PLOTINUS
WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
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IN SEVEN VOLUMES

VI
ENNEADS
VI. 1-5

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The text of these volumes corresponds to that of the third volume of the revised editio minor of Henry and Schwyzer (Plotini Opera III, Oxford Classical Texts, 1982), with correction of printers' errors and a few changes in punctuation, except in the following places, where the changes are indicated in the critical notes:

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Indices have not been provided. The availability of the recently published Lexicon Plotinianum (by J. H. Sleeman and Gilbert Pollet; Leiden and Leuven 1980) makes the provision of a selective word-index unnecessary and likely to be misleading; and the Index Fontium in Plotini Opera III (see above), while not complete, is very extensive and must be referred to by anyone seriously interested in the sources of Plotinus; work on its revision and expansion is continuing.
PREFACE

The preparation of Volumes VI and VII for publication has been assisted by grants from the British Academy and the Leverhulme Trust, which are gratefully acknowledged.

A. H. ARMSTRONG.

SIGLA

A = Laurentianus 87, 3.
A' = Codicis A primus corrector.
E = Parisinus Gr. 1976.
E = exemplum alterum trajectus VI. 5 in codice E a posteriori scriba scriptum.
B = Laurentianus 85, 15.
R = Vaticanus Reginensis Gr. 97.
J = Parisinus Gr. 2082.
U = Vaticanus Urbinas Gr. 62.
C = Monacensis Gr. 449.
Q = Marcianus Gr. 242.
L = Ambrosianus Gr. 687.
w = AE
x = EJ
z = QL
mg = in margine
ac = ante correctionem
pc = post correctionem
H-S1 = Henry-Schwyzer, editio maior
H-S2 = Henry-Schwyzer, editio minor (= OCT)

ORDO ENNEADVM COMPARATVR
CVM ORDINE CHRONOLOGICO

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VI. 1-3. ON THE KINDS OF BEING

Introductory Note

The work on the Categories (Nos. 42-44 in the chronological order) was composed late in Plotinus' writing life, towards the end of the six years during which Porphyry was with him (Life ch. 5). It is difficult not to feel as one reads it that he did not find the subject very congenial. In the first of the three treatises into which Porphyry has divided the work (Porphyry's editorial divisions correspond exactly here to the real divisions of the subject-matter, as they do not always do elsewhere) Plotinus seems to be doing his duty as a Platonic philosopher by making his contribution to the traditional polemic which some Platonists had been engaged in since, probably, the first century B.C against the category-doctrine of Aristotle and the Stoics, and to the joint attack by Peripatetics and Platonists on Stoic category-doctrine which had been going on since about the same period. (There were other Platonists notably Alcinous (or Albinus) in the second century A.D, who took a more positive attitude which finally prevailed in the Platonic school, with Porphyry and Iamblichus.)

In the first twenty-four chapters of VI. 1 Plotinus seems to be very much dependent on the polemic against the Aristotelian categories of the Platonist of the second century A.D, Nicostratus (who took over the work of an otherwise unknown Lucas), about which we know something from the Commentary on the Categories of Simplicius: the passages of this which are relevant to the text of Plotinus are printed in the editio maior of Henry and Sohwyzer.

In the last six chapters of the treatise it is likely that he is making use of the anti-Stoic polemic of the Peripatetic Andronicus, the editor of Aristotle in the first century B.C. and his pupil Boethus. Ancient philosophers are not at their best in polemic, and Plotinus and his Platonic and Peripatetic sources are no exceptions. Very much of the criticism is carping, superficial and tendentious, and there is very little attempt to understand the positions of Aristotle and the Stoics or to discover what they are really trying to do. The philosophical point of view is throughout that of Platonism as Plotinus understood it, Aristotle is treated as if he were a bad and metaphysically unintelligent Platonist, and the Stoics as gross and crude materialists. Plotinus can sometimes understand Aristotle at a very much deeper level, and, even when he is criticising him, develop genuinely Aristotelian thoughts: and his own thought in some areas is much influenced by Stoicism, in ethics and in his understanding of the organic unity of the universe.

VI. 2 is on a considerably higher level and must rank as one of the major works of Plotinus on the One-Being, the Divine Intellect, Nous. Here he turns from polemic against opponents to expound the true Platonic doctrine of the Categories of the Intelligible World. These are the "greatest genera" of Plato Sophist 254D-257A, Being, Rest, Motion, Same and Other. Plotinus uses them in a remarkable and original way, of which this treatise gives the fullest account to be found in the Enneads. It has not perhaps very much to do with logic in any ordinary Aristotelian or modern sense: the "categories" are not really used as logical categories or classes. Brähier, in his Notice to VI. 1-3 in his edition (p.37), puts it very well when he speaks of it as a "reflective analysis which brings to light different aspects of the same whole." The ultimate

appeal, as always when Plotinus is speaking of the
intelligible world and its source, is to a direct awareness or
vision, for which discursive reasoning can only prepare us.
This is very apparent in Chapter 8 and in the last three
chapters of the treatise, especially Chapter 21.
In VI. 3 Plotinus returns from the intelligible to the
sensible world, and does his best to provide it with a
suitable Platonic set of categories. His attitude to Aristotle
at this point becomes a good deal more positive, and this
part of the work is more a critical adaptation than a
refutation of Peripatetic doctrine. But he finds it difficult to
arrive at any certain conclusions, and is more imprecise
and undogmatic than usual. This is particularly apparent
in the last eight lines of Chapter 8, where he suggests,
though he does not pursue the suggestion, that we might be
able to manage here below with only two categories, quasi-
(substance and relation, and in the rather impatiently
agnostic last words of Chapter 27. We can see clearly in
this treatise how a Platonist, who, following the
Timaeus, does not believe that any certain and unchanging
knowledge of the sense-world is possible, can be much more
open and uncommitted to any particular account of the
nature and structure of material things than an
Aristotelian, who, while still believing that certain and
unchanging knowledge is possible, must find its objects
predominantly in the world of sense.
(Only Substance, Quantity, Quality, Motion and,
incidentally, Relation are discussed in VI. 3. It is possible,
but not certain, that Plotinus meant to continue with a
fuller discussion of other categories than the summary
remarks in the last chapter.)
ON THE KINDS OF BEING

VI. 2

The Platonic genera. Genera and Principles. Being and Becoming (again, absurdity of the Stoic "something") (ch. 1). Being is one and many; its co-equal genera are also principles (ch. 2). The transcendent One cause of the genera: the genera in the unity of the One-Being: inadequacy of discursive reason to apprehend this (ch. 3). Bodily and intelligible being: Soul as a handy example of the intelligible (ch. 4). The unity and multiplicity of Soul, and of the One-Being (chs. 5 and 6). Movement as life in Soul and intellect. Necessity also of the genus Rest (ch. 7). The discernment by direct vision of Being, Motion and Rest in intellect: this brings with it the discernment of Same and Other (ch. 8). Are there more genera? Why the transcendent One is not a genus (ch. 9). Why the One in the One-Being is not a genus: how this One is in Being (chs. 9-11). All things, including mathematical entities, which appear to be soulless, strive towards the One and Good (chs. 11-12). Quantity and number are posterior to and derived from the five Platonic genera (ch. 13). So is quality: in the intelligible world it is the activity of substance (ch. 14). Being and the other four Platonic genera (ch. 15). There is no place for the other Aristotelian categories in the intelligible (ch. 15). The Good is not a genus: the activity, life or movement of the One-Being towards the transcendent Good is its good (ch. 17). The Beautiful belongs to Substance, Knowledge is Movement. Intellect is not a genus, but all that truly exists: and the virtues are its activities (ch. 18). The genera and their species: universal and particular in Intellect (chs. 19-20). The great vision of Intellect; in which, deriving from and along with the primary genera, Quality, Quantity, number and figure are discerned. The all-inclusiveness of Intellect (ch. 21). Exegesis of Timaeus 39E (the Complete Living Creature) in terms of this doctrine, with confirmatory texts from the Parmenides and Philebus (ch. 22).

ON THE KINDS OF BEING

VI. 3

Are the categories of the sense-world the same, analogously, as those of the intelligible, or different? Problems of classification in the sense-world (ch. 1). Sensible substance: matter, form and composite: the Platonic intelligible categories cannot be applied, even analogously, to sensible substance (ch. 2). Discussion of matter, form and composite continued: relation of other categories to them. Seven, five, or possibly only two categories of the sensible world (ch. 3)? What have matter, form and composite in common to make us put them in the category of "substance" (ch. 4)? Substance and substrate (chs. 4-5). What does "is" mean in the sense-world (ch. 6)? It is not matter from which things were below derive their being (ch. 7). Sensible substance as a combination of qualities and matter (ch. 8). How should the genus "sensible substance" be divided into species (chs. 8-10)? Quantity in the sense-world (chs. 11-15). Quality in the sense-world (chs. 16-20). Movement in the sense-world (chs. 21-25). Stillness in the sense-world is to be distinguished from the Platonic category Rest in the intelligible (ch. 27). Summary conclusion, with a few remarks on Relation (ch. 28).
VI. 1. (42) PERO' TON GENON TOY ONTOY

1. Perno' ton onton pòsa kai táv éxhýmous mév kai oi lýni sýmatai, én, oi dé androména, oi dé úpovra eiptónnes, kai toúttov ekaístoi oi mév állooi oi dé állo to én, oi dé tás pereasména kai ad tás úpovra eiptónnes kai tòis mév autiúth eiptoléma auti.ai ai éxhitai ikanos pértei émiv. Dósa d' eiptolémves tás éxhýmous idéthei en génwv enarruméntas kátw, p Fastov avtopoystov, ai oútse ex thémov, sti polli kai ev tois vnomous évónov, oútse upéron, sti múte avlo ton méh' épiastímy ev gnósió, 10 tás te pereasména eis ármbwv auton, sti tás én súphymenov ouk érithos ouv stoixhexa, génh dé' tiva oútai érfikous, oi mév dékia, oi dé élástoa év Ín S' av tives ou plévous avtón. Esti dé kai ev tois génves

1 ovstos, én tál axónov, sti 'H-S'.
2 Theiler: Ík Enn.: del. Volkmann, H-S'.

1 The "extremely ancient philosophers" are the Pre-Socratics. As usual, Plotinus takes his information about them from Aristotle and dismisses them very summarily. "One being": Thales. Anaximenes, Heraclitus. "A definite number": Empedocles; "An infinite number": Anaxagoras, Democritus.

2 Aristotle and the Stoics.

3 The reference may be to Peripatetic discussions of the Categories by Andronicus, Rhetthus, and their followers.

VI. 1. ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

1. The extremely ancient philosophers investigated beings, how many there were and what they were: some said there was one being, some a definite number, and some an infinite number; and in each of these groups, some said the one being was one thing and some another, and the same applies to those who said that the number of beings was limited and those who said that it was infinite.1 And since these views have been sufficiently examined by those who came after them, we can let them go. But since these later philosophers,2 after examining the views of the earlier ones, themselves placed beings in a number of definite kinds, we must consider them and see how many the kinds are; these philosophers did not posit one being, because they saw many even in the intelligible realm, nor an infinite number, because this was impossible and knowledge could not occur, and some of them posited ten of their numerically limited kinds and some fewer (they have said that the foundations of being are not rightly thought of as a sort of elements, but as genera of some kind); but there might have been some who posited more than those ten.3 But there are differences in their genera (first century B.C.): cp. Deux, ppus In Cat. 137, p. 32:10-34:2. But the wording is vague, and Plotinus clearly did not know much about these people and was not very interested in them.
15. First, then, we must take the opinion which divides beings into ten, and see whether we think the philosophers are saying that there are ten genera which fall under the common name of "being", or ten categories. For they say, and say rightly, that being does not mean the same thing in all ten; but we should rather ask them this first, whether the ten are there in the same way in the intelligible beings and the beings perceived by sense, or whether they are all in the beings of the sense-world, but in the intelligibles some are there and some not: for it certainly cannot be the other way round. At this point we must examine which of the ten are also there in the intelligible, and if the things there can be brought under one genus with those here below, or whether the term "substance" is used ambiguously of that there and this here. But if this is so, then there are more than ten genera. But if "substance" is used in the same sense there as here, it will be absurd for it to mean the same thing when applied to primary beings and those which come after them, since there is no common genus of things among which there is priority and posterity. But in their classification they are not speaking about the intelligible beings: so they did not want to classify all beings, but left out those which are most authentically beings.

2. Again, then, are they really to be considered as genera? And how is substance one genus? For we must in any case begin with this. That there cannot be one common substantiality applying to both as well: for some of them make the genera principles of being, others the beings themselves, generically the same in number.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

intelligence and sensible substance has been said already. And besides, there will [if this is so] be something else before both intelligible and sensible substance, which is something else and is predicated of both, and this could not be either body or bodiless: for [if it is] body will be bodiless, or the bodiless body. 1 Of course we must also investigate this point about the substance here below themselves, what there is common to matter and form and the composite of both. For they say that all these are substances, but that they are not equal in respect of substance, when it is said that form is more substance than matter—quite correctly; but there are those who would say that matter is more substance. But what could the substances which they call primary have in common with the secondary ones, when the secondary ones derive their name of substances from those prior to them? But in general it is impossible to say what substance is: for even if one gives it its “proper characteristic”, it does not yet have its “what it is”, and perhaps not even the definition “that which is one and the same in number which is receptive of the opposites” will fit all cases.

3. But ought we really to call substance one category, collecting together intelligible substance, matter, form and the composite of both? This would be like saying that the genus [or clan] or the Heraclids was a unity, not in the sense of a unity common to all its members, but because they all come from one ancestor: for the intelligible substance would be so primarily, and the others secondarily and less. But what prevents all things from being one category? For everything else which is said to exist
ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

Plotinus returns to the discussion of sensible "substance" at length in VI. 3.
These are the Platonic Ideal Numbers, which Plotinus discusses in VI. 6.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

... in the things which participate in them, the numbers by which we count, not just units, but ten horses or ten oxen, first of all it will seem absurd that, if the numbers in themselves are substances, these [counting] numbers should not be so as well, and then [it will also seem absurd] if when they measure their subjects they exist in them, and do not exist outside them and measure them like rulers and measuring-pots. But if it is as existing on their own and not in their subjects that they are taken for measuring, those subjects will not be quanta since they will not participate in quantity, and why are the numbers themselves quantitative? For they are measures: but why are measures quanta or quantity? Presumably because, since they are among the things that exist, if they do not fit into any of the other categories, they will be what they are called and will be placed in the category called quantity. For their unit marks off one thing, and then goes on to another, and number indicates how many there are, and soul measures the multiplicity using number to help it. Therefore when it measures it does not measure what a thing is: for it says "one" and "two", whatever they are and even if they are opposites; but it does not measure what state a thing is in either, warm or beautiful for instance, but how many things there are. Number itself then, whether it is regarded in itself or in the things which participate in it, is quantitative, but its participants are not. So not the "three cubits long" but the "three". Why, then, are magnitudes also quantitative? Is it because they are near the quantum, and we call the things in which they occur quanta, not because they are quanta in the proper sense, but we call something big as if on...
ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

the ground that it participates in a great deal of number, and small, because it participates in a little? But the big itself and the small are not considered to be quanta, but relations; but, all the same, they call them relations in so far as they appear to be quanta. But we must consider this more precisely. There will, then, not be one genus, but only number, and the other things as quanta secondarily. There is not, then, one genus in the proper sense, but one category which gathers in also the things that are somehow near quanta in a primary and secondary sense. But we [Platonists] must investigate how the numbers in and by themselves are substances, or whether they too are a kind of quantum; but, whichever way they are, those numbers would have nothing in common with these numbers here below, except the name alone.

But how are [articulate] speech and time and movement quanta? First of all, if you like, about speech. But it is speech and is of a certain quantity—for it is certainly measured—yet in so far as it is speech it is not a quantum: for it is something significant, like noun and verb. Like theirs, its matter is the air: for in fact it is composed of them; but it is rather the impact which is speech, and not just simply the impact but the resulting impression which so to speak shapes the air: it is therefore an action, and a significant action. Certainly one would more reasonably class this movement according to the impact as an action and the corresponding movement as an affection, or say that each of them was an action of one thing and an affection of another, or an action upon the substrate and an affection in the substrate. But if the voice is not considered in terms

1 transposusimus.
2 coniecimus: καὶ Ενα.
of the impact but of the air, there would be two categories and not one to be extracted from the significant action, if the significant thing is to be placed in this category and the co-significant in that. As for time, if it is understood in its measuring capacity, we must grasp what it is that measures: for it is either soul or the "now". But if it is understood as measured, let it be a quantum in respect of being of a certain length, a year's length for instance; but in respect of being time it is some different nature: for the so much is a something else which is so much. Quite certainly time is not quantity; but it is just exactly quantity which has no hold on anything else which is the quantum in the strict and proper sense. But if one classes all the things which participate in the quantitative as quanta, then substance will be the same thing as quantum. But that "equal and unequal are characteristic of the quantum" must be understood of the quantum itself, not of the things which participate in it, except incidentally, not in so far as they are those things which they are, as the man three cubits tall is; he too is not brought together into one genus, but under one genus and one category.

6. As regards relation, we should enquire about it in this way: whether there is any generic community in it, or whether it comes together in another way into one. And it is particularly important when dealing with this category to ask whether this state of being related has any substantial existence, for

1 Igai.

2 Aristotle Categories 6. 6a26-7
instance the right and the left and the double and the half, or whether it is so in some cases, for instance the one last mentioned, but there is no substantiality in the first mentioned, or whether it is nowhere so. What, then, about double and half and in general exceeding and exceeded, and again about habitual state and [changeable] disposition, and lying, sitting, standing, and again about father, son, master, slave, and further about like, unlike, equal, unequal, and active also and passive, and measure and measured? And knowledge and sense-perception, of which one is related to the object known and the other to the object perceived. Knowledge would indeed have in relation to its object a single active substantial existence, and sense-perception in the same way in relation to its object, and so would the active to the passive, granted that they accomplish a single work, and the measure to the measured in respect of measuring it. But what product would like have in relation to like? It is not a question of a product, but of something which is there, of the sameness in the qualified. But there is nothing over and above the qualification in each of the like things. Nor is there in the case of equal things: for the sameness in the quantum is there before the state of being related. But what is this state of being related other than our judgement when we compare things which are what they are by themselves and say "this thing and this thing have the same size and the same quality", and "this man has produced this man, and this man controls this man"? And what would sitting and standing be over and above what sits and stands? But habitual state, when it refers to the possessor, would rather signify
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

I. Pleromaios, ἢ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἔξωμεν, λοιπὸν ἐν εἶπ' καὶ ἐπὶ διαθέσεως ἁσάντως, τί ἢ ἐν ἐνίοτε ποιά ταύτα τὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ ἦμων τὴν παράθεσιν νοσοῦτοι; τὸ δ' ὑπερέχου τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἄλλο τέ καὶ τὸ. τὸ δὲ ἄλλο· ἢ δὲ παραβολὴ παρ' ἦμων, οἷς ἐν αὐτοῖς ὃ δὲ δεξιόν πρὸς ἀριστερῶν καὶ ἐμπροσθεν καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν μᾶλλον ἄλλος ἐν τῷ κεισθαι ὃ μὲν ἂδι, ὃ δὲ ἄδι ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸ δεξιόν καὶ τὸ ἀριστερόν ἐνοχούσαρεν, ἐν δὲ αὐτοῖς ἡμῶν. τὸ τε πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον χρόνοι δύο· τὸ δὲ πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον ἠμῶν ἡ ὁσάπτων.

