ γεγένημεν, εἰπὲν ἐγώ, ἐξεῖδεν γενεσθαι τι καὶ μορφῆς ἑαυτῷ ἐκεῖν ἐσχῆν ὁ δὲ μηδείς ἐποίησε, τις ὁ ποιητής το arcpy τῶν ὁμοίων καὶ πάντα ὁδικῶν μὲν, ὥστε ὁποῖα τὰ ὅστα, πάντα δὲ, ὥστε οὐκ' αὐτοῦ, πάντα 15 δὲ παρθεὶν δυνάμενον τι ἐν μέγαθεν ἦσθι; ὃ ἄσειρος ἦν ἐνι, ἀλλ' ὁ ἄσειρος, μέγαθος οὖν ἦν οὕτως καὶ γὰρ μέγαθος ἐν τούτο ὑπάτως καὶ δεῖ, εἴ καὶ τούτῳ ποιήσεις, αὐτὸς μὴ ἦκεν, τὸ τέ της ὁμοίας μὲν, τοῦ νοοῦν ἦκεν δ' ἐν καὶ ἀλλ' τι μετ' αὐτῶν τὸ μέγαθος. τὸ δὲ μέγα αὐτοῦ 20 το μηδέν αὐτοῦ εἶναι δυνατὸτερόν περιοικοῦσα τῇ μηδέν δύνασθαι τον γὰρ τῶν αὐτοῦ ἐς οὖν ὅτι ἐδόθη μηδέν ταύτων ἔχων, τὸ τε ἐς ἄπλι καὶ ἐς πάντα ὑπὸ μέρος.

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32. Where then is he who made the beauty which is so great and the life which is so great, he who is the generator of substance? You see the beauty which rests upon the very Forms, all of them richly varied. It is beautiful to abide here; but when one is in beauty one must look to see whence these Forms come and whence they derive their beauty. But this itself must not be any one of them; for then it will be one of them and will be a part. Nor, then, can it be a shape of any kind or an individual power, nor again all those which have come to be and exist here above, but it must be above all powers and above all shapes. The principle is the formless, not that which needs form, but that from which every intelligent form comes. For what came to be, if it did come to be, came to be something and had its own particular shape; but who could have made what no one made anything? Therefore it is none of these things and all of them: none of them because the real beings are later, but all of them because they come from it. But what size could that have which has the power to make all? Now he would be unbounded, but if unbounded he would have no size. For there is size in the last and lowest things; and, even if he makes size, he himself must not have it. And the greatness of substance is not quantitative, but something else posterior to him might also have size. But his greatness is that nothing can be more powerful than him and nothing can be compared with him; for to what that belongs to him could anything come to equality which has nothing the same? And being for ever and

passage he is speaking as one who is already in the World of Forms and seeking to go beyond it.

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1 Plotinus normally uses ἐνι (there) for the World of Forms and ἐναέθε (there) for the material world. But in this
PLOTinus: ENNEAD VI. 7.

for all things gives him no measure—nor on the other hand measurelessness: for if he was measureless] how could he measure the others? Nor again has he form either. Truly, when you cannot grasp the form or shape of what is longed for, it would be most longed for and most lovable, and love for it would be immensurable. For love is not limited here, because neither is the beloved, but the love of this would be unbounded; so his beauty is of another kind and beauty above beauty. For if it is nothing, what beauty can it be? But if it is lovable, it would be the generator of beauty. Therefore the productive power of all is the flower of beauty, a beauty which makes beauty. For it generates beauty and makes it more beautiful by the excess of beauty which comes from it, so that it is the principle of beauty and the term of beauty. But since it is the principle of beauty it makes that beautiful of which it is the principle, and makes it beautiful not in shape; but it makes the very beauty which comes to be from it to be shapeless, but in shape in another way; for what is called this very thing [, shape,] is shape in another, but by itself shapeless. Therefore that which participates in beauty is shaped, not the beauty.

33. Therefore, even when it is called beauty, one must even more avoid shape of this kind; but it must not be set before the eyes, that you may not fall cut of beauty into what is called beauty by obscure participation. But the shapeless form is beautiful, since it is form, and is so in proportion to the length you go in stripping all shape from it, the shape in reasoning, for instance, by which we say that one form differs from another, as we say that righteousness and integrity are different from each other,
although they are beautiful. When the intellect thinks one particular thing, it is dimished, as it is also even if it takes together all things that are in the intelligible realm; if it thinks an individual, it has one intelligible shape; if it thinks all together it has a kind of variegated shape, still in need [and trying to discover] how it should contemplate that which is above that which is all-beautiful and variegated and not variegated; that which the soul desires without saying why it longs for something like this, but our reasoning says that this is the real thing, since the nature of the best and the nature of the most lovable is in the altogether formless. Therefore, whatever you bring into form and show to the soul, it seeks something else over it which gave it shape. Our reasoning insists that what has shape, and shape, and form, all this, is measured and limited, that is, it is not all or self-sufficient or beautiful of itself, but this too is mixed. These beautiful things, then, must be measured and limited, but not the really beautiful or rather the super-beautiful; but if this is so, it must not be shaped or be a form. The primarily beautiful, then, and the first is without form, and beauty is that, the nature of the Good. The experience of lovers bears witness to this, that, as long as it is in that which has the impression perceived by the senses, the lover is not yet in love; but when from that he himself generates in himself an impression not perceptible by the senses in his pureless soul, then love springs up. But he seeks to see the beloved that he may water him when he is withering."

1 An allusion to Phaedrus 251B1-4.
come to understand that one must change to that which is more formless, he would desire that; for his experience from the beginning was love of a great light from a dim glimmer. For the trace of the shapeless is shape: it is this which generates shape, not shape this, and it generates it when matter comes to it. But matter is necessarily furthest from it, because it does not have of itself any one even of the last and lowest shapes. If then what is lovable is not the matter, but what is formed by the form, and the form upon the matter comes from soul, and soul is more form and more lovable, and intellect is more form than soul and still more lovable, one must assume that the first nature of beauty is formless.

And we shall no longer be surprised if that which produces these strangely powerful longings is altogether free from even intelligible shape; since the soul also, when it gets an intense love of it, puts away all the shape which it has, even whatever shape of the intelligible there may be in it. For it is not possible for one who has anything else and is actively occupied about it to see or to be fitted in. But one must not have evil, or any other good either, ready to hand, that the soul alone may receive it alone. But when the soul has good fortune with it, and it comes to it, or rather, being there already, appears, when that soul turns away from the things that are there, and has prepared by making itself as beautiful as possible and has come to likeness (the preparation and the adornment are clearly understood, I think, by those who are preparing themselves) and it sees it in itself suddenly appearing (for there is nothing between, nor are there still two but
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

οὐ γὰρ ἐν διακρίσεις ἦτι, ἐκεί, ὡς πάρεστι μέμειος δὲ
15 τοῦτο καὶ οἱ ἰσοταιχία ἐρασταὶ καὶ ἐρμαντοῖ τυχόντες), καὶ οὕτως πάματος ἦτι αἰσθάνεται, ὅτι ἐστὶν
ἐν αὐτῷ, ὅτε ἐστὶν ἄλλο τί λέγει, οὐκ οὖν ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ
ξῦνοι, οὐκ ὃν, οὐδὲ πάν (ἀνάμωμοι γάρ ἡ τούτων ποι
άν), ναοὶ δὲ σχολέον εἶχεν πρὸς αὐτὰ ὑπερθηκεί, ἐκάκο
20 καὶ εὔτος ἐρασισμὸς ἐκεῖνο πιστίντε ἱπποτὰ κάκισκον
ἀντ' αὐτής βλέπει: τίς, δὲ οὔτα βλέπει, οὐδὲ τοῦτο
σχολάζει ὑπάρχει, ἢ θαυμάζει οὐδὲ πάντων ἀντὶ τοῦτο
ἀλλάζει, οὐδὲ εἰ τε αὐτή πάντα τού ὁπρακόν
ἐπιτρέπει, φίλος εἶκεν ὑπάρχει οὐδὲ ἐμπέρνον, οὐδὲ
μᾶλλον ἐγκυροῦ ὑπάρχει σχολάζει τα τε ἄλλα
25 πάντα σχολάζει, καὶ ἐπειδὴ Ἠδόμενος, ὅτι τοῦτο ἐστιν ὁ
ἐφύτη, καὶ τίθεσθαι, καὶ μὴ οἰκοσύνη, οὕτως ἐστιν
ἄλλα ἐστιν ἄπαντα ἐκεῖ ἢ πάν ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ
ἀληθινῶν τούτων, ἢ οὐδὲ ἐγκυροῦ, ἢ εὐτούς ἢ ἐστιν, καὶ ἐτερον
30 λέγει, καὶ σωματικά δὲ λέγει, καὶ, εἰπεῖν, οὔτε
ῥητικά καὶ ἐπιτρέπον, οὔτε λέγει ὅτι ἐπηρεάζεται οὐδὲ
γαρπολείμμος λέγει τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο γενομένο, ὅ πάλιν, οὐκ ἐπεισόδιν ἐποίησεν ἡ
ἀλλὰ καὶ οὐδὲ πάντα, ὅπως ἐπιθετοῦσαν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτο
35 λέγει, καὶ σωματικά λέγει, καὶ εἰπεῖν, οὔτε
ῥητικά καὶ ἐπιτρέπειν, οὔτε λέγει τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο γενομένο, ὅ πάλιν, οὐκ ἐπεισόδιν ἡ
ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτο ὅπως ἐπιθετοῦσαν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτο
éseis μὴ κρίνεται,

1 "There is nothing between" is said of Intellect and Soul in IV. 4. 2. 37-38, and, more unexpectedly, of Intellect and the material universe at V. 3. 7. 13. ἐν ἄλλω is always used by Plotinus of a perfect union in which the two united

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both are one; nor could you still make a distinction while it is present; lovers and their beloveds here below; imitate this in their will to be united), it does not still perceive its body, that it is in it, and does not speak of itself as anything else, not man, or living thing, or being, or all (for the contemplation of these would be somehow disturbing), and it has no time for them nor wants them, but it has been seeking it, and meets that when it is present, and looks at that instead of itself; but it has not even time to see who the soul is that looks. There, truly, it would not exchange this for anything in the world, not even if someone handed over the whole universe to it, because there is nothing still better, and nothing that is more a good; for it does not run up higher, and all the other things are on its way down, even if they are in the realm above. So then it has the ability to judge rightly and to know that this is what it desired, and to establish that there is nothing better than it. For there is no deceit there; or where could it find any thing truer than the truth? What it speaks, then, is that, and it speaks it afterwards, and speaks it in silence, and in its happiness is not cheated in thinking that it is happy, and it does not say it is happy when the body tickles it, but when it has become that which it was before, when it is fortunate. But it says it in contempt of all the other things in which it delighted before, offices or powers or riches or beauties or sciences, and it would not have spoken if it had not met better things than

retain their distinct natures. See Lexicon Plotinianum s.v. ζάρη (b). Its use in IV. 4. 2. 39, ἐν ἄλλω ἐπιθετοῦσαν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, brings out its meaning clearly.
PLATO'S ENNEAD VI. 7.

35. συντενχούσα τούτων οὐδὲ φοβεῖται, μὴ τι πάθη, μετ' ἐκείνου οὖσα οὐδὲ ἔλεος ἢδονα· εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ περὶ αὐτῆς φθείροι, ἐν μαλά καὶ βολεῖται, ἢν πρὸς τούτῳ ἢ μάλιστα εἰς τόσον ἦμει εὐπαθεῖαι.

35. Oūc δὲ διάκειται τότε, ὡς καὶ τοῦ νοείν καταφρένειν, ὁ τῶν ἄλλων χρόνων ἡσυχάζει, οὐκ ἂν τοις κόιναῖς τις ἦν, αὐτὴ δὲ οὐ κυιεῖθαι θέλει. καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' ἐκείνων φήσαι, ὥσπερ καὶ τοὺς γενόμενος αὐτῇ.

5 ἔθεσται οὖν τοιαύτα καὶ ἄν τι ἔστω τις ὄντα τὸν θεόν, πάντα θηλήν ἢδίκης, εἶναι τις ἐπιστολῆς εἰς παῦν θνοῦντα καὶ οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἔθεσιν ἐκείνου ἐκατά τῶν πνευμάτων καὶ θεικίμια, πρὸς ἔστω τοὺς τών ἀκούσ.

10 δεσπότης, ἰδὼν δ' ἐκείνου καὶ ἄγονθετι οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἀναγνώσεων φύσιν ὡστα, ἀλλ' ἄξιον τῆς ὁποίας θείας, ἐφεξή ἐκείνου τούτου μόνον τοῦ λοιποῦ βλέποι, εἶτα βλέπων καὶ μὴ ἀφαίρειν τὸ ὄραμα μηκέτι ὀνομα βλέπων τῷ συνεισέχῃ τῆς θείας, ἀλλ' τῆς ἰδίας ἀτυχοῦ.

15 συγκεκράσατο τῷ θεμάτι, ὡστε ἐν αὐτῷ ἢδὴ τὸ ὄρατον πρότερον ὡς ἔγνωσθεν. τῶν δ' ἄλλων πάντων ἐπιλείποντο θεωρήματα. καὶ τάχα ἂν σαῦξε τὰ ἀναλογοῦν ἡ ἲκὼν, εἰ μὴ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ὁ πιστεύει τῷ τῶν ἀκούσ θεωρήματο, ἀλλὰ τῆς θείας, καὶ οὕτως οὐ κατ' ὄνων φανερώσει.

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1 The phrase "the intelligible place" here and in line 41 is taken from Plato's Republic (598C1 and 517B6).

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these; it is not afraid, either, that anything may happen to it, since it does not even see it while it is with that; but if all the other things about it perished, it would even be pleased, that it might be alone with this: so great a degree of happiness has it reached.

35. And the soul is so disposed then as even to despise intelligence, which at other times it welcomed, because intelligence is a kind of movement, and the soul does not want to move. For it says that he whom it sees does not move either; yet when this soul has become intellect it contemplates, when it has been, so to speak, made intellect and has come to be in the intelligible place; but when it has come to be in it and moves about it, it possesses the intelligible and thinks, but when it sees that god it at once lets everything go; it is as if someone went into a house richly decorated and so beautiful, and within it contemplated each and every one of the decorations and admired them before seeing the master of the house, but when he sees that master with delight, who is not of the nature of the images [in the house], but worthy of genuine contemplation, he dismisses these common things and thereafter looks at him alone, and then, as he looks and does not take his eyes away, by the continuity of his contemplation he no longer sees a sight, but mingles his seeing with what he contemplates, so that what was seen before has now become seen in him, and he forgets all other objects of contemplation. And perhaps the likeness would keep in conformity with the reality if it was not a mortal who encountered the one who was seeing the sights of the house but one of the gods, and one who did not appear visibly but
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filled the soul of the beholder. Intelect also, then, has one power for thinking, by which it looks at the things in itself, and one by which it looks at what transcends it by a direct awareness and reception, by which also before it saw only, and by seeing acquired intellect and is one. And that first one is the contemplation of Intelect in its right mind, and the other is Intelect in love, when it goes out of its mind “drunk with the nectar”; then it falls in love, simplified into happiness by having its fill, and it is better for it to be drunk with a drunkenness like this than to be more respectably sober. But does that Intelect see in part, at one time some things and at another others? No, but our rational discourse instructing us makes them come to be, but Intelect always has its thinking and always its not thinking, but looking at that god in another way. For when it saw him it had offspring and was intimately aware of their generation and existence within it; and when it sees these it is said to think, but it sees that by the power by which [later] it was going to think. But the soul sees by a kind of confusing and annulling the intellect which abides within it—but rather its intellect seems first and the vision comes also to fit and the two become one. But the Good is spread out over them and fitted in to the union of both; playing upon them and uniting the two it rests upon them and

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1 Plotinus may be thinking here particularly of possession by Apollo or Dionysus.
2 For this “pre-intellectual” vision of Intelect see III. 8, 9, 29-32; IV. 4, 2-4; V. 9, 11, 13; it is the first moment in Intelect’s eternal generation, its perfectly “intellectual” vision being the second.
3 Again the drunkenness of Poros from Plato Symposium 203B3; see ch. 30, n. 4, p. 179. The application of it to Intelect’s eternal self-transcendence in vision of and union with the One is strikingly powerful and paradoxical. Intelect must be eternally out of its mind with drink or love to be the Divine Mind.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

gives them a blessed perception and vision, lifting them so high that they are not in place nor in anything other, among things where it is natural for one thing to be in another: for he is not anywhere either; but the intelligible place is in him, but he is not in another. Therefore the soul does not move then either, because that does not move. Nor, then, is it soul, because that does not live, but is above life. Nor is it intellect, because that does not think either; for one must be made like. It does not even think that it does not think.

36. The rest, then, is clear, and something has been said also about this. But all the same, even now we must speak of it for a little, starting from that [experience] but proceeding by rational discourse. The knowledge of the Good is the greatest thing, and Plato says it is the "greatest study", not calling the looking at it a "study", but learning about it beforehand. We are taught about it by comparisons and negations and knowledge of the things which come from it and certain methods of ascent by degrees, but we are put on the way to it by purifications and virtues and adornments and by gaining footholds in the intelligible and settling ourselves firmly there and feasting on its contents. But whoever has become at once contemplator of himself and all the rest and object of his contemplation, and, since he has become substance and intellect and "the complete living being", no longer looks at it from outside—when he has become this he is near, and that Good is next above him, and already close.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

15 αὐτοῦ ἦν ἐπὶ παντὶ τῷ νοητῷ ἐπίστολον. ἔθαν δὲ εὐσάν
tις τὸν μάθημα, καὶ μέχρι του παπαγογήθηκει καὶ ἐν
cαλῷ ἠθικῆς, ἐν ὃ μὲν ἦστι, μέχρι τοῦτον νῦν,
εἰκόνισθαι δὲ τῷ αὐτῶν τοῦ τῶν οἷων κύρια καὶ οὕῳ
ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ οἶνον αἰσθάνοντας ἀρχέγοισεν εἰκόνισθαι ὡς

20 ἵπποι ὡς, ἀλλ’ ἡ θέα πλησίασα φαντάζοι τὰ ὀμάτα τοῦ δὲ
ἀυτοῦ παρατείνειν Ἑλεον ὁρᾶν, ἀλλ’ αὐτῷ τὸ φῶς τὸ ὄραμα
ἔμειν, τῷ γὰρ ἦν ἐκεῖνο τὸ μὲν ὀράματον, τὸ δὲ φῶς
ἀυτοῦ, αὐτὸ νοῦς καὶ νοεσθεῖον, ἀλλ’ αὐτὴν καὶ ἀνεθανάτην
ταῖς εἰς ὑπόστασιν καὶ ἀνεθανάτην εἶναι πατρί αὐτῷ αὐτὸς δὲ
ἀυτὴ μόνον γεννώσα νοῦν, οὕτω σβέσασα αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ

25 γεννήσας, ἀκολουθεῖσα μὲν αὐτὴ, γεννηθὲν δ’ ἐκείνου
τῶν τούτων εἶναι, γὰρ μὴ τούτῳ τοιοῦτων ὄν, ὃν ἐκεῖ

37. Οἱ μὲν οὖν νόσησαν αὐτῷ δόσας τῷ λόγῳ τῶν μὲν
ἐλαττῶνοι καὶ τῶν ἐκ αὐτοῦ νῦν ἔσωσαν καὶ τοῦτο ἄντον τὰ ἄλλα,

5 αὐτῶν ἐπίστολον καὶ τοῦ νοεί κριτίσσανος καὶ ἀρτί
ἔσωσαν τοῦτον ὄν, ὡς ἐπιστὴν καὶ ἀρτί

10 ἐστὶν τέλειος καὶ οὐ τῇ νοσήσας τελείωσεν. Εἰ δὲ οὕτως

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by, shining upon all the intelligible world. It is there
that one lets all study go; up to a point one has been
led along and settled firmly in beauty and as far as
this one thinks that in which one is, but is carried
cut of it by the surge of the wave of Intellect itself
and lifted on high by a kind of swell and sees
suddenly, not seeing how, but the vision fills his eyes
with light and does not make him see something else
by it, but the light itself is what he sees. For there is
not in that Good something seen and its light, nor
intellect and object of intellect, but a ray which
generates these afterwards and lets them be beside
it; but he himself is the ray which only generates
Intellect and does not extinguish itself in the genera-
tion, but it itself abides, and that Intellect comes to
be because this Good exists. For if this was not of the
kind it is, that would not: have come into existence.