7. Εἰ μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν λέγομεν, ἀλλὰ λέγοντες ἄμεσα, οὐδὲν ἄν τούτων εἶπ', ἀλλὰ κενον ἡ σχέσις· ἐὰν δ' ἐνθελοῦμεν λέγοντες "πρότερος δὲ τοῦτο, ὃ ἡμεῖς ὑστερος", χρόνους δύο παραβάλλουμεν ἑτέρον παρά τὰ ὑποκειμένα αὐτῶν λέγοντες τὸ πρότερον, καὶ ἐπὶ δεξιῷ καὶ ἐπὶ ἀριστερῶν ἁσάντως, καὶ ἐπὶ μεγεθῶν παρὰ τὸ ποσόν αὐτῶν τὴν σχέσιν, καθὼς τὸ μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, τὸ δ' ὑπερβάλλεται, ἐὰν δ' καὶ μὴ λεγόντων ἦμων μηδὲ νοσοῦτων ἦσσαν αὐτῶς, ὡς ἐξ ἀδιάλειπτῶν εἶναι τὸ τοῦτο τοῦτο μέγεθος, καὶ ἕχει, τὸ δ' ἐχεται, καὶ πρὶν ἦμας ἐνεισήμανεν, καὶ ἂν πρὸ τοῦ ἦμων πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιό εἶναι ἦσσαν ἐν ταὐτότητι τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἃν ἢ...
related to each other is subsequent to the subjects related, but we observe it as presently existent, and our knowledge is directed to the object being known—at this point the substantiality arising out of the state of relation is even more obvious—we should stop enquiring whether the state of relation exists, but we should also note that with some things in this state, as long as the subjects remain as they were, even if they become separated, the state of relation persists, but with others it comes into existence when they come together, and with others again, even when they remain as they are, the state of being related either comes to an end altogether or becomes different, as in the case of right and near, and it is from these particularly that our suspicion arises that in things of this kind relation is nothing. Having taken note of this, then, we must enquire what is the same in all, and if it is so as a genus, but not something incidental; then, when we have found what is the same, we must enquire what kind of existence it has. We must certainly speak of relation, not if something is simply said to belong to another, a state of soul or body for instance, nor because a soul belongs to this man or is in something different [from itself], but in things where the existence derives from nowhere else but the state of relation: existence here does not mean that of the [related] subjects, but that of the relation. For instance the relation double to half gives existence neither to the two-cubits-long nor in general to two things, nor to the one-cubit-long nor in general to one thing, but when these are in their state of being related, in addition to being two and one respectively, the first has the name and reality of double, and the one the
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

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34 name and reality of half. They both together, therefore, generated from themselves something else, the existence of double and half, which came into existence in relation to each other, and their being is nothing else than being for each other; for the double it comes from exceeding the half and for the half from being exceeded; so that one of them is not prior and the other posterior, but they come into existence together. But do they remain in existence together? Now in the case of father and son and similar relations, when the father is gone the son is [still] son, and a brother [is a brother] when his brother is gone: for we say "he is like the dead man".

8. But we digressed here; and starting from this point we must investigate the question why there is dissimilarity in these relations. But let these philosophers1 tell us what common substantiality this being from each other has. Well now, this common reality cannot be a body. So it remains that, supposing it exists, it is incorporeal, and is either in the things related or comes from outside. And if the state of being related is [always] the same, it is univocal, but if not, but different in different cases, it is equivocal: for it is certainly not just because it is called a state of being related that it would have the same essential character. Are then the states of being related to be distinguished in this way, in that some things have a relationship observable as inactive, just lying there, so to speak, and it only exists when they are entirely simultaneous, but others, along with their power and operation, are either always disposed to relationship and had their

1 The Peripatetics.
PLOTINUS: ENEAED VI. 1.

kai pro tov ton etoumastea, en de tis spondph kai energeias uposth, h kai allos to mne ptepoteke, to o uposth, kai to upostan deisima mwnon parage tiv

15 etero, to de tiv upostasen tonion giv kai o pathe kai o nios kai to poihtikov de kai pithetikon exe tin othe kai energeias. oix othn tauti diapireen ton skhias kai diapireten othi wos tautov te kai kouan en diathesa, alli allos wos etero phsai tivn skhian en

20 ekadri, kai lekton onomav ton mne poiovan poias kai thasen, wos mou amfiv, tivn de ou poiovan, alli eti amfiv to poiovan allo; oin isostheta tivn tiv tov isostheta gar isai kai allos tivn shgenetai tivn taiva tiv de megas kai mikrof, tiv mne megous parousias, tiv de mikrophs. allin de tiv mne meilen, tiv

25 de mikroteron, ois mne metallixontes o mne meilen energeias fainontos tov en eitw megous, o de mikrof tivs mikrophs.

9. Xrph oin evi mne ton prosan eiphmon, othon poiovnotos, eiposthe, energeia tivn shgen kati tivn energeias kai ton evi tiv energeias loygon thiasai, evi de ton alon eidos kai loygon metaplhym ethn. kai gar, preparedness for it beforehand, and it comes into existence in their coming together and actualisation, or, in a quite general way, one set of them have produced and the others come to exist, and what has come to exist only gives a name to the other, but the producer gives the existence? For the father and the son are like this; and the active and the passive have a kind of life and actualisation. Are we then to divide the state of being related in this way, and divide it not as something identical and common in its differentiations, but on the general assumption that the state of relationship is a different nature in each of the two classes, and we are to speak of it equivocally when we say that one kind produces action and affection as a united pair, but the other does not produce, but what produces the relationship in both the related things is something other than them? For instance, equality is the state of relationship which produces equals; for they are equal by equality, and in general same things are the same by some kind of sameness; as for large and small, one is large by the presence of largeness and the other small by the presence of smallness. But when it is a question of larger and smaller, one of the participants is larger by the actualisation of the largeness apparent in him, and the other smaller by the actualisation of the smallness.

9. We must therefore in the cases mentioned earlier, of the producer and of knowledge for instance, posit that the state of being related is active by reason of the activity of the actual agent and the rational forming principle operative in the activity, and in the other cases that it is a participation in form and rational forming principle. For certainly, if
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5 ei μὲν σώματα ἔσεν τὰ δύτα ἐστι, οὐδὲν ἔστι λέγει ἐστιν 
taūτας τὰς τοῦ πρὸς τι λεγομένος σχέσεις: ei de καὶ 
ἀσωμάτως διδομένη τὴν εἰρήνα χώραν καὶ τοις λόγοις 
lόγους λέγοντες τὰς σχέσεις καὶ εἴδων μεταλλήθησις 
aπίτι—τοῦ γὰρ διπλάσιον εστί τὸ διπλάσιον αὐτὸ 
10 ἄλλων, τῷ ὑπὸ τὸ ἡμιού, καὶ τὰ μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶδε, τῷ ἄ 
τοις ἀντικειμένοις εστί τὰ λέγεται: ἄμα οὖν τῷ μὲν 
προσχήθη τῇ διπλάσιον, ἀλλὰ δὲ τὸ ἡμιοῦ, καὶ τῷ μὲν 
tὸ μέγεθος, τῷ δὲ ἡ μικρότης. ἡ ἀμφότερα ἐστιν ἐν 
ἐκάστῳ, καὶ δομούσι καὶ ἀναμοτίσι καὶ ὅλως ὑπότων 
15 καὶ ἄλλους: διὸ καὶ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνάμοιον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ 
tαύτῳ καὶ θάνατον. τὶ οὖν, εἰ ἐς μὲν ἀναχρός, ὁ δὲ 
νομικῶν εἶδος τοῦ εὐπορίου μετονομᾶς: ἢ, εἰ μὲ 
παντάπανιν αἰχμῆς, ἵτιν δέος ἀνανομίας: εἰ δὲ ἐν τῷ 
μένε τὸ μᾶλλον, τῷ δὲ τῷ ἡμιού, μεταλλήθη εἶδος ὦν 
κατοικοῦσιν ὁ ἡμιούς αἰχμῆς, ὁ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐτὶ μᾶλλον ὦν 
20 κατοικοῦσιν: ἢ τῇ υπερήφανε, εἰ τὰς βοῶν τὴν 
παραβολήν ἔχειν, οἷον εἶδος αὐτοῖς ἄνθος. αὐθεντικῶς δὲ 
eἴδους τι εἰς ἁμφοτέρος, καὶ γνώσεις ὀνόματος εἰς ἁμφότερος 
ti 
eἴδους: ἢ δὲ ἔξω πρὸς τὸ ἐξήκομεν ἐνέργεια τις ὁ λοι 
συνέχεια, ὡσπερ ποιήσαι τις: ἡ δὲ μέτρησις τοῦ 
38

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realities had to be bodies, it would be necessary to 
say that the states which are said to belong to a 
relation were nothing; but if we give the principal 
place to incorporeal things and rational principles, 
saying that the states of relationship are rational 
principles and participations in forms their causes 
...... for [it is necessary to say] that the double 
itself is cause of being double, and for the other 
related thing the half [is cause of its being half]. 
And some are what they are called by the same form, 
but others by opposed forms: for the double comes to 
one thing and the half to another simultaneously, 
and largeness comes to one thing at the same time as 
smallness to the other. Or both are in each thing, 
both likeness and unlikeness and, in a general sense, 
sameness and otherness. What then is going on if 
one man is ugly, but another uglier by participation 
in the same form? Now, if they are altogether ugly, 
they are equal by the absence of form; but if there is 
a greater degree of ugliness in one, and a lesser 
degree in the other, the less ugly is so by partici¬ 
pation in a form which is not in control and the more 
ugly by participation in it when it is still more not in 
control; or, if one would like to get one's comparison 
in this way, one could do it] by privation, which 
would be like a kind of form for them. But sense¬ 
perception is a kind of form coming from both [the 
related things] and knowledge in the same way a 
kind of form from both; but the habitual state in 
relation to what is possessed by it is a kind of 
activity which in a way holds it together, like a kind 
of making; and measuring is an activity of the

1 The apodosis of this sentence is missing.
Plotinus: Ennead VI. 1.

20 μετρούντος ἐνέργεια πρὸς τὸ μετρούμενον λόγος της εἰ μὲν οὖν [ὡς εἰδος] γενεικώς τὴν τοῦ πρὸς τι σχέσιν ὡς εἰδος τις ἡθετεί. γένος ἐν καὶ ὑπόστασις ὡς λόγος τῆς πανταχοῦ εἰ δὲ οἱ λόγοι καὶ ἀντικείμενοι καὶ διάφοροι ἐχοντες τὰς ἐφημεῖας, τὸ πάντα αὐτὸ ἐν ὑπὸ γένος εἶπ. ἂλλ' εἰς ὑμοῦσα ἡ τοιαῦτα ἀνάγεται καὶ κατηγοριά 

30 μέ. ἂλλ' εἰ καὶ εἰς ἐν δύναστο ἀνάγεσθαι τὰ ἐφημεῖα, ἂλλ' εἷς γένος ἐν ἄδικαν τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτήν κατηγορίαν αὐτοῖς τεθέντα. καὶ γὰρ τὰς ἀποφάσεως αὐτῶν εἰς ἐν ἀνάγαυοι, καὶ τὰ παροχωματίζομεν ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἀνοι καὶ 

35 τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον, τῶς ἐν αὐτῷ ὑφ' ἐν γένος αὐτό τι καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις, διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον, καὶ πρὸς τι καὶ ὑπὸ πρὸς τις ὑπέρ ἐν εἰ ἐν ὑπὸ τῆς γένους 

30 καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ ζωῆς ἐκεῖ τιθεί. καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ὑπέρ ἡ λευκότης καὶ ὁ λευκός, οὐκ ὑπὲρ ταύτων.

10. Τὴν δὲ ποιήσατα, ἄφ' ἐσ' ὁ λεγόμενος ποιός, δεῖ λαμβάνειν πρῶτον τὰς ὡς τοὺς λεγομένους ποιοὺς παρέχεται, καὶ ὅ τι μὲ καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ κατὰ τὸ κοινὸν ταῖς διάφοραις τὰς ἐφημεῖας τὰ ἐδώ συνέχεται. ἢ, ἐπὶ πολλαχῶς αὐτὸ

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measurer which is a rational principle in relation to the measured. If then one is going to consider the state belonging to relation generically as a form, it will be one genus and substantial reality, as there is a rational forming principle in all cases; but if the rational principles are both opposed and have the differences which have been stated, perhaps there would not be one genus, but all relatives are brought back to a certain likeness and a single category. But even if it was possible to bring back all the relatives we have mentioned into one, it would be impossible to bring into a single genus all the things which are grouped under the same category with them. For they bring back into one the denials of the relative terms and the things which derive their name from them, for instance the double and the double-sized man. 1 How then could one bring under one genus a thing itself and the denial of it, double and not double, and relative and not relative? It is just as if one made a genus "living being" and put the nonliving being into it. And the double and the double-sized man are like whiteness and the white man, not at all identical.

10. And as for quality, from which what is called the qualified [or quale] derives, one must first grasp what is its real nature which enables it to produce what are called qualified beings, and whether, being one and the same according to what is common [to all kinds of quality], it produces its species by distinctive differences, or, if qualities are to be under-

1On ἀναφέροντες see Dicippus In Categ. 33. 8-13 (= Aristotle fr. 116 Rose, p. 106 Ross). παροχωματίζομεν are defined in Aristotle Categories 1.1a12.
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5 poíoτήτες, σοφά ἐν ἀν εἰσί γένος. τι ἄν τὸ καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ τε ἐξεσος καὶ διαθέσεως καὶ παθητικῆς ποσότητος καὶ σχήματος καὶ μορφῆς; καὶ λεγόμενο, παχύ, ἰσχυρό; εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ καὶ νῦν δύναμιν ἐρεύμεν, ἂν ἐφαρμότικα τοις ἑξεσι καὶ τοῖς διαθέσεως καὶ τοῖς φυσικῶς δυνάμεισιν,

10 ἂν' ἂς τὸ ἔχων δύναται δύναται, ὅπερτι αἱ ἀδυναμίαι ἀρμόσουσιν. ἐπειτε τὸ σχῆμα καὶ ἡ μορφή ἡ περὶ ἐκαστον πώς δύναμις; εἶπα τοῦ ἄν δὲν ἦν δύναμιν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει, ἀλλ' ὅταν αὐτῶ προσέλθῃ τὸ ποιών. αἱ δὲ ἐνέργειαι τῶν οὐσιῶν. ὅσαι μάλαται εἰσὶν ἐνέργειαι, τὸ 5 ποιών καθ' αὐτῆς ἐνεργείαι καὶ τῶν οἰκείων δυνάμεων δ' εἰσι. ἀλλ' ἄρα κατὰ τὰς ἐπ' αὐτὰς τὰς οὐσίας δυνάμεις; οὖν ἡ πυκνείος δύναμις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' τὸ λογικόν ἄστε τοὺς ποιῶνς τὸ ὅπως λογικόν. ἀλλά μάλλον θέτει ἢ ἀρτῆς κτήσαι ὅτι τῶν ὅσι τοις ὅσις δυνάμεις προκατείχατο τῶς οὐσίων· ἂν δὲν ἦσθαν ἄνθρωπος, ἂν δὲν ἦσθαι ὁ ποιών ὅσις λέγει. αἱ δὲ ποιῶται αἱ κυρίως,

20 προκατείχατο τῶς οὐσίως μὲθ' αὐτῶς τὸ ποιῶν εἶναι. αἱ δὲ διαφοράς αἱ πρὸς ἀλλήλας τῶς οὐσίας διστάσαις ὅμοιότητις ποιῶται, ἐνέργειαν ύστερος μάλλον καὶ λόγοι ἢ μέσοι λόγων, τὸ τί οὔδεν ἦσθαν ἱθέ σφαλμα, καὶ διὸ καὶ τό ποιῶν οὕτως λέγει. αἱ δὲ ποιῶται αἱ κυρίως,

25 καθ' ἐκ ποιῶν, ἂν δ' ἐν λόγων δυνάμεις εἶναι, τὸ κοινὸν εἶν ἄν λόγοι τίνες καὶ οὗν μορφᾶ, περὶ το ὅσις κάλλη

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stood in many different senses, there would not be one genus of quality. What, then, is the common element in state and disposition and passive quality and figure and shape? And what about rarefied and solid and lean? For if we are going to say that the common quality is power, which fits states and dispositions and natural powers, from which that which has it has the powers which it has, the incapacities will not fit in any more. Then, how are individual figure and shape power? And further, being qua being will have no power except when the quale comes to it. And the activities of substances, which are activities in the strictest sense, activate what belongs to the quale by themselves, and what they are belongs to their own powers. But does this mean that qualities are according to the powers intrinsic to the essences themselves? For instance, the power of boxing does not belong to man qua man, but rationality does; so that rationality in this sense is not a quality, but rather the rationality which one might acquire from virtue; so "rationality" is equivocal; so that quality would be a power which adds to substances, posterior to their being themselves, the being qualified. But the specific differences which distinguish substances in relation to each other are qualities in an equivocal sense, being rather activities and rational forming principles, or parts of forming principles, making clear what the thing is none the less even if they seem to declare that the substance is of a specific quality. And the qualities in the strict and proper sense, according to which beings are qualified, which we say are powers, would in fact in their general character be a sort of forming principles and, in a sense, shapes, beauties

1 The passage of Aristotle under discussion in this chapter is Categories 8. 8b25 ff.
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and uglinesses in the soul and in the body in the same way. But how can they all be powers? Let us grant that beauty and health are, of both kinds, but how can ugliness and illness and feebleness and in general incapacity be powers? Is it because beings are said to be qualified according to them? But what prevents the term "qualified" from being used equivocally and not according to one definition, and not only in four different senses, but in at least two in the case of each of the four? Now, first of all, is not quality [divided] according to active and passive, so that what is able to act is quality in one sense, and what is passive in another? And further, health determined by disposition and state is a quid, and illness in the same way, and strength and feebleness. But if this is so, power is no longer common [to all quality], but we must look for something else as the common element. Nor, again, are all qualities rational forming principles: for how can illness, a permanent state of illness, be a forming principle? But, then, are those which consist in forms and powers qualities, but these other ones privations? So there is not one genus, but they are brought into one as one category, as for instance knowledge is a form and power, but ignorance is a privation and incapacity. Now incapacity is a sort of shape, and so is illness, and both illness and vice are capable of and do many things, but badly. But when a quality is a missing of the mark, how is it a power? It does its own business, not having the correct end in view; for it would not have done anything which it could not do. And the unbeautiful has some sort of capacity. Well, then, does the triangle? Now in general we ought not even to look in the direction of power, but
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50 διακεῖται ὡστε κατὰ τὰς ὅλον μορφὰς καὶ χαρακτῆρας, καὶ κοινῶν ἡ μορφή καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐτείρι ὑπὸ μετὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. ἀλλὰ πάλιν πῶς αἱ δύναμεις: ἢ καὶ ὁ φύσει πυκνικός τῷ διακείμενῳ ποικῆς τοῦ οὐσιαστικοῦ, καὶ ὁ ἀδύνατος πρὸς τι, καὶ ὅλος χαρακτήρ τις ἡ ποιότης ὅνε

55 ὡς ὁ εὔσιάς, ἢ δὲ ἢ τα ἑαυτῷ δοκῇ καὶ εἰς ὅποιαν ἀμβλασθήσατα καὶ εἰς μὴ ὅποιαν, ὅπως θερμαίνῃ καὶ λευκότης καὶ ὅλος χρῶσ τὸ μὲν τῆς ὅποιας ἄλλο, ὅπως ἐνεργείας αὐτῆς, τὸ δὲ δευτέρῷ καὶ ἀνεφείπων καὶ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἐνθαμάσας αὐτὸ καὶ ἆλοιπον. ἀλλ’ εἴ κατά

60 τὴν μορφῶσαν καὶ χαρακτῆρα καὶ λόγον, πῶς τὰ κατὰ ἀναγεννημέναι καὶ αἰσχρῷ; ἢ λόγους ἅπαν τελείως λεκτῶν, ὅπως ἐν τῷ ἀισχρῷ, καὶ ἐν τῷ κάτω πῶς ὁ λόγος; καὶ ἐν ἕνα άλλα λόγον καυσάμενον τὸν τῆς ἄλλης, ἢ ἄλλο ἐν λόγῳ πάντα, ἀλλ’ ἄρκει τὸ κοινόν παρά τὸ πῶς διακόσια ἐκεῖν

1 Plotinus seems to be here concerned to exclude any recourse to the 'negative Forms' which undoubtedly appear in Plato, but have generally been an embarrassment to Platonists; he explicitly denies their existence in V. 9.10.