37. Those who in their reasoned account attribute
thinking to the Good do not attribute to him thinking
of the lesser things which derive from him: yet
some people do say that this is absurd, that he
should not know the other things; but, however that
may be, those [Peripatetics], since they did not find
anything of more worth than himself, attributed to
him thought of himself, on the supposition that he
would become more majestic by thinking and that
thinking was better than what he is in himself, but
that it was not he himself who conferred majesty on
thinking. For by what does he have his worth, by
thinking or by himself? If it is by thinking, he is in
himself of no worth or lesser worth, but if by himself
he is perfect before thinking and not perfected by

1 See Aristotle Metaphysics Α 1074b17–35.
thinking. But if he has to think because he is active actuality, but not potency, if he is a substance always thinking and it is because of this that they say he is active actuality, they are all the same speaking of two things, substance and thinking, and are not saying that he is simple, but adding something else to him, as actually seeing is an addition to the eyes, even if they are always looking. But if they say that he is actual because he is active actuality, that is, thought, if he was thought he would not think, just as movement is not in motion. "Well then, do you not yourselves say that those higher things are substance and active actuality?" Yes, but we agree that those are many, and being many are different, but the first is single and simple, and we attribute thinking to what comes from another, and a kind of seeking its substance and its self and what made it, and say that in turning back in its contemplation and recognising itself it is at that point rightly and properly Intellect; but that what has not come to be and has nothing before it, but is always what it is—what reason will it have to think? This is why Plato rightly says that it is above Intellect. Now Intellect, if it did not think, would be unintelligent: for if that whose nature includes thought did not think, it would be unintelligent; but when something has no work to do, why should one put a work to it and then predicate the absence of this work of it because it does not do it? It would be as if one were to call him unmedical. But he has no work to do because there is no obligation on him to do anything; for he is sufficient and does not have to

1 See ch. 35, n. 1, p. 184.
PLUTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

30 autós kai oúde déi heptícov par autón upér to pénta ósos arei gínar autós kai tois pléon óws autós déi estin.

38. Hoti de oúde tois "éxw" ómws vàr oúde tois. déoan óti esti tois "ágasbó éstas" kai tois tois, allá kai y oú de tois "éstas", to de "éstas", éwos oú y kat' allou allou, allá oímeno én tois. Légei hem de plíathos peripwóteres autóis légonentes óws autói oúde katagoróuntes, óti autós épargchet, allá óti autós éstas oúde tois "ágasbó én tois" légonentes oúde tois "tò" prósbléoun autóis, dén deo de oú dínámvei, ei tois autó pantaunes apólois, yn mì alló, to de alló poiosmen, yn mì deúthei. tois "éstas" éti, autói légonentes "tò "ágasbó én tois, allá tois paraðégetai, forws oíws odhíes "éi nh 1 aiasthein kai nynéste autós, tis oūn gnéastei, "égw émimi", allá oíws oidhi tis oūn oíws éreis tois "ágasbó émimi", to plíathos "éstas" katagorophesi autóis. allá tois "ágasbó én tois" éreis tois prosocheis "ágasbô" mén vàr nynéstei ois ois yòs tois "éstas", ei mì kata allou katagorophi de ab autóis tois odhíes 2 ówos oíws égwas pantaunes nynéstei tois "égw émim tois "ágasbó", deo deo de, "ágasbó mén nynéstei, oíws nynéstei deo deo tois deo deo oú deo mì esti tois nein, ois oūn tois nynési einai, oíws "ágasbó émimi", kai eis mì nynési autós tois "ágasbó", oíws autós autós éstas nynéstei, allá "ágasbó én tois "ágasbó émimi", tois nynéstei, deo deo tois "ígw "ágasbó tois "ígw "ágasbó", éstas hóde tois "ígw "ágasbó tois "ígw "ágasbó

1 Α"ν (= Ficinus).
2 Kierchhoff: autó Enn.

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seek anything but himself who is above all things; for he suffices for himself and all else by being what he is.

38. But he is not: even the "is"; for he has no need whatever even of this; for "he is good" is not applicable to him either, but to that to which the "is" applies; but the "is" [when said of him] is not said as one thing of another, but as indicating what he is. But we say "the Good" about him, not speaking of him himself nor predating of him that good belongs to him, but saying it is himself; so that, since we do not think it proper to say "is good" nor to put the article before it, but are unable to make ourselves clear, if one takes it away altogether, we say "the good" so as not to still need the "is", that we may not make one thing and then another. But who is going to accept a nature which is not in a state of perception and knowledge of itself? What then will he know? "I am"? But he is not. Why then will he not say "I am the Good"? Again he will predicate the "is" of himself. But [perhaps] he will only say "good", with some addition; for one could think "good" without "is", if one did not predicate it of something else. But he who thinks that he is good will in every case think "I am the Good"; if not, he will think good but the thought will not be present to his mind that he is this good. The thought, then, must be "I am good". And if the thought itself is the Good, it will not be a thought of himself but of good, and he himself will not be the Good, but the thought will. But if the thought of the Good is different from the Good, the Good is there already before the

1 Cp. the closely parallel discussion in V. 3. 16.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

αὐτῷ. εἰ δὲ ἐπί τῆς νοησεως τὸ ἀγαθόν αὐτάρκες, αὐτάρκες ἀν αὐτῷ εἰς ἀγαθόν οὖν ἄδικον ἀν ἀδικία τῆς νοησεως τῆς περί αὐτοῦ ὄσις ἢ ἂν ἄδικον οὐ νοεῖ ἐαυτό.

39. Ἀλλὰ ἢ τῇ ὡδὲ ἄλλο πέρεστον αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ἀμελὴ τις ἐπιβλητικόν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν ἐσται. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄντων οἶον διαστήματος τινος οὐδὲ διαφοράς πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιβάλλειν ἐαυτῷ, τί ἂν εἰ ἤ ἂν τῷ διὰ καὶ ὅρθος ὁ ἐπιβάλλεις λαμβάνει, ὅπως νοεῖ καὶ ὑπάρχει. δεῖ γὰρ τὸ νοοῦν ἤς ἐπιβάλλεις καὶ ταὐτός ἄν λαμβάνει, εἴπερ νοήσει. ἐαυτῶν τῇ γὰρ εἰ διακρίνει ἀπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐπέραν σχέσει τὰ τὰ πάντα οὐ θεωρήσει, μηδεμιάς ἐπιβάλλεις γενομένης εἰς τὰ πάντα εἶναι οὔτε 

10 γὰρ ἄν οὐδὲ δίο. ὡστε, εἰ νοῦσης, ὅπως δήποτε ἐπιβάλλεις, εἴπερ ἄλογοι νοήσεις διὰ τὰ γὰρ οὐκ ἢ ἡπαντά; ἢ ἂν δὲ, ἄλογοι άσθοι γίνεται νοοῦν ἐπιβάλλεις, ἀλλὰ δὲ τὴν νόησιν τὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐπέραν εἶναι, εἰ τὶ οὐλοί δύνασθαι νοεῖν αὐτό. ἐλέγομεν δὲ, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν νοεῖται τίποτα, 1 εἴπερ εἰ ἄλογος ὁ νοοῦν ἐπιβάλλεις, νοήσεις 

15 δὲ αὐτὸς πολὺς γίνεται, νοοτροπία, νοοτροπία, κατάσκοινος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσφέρει νῦρ. πρὸς δὲ τούτους κάκην αὖ προσφέρει, ἐπερ οὕτως ἢ ἔν τὸ ἄλογον, ὡς ἐκάστη

thought of it. But if the Good is sufficient to itself before the thought, since it is sufficient to itself for good it will have no need of the thought about it; so, as good, it does not think itself. 39. But as what, then? Now nothing else is present to it, but it will have a simple concentration of attention on itself. But since there is no distance or difference in regard to itself, what could its attention be other than itself? Therefore Plato rightly understands that there is otherness and sameness where there is intellect and substance. ¹ For one must always understand intellect, as otherness and sameness if it is going to think. For [otherwise] it will not distinguish itself from the intelligible by its relation of otherness to itself, and will not contemplate all things if no otherness has occurred to make all things exist; for [without otherness] there would not even be two. Then, if it is going to think, it will not presumably think itself alone, if it is going to think at all; for why will it not think all things? Will it not be able to? But in general intellect is not simple when it thinks itself, but its thought about itself must be thought of another if it is to be able to think itself as anything at all. But we said that there is no thinking of this Good, not even if he wanted to see himself as another. But he himself thinks he becomes many, intelligible, intelligent, in motion and everything else appropriate to Intellect. But besides this it is appropriate to observe that point which has been discussed elsewhere,² that each

¹ Plotinus' usual application of the "very important kinds" of Plato Sophist 254–5 to Intellect.
² Cp. e.g. VI. 9. 2.
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thought, if it is going to be a thought, must be something multiply various, but that kind of movement, simple and all the same, if it is to be something like a touch, has nothing intelligent about it. Well then, will he not know the other things or himself? The other things come after him, and he was what he was before them, and the thought of them would be acquired from outside himself, and not always the same, and of things that do not stand still; and even if he thinks the things that stand still, he is many. For it is certainly not true that the things which come after will possess the substance with their thought, but the thoughts of this Good will be only visions empty [of real content]. But it is enough for providence that he exists from whom all things come. But what is his relation to himself, if he does not think himself? But he will stand still in majesty. Plato did say, speaking of substance, that it will think, but would not stand still in majesty, meaning that substance thinks, but that which does not think will stand still in majesty; he used “will stand still” because he could not explain what he meant in any other way, and he considered more majestic and truly majestic that which transcends thought.1

40. And those who have had a contact of this kind would know that thinking cannot pertain to him; but we do need to add some words of encouragement to what has been said, if discourse can indicate it in any way at all. But necessity must have persuasion mixed with it. One must, then, know and understand that all thinking comes from something and is of

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1 Plotinus is here interpreting Plato Sophist.
something. And one kind of thinking, which keeps close to that from which it comes, has as its ground that of which it is the thought and itself becomes a kind of superstructure, being its ground's actuality and fulfilling that ground's potentiality without generating anything itself; for it is only a kind of completion of that of which it is. But the thinking which accompanies substance and has brought substance into existence could not be in that from which it came to be; for it would not have generated anything if it was in that. But since it was a power of generation by itself, it generated, and its active actuality is substance, and also in substance it is there with it, and the thought and this substance are not different things, and, again, in that the nature thinks itself, they are not different except in definition, what is thought and what thinks, that is, a plurality, as often been demonstrated. And this is the first active actuality, which has generated an existent which came to be substance, and, being the image of another, is the image of one so great that substance came to be. But if it was intrinsic to that and did not derive from it, it would be nothing else but intrinsic so that and would not be an existent on its own. Certainly, as this is the first active actuality and the first thought, it would have neither actuality or thought before it. So then when one goes on from this substance and thought one will not arrive at substance or thought, but will come, beyond substance\(^1\) and thought, to something wonderful, which does not have in it substance or thought, but is alone by itself, with no need of the things which come from

\(^1\) Plato Republic VI 509B9.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

30 οὖν ἔδειμεν. οὐ γὰρ ἔνεργησα ἐνέργειαν ἔνεργως ἤγα μὴ ἢ, πρὸς γενέσθαι: οὐδὲ νόησας ἐγένητο λόγος τῷ γὰρ ἐν νοησίς, ἦπερ γενέσθαι νόησιν. οὐκ οὐ γὰρ ἡ νόησις, οὐ μὲν ἄγαθον, χείρον αὐτῶν ἀστή τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ εἰ κακία ἤκου μεῖον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, οὐκ ἦτο τῇ ἄγαθῳ τῷ ἄγαθῳ. ἂν ἦτο τῇ ἄγαθῳ ἢ ἦτο τῇ ἄγαθῳ, ἢ μὴ ἦτο τῇ ἄγαθῳ ἢ ἦτο τῇ ἄγαθῳ, Ἀλλ' ἦτο τῇ ἄγαθῳ τῷ ἄγαθῳ, τῷ ἄγαθῳ τῷ ἄγαθῳ, τῷ ἄγαθῳ τῷ ἄγαθῳ.

40 ἄγαθον ἀνθρακωβίον ἐπερημένη ἢ εἰς αὐτόν, καθαρὸν καθαρὸν ὡς περὶ τὸν ἄγαθον καὶ αὐτής ἄψευδος. καθαρὸν δὲ νόησας εἰκονικώς ἐστιν ἢ ἐστιν, ὅπως παρασταθήμενον τῇ νοήσῃ παραστάσιν, όι μὴ εἰκονικῷς καὶ ἐν ἐναι. εἰ δὲ τεις καὶ τυχόν ἄρα νοσοῦν καὶ νοσομένον ποιεῖ καὶ νοσομένον

45 καὶ νόησιν συνεδρίαν τῇ νοσημένῃ καὶ ὡς ποιεῖ αὐτὸ νοσεῖ, ὅλην διεξαγαγεῖ καὶ τοῦτον τῷ αὐτῷ, εὑρετήρι ἄνεργεια καὶ νόησις ἄλλου ὑποκειμένως τελείως καὶ καταστάσεως οὕτω πρὸς αὐτῆς καὶ αὐτῆς ἄλλην ἔχει φύσιν, ἢ καὶ τῷ νοεῖν εἰκόσις, καὶ γὰρ ἔχει ἡ νόησις, ὅτι ἄλλο πρὸς αὐτής καὶ ότι αὐτὴ αὐτῆς, ὅπως καταμεθάλαται ἢ ἐστὶν ἢ ἄλλον ἴδε γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐν αὐτῇ. ὡς μὴ τεις τῷ ἄγαθῳ πρὸς αὐτῶν μετέ τί σύνεσιν αὐτῷ ἢ

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it. For it did not act before it generated activity: for then activity would have been there before it came to be; nor did it think before it generated thought: for then it would have thought before thought came to be. For in general thought, if it is of the Good, is worse than it; so that it would not be thought of the Good; but I mean "not of the Good" not in the sense that it is impossible to think the Good—this may well be so—but that there would be no thought in the Good itself; otherwise the Good and what is less than it, the thought of it, would be a unity together. But if [thought] is going to be worse [than the Good], thought and substance will be together. But if thought is better, the object of thought will be worse. Certainly then thought is not in the Good but, being worse and given its value by the Good, would be somewhere else than it, leaving that Good clear of thought itself as well as everything else. But being clear of thought it is purely what it is, not hindered by the presence of thought from being pure and one. But if someone makes this also at once thinker and thought and substance and thought in company with substance, and in this way wants to make it self-thinking, he will need another, and this other prior to itself, since active actuality and thought is either the bringing to completion of something else underlying it or a co-existent and so has itself also another nature prior to it by which thinking comes naturally. For it has something to think about because there is something else before it; and when it thinks something else; it has from the vision of another in itself. But that which has nothing else before it nor anything accompanying it from something else—

Kirchhoff: 338 & Enn.

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whatever will it think and how will it think itself? For what did it seek and what did it long for? Was it to know how great its power was, as if it was outside it in so far as it thought it? What I mean by this is, if the power which it learnt about was one thing and the power by which it learnt another; but if they were one, what was it seeking?

41. For it seems likely that thinking has been given as a help to the natures which are of the more divine kind, but lesser, and as something like an eye for their blindness. But why should the eye which is itself light 1 need to see real being? But what does need to see light through the eye because it has darkness in itself. If then thinking is light, and light does not seek light, that ray which does not seek light would not seek to think, and will not add thinking to itself; for what will it do with it? Or what will even Intellect itself add in its need in order to think? So he has no perception of himself—he does not need it—and he is not two, or rather not several, himself, his thinking—for his thinking is certainly not himself—and what is being thought must be the third. But if intellect, thinking, and object of thought are the same, if they become altogether one they will make themselves disappear in themselves; but if they are distinguished by being other they will, again, not be that Good. With the best nature, then, which needs no assistance, we must leave aside everything; for whatever you add, you have lessened by the addition the nature which needs nothing. For thinking is a fine thing for us, because the soul needs to possess intellect, and for Intellect, because its

1 Cp. IV. 5. 4 and 7; V. 5. 7.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 7.

being is the same as thinking, and thinking made it; therefore this Intellect needs to keep company with thinking and to be always getting an intimate understanding of itself, that this is this, because the two are one; but if it was only one, it would have sufficed to itself and would not have needed to get understanding. Since also "Know yourself" is said to those who because of their selves' multiplicity have the business of counting themselves up and learning that they do not know all of the number and kind of things they are, or do not know any one of them, not what their ruling principle is or by what they are themselves. But if the Good is anything, it is so in a greater way than by knowledge and thought and self-perception, since it is not anything for itself; for it does not bring anything into itself, but itself suffices. It is not, then, even good for itself, but for the others, for they need it, but it could not need itself; that would be ridiculous; for if it did it would be in need of itself. Nor, certainly, does it look at itself; for it must have and get something from the looking. For it has left all these things to the beings which come after it, and, so it seems, none of the additions to the others are with it, just as even substance is not; so not thinking either, since that is where substance is and the primary and authentic thinking and being are both together. Therefore "There is neither discourse nor perception nor knowledge" because it is impossible to predicate anything of it as present with it.

42. "All, then, upon what is in itself knowable and existent,

\footnote{A reference to Parmenides fr. B 3 DK.}

\footnote{Plato Parmenides 142A8-4.}
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faculty is to be used where you should put them, put away these things which you regard as majestic on the second level, and do not add the seconds to the first or the thirds to the seconds, but set the seconds around the first and the thirds around the second. For thus you will leave each of them as they are and will make the things which come after depend upon those higher realities which exist in independence as the later things circle round them. This is why it is rightly said in this regard also "All things are around the King of all and all are for the sake of that King"; Plato is speaking of all the real beings and says "for the sake of that King", since he is the cause of their being and they, we may say, strive after him, who is other than all of them and has nothing which belongs to them; otherwise they would not still be "all things" if any of the other things which come after him belonged to him. If then Intellect is one of "all things" it does not belong to him. But when Plato calls him "Cause of all beauties" he is clearly putting beauty in the world of Forms, but the Good itself above all this beauty. Now when he puts these second, he says that the thirds depend on them, that is the things which come to be after them, and what he posits around the thirds, clearly the things that came to be from the thirds, this universe here, he makes depend on Soul. But since Soul depends on Intellect and Intellect on the Good, so all things depend on him through intermediaries, some close to him, some neighbours of those close to him, and the things of sense dependent on Soul at the ultimate distance from him.

cryptic passage, very unlikely to be authentic Plato, had great authority for the Neoplatonists.
VI 8. ON FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE

Introductory Note

This treatise, number 39, immediately follows in Porphyry's chronological order its predecessor in the Enneads, VI. 7 (38). The two together contain the profoundest and most powerful expression of the thought of Plotinus about the One or Good. This First Principle is spoken of here in more strongly positive terms than anywhere else in the Enneads: the language of will and love and thought is used about him, and he appears as something more like a 'personal God' than he does elsewhere in the Enneads. But, as Plotinus makes clear in the treatise, this positive emphasis is in no way intended to be inconsistent with the negative way of approach to the One on which he so strongly insists. It is rather a powerful contribution to that negating of negations which the later Neoplatonists showed clearly was the final stage on the negative way and was necessary to attain that fruitful and illuminating silence in which alone the One can be contemplated.

Plotinus starts the treatise with an analysis of our concept of human freedom and it is from this that he ascends, with considerable trepidation but admitting that he has no better starting point, to consider the freedom of the One which is the main subject of the work. At chapter 7 he introduces a "rash statement starting from a different way of thinking" which says that since the Good "happens to be as it is, and does not have the mastery of what it is, and is what it is not from itself, it would not have freedom."
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and its doing or not doing what it is necessitated to do or not to do is not in its power." It is not clear whether Plotinus regards this as a positive statement of a doctrine other than his own or as an objection to his own doctrine; and if the latter, whether it is a possible objection which he has himself thought of or an objection which he has actually heard from others; a view of my own that it comes from a Christian source much concerned to assert the absolute freedom of God's will has not been generally accepted (A. H. Armstrong, "Two Views of Freedom" in Studia Patristica XVIII, Pergamon Press, Oxford 1982, 397–406). But however that may be, he takes it very seriously, and concentrates in the rest of the treatise on establishing his own doctrine of the One against it. It is in doing this that he uses language more likely than anything else in the Enneads to commend his version of Platonism to theists (Platonic, Jewish or Christian) accustomed to think of God as a Supreme Being possessed of intelligence and will; though, as has already been said, he is careful to show that this positive language is in no way inconsistent with his negative theology.