On negative Forms in Plato see W. D. Ross Plato's Theory of Ideas (Garden 1951) 167-9. Plotinus' 'theory of Ideas' is of exactly the kind which Ross suggests on p. 189: 'It might be possible for a theory of Ideas to dispense with an Idea of evil and with Ideas of its species, and to explain all evil in rather to what [a quality] is disposed; so that quality is a matter of what one might call shapes and characteristics, and shape is the common element, and the form on the substance which is posterior to the substance. But again, how are there the powers? The natural boxer has this ability of his by being disposed in a certain way, and so does the man who is incapable of something. And in general quality is a kind of non-substantial characteristic; it is something which seems to be the same and to contribute both to substance and to non-substance, heat, for instance, and whiteness and in general colour: that which belongs to substance is one thing, a kind of activity of the substance, but that which does not has a secondary status and derives from that other and is one thing in another, an image of it and like it. But if quality corresponds to shaping and characteristic and rational forming principle, what about the cases of incapacity and ugliness? They must be said to be incomplete forming principles, as in the ugly. And how is the forming principle in illness? Here too we must speak about a disturbed forming principle, that of health. Or perhaps all are not contained in rational forming principle, but the sufficient common element [of quality] is, besides being disposed in a particular way, being outside substance, and the

the sensible world as due to the fact that the relation of the phenomenal to the ideal is never one of perfect instantiation but always one of imitation which falls short of its pattern." Plotinus' close friend and colleague Amelius, however, took a different view, perhaps closer to Plato's own. He postulated Forms of Evils (Asclepius In Nic. Arithm. 44. 3-5 p. 32 Tarán; cp. Proclus Platonic Theology I. 21 p. 98 Saffrey-Westerink).
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quality of the substrate is what comes upon it posterior to the substance. But the triangle is a quality of that in which it is, not simply and solely a triangle, but the triangle which is in this thing and in so far as it has shaped this thing. But did manhood also shape? Rather, it gave substance.

11. But if all this is so, why are there several species of quality, and why is there a difference between state and disposition? For there is no specific difference of quality involved in persistence and non-persistence, but any kind of disposition is sufficient to make something a quale; and persisting is an external addition; unless someone says that dispositions are only incomplete sort of shapes, but states are complete ones. But if they are incomplete, they are not yet qualities; but if they are already qualities, persistence is an addition. But how are natural powers another species [of quality]? For if they are qualities because of the powers, the power-characteristic does not fit all of them, as has been said; but if we say that the natural boxer is qualified by being so disposed, then the addition of "power" does nothing, since there is power in states also. Then why will [the boxer] by natural power differ from the [boxer] by knowledge? If they are both [pugilistically] qualified, these differences are not specific differences of quality, if one is a boxer by practice and one by nature, but the difference is external. But how [are they to be differentiated] in relation to the very form of boxing? And [the difference is external again] if some qualities derive from being affected, but others not: for the source of the quality does not make a specific difference; but what I am talking about is differentiation by vari-
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Ations and specific differences of quality. But there would also be room for enquiry how qualities are members of the same species if these particular ones derive from being affected, some in this way, but others not even belonging to the same things; and if some derive from being affected by coming into being, but others by producing [the affection], they would be called qualities equivocally. And what about the shape of each individual thing? For if this is meant in the sense in which each thing is form, the thing is not [in this sense] a quale; but if it is meant in the sense in which a thing is beautiful or ugly in a way posterior to the form of its substrate, there would be some sense in it. And would not the rough and the smooth and the rare and the dense be correctly called qualia? For it is certainly not by the distances [of the parts] from each other or their nearness that something is subtle or dense or there is roughness, and it is not everywhere the result of the irregularity or regularity of the position [of the parts]; and even if these were their origins, nothing prevents them even so from being qualia. And knowledge of light and heavy will reveal where one ought to put them. But there might be an ambiguity about "light" if it is not used in the sense of more and less weight, since it has in it the idea of "lean" and "fine", which is in another species besides the four.2

12. 'All' ei μη ὅστως τις ἔδωσει τὸ ποιό διαίρειν, τόν ἀν δεῖλα; ἐπιασκεπτόνν οὔ, εἰ δὲ τὰς μὲν σοματος

1 A critical reference to the discussion of "passive" qualities in Aristotle Categories 8: 9a35-b11.

2 There seems to be a reference here to Andronicus, who according to Simplicius In Categ. 8, 263, 19-22 made a special genus for λέπτον, πορφύρα etc.
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LEGONTA, TAS DE PSIKHH, TOT DE SOMATOS MEROZEN KATA TAS AIETHHEIN, TAS MHN OPHNE VEMONTA,1 TAS DE OUKH H
5 GENOEE, ALLAS OSEFRESHEI H APOH, TOT DE TIS PSIKHIS POUS; EPIHOLEITOU, THEMOIOIKH, LOGISTIKOU. H TAIHS
DIASPORAI TON ENERGOION, AI GYNOITEI KAT Autas, OTI GENHNAI AI AIYTAI OTOS. H TIS OPHELIMOY KAI BLABERF
KAI PALLA DIASPEITON TAS OPHNELAIAS KAI TAS BLEBAS. TAD
10 AIYTA DE KAI ETI TON SOMATIKAON TON POIOEI DIASFORA H TIS OPHELIMOY KAI BLABERFO OIKEINA YAR DIASPORAI
POIOTHENOS. H YAR DOKEI H OPHELIA KAI TO BLABEOS YTO TIS POIOTHENOS KAI POIOU H LOGITHEON TRPON ALLON.
EKKAINENON DE, POS KAI O POIOS KATA TIS POIOTHEN 15 EN TIS AIYTH EISTA OY YAR DE EN YNEOS AMFOU. KAI EI O
TUKTIKOS EN POIOTHEN, POS OI KAI O PIPIKIKOS; KAI EI TOIOUTO, KAI TIS POIYTIKON; OUSTE ODHEN DEI EIS TIS PRYS TI
TIS POYTIKON ODHI AB TIS PAYTIKIKON, EI OPAYTIKOS
POIOS. KAI EINOS BLETON EINAIH O PIPIKIKOS, EI KATA
DYNAAMIS LGETAI, H DE DYNAAMIS POIOTHEN. DEI DE KAT Autas
20 H DYNAAMIS H TIS DYNAAMIS, ODHI OITAI PROS TI OIDE POIYON
ESTI. OIDE YAR ASE TIS MEEZON TIS POYTIKON TIS YAR MEEZON
TIS UPSTASEIN, KATH TIS MEEZON, PROS TIS ELATON, TIS DE
POIYTIKON TIS TOYNDE EINAI HEN. ALLA TAIOS KATA MEI TIS
TOYNDE POYON, H DE DYNAAMIS EIS ALLA POYTIKON

1 Igal, H-S; LEGONTA Enn: THEILER Theiler, H-S.

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soul, and classify the bodily ones according to the senses, allotting some to sight and some to hearing or taste, and others to smell or touch. But how are we to classify those of the soul? As belonging to the appetitive, emotional or rational part. Or by the differences of the activities which occur in accordance with them, because these qualities are such as to produce these activities. Or by helpfulness and harmfulness; and again one must divide the helps and the harms. But the same grounds of differentiation apply to bodily qualities, by doing different things or by helpfulness and harmfulness: for these are proper differences of quality. For one either thinks that help and harm come from quality and the quale or one must adopt a different method of investigation. But we must consider also how the qualified by the quality is in the same category [as the quality]: for there is certainly not one genus for both. And if the boxer is in the category of quality, why not also the doer and maker? And if this is so, then also the ability to do and make; so that there is no need to refer doing to the relative, nor again the ability to be affected [by the doing] if the one who is affected is qualified [by the doing]. And perhaps the doer and maker is better placed here, if he is called so in regard of power, and power is quality. But if power, or any power, pertains to substance, it is not in this way either a relative, and not, furthermore, a quale. For ability to do is not like more; for the more has its reality, in so far as it is more, in relation to the less, but ability to do by being such as it is already. But perhaps it is a quale by being such as it is, but in so far as it has power directed to something else it is called ability to do as a relative.
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Why then is not the boxer relative, and boxing itself? For boxing is altogether directed to somebody else; for certainly there is no part of the art which is not other-directed. And perhaps we should consider and speak of the other arts, or most of them, like this: in so far as they dispose the soul, they are qualities, but in so far as they do or make they belong to the category of doing and making, and in this way are other-directed and relative; since they are also relative in another way, in that they are called states. Is there then another reality of the doer and maker, according to its ability to do and make, when it is not another thing than it is in so far as it is a quale? Perhaps in the case of living things, and still more those which have the power of choice, one might say that there is a reality in them also according to their capacity to do and make, because of their inclination to act so; but in the case of lifeless powers, which we call qualities, why bring in doing and making? Now, whenever a thing encounters another, it gets something from it and takes a share from that other of what it has. But if the same thing both acts on and is affected by something else, how is doing and making still there? Since the more abo is three cubits long in itself and is more or less on the occasions when it meets something else. But someone will say that: the greater and the less are so by participation in largeness and smallness; so this [acting on and being affected] will also be by participation in activity and passivity. But one must are Forms of qualities, and contradicts his own doctrine that there are no qualities in the intelligible world, but what we call qualities here below are activities of substances there. See II. 6 and VI. 2.14.

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This is common Plutonic doctrine: cp. Phaedo 100E5-6. But Plotinus is anxious, as appears in what follows, that it should not be interpreted in a way which asserts that there

1 Kirchhoff (ad faciendum Ficinus): nos Em. 
2 "( = Ficinus), Creuzer: metàfíme wíxò, H. 8.
46 ποιότητές καὶ αἱ ἕκαστον ἢ τὰ ἑν τοῖς τιθεμένοις κάκει; ἢ κάν μὴ ἐκείνη τις διὰ τούτοις, ἀλλὰ ναὸν λέγων εἰ ἐξε πέφυ, ἢ κοινὸν τὶ ἐπ’ ἐκείνης καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἑξε τοῦ καὶ σοφίας δὲ συγχωρεῖται. ἢ εἰ ἑμῶν μόνος πρὸς τὴν ἑνταύθη, ἀν ἢ ὡσον δηλοῦσθαι ἐν τούτωσι:
50 εἰ δὲ συνανήμας, ἔσται ἐν ποῖῳ κοινῷ ἑνταύθα κάκει; εἰ μὴ τὰς τάκες λέγει πάντα ὑπόλειος καὶ τὸ νοεῖ τοῖς ἀλλὰ τούτω κοινὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀλλόν κατηγοριάς, [7] εἰ τὸ δυτικὸν ὅσον κάκει, ἢ ὥσπερ εἰ ἀρμοῖ.

13. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολὺ ἐπισκόπου εἰ τὸ χρόνος καὶ αὐθορίον καὶ πέρι ταῦτα μέχρι χρόνου, διὰ τὸ εἰκ ἐν τῷ ἀυτῷ ἔσται καὶ ταύτα, ἐν δὲ καὶ ὁ χρόνος; ἔτει καὶ τὸ ἦν καὶ τὸ ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἔσται, εἰδή ὄντα χρόνου, δίκαιον δήσοι τι ἐν ὃ ὁ χρόνος τετελεῖ. λέγεται δὲ τοῦ ποιοῦντον χρόνον; ὡστε τί δει κατηγορίας ἄλλης; εἰ δὲ λέγει καὶ ὥσπερ ὃ ὁ μόνον χρόνος τοῦ ἦν καὶ ἔσται,

1 A Peripatetic would deny the Forms, but admit a transcendent incorporeal Naos and sophia (which Plotinus, as usual, interprets in his own way).

2 In ch. 5 Plotinus makes it clear that time is not quantity, though definite lengths of time are quanta; cp. also VI 3. 11. His doctrine of time in this treatise is by no means as developed and carefully thought out as it is in the On The Kinds of Being I

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conquire here also if the qualities here and those in the intelligible world come under one genus; this is directed to those who posit qualities in the intelligible world as well; or even if someone does not grant that there are Forms, all the same when he speaks of intelligence, if he is speaking of a state, he certainly [implies that there is] something common to the state in the intelligible world and this one here; and it is agreed that there is wisdom. Now if the term "wisdom" is used of it equivocally in relation to the wisdom here below, it is clearly not counted among the things of this world; but if it is used univocally then the quale will be common to both worlds, unless someone says that all the things in the intelligible world belong to the category of substance; in which case being intelligent will be substance there too. But this is a general question about the other categories as well, whether there are two genera here and there, or whether both fall under one.

13. About the "when" we must enquire in this way: if the "yesterday" and "to-morrow" and "last year" and such are parts of time, why are not these also in the same genus in which time is too? Since it is surely right that the "was" and the "is" and the "will be", being parts of time, should be classed in the same genus in which time is. But time is said to belong to the quantum: so what need is there of another category? But if they were to say that it is not only time that the "was" and the "will be" treatise which follows On The Kinds of Being in Porphyry's chronological order, III. 7 (46) On Eternity and Time, perhaps written because Plotinus did not feel that he had dealt with time adequately in On The Kinds of Being.
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are, and the "yesterday" and "last year"—for these must be classed under the "was"—but (as was just said) not only time but some time, then, first of all, if it is "some time" it will be time; then, if the "yesterday" is time past, it will be something composite, if past is one thing and time is another: two categories, then, and not something single and simple. But if they are going to assert that what is when is that which is in time, but not time, if they mean by this "in time" the state of affairs, for example that Socrates was last year, the "Socrates" would be brought from outside, and they are not talking about one thing. But what would Socrates or the affair in this particular time be except in a part of time? But if because they say "a part of time", and in that it is a part claim that they are not saying that something is simply time, but a past part of time, they are making still more, and are adding on the part qua part, which is a relative. And will the past be for them either something included in or the same as the "was", which was a part of time? But if [they make their distinction] because the "was" is indefinite, but the "yesterday" and the "last year" are defined, first of all, where are we going to class the "was"? Since the "yesterday" will be a "definite was", so that the "yesterday" will be a definite time; but this is a time of a certain quantity; so that, if time is a quantum, each of these will be a definite quantum. But if, whenever they say "yesterday", we take this to mean that this particular thing happened in a past definite time, they are mentioning still more and more things; then, if one must introduce other categories by putting one thing in another, as in this case what is in time, we shall discover many others.
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20 ἐν χρόνῳ ἄλλο καὶ τὸ ἐν τόπῳ ἄλλο παρὰ χρόνῳ καὶ
tόπου, διὰ τι ὁ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἀγγείῳ ἄλλη κατηγορίαν
ποιήσει, καὶ τὸ ἐν ὕλῃ ἄλλο, καὶ τὸ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἄλλο,
kαὶ τὸ ἐν ὄλω μέρος καὶ τὸ ὄλον ἐν μέροι, καὶ γένος ἐν
eἴδει καὶ εἴδος ἐν γένει, καὶ ὑπόκινον ἔν πλεῖν διέ
κατηγορία ἐστονται.

15. Ἐν δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν λεγομένῳ τάδ’, ἐν τῷ ἐπισκέψεως, λέγεται γέρων ὡς, ἐπει μετὰ τὴν ὑσίαν τὸ
περὶ τὴν ὑσίαν ὑποστήσιν καὶ ἀριθμός, τὸ ποιεῖν γένος ἐ
tεροι ἃν, καὶ ποιήτης οὗς περὶ αὐτὴν ἄλλο γένος
δὲ τὸ ποιεῖν, ὑπόκινον καὶ ποιήσεως ὑποστήσιν ἄλλο γένος
τὸ ποιεῖν. ᾧ ὅν ποιεῖν ἢ ή ποιήσεις, ἢ θ’ ἔτοι ποιεῖν,
ἀπέρτη καὶ ποιήτης, ἢ θ’ ἔτοι ποιεῖν ὑποστήσιμον
ποιεῖν, ποιεῖν, ἢ ποιήσεις ἢ ὑποστήσιν εἰς ἐν ἀριθμόν;
ἐμφανίζεται δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ ποιῆτα, ἢ δὲ
ποιήτης ὑπ’ ἐν ποιητεῖς εἴναι τον, τούτο δὲ ἐνεργεία
ἀπειράρχη μᾶλλον εἶναι τὴν κατηγορίαν,
η̆ περὶ τὴν ὑσίαν. λέγεται δημιουργικὴ, ὡς ἑκεί
ποιήτης, καὶ (κτ’). αὐτὴ περὶ τὴν ὑσίαν ὑποστήσις

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time is something else besides time and what is in
place is something else besides place, why will not
what is in a pot make another category, and why is
not what is in matter something else, and what is in
a substrate something else, and the part in the whole
and the whole in the parts, and the genus in the
species and the species in the genus? And so we shall
have more categories.

15. But in what is called “acting” [or doing and
making] these are the points which one would
enquire into. For it is said that, since after substance
there were the accompaniments of substance, quanti¬

ty and number, the quantum was another genus,
and because quality accompanies substance the
quale was another genus; so, since there is activity,
acting is another genus. Is the genus then the acting
or the activity from which the acting comes, just like
the quality from which the quale comes? Or in this
case are activity, acting, and the agent, or acting and
activity, to be included in one genus? But acting
indicates more clearly that there is also the agent,
but activity does not; and acting is in some kind of
activity, that is, of active actuality. So would active
actuality rather be the category, which is said to be
observed as an accompaniment of substance, like
quality in the other case? And [is there a question] whether active actuality is an accompaniment
of substance just like movement? And the movement of

1 ποιεῖν καὶ ἐνεργεία present considerable difficulties to the
translator. "Doing and making" and "active actuality" go
some way towards bringing out the full range of meaning of
the two words, but are too cumbersome to use continually
and not always necessary. Various more or less unsatis-
factory compromises will be detected in what follows.

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14. real beings is one genus. For why is quality one single accompaniment of substance, and quality one, and the relative one because of the state of relatedness of one thing to another, but, when movement is an accompaniment of substance, will movement also not be a single genus?

15. But if someone were to say that movement was an incomplete active actuality, nothing would prevent us from giving active actuality the priority and subordinating movement to it as a species, as being incomplete, making its category active actuality, but adding the ‘incomplete’. For the ‘incomplete’ is said about it, not because it is not also active actuality, but it is altogether active actuality, but has also the “over and over again”, not that it may arrive at active actuality—it is that already, but that it may do something, which is another thing subsequent to itself. And then when it does do it: it is not itself brought to completion, but the business which was its object: walking, for instance, was walking from the beginning. But if one had to complete a lap, and had not yet arrived at the point of having completed it, what was lacking would not belong to walking or movement, but to walking a certain distance; but it was already walking, however short the walk was, and movement: for certainly the man who is in motion has already moved, and the man who is cutting, cut already. And just as what is called active actuality does not need time, so neither does movement, but [only] movement to a certain extent; and if active actuality is in timelessness, so is movement in that it is in a general way.

The reference here is to the “Platonic Category” of the intelligible world κύριος (Plato Sophist 25dD); see VI. 2. 7–8.

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movement. But if it must be in every way in time because it has acquired the character of continuity, then sigh: which does not interrupt its seeing would be in continuity and in time. There is evidence for this in the stupid statement which says that it is always possible to take a piece of any movement whatever, and there is not a beginning of the time in which and from which it began, nor a beginning of the movement itself, but it is always possible to divide it up and back: so that it would result that the movement which has just begun has been in motion from infinite time, and that movement is infinite in respect of its beginning. This results because of separating of active actuality from movement and asserting that active actuality occurs in timelessness, but saying that movement needs time, not movement of a certain length only; but they are compelled to say that its nature is quantitative; and yet even they admit that the quantum is incidentally present to it, if it is a day long or of any time you like. Therefore, just as active actuality is in timelessness, so nothing prevents movement from originating in timelessness, but time has come by its becoming of a certain length. Since changes also are admitted to take place in timelessness, in the remark "as if there was not a change which takes place all at once",1 if then change, why not also motion? But change has here been taken, not in the sense of completed change: for there was no need of change in completion of the process of change.

17. But if someone were to say that neither active actuality nor movement need a genus in and by

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1. "Εννέαν τῶν τῆς μέν ἐνέργειαν τῶν διαμέλει εἶναι ἐνεργητικοί, τὴν δὲ τοῦ διαμέλει κινητικήν ἤ κινητόν, 5 λεκτέων ὡς τὰ μὲν πρὸς τι αὐτὴ ἢ σχέσεις ἐγένοντο, ἀλλὰ σε ὑπὸ τῷ πρὸς ἄτρον μόνον λέγεσθαι. δὲν δὲ ἢ τις ἑποδόταις, κἂν ἀτρόν ἢ κἂν πρὸς ἄτρον, τὴν γε πρὸ τοῦ πρὸς τὶ εἴληθε φύσιν. αὐτὴ ταύταν ἢ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ ἐξεὶ δὲ ἀτρόν οὐκ αὐτὲς ἐκ τοῖν πρὸ

10 τοῦ πρὸς τί εἴληθε τε καὶ νοεῖσθαι καθ' αὐτά ἢ ὁποῖοι πάντα ἔσται πρὸς τὶ κάνως γὰρ ἔξει ὡς ὁποῖα σχέσεις πρὸς ὅποιαν, ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς. αὐτὴ τε ἡ ποίησις καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν διὰ τί εἰς τὸ πρὸς τὶ οὐκ ἀναχθήσεται; ἡ γὰρ κίνησις ἢ ἐνέργεια πάντως ἐσται εἰ δὲ τὴν μὲν

15 ποίησιν εἰς τὸ πρὸς τὶ ἀνάξωσι, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν ἐν γένος ἐστίνοι, διὰ τί οὔ καὶ τὴν μὲν κίνησιν εἰς τὸ πρὸς τὶ, τὸ δὲ κινεῖσθαι εἰς τὸ γένος ἔσται, καὶ διαφόροις τὸ κυνεῖσθαι ὡς ἐν διχῇ ἐν εἰκότω ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ τάσεως, ἀλλὰ εἰς ὡς νῦν τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ τάσεως;

18. Ἐπισκεπτόμεθα δὲ, εἰ ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν τὰς μὲν ἐνεργείας φύσοις, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις, τὰς μὲν ἐνεργείας λέγοντες εἶναι τὰς αὐθέντας, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις, ὡς τὸ τέμνει—ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ τὸ τέμνει—ἡ πάσας κινήσεις ἡ

5 μετὰ κινήσεως, καὶ εἰ πάσας πρὸς τὸ πάσας τὰς

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themselves, but they are to be referred to the relative in that active actuality belongs to that which is potentially active and actual, and movement to that which is potentially moving or moved, one must answer that it is the very state of relatedness which produces relatives, and they are not produced by the mere statement that a thing is related to another. But when there is some substantial reality, even if it belongs to something else or is related to something else, it certainly possesses its nature prior to the relativity. This active actuality, then, and movement and state, though belonging to another, do not lose their priority to the relative and being thought in and by themselves; otherwise in this way everything will be relative: for absolutely everything has a relation to something, as in the case of the soul. And why are not activity and acting to be referred to the relative? For movement and active actuality will be altogether so. But if they are going to refer activity to the relative, but make one genus of acting, why will they not refer movement to the relative, but posit being in motion as one genus, and divide being in motion, as one genus, into two, into the species of acting and being acted upon, instead of, as they do now, saying that acting is one genus and being acted upon another?

18. But we must investigate whether they are going to assert that in acting some activities are active actualities and some are movements, saying that those which occur all at once are active actualities and the others are movements, cutting for instance—for cutting goes on in time—or whether they are all movements or accompanied by movement; and whether all activities are related to passi-
vity, or there are also some which are independent, walking and talking for instance, and whether all the activities which are related to passivity are movements, but the independent ones are active actualities, or whether there are some of each in each class. Walking at any rate, which is independent, they would say was a movement, but thinking, though it also has no passivity, an active actuality. I suppose. Or else it must be asserted that thinking and walking are not included in acting at all. But if they are not in acting, it must be said where they are: but perhaps the act of thinking is related to the object of thought just as thought [in general] is. For certainly sense perception is related to the sense-object; but if in that case sense-perception is related to the sense-object, why is not the actual [particular] act of sense-perception any longer related to the sense-object? And sense-perception, even if it is related to something else, has indeed a relatedness to that something, but has something over and above the relatedness, the being either an active actuality or a passive experience. If then the passive experience, over and above belonging to something and being caused by some agent, is something different so also is the active actuality. Certainly walking, which itself also has the characteristics of belonging to something, and in fact belonging to the feet, and of being caused by an agent, has the being a movement. Therefore thought also, over and above its relation, has the being either a movement or an active actuality.

19. But we must investigate whether some active actualities are going to appear as incomplete without acquiring an addition of time, so that they will
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come into the same genus as movements, life and living for instance. For the life of every man is in a complete time, and his well-being is not in partlessness, but is like they maintain that movement also is. So that both are to be called movements, and movement is one thing and one genus, as we observe besides the quantum in the substance the quale as well, and a movement which appertains to the substance. And, if you like, some movements are of body and some of soul, or some are self-originated and others are produced in the moving things by the agency of others, or some come from themselves and some from others, and the ones which come from themselves are activities, whether they are directed to other things or independent, but those which come from others are passivities. And yet the movements to other things are the same as the movements from other things: for cutting, the cutting which comes from the cutter and the cutting which takes place in what is being cut, is one, but cutting and being cut are different. But perhaps even the cutting originating from the cutter and the cutting going on in the cut are not one, but what cutting is is the process in which, from an active actuality and movement of this particular kind, another successive movement comes to be in what is being cut. Or perhaps the difference does not lie in the actual being cut, but in something else, the subsequent movement, feeling pain for instance: for there is certainly passivity in this. Well then, what is the case if there is not any pain? What else is there than the active actuality of the agent existing in this particular thing? For in this way this description also fits acting. And in this way acting is double, one
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kind which does and one kind which does not occur
in another; and it is no longer a distinction of acting
and being passive, but acting in another has pro-
duced the supposition that there are two, acting and
being passive. Writing, for instance, although it is in
something else, does not require (the concept of)
passivity, because it does not produce anything else,
feeling pain for instance, in the writing tablet
beyond the actual activity of the writer; but if
someone says that the tablet has been written on, he
is not referring to passive suffering. And in the case
of walking, though there is ground on which one
walks, (the concept of) its passive suffering is not
included. But when one steps on the body of a living
being, one does have passive suffering in mind, since
one reasons about the pain which occurs, not the
walking; otherwise one would have thought of it
before also. In this way too in all cases, where action
is concerned one genus must be mentioned together
with passive suffering, that of the opposite of action.
But what is called passive suffering is what occurs
subsequently, not the opposite like being burnt to
burning, but what results from burning and being
burnt which are one, either the pain which occurs in
the burnt object or something else, like shrivelling.
Well then, if someone does this very thing in order
to cause pain, does not one act and the other suffer,
even if the two come from one actual activity? Now,
in the actual activity what belongs to the will to
hurt is no longer contained, but the agent does
something else, by which he causes pain, which
something else, being one and the same when it
occurs in what is going to be hurt produces another
effect, that of being hurt. Why then is not the one

thing which occurs, before it also causes pain, or if it
does not cause pain in its object at all, nor a passive
affection of that object, like hearing? Now hearing is
not a passive affection, nor is sense-perception in
general, but being hurt is coming into a passive
state, which is not opposite to action.

20. But granted that it is not opposite, yet all the
same it is different from action and not in the same
genus as doing and making. Now if both are move¬
ments, it is in the same genus. as, for instance,
"qualitative change is movement in respect of
quality". Whenever, therefore, the movement in
respect of quality, the qualitative change, proceeds
from the agent : is it an action and is it doing, if the
maker : is unaffected? If the agent is unaffected, it is
in the category of doing, but if the agent is acting on
someone else, hitting him for instance, and is af¬
fected, the agent is no longer doing. Now nothing
prevents the doer from also being affected. If then
the affection is in respect of the same thing, for
instance rubbing, why is it doing rather than being
affected? It is because it is reciprocally rubbed that
it is also affected. Are we then to say that there are
two movements in it because it is reciprocally
moved? How can there be two? But there must be
one. And how does the movement in producing quali¬
tative change dispose what is affected in a different
way and the agent remain unaffected by that change in disposition? For
how could it be affected by what it does in another?
ON THE KINDS OF BEING

Is it then the fact that the movement is in something else which produces being affected, which was not being affected in the case of the agent? But if on the one hand the rational form of the swan produces whiteness and [on the other] the swan coming into being is made white, are we going to say that the swan is affected as it proceeds to substantiality? But is it if it is made white afterwards when it has come into being? And if one thing is going to make something larger and the other is going to be made large, is that which is going to be made large affected? Or is being affected only in quality? But if one thing makes something beautiful and the other is made beautiful is that which is being made beautiful affected? If, then, that which makes beautiful becomes worse or even disappears, like the tin, and the other, the copper, becomes better, are we to say that the copper is affected and the tin acts? And how is the learner affected when the activity of the agent comes to him? How could the activity be a passivity when it is certainly one? But is this activity not a passivity, but will [the learner] who has it be passively affected, being affected being taken as somebody being affected? For it is not because the learner has not been active: for learning is not like being hit, since it consists in grasping and getting to know, and neither is seeing.

21. By what indication, then, are we to recognize being affected? Not, certainly, by the fact that the activity [affecting it] comes from another, if the one who received the activity took it over and made it his own. But is it when there is no activity and only passive affection? What then if it becomes more beautiful, and the activity has the worst of it? Or if...
someone is viciously active and starts an unscrupulous attack on another? Now, there is nothing to prevent activity from being bad and passive affection good. So by what shall we distinguish them? Perhaps by the fact that the one is directed from the agent to another, and the other, passive affection, is in another but comes from a different source? What then if it comes from oneself but is not directed to another, thinking or opining for instance? And what about getting heated as a result of one’s own thought or of being put into a passion by an opinion, when nothing comes to one from outside? Is action, whether in oneself or going on to another, a self-caused movement? Then what is concupiscence and every sort of desire, if desire derives its movement from the desired object? Unless of course one does not make the assumption that it has derived its movement from the object, but only that it has been awakened after [the appearance of] the object. How then does desire differ from being hit, or pushed and knocked down? But perhaps we should divide desires, saying that some of them are actions, all that follow intellect, but those which drag one are passive affections, and that passive affection is not a matter of deriving from another or from oneself—for a thing can rot in itself—but that when without any contribution of its own a thing undergoes an alteration which does not bring it to substantiality and changes it for the worse, or not for the better, an alteration of this kind has the characteristic of passivity and being passively affected? But if being heated is acquiring heat, and this contributes to one thing’s substantiality but not to another’s, being affected and not being affected will be the same.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

on the kinds of being 1

thing. And, surely, being heated is double. Now being heated, when it contributes to substantiality, will then also contribute to substantiality by something else being affected; for instance when the bronze is heated and affected, but the substance is the statue, which was not heated itself except incidentally. If then the bronze is more beautiful as a result of being heated or according to the degree of heat, there is nothing against saying it is passively affected: for being passively affected is double, one kind consisting in becoming worse, the other in becoming better, or neither.

22. Passive affection, then, occurs by having in oneself an alterative motion of any kind; and action is either having in oneself an independent self-derived motion or one which starts from oneself and ends in another, [a motion, that is,] starting from that which is said to act. There is motion in both cases, but the difference which separates action and passive affection keeps action, in so far as it is action, unaffected, but makes passive affection consist in being disposed otherwise than it was before; the substance of what is affected gains nothing which contributes to its substantiality, but what is affected is different, when a substance comes to be. So the same is action in one relationship and passive affection in another. It is the same motion, but looked at on one side it will be action, but on the other passive affection, because this is disposed in this way; so it seems likely that both are relation, in all cases where action is related to passive affection; if one looks at the same on one side it is action, but if on the other, it is affection. And each of the two is looked at not by itself, but [one] along with that

1 del. Kirchhoff.
ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

which acts, and [the other] with that which is affected: this one moves and this one is moved, and each is two categories; and this one gives motion to this, and this one receives it, so that there is taking and giving and this is relation. Or, if the recipient has, as in the phrase "have colour", why does it not also "have movement"? And independent movement, that of walking for instance, has walking, and also has thinking. But one must consider whether forethought is action, if being the object of forethought is being affected; since forethought is directed to something else and is about something else. Now forethought is not action, even if the thought is about something else, nor is being its object being affected. And thought is not action either—it does not operate in the object of thought itself, but is about it: it is not any kind of doing or making. And one should not call all activities doings or makings, or say that they do something. Doing is incidental.

Well then, if someone walking produces footprints, do we not say he made them? But [he did so] because he was something else. Or [we may say that] the making is incidental and the activity [of footprint-making] is incidental, because he did not have this in view: since we speak of action in the case of lifeless beings, that fire heats, for instance, or "the drug acted". But that is enough of that.

23. But about having, if "having" is used in many different senses, why will they not refer all the ways of having to this category? So the quantum, because it has size, and the quale, because it has colour, and the father and such, because he has a son, and the son because he has a father, and, in general, possessions. But if the other things are in

![Image of a page from a book containing text in Greek and English, discussing Plotinus' Enneads VI.1, with a focus on the kinds of being and the relationship between actors and affected.]
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

those categories [of quantity, quality and relation] but weapons and shoes and things around the body [are in this one], first of all one might enquire why, and why the person who has these things makes another category, but, if he burns them or cuts them or buries them or throws them out, does not make another or others. But if it is because they are around the body, if a cloak lies on a bed there will be one category and if someone has wrapped himself in it another. But if it is in accordance with possession and the state of possessing, obviously again all the other things spoken of in connection with having are also to be referred to the state of possessing, wherever one puts it for there will be no differentiation according to what is possessed. If then one must not say that one has a quality, because quality has been mentioned already, or that one has quantity, because quantity has been mentioned, or that one has parts, because substance has been mentioned, then why should one say one has weapons, when substance has been mentioned, and they are in this category? For a shoe and weapons are substance. And how, altogether, is "this man here has weapons" a simple statement belonging to one category? For this means being armed. Then, can one say this only about a living man, or also if it is a statue which has the weapons? For each of the two appeals to "have" them in a different way, and perhaps "have" is equivocal: since "stand" is not the same in both cases. And again, how is it reasonable that something which occurs in a few cases should have another general category?

24. About position—which also only occurs in a few cases—lying on, sitting: though these terms do
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

Xeyopivtvv, aXXa

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

not simply express position, but "they are in a certain position" or "he is posed in such and such an attitude". And the attitude is something else; but what else does position signify but "is in place" and, when place and attitude have been mentioned, what need is there to join up two categories into one? Then further, if "sits" signifies an activity, it must be ranked among activities, but if a passive affection, it must be placed in the class of having been or being affected. But what does "he lies on" mean except "he lies above", like "he lies under", or "he lies between"? And why, when lying on is in the category of relation, is not the man who is lying on something there too? Since being on the right is there too, and the one on the right and the left. So much for that.

25. But as for those who posit the four genera and make a fourfold division into subjects and qualia and things in a certain state and things in a certain state in relation to others, and posit over them a common something and include all things in one genus, there is much that one could say against them because they assume a common something and one genus over all. For, really, how incomprehensible and irrational this something of theirs is, and how unadapted to bodiless things and bodies. And they have not left any room for differences with which they will be able to differentiate the something. And this something is either existent or non-existent; if, then, it is existent, it is one of its species; but if it is


1. Again the Stoics see ch. 2, p. 1, p. 16.

2. For a good account of the Stoic Categories and of the misunderstandings about them which may have arisen.
ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

non-existent, the existent is non-existent. And there are innumerable other objections. Well, we should leave these for the present and consider the division itself. They rank subjects first and at this point rank matter before the others, and so rank what they think is the first principle along with the things which come after their first principle. And first of all, they bring prior things into one [genus] with posterior things, when it is not possible for that which is prior and that which is posterior to be in one genus. For in things in which there is prior and posterior, the posterior takes its being from the prior, but in things which come under the same genus each receives an equal contribution to its being from the genus, if the genus is what is predicated in speaking of the essential nature of the species: since they, I think, will agree that existence comes to the other things from matter. Then, when they count the subject as one, they do not enumerate existing things, but are looking for the principles of existing things. But it makes a difference whether one speaks of the principles or the things themselves. But if they are going to say that only matter exists, and that the other things are affections of matter, they ought not to place a single genus before being and the others: rather, it would have been better put if they had distinguished one thing as substance and the rest as affections and then divided those. And [it is unreasonable] to call some things subjects and [put] others in [categories], when the subject is one and has no differentiation except by being divided, like a mass, into parts—yet it cannot even be divided because they say that its substance is continuous—it would
have been better to say "the subject" [in the singular].