Synopsis

Statement of scope of the enquiry: it is to extend as high as the One, but we must begin with our own experience of "having something in our power" (ch. 1). Problems about the freedom of human beings in our present state, as embodied souls (chs. 2–3). Freedom is power to go to the Good; Intellect possesses this in the fullest degree (ch. 4). Our souls in their highest, contemplative, activity can share in this freedom of Intellect (chs. 5–6). How can we drag the lord and master of all things, the Good, into our discussion of freedom? A rash and absurd statement about it (ch. 7). Total inadequacy of all our language to the Good (ch. 8). And especially inadequacy of "it happened to be" (ch. 9). Chance is later than and inferior to Intellect; and though the Good necessarily is what he is he is not bound by necessity but is the necessity and law of the others (ch. 10). Questions which cannot properly be asked about the Good; necessity to overcome our persistent tendency to imagine it as in a place (ch. 11). That which gives freedom to substance itself must be still freer; though "master of himself" is inadequate (ch. 12). Yet perhaps we must use this sort of inadequate language, understanding "as if" with every word; then we shall say that the Good is master of himself and is as he willed himself to be (ch. 13). Cause and substance are one in the world of real being; still more in the cause of that world. He is cause of himself, self primarily and beyond being (ch. 14). He is supremely lovable and love of himself; when we attain to him we are far above chance, more than free and more than independent (ch. 15). He is everywhere and nowhere, giving himself existence in being awake to himself (ch. 16). Intellect is beyond providence, choice and chance, and its cause still more so, by himself what he is, related and directed to himself (ch. 17). Intellect and the One: image of the circle with the One as centre, being as he wished to be and ought to be (ch. 18). Experience of the Good transcends language; he who made being has no need of being and is beyond it (ch. 19). He is eternally his own self-making, totally self-determined and at his own disposal (ch. 20). He is his will, truly free and truly himself (ch. 21).
VI. 8. (39) ΠΕΙΡΑΚΤΙΚΩΝ ΕΚΟΥΣΙΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΘΕΑΝΜΑΤΟΣ ΤΟΥ ΕΝΟΣ

1. Ἀρ’ ἔστι καὶ ἐπὶ θεῶν εἰ τι ἑστι ἐν’ αὐτοῖς ζητεῖν, ἡ ἐν ἀνθρώπων ἀδικείας τε καὶ ἀποφασισμών δυνάμει τὸ τοιούτοι διὰ πρόσωπον ζητεῖν, θεοὶ δὲ τὸ τὸ πάντα δύναμαι ἐπιτρέποντες καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς σώμαν τι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντα εἶναι; ἡ τῆς δύνασιν δὴ πάντα καὶ τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτώ δὴ πάντα ἐν ἐπιτρέποντες, τῶς δὲ ἄλλος τὰ μὲν αὐτῶς, τὰ δὲ ἐκείνως ζητεῖν, καὶ τῶν ἐκατέρως, ἢ καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ζητηθέντων, τολμήσοντες δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων καὶ τοῦ ἕνου υπὲρ πάντα ζητεῖν τὸ τοιούτον, πώς τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ, καὶ πάντα συγχωρώμεν δύνασθαι. καίτοι καὶ τὸ δύνασθαι τοῦτο σκέπτεται πώς ποτε λέγεται, μόποντας αὐτῶς ἐν τοῖς δύνασιν, τὸ δὲ δύνασθαι φύσιμον, καὶ δυνατον μέλλοντας, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐν τῷ παροῦντι ἀναβληθέντων, πρότερον δὲ ἐν’ ἧμερον αὐτῶν, ἐν’ ἅν καὶ ζητεῖν ἐδώς, εἰ

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1. Is it possible to enquire even about the gods whether there is anything which is in their power, or is it true that this kind of enquiry is proper in dealing with human impotence and dubious powers, but we must attribute to the gods omnipotence and say that not just something but everything is in their power? Or is it true that omnipotence and having everything in his power is indeed to be attributed to the One, but with the other gods we should say that some things are this way and some the other way, and of which gods each is true? Now we must certainly enquire about this as well [as human freedom] and we must dare to push our enquiry on to the first beings and to him who is on high above all things, and enquire in this way what "being in his power" means, even if we agree that he is omnipotent. And we must investigate as well what this "potent" means, in case by using this term we intend to say that it sometimes means potency and sometimes actual activity, and an activity which belongs to the future. But we must postpone these questions for the present, and first enquire about ourselves, as we usually do, whether

Plotinus shows himself here very well aware of the ambiguity inherent in the Greek philosophical usage of dikaiosynē, ἀνοησία which it is often necessary to take into account in reading him.
anything does happen to be in our power. First we must ask what something "being in our power" ought to mean; that is, what is the idea of this kind of thing in our minds; for in this way it might come to be known whether it is suitable to transfer it to the gods and, still more, to God, or whether it should not be transferred; or whether it should be transferred, but we should enquire how "being in their power" is to be applied to the other gods and to the first beings. What then do we have in our minds when we speak of "being in our power", and why are we trying to find out? I myself think that, when we are pushed around among opposing chances and compulsions and strong assaults of passions possessing our soul, we acknowledge all these things as our masters and are enslaved to them and carried wherever they take us, and so are in doubt whether we are not nothing and nothing is in our power, on the assumption that whatever we might do when not enslaved to chances or compulsions or strong passions, because we wished it and with nothing opposing our wishes, this would be in our power. But if this is so, our idea of what is in our power would be something enslaved to our will and would come to pass (or not) to the extent to which we wished it. For everything is a voluntary act which we do without being forced to act with knowledge (of what we are doing), and in our power which we are also competent to do. And nothing or criticising his predecessors but with building up his own distinctive Platonic view of human freedom, that we are only truly free when we live on our highest level in the realm of intellect.
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both may often coincide, even if their definition is different; but sometimes they might be discordant; for instance, if one was competent to kill, it would not be a voluntary act when one did so if one did not know that this man was one's father. But perhaps that ignorance would be incompatible with having something in one's power; and certainly the knowledge involved in a voluntary act must not only apply in the particular circumstances but generally. For why is the action involuntary if one does not know that it is a relation, but not involuntary if one does not know that one ought not to do it? Possibly because one ought to have learnt that? Not knowing that one ought to have learnt it is not voluntary, nor is what leads one away from learning.

2. But we must enquire into the following: to what ought we to attribute this which is referred to us as being in our power? One possibility is to attribute it to impulse and any kind of desire, for instance what is done or not done by passion or lust or calculation of the beneficial accompanied by desire. But if by passion or lust, we shall grant that something is in the power of children and wild animals and madmen and those who are beside themselves and caught by drugs or casually occurring imaginations of which they are not master; but if by calculation accompanied by desire, is this so if the calculation has gone wrong? Should we perhaps attribute it to correct calculation accompanied by correct desire? Yet even here one might enquire whether the calculation set the desire in motion or the desire the calculation. Then also, if the desires are accordingly to nature, if they are of the kind that belong to the living being, that is, the composite, the soul followed
the necessity of nature; but if they are of the kind that belongs to the soul alone, many of the things which are now said to be in our power will be outside it. Then also, what here calculation precedes our passions? Or when imagination compels and desire pulls us in whatever direction it leads, how are we given the mastery in these circumstances? And how in general can we have the mastery where we are led? For that which is in need and necessarily desires to be filled does not have the mastery over that to which it is simply being led. But how in general can something be self-originated which comes from something else and whose origin is referred to something else and has come to be as it is from thence? For it lives according to that and as it is formed by it; or in this way soulless things will be able to have something in their power; for fire also acts as it has come to be. But if it is because the living being and the soul knows what it does, if it knows by sense-perception, what help is that to things being in their power? For sense-perception does not give mastery of the work since it only sees. But if by knowledge, if it is by knowledge of what is being done, here too it only knows, but something else leads to action; but if reason or knowledge acts against the desire and gets the better of it, we must enquire to what this is to be referred, and in general where it takes place. And if reason itself makes another desire, we must understand how; but if it puts a stop to the desire and stands still and this is where what is in our powers is, this will not be in action, but will stand still in Intellect; since everything in the sphere of action, even if reason is dominant, is mixed and cannot have being in our power in a pure state.
3. We must therefore enquire about these matters; for [in doing so] we are already also coming near to our subject of discourse, the gods. Well then, we traced back what is in our power to will, and then placed this in the context of discourse, and then of correct discourse—but perhaps we ought to add to "correct" that it belongs to rational knowledge; for if someone had a right opinion and acted on it he would not indisputably have the power of self-determination if he acted, without knowing why his opinion was right, but led to his duty by chance or some imagination; since when we say that imagination is not in our power, how can we put those who act by it in the class of the self-determined? But we do say this about the imagination which one can properly call imagination, that which is roused by the experiences of the body, for being empty, or again full, of food and drink in a way gives the imaginations shape, and one who is full of semen has different imaginations, and so it is according to all the qualities of the bodily fluids, and we shall not class those who are active according to imaginations of this kind among those whose principle of action is self-determined; therefore we shall not grant to bad men, who do most things according to these, either having something in their power or voluntary action, but we shall grant voluntary action to one whose doings depend on the activities of intellect and who is free from bodily affections. We trace back what is in our power to the noblest belonging to the higher and one to the lower soul (IV. 3. 3). But here he seems to exclude the higher \(\varphiαντασία\) from consideration.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.

4. Καίτως ἦγεσιν το τὰς ἐπειθέντας προτάσεις ἑλευθέρως δύτως (εἰς) ὡς οἱ καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τὸς ἑκ τοῖς νοικίς ἑγεμονιάς σὺν ἀδελφών [κέναι]


6. Καίτως ἦγεσιν το τὰς ἐπειθέντας προτάσεις ἑλευθέρως δύτως (εἰς) ὡς οἱ καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τὸς ἑκ τοῖς νοικίς ἑγεμονιάς σὺν ἀδελφών [κέναι]


8. Καίτως ἦγεσιν το τὰς ἐπειθέντας προτάσεις ἑλευθέρως δύτως (εἰς) ὡς οἱ καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τὸς ἑκ τοῖς νοικίς ἑγεμονιάς σASTERisksASTERisksistent οἱ καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τῆς κατὰ τούτον [εἰς] φύσις τῶν παρεῖναι.

9. Καίτως ἦγεσιν το τὰς ἐπειθέντας προτάσεις ἑλευθέρως δύτως (εἰς) ὡς οἱ καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τὸς ἑκ τοῖς νοικίς ἑγεμονιάς σὔτη καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τῆς κατὰ τούτον [εἰς] φύσις τῶν παρεῖναι.

10. Καίτως ἦγεσιν το τὰς ἐπειθέντας προτάσεις ἑλευθέρως δύτως (εἰς) ὡς οἱ καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τὸς ἑκ τοῖς νοικίς ἑγεμονιάς σউτη καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τῆς κατὰ τούτον [εἰς] φύσις τῶν παρεῖναι.

11. Καίτως ἦγεσιν το τὰς ἐπειθέντας προτάσεις ἑλευθέρως δύτως (εἰς) ὡς οἱ καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τὸς ἑκ τοῖς νοικίς ἑγεμονιάς σὔτη καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τῆς κατὰ τούτον [εἰς] φύσις τῶν παρεῖναι.

12. Καίτως ἦγεσιν το τὰς ἐπειθέντας προτάσεις ἑλευθέρως δύτως (εἰς) ὡς οἱ καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τὸς ἑκ τοῖς νοικίς ἑγεμονιάς σὔτη καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τῆς κατὰ τούτον [εἰς] φύσις τῶν παρεῖναι.

13. Καίτως ἦγεσιν το τὰς ἐπειθέντας προτάσεις ἑλευθέρως δύτως (εἰς) ὡς οἱ καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τὸς ἑκ τοῖς νοικίς ἑγεμονιάς σὔτη καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τῆς κατὰ τούτον [εἰς] φύσις τῶν παρεῖναι.


15. Καίτως ἦγεσιν το τὰς ἐπειθέντας προτάσεις ἑλευθέρως δύτως (εἰς) ὡς οἱ καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τὸς ἑκ τοῖς νοικίς ἑγεμονιάς σὔτη καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τῆς κατὰ τούτον [εἰς] φύσις τῶν παρεῖναι.

16. Καίτως ἦγεσιν το τὰς ἐπειθέντας προτάσεις ἑλευθέρως δύτως (εἰς) ὡς οἱ καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τὸς ἑκ τοῖς νοικίς ἑγεμονιάς σὔτη καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τῆς κατὰ τούτον [εἰς] φύσις τῶν παρεῖναι.

17. Καίτως ἦγεσιν το τὰς ἐπειθέντας προτάσεις ἑλευθέρως δύτως (εἰς) ὡς οἱ καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τὸς ἑκ τοῖς νοικίς ἑγεμονιάς σὔτη καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τῆς κατὰ τούτον [εἰς] φύσις τῶν παρεῖναι.

18. Καίτως ἦγεσιν το τὰς ἐπειθέντας προτάσεις ἑλευθέρως δύτως (εἰς) ὡς οἱ καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τὸς ἑκ τοῖς νοικίς ἑγεμονιάς σὔτη καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τῆς κατὰ τούτον [εἰς] φύσις τῶν παρεῖναι.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.

\[\] where one has no power to go to one's own good but is led away to the good of another. But to speak of being enslaved to one's own nature is making two things, one which is enslaved and one to which it is enslaved. But how is a simple nature and single active actuality not free, when it does not have one part potential and one actual? For it could not be said to be active according to its nature, as if its substance was one thing and its activity another, if being and acting there are the same. If then the activity is neither because of another or in the power of another, how is it not free? And even if "being in its own power" is unsuitable language, but there is something higher than being in its power here, even so it is in its own power because it is not in the power of another nor is another master of its activity; nor indeed of its substance, if it is principle of its substance. And even if Intellect does have another principle, it is not outside it, but it is in the Good. And if it is active according to the Good, it is much more in its own power and free; since one seeks freedom and being in one's own power for the sake of the Good. If then it is active according to the Good, it would be still more in its own power; for it has already what goes from itself to it, and in itself what would be better for it, being in it, if it is directed towards it.

5. "Αρ' ὁδ' ἐν νῷ μάλιν νοοῦν; το ἀνεξόνοιο καὶ το ὑπε', ἀντί ἕν ἐν ὑπ' ἑαυτῷ κατά νοῦν ἐνεργούση κατά ἑαυτὸν προστάσσον, τό μὲν ὅτι προστάσσει ἐπεξέ διάσωσι, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι πρὸς τὴν

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1 Kirchhoz.
2 Kirchhoz ὑψώσει Ἐπικο.
3 delevimus.
the accomplishment; for it is not we who are in charge of the accomplishment. But if it is granted in reference to acting finely and doing everything which comes from oneself, perhaps this might be correctly said. But how is that in our power? For instance if we are brave because there is a war; what I mean is, how is the activity then in our power when if war did not break out it would not be possible to carry out this activity? But it is also the same with the other actions done according to virtue, since virtue is always being compelled to do this or that to cope with what turns up. For certainly if someone gave virtue itself the choice whether it would like in order to be active that there should be wars, that it might be brave, and that there should be injustice that it might define what is just and set things in order, and poverty, that it might display its liberality, or to stay quiet because everything was well, it would choose to rest from its practical activity because nothing needed its curative action, as if a physician, for instance Hippocrates, were to wish that nobody needed his skill. If then it is active in practical affairs virtue is compelled to be helpful, how can things be purely and simply in its power? Are we then to assert that the actions are compelled but the will and the reason which are before the action are not compelled? But if this is so, by placing them only in what comes before the action we shall be placing self-determination, and being in the power of virtue itself, outside the action. And what about virtue itself which is according to state and disposition? Are we to say that when the soul is in a bad way it comes to set it to rights by bringing the passions and desires within proper limits? In what
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way then are we saying that being good is in our power and "virtue has no master"? Yes, it is if we wish and choose it; or because when virtue comes to be in us it constructs freedom and being in our own power and does not allow us to be any more slaves of what we were enslaved to before. If then virtue is a kind of other intellect, a state which in a way intellectualises the soul, again, being in our power does not belong to the realm of action but in intellect at rest from actions.

6. How then did we refer this before 1 to will when we said "which would come to pass to the extent that we wished it"? 2 Now it was said there also "or would not come to pass". If then what we are saying now is correctly said and what we said before will be in tune with it, we shall assert; that virtue and intellect have the mastery and that we should refer being in our own power and freedom to them; and since these have no master, intellect is independent and virtue wishes to be independent by supervising the soul to make it good, and up to this point is free itself and makes the soul free; but when compulsory passions and actions come in the way it has not in its supervision wished that they should occur, but all the same even among those it will keep its independence by referring back to itself even here; for it will not follow the lead of the facts, for instance by saving the man who is in danger, but, if it thinks fit, it will sacrifice him and command him to sacrifice his life and property and children and even his fatherland, having in view its own excellence and not the existence of what is subject to it; so that also in practical actions self-determination and being in our own power is not referred to practice and outward

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1 A favourite text from the proclamation which introduces the choice of lives in the Myth of Er. Plato Republic X 617E2.
2 Cfr. 1, lines 32–3.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.

25 τι πελευρόν τοῦ οὖματος θεών καὶ άρση καὶ θεορίαν

activity but to the inner activity of virtue itself, that is, its thought and contemplation. But one must say that this virtue is a kind of intellect and not count in with it the passions which are enslaved and limited by the reason; for these, Plato says, "come close to the body, since it is by habits and exercises" that they are set in order. So it is still clearer that the immaterial is the free, and it is to this that being in our power is to be referred and the will which has the mastery is free, and independent, even if something directs it by necessity to what is outside. All therefore that comes from this will and is done according to it is in our power, when it is acting externally and when it is by itself; what it wishes and makes actual without hindrance, this is primarily what is in our power. But the contemplative, that is the primary, intellect is what is in its own power in this way, that its work in no way depends on another, but it is all turned to itself and its work is itself and it rests in the Good, being without need and fulfilled, and, one might say, living according to its will; but its will is its thought, but was called will, because it was to its mind; for what is called will imitates what is in its mind. For will wants the Good; but thinking is truly in the Good. That intellect therefore has what its will wants, that by which it becomes thought when it attains it. If then we still being in our power to willing the Good, surely that which is already firmly settled in what its will wants must possess it. Or else

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1 Republic 518D-10-Ε2.
2 Plotinus is playing here on the common meaning of κατὰ νόον, "according to one's mind", "as one likes it", and the sense required by context here, "according to

1 Igal, ed. Enn.
2 Theodor, Ἐπίθυμος Enn.
it must be assumed to be something greater, if one does not want being in one’s own power to go up so high.

7. The soul, then, becomes free when it presses on without hindrance to the Good by means of Intellect, and what it does through this is in its power. But Intellect is free through itself, but the nature of the Good is the very goal of the striving and that through which the others have what is in their power, when one is able to attain it without hindrance and the other to have it. Now how can one bring the very lord and master of all things of value after it, that which sits in the first seat, to which all things also want to ascend, and depend on it and have their powers from it so as to be able to have something in their power—how can one bring it [down to the level of] what is in your and my power to which Intellect also was only dragged with difficulty, though it was all the same violently dragged? Unless some rash statement starting from a different way of thinking says that since the nature of the Good happens to be as it is, and does not have the mastery of what it is, and is what it is not from itself, it would not have freedom, and its doing or not doing what it is necessitated to do or not to do is not in its power.¹ This statement is indeed contrary and absurd and would altogether do away with the nature of free will and self-determination and our idea of what is in our power, as if this was empty talk and names for non-existent things. For not only must the one who makes it say that nothing is in anyone’s power, but he must say that he does not think or

¹ On this statement: see Introductory Note p. 224.
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understand this term. But if he did admit that he understood it, he could be easily refuted, because our idea of what is in our power fits what he said it did not fit. For the idea is not concerned with the substance of a thing and does not take it as well into consideration—for it is impossible for a thing to make itself and bring itself into existence—but our idea wants to observe what among beings is a slave of others and what has self-determination and what is not subject to another but itself master of its activity, which is purely and simply the case with eternal beings in that they are eternal, and with those which pursue or possess the good without hindrance. But certainly since the Good is above these it is absurd to seek as if for another good beside it. Then also it is not correct to say that it exists by chance; for chance occurs among things that are later and among many things; but we could not say that the First is by chance and is not master of its own coming to be, because it has not come to be. And the remark that it does as it is is absurd if it involves a claim that there is freedom when it does things or is active against its own nature. Nor indeed does its possession of uniqueness take away its independence, if it possesses uniqueness not because it is obstructed by something else but because it is this very thing and is, we may say, satisfied with itself and has nothing better than itself; otherwise one will take self-determination away from what attains the Good in the highest degree. But if this is absurd it would be more absurd to deprive the Good itself of self-determination because it is good and because it remains on its own and does not need to move to something else, since

1 transpassimus.
2 Creutz. τὰ βασιλείαν.
the other things move to it and it has no need of anything. But when his, so to speak, existence is his, as it were, activity—for one is not one thing and the other another if this is not even so with Intellect, because its activity is more according to its being than its being according to its activity—so that it cannot be active according to what it naturally is, nor will its activity and its life, as we may call it, be referred to its, in a manner of speaking, substance, but its something like substance is with and, so to put it, originates with its activity and it itself makes itself from both, for itself and from nothing.