26. But, speaking generally, it is in every way superlatively absurd to rank matter, something which is potential, before all things, but not to put actuality before potency. For it is not even possible for what is in potency ever to come to actuality if the potential holds the rank of principle among beings: for it certainly will not bring itself to actuality, but the actual must be before it, and then this potential will no longer be a principle; or, if they say that [potential and actual] are simultaneous, they will put the principles in the realm of chance. And then, if they are simultaneous, why do they not give the actual the first rank? And why is this one, matter, the more existent, and not that one? But if the actual is later, how [did it come into being]? For, certainly, matter does not generate form, that which is without quality the qualified, nor does actuality come from the potential: for [if it did] the actual would exist in the potential, and it would no longer be simple. And God for them comes second after matter: for he is a body, and composed of matter and form. And where did he get his form from? But if [he had it] without having matter, having the nature of a principle and being a rational formative power, God would be bodiless and the creative bodiless. But if even without matter God comes second after matter, in that he is a body, they will be introducing another matter, that of God. Then how is matter a principle if it is body? For it is not possible for a body not to be many, and every body is composed of matter and quality. But if this one is body in a different way,
ON THE KINDS OF BEING

they are calling matter body equivocally. But if three-dimensionality is the common characteristic of body, they are speaking of mathematical body; but if resistance accompanies three-dimensionality, then they are talking about something which is not one. And then resistance is a quale or derives from quality. And where did the resistance come from? And where the three-dimensional extension, and who extended it? For matter is not contained in the definition of three-dimensionality, nor three-dimensionality in the definition of matter. If then matter participates in magnitude, it would no longer be simple. Then where does its unification come from? For it is certainly not absolute unification, but by participation in unity. They should certainly have worked out that it is not possible to put mass in the first place of all, but that which is without mass and the one, and starting with the one to conclude in the many and starting with the sizeless to conclude in magnitudes, if it is not possible for many to be unless one is, nor size unless the sizeless is: if, that is, size is one not by being itself one but by participation in the one and a coming together. There must therefore be the primarily and properly [existent] before that [which exists] by coming together or how does the coming together occur? And one must enquire what is the manner of the coming together: for [if the Stoics had done so] they might perhaps have found the one which is not incidentally one. By "incidentally one" I mean that which is one not by being the one itself, but from another.


1 U, H-S\textsuperscript{2}: αὐτὸς ὁ δύσος \textit{wBx}, \textit{Pharn} ἀνὴρ ὁ \textit{Arnim} (SVF II n. 315), H-S\textsuperscript{3}.

This is the nearest Plotinus ever comes to any awareness that Stoic corporealism was not as gross and absurd as Platonist and Peripatetic opponents supposed. The Stoic conception of "body" was much subtler and more interesting than Plotinus represents it here and elsewhere.
27. And in other ways, also, they ought to keep the principle of all things in the place of honour, and not to posit as principle the shapeless nor that which is without share in life and unintelligent and dark and is the indefinite, and then to attribute substance to this. For thou bring in God for the sake of appearances, [a God] who has his being from matter and is composite and posterior, or rather is matter in a certain state. Then if matter is the substrate [or subject] there must necessarily be something else which acts upon it, being external to it, and makes it to be subjected to the things which are sent into matter by it. But if God himself was subjected in matter and himself came into being along with it, he will no longer make matter a subject, nor will he be the subject [or substrate] along with matter: for to what will they be substrates, when there will be nothing to make them substrates since everything has been used up in the so-called substrate? For the substrate is substrate in relation to something, not to what is in itself but to what acts upon it: as it lies subjected. And the substrate is subjected in relation to what is not substrate: that is, to what is external, so that this would just have been left out. But if they do not require anything from outside, but the substrate itself is capable of becoming everything by being figured, like the dancer who in his dance makes himself everything, then it will no longer be the substrate, but itself everything. For as the dancer is not the substrate of the figures—for all the rest are his active actuality—so what they call matter will not be the subject of all things, if all the rest come from it: or rather, all the rest will not even exist, if matter in a certain state is all the rest, just

\[1\] A brief allusion to one of Plotinus' favourite images, that of the cosmic dancer. ep. III. 2.18. 24-27 and 17. 8-11; IV. 4.33. 6-25.
as the dancer in a certain state is the figures. But if all the rest are not going to exist, this matter will not in any way be a substrate, and not the matter of existing things, but, since it is purely and simply matter, will by this very fact not be matter: for matter is relative. For the relative is in relation to something else, and something of the same genus, double to half for instance, not substance to double; but how is being to non-being a relation, except incidentally? But the relation of being in itself to matter is one of being. For if it is potentiality, which is going to be, and that is not substance, it will not be itself substance; so that this is what happens to the Stoics: they blame those who make substances out of non-substances, but themselves make non-substance out of substance; for their universe, in so far as it is universe, is not substance. But it is absurd that matter, the substrate, is substance, but bodies are not more substantial and the universe more substantial than bodies, [but the universe according to them] is only substance in so far as it is a part of the substrate; and that the Living Being does not have its substantiality from soul but only from matter, and that the soul is an affection of and posterior to matter. From what, then, did matter derive its ensoulement, and in general from what did the real existence of soul derive? And why does matter sometimes become bodies, but another part of it becomes soul? For, even if the form comes from somewhere else, soul would in no way come into being when quality comes to matter, but soulless bodies. But if something moulds matter and makes soul, the soul which makes will be prior to the soul which comes to be.
28. *Alla γὰρ πολλά διότι τῶν λεγομένων πρὸς τὸν ὑπόθεσιν ταύτης τούτων μὲν πανσέστε, ἤ καὶ ἄτοπον ἢ τὸ πρὸς αὐτῷ πάντως ἀποκρίνεται ἀπὸ καίρους φιλοσοφικοῦ, δεικνύεται, ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὢν ὡς τὸ μάλιστα ἤν προτέτονοι 5 καὶ τὸ ὑπάττον πρῶτον. αὐτῶν δὲ ἡ ἀδιάλειπτος αὐτοῖς ἡμερῶν γενομένη καὶ πιστὰ εἰς ἄρχον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θέσεων. τὰ γὰρ σώματα νομίζοντες εἶναι τὰ ὅντα, εἶτα αὐτῶν τῆς μεταβολῆς εἰς ἀλλήλα παραβλέπειται τὰ μένον ὅπως αὐτὰ τούτα ἑξέβησαν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμείας, εἴτε ἀν εἰς τὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τότον ἢ τὰ σώματα νομίζοντες εἶναι τὸ ὅν, πρὶν ὃι λόγεσιν ὁ τόπος νομίζασα. καὶ τῶν καὶ ὁποῖος αὐτοῖς μένει, ἐδει γαρ ὡς τὸ ὅπως μένον νομίζοι τὸ ὅν, ἀλλὰ ἂν ἐκεῖ πρότερον, τίνος τῶν ἄρχων ὡς, ἢ ὡς ἀναφέρονταί καὶ τὰ ἀεὶ μένος. προβλέποντες τὴν προτεστασίαν ἄλλως ἐναντίον ἑαυτῶν, μᾶλλον 10 εἰς ἐκείνοι. τὸ τε ἀπεθανόμενον μετ’ ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν τὸ ἐνθίζεις μᾶλλον ὡς τὸ διὸν ὥς ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἰς ἐκείνῳ να ὡς ἐν τῶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἰς δὴ καὶ τὸ διὸν ὑποθέσει ἐκείνου ὡς ἐν, πῶς ἐν ὑποθέσει ἐκείνου. 15 πάντως τοῖς ἀναμεμείζοναν τῇ ἀπεθανοῦσα παρακλήσεις ἐκκαλεῖ τῇ 20 μη ὅπως ἐκαθαήηι ἀλλων τίθεθαι ὡς ὅπως ἄρετος ὡς τὸ ἀντίτυπον αὐτή τι διάδοτος, ποιότης γάρ τούτο, εἰς δὲ τὸ ὅπως λέγοντας λαβεῖν, ἀποθανεί ό νοῦς αὐτοῦ ὡς τὴν ἀλήθειαν προκάζει καὶ τὸ ὅπως ἀλθεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ ὡς αὐτοῦ. σῶκ

1 Theiler.
since their intellect is not real for them, how could it be trustworthy when it speaks about things more authentic than itself and is in no way related to them? But about this nature and about substrates we have spoken sufficiently elsewhere.

29. Qualia for them must be different from the subject-substrates, and this is what they mean; otherwise they would not have counted them second. If then they are different, they must also be simple; if this is so, not composite; and if this is so, they must not have matter, in so far as they are qualia; and if this is so, they must be bodiless and active: for matter is subjected to them for passivity. But if they are composite, first of all the division is absurd which sets simples and composites over against one another, and that under one genus, and then puts the other one in each of the species, as if someone dividing knowledge said that one kind was literary knowledge and another literary knowledge plus something else. But if they were to say that qualia are qualified matter, first of all their rational forming principles will be immanent in matter; they will not make something composite when they have come to be in matter, but before the composite which they make they will be composed of matter and form; they will not, then, themselves be forms or forming principles. But if they were to say that the forming principles are nothing but matter in a certain state, this is not a different kind of state, what is the difference? Now clearly in this case being in a certain state is more of an existence. But if it is not an existence there too, why do they count it
as one genus or species? For certainly that which is and that which is not cannot be under the same genus. But what is this being in a certain state imposed upon matter? It is either existent or non-existent; and if it is existent, it is altogether bodiless; but if it is non-existent, it is an empty appellation and there is only matter, but the quale is nothing. But neither is the thing in a certain state anything: for it is still more non-existent. And the fourth class mentioned is even still more non-existent. So, then, only matter is existent. Who, then, asserts this? Not, presumably, matter. But perhaps matter does assert it: for matter in a certain state is intellect; though the "in a certain state" is a meaningless addition. Matter, then, says this and understands it. And if it talked sense, it would be surprising how it thinks and does the works of soul, when it has neither intellect nor soul. But if it was talking senselessly, making itself what it is not and cannot be, to whom should we attribute the senselessness? Well, if it did speak, to itself; but, as things are, matter does not speak, but the speaker speaks with a large contribution from matter, to which he entirely belongs, even if he has a bit of soul, he speaks in ignorance of himself and of the power which is able to speak the truth about such things.

30. In the case of things in a certain state, it is perhaps absurd to put things in a certain state third, or however they are placed in the order, since every thing in a certain state is in relation to matter. But they will say that things in a certain state have a distinctive difference and that it is one thing for matter to be in this or that particular state, but something else in the case of things in a certain
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

"eti tā μέν ποιά περὶ τὴν ὁλην πως ἐχουση, τὰ ἱδίως δέ πως ἐχουση περὶ τοια. ἀλλὰ τῶν ποιῶν αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἢ ὡς πως ἐχουσης ὡς τῶν ποίων ἐχουση ἐπὶ τὴν ὁλην αὐτοῖς ἀνατρέχει καὶ περὶ τὴν ὁλην ἐσται. πῶς δὲ 10 ἐν τὰ ποιῶν πολλῆς διαφοράς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡσις; πώς γέρ τῳ τρίτῃ καὶ τῷ λευκῷ εἰς ἐν τού μὲν πασών, τοῦ δὲ ποιῶν δυνατος; πῶς δὲ τῷ στόχῳ καὶ τῷ ποι; πῶς δὲ ἄλλως πως ἐχουση τῷ χρής καὶ τῷ περίπου καὶ τῷ ἐν Λυκίῳ καὶ Ἑκατομμύριοι καὶ ἔλας πῶς δὲ ὁ χρόνος πως ἐχουση; οὗτο

15 γάρ αὐτῶν οὕτω τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ χρόνῳ, οὗτο τὰ ἐν τῷ τούτῳ οὗτο ὁ τόπος, τὸ δὲ ποιῶν πῶς πως ἐχουση; ἔπει οὗτοι τοὺς ποιῶν ἐχουσην ἀλλά μᾶλλον ποιῶν ποιῶν ἢ ἐλοχοῖ οὐ ποι-

1 ἀλλὰ ποιῶν μένον καὶ οἱ πάσχον ὡς ποιῶν ἐχουση, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιῶν πάσχον ἢ ἐλοχοῖ πάσχον ὡς ποιῶν. Ισος

20 δ' ἂν μόνον ἀριστεροὶ ἑπὶ τοῦ κεινᾶτα τῷ ποιῶν ἐχουσην καὶ οὕτω τοῦ ἐχουσην ἑπὶ τοῦ ἐχουσην οἷα ποιῶν ἐχουσην ἀλλὰ "ἐχουσην" τὸ δὲ πρὸς τού ὡς μή δ' ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις εἰσίδεσαι ἐπειρομένους ἐν ἑν ἐν ποικιλίας εἰς τοιαύτης ὑποτυπών τοις τοιαύτης σχέσεις, τοπολαχοὶ ὡς διάδοσεν. ἐπὶ δ' ἐν γένει τῷ αὐτῷ (τό)' ἐπειρομένουν

25 πράγμα τῶν ἀδήν ὡς ἀποστου σωστάτετε [τὸ ἐπειρο-

1 Gulliver: on the BuUC, Creuzet: on the dw. Perma.
2 H. S.
3 del. Kirchoff.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

which were there before: for one and two must be
there first for there to be half and double.

But as for all the others who have made other
assumptions about beings or the principles of beings,
whether they said they were infinite or limited,
Lodies or bodiless, or both, one is free to enquire
about each and every one of them, taking into
account as well what the ancients said against their
opinions.
VI. 2. ON THE KINDS OF BEING II

1. Now that our enquiry about what are called the ten genera has been completed, and we have spoken about those who bring all things into one genus and posit four species of a sort under the one, the next thing would be to say how these things look to us, trying to lead back our own thoughts to the thought of Plato. Now if it was necessary to assume that being is one, there would be no need to investigate whether there is one genus over all, or whether the genera cannot be classed under one, or whether the principles [can or cannot be], or whether one should assume that principles are the same as genera or genera as principles, or whether all the principles are also genera but the genera not [all] principles, or the other way round, or whether in both groups some principles are also genera and some genera also principles, or whether in one group all are the others, but in the other some are also the others. But since we maintain that being is not one—Plato and others have explained why it becomes, per-

《The critical discussion of the ten Aristotelian categories occupies the first 24 chapters of VI. 1, of the Stoic categories the last 6. Note the importance which Plotinus gives here to the highest Stoic genus, is (cp. VI. 1. 25 and below lines 21–5), which he did not quite understand and which annoyed him particularly, perhaps because Severus the Middle Platonist, who was read in his school (Life ch. 14. 21), had taken it seriously and used it in his exegesis of the Timaeus: see below n. 1, p. 112.}

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2 On the difference between principles and genera see ch. 2. 15–19. It is of great importance for Plotinus' exegesis of the Sophist.

3 The reference to Plato is to Sophist 244B–245C and Parmenides 141C9–10. "Others": Aristotle and the Stoics; cp. VI. 1. 1. 5–9.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING II

haps, compulsory to enquire about these points, centring our discussion first on what number [of kinds of being] we intend and in what sense. Since, then, we are enquiring about being or beings, we must in our discussion first of all make a distinction between what we call being, about which at present our investigation would be correctly conducted, and what others think is being, but we call it becoming, and say that it is never really real. But in thinking of these two classes which are distinct from each other one must not think of them as if there was a genus of "something" divided into them, or suppose that Plato made this division. For it is absurd to put being under one genus with non-being, as if one were to put Socrates and his portrait under one genus. For "making a distinction" here means marking off and setting apart, and saying that what seems to be being is not being, [and by this Plato] indicates to thein that what is truly being is something else. And by prefixing "always" to being he indicated that being must be of such a kind as never to belie the nature of being. So we are speaking of this being, and this is the being about which we shall enquire on the assumption that it is not one; afterwards, if it seems proper, we shall say something about becoming and what comes to be and the universe perceived by the senses.

2. Since, then, we maintain that being is not one, do we say that it is a number or infinite? What do we really mean by "not one"? Now we say that it is at the same time one and many, and that it is a richly variegated one keeping its many together in one. It is therefore necessary that this, which is one in this way, should either be generically one, and the
ON THE KINDS OF BEING II

beings its species, by which it is many and one; or that it should be more genera than one, but all grouped under one; or that there should be more genera, but none of them subordinated to any other, but each including those below it (whether they themselves are lesser genera or species with individuals grouped under them) and all contributing to one nature; the intelligible universe, which is certainly what we call being, would be constructed from all of them. If this is so, these must certainly not only be genera but at the same time also principles of being: genera, because there are other lesser genera under them and subsequently species and individuals; principles, if being is thus composed of many and the whole derives its existence from these. If then there were a number of originative constituents and they came together as wholes and made the all while having nothing else subordinated to them, they would be principles, but not genera; as if someone made the sense-world out of the four elements, fire and such: for these would be principles, but not genera; unless “genus” is used equivocally, if we say, then, that they are a kind of genera, but that these same genera are also principles, then shall we achieve the completion of the whole by mixing the genera, all of them, together with each other, each with the things which come under it, and make a blend of every thing! But then each and every thing will be potential and not actual, and each will not be itself in a pure state. But shall we let the genera go and mix up the individuals? What then will the genera be by themselves be? They will be by themselves and pure and their mixed-up members will not abolish them. And how

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5 εἴδη δ' αὐτῷ τὰ ὑπά, εἰς πολλὰ καὶ ἐν, ἥ πλείων ἐνός γένες, ὡς ἐν δὲ τὰ πάντα, ἥ πλείων μὲν γένες, μηδὲν δὲ ἄλλο ὑπ' ἄλλοις, ἀλλὰ ἕκαστος περιεκτικὸς τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὸς, εἴτε καὶ αὐτῶν γενῶν ἐκτός ὑπήρκων ἐν ἑνίον καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀτόμων, συντελεῖ ἐπαντα εἰς μίαν φύσιν καὶ ἕκ

10 πάντων τῷ νοητῷ κόσμῳ, διὸ δὴ λέγομεν τὸ δὴ, τὴν ὑπότοιον εἶδων. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐ μόνον γένες ταύτα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχὰς τοῦ ὄντος ἑμαυ ὑπάρκειν γένες μὲν, ὡς ὑπ' αὐτὰ ἄλλα γένες ἐλάττων καὶ εἴδη μετα τοῦτο καὶ ἀναμενομένοις ἀρχὰς δὲ, εἰ τὸ δ' ὑπάρξει ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὸ πάν ὑπάρχει. εἰ μὲν τοιαύτης μὲν ὑπ' ἕδ' ὑπ', 15 συνελθέντα δὲ τὰ ὁλα ἐποίησε τὸ πάν ἄλλο 1 οὐκ ἔχεντα ὑπ' αὐτὰ, ἀρχὰς μὲν ἄλλο ὑπ' ἄλλο, γένες δὲ οὐκ ὑπ' ὅλον εἰ τις ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων ἐτύπωκεν τὰ ἀληθέντα, πυρὸν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ταύτα γὰρ ἀρχὰς ἄλλο ἄλλο, γένες δὲ οὐδ' εἰ μὴ ὑμωνήματος τὸ γένος, λεγομένες τοιούτων καὶ γένες τινὰ 20 εἶναι, τὰ δ' αὐτὰ καὶ ἀρχὰς. διὸ τὰ μὲν γένη, ἐκαστὸν μετὰ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὡς μικρὰς ἐπιλογίζοι τὰ πάντα, τὸ ὅλον ἀποτελοῦσαν καὶ συγκρίνουσαν ποιούμενον ἀπὸ τῶν ἔκαστον μετὰ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὡς μικρὰς ἐπιλογίζοσαν τὰ πάντα, τὸ ὅλον ἀποτελοῦσαν καὶ συγκρίνουσαν ποιούμενον ἀπὸ τῶν ἔκαστον μετὰ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὡς μικρὰς ἐπιλογίζοι τὰ πάντα, τὸ ὅλον ἀποτελοῦσαν καὶ συγκρίνουσαν ποιούμενον ἀπὸ τῶν ἔκαστον μετὰ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὡς μικρὰς ἐπιλογίζοι τὰ πάντα, τὸ ὅλον ἀποτελοῦσαν καὶ συγκρίνουσαν ποιούμενον ἀπὸ τῶν ἔκαστον μετὰ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὡς μικρὰς ἐπιλογίζοι τὰ πάντα, τὸ ὅλον ἀποτελοῦσαν καὶ συγκρίνουσαν ποιούμενον ἀπὸ τῶν ἔκαστον μετὰ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὡς μικρὰς ἐπιλογίζοι τὰ πάντα, τὸ ὅλον ἀποτελοῦσαν καὶ συγκρί

1 cominesmus: )&&( ν'BcC: )) Creuzer (alia Firmius): om. U.

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can this be? We will discuss this later; but now, since we have agreed that there are genera, and further that they are principles of substance and principles and a composition in another way, first it must be stated how many genera we say there are and how we distinguish them from each other and do not bring them under one, as if they came together by chance and made some one thing; yet it would be much more reasonable if they did come under one. Now, if it was possible for them all to be species of being, with the individuals immediately subsequent to them, and nothing outside these, it might perhaps be possible to proceed like this. But since such an arrangement would be the abolition of substance—for the species would not be species, nor altogether would there be many under one, but all would be one, and there would be no other or others outside that one: for how could the one become many, so as to generate species, unless there was something else besides itself? For it could not by its own means become many, unless somebody cuts it up like a magnitude; but even so the cutter would be another. But if it is going to do the cutting up, or in general the dividing, itself, it will be divided before the division. Thus, and for many other reasons, we must abandon the "one genus", also because it is not possible to take any and every individual thing and call it being or substance. But if one does call it substance, one will do so by incidental predication, as if one called substance white: for one is not speaking of what is [essentially] white.

1 Ch. 19, 12-17.
3. We certainly say that there are several genera, and that it is not by accident that there are several. They derive therefore from one. Now, even if they do derive from one, but a one which is not included in the definition of their being, nothing prevents each one of them, since it has not the same specific form as another, from being itself a separate genus. Is then this one which is outside the genera which have come into being [from it] their cause, but not predicated in the definitions of what each of the others are? Yes, it is outside. For the One is transcendent, so as not to be numbered with the genera, if the others exist through it, which are on equal terms with each other as far as being genera goes. And how does it come about that it is not numbered with them? We are looking for beings, not what transcends being. So much, then, for this One; but what about the one which is numbered with the others? One might wonder about this, how it is numbered with those caused by it. Now if it and the others were under one genus, it would be absurd; but if it is numbered with those of which it is the cause, as if it was the absolute genus and the others were subsequent—and the subsequent are different from it, and it is not predicated of them as their genus or anything else with reference to them—then they too must be genera, if they have things classed under them. For if you generated walking, walking would not be classed under you as its genus; and if there was nothing else before it as its genus, but there were things after it, walking would be a genus in the beings, and why "one" is not a genus like "being", is taken up again in ch. 9.
We thankfully accept here Igal's excellent emendation τολόνων (cp. ch 21, 4). The reading with most MSS authority τολόνων ("downiness" or "furriness") printed in H-S, can surely on reflection only commend itself to cats, and the τολόνων of other MSS, generally adopted by editors, is not used elsewhere by Plotinus and does not give as exactly appropriate a sense.

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mēn ēς ὑποκείμενον αὐτῷ, ὃν ἐπὶ λίθον, τὸ δὲ ὅποσον ὃ αὐτῷ, τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ὅποιον, ὃν τὸ χῶμα, καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς ἄλλου σῶματος ἐποίημεν ὃς, ὃς ἐπὶ τῆς σῶματος φύσει τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ὅν ὁμοία, τὸ δὲ ἐστὶ ποιῶν, τὸ δὲ τοιόν, ὧμοιόν μὲν τότε, τὸ δὲ λόγος διαφερέται εἰς τρία, καὶ σώμα ἄν ἄν ἄν τὰ τρία; εἴ δὲ 10 καὶ κίνησις αὐτῶς παρὴν σύμφωνος τῷ αὐτῷ, καὶ τοῦτο ἐν συναρμολογείται, καὶ τὰ τέταρτα ἔρχεται ἐν ἐν, καὶ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐν ἀπήρτιστο πρὸς τὸ ἐν καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν τοῖς ἀπαιρεῖται. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἐπεξετάσατο περὶ ὁμοίας καὶ τῶν ἕκατον γεωργίας καὶ ἀρχών ὁ λόγος ἐστί, ἀφελμένας χρή τῷ ἐν τοῖς μέσωμα γένεσιν καὶ 15 τῷ δὲ αἰσθήσεως κατανόησιν καὶ τὰ μεγέθη στὸ γάρ καὶ τὸ χῶμα καὶ τὸ διαμέτρητον ἔτι ἀλλήλων ἐστι—λαβεῖν τινα φαινήν ὑπόστασιν καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς διὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν, ἐν ὧν καὶ τὸ βαθύματος πολλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὀστῶς ἐν, ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν σωμάτων υψηλότατον τὸ 20 αὐτό ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ἐστὶν; καὶ γὰρ εἰς ἅπαντα τὸ ἀυτὸ, καὶ ἐτέρων τὸ χῶμα καὶ τὸ σχῆμα ἐτέρων καὶ γὰρ χωρίζεται. εἰ δὲ τις λαβοί τις ψυχὴν μὲν ἄδιάκοπον ἰσογείθη ἀπόστασιν, ἡς δὲ τῇ πρώτῃ τῆς διανοίας ἐπιμέλης, τῶς ἐν τῇ ἐπίσημῃ πολλὰ ἐν τῇ ἐπικείσει πάλιν αὐτῷ; 25 καὶ τοῦ νομίσματος εἰς τοῦτο τελεύτατο, ὅτε διερχομεν τὸ γένους εἰς σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν, καὶ σῶμα μὲν πολυειδές καὶ

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its parts—a stone for instance—that there was what functioned as its substrate, and its quantity, the magnitude, and its quality, colour for instance, should we not say in the case of every other body that there was what might be called substance, and quantity, and quality, all together, but divided by our reasoning into three, and that body was the three as one? But if it also had movement as a natural part of its constitution, and we counted this in as well, then the four also would be one, and the one body would be brought to completion by them all in respect of its unity and its own nature. In the same way, certainly, when the discussion is about intelligible substance and the genera and principles there, one must remove the coming into being in the sphere of bodies and the understanding through sense-perception and the magnitudes—for it is [because bodies have size in] this way that there is separation and they stand apart from each other—and grasp an intelligible existence and that which really and truly is and is more one. In this it is also remarkable how that which is one in this way is many and one. For in the case of bodies it has been agreed that the same body is one and many; for the same one [can be divided] to infinity, and its colour is different from its shape; for they are in fact separated. But if someone takes one soul, without spatial separation of parts, without magnitude, supremely simple, as it will seem at the first application of the mind to it, how would one expect to find that it was after all many? For one would have thought that one could stop at this, when one had divided the living being into soul and body, and found the body multiform and composite and vari-
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ous, but was confident: that one had found that the soul was simple and could rest from one's journey since one had come to the principle. Since, then, this soul has come ready to hand for us from the "intelligible place," as in the former discussion the body did from the perceptible, let us apprehend how this one is many, and how the many are one, not a one compounded from many, but one nature which is many; for through this, when it has been apprehended and has become clear, we maintained that the truth about the genera in real being would become clear.

5. But first we should think about this: that since bodies, of animals and plants for instance, are, each and every one of them, many in virtue of the colours and shapes and sizes and specific forms of their parts, and the fact that one is in one place and in another, but all come from one, they will come either from a one which is in every way and altogether one or from a one which is more one than is that which comes from it, so that it is also more real than that which has come into being—for the extent of the departure from being is as great as that of the departure from unity—since, then, they are from a one, but not a one such as to be in every way one or the absolute One—for this would not have made a discrete plurality—it remains that they must be from a plurality which is one. But what made them is soul: this then is a plurality which is one. What then? Is the plurality the rational forming principles not always for him very clear cut (Plato, of course, makes no such distinction).

1 The phrase occurs in Plato Republic 508C1 and 517B6. Plotinus' use of it here, and the presentation of soul as the handiest example of a being "from the intelligible place", show clearly that the distinction between ἱκανός and νόος was
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of the things which have come into being? Or is it rather itself one thing and the forming principles different from it? On the contrary, it is a forming principle itself and the sum of the forming principles, and the principles are its activity when it is active according to its substance; but the substance is the potentiality of the principles. It has then been demonstrated from what it does to other things that this one is indeed many. But what if it was not doing anything, but one was to consider it not doing by ascending to that of it which does not do? Will one not find many powers here too? For everyone would agree that the soul exists; but is this really the same thing as saying that a stone exists? Certainly not. But all the same there in the case of the stone also, existing for the stone is not [just] being but being a stone; so here, existing for soul is being soul along with being. Is then being one thing, and the rest something else, which contributes to the completion of the substance of the soul, and is there being [as such] and an essential difference makes the soul? No, the soul is a particular being but not in the way that a man is white, but only and simply like a particular substance; and this is the same as saying that it does not have what it has from outside its substance.

6. But, surely, does it not have [something] from outside its substance to make it in one respect existent but in another existent in a particular way? But if it is existent in a particular way, and the particularity comes from outside, it will not be substance as a whole and in so far as it is soul, but in a particular respect, and a part of it will be substance, but not the whole of it substance. Then what
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10. And this being of soul must be within, like a “source and principle,” or rather must be all that it is; so it must be life; and both must be one, being and life. Is it then one like a single forming principle? No, the underlying reality is one, but so one that it is also two or even more, all that soul primarily is. It is therefore substance and life, or it has life. But if it has it, that which has is, in itself, not in life, and the life not in substance; but if one does not have the other, one must say that both are one. Or rather one and many, and as many as appear in the one; and one for itself, but many in relation to the others; and it is one being, but makes itself many by what we may call its movement; and it is one whole, but when it undertakes, one might say, to contemplate itself, it is many: as if it cannot bear its being to be one when it is capable of being all the things that it is. And its contemplation is the cause of its appearing many, that it may think: for if it appears as one, it did not think, but is that One.

7. What, then, are the constituents seen in soul, and how many are there? Since we find in soul substance and life together, and substance is common to all soul, and life also common, and life is also in Intellect, if we bring in also Intellect and its life, we shall posit as common to all life a single genus, movement. And we shall posit substance and movement, which is the primary life, as two genera. For even if they are one, [the observer] separates them in thought; finding the one not one; otherwise it would (47). 17. 67 (see my note ad loc.). For further examples see Lexicon Plotinianum s. v. λίθος.

1. "The stone" as an image of lifelessness occurs several times in Plotinus: cp. VI. 5 (23). 11. 5-14 and possibly III. 2.
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not have been possible to separate them. But observe in
other things also how movement and life are
clearly separated from being, even if not in the true
being, yet in the shadow and that which has the
same name as being. For as in the portrait of a man
many things are wanting, and especially the decis¬
ively important thing, life, so in the things perceived
by sense being is a shadow of being, separated from
that which is most fully being, which was life in the
archetype. But then, this gives us grounds for se¬
parating living from being and being from living.
Now there are many species of being and there is a
genus of being; but movement is not to be classed
under being nor yet over being, but with being; it is
found in being not as inhering in a subject; for it is
its actual activity and neither of them is without
the other except in our conception of them, and the
two natures are one nature: for being is actual, not
potential. And if, none the less, you take either of
them separately, movement will appear in being and
being in movement, as if in the "one-being" each
taken separately had the other, but all the same
discursive thought says that they are separate and
that each form is a double one. But since movement
appears in the sphere of being, not as changing the
nature of being, but rather in being as if making it
perfect, if one does not introduce rest as well one
would be even more perverse than one who did not
grant that there was movement; for the notion, and
intellectual perception, of rest comes ready to
hand where being is concerned than that of move¬
ment; for "existing in the same state and in the same
way"1 and having a single definition are there in
being. So let rest be one genus, different from move¬

1 Plato Sophist 243A12.
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ment, in that it would seem to be its opposite. But that it is different from being could be made clear in many ways, especially because, if it was the same as being, it could not be any more the same as being than motion. For why is rest the same as being, but motion not, when motion is its life and the active actuality of its substance and its very being? But, just as we separated movement from it as being the same and not the same as it, and spoke of them as two and yet again one, in the same way we shall also separate rest from it and yet again not separate it, separating it so far in the mind as to posit it as another genus among real beings. Otherwise, if we were to bring rest and being into one, saying that there was not in any way any difference between them, and bring being into one with movement in the same way, we shall bring rest and movement into identity through the medium of being, and movement and rest will be one for us.

8. But one must posit these three, if Intellect thinks each of them separately; but it does at once know and posit them, if it thinks, and they exist, if they have been thought. For the being of things whose being involves matter is not in the intellect; but if things which are without matter have been thought, this is their being. But behold Intellect, pure Intellect, and look upon it with concentrated gaze, not seeing it with these bodily eyes of ours. You see the heart of substance and a sleepless light on it, and how they stand on it and how they stand apart, existing all together, abiding life and a thought whose activity is not directed towards what is coming but what is here already, or rather "here already and always here already", and the always
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present, and it is a thought thinking in itself and not
outside. In its thinking, then, there is activity and
motion, and in its thinking itself, substance and
being: for, existing, it thinks itself as existent, and
the being on which it is, so to speak, founded. For its
self-directed activity is not substance, but being is
that to which the activity is directed and from which
it comes: for that which is looked at is being, not the
look; but the look, too, possesses being, because it
comes from and is directed to being. And since it is in
act, not in potency, it gathers the two together and
does not separate them, but makes itself being and
being itself. And since being is the most firmly set of
all things and that about which the other things [are
set], it has made rest exist and possesses it not as
brought in from outside but from itself and in itself.
It is that in which thought comes to a stop, though
thought is a rest which has no beginning, and from
which it starts, though thought is a rest which never
started: for movement does not begin from or end in
movement. And again the Form at rest is the defi¬
n ing limit of Intellect, and Intellect is the movement
of the Form.

So all things are being, rest and motion; these are
all-pervading genera, and each subsequent thing is a
particular being, a particular rest, and a particular
motion. Now when anyone sees these three, having
come into intuitive contact with the nature of being,
he sees being by the being in himself and the others,
motion and rest, by the motion and rest in himself,
and fits his own being, motion and rest to those in
his intellect: they come to him together in a sort of
confusion, and he mingles them without distinguishing
them; then as it were separating them a little and

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holding them away from him and distinguishing them he perceives being, motion and rest, three and each of them one. Does he not then say that they are different from each other and distinguish them in otherness, and see the otherness in being when he posits three, each of them one? And again, when he brings them back to unity and sees them in a unity, all one, does he not collect them into sameness and, as he looks at them, see that sameness has come to be and is? So we must add these two, the same and the other, to those first three, so that there will be in all five genera for all things, and the last two also will give to subsequent things the characters of being other and same; for each individual thing is a particular "same" and a particular "other"; for "same" and "other" without the "particular" would apply to genera. These are the primary kinds because you cannot apply any predicate to them which forms part of the definition of their essence. You will certainly predicate being of them, for they exist, but not as their genus, for they are not particular beings. Nor can you predicate being as the genus of motion and rest, for they are not specific forms of being; for some things exist as species of being, ethers as participating in being. Nor again does being participate in these others as if they were its genera: for they do not transcend being and are not prior to it.

9. But that these genera are primary one could confirm from these arguments, and perhaps also from others; but how could one be confident that there are only these [primary genera] and not others in addition to them? For why not also the one? And why not the quale and the quantum and the relative and the others, which other philosophers have al-
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CATHERBLURKITA, TO MELON EN, EI MEL TO PANWOS EN, [EN] 1
OT MTEN ALLO PROSSO, MI PUXET, MI NOOS, MI OTIOU
OIOENOS AN KATAPORROTO TOOTO, WSTE ODE GEYOS. EI DE
TO SOSO PAN DUN, EPH OI TO OI NE LEMME, OI PROTO

EN PAN. ETI DIAFOROS DUN AUTOI PAN, OI NOEIOII EID;
EI DE TOITO MI, OI GYOS. PIIOS GYR KAI DIAHEREIS;
DIAHEREIS GAPE PALLA PHEII EDESTE: OSTE AUTO TO EN PALLA
EOSTAI KAI APALAI EOST, EI ALLAI GYOS EOSTI. ENGETI TI
PRAOATHESI DIAPOI ELIS EID. OI GYR AN ENI DIAPOAI EN

15 TIO EN, ASPEE EI TII OUPES. DOSIEM MI GYR DIOETAI O
NOOS EOSTI DIAPHORAS, ENOS DE PIOS; EITE EKASTOTE METI
TII DIAFAROS DUO THEIS ANACTEI TO EN, ENSTE PANTAXH "
MOYANOS PRAOATHESI TO PIOTERON HOI. EPEIST
I DE TIS LEOI TO EPI TIO DUNI EN KAI TO EPI
KOHEROS EN KAI TOIS AALLOS KOYMAI EOSTI, ELI MEL TAAV

20 EGON TO DEI KAI TO EN, EN DEI LETHOS TO OI NII PESAIE TII
AALLOS GYOSI, DAI MI DEEP AIOSA. AIALL ETERO
TROSTOIO LEOI, MIOS OIDE TO EN KOUEN EP AIYON ESTAI,
ALLA TO MEL PROTOSI, TO DE AALLOS. EI DE MI PANWOS
LEOIA POICEI, ALLA EN TI EEP AIYON, ASPEE TO AALLA, EI
MEL TAAV AEIT TO OI KAI TO EN, EDI TIU OILOS

1 1. The reference is to the Aristotelian categories.
2 I retain the (oE) AEP of Muller here.
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25 ἡμιμεμένον ἐν τοῖς γένεσιν ὄνομα εὐάγεται, οἱ δὲ ἐν ἐκάτερον, τινά φύσιν λέγει, καὶ εἰ μὲν προστίθημι (<"τι.">, τι ἐν λέγει, εἰ δὲ μηδὲν, ἐκείνο, δ ὀδύνας καταγγείλεται, πάλιν αὐθένται: εἰ δὲ τῷ τῷ δει οὖν, εἴπομεν μὲν ὅτι οὐ πρῶτος ἐν λέγει, ἄλλα τι καλότει

30 πρῶτος εἴναι τοῦτο ἐξηγημένου ἐκείνου τοῦ παντελῶς ἐν; καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἄν μετ᾽ ἐκείνο λέγομεν ὅτι καὶ τὸ πρῶτος ὅτι ὅτι αὐθεν ἡ, εἰπὲν ἢ, οὐκ ἄν ἂν τῷ πρῶτῳ τῷ πρῶτῳ δὲ τῷ πρῷ αὐτῶ ἐν. ἐπειτα χωρισθεῖν τῇ νόησει τοῦ ὅτου διάφαρος οὖν ἔχει ἐπεστα ἐν τῷ

35 οὕτω, εἰ μὲν ἑπακολούθημα αὐτῷ καὶ πάντων καὶ ὡστερόν πρῶτον δὲ τῷ γένος. εἰ δὲ ἄμα, καὶ πάντων τῷ δὲ γένος εὕχ ἁμα. εἰ δὲ πρῶτος, ἡκῆ τις καὶ αὐτοῦ μόνον εἰ δὲ ἡκῆ αὐτοῦ. οὔ γένος αὐτῶ εἰ δὲ μη αὐτοῦ, ὁδὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἦ δεῖ οὐ καὶ τὸ ἄν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων. ὅλως γὰρ ἔσεπε τὸ ἐν τῷ δυτὶ πλησίον τῷ

40 εἰ καὶ οἷον ὑπερισχύστων τῷ ὅτι, τοῦ ὅτου τῷ μὲν πρὸς ἔκεινο ἐν ὅτι, τὸ μὲτ᾽ ἐκείνο ἄντως, ὃ δὴναται καὶ πολλά εἶναι, μένου αὐτῷ ἕν καὶ οὐθὲν μερίζεσθαι οὐδὲ γένος εἶναι βούλεσθαι.