8. But we see self-determination not as that Good's incidental attribute but itself by itself, by taking away the opposing factors from the self-determinations in other things; we might say this about it by transferring what is less from lesser things because of incapacity to find what we ought to say about it. All the same, we could find nothing to say which is applicable to it, or even really about it; for all noble and majestic things come after it. For he himself is the origin of these; yet, all the same, in another way not their origin. For those who put away everything, "being in his power" [is to be put away] as later, and "self-determination"—for it already speaks of activity towards another—and "that he is unimpededly active" and "that when others exist his activity directed to them is unhindered". But we must say that he is altogether unrelated to anything; for he is what he is before them; for we take away the "is", and so also any kind of relations.

I retain δια here with H-S. But δια (Kirchhoff: non Ficino) would fit the context better.
to the real beings; nor, certainly, [do we accept] the "as he naturally is"; for this also is later, and even if it may be said about those real beings, it would be said about those which come from another, and so first about substance, because it grew naturally from him; but if nature is in the things in time, it cannot be applied to substance. Nor indeed must we say this nature "is not from itself"; for we took away the "is", and the "not from itself" would be said when it [was brought into being] by something else. Did it then just happen to be like this? No, we must not bring in "happened to be"; nothing happened to him or in relation to something else; for "happened to be" applies among many things, when some are there and something happens to be besides them. How then could the first happen to be? For it did not come, so that you might enquire "How then did it come? What chance brought it or established it in being?" For chance did not yet exist, nor accident either; for accident comes from something else, and among things which have come to be.

9. But if someone takes "happened to be" as applying to the Good, one must not stop at the word, but understand what the man who says it has in mind. What, then, does he have in mind? This, that it is because it has this nature and power that it is principle; for if it had another, it would have been what it was, and if it was worse, it would have been active according to its own substance. To this we must reply that it was not possible for it, since it is the principle of all, to be what chance made, and certainly not to be worse, not even to be good but good in another way, a kind of lesser way. But the principle must be better than all the things which come after
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It; so it must be something defined. But I mean defined by its uniqueness, and not of necessity; for there was no necessity; for necessity is in the things which follow the principle, and even this [subsequent] necessity does not have power to force them, but this uniqueness comes from the principle itself. It is this, then, and not something else, but what it ought to be: it did not then happen to be like this, but had to be like this; but this "had to be" is principle of all things that had to be. It could not then be this in the sense that it happened to be; for it is not what it once happened to be, but what it ought to be; or rather, not what it ought to be, but the other things have to wait and see how their king will appear to them and affirm that he is what he himself is, not appearing as he happened to be, but as really and really is. And really is the Good, not active according to the Good—for in this way he would seem to be following another—but being one, what he is, so that he is not active according to that, but is that. If then "happened to be" does not even apply to real being—for, if anything is going to happen, it happens to being, but being itself does not happen, nor is it a casual occurrence that being is like this; nor does it derive being like this from something else, being as it is, but this is really its nature, to be real being—how could one imagine about what transcends being1 that it happened to be like this, that to which it belongs to have generated being, which did not happen to be like this but is as its substance is, being what substance is and what Intellect is; for in this way one could even say of Intellect "it just

1 Plato Republic VI 500B9.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.

1. A clear statement of the necessity of negating one's negations as the final step in the negative way. very

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happened in this way to be Intellect", as if Intellect was going to be anything else but this which the nature of Intellect is. That, surely, which does not depart from itself, but is its own without declination. one would most properly say is what it is. What, then, is one to say at the point where one goes up to and looks upon what is above this? Is it what: it happens to be as one sees that it is? No, it did not happen to be in this way or in that way, but it did not happen to be at all. But [could one say] "in this way", and "not otherwise, but in this way"? But [you must] not [say] "in this way"; for in this way you would be defining it, and it would be a particular thing; but the one who sees it cannot say "in this way" or again "not in this way"; for you would be saying that it was one of the beings to which "in this way" applies. It is then something else besides all the things which are in this way. But, since you see it as without definition, you will be able to speak of all the things which come after it, but you will affirm that it is none of these, but, if anything at all, that it is all power, really master of itself, being what it will to be, or rather throwing "what it wills to be" away to the beings, and being itself greater than all willing, setting willing after itself. It did not then will the "in this way" so that it might conform to it, nor did another make it like this.

10. And then one must also put these questions to the one who said "happened to be": on what conditions would he affirm that "happened to be" was false, if there was any [happening to be]? And how

strongly stressed by the Athenian Neoplatonists Proclus and Damascius and by Pseudo-Dionysius.
FLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.

"συνέβη", καὶ εἰ τίς εἶ θάνη φόνος, τότε φύσις οὐκ
5 ἐφαρμόζετο τὸ ἀνοίχτω λόγον ἀπαρτισθεὶς τύχη, ποῦ
ποτε τὸ μὴ ἐν τῇ δόξῃ εἶναι γένος, αὐτῷ δέ τὸ ἀνοίχτω
αὐτῇ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν ἄλλων εἶδος καὶ πέρας καὶ
μορφὴ διδόσα, καὶ οὐκ ἄστων ἐν τοῖς αὐτῶν καὶ λέγον
γενομένως τύχη ἀναθέτεται, ἀλλά αὐτὸ τοῦτο λόγῳ τῆς
10 αἰτίας, εἰ δὲ τοῖς μὲν προηγομένωι καὶ μὴ ἄκολοθοι,
ἀλλὰ συμπτώμασι, ἡ τύχη. τῆς δὴ ἀρχῆς παντὸς λόγου
tαι καὶ τάξεως καὶ δρον πῶς ἐν τῇ τοῦτον αὐτοὺς ἀναθέτει τύχη καὶ μὴ πολλάκις μὲν ἡ τύχη κυρία, τοῦ δὲ καὶ λόγων καὶ τάξεως εἰς τὸ γεννάν ταύτα

15 οὐ κυρία ὅτι καὶ ἄνως ἐν δοκεῖ λόγῳ εἶναι τύχη,
pῶς ἐν γενετήματι αὐτοὶ γένος, εἰ καὶ μὴ γεννάν μοῦν
τύχη, ὀδόθε τὸ πρὸ του οὐδὲ τὸ κρείττον τοῦ: αὐτές γὰρ
ἐξαν δεῖν γεννήθηνε, ὅτε ἢν τῷ παρέπειν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ ὅλος
ἐν τοῖς αὐτίκοις, εἰ καὶ μὴν πρὸ ἐκείνου, αὐτός δὲ
πρῶτος, στήσαι ἑνσάθη δεῖ καὶ μηδὲν ἐνεργεῖ αὐτῷ

20 λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τα μετ᾽ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο πῶς ἔγένητο, αὐτὸ δὲ
μνημεῖται ὅπως, ὅτι διότι τοῦτο μὴ ἔγένητο. τί οὖν, εἰ μὴ
ἔγενητο, ἐν τοῦτο οὐδὲν εἶναι, εἰς τοῦτο οὐδὲν, εἰς τοῦτο οὐδὲν
καὶ εἰ μὴ θυμήσαι δὲ, ἀλλὰ ἢν δὲ έστων, οὐχ ὑποστήριῳ 
ἐκείνοι, ἐρώτησε δὲ ἐκείνο οὐς ἔστων;

1 Igal, et το Ενν.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.

25 ἐξανάγκης τούτο ἐν εἰς, ὥς ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἄλλω, ὥς οὐχ ὃτι οὐκ ἄλλως, οὕτως, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τὸ ἀριστον οὕτως. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸ βέλτιον ἐλθεῖν οὐ πάντες αὐτεύουσιν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ χειρὶν ἐλθεῖν οὐδὲν ὑπ’ ἄλλου κεκυκλώται. ἀλλ’ ὅτι μὴ ἦλθε, παρ’ αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔλημθεν, οὐ τὸ κεκυκλώσθαι.

30 ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῷ ἐναί, ὃ μὴ ἐλήμθη καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον ἐλθεῖν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρὸν οὐκ ἀδυναμία συμπείραι τοῦ μὴ ἔσκευτο, ἀλλὰ παρ’ αὐτῷ καὶ δὲ αὐτὸν τὸ μὴ ἔσκευ. καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔσκευ τῷ μηδὲν ἄλλῳ τῇ ἅπερ ἄλλη τῆς δυνάμεως ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχει, οὐκ ἀνάγκης καταλημμέναι.

35 ἀλλ’ αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκης τῶν ἄλλων ἀδύνατος καὶ νόμου. αὐτὴν ὅπως ἂν ἀνάγκης ἀναστίκησας ἢ ὡς ἄλλον ὅσον ἀδύνατον ἐπισταμένων τῶν μετ’ αὐτῷ δὲ αὐτῇ, τὸ ὁδὸν πρὸς ἀποστάσεως μᾶς ἂν ἢ ὡς ἄλλου ἢ ὡς αὐτοῦ ὑποστῆ.

11. Ἀλλὰ τὰ μὴ ἀπατῶν τούτο τί; τί σωστὴσατας δει ἀπάθειναι, καὶ ἐν ὑπόροτη τῇ γνώμῃ θεμαίνως μηδὲν ἐτὶ ἤρθεν, τί γὰρ ἂν ταῖς καὶ ἤρθεν εἰς οὗ οὐκ ἦτω διδακτικῶς πάσας ἐτὶ ἤρθεν εἰς ἀρχήν ἱσότης καὶ 5 ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ ἀπαθείᾳ, πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτος ἤρθεν ἢ ὡς σωστάς χρὴ ναμίθειν ἢ τοῦ τί ἦτω εἰς τοῦ οὐκ ἢ τοῦ δια τί τοῦ ἔστων εἰς τοῦ συν εἰς τοῦ μὲν ἢ ἐκείνο εἰς τοῦ μετ’ αὐτό. τὸ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἀρχήν ἄλλην ἤρθεν ἡ ἄρχην ἢ τῆς πάσης οὐκ ἔστι ἐκείνη ἢ τὸ ἄλλον ἢ ὡς εἰς τοῦ τί οὕτως ἤρθεν, τίς ἦτω σῳζόντων αὐτῶν ἢ σωστάς ἔσχατος ἡ ἄρχην ἡν. 1

1 Kirchhoff, τὸ Ἐνν., Η-§1.

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not be otherwise. Now he is not as he is because he cannot be otherwise, but because being what he is is the best. For not everything has the power over itself to go to the better, but nothing is hindered by another to go to the worse. But that it did not go was due to itself; it was not because it was hindered but because it was itself what did not go; and inability to go to the worse does not indicate the powerlessness of what does not go, but its not going comes from itself and is because of itself. And not going to anything else has in it the extreme of power; [that which does not go] is not held fast by necessity, but is itself the necessity and law of the others. Did necessity, then, bring itself into existence? No, that did not come into existence; the other things after it came to existence through it. How then could that which is before existence have come to exist either by another’s agency or by its own?

11. But what is this which did not come to existence? We must go away in silence and enquire no longer, aware in our minds that there is no way out. For why should one even enquire when one has nothing to go on to, since every enquire goes to a principle and stands still in it? And besides, one must consider that every enquire is about either what something is, or of what kind it is, or why it is or if it is. Now being, in the sense in which we say that that is, [is known] from what comes after it. And the question “why?” seeks another principle; but there is no principle of the universal principle. And to enquire into what kind of thing it is is to enquire what attributes it has, which has no attributes. And the question “what is it?” rather makes clear that we must make no enquire about it, grasping it, if
muhsen autw hemotw einai prosoptewn mahtontas. bios the eouikameq tautw thn aporion endimnhontai, peri tautw tis fouskos ouster eneugnummen, ex to evwv mon tis tis tis kharon kai toto, ouster ti chos, esti choas hdi outhis enugnyseis taun thn fouson eis to evwv evfanafron hmoi gwniota h outhis tis, eisagontes se autw eis to toisatw toto outhis outhis tis, kai ouster ethein
20 outhe elghthena autw thn parousian kai outhis thn outhen, kai de kai ouster ek tws bainous h eis outhis tis eis euvide epoqhen. didner de to aistov thn aporion aneapteta eis poihsiasthai thn epiqlh ths pro autw pato toto kai mbede eis ornoon tis tis, autw, meta
28 aiei eikovn en autw kai idieumyn meta epihlhonta, alli outhis mon, oui esti, leugumenon oui anagkh ths tis logian einai, to de toto, ouster kai ta alla, ouster to pato na outheis to. oui aitovn toto noithete, oui noithete, oude evge autw evi tivoteis oui kenvkou oude
30 peribalein eisoutes eis, oude to dous autw outhei exetein autw o mhn oude to poion oude gar morfi tis peri autov oude norpsi h ei th oude to pror alloseph autw gar kai phfrasthe, prin alla, ti oui oui eitei to outhis outhei; oui poud phraste h toto, auti
35 kai ta alla evn iaswenei, pato to peri toto

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possible, in our minds by learning that it is not right to add anything to it. But in general we probably think of this difficulty, those of us who think about this nature at all, because we first assume a space and place, a kind of vast emptiness, and then, when the space is already there, we bring this nature into the place which has come to be or is in our imagination, and bringing it into this kind of place we enquire in this way as if into whence and how it came here, and as if it was a stranger we have asked about its presence and, in a way, its substance, really just as if we thought that it had been thrown up from some depth or down from some height. Therefore one must remove the cause of the difficulty by excluding from our concentrated gaze upon it all place, and not put it in any place either as resting and settled in it or as having come to it, but [think of it] as being what it is (this is said by the necessity of speech), but that place, like everything else, is afterwards, and last of all afterwards. When therefore we think, as we do think, of this being out of place, and put nothing round it in a kind of circle, and are unable to encompass its extent, we shall not attribute extension to it; and certainly not quality either; for there could not be any shape about it, even intelligible; and not relation to something else; for it existed by itself before there was anything else. What then could the "it happened to be like this" still mean? And how shall we be able to say this, because everything else about it is said negatively?

begins his account of the generation of the gods (Theogony 116), which he understands as Aristotle does (Physics A 138b6-8) as the empty space or place which things occupy.

1 Plotinus is thinking of the Chaos with which Hesiod
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.

λεγόμενα; ὃστε ἀληθῶς μᾶλλον οὐ τὸ ὁδὸν συνέβη, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὁδὸν ὁπίσω συνέβη, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὁδὸν συνέβη δῶλον).

12. Τί νῦν; οὐκ ἐστιν ὁ ἐστι; τινὶ δὲ εἶναι ὁ ἐστιν ἢ τοῦ ἐπέκεινα εἶναι ἢ ἐν χώροις αὐτῶς; πάλιν γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐδὲν τι πειθεῖσα τοὺς εἰρημένους ἀποροῦσα ἐστιν.

λεγετὸν τοῖς πρὸς τὰ πάντα ὑπὲρ, ὡς ἔκαστος μὲν ημῶν ὁ καθὰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα πᾶρρα ἐς τὴν ὁδόθα τις υἱὸς τῶν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ μάλας ἑκάστας μετέχομεν ὁμοίως καὶ ἐσμέν τις οὐ̱δὲν, τοιοῦτο ὁ δὲ ἐστὶν ὁδὸν συνέβη τὸ ἐκ διαφορᾶς καὶ οὐ̱δένα; οὐκεῖν κυρίους οὐ̱δένα ὁδὸν οὐ̱δένα αὐτοποίησιν διὸ οὐ̱δὲν κύριοι τῶν ἰσότων ὁμοίως, ἐλλάς γὰρ ποῖς οὐ̱δένα.

10 καὶ ἡμὲς ἄλλα, καὶ κύριοι οὐ̱δένα τῆς αὐ̱τῶν ὁμοίως, ἀλλὰ οὐ̱δὲν κύριοι ημῶν, εἰπτεν αὐ̱τή καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν προστίθηκε. ἀλλὰ ἐπεκεῖν ἐπὶ διὰ κύριον ημῶν ἀπὸ τὰ ἐκάστας, οὕτως τις οὐ̱δὲν ἐπὶ τὰ κύρια ἐκάστας καὶ ἐκάστας ἐκάστας.

15 καὶ πάντως ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ ἔτινυ τοῖς ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ πάντως καὶ ἡ οὐ̱δένα αὐ̱τοῖς, ἐπεκεῖν ἐπὶ ἐτόν, τοῖς ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ κύριον οὐ̱δένα οὐ̱δένα εἰς ἄλλα, ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀπὸ τὰ κύρια ἐκάστας. καὶ γὰρ αὐ̱τὴ ἀρχὴ κύριον εἶναι κύριον, ἡ ἀρχή οὐ̱δένα εἰς οὐ̱δένα. τὸ δὲ θεοτοκικὸς ἐλεύθερον τὴν οὐ̱δένα, ἐπεκεῖν διηλόγισεν τοὺς ἐλευθερούς ἐκακόμενοι ἄνεξ ἐκεῖνον, τίνι ἐν ἄλλοις ἐκεῖ, εἰπέν οὐ̱δὲν καὶ θεωμένοι φθηγγασθήσει τοῦτο; τῇ

1 Θεωρικ: σὺ ἐπεστράτευσα
2 Harder: τοῦτο ἄλλα wBUQ: om. x.

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So that not "it happened to be like this" but "not even like this did it happen to be" is truer, where it is true that it did not happen to be at all.

12. Well then, is he not what he is? And is he himself really master of his being what he is or transcending being? For again the soul is not in the least persuaded by what has been said and sees no way out of its difficulty. So we must say this as well, that each one of us may be far from substance in respect of his body but in respect of the soul and what we most are we participate in substance and are a particular kind of substance, that is a particular kind of composite of substance and difference. We are not then substance in the strict and proper sense or absolute substance; and for this reason we are not masters of our own substance. For in some way substance is one thing and we are another and we are not masters of our own substance, but substance, the very thing itself, is master of us, given that this also adds the difference. But since in some way we are that which is master of us, in this way, all the same, even here below we could be called masters of ourselves.1 But where absolute substance is completely what it is, and it is not one thing and its substance another, what it is it is also master of, and is no longer to be referred to another in that it is and in that it is substance. For, again, it has been let go into self-mastery in that it is what is primarily related to substance. That, then, which has made substance free, which is clearly of a nature to liberate and can be called liberator—to what could it be a slave, if it is even in any way permitted to utter this

1 The sense in which this is true is explained in V. 3. 4.

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PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.

... αὐτοῦ ὑστέρα, καὶ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα ὑπῆρχα τε ἢτερα, καὶ αὐτὸ ὁ οὐκ ἦν ὁ οὐκ. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐστι τις ἐνέργεια ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐνέργειᾳ αὐτῶν ἐπρομεθεῦ, οὐδέν δ' ἂν διὰ τούτῳ εἴη ἄν ἐτερόν αὐτῶν καὶ οὐκ εὐθὺς
25 αὐτῶν κύριος, ἀφ' ὅ ἡ ἐνέργεια, όμως ἐτερον ἐνέργεια καὶ αὐτῶς. εἰ δ' ὅλως ἐνέργειαν αἱ ἑως ὑστερον ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι, άλλα τέλλα περὶ αὐτῶν ἐνέργειατα τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἰσχειν, ἐτι μᾶλλον ὡτε τὸ κύριον ὡτε τὸ κεφαλαίαν ἐκεί εἶναι δώσωμεν. ἀλλ' οὐδέ τι ἀπὸ τὸ "αὐτὸν κύριον", όμοι ὅτι ἀλλ' αὐτῷ κύριον, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ "ἀυτὸν κύριον" τῇ ὑστερα ἐκένθημεν, τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ τοιαύτῳ ἐν κατὰ τοῦτο ἐπεκαθή. τι οὖν τὸ ἐν τῷ τοιαύτῳ τοῦ ἀπαντάν αὐτῶν κύριον; ήτι, ἐπειδὴ ὑστερα καὶ ἐνέργεια ἐκεί δύο ποι ἄγον ὅτα ἴδο ν ἔνεργειας τὴν ἐνεργητή τοῦ κυρίου, τοῦτο δὲ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ τοῦτο, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ
35 χρόνος ἐγένετο τὸ κύριον εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐγένετο κύριον. ὅσον δὲ οὐ δυο ὡς εἰν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἑν τῇ ἐνέργεια μόνον οὐδείς ἐνέργεια—οὐδὲ τὸ "κύριον αὐτοῦ" ὑπόθεν.