1 Bouillet, Harder, Theiler.
How then is each individual belonging to being one? Now by being a particular one it is not one—for it is already many by being a particular one—but each of the specific forms is equivocally one: for a specific form is a multiplicity, so that "one" here is [used as it is of] an army or a chorus.¹ So then the one there [in being] is not in these, so that the one is not a common term and it is not the same one which is observed in being and in particular beings. So that the one is not a genus; since every genus of which the one is truly predicated as genus can no longer have the opposites truly predicated of it; but in that the one and the opposites are truly predicated of every being, the one will not be predicated as their genus. So that it will not be truly predicated of the first genera either, since the one being also is not more one than many, nor is any one of the other genera one in such a way as not to be many, nor can [the one be truly predicated] of the others which come after, which are in every way many. But in general, no genus is one: so, if the one is a genus, it will destroy its unity. For "the one is not a number"²; but it will be a number if it has become a genus. Further, the one is one in number: for if it was one in genus, it would not be properly one. Further, just as in the numbers the one is not there as a genus predicated of them but is said to exist in them, but not said to be their genus, so, even if the one is in the beings, it would not be the genus either of being or of the other [general] or of all of it.

¹ Plotinus is here using the Stoic scale of degrees of unification; it appears more clearly in ch. 11. 9-9 and VI. 9.4-8; cp. also V. 5.4. 31. For the scale in the Stoics see SVF

² del. Page, Harder.
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Further, just as the simple might be principle of the non-simple, but could not also be its genus—
for, if it were, the non-simple would also be simple—
so with the one, if the one is principle, it will not also
be genus of the things posterior to it. It will not
therefore be the genus either of being or of the other
[genera]. But if it is going to be a genus, it will be the
genus of the particular "ones", as if one were to
think it right to separate the one from substance. It
will be, then, a genus of particular things. For, just
as being is not the genus of all things but of the
specific forms which "are", so the one will be the
genus of the particular specific forms which "are one".
What then will be the difference of one from
another in so far as they are one, as there is a
difference of being of one from another? But if the
one is divided along with being and substance, and
being by the division and by being observed in many
things as the same is a genus, why could not the one
be a genus since it appears as many things as
substance and is divided into an equal number of
parts? Now, first of all it is not necessary, if some¬
thing exists in many things, that it should be a

genus, either of the things in which it exists or of
other things; nor, in general, if something is com¬
mon, is it at all necessary for it to be a genus. At any
rate the point, which exists in the lines, is not a
genus, either of them or generally speaking, nor, as
was said, is the one in the numbers a genus either of
the numbers or the other things. For that which is
common and one in many things must employ dif¬
ferentiations which belong to itself and make spec¬
ific forms and make them in its essential being. But
what are the differentiations of the one or what

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1. <5> by Ficinus, suspic. Creuser. scr. Theiler: <5> BxUC, Kirchhoff: <5> w. Perna, Creuzer.
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specific forms does it generate? But if it makes the same specific forms as occur in the sphere of being, it would be the same as being, and one of the two would be only a name, and being is sufficient.

11. But we must investigate how the one is in being, and how what we speak of as division [works], and in general the division of the genera, and if it is the same [as the division of being] or different in each of the two cases. First, then, how in general each and every thing is called one, and then if we mean the same [by "one" when we speak of it] in the one being and as transcendent. Now the one over all things is not the same; for we do not mean the same [by "one"] in the case of perceptible and of intelligible things—and certainly being is not [one in the same sense as the others]—[and it does not mean] the same in the case of perceptible things in comparison with each other; for it is not the same in a chorus and an army and a ship and a house, and not the same in those last and in what is continuous. But nevertheless all try to represent the same [One], but some attain only a remote resemblance, some come nearer, and attain it already more truly in Intellect; for soul is one and Intellect and being are still more one. So we then in each thing when we say its being also say its "one", and is it with its "one" as it is with its being? This happens incidentally, but a thing is not therefore one in proportion to its being, but it is possible to have no less real an existence but to be less one. For an army or a chorus has no less being than a house, but all the same it is less one. It seems then that the one in each thing looks more to good, and in so far as it attains to good it is also one, and being more or less one lies in this; for each thing
wishes not just for being, but for being together with the good. For this reason things which are not one strive as far as they can to become one, natural things by their very nature coming together, wishing to be united in identity with themselves; for all individual things do not strive to go away from each other, but towards each other and towards themselves; and all souls would like to come to unity, following their own nature. And the One is on both sides of them; for it is that from which they come and to which they go, for all things originate from the One and strive towards the One. For in this way they also strive towards the Good; for nothing whatever among the real beings could have come to exist or endure in existence if its striving was not directed towards the One. This is how it is with the things in nature. But as for the things of art, each art brings each of its products to this as far as it can and as far as their capacity allows. Being attains this most of all: for it is near. For this reason the other things are called only what they are called, man for instance; for even if we do sometimes say "one man", we say this in comparison with two; but if we do use the one in other contexts, we do so by adding, beginning from itself. But in the case of being we call this whole "one-being" and by indicating it as one claim its close communion with the Good. So the one in it also is principle and goal, but not in the same way, but otherwise, as there is prior and posterior also in that which is one. What then is the one in it? Is it not observed to be alike in all the parts and common? Now, first of all the point is common in lines and is not the genus of lines; there is something common in numbers, very likely this one, and it is not a genus.
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for the one in the one itself is not the same as the one in the unit and the two and the other numbers. And then in being also nothing prevents some things from being prior and others posterior, and some simple and some composite. And if the one is the same in all things which belong to being, as there is no differentiation of it it does not make specific forms; but if there are no specific forms, it cannot itself be a genus.

12. And so much for this. But how does the good for numbers lie in their being each of them one when they are soulless? Now this is common also to other soulless things. But if anyone were to say that numbers do not exist at all, we for our part were speaking of existing things, in so far as each of them is one. But if they were to enquire how the point partakes of the good, if they are going to assert that it exists by itself, then, if they assert that it is soulless, their enquiry is the same as in the case of other things of the kind; but if in others, in the circle for instance, this is the good of the point and its desire is directed to this, and it will strive as far as it can towards the transcendent through this circle. But how can the genera be these things? Can they really be particulars, all chopped up small? No, the generic one is like a whole in many things. Does it exist only in the things which participate in it? No, but it exists both independently and in the things which participate in it. But perhaps this will be clearer later.

13. But now, why is the quantum not in the primary genera, and also the quale? Now, the quantum is not primary with the others because they are simultaneous with being. For movement is with

1 Kirchhoff: τοι ἔνν.
2 εκατ. U, Igal, H–S²: καὶ τι ἐκ. WBEσC.
PLOTINUS ENNEAD VI. 2.

... being as the activity of being, since it is its life; and rest came in as well in substance itself; and still more is being same and other associated with these three classes, so that sameness and otherness also are seen together with them. But number is posterior to these classes and posterior to itself, and the posterior comes from the prior and numbers come one after another in order, and the posterior exist in the prior; so number could not be counted among the first genera; and we should enquire whether it is a genus at all. But magnitude is still more subsequent and composite; for it is number in this particular thing—and a line is some sort of two and a surface three. If then the continuous magnitude has its quantitableness from number, if number is not a genus how could this have [the status of a genus]? And there is prior and posterior also in magnitudes.

If it is common to both numbers and magnitudes to be quantitative, we must grasp what this [being quantitative] is and, when we have found it, posit it as a posterior genus, not among the primary genera; and if it is a genus not among the primary ones, it must be referred back to one of the primary genera or to one of those which go back to them. So it is perhaps clear that the nature of the quantum signifies a definite quantity and it measures how much each thing is and is itself so much. But if definite quantity is common to number and magnitude, then either number is primary and magnitude comes from it, or number consists altogether in a mixture of movement and rest, but magnitude is a movement or derives from movement; movement goes forward into the indefinite, but rest in holding back what is going forward makes the unit. But we must consider later...
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the coming into being of number and magnitude, or rather their real or notional existence. For perhaps number is among the first genera, but magnitude comes later in a composition; and number is of static things, but magnitude is in movement. But, as we say, we will discuss these questions later.

"But as for the quale, why is it not among the primary genera? It is because this also is posterior and comes after substance. In composite substances, then, which are made up of many elements, and in which numbers and quantities produce their differentiation, there might also be qualities, and a certain common element will be discerned in them; but in the primary genera the distinction which must be made is not between simples and composites but between simples and those which make an essential contribution to substance, not to a particular substance. All the same, we did think it right to say elsewhere that the elements which contributed to the essential completion of substance were qualities only in name, but those which came from outside subsequent to substance were qualities [in the proper sense], and that those which were in substances were their activities, but those which came after them were already passive affections. But now we are saying that the elements of particular substance make no contribution at all to the completion of substance as such; for there is no substantial addition to the substance of man by reason of his being man; but he is substance at a higher level, before coming to the differentiation, as is also the living being before coming to the "reasonable"."
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15. How then do the four genera contribute to the completion of substance when they do not yet make it a kind of substance? For they do not make it a particular substance. It has been said that: being is primary, and it is clear that movement cannot be other than primary, nor rest, nor other, nor same; and it is perhaps also obvious that this movement does not produce quality, but if we say something about this, it will perhaps be clearer. For if movement is the activity of substance, and being and the primary genera altogether are actively actual, movement could not be something incidental, but, being the activity of what is actively actual, could not any longer be called something which contributes to the completion of substance, but is substance itself: so that it has not entered some subsequent genus, not even quality, but is ranked as simultaneous. For being is not first being and then in movement, nor is it first being and then at rest; nor is rest a passive affection of it; and same and other do not come after it, because it did not become many afterwards, but what it was, one-many; but if it is many, it is also otherness, and if it is one-many, it is also sameness. And these are enough for its substance; but when it is going to proceed to the lower levels, then there are others, which no longer make substance, but qualified and quantified substance, and let us grant that these are non-primary genera.

16. But how could “relation”, which is like a side-shoot, be among the first genera? For the state of being related is of one thing to another and not of a thing to itself. “Where” and “when” are still further away. For the “where” means one thing in another, so that there are two; but the genus must be one, and
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5 γένος ἐν δει ἐλατειν, οὐ δύνατον ἐκεῖ· νῦν δὲ οἱ λόγοι περὶ τῶν ὀντῶν κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν. ἐπὶ τοίς ἐκείνοις οὐκ ἔχει οὐκ εἶναι, πεπτόμενοι μᾶλλον δὲ ἱσώς οὐ. οἱ δὲ καὶ μέτρου καὶ οὐχ ἀπλοῦς μέτρου, ἀλλὰ κινήσεως, διὸ καὶ σύνθετον τὸ ὅλον καὶ κινήσεως πᾶσην, ὡστε οὐχ ὅσον κίνησις ἐν ἰγκ διαφοράς. τὸ δὲ "ποιεῖν" καὶ τὸ "πάσχειν" ἐν κινήσει, εἰ ἀρα ἐκεῖ τὸ πάσχειν καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν δὲ διόν δομοὺς καὶ τὸ πάσχειν ὀδόντερον οὐ τού πόλιος καὶ τὸ "ἐχεῖν" διό καὶ τὸ "κεπαθα" ἀλλὸ ἔτι ἄλλη σύνθεσις, ὡστε πρόεια.

10 17. Ἀλλὰ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἱ ἀρέται διὰ τὸ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις, ἐπιστήμη· νοῦς; ἢ τὸ μείον ἄγαθον, εἰ τὸ πρώτον, ἢ τὸ λέγοντα τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, καθ᾽ ἢστι συνεν κατηγορεῖται, ἀλλ᾽ ἡμεῖς μή ἔχουσιν ἀλλὰς στηρίζουσιν λέγοντα, γένος συνενθεῖν ἔτι εἰδ. οὐ γὰρ καὶ ἀλλ᾽ ἑξαίρεται ἢ ἢν γὰρ ἐν ἑκατον ἔκεινον, καὶ πρὸς οὐνές ἐκ ἑκεῖνον, οὐκ ἐν οὐνές. εἰ δ᾽ ὄντος τὸ ἀγαθὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ποιεῖν οὐκ ἐν 

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159 not a compound; and there is not any place in the intelligible world; but now we are speaking of the things which truly exist. And we must consider whether time is there; but it is more likely that it is not. But if it is a 'measure', and not just a measure, but a 'measure of movement', there are two [components], and the whole is composite and posterior to movement, so that it is not where movement is in a division on the same level. But "acting" and "being affected" are in movement—if being affected is really in the intelligible world at all; and "acting" involves two; and so likewise does "being affected"; neither, therefore, is simple. And "having" implies two, and "position" means one thing in another, so that there are three.

17. But why are not the beautiful and the good and the virtues among the primary genera—and knowledge and intellect? As for the good, if it is the first, the nature which we certainly do call that of the good, of which nothing is predicated, but we call it this because we cannot indicate it in any other way, it could not be the genus of anything. For it is not predicated of other things, or each of the other things of which it was predicated would be spoken of as the good. And that good is before substance, not in substance. But if it is the good as a quale, the qualified in general is not among the primary genera.

7(45). 7. 7-10; on anticipations of the later doctrine in the much-discussed chapter 11 of III. 7 see Peter Manchester "Time and the Soul in Plotinus III 7 [45] 11" in Dionysius II, 1978; for the later doctrine itself see S. Sambursky and S. Pines The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism (a collection of passages with introduction and commentary), Jerusalem 1971.
10 πρῶτον μὲν ἄλλος καὶ οὖν ἐκεῖνος ὡς τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ὡς ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ὡς ως ποιήτ., ἄλλοις ἐν αὐτῷ. ἄλλα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἑφαμεν γένη ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ διότι κοινὸν τι ἦν ἐκαστὸν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς ἐιρήτο, γένος. εἰ οὖν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἥρατα ἐφ' ἐκαστῷ μέρει τῆς οὐσίας ἡ τοῦ ὄντος ἡ ἐπὶ τοῖς πλείστοις, δι' ὑδ' ἡ γένος καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις; ἡ ἐν ἀπασεί τοῖς μέρεσιν οὐ παθῶν, ἄλλα πρῶτοις καὶ δευτέροις καὶ ὑστέροις: ἡ γὰρ ἐν τῷ άτερον παρά θατέρου, τό ὑστέρου παρὰ τοῦ πρωτεροῦ, ἡ δὲ παρ' εἰς τὸ ἔνας τάς τοῦ ἐπέκεινα, ἄλλα δ' ἄλλως κατὰ φύσιν τὴν αὑτῶν μεταλαμβάνει. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ γένος
20 ἐθέλει τε θεάται, ὑστέρον ὑστέρου γὰρ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ τι ἐστί τὸ ἐστί: αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ δι' αὑτή, ἐκεῖνο δὲ τὸ τοῦ ὄντος ἦν καὶ εἰς τὴν οὐσίαν. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐπίκεινα τοῦ ὄντος, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ὄν καὶ ἡ οὐσία ὁ δὲ γενεῖ ἀλλὰ πολλά ἐναὶ, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἑχειν ἐκατ. Ταύτα, ἐπεμηνέμενα γένη, καὶ εἰναὶ ἐν πολλάς. εἰ μέντοι τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἐν τῷ ἐν τῷ ὄντε—μὴ ὄνομαί λέγει τὴν ἐνέργειαν αὐτοῦ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν προς τὸ ὄν τοῦτο εἰναι τὸ ἀγαθόν αὐτοῦ. ἡ δὲ ἐκεῖθεν ἠγαθοίδες ἡ ἀγαθόν τοῦτο ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ προς τὸ ἀγαθόν τοῦτο.

25 ὧν τοῦ καλοῦ, εἰ μὲν ἐκεῖνο ή πρώτη καλλονή, ταύτα τινα καὶ παραπλήθει καλλονή τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῖς.

18. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ, εἰ μὲν ἐκεῖνο ή πρώτη καλλονή, ταύτα τινα καὶ παραπλήθει καλλονή τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῖς.
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would be the same and similar to what was said about the Good; and if it is that which, one might say, shines out upon the Idea, we could say that it is not the same in all the Forms and that the shining upon them is posterior. But if the beautiful is nothing else but substance itself, it has been included in what was said about substance. But if it is the beautiful in relation to us who see it by affecting us in this kind of way, this active actuality is movement, and if the activity is directed towards the transcendent, it is [still] movement. And knowledge is self-movement, since it is a sight of being and an active actuality, not a state; so that it also comes under movement—but, if you like, under rest, or under both; but if under both, it is as something mixed; and if so, the mixed is posterior. But Intellect, since it is being as intelligent and a composite of all [the genera], is not one of the genera; and the true Intellect is being with all its contents and already all beings, but being in isolation, taken as a genus, is an element of it. But righteousness and self-control and virtues in general are all particular activities of Intellect; so that they are not among the primary [genera] and genus and species [of virtue] are posterior.

19. Granted that these four are genera, and primary genera, does each of them by itself make species? Does being, for instance, already divide by itself without the others? No: since it must take its differentiations from outside the genus, and they are particularly sharply. For the "shining" of beauty on the Idea see VI. 7.21-22. Cp my "Beauty and the Discovery of Divinity in the Thought of Plotinus" (Plotinian and Christian Studies XIX).
differeintiations of being as being, but the differ¬
entiations are not being itself. Where will it get them
from, then? Certainly not from non-beings. But if it
got them from being and the three remaining genera
existed, it is clear that the differerntiations arose
from them and with them, applied to being and
coupled with it and coming to be simultaneous with it.
But by coming to be simultaneous with it they
made what is composed of all. How then do the
others exist along with that which is from all? And
how if they are all genera do they make species?
How does movement make species of movement, and
rest, and the other ones? For we must be careful
about this, that each genus does not disappear in its
species, and that the genus is not only predicated as
observed in them, but that it is both in the species
and in itself, and must be at once mingled and pure
and unmingle, and must not contribute uselessly to
substance by destroying itself. We shall have to
consider these questions. But since we asserted that
what is composed of all beings is each individual
intelligence, but posited that the being and sub¬
stance prior to all as species and parts was Intellect,
we are saying that Intellect as it is is posterior. Well
then, let us make this difficulty profitable for our
enquiry and by using it as a kind of example enback
upon getting to understand what we are saying.

20. Let us then apprehend one Intellect which in
no way applies itself to partial things and is not
active about anything in particular, so that it may
not become a particular intellect, like the knowledge
before the specific partial forms of knowledge and
the knowledge in specific form before the parts in it;
for every body of knowledge is none of its partial
contents but the potentiality of all of them, but each part is actually that part which it is, and potentially all of them, and the same is true of universal knowledge: the specific bodies of knowledge, which lie potentially in the whole, those, that is, which grasp the specific contents in the whole, not a part of the whole; yet it must certainly be pure and independent. Thus we can certainly say that universal Intellect exists in one way—that is the one before those which are actually the particular intellects—and particular intellects in another, those which are partial and fulfilled from all things; but the Intellect over all of them directs the particular intellects, but is their potentiality and contains them in its universality; and they on the other hand in their partial selves contain the universal Intellect, as a particular body of knowledge contains knowledge. And [we can say that] the great Intellect exists by itself, and so do the particular intellects which are in themselves, and again that the partial intellects are comprehended in the whole and the whole in the partial; the particular ones are on their own and in another, and that great Intellect is on its own and in those particular; and all are potentially in that Intellect which is on its own, which is actually all things at once, but potentially each particular separately, and the particular intellects are actually what they are, but potentially the whole. For in so far as they are this which they are called, they are actually that which they are called; but in that they are generically that whole, they are potentially that whole. And it again, in that it is the genus, is the potentiality of all the species under it and none of
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them in actuality, but all rest quietly in it; but in
that it is actually what it is before the species, it
belongs to the non-particulars. But certainly, if the
intellects in specific form are going to exist, the
activity proceeding from universal Intellect must be
the cause.