13. Ἄλλ' εἰ καὶ τὰ ὑπόμενα ταῦτα ἐπέγεν δι' [οἷς ορφανοῖς] τοῦ ἔναρρημένου, πάλιν ἀπ ἂν εὐεξία, ὡς τὰ μὲν (εἷς) ὑπόθεται, ὅτι οὐ πεισθέντον οὖθε ὡς εἰς ἐπιστον δῦο, τὰ δὲ νῦν τῆς πεισθερον κύριο καὶ τὰ παρανοηθέν τοις λόγοις, εἰ γάρ δοίητε ἐνέργειας

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word? To its own substance? But this substance gets its freedom from it and comes after it, and it is not in possession of substance. If then there is an active actuality in him, and we are going to locate him himself in the active actuality, he would not because of this be something else than himself and not himself master of himself, he from whom the active actuality comes, because active actuality and he himself are not different. But if we are not in any way going to grant that there is active actuality in him, but say that the other things have their existence by being active round him, then still more shall we refuse to grant that there is mastery or being mastered at that level. But we shall not even admit the "master of himself", not because something else is master of itself, but because we have allotted the "master of himself" to substance, and put him in a more honourable place than this applies to. What then is that which is in a more honourable position than being its own master? It is because, since substance and activity there are in a way two and gave, from the point of view of activity, the idea of mastery, but this was the same thing as substance, for this reason mastery came to be separated, and it was said to be master of itself. But where there are not two as one, but there is one—either only active actuality or not active actuality at all—"master of himself" is not correct.

13. But, if one must bring in these names of what we are looking for, let it be said again that it was not correct to use them, because one must not make it two even for the sake of forming an idea of it, but now we must depart a little from correct thinking in our discourse for the sake of persuasion. For if we
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were to grant activities to him, and ascribe his activities to what we might call his will—for he does not act without willing—and his activities are what we might call his substance, his will and his substance will be the same thing. But if this is so, then as he willed, so also he is. He does not then will and act as it is his nature to, any more than his substance is as he wills and acts. So he is altogether master of himself since he has even his being in his own power. Observe this also: everything in its desire for the Good wants to be that Good rather than what it is, and thinks that it is in the highest degree when it participates in the Good, and in such a state each being will choose for itself to be so far as it has being from the Good; so the nature of the Good is obviously far more worthy of choice for himself, if it is true that whatever share of the Good there may be in something else is not worthy of choice, and is its freely willed substance which comes to it in accordance with its will and is one and the same thing as its will and is established in existence through its will. And as long as each individual did not have the Good it wished something else, but in that it possesses the Good it wills itself, and neither is this kind of presence by chance nor is its substance outside its will, and it is by this Good that its substance is defined and by this that it belongs to itself. If then it is by this that each thing itself makes itself, it becomes, I suppose, obvious that that Good is primarily the kind of thing it is by its own agency, by which the other things also are able to be by their own agency, and that the will, as it were, to be the kind of thing it is goes with its, as we please to call it, substance, and it is not possible to apprehend him.
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without the will to be by his own agency what he is, and that his willing to be himself by his own agency is concurrent with his being what he wills, and his will and he himself are one, and not less one by this, that he himself is no one thing as he happened to be and what he would have liked to be. For what could he have wished to be except this which he is? For even if we assumed that he could choose to become what he wished, and it was possible for him to change his own nature into something else, he would not wish to become something else, or have any fault to find with himself, as if he is this thing which he is by necessity, this being himself which he always willed and wills. For the nature of the Good is in reality the will of himself, a self not corrupted nor following his own nature, but choosing himself, because there was nothing else at all that he might be drawn to. And one might also make the following point, that the other things do not each of them include in their substance the character of being satisfied with themselves. For a thing could even dislike itself. But it is necessary for the choice and willing of itself to be included in the existence of the Good, or it would hardly be possible for anything else to find itself satisfactory; they are satisfied with themselves by their participation in or imagination of the Good. But one must go along with the words, if one in speaking of that Good uses of necessity to indicate it expressions which we do not strictly speaking allow to be used; but one should understand "as if" with each of them. If then the Good is established in existence, and choice and will join in establishing it—for without these it will not be—but this Good must not be many, its will and substance

1 Kirchhoff: ὁς Ἐνν.
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βούλησαν καὶ τὴν οὔσην [καὶ τὸ θέλειν].

1. ἔτι δὲ θέλειν

2. παρ' αὐτοῦ, ἀνέγκη παρ' αυτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἐδικαίος

3. εἶναι, ὡστε αὐτῶν πετοιηκέναι αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος ἀνέθερ..

4. γὰρ ἡ βούλησαν παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ οἷον ἔργον αὐτοῦ, αὐτῆς

5. δε ταύτην τῇ ὑποστάσει αὐτοῦ, αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῶς ὑποστήθηκας ἐν εἰς αὐτῶς... ὡστε οὐκ ἀπερ ἐγκαὶ ἐνεί, ἀλλ' ἀπερ ἔμοισθης αὐτός.

6. Ἕτω δὲ ὅτι καὶ ταύτη ἐκαστὸν τῶν

7. λεγομένων εἶναι ταύτην ἐστὶ τῷ εἶναι αὐτῷ, ἡ ἐπφορο-

8. οῖον ἀνθρώπου ὅπε ἔτης, καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπω εἶναι ἀλλο-

9. μετέχει γε μὴν ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ ὁ ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπω εἶναι.

10. ἐξ ψυχῆς ἡ δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐξ ὕπνου ἐναι ταῦτα ἐν," ἡ ἀνθρώπως εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐν κατὰ τέχνην γένοιτο ἀνθρώπος, ἐπιστοὶ ἐτερον τοῦ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι εἰκὸν ἐν γένοιτο κατὰ τέχνην τούτο δ' ἐστιν παρ' αὐτοῦ ἄνθρωπος αὐτῷ. ἐγὼ δ' ἅπα ἀνθρώπω

11. εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τέχνην τινα ὑπὸ εἰς

12. αὐτὸν συμβάλθηκε, πᾶσα τὰ ὑπὸ τὸ ἀνθρώπου αὐτῷ, τὸ γεννητικὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου αὐτὸς, καὶ ͜ος τὰ βάντα πάντα, κατὰ τύχῃ ἐν λόγῳ, ὑπὸς ἀποευθείᾳ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐνεί καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ ὑπὲρ ὑπερήφανον τὴν τέχνην, ὡστε καὶ

13. ἔτη.

14. And, further, one must look at it also in this way: each of the things which is said to be is either the same as its being or different; for instance, this particular human being is one thing and essential humanity another; the human being, of course, participates in essential humanity. But soul and essential souness are the same thing if soul is simple and not predicated of something else, and the human being as such is the same as essential humanity. And the one might become a human being by chance, in so far as it is different from essential humanity, but essential humanity could not come to be by chance: this means "the human being as such comes to be from himself". If then essential humanity comes to be from itself and not by chance or as it happens, how could that which is above humanity as such and which generates humanity as such, and to which all the real beings belong, be said to be by chance, a nature simpler than essential humanity and universal essential being? Further, as one goes towards the simple it is not possible to take chance.

1 There is a reference here (with a Platonic correction) to the Form of man) to Aristotle Metaphysics H 3. 1043b2-4.
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up with one, so that it is impossible for chance to ascend to the simplest of all. And, further, it is appropriate to remember that statement which has already been made somewhere¹ that each and every one of the things which in truth are and have been brought to existence by that nature, and anything among the things of sense which is of this kind, is of this kind by what comes from those higher beings. I mean by "of this kind" having together with their substance also the cause of their existence, so that the observer afterwards can say why each of its inherent parts is there, for instance why there is an eye and why the feet of those particular beings are as they are and the cause which brings into existence together each part of each thing and brings them into existence on account of each other. Why are the legs and feet as long as they are? Because this is as it is, and because the legs and it is the feet and legs are as they are. And in general the harmony of all the parts with each other is their reciprocal cause; and the reason why this part is, is that this is essential humanity; so that the being and the cause are one and the same. But these came in this way from a single source which did not reason but gave the reason why and the being together as a whole. It is the source therefore of being and the why of being, giving both at once; but that from which these come is like the things which have come to be much more originally and more truly and more than as it is on their level in that it is better. If then there is nothing random or by chance and no "it happened to be like

¹ The reference is a general one to the first two chapters of the preceding treatise VI. 7.

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This with the things which have their cause in themselves, and all things which come from him do have it, for he is the father of reason and cause and causative substance, which are certainly all far from chance, he would be the principle and in a way the exempler of all things which have no part in chance, truly and primarily, uncontaminated by chances and coincidence and happening, cause of himself and himself from himself and through himself, for he is primarily self and self beyond being.

And he, that same self, is lovable and love and love of himself, in that he is beautiful only from himself and in himself. For surely his keeping company with himself could not be in any other way than if what keeps company and what it keeps company with were the one and the same. But if what keeps company is one with what it keeps company with and what it is, in a way, desiring is one with the object of desire, and the object of desire is on the side of existence and a kind of substrate, again it has become apparent to us that the desire and the substance are the same. But if this is so, again it is he himself who makes himself and is master of himself and has not come to be as something else willed, but as he himself wills. And further, when we say that he does not receive anything into himself nor does anything else receive him, in this way too we shall be placing something of this kind outside chance existence not only by making him one alone and clear of all things but for this reason: if we ever see in ourselves a nature of this

the Neoplatonists, giving Platonic authority for the doctrine of the Three Hypostases.

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There is a reference here to the Platonic Letter VI 323D4, one of the esoteric passages (with Letter II 312E) from dubiously genuine letters which were foundation-texts for
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18 το σώμα το ἑπόθεν ἔχονσαν τῶν ἄλλων, ὡς συνήρτηται ἡμιόν, καθὰ πάραγεν ὅ τι περ ἂν συμβῆ με [καὶ] κατὰ τόχρην ὑπάρχει—πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα, δοξά ἡμῶν, διὰλεκτοὶ κακκείμενοι; τὰ πάντα καὶ οἷον κατὰ τόχρην προσεκλήσατα, τούτω δὲ μόνῳ τὸ κέρατον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ αὑτόφυλον
20 φαντος ἀγαθωτὸς καὶ ἄγαθος ἐνεργῶν καὶ μετονομαζότας ἄνα τούτω, οἷον ἐπάκοντο τὸ ὑπὲρ τὸ νοείν ἐξούσια: εἰς δὴ ἀναμαθάτους καὶ γεννάμενος τούτῳ μόνον, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀφέντες, τί ἄρα εἰσομένη μείον ἢ ἢ ἀλλιώτερον, καὶ πλέον ἢ αὑτοφυλοσείς; τὸ δὲ ἢ ἡμῖν προσφέρει τόση
tύχας ἡ τῶν εἰκή ἡ τῷ ἀναβαθμίζοντα καὶ τῷ ἀλλιβρισείν, ἠ τὸ δὲ ἄλλο, ἀλλ᾽ ἢτοι αὐτὸ μόνοι, τὰ μὲν ἀλλά μοναδικὰν οἷον ἢτοι αὐτοῦ αὐτόπαρκοι εἶναι εἰς τὸ εἶναι τοῦτο δὲ ἢτοι μὲν ἢτοι καὶ μοναδικοῖ, ὡστε χρῆ δὲ πρῶτη οὐκ οἶν ἐν ἐκάθεν αὐτοῦ ἢ ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀνθρώπων γὰρ εἰς τὸ εἶναι καὶ
25 αὐτῆς ἀκέδανται ὡς ἄλλοι, καὶ διερίζεται ἄλλ᾽ ἄλλοι πρὸς εἰς λόγου, ἀναλύεται τύχην τὸ γὰρ κατὰ λόγοι ἐν τῷ ἑνώμενον αὐτῶν ἡμῖν εἰκόνες μὲν ὡς λόγοι, καλλίστων δὲ ἢ λόγως τούτοις ἀνέχειν τῶν τύχης χωμάτου: Ῥῆτα γὰρ λόγων πάσης ἡ ἀκέδασιν καὶ εἰς τόσι
30 ληγεῖ τὰ πάντα, ἀστερὶ φωτοῦ μεγίστου κατὰ λόγων ζώντος ἀρχῆς καὶ βάσεως, μένοςα γὰρ αὐτῇ ἐνθέον, διδῶνσα δὲ κατὰ λόγων τῷ φωτὶ, ὃ ἐλάβετο, εἶναι.

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kind which has nothing of the other things which are attached to us by which we have in experience whatever happens by chance—for all the other things which belong to us are enslaved to and exposed to chances, but this alone has self-mastery and self-disposal by the active presence of a light in the form of good, and good, and greater than that which belongs to Intellect, having its transcendent of Intellect not as something brought in from outside; surely, when we ascend to this and become this alone and let the rest go, what can we say of it except that we are more than free and more than independent? Who could then make us depend on chances or randomness or just happening when we have become the true life itself or come to be in it, which has nothing else but is itself alone? For the other things when they are isolated cannot be self-sufficient enough to exist; but this is what it is also when it is isolated. But as first existence it is not in the soulless and not in irrational life; for this also is too weak to exist and is a dispersion of rational principle and an indefiniteness; but in so far as it advances towards rational principle, it leaves chance behind; for that which is in accordance with rational principle is not by chance. But for us as we ascend that is not rational principle but more beautiful than rational principle; so far is it from happening by chance. For it is the root of rational principle as itself, and all things come to a stop in it; it is like the principle and fundament of a mighty tree living according to rational principle which remains itself by itself but gives to the tree existence according to the rational principle which it receives.

1 del. H-S 2 coniectum: ed. eadem, Enn. 278
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16. But since we maintain, and it appears to be so, that this is everywhere and again is nowhere, we must ponder this and think out what we ought to posit about the subject of our enquiry when we look at it from this point of view. For if he is nowhere, he has not happened to be anywhere, and if he is everywhere, he is as much as he is everywhere; so that the "everywhere" and "in every way" are himself; he is not in that everywhere, but is this himself and gives the others their being there with him in the everywhere. But he, since he has the highest place, or rather does not have it, but is himself the highest, has all things as slaves; he does not happen to them, but they to him, or rather they happen around him; he does not look to them, but they to him; but he is, if we may say so, born to his own interior, as it were well pleased with himself, the "pure radiance,"{1} being himself this with which he is well pleased: but this means that he gives himself existence, supposing him to be an abiding active actually and the most pleasing of things in a way rather like Intellect. But Intellect is an actualization; so that he is an actualization. But not of anything else; he is then an actualization of himself. He is not therefore as he happens to be, but as he acts. And then, further, if he is supremely because he so to speak holds to himself and so to speak looks to himself; and this so-called being of his in his looking to himself, he as it were makes himself and is not as he chanced to be but as he wills, and his willing is not random nor as it happened; for since it is willing of the best it is not random. But that an inclination of this kind to himself; being in a kind of way his activity and abiding in himself, makes him be what

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1. The light in which the souls see the Forms in Phaedrus 250C4; for Plotinus this light is the Good (or comes from the Good: VI. 7. 21–22).
he is, is evident if one posits the opposite; because, if he inclined to what is outside him, he would put an end to his being what he is; so then his being what he is is his self-directed activity; but these are one thing and himself. He therefore brought himself into existence, since his activity was brought out into existence along with himself. If then he did not come into being, but his activity was always and a something like being awake, when the wakener was not someone else, a wakefulness and a thought transcending thought which exists always, then he is as he woke himself to be. But his waking transcends substance and intellect and intelligent life; but these are himself. He then is an active actuality above intellect and thought and life; but these are from him and not from another. His being then comes by and from himself. He is not therefore as he happened to be, but he is himself as he willed.

17. And further, [consider it] also like this: we affirm that each and every thing in the All, and this All here itself, is as it would have been if the free choice of its maker had willed it, and its state is as if this maker proceeding regularly in his calculations with foresight had made it according to his providence. But since things here are always like this and always come to be like this, so their rational principles also always rest among the things which exist all together, standing still in a better order, so that the things there transcend providence and transcend free choice, and all the things which are in real being stand in intellectual stillness. So that if someone calls this disposition of things providence,
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he must understand it in this way, that Intellect is there standing still before this All, and this All here is from and according to Intellect. If then Intellect was before all things and an intellect of this kind was the principle, it would not be just as it chanced to be, being many but in tune with itself and as it were brought together into a single order. For what is many and an ordered multiplicity, and all rational forms included in one which goes through all, none of this is as it chanced and as it happened to be, but it is far from a nature of this kind and opposed to it, as much as chance whose place is in unreason is to rational principle. But if that before the Intellect of this kind is the principle, it is obviously close to this which is rationalised in this way, and what we speak of in this way is according to that and participates in that and is as that wills and is the power of that. He is in thus there alone, one rational principle for all things, one number and one which is greater and more powerful than what has come into being, and there is nothing greater or better than him. He does not then have from another either his being or his being what he is. He himself therefore is by himself what he is, released and directed to himself, that he may not in this way either he related to the outside or to something else, but altogether self-related.

11. And you when you seek, seek nothing outside him, but seek within all things which come after him; but leave him himself alone. For he himself is the outside, the encompassment and measure of all things. Or within in depth, but what is outside him, touching him in a kind of circle and depending on him, is all which is rational principle and intellect;
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but, rather, it would be Intellect, in so far as it touches him and in the way that it depends on him, in that it has from him its being Intellect. Just as a circle, therefore, which touches the centre all round in a circle, would be agreed to have its power from the centre and to have in a way the centre's form, in that the radii in the circle coming together to one centre make their terminal point at the centre like that to which they are carried and from which they, so to speak, grow out, though the centre is greater than is proportionate to these lines and their terminal points, the points of the lines themselves and the terminal points are like that centre, but only a dim image of that which has power to produce them in having power also to produce the lines; and what that centre is like is revealed through the lines; it is as if it was spread out without having been spread out—it is like this that we must apprehend Intellect-Being, coming to be from that Good and as if poured out and spread out and hanging out from it, is, by its own intelligent nature, evidence of something like Intellect in the One which is not Intellect, for it is one. Just as in our example also the radii and the circle were not the centre, but it is the father of circle and radii giving traces of itself and with an abiding power generating radii and circle, not at all cut off from it, by a kind of strength; so also is that too, as the intellectual power runs round it, a kind of archetype of the image of itself, Intellect in one, an image, as it were, overcome by many and into many and so becoming Intellect, while that remains before Intellect and generates intellects from its power what chance happening (or accident or "as it happened to be") could come near a power like this

1 coniectimus. φιλόσοφος Ενν. 2 delevimus. 3 Thcler. 4 P' Ps (Ficinus); ὃ Ενν. 5 A'S5 (Ficinus), H-S; om. H-S'.
which makes Intelect and is maker of reality? For something like what is in Intellect, in many ways greater, is in that One: it is like a light dispersed far and wide from some one thing translucent in itself; what is dispersed is image, but that from which it comes is truth; though certainly the dispersed image, Intellect is not of alien form; it is not chance, but each and every part of it is rational principle and cause, but that One is cause of the cause. He is then in a greater degree something like the most causative and truest of causes, possessing all together the intellectual causes which are going to be from him and generative of what is not as it chanced but as he himself willed. And his willing is not irrational, or of the random, or just as it happened to occur to him, but as it ought to be, since nothing there is random. For this reason Plato speaks of "due" and "right moment",1 desiring to indicate as far as possible that it is far from "as it chanced", but what it is is what it ought to be. But if this is what ought to be, it is not so irrationally, and if it is the right moment it has the most authentic mastery among the things which come after it, and has priority in its own right and is not what it is in a way chanced to be, but what he in a way wished to be, since he wishes what ought to be and what ought to be and the active actuality of what ought to be one and one and it is not what ought to be as a substrate, but as the first active actuality revealing itself as what it ought to be. For this is how one has to speak of him since one is unable to speak as one should.

1 Taken from an entirely different context, Plato’s discussion of the two kinds of measurement, Statesman 388

281D–E, from which Aristotel devlops his doctrine of the Mean.

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19. Λαμβανόμενος τις, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀνακωπεῖς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἐκεῖνο αὐτό, καὶ θέασαι καὶ αὐτὸς οὖν δοῦν θέλει εἰπέων δινάμενος. ἵδιον δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα λόγον ἀφεὶς θέτειν παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐκεῖνο. 5 τούτῳ οὖ, καὶ εἴπερ εἶσαι οὕσως, δουλήν ἂν αὐτῷ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἶναι καὶ οἷον παρ' αὐτοῦ εἶναι, οὐδὲ ἂν τὸν ἑαυτόν αὐτὸν ἤτιον τὸ ἕν, ὡς ἐπίθετο, ἰππόποδα διάνεις καὶ ἐκπληγείτε γὰρ ἂν τολμῶν, καὶ οὐδὲ ἂν ἔχων οἷον τούτων. εἴπει περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντη.

10 οὖτος ἐκεῖνος οἷον πρὸς ἀμάθος τῆς ψυχῆς προ-φαινομένος καὶ, ὅπως ἢ ἐπιστήμη, ἐκεῖνος βλέποντος, εἰ μὴ ποι. ἀλλ' ἀφεῖς τὸν θεὸν ἄπειρον μηδὲν ἐπὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ διανοούμενον. χρὴ δὲ οὕσι καὶ τὸ ἐκέει σα καὶ τοῦτο νοείζων τοῦ παλαιοῦ λαγόμενον.

15 ὅτι ἄνθρωπος, οἷον μὲν ὑπὲρ γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι οἱ ἀυλείμοι οἵδος οὐδὲ οἰκεῖ ἀρχή ἢ ὄντος ἀυτοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὁμοίας ὁς οὐκ αὐτῷ ἐποίησε τὴν ὁμοιότητα, ἀλλ' ὁμοίας τὸν ἔσχην ἐκεῖνον ἐκεῖνον, ἢ τὸν ἔσχην ἐκεῖνον, ἢ ἐποίησεν αὐτό.

20. Τί οὖν; οἷον σημαίνει, ἢπειρεί τις εἰ, πρὶν ἢ γενέσθαι γεγονότα; εἰ γὰρ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ, τῷ μὲν “ἐαυτόν” ὁποῖα ἔστι, τῷ δὲ μὲν κανέν ἐστιν ἢ ἐν ἠμῶν ἐκεῖνον τοῦ ποιημένου ὁμοιότατα αὐτῷ. πρὸς δὲ δὴ λεκτέων.

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19. Raised up, then, towards that by what has been said one should take hold of that itself, and he will see also himself and will not be able to say all that he wishes. But when he sees that in itself he will put away all reasoning and will set that by itself as being such that, if it had substance, its substance would be its slave and as if derived from it. Nor would one who sees it still be rash enough to say "as it happened to be"; nor is he able to utter a word about it; if he did he would be struck dumb in his rashness, and would not in his swift flight be able to say "where" about it; it appears everywhere to him as if before the eyes of his soul and, wherever he fixes his gaze, he is looking at him, unless he leaves the God and fixes his gaze elsewhere and thinks no more about him. And one ought perhaps to understand that it was in this sense that the ancients spoke of "beyond being" with a hidden meaning,1 not only that he generates substance but that he is not a slave to substance or to himself, nor is his substance his principle, but he, being principle of substance, did not make substance for himself but when he had made it left it outside himself, because he has no need of being, he who made it. He does not then even make being in accordance with his being.

20. "Well then," someone might say, "does he not happen to be already before he comes into being? For if he makes himself, as regards himself he does not yet exist, but on the other hand as regards the making he exists already before himself, as he himself is what is made." To this we must reply that he is

1 The reference is of course again to Plato Republic VI 506B9.
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not at all to be classed as made, but as maker; we must posit that his making is absolute, and not in order that something else should be brought to perfection by his making, since his activity is not directed to the perfection of something else, but is altogether this God; for there are not two, but one. Nor shall we be afraid to assume that the first activity is without substance, but posit this very fact as his, so to speak, existence. But if one posited an existence without activity, the principle would be defective and the most perfect of all imperfect. And if one adds activity one does not keep the One. If then the activity is more perfect than the substance, and the first is most perfect, the first will be activity. In his activity, therefore, he is already this first, and it cannot be that he was before he came to be; for then he was not before coming to be, but already altogether was. Now certainly an activity not enslaved to substance is purely and simply free, and in this way he himself is himself from himself. For indeed, if he was kept in being by another, he would not be first self from himself; but if he is rightly said to hold himself together, he is both himself and the bringer of himself into being, granted that what he by his nature holds together is what from the beginning he has made to be. Now if there was a time from which he began to be, "he has made" would be used in the strict and proper sense; but now, if he was what he is before eternity existed, this "he has made" must be understood to mean that making and self are concurrent; for the being is one with the making and what we may call the eternal generation. From this too [it comes that we say] "ruling himself"; and if there were two, this is properly said, but if there is
καὶ εἰ μὲν δῦν, κυρίως, εἰ δὲ ἐν, τὸ ἄρχων μόνον αὐτὸν ἀρχεῖ τὸ ἀρχηγόν. πάντας ὁ ἄρχων αὐτὸς ἄντος πρὸς δὲ, ἢ τὸ ἄρχων ἀνταὐσθεὶν τρὶς τὸ ἀρχὰ τὸν, διὸ ὅτι ἡμᾶς δὲ, εἰ δὲ μὴν ἡμᾶς ἔμεν, πρῶτον τοῦτο δὲ εἰ τὰξιν, ἀλλὰ κυριακτί καὶ δυνάμεις αὐτοῖς καθάρως, εἰ δὲ καθάρως, ὥσπερ ἔστω ἐκεῖνο περί τὸν μὲν αὐτοῖς. ὅλον ὁτι

35 αὐτοῖς ἐκεῖνοι εἰς αὐτοῖς. τί νῦν αὐτὸς, ὁ μὴ αὐτὸς τί νῦν, ὁ μὴ ἐπεργεῖ; καὶ τί, ὁ μὴ ἐπεργεῖ; εἰ γὰρ τε εἰς μὴ ἐπεργεῖν αὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ, να καθαρὶ ὅτι εἰ ὅστε αὐτοῖς πάντα δυνάμεις ἕκατον τοῦ γὰρ ἀνταὐσθεὶν τοῖς πάντα τοῖς κύριοις πάντα τοῖς ἐπὶ ἐναίδεος. ἐκεῖνο γὰρ οὐ κάθοιτο, οὐ μὴν αὐτὸς κύριος εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν.

21. Ἐδόθη τοι ὁτι αὐτὸς ἔπειτα ἔπειτα ἔπειτα, εἰ ὅσπιτα, ἔπειτα καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὑπὲρ ἀναπήδευς, ὥσπερ εἰ ἂν κακὸν ποιεῖ, ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ δύνασθαι ἐκεῖνο, ὅπως καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα, ἀλλὰ ὧς ὁστεμάθηκε καὶ ἀρκετὴν δυνάμεις ὅπως ἔστω ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι ἡμᾶς δυνάμεις ἔστω, ὅτι μὴ ἔλαβηται τοῦ ἐν καὶ γὰρ τὸ τὰ ἀντικείμενα δύνασθαι ἀναπηδεύς ἐστί τοῦ ἐπί τοῦ ἀρτοῦ μείνῃ, δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὴν ποιήσαν αὐτὸν ἀρτοῦ, ἢ γάρ γαρ, καὶ ταύτα ἀποῖς εἶναι καὶ ἐκεῖνο, καὶ τίς ἂν παρατρέψῃ βουλήσῃ γενομένου ὅσοι καὶ ἦν

10 βουλήσων οὐκ; βουλήσει οὖν μέτων ὄντως, τί δὲ βασὶς ἐκεῖνον ἀδελφοῖς τὸ ὑποστάσαι; ποῦ βουλήσει οὖν αὐτῷ ὅτα ἡ βουλήις ἀπὸ οὐσίας ἀνενεκὴ; ὥς ἦν

1 Theiler: οὖν ἔλεον.
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his substance; so there is nothing different from his substance. Or what was there that he was not, will for instance? So he was all will, and there is nothing in him which is not that which wills—nothing, then, before willing. So he himself is primarily his will. So then he is also as he willed and of the kind he willed, and what follows upon his will, what this kind of will generated but it generated nothing further in himself, for he was this already. But his holding himself together must be understood, if one is to say it correctly, as meaning that all the other things that exist are held together by this; for they exist by some kind of participation in him, and it is to this that their origin is to be traced. But he himself has no longer any need from himself of holding together or participation, but is all things by and in himself— but rather none of them, and he does not need all things to be himself; but when you speak or think of him, put away all the other things. When you have put away all things and left only himself, do not try to find what you can add, but if there is something you have not yet taken away from him in your mind. For even you can grasp something about which it is not possible any more to say or apprehend anything else; but it is something which has its place high above everything, this which alone is free in truth, because it is not enslaved to itself, but is only itself and really itself, while every other thing is itself and something else.

1 Aμαν (= Ecinus: αμαν, Egn., H-S²).
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Instead order, though they were written some years later, VI 7[38] and VI 8[39], need particularly to be taken into consideration.

Synopsis

All beings are beings by the One; unity is the condition of their existence. Soul unifies all beings in this world, but is not itself the One, but one by something else (ch. 1). Not in real being, either individual or universal, the One; the world of Forms, which is Being, and is alive, and is Intellect, is manifold, and neither as the totality of real beings nor as living and thinking can it be the One which gives it unity (ch. 2). Difficulty of thinking or speaking about the One because it is formless; we must first reach the level of Intellect and then go beyond it; the One is not one of things it generates, and all which is said of them must be denied of it (ch. 3). We are aware of the One by a presence above knowledge; teaching and reasoning can only help on the way to it (ch. 4). We must first come to an understanding of the soul and its derivation from Intellect, and go on from there; inadequacy of all names, including "One", for the source of Intellect (ch. 5). What we mean by using this inadequate term for it; the absolute self-sufficiency of the One; it is beyond the need for thinking (ch. 6). Need to turn inwards, away from all other things, and even oneself, to find the One (ch. 7). The image of the circle; how we must turn to the One, the centre, by putting away otherness (ch. 8). The One is always present, always giving its gifts, but we must put away all other things to possess him truly (ch. 9). The vision which is perfect union, with no consciousness of duality (ch. 10). The final mystery of that union; how we fall from it and rise to it again (ch. 11).
VI. 9. ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE

1. It is by the one that all beings are beings, both those which are primarily beings and those which are in any sense said to be among beings. For what could anything be if it was not one? For if things are deprived of the one which is predicated of them they are not those things. For an army does not exist if it is not one, nor a chorus or a flock if they are not one. But neither can a house or a ship exist if they do not have their one, since the house is one and so is the ship, and if they lose it the house is no longer a house nor the ship a ship. So then continuous magnitudes, if the one was not with them, would not exist; at any rate, if they are cut up they change their being in proportion as they lose their one. And again the bodies of plants and animals, each of which is one, if they escape their one by being broken up into a multitude, lose the substance which they had and are no longer what they were but have become other things, and are those other things in so far as each of them is one. And there is health when the body is brought together into one order, and beauty when the nature of the one holds the parts together; and the soul has virtue when it is unified into one thing and one agreement. Is it true then that, since the soul brings all things to their one by making and moulding and shaping and composing them, we should, when we have arrived at it, say that it is this
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.

20 λέγειν, ὡς αὕτη τὸ ἐν χορηγεί καὶ αὕτη ἐστι τὸ ἐν; ἡ ἀστερ τὰ ἄλλα χορηγοῦσα τοῖς σώμασιν οὐκ ἐστὶν αὐτὴ ὁ δίδωσιν, οὐν μορφή καὶ εἶδος, ἀλλὰ ἔτερα αὐτῆς, οὕτω χρή, εἰ καὶ ἐν δίδωσιν, ἔτερον ἦν αὐτῆς νομίζειν αὐτὴν διδάσκει καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐν βλέπουσαν ἐν ἐκαστὸν ποιεῖν. 

25 ὡσπερ καὶ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον, συναθροῦσαν μετὰ τοῦ ανθρώπου τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐν. τῶν γὰρ ἐν λεγομένων τῶν ἐκαστόν ἐστιν ὃς ἔχει καὶ δ ἐστιν, ὡστε τὰ μὲν ἤδην ὡστα ἤδην ἐχειν τὸ ἐν τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον μᾶλλον, καὶ ὃ καὶ ὃν ἤδην ἐτερον ὡστα τὸν ὡς τῷ μᾶλλῳ πᾶς τὸν μᾶλλῳ ἐκαστὸν ἐστιν. ἔχει καὶ τὰς λόγους τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ὃς αὕτων ἐναι, [τὸ μᾶλλον ἐν] ¹ οἷς μὴν αὑτῷ τὸ ἐν ψυχή γάρ μία καὶ συμβεβηκός πιστύ ἐν καὶ ὑποτελεύτη ἐν καὶ ψυχή καὶ ἐν. ὡσπερ σώμα καὶ ἐν. καὶ τὸ μὲν διεστικός, ὡσπερ χορός, πορρωτάτο τὸ ἐν, τὸ δὲ συνεχές εἰργατέρως ψυχή δὲ ἐτοι μᾶλλον κοινοφηδότι καὶ αὐτής. εἰ δ' ὃν ἄνευ τοῦ ἐν ἐναὶ οὕτως ἐν ψυχή εἰπ. ταύτης ἐν ταύτῃ τούτης ἐν ψυχή καὶ τὸ ἐν πρῶτον μὲν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα <Δ> ² ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνα μετὰ τοῦ ὡς εἰς τὸ ἐν ἐναὶ ἐναὶ ἐστὶν ἄλλων ἁπτομένων αὐτῶν τὸ ἐν—οὕ τοι ταύταν σώμα καὶ ἐν. ἀλλὰ τὸ σώμα μετέχει τοῦ ἐν—ἐτερον ἦν τὸ πολλῷ ἡ ψυχή καὶ ἡ μία καὶ ἡ μία καὶ ἡ μία 

30 εἰ μὴ ἐν μέροις συνεπειράς μὲν διαφέρεις ἐν αὐτῇ, λογιζεῖσθαι, ἀρέσκεσθαι, ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ὃ τοῦ ἐν ἀστερ δεσμῶς συνέχεσθαι. ἐπείγει μὲν δὴ ψυχή τὸ ἐν ἐν

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which provides the one and this which is the one? Rather we should consider that, just as with the other things it provides for bodies, it is not itself what it gives, shape and form for instance, but they are other than it, so, even if it gives the one, it gives it as something other than itself, and that it is by looking to the one that it makes each and every thing one, just as it is by looking to [the Form of] man that it makes something man, taking the one in it along with the man. For of the things which are said to be one each is one in the way in which it also has what it is, so that the things which are less beings have the one less, and those which are more beings, more. And the soul too, which is other than the one, has its being more one in proportion to its greater and real being. It is certainly not the one itself; for the soul is one and the soul is somewhat incidental to it, and these things, soul and one, are two, just like body and one. And what has separate parts, like a chorus, is furthest from the one, and what is a continuous body is nearer; and the soul is nearer still, but still participates in it. But if because without being one it would not be soul, for this reason someone makes soul and the one the same, first of all, all the other things are what they are along with their being one; but all the same the one is different from them— for body and one are not the same thing, but the body participates in the one—and then the soul is many, even the soul which is one, even if it is not composed from parts; for there are very many powers in it, reasoning, desiring, apprehending, which are held together by the one as by a bond. So the soul brings the one to other things.

¹ transposimus, ut corrigere possum.
² H-S².

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being also itself one by something else; it too experiences this unity by the act of another.

2. Is it, then, true that for each of the things which are one as parts its substance and its one are not the same thing, but for being and substance as a whole and being one and one are the same thing? So that anyone who has discovered being has discovered the one, and substance itself is the one itself. For example, if intellect is substance, intellect is also the one since it is primarily being and primarily one, and as it gives the other things a share in being, so in the same measure it also gives them a share in the one. For what can anyone say that it is besides being and intellect? For it is either the same as being—for "man" and "one man" are the same thing—or it is like a kind of number of the individual; you say "one" of a thing alone just as you say "two things". Now if number belongs to the real beings, it is clear that so does the one; and we must investigate what it is. But if number is an activity of soul going through things one after another, the one would not be anything factual. But our argument said that if an individual thing loses its one it will not exist at all. We must therefore see if the individual one and individual being are the same thing, and universal being and the universal one. But if the being of the individual is a multiplicity, but it is impossible for the one to be a multiplicity, they will be different from each other. At any rate

1 That Intellect-Real Being is the first principle was the view of most Platonists before Plotinus, including his fellow-pupil of Ammonius, Origen, the Platonic (to be distinguished from Origen the Christian). See Origen fr. 7 Weber (= Proclus Platonic Theology II 4, 7.31, 5-11 Saffrey-306.

Wentonk, H. R. Schwabe has suggested that Ammonius himself may have held a view closer to that of Plotinus (Ammonios Sukkas, der Lehrer Plotins, Opladen 1983, 12-18).
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.

εἴη ἐκάστορ. ἄνθρωπος γονέως καὶ ζώων καὶ λογικοῦ καὶ 20 πολλά μέρη καὶ σωθεῖται ἐν τῇ πολλῇ πάτῃ. Ἀλλα ἂν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἐν, εἰ τὸ μὲν μεριστὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀμερός, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ ὅλον δὲ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ εἶχον τὰ ὅσα πολλά μᾶλλον ἐν εἴη καὶ έπτερον τὸν ἀνθρώπον, μεταλβήσας δὲ ἔχουν καὶ μαθάσει τὸ ἄνθρωπον. ἃ ἐστι δὲ καὶ ζώον [καὶ νοῦν] 1 τὸ δὲ-οὖ 26 γὰρ δὴ νεκρῶν πολλὰ ἁρμά τὸ ἄνθρωπον τὸν καὶ οὕτω πολλὰ ἀνέγκει εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ μᾶλλον, εἰ τὰ εἴδη περιέχουσαν ὑπὸ γὰρ ἢ ἔνσει ἐν, ἀλλ’ ἁμαρτωλὸς μᾶλλον καὶ ἐκάστη καὶ ἡ σύμπασσα, καὶ οὕτως ἐν, ἀμβετερ ἃν ἐνή ἡ 27 κόσμου ἐν ὡς δὲ τῷ μὲν τῷ πρῶτῳ, ἀδὲ νοῆς καὶ τὸ ἔνα καὶ τὸ δὴ-οὖ πρῶτα ἐδέξας τε γὰρ ἐκαστον ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ ὑμάθοντα καὶ ύπερτορον ἐξ ὧν γὰρ ἐκαστῶν ἐστι, πρότερα ἐκεῖνα, ὅτι δὲ εἴμων τὸν νοοῦν τῷ πρῶτῳ ἐναίη καὶ ἐν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐτέτας τῷ νοοῦν ἀνάγκη 28 ἐν τῷ νοεῖν εἴπει καὶ τόν γε ἄρσην καὶ τόν οὖ πρὸς τό ἔξω βλέπων νοεῖν τῷ πρὸ ἀυτοῦ εἰς αὐτῶν γὰρ ἐνεστρέφειν εἰς ἁμηρῆ ἐπιστρέφει καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτός τό νοοῦν καὶ τό νουσμενον, διδυμοῦς ἐστι καὶ νός ἀπλοῖς αὐτὸ τό ἔξω εἰ δὲ πρὸς ἄρσην βλέπει, πάντως πρὸς τῷ κρείττον καὶ πρὸ τοῦ αὐτῶν, εἰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς κρείττον, καὶ οὕτως δεξίον, καὶ χρῆ τῷ νοῆς τοιούτων τίθεναι, ὁδον παραιτά μὲν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ

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"man" and "living being" and "rational" are many parts and these many are bound together by the one. "Man" and "one" are therefore different, and one has parts and the other is partless. And, further, universal being, which has all the beings in it, will be still more many and different from the one, and will have the one by sharing and participation. But being also has life; for it is certainly not a corpse; being therefore is many things. But if it is intellect, in this way too it must be many, and still more if it includes the Forms. For the Idea is not one, but rather a number, both each individual one and the total Idea, and is one in the way in which the universe is one. But altogether the one is primary and the Forms and being are not primary. For each Form is of many parts and composite and posterior; for those elements from which an individual thing is composed are prior to it. And it is clear also from the following that intellect cannot be the first: it is necessary that intellect exists in its thinking, and that the best intellect, the one which does not look outside itself, thinks what is before it; for in turning to itself it turns to its principle. And if intellect itself is what thinks and what is thought, it will be double and not single and so not the one; but if it looks to another, it must certainly be to that which is better than it and before it. But if it looks both to itself and to what is better than it, in this way also it is second. And one must suppose that intellect is of such a kind that it is present to the good and the first

1 Here Plotinus is developing and correcting Aristotle's account of the self-thinking divine mind in Metaphysics A 8. 1074b15-1075a12.

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and looks to him, but is also present with itself and thinks itself, and thinks itself as being all things. It is far, then, from being the one since it is richly various. The one then cannot be all things, for so it would be no longer one; and it cannot be intellect, for in this way it would be all things since intellect is all things: and it cannot be being; for being is all things.