21. How then does Intellect itself, remaining one
in its essential structure, produce the partial beings?
This is the same [as asking] how from those four
primary genera the things which we call subsequent
proceed. Well then, see how in this great, this
overwhelming Intellect, not full of talk but full of
intelligence, this Intellect which is all things and a
whole, not a partial or particular intellect, all things
which come from it are present. It certainly has
number in the things which it sees, and it is one and
many, and the many are its powers, wonderful
powers, not weak but because they are pure the
greatest of powers, fresh and full of life, we may say,
and truly powers, without any limit to their action:
so they are infinite, and infinity [is there] and great¬
ness. Then when you see existing in it in the way
proper to Intellect this greatness, along with the
beauty that there is in it of its substance and the
glory and the light around it, you see quality also,
alread in flower on it; and with the continuity of its
activity you see magnitude, quietly at rest, appear¬
ing to your gaze; there are one and two and three,
magnitude and all that is quantitative being the
third. And when you see quantity and quality in it,
both tending to one and in a way becoming one, then
observe figure also appearing. Then otherwise tum¬
bles in and separates quantity and quality, and there
are differences of figures and other qualities. And
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same nature, which is there as well, makes equality exist, and oneness, inequality, in quantity, number and magnitude, and from these derive circles and squares and figures with unequal sides, and like and unlike numbers, and odd and even. For since its life is intelligent and its activity without imperfection, it leaves out none of the things which we now find to be works of intelligence, possessing them as realities and in the manner proper to Intellect. Intellect possesses them as in thought, but not the discursive kind of thought; but nothing is left out of all the things of which there are intelligible forming principles, but Intellect is like one great complete intelligible principle embracing them all, and it goes through them starting from its own first principles, or rather it has always gone through them, so that it is never true that it is going through them. For in general everywhere, whatever one might apprehend by reasoning as being in nature one will find existing without reasoning in Intellect, so as to think that Intellect has made being as it is after reasoning—it is like the rational forming principles which make living beings: for as the most accurate reasoning would calculate was best, so are all things in the rational principles before reasoning. What, then, should one expect in the higher principles before nature and the principles in it? For in those of which the substance is nothing else than Intellect, and neither being nor intellect is brought to them from outside, there would be no trouble about everything being for the best, if it is disposed according to Intellect and is what Intellect wills and is; therefore it is true and primary: for if it came from another, that other would be Intellect. Now all figures have

1 Igal, H-S:
been seen in being and all quality—not a particular quality; for it could not be one since the nature of the other is there, but one and many; for sameness is there also: one and many, and being is like this from the beginning, so that the one and many is in all its specific forms; magnitudes are various and figures various and qualities various; for it was not possible or lawful for anything to be left out, for the intelligible All is complete, or it would not be the All; and since life is running over it, or rather everywhere accompanying it, all things necessarily become living beings, and there are bodies there also since there is matter and quality. Since all things eternally come into being and eternally abide, and are in eternity comprehended in being, each of them being what it is and all again being in one, the complex and construction, as we may put it, of all in one is Intellect. And since it has the real beings in itself it is a “complete” living being and “the absolute living being” 1; but by giving itself to that which comes from it to behold, by becoming intelligible, it allows the transcendent Intellect to be rightly so called. 2

22. And Plato speaks riddlingly of “the way in which Intellect sees the Ideas in the complete living creature [observing] of what kind they are and how many they are”. For Soul too, which comes after Intellect, though in so far as it is Soul it has [the Forms] in itself, sees them better in that which is before it; and our intellect, though it has them, sees them better in that which is before it; for in itself it

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**ON THE KINDS OF BEING II**

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1 Plato Timaeus 31B1 and 39E7–9.
2 I adopt here Igal’s évi ro for ékexw, a very small change which gives a clearer sense.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

only sees, but in what is before it it also sees that it
sees. Now this intellect of ours, which, we maintain,
sees, is not separated from that before it, as it derives
from it, and because it is many from one and has the
nature of the other accompanying it, it becomes one-
many. But the one Intellect, since it is also many,
makes the many intellects as well by a necessity of
this kind. But in general it is not possible to appre-
end the numerical one and the individual; for
whatever you apprehend is specific form; for it is
without matter. So Plato makes this cryptic remark
also, that "substance is cut up to infinity". For as
long as the division, of a genus for instance, arrives
at another form, it is not yet infinite; for it is limited
by the forms which have been generated; but the
ultimate form which is not divided into forms is more
infinite. This is the meaning of "at this point to let
them go into the infinite and say goodbye to them".
But as far as they are on their own, they are infinite,
but as soon as they are comprehended by the one
they arrive at number. So then Intellect holds the
soul which comes after it so that it is in number, and
holds soul down to its last part, but its last part is
altogether infinite. And an intellect of this kind is a
part, although it contains all things, and the whole
intellect... but soul is a part of a part, but like an
activity proceeding from it. For when it is active in
itself, the products of its activity are the other
intellects, but when it acts outside itself, the product
is Soul. And since Soul acts as genus or specific form,
the other souls act as specific forms. And the activi-
ties of these are double: that which is directed above
Kirchhoff's text or that printed by Henry and Schwyzor in
their first edition.

1 Plato Parmenides 148B4-C1.
2 Plato Philebus 16E1-2.
3 No satisfactory sense can be extracted either from
is intellect, that which is directed below is the other powers in proportion and order; the last of them is already grasping and shaping matter. And its underpart does not prevent all the rest from being above. Or rather, what we call its underpart is an image of it, but not cut off, but like images in mirrors, [which last] while the archetype is present outside. But one must understand what “outside” means. And as far as that which is before the image [extends] the total intelligible universe, completed from all intelligibles, like this universe here below, which is an image of that one, as far as it is possible for an image of the Living Being to preserve the Living Being itself, as a drawing or a reflection in water is the ghostly image of that which appears to be there before the water and the drawing. But the image in the drawing and the water is not of the composite, but of the one formed by the other. So then the image of the intelligible is not of its maker but of the things contained in the maker, which include man and every other living being: this here is a living being and so is that which made it, each in a different sense and both in the intelligible.
VI. 3. ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

1. We have explained the way in which we think about substance and how it might accord with the thought of Plato. But we must also enquire about the other nature, whether we should posit the same genera which we posited in the intelligible, or more here below, adding others to those, or altogether different ones, or some as they were there but others otherwise. We must of course understand "the same" [genera] analogously and ambiguously: this will become obvious when we have got to know them. Our starting-point is this: since our discussion is about sense-objects and every sense-object is included in this universe of ours, it will be necessary in considering the universe to seek to divide its nature and distinguish its elements and arrange them by genera: as if we were to divide articulate sound, which is unlimited, into limited sections by bringing back to one what is the same in many, and then to another one and again a different one, until we have brought each and every one of them into a definite number, calling the one under which individuals are classed a species, and the one under which species are classed a genus. Now in the case of articulate sound each and every species and all of them which

1 This passage on the collection and division of sounds corresponds closely to Plato Philebus 173-18C.
have been discovered can be brought back to one, and we can predicate "letter" or "sound" of all; but in the case of the things we are investigating this is not possible, as has been shown. Therefore we must look for more genera, and different ones in this All from those in the intelligible, since this All is different from that and it is not called the All in the same sense but in a different one, and is an image. But since here below also in the mixture and composition one element is body and the other soul—for the All is a living thing—and the nature of soul is in that intelligible All and will not fit into the classification of what is called substance here below, we must, even if it is difficult to do so, all the same leave soul out of the investigation in which we are at present occupied; just as if someone wishing to classify the citizens of a city, by their property assessments or skills for instance, left the resident foreigners out of account. But as regards the affections, which occur in soul with the body or because of the body, we must consider later how they are to be classed, when we are enquiring about things here below.

2. And first of all we should consider what is called substance, agreeing that the nature in the sphere of bodies can only be called substance ambiguously, or should not properly be called substance at all but coming into being, because it is adapted to the idea of things in flux. Then some of the things which belong to coming into being are of this kind, and some of that: there are bodies; these, both simple and composite, we put into one class; and then there are incidentals and consequentials, and these we should also distinguish from each
other. Or there is one thing which is matter, and another which is the form upon it, and either each as a genus is separate or both fall under one genus, being each of them substance in the ambiguous sense or coming into being. But what is the common factor of matter and form? And how can matter be a genus, and a genus of what? For what essential differentiation is there belonging to matter? But in what genus is the product of both to be ranked? If the product of both is itself bodily substance, and each of them is not body, how could they be ranked in one and the same genus with the composite? And how could the elements\(^1\) of a thing be ranked with the thing itself? But if we were to start with bodies, we should be starting with syllables. But why should we not say analogously, even if the division is not on the same lines, that instead of being in the intelligible there is matter here below, and instead of the intelligible movement there is form here below, a kind of life and perfection of matter, and that matter’s not going out of itself corresponds to rest, and that there are sameness and otherness, since there is plenty of otherness, or rather unlikeness, here below? Now, first of all, matter does not hold or grasp form as its life or its activity, but form comes upon it from elsewhere and is not one of matter’s possessions. Then, in the intelligible the form is activity and motion, but here below motion is something else and an incidental; but form is rather matter’s rest and a kind of quietness; for it limits matter which is unlimited. And in the intelligible sameness and otherness belong to one thing, which

\(^1\) Or "letters": cp. ch. 1, 18.
is both same and other, but here below a thing is
other by participation and in relation to something
else, and the same and other is some particular same
and other, not as it might be in the intelligible but a
particular same and a particular other which is
something among the things which come later. But
how can there be a rest of matter when it is being
pulled into all sizes and gets its shapes from outside
and is not sufficient in itself to generate the other
things with these shapes? We must therefore reject
this division.

3. But let us explain how we should divide; this is
the way to begin with: it is one thing to be matter,
another to be form, another to be the composite of
both, and another to be the peripheral character¬
istics; and of these peripheral characteristics, some
are only predicated, some are also incidental; and of
the incidentals some are in these three [:, matter,
form and composite], but in other cases these three
are in the incidentals; others are their activities,
others their passive affections, and others conse¬
cquences. And matter is common and in all the sub¬
stances, but is certainly not a genus, because it has
no essential differences, unless one understood the
correctly those as one part, having a fiery shape and one
the shape of air. But if one was satisfied with what is
common, that there is matter in all existing things,
or that it is like a whole in relation to parts, it would
be a genus in another sense; and this would be one
element, and an element can be a genus. But the
form, with the addition "about matter" or "in matter",
separates from the other forms, but does not
include all substantial form. But if we mean by form
that which makes substance, and by rational forma-
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

tive principle that which is substantial according to the form, we have not yet said how substance is to be understood. But, as for that composed of both [matter and form], if this alone is substance, matter and form are not substances; but if they are also this, we must investigate what they have in common. But the characteristics which are only predicated would come under relation, being a cause or being an element for instance. And the incidental characteristics in the three would be quantitative or qualitative, in so far as they are in them; as for the cases where the three are in the incidentals, this would be like place and time; their activities and passive affections would be like movements; their consequences like place and time, the place a consequence of the composites, the time, the time of the movement. But the three will go into one, if we can find something common, the ambiguous substance here below; then the others will follow in order, relation, quantity, quality, in place, in time, movement. Or, if one leaves out place and time, "in place" and "in time" are superfluous, so that there are five, on the assumption that the first three are one; but if the first three do not go into one, there will be matter, form, composite, relation, quantity, quality, movement. Or these last also could go into relation: for it is more inclusive.

4. What is it, then, which is the same in the three, and what will it be which makes them substance, the substance in things here below? Is it a kind of base for everything else? But matter is thought to be a base and "seat" for form, so that the form will not

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1 Plate Timaeus 52B1.
be included in substance. And the composite is a base and seat for other things, so that the form with the matter will be a base for the composites, or at least for all that come after the composites, quantity, quality, movement for instance. But then, is the same in the three what is called "not belonging to another"? For white and black belong to something else, that which has become white, and the double belongs to something else—I do not mean that it belongs to the half but I am speaking of a double-sized piece of wood—and a father is someone else's, in so far as he is a father; and knowledge belongs to another, in whom it is, and place is the boundary of another, and time the measure of another. But fire does not belong to something else, nor does a piece of wood in so far as it is a piece of wood, nor does man belong to something else, nor does Socrates, or "composite substance" in general, or the substantive form belong to something else, because it is not an affection of something else. For form does not belong to matter, but is a part of the composite; and the form of man and man are the same thing; and matter is part of a whole, and belongs to another as belonging to the whole, and not in the sense that that of which it is said to be is another thing; but what is said to be white is the white of something else. That then which belongs to another and is said to be of that other is not substance: substance, that is, is what belongs to that which it is, or, if it is a part, is an essential completion of a composite of its own kind; for the composite is either or both parts of itself, but in relation to the composite each part is

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1 Aristotle Metaphysics H 3. 1043a30.
said to belong to it in another sense; or if it is a part, it is called so in relation to something else, but by itself its natural existence is said to be in being what it is, not in belonging to another. The substrate is also common to matter, form, and the composite; but the matter is substrate to the form in one sense, and the form [and the composite] to the affections in another. Or, alternatively, the matter is not substrate to the form—for the form is its perfection in so far as it is matter and in so far as it is potential—nor, again, is the form in it: for when something completes some one thing with something else, neither of them is in the other, but both the matter and the form together are substrates to something else—man and a particular man are substrates to the affections, and precede the activities and consequences—and [substance is] that from which the others come and through which the others exist and the subject which is effected and the origin of doing and making.

5. This is to be understood as being said about what is called substance here below: if it applies in any way to that intelligible substance, it is perhaps analogously and ambiguously. Thus it is said to be the first in relation to what comes after it. For it is not the first in any unqualified sense, but substantial sensibles are last in relation to intelligibles but first after them. And “substrate” is used in a different sense, and it is disputed whether there is passive affection in the intelligible, and, if it is there, possibility there is something different. And the statement "not being in a substrate applies to all substance” is true if that which is in a substrate must "not be there as a part of that in which it is", nor in such a
way as to contribute with it to the completeness of some one thing; for it could not be as in a substrate in that with which it contributes to a composite substance; so the form is not in the matter as in a substrate, nor is humanity in Socrates [in this way], since it is a part of Socrates. What is not in a substrate, therefore, is substance; but if we say that it is "not in a substrate nor predicated of a substrate", we must add "as of something else", that the human also, predicated of a particular human being, may be included by the statement in the addition "not of something else". For when I predicate humanity of Socrates, I mean it not in the sense in which the wood is white, but in the sense that the white thing is white: for in saying that Socrates is human, I am saying that a particular human being, predicking humanity of the human in Socrates; but this is the same as calling Socrates Socrates, and again as predicking "living being" of this particular rational living being. But if someone says that not being in a substrate is not a peculiarity of substance, for the essential differentiation is not itself one of the things in a substrate, it is by understanding [the differentiation] as "the two-footed" that he makes this assertion that it is not in a substrate: since, if he did not understand "the two-footed", which is a particular kind of substance, but "two-footedness", not meaning a substance but a quality, then the two-footed will be in a substrate. But time is not in a substrate either, nor is place. But if "the measure of movement" is understood as

1 Ibid. 5. 2a12-15.
2 Aristotle, in Categories 5. 3a21-28.
Plotinus: Ennead VI. 3.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

applying to what is measured, the measure will exist in the movement as in a substrate, and the movement in what is moved; but if it is taken as referring to the measurer, then the measure will be in the measurer. And place, being the "boundary of the surroundings", is in those surroundings. But what is to be said about this substance here which we are discussing? It comes about that this substance can be understood in contrary ways according to one or more or all of these statements, since the statements fit both matter and form and the composite as well.

6. But if anyone should say that, granted that these are observations about substance, what it is has not been said, he is perhaps still requiring to see this with his bodily eyes; but this "is" and this "being" could not be seen [in this way]. Well then, is not fire substance, and water? Is each of them substance because it is seen? No. But by having form? No. But by having matter? No. But by being? Not this either. And not by being a composite either. But by what, then? By being. But the quantum is, and the quale is. But, we shall insist, only in an ambiguous sense. But what is this "is" which applies to fire and earth and suchlike things, and what is the difference between this "is" and the "is" which applies to the others? It is that one means simply to be and simply existing, but the other means to be white. Well then, is the "is" which is added to the "white" the same as the "is" without addition? No, but one means primary being, the other being by participation and secondarily. For the "white" added to "being" makes the being white, and the "being" added to the "white" makes the white being, so that in both cases [there is something incidental], the "white" incidental to the

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1 Theiler.
3 Creuzer.
"being" and the "being" incidental to the "white". And we do not mean this in the sense in which one might say that Socrates is white and the white thing is Socrates; for in both these cases Socrates is the same, but perhaps the white is not the same; for in the statement "the white thing is Socrates", Socrates is included in "the white", but in the statement "Socrates is white" the white is simply and solely incidental. And here [in the case we are discussing] "being is white" has "white" as incidental, but in the statement "the white is being", "the white" has being included in it. And in general the white has being because it is about being and in being; it derives its existence therefore from being; but being has being from itself and white from the white, not because it is in the white, but because the white is in it. But, since this being in the sense-world does not exist of itself, it must be said that it has its being from the real being and has its being white from the real white; that also which has the white has its being by participation in the being of that other intelligible world.

7. But if anyone should say that the things here which are based on matter have their being from it we shall demand where matter gets being and the existent from. We have explained elsewhere that matter is not primary. But if one says that the other things could not come into existence except on the basis of matter, we shall agree as far as sense-objects are concerned. But even if matter is prior to these, nothing prevents it from being posterior to many things and to all the things there in the intelligible world.

1 In VI. 1. 25-28 (the critique of Stoic corporealism).
since the being it has is dim and less than the things
based upon it, in so far as they are rational prin-
ciples and derive more from the existent but matter
is utterly irrational, a shadow of rational form and a
falling away from rational form; but if one says that
this matter gives being to the things based on it as
Socrates does to the whiteness based upon him, we
must say that what is more existent might give being
to what is less existent, but the less existent could
not give being to the more existent. But if the form is
more existent than the matter, existence is no more
something common to both, nor is substance a genus
containing matter, form and the composite, but they
have many things, those we are speaking of, in
common, but their being is different. For when some-
thing which is more existent arrives about some-
thing which is less existent, [the latter] would be
first in order, but posterior in substance; so that, if
being is not equal for matter, form and the com-
posite, substance would not still be common as a
genus. It will, certainly, be otherwise disposed to the
things which come after it, as having something
common in relation to them by the fact of their
being, as there is a dimmer and a clearer life, and one
picture is a sketch and another a more finished
work. But if one were to measure being by the
dimness of being and let go what is more of it in the
others, in this way again being would be common. But
one should not perhaps proceed like this. For each
[of the three, matter, form and composite