3. What then could the One be, and what nature could it have? There is nothing surprising in its being difficult to say, when it is not even easy to say what Being or Form is; but we do have a knowledge based upon the Forms. But in proportion as the soul goes towards the formless, since it is utterly unable to comprehend it because it is not delimited and, so to speak, stamped by a richly varied stamp, it slices away and is afraid that it may have nothing at all. Therefore it gets tired of this sort of thing, and often gladly comes down and falls away from all this, till it comes to the perceptible and rests there as if on solid ground; just as sight when it gets tired of small objects is glad to come upon big ones. But when the soul wants to see itself, seeing only by being with it and being one by being one with it, it does not think it yet has what it seeks, because it is not different from what is being thought. But all the same this is what one must do if one is going to philosophise about the One. Since, then, that which we seek is one and we are considering the principle of all things, the Good and the First, one must not go far away from the things around the primary by straining his eyes to catch sight of a little boat far away among the waves (fr. 2 des Places, 11 Leemans).

2 Plotinus may be thinking here of Numenius’ comparison of the attempt to see the Good to someone...
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falling down to the last things of all, but as one goes to the primary one must lift oneself up from the things of sense which are the last and lowest, and become freed from all evil since one is hastening to the Good, and ascend to the principle in oneself and become one from many, when one is going to behold the Principle and the One. Therefore one must become Intellect and entrust one's soul to and set it firmly under Intellect, that it may be awake to receive what that sees, and may by this Intellect behold the One, without adding any sense-perception or receiving anything from sense-perception into that Intellect, but beholding the most pure with the pure Intellect, and the primary part of intellect. When therefore he who is embarked on the contemplation of this kind imagines size or shape or bulk about this nature, it is not Intellect which guides his contemplation because Intellect is not of a nature to see things of this kind, but the activity is one of sense-perception and opinion following sense-perception. But one must take one's information from Intellect where it is competent. And Intellect is competent to see its own things and the things before it. The things in it also are pure, but those before it are purer and simpler—or rather that which is before it. It is not therefore Intellect, but before Intellect. For Intellect is one of the beings, but that is no; anything, but before each and every thing, and is not being; for being has a kind of shape of being, but that has no shape, not even intelligible shape. For since the nature of the One is generative of all things it is not any one of them. It is not therefore something or qualified or quantitative or intellect or soul; it is not in movement or at rest,
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.

κινούμενον οὐδ' αὐτ' έστι τάσις, οὐκ έν τόπω, οὐκ έν χώραν, 
άλλ' αὐτ' κα' έν τό μόρος είσθε, μάλλον δε 
άνεξος πρό κινήσεως, πρό στάσεως ταύτη γάρ περί τό ὄν, ὁ πολλά αὐτό πει. διή 
τ' οὖν, εἴ μη κινούμενον, οὐκ ἔστι τάσις: ζήτημα μέν τοῦ ὄν 
πάσης διάταξις ἡ ὑπόστασις ἐπιμέλεια ἡ κατάστασις ἡ ἐπιστήμη, οὐ τε ἐπίστευ 
stάσει ἐστίς καί οὐ ταύτῃ τῇ στάσει: οὕτως ἡμῖ 

βοηθεῖται εὐτύχει καί οὐκέτει ἄπλοι μενε, εἴ 
τ' οὖν, εἴ μη κινούμενον, οὐκ ἔστι τάσις: ζήτημα μέν τοῦ ὄν 
πάσης διάταξις ἡ ὑπόστασις ἡ ὑπόστασις ἡ ἐπιστήμη, οὐ τε ἐπίστευ 

4. Προκειται δ' ο' ἄπορον μάλιστα, ἢ μηδέ κα 

ποτήρινη ἢ σύκεος μολυνη μηδέ κατά νόμον, ὅπερ 
τά ἄλλα οὐκά, ἄλλα κατά παρασκευή ἐπιστήμη 

κεραίων. πάντες δ' ο' φυσικοί τόν εἶναι τῆς ἀνάπτυξι 
τά καί ὁ πάντως ἐστιν ἔστιν ἔστιν ὄν, ἔστιν ἐπιστήμην τού 

λόγου γαρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τολάτ' δ' αὐτό. παρέχεται 

καί ο' τά ποτήρια, καί πλήρος πασίον. ὑπέρ 

ποτήρια τοίνυν δει φαινείνει καί μηδέμεν κακών 

τά εἶναι, ἄλλ' ἀποστήμην δει καί ἐπιστήμη 

καί 10 ποτήρια καί παντώς ἄλλου καί καλοῦ δεμάτου. πάν

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not in place, not in time, but "itself by itself of single form", or rather formless, being before all form, before movement and before rest; for these pertain to being and are what make it many. Why, then, if it is not in movement it is not at rest? Because each or both of these must necessarily pertain to being, and what is at rest is so by rest and is not the same as rest, so rest will be incidental to it and it will not be the same as rest. For to say that it is the cause is not to predicate something incidental of it but of us, because we have something from it while that One is in itself; but one who speaks precisely should not say "that" or "is"; but we run round it outside, in a way, and want to explain our own experiences of it, sometimes near it and sometimes falling away in our perplexities about it.

4. The perplexity arises especially because our awareness of that One is not by way of reasoned knowledge or of intellectual perception, as with other intelligible things, but by way of a presence superior to knowledge. The soul experiences its falling away from being one and is not altogether one when it has reached knowledge of anything; for reasoned knowledge is a rational process, and a rational process is many. The soul therefore goes past the One and falls into number and multiplicity. One must therefore turn up above knowledge and in no way depart from being one, but one must depart from knowledge and things known, and from every other, even beautiful, object of vision. For every

1 This comes from an established Platonic-Pythagorean
exegesis of the First Hypothesis of Plato’s Parmenides.
2 Plato Symposium 211B.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.

γάρ καλόν ὑποτεκνών οἰκέων καὶ παρ` ἐκείνου, ὀσπερ πάν χρὸνος μιθησεμένων παρ` ἡλίου. ἔδω τοῦ δὲ τοῦ ὀφεῖν ὑπὸ ὑποτεκνών, ὁποῖον, ἀλλὰ λέγομαι καὶ γράφωμεν πάσης ἡμέρας στηριχαί ἡμέρας καὶ ἀναγεννησίας ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐπὶ τὴν θέαν ὀσπερ ὑπὸ δικόν διεσεύστης τῷ τοῦ θεάτας θαυμασμὸν.

15 μέχρι τῆς οἴκου ὑπερ ὑποτεκνών ἡ διάνοια, ἢ ἔθελεν, ἢ ἐπὶ πάν οὐκ ἐργαν ἐκ τοῦ ἱερίδιον θεοῦ καὶ βεβολημένου. έδω δὲ μὴ ἐπί τις ἐπὶ τὸ θέμα, μηδὲ σύνειν ἐγείρῃ ἢ πυκνῇ τῇ ἐκείνῃ ἡγολογείς μηδὲ ἐπίθεσθαι μηδὲ ἐσχατώ ἐν αὐτῷ οἶνον ἱερικοῦ πάθημα ἐκ τοῦ θεῦ ἐστροφῇ ἢ ἐς ἀναπαυσμάν,

20 δεξιέμενοι2 φῶς ἰδιοτικόν καὶ πάσην τὴν ψυχήν περικειότατα3 διὰ τὸ ἐγκυρότερα γεγονέναι, ἀναμβεβηκέτε, δὲ ἐπὶ ὑποθαμαρχή υπάρχον, ἡ ἐσπάδαια πάν τῇ θείᾳ, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀναμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ ἔχων τὸ διεσύμφων ἀρ' αὐτοῦ, ὁ μὴν εἰς ἀναπαυσιμόν, ̣—γάρ

25 δὴ ἐπεστίν οὐδεὶς ἐκεῖνο καὶ πάντων δέ, ὡστε παρών μὴ παρεναι ἀλλ' ἢ τοὺς δέχεσθαι δυνάμειν καὶ παρασκευασμένοι, ὡστε ἑναρμόσει καὶ τοῖς εἰς ἀνεφάσησθαι καὶ σχεῖται ἐμπεσάντων: καὶ τῇ ἐπὶ αὐτῷ δυνάμεις ὑπεργείει τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ δῶν σώσει ἔχει, ὡς ἔχει, ὡς ἐνίατον ἀπ',

30 αὐτοῦ, δὴ δύναται ἰδεῖν ὡς πάσης ἐκείνης ἕκενος θεάτος εἴναι—εἰ τοῦ μήπετο εἶναι ἐκεῖ, ἀλλὰ διὰ ταῦτα ἔσται ἔσται, ὡς ἔσται, ὡς δ' ἐκείνως παταιδαγωγοῦσιν λόγος καὶ πάντων περὶ αὐτοῦ παραφυσικόν, δ' ἔκειναι μὲν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐν ἔτειρ

1 Kirchhoff: ἰδεῖν θεατός Ενν. 2 suspic. Harder: περικείμενον Ενν. 316

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beautiful thing is posterior to that One, and comes from it, as all the light of day comes from the sun. Therefore, Plato says, "it cannot be spoken or written": but we speak and write impelling towards it and wakening from reasonings to the vision of it, as if showing the way to someone who wants to have a view of something. For teaching goes as far as the road and the travelling, but the vision is the task of someone who has already resolved to see. But if someone has not come to the vision, and his soul has no awareness of the glory there, and he has not experienced and does not have in himself a kind of passionate experience like that of a lover resting in the beloved, then, having received the true light and illumined his whole soul through drawing nearer, but being still held back in the ascent by a burden which hinders the vision, and having ascended not alone but taking something with him which keeps him from the One, or being not yet brought together into unity—for that One is not absent from any, and absent from all, so that in its presence it is not present except to those who are able and prepared to receive it, so as to be in accord with it and as if grasp it and touch it in their likeness: and, by the power in oneself akin to that which comes from the One, when someone is as he was when he came from him, he is already able to see as it is the nature of that God to be seen—if then someone is not yet there but is outside because of these impediments, or through lack of a reasoning to guide him and give him assurance about the One, let him blame himself for those hindrances and try to

1 Plato Letter VII 541C5.
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depart from all things and he alone, but as for what he disbelieves because he is deficient in his reasonings, let him consider the following.

5. Whoever thinks that reality is governed by chance and accident and held together by bodily causation is far removed from God and from the idea of the One, and our discourse is not directed to those people but to those who posit another nature besides bodies and have gone up as far as soul. Now these must come to an understanding of the soul, in other ways and especially that it derives from Intellect, and that it is by sharing in the rational principle which comes from it that it possesses virtue; after this they must grasp that there is an Intellect other than that which is called reasoning and reckoning, and that reasonings are already in a kind of separation and motion, and that our bodies of knowledge are rational principles in the soul and of a kind which have already become manifest there because Intellect the cause of knowledge has become present in the soul. And when one has seen Intellect as something like an object of sense because it is apprehended as transcending the soul and being its father, an intelligible universe, one must say that Intellect is a quiet and undisturbed movement, having all things in itself and being all things, a multiplicity which is undivided and yet again divided. For it is not divided as are the rational principles which are already thought one by one, nor are its contents confused; for each one proceeds separately; it is as it is in our bodies of knowledge, where all the items are in a partless whole and yet each of them is separate. This multiplicity all together, then, the intelligible universe, is what is near to the First, and our
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argument says that it must necessarily exist, if one says that the soul exists, and that it must be of higher authority than soul, it is not, however, the First, because if it is not one nor simple; but the One is simple and the principle of all things. Now that which is prior to what is most honourable among real beings, given that there must be something before Intellect which wants to be one but is not one, but in unitary form, because Intellect is not dispersed in itself but is in reality all together with itself and its nearness after the One has kept it from dividing itself, though it did somehow dare to stand away from the One—that which is before this Intellect, this marvel of the One, which is not existent, so that: “one” may not here also have to be predicated of something else, which in truth has no fitting name, but if we must give it a name, “one” would be an appropriate ordinary way of speaking of it, not in the sense of something else and then one: this is difficult to know for this reason, but can be better known from its product, substance—and it is intellect which leads to substance—and its nature is of such a kind that it is the source of the best and the power which generates the real beings, abiding in itself and not being diminished and not being one of the things which it brought into being. Whatever is even before these, we give the name of “One” to by necessity, to indicate its nature to one another, bringing ourselves by the name to an indivisible idea and wanting to unify our souls; we do not: when we

remind his readers, in the middle of his account of the supra-intellectual way to the One, that this can only begin when the intellectual way has reached its goal.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.

οὐ μονάδα λέγομεν ὅτι γὰρ οὕτως ἐν ποικιλότητι, ὅπως ἐὰν ἦν ἕνα ὑπέρτη ἡ προσοφυγή υἱός καὶ τοῦ πρὸς υἱόν· οὐκ οὖν δή ὡς ἐπειδή καὶ τὸν κάθεως ὄνομα ἑκάστῳ τῆς ἀναλογίας τῆς ἀρνίου καὶ τῆς ὕποψης τοῦ πλήθους καὶ τοῦ μερείου.

6. Πλέον τόθι λέγομεν ὡς, ὅπως τοῦτο νῦν, ἐστὶ ἐκεῖνος ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος, ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος τὰς ἐξαρχὰς. Ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ μεγάλοις ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν, ἐν μικροῖς μὲν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν, ὡς τὸ μικρότατον μέγιστον γὰρ ἀπάντως ὡς μεγάλοις ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν, ὡς καὶ τὸ ἀμέγερον συνάμερον ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτὸ ὄντα 10 τοῖς ὑπόκεισθεν ἀμέραστα καὶ ἀμέρακα, οὐ τοῖς ὑγιεσιν. ἐνθαυσάμενοι καὶ ἀπειροῦν αὐτῶν οὐ τῷ ἀκέραντῳ τῷ μεγάλως ἢ τῷ ἀμέραστῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπειροτατῷ τῷ ἀμέραστῳ, ὅταν γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ νοησήσῃ ὅτι νομιμὸν νομιμὸν, πλέον ἐστὶν καὶ ὅτι διὰ τοῦτο διότι τῇ διόνυσῳ, καὶ ἐνταῦθα πλέον ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωποι. 2

10 ὃν τὸν ἑκάστου τῆς συνοίνοις καὶ ἀμέραστος, ἐκόλοουν ἀκέραντος ἀμέραστους ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πάντως ὁ πά

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call it one and indivisible mean it in the sense of a point or a unit, for what are one in this way are principles of quantity, which could not have come to exist unless substance and that before substance had preceded it; so that is not where one should direct one's thought; but all the same these correspond to those higher things in their simplicity and avoidance of multiplicity and partition.

6. In what sense, then, do we call it one, and how are we to fit it into our thought? "One" must be understood in a larger sense than that in which a unity and a point are unified. For there the soul takes away size and multiplicity of number and comes to a stop at the smallest and rests its thought on something which is partless but was in something divisible and is in something else; but what is not in something else or in the divisible is not partless either in the same way as the smallest; for it is the greatest of all things, not in size but in power, so that its sizelessness also is a matter of power; since the things after it also are indivisible and undivided in their powers, not in their bulks. And it must be understood as infinite not because its size and number cannot be measured or counted but because its power cannot be comprehended.1 For when you think of him as Intellect, or God, he is more; and when you unite him in your thought, here also the degree of unity by which he transcends your thought is more than you imagined it to be; for he is by himself without any incidental attributes. But someone could also think of his oneness in terms of self-to be taken: they are to point beyond any comprehensible unit or unboundedness.

1 Harder: Μεγακεφαλή Εφες.
2 Gyllv.: θείον Εφες.

1This is, perhaps, the clearest explanation in the Enneads of the way in which Plotinus intends his use of the terms "one" and "infinite" as applied to the First Principle.
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sufficiency. For since he is the most sufficient and independent of all things, he must also be the most without need; but everything which is many is also in need unless it becomes one from many. Therefore its substance needs to be one. But the One does not need itself: for it is itself. Certainly anything which is many needs all the things which it is, and each of the things in it, since it is with the others and not by itself, and exists in need of the others, makes a thing like this needy both in each single part and as a whole. Given, then, that there must be something supremely self-sufficient, it must be the One, which is the only thing of such a kind as not to be in need either in relation to itself or to anything else. For it does not seek anything for its being or for its well-being, or its establishment in its place. For since it is the cause of the others it does not have from the others what it is, and what could its well-being be outside itself? So its well-being is not incidental to it: for it is itself. And it has no place: for it needs no establishment as if unable to support itself; and that which has to be established is soulless and a mass which falls if it is not yet established. And the other things are established through him, through whom they at once exist and have the place to which they are assigned; but that which is looking for its place is in need. But a principle is not in need of the things which come after it, and the principle of all things needs none of them. For whatever is in need is in need as striving towards its principle; but if the One is in need of anything, it is obviously seeking not to be one; so it will be in need of its destroyer; but everything which is said to be in need is in need of its well-being and its preserver. So that there is nothing...
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good for the One; so then it does not wish for anything; but it transmutes good, and is good not for itself but for the others, if anything is able to participate in it. And it does not think, because there is no otherness: and it does no move: for it is before movement and before thought. For what will he be able to think? Himself? Then before his thinking he will be ignorant, and will need thinking in order to know himself; he who suffices for himself. There is, then, no ignorance about him because he does not know or think himself; for ignorance is of what is other, when one thing is ignorant of another; but the One alone does not know and has nothing of which it is ignorant, but being one and in union with itself does not need thought of itself. For in order to keep to the one you should not add the "in union!", but take away thinking and being in union and thought of itself and of the others; for we must not put him on the level of the thinker, but rather than that of the thought. But thought does not think, but is a cause of thought to another, and the cause is not the same as what is caused. But the cause of all things is none of them. So we must not even call this One good, the good which he gives, but the Good in another way beyond all goods.

7. But if because it is none of these things you become indefinite in your thought of it, stand fast on these and contemplate it from these. But contemplate it without casting your thought outwards. For it does not lie somewhere leaving the other things empty of it, but is always present to anyone who is able to touch it, but is not present to the one who is unable. But, just as with other things it is not possible to think anything when one is thinking
something else and has one’s mind on something else, but one must add nothing to what is being thought about, that it may really be it which is being thought about, so here one must know that it is not possible when one has the impression of something else in one’s soul to think that One while the impression is acting, and that the soul when it is taken up with and possessed by other things cannot take the impression of the opposite; but just as it is said of matter that it must be free from all qualities if it is going to receive the impressions of all things, so much more must the soul be without form if there is going to be no obstacle settled in it to its fulfillment and illumination by the first nature. But if this is so, the soul must let go of all outward things and turn altogether to what is within, and not be inclined to any outward thing, but ignoring all things (as it did formerly in sense-perception, but then in the realm of Forme), and even ignoring itself, come to be in contemplation of that One, and having been in its company and had, so to put it, sufficient converse with it, come and announce, if it could, to another that transcendent union. Perhaps also it was because Minos attained this kind of union that he was said in the story to be “the familiar friend of Zeus,” and it was in remembering this that he laid down laws in its image, being filled full of lawgiving by the divine touch. Or, also, he may think civic matters unworthy of him and want to remain always above; this is liable to happen to one who has seen much. Plato says the One is not outside anything.  

1 A summary paraphrase of Plato Timaeus 50D–E.

2 The quotation is from Odyssey 18.175-8. But Plotinus may have taken it from the account of Minos in the pseudo-Platonic dialogue of that title (Minos 318E-323D) which he is using here.

3 Plato Parmenides 138E4.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.

οὐδὲνόςφησαν ἐστὶν ἐξοικεῖον ἐξω, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν σύνεστιν
30 οὐκ εἰσάγοντο. ψεύδοντο γὰρ αὐτῶι αὐτῶι ἐξω, μάλλον δὲ αὐτῶι ἐξω. οὐ δύναται οὖν ἐξεῖν ἐν πεφεύγονσι, οὖθεν αὐτώις ἀπελευκέστες ἀλλοι ἵππαι, οὔτε γε παῖς αὐτῶι ἐξω ἐν μαθή γεγενημένοι εἰδήσει τῶν πατέρων ὅ δὲ μαθὼν ἑαυτῶι εἰδήσει καὶ ὑποθέλει.

8. Εἴ τι οὖν ἐνεχθή ἐκεῖ ἐναυτή τῶν ἄλλων χρόνον, καὶ εἴδεν ὅτι ἡ κύρισιν αὐτής οὐκ εὐθεία, ἀλλ’ ἡ ὡντα κλάσιν λάβη, ἢ δὲ κατὰ φώςαν κύρισις οὐα ἡ ἐν κύκλῳ περί τι οὐκ ἐξω, ἀλλὰ περί κέντρον, τὸ δὲ κέντρον ἄφ’
5 οὗ ἐν κύκλῳ, κυνήσται περὶ τοῦτο, ἄφ’ οὐκ ἐστιν, καὶ τούτου1 ἀναφηγεῖται συνεφέσσον ἑαυτῇ πρὸς τὸ αὐτό, πρὸς ὁ ἁγιωτάτης μὲν πάσος, φέρονται δὲ οἱ θεοὶ ἀεί
πρὸς ὁ φθοράνθης θεοὶ εἰς, θεοὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐκεῖνο συνεφεσσόν, τὸ δὲ σύμφωνα ἀφοιμισαμένον ἀφτροποῦσ’ δὲ
10 πολὺς καὶ θηρίον, τὸ οὖ ἡ ψυχὴ ἁνὰ κέντρον τοῦτο ἐστὶ τὸ ἐχθρεύμενον; ἡ ἄλλα οὐ δει λαμβάνει, εἰσ’ ὅ πάντα οὗν κέντρα συμπέπτει καὶ οὗν ἀνακλεῖ τὸ κέντρον τοῦτο τὸ κύκλου; οὐδὲ γὰρ οὕτω κέκλει δ’ τῷ ψυχῇ ὡς τὸ
σχῆμα, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ περὶ αὐτῆς ἡ ἀρχαία

1 Kirchhoff: τῶν Ἐνν.

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but is in company with all without their knowing. For they run away outside it, or rather outside themselves. They cannot then catch the one they have run away from, nor seek for another when they have lost themselves. A child, certainly, who is outside himself in madness will not know his father; but he who has learnt to know himself will know from whose he comes.

8. If then a soul knows itself for the rest of the time, and knows that its movement is not in a straight line, except when there is a kind of break in it, but its natural movement is, as it were, in a circle around something, something not outside but a centre, and the centre is that from which the circle derives, then it will move around this from which it is and will depend on this, bringing itself into accord with that which all souls ought to, and the souls of the gods always do; and it is by bringing themselves into accord with it that they are gods. For a god is what is linked to that centre, but that which stands far from it is a multiple human being or a beast. Is this true, as it were, centre of the soul what we are looking for? Or should we think it is something else in which all such centres coincide? And that the centre of the circle here below is only like it analogically? For the soul is not a circle in the same way as a geometrical figure, but because there is in it and around it the ancient nature,1 and because it comes

1 The phrase 'the ancient nature' of the soul occurs in Plato at Symposium 202B (Aristophanes' story), Republic X 611D9 (the simile of the sea-god Glauce) and Timaeus 90D6 (in the context of the education of the soul). In all these places it means the true original nature of soul.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.

15 φῶς, καὶ ὡς ἂν τὸ αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐπὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ὡς ἂν χωρὶς ἄλλως ἡμῖν. νῦν δὲ, ἐπεὶ μέρος ἡμῶν κατέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος, οἷον εἰς τοὺς πόδας ἔχει ἐν οὐσίᾳ, τά γὰρ χωρὶς σώματος ὑπέρεξεν, τά δὲ μὴ βαστάσθη ὑπὸ σώματος ὑπεράσπιστα, ταύτω συνεστραφεῖν κατὰ τὸ ἐκατόν κέντρον τῷ οὐδὲν πάντων κέντρῳ, καθάπερ τῶν μεγάλων κύκλων τὰ κέντρα τῷ τῆς οὐραίας τῆς περικυκλούσας κέντρῳ, ἀναπαυόμεθα. εἰ μὲν ὡς συμμετοχὴ ἤσαν, ὡς ψυχῆς κύκλως, τοπικῶς ἐν τῷ κέντρῳ συνηγμένοι καὶ ποικίλους τοῦ κέντρου περικύκλωσ εἴποτε ἡμῖν ἀνείπῃ τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐναίσπισθάντας τὸ νῦν ἐκεῖνον καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκεῖνῃ ἁπάντως τῷ ψυχῇ περικυκλώσει καὶ τοῦτο τῷ συνεστριβόλῳ καὶ συναπτομένῳ τῷ παραπολεμών συνάφος

30 διειρήθησαν. σύμφωνα μὲν γὰρ σύμφωνα κωλύεται κοινωνική ἄλλης, τὰ δὲ αὐτῶν σύμφωνα οὐ διειρήγεται: οὐδὲ ἄλλης ἄλλης ἄλλης ἄλλης, ἐπερώτησε δὲ καὶ διαφορὰ: ὅταν οὖν ἡ ἔκφραστη μη παύσθη, ἄλλης μὲν ἐκεῖνη παράπτωσιν. ἐκεῖνον μὲν οὖν ἢ έχειν

35 ἐπερώτησε δὲ πάσας τινας, ἡμεῖς δὲ οὖν μὴ έχομεν καθενὸς μὲν ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐστίν, ὡστε περὶ χθείας ἡμεῖς, ἡμεῖς δὲ εἴληθην, ὡστε ἡμεῖς περὶ ἐκείνου καὶ δεῖ μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἂν εἰς αὐτὸ βλέπεσθος, ἄλλῳ οὖν χρόνῳ εἶτα ἐξευθέοις τοῖς κορυφαίοις τραπέζιν εἶναι τὸ ἐκεῖνον. τὸν χρόνον τινας, ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐπιστρέφει, ἢ ἐν τῷ καλῶς

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from an origin of this kind, and because souls are wholly separated. But now, since a part of us is held by the body, as if someone had his feet in water, but the rest of his body was above it, we lift ourselves up by the part which is not submerged in the body and by this join ourselves to our own centres to something like the centre of all things, just as the centres of the greatest circles join the centre of the encompassing sphere, and we are at rest. If then our circles were bodily, not soul-circles, they would be in touch with the centre at a place; the centre would be in some place and they would be around it; but since the souls themselves belong to the realm of Intellect and that One transcends Intellect, we must suppose that the contact takes place by other powers, in the way in which the thinker is naturally united to the thought, and that the thinker is present more completely by sameness and otherness and joined to what is akin to it with nothing to keep them apart. For bodies are hindered from communion with each other by bodies, but incorporeal things are not kept apart by bodies; nor are they separated in place, but by otherness and difference; when therefore there is no otherness, the things which are not other are present to each other. That One, therefore, since it has no otherness is always present, and we are present to it when we have no otherness; and the One does not desire us, so as to be around us, but we desire it, so that we are around it. And we are always around it but do not always look to it; it is like a choral dance: in the order of its singing the choir keeps round its conductor but may sometimes turn away, so that he is out of their sight, but when it turns back to him it sings beautifully and is truly

1 ἢς ἢς Puehm: ἢς ἢς ομ. βερν.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.

καὶ ὄστως περὶ αὐτὸν ἔχει, οὗτως καὶ ἡμείς ἀδεὶς μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ—καὶ ὅταν μὴ, 1 λύσι ἡμῶν ταυτελίς ἐσται καὶ συκέτι ἐσσάμεθα—οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἐς αὐτῶν ἀλλ' ἦν ἐς αὐτὸν ἔκειμεν, τότε ἡμῖν τέλος καὶ ὑπάσπασα καὶ τὸ μῆ

45 ὁπότεν χαροῦσιν ὁπότιν περὶ αὐτὸν χαρέται ἐθέους.

9. Ἔν δὲ ταὐτή τη χορείᾳ καθὼς πηγήν μὲν ἔσυξ, πηγήν δὲ νῦν, ἁρχὴν ὄντως, ἂγαθοῦ αὐτῶν, μῆν ψυχής ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων ἐκείνων ἕκεινον ἐκατοντάκτων σι ὡς ἱππότα ἢ ἤματα ἢ τὰ γενεάμενα, νῦν δ' ἐστὶν ἀΰτα, ὅτι ἡ ἁρχὴ αὐτῶν ἡσαυτοῦ μὲν εἰς ἡμερομερῶν ἐς αὐτόν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἡμερομερῶν διὰ κάποια μὲν εἰς οὖν ὅποτου οὗτος καὶ τὸ ποιοῦ μὲν, ὅτι ἁρχὴ ἀποτελοῦσθαι ὁδὲ χαρίς ἐστερνεί, εἰ καὶ παραπλησίον ἡ σώματος φύσις πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡμᾶς εἴκωσε, ἀλλ' ἐμπνεύσεσθαι καὶ σαρώσεισθαι αὐτὸς ὄντως, εἰτ' ἀποτιθέαντος ἐκείνων, ἀλλ' ἂν χαραγούσιν εἰς τὴν ἅπερ ἐστὶ. μᾶλλον μένοι σωμάτων νεώτερος πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ εἰς ἐν ταῦτα. τὸ (δὲ) 2 πάντα εἶναι μένος καὶ θετοῦ εἶναι ἐν ταῦτα καὶ ἀνασκολοπεύειν ψυχή καὶ κατοίκουν ἐν. εἰ δὲ τῶν κατοικοῦν καθαροῖς τόποις ἀναδρομοῦσι καὶ νοεῖς ἐνταῦθα, καὶ ἐπικύρων ἐνταῦθα, καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐν τῇ ὅποτος ἐν τῇ Ἰερᾶ τῷ Ἰεραρχῷ ἔρωτι θεοῦ ἀναγέννησεν μυστικῶς, τὸ δὲ ἢκεῖ ὡς ἐνεχρίει μν ὁτι ἐνεχρίει δὲ καὶ γεννὴς ὑπὸν τῷ ἑαυτῶν τῷ ἔρωτι ἐκείνῳ, γεννὴς δὲ καλλος, γεννὴς δικαιοσύνης, ἁρχὴν γεννή.

10. τάστατο γὰρ καὶ ψυχή πληροθεσίας ἔσται, καὶ τούτοις ἡ ἁρχὴ καὶ τέλος ἡ ἁρχὴ μέν, ὅτι ἐκεῖθεν, τέλος δὲ, ὅτι τὸ

1 Kirchhoff: ἡ ἐπανάληψη ἐκείνη
2 Kirchhoff: οἱ περικείμενοι ἐκείνοι
3 Müller.
4 * A² (= Plineus): μουσική ἐκείνη

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with him; so we too are always around him—and if we were not, we should be totally dissolved and no longer exist—but not always turned to him; but when we do turn to him, then we are at our goal and at rest and do not sing out of tune as we truly dance our god-inspired dance around him.

9. And in this dance the soul sees the spring of life, the spring of intellect, the principle of being, the cause of good, the root of the soul; these are not poured out from him but with the result that they diminish him; for there is no bulk; otherwise the things generated from him would be perishable. But as it is they are eternal, because their principle remains the same, not divided up into them but abiding as a whole. So they also abide; just as the light abides if the sun abides. For we are not cut off from him or separate, even if the nature of body has intruded and drawn us to itself, but we breathe and are preserved because that Good has not given its gifts and then gone away but is always bestowing them as long as it is what it is. But we exist more when we turn to him and our well-being is there, but being far from him is nothing else but existing less. There the soul takes its rest and is outside evils because it has run up into the place which is clear of evils; and it thinks there, and is not passive, and its true life is there; for our present life, the life without God, is a trace of lifeimitating that life. But life in that realm is the active actuality of Intellect; and the active actuality generates good in quiet contact with that Good, and generates beauty, and generates righteousness, and generates virtue. It is these the soul conceives when filled with God, and this is its beginning and end; its beginning because it comes from thence, and its end

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because its good is there. And when it comes to be there it becomes itself and what it was: for what it is here and among the things of this world is a falling away and an exile and a "shedding of wings".1 And the soul's innate love makes clear that the Good is there, and this is why Eros is coupled with the Psyches in pictures and stories. For since the soul is other than God but comes from him it is necessarily in love with him, and when it is there it has the heavenly love, but here this love becomes vulgar; for the soul there is the heavenly Aphrodite, but here becomes the vulgar Aphrodite, a kind of whore.2 And every soul is Aphrodite; and this is symbolised in the story of the birth of Aphrodite and Eros who is born with her.3 The soul then in her natural state is in love with God and wants to be united with him; it is like the noble love of a girl for her noble father. But when the soul has come into the world of becoming and is deceived, so to say, by the blandishments of her suitors, she changes, bereft of her father, to a mortal love and is ashamed; but again she comes to hate her shame, and purifies herself of the things of this world and sets herself on the way to her father and fares well.4 And if anyone does not know this experience, let him think of it in terms of our loves here below, and what it is like to attain what one is most in love with, and that these earthly loves are mortal and harmful and loves only of images, and that they change because it was not what is really and truly loved nor our good nor what

1 Kirchhoff: πρὸς WBCQ: οἰο. τοῦ.

2 For the distinction of the two Aphrodites (which seems to have been a sort of Athenian homosexual in-joke, without foundation in cult or popular belief) see Plato Symposium 180D-2. It had, of course, a much more serious history from Plotinus onwards.

3 Symposium 203B. Plotinus' fullest interpretation of the myth is III. 5. 7-9.

4 Plotinus uses this comparison again at V. 5. 12. 37. But there it is not the beauty of the world of sense which draws the daughter away from the father, but the beauty of the intelligible: on this see my note ad loc.
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1. The phrase seems to have been a fairly commonplace one, used by a mystery initiate when addressing others to avoid divulging secrets. See Pausanias 1.57. 4-5 (where it is 338).

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we seek. But there is our true love, with whom also we can be united, having him in his body and truly possessing him, not embracing him in the flesh from outside. But “whoever has seen, knows what I am saying,”1 that the soul then has another life and draws near, and has already come near and has a part in him, and so is in a state to know that the giver of true life is present and we need nothing more. But quite otherwise, we must put away other things and take our stand only in this, and become this alone, cutting away all the other things in which we are encased; so we must be eager to go out from here and be impatient at being bound to the other things, that we may embrace him with the whole of ourselves and have no part with which we do not touch God. There one can see both him and oneself as it is right to see: the self glorified, full of intelligible light—but rather itself pure light—weightless, floating free, having become—but rather, being, a god; set on fire then, but the fire seems to go out if one is weighed down again.

1. How is it, then, that one does not remain there? It is because one has not yet totally come out of this world. But there will be a time when the vision will be continuous, since there will no longer be any hindrance by the body. But it is not that which has seen which is hindered, but the other part which, when that which has been retranslated from vision, does not rest from the knowledge which lies in demonstrations and evidence and the discourse of the soul; but seeing and that which has seen are not reason, but greater than reason and before reason, used in the very down-to-earth and unspiritual context of beans. Plotinus also uses it at I. 6. 7. 2.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.

λόγῳ, ὄσπερ καὶ τὸ ὁρόμενον. ἦσαντο μὲν οὖν ὑδάν
10 τότε, ὅτε ὅρα, τοιούτοι δέχετα, μελλόν δὲ αὐτῷ
tοιοῦτο τοιοῦτο συνέται καὶ τοιοῦτο εἰσεθήσεται ὑπ' ὅλου
γενόμενον. τάξα δὲ οὐδὲ "ὑμεῖς" λέκτην, τὸ δὲ
"όφθην", εἴπερ δὲ δύο ταῦτα λέγειν, τὸ τε ὅραν καὶ
ὁρόμενον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν ὁμοίῳ τολμήγος μὲν ὁ λόγῳ.
tότε μὲν οὖν οὕτω ὅρα οὖθε διακρίνει ὁ ὅραν οὖθε
15 φαντάζεται διό, ἀλλ' οὖν ἄλλος γενόμενος καὶ οὐκ
αὐτὸς οὖθε αὐτῷ συνειλέει ἐκεί, κάκειναν γενόμενος ἐν
ἐστιν ὅπερ κέντρο κέντρον συνάφεις. καὶ γὰρ ἄνταλθα
συνεπάγετα ἐν ἑστὶ, τὸ τε δίο, ὅταν χαρίσ., οὖτοι καὶ
ἡμεῖς νῦν λέγομεν ἔτερον. διὸ καὶ ἀποφράσθην τὸ θέαμα:
20 πῶς γὰρ ἐν ἀπαγγειλαία τις ὁποῖον ὁδόν ἐκεί ὁποίο
ἐθέασε ἔτερον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς οὗτον;

11. Τούτῳ δέ ἐθέλον δήλων τὸ τῶν μυστηρίων
tῶν ἐπίστασι, τὸ μὴ ἐκφέρειν εἰς μὴ μεριμνήσιν,
ὅτι οὐκ ἔκφερον. ἔκοψε δὲ ὅπερ ἄλλα ἤστιν τὸ
θεῖον, ἐπὶ μὴ καὶ αὐτῷ ὁδόν ἐπεκάθηκεν, ἔτει τούτων διὸ
δὲ οὐκ ἦν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἴδιον ὁ ὁδόν πρὸς τὸ ἐκφέρειν, ἢσ
δὲ μὴ ἐκβάλλειν, ἀλλ' ἐκβάλλειν, δὲ ἐκφέρειν
ἐμφύτευτο εἰ μεριμνήσῃ, ἔχων δὲ πρὸς ἔκπεισιν
eἰκόνιν. ἦν δὲ εἰ καὶ αὐτὸς διαφοράς ἐν αὐτῷ ὀνομαζὼν
πρὸς οὗτον ἔχων οὔτε κατὰ ἀλλα—οὐ γὰρ γε ἐκεῖνον
10 παρ' αὐτῷ, δὴ θυμὸς, οὐκ ἕπαθομεν ἀλλ' ἄνω οὕτως
ἄναβασιν. ἀλλ' οὖθε λόγος οὐκέ τις κύριος οὐδ'
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.

...καὶ τὸ τοῦτο λέγειν. ἀλλ' ὅσπερ ἅμαστεῖς ἔνθεος ἕκαστος ἐγνώμμενος, ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ τοῦτο λέγειν καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ τοῦτο λέγειν. ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ τοῦτο λέγειν καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ τοῦτο λέγειν. ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ τοῦτο λέγειν καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ τοῦτο λέγειν.

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reason or thought, and he himself was not there, if we must even say this; but he was as if carried away or possessed by a god, in a quiet solitude and a state of calm, not turning away anywhere in his being and not busy about himself, altogether at rest and having become a kind of rest. He had no thought of beauties, but had already run beyond beauty and gone beyond the choir of virtues, like a man who enters into the sanctuary and leaves behind the statues in the outer shrine; these become again the first things he looks at when he comes out of the sanctuary, after his contemplation within and intercourse there, not with a statue or image but with the Divine itself; they are secondary objects of contemplation. But that other, perhaps, was not a contemplation but another kind of seeing, a being out of oneself! and simplifying and giving oneself over and pressing towards contact and rest and a sustained thought leading to adaptation, if one is going to contemplate what is in the sanctuary. But if one looks in another way, one finds nothing. These are images: and this, therefore, is how the wise among the expositors of holy things express in riddles how that god is seen; and a wise priest who understands the riddle may make the contemplation real by entering the sanctuary; and even if he has not been there, and thinks that this sanctuary is something invisible, and the source and the principle, he will know that he sees principle by principle and that like is united with like. And he will neglect none of the divine properties which the soul can have even describing the mystical union according to Plotinus as an "ecstasy". It gives a very misleading impression of this austere and quiet mysticism.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 9.

... before the vision, and will seek the rest from the vision; and the rest, for him who has gone beyond all, is that which is before all. For the nature of the soul will certainly not arrive at absolute non-existence, but when it goes down it will arrive at evil and in this way at non-existence, not at absolute non-existence. But if it runs the opposite way, it will arrive, not at something else but at itself, and in this way since it is not in something else it will not be in nothing, but in itself; but when it is in itself alone and not in being, it is in that; for one becomes, not substance, but "beyond substance" by this converse. If then one sees that oneself has become this, one has oneself as a likeness of that, and if one goes on from oneself, as image to original, one has reached "the end of the journey". And when one falls from the vision, he wakes again the virtue in himself, and considering himself set in order and beautiful by those virtues he will again be lightened and come through virtue to Intellect and wisdom and through wisdom to that Good. This is the life of gods and of godlike and blessed men, deliverance from the things of this world, a life which takes no delight in the things of this world, escape in solitude to the solitary.

1 "Beyond substance" is the often quoted foundation-text from Plato Republic VI 598B9, "the end of the journey" from Republic VII 622B3, again in the context of the ascent to the Good.

2 "Tell me, is the "living" one above or below?" These last words, in the common translation "right of the alone to the Alone", are the only words of Plotinus at all generally known and remembered. He uses the "alone to the alone" formula elsewhere in the Enneads when speaking of our encounter with the Good (I.6.7; VI.1.34.7). It is in fact a fairly commonplace Greek phrase, generally, but not always, in a religious context. The closest parallel to Plotinus' use of it is in Numenius fr. 2 des

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Places (11 Leemans) 11–12 διαγράφει τίς ὁμοίως μᾶνι μόνον. See R. D. Dodds "Numenius and Plotinus" in Les Sources de Platon (Entretiens Hardt V), Vandoeuvres Genève 1957, 16–17. It does tell us something important about the mysticism of Plotinus, but can be misleading if considered in isolation from the rest of life and Cosmo in Plotinus (Plotinian & Christian Studies XVIII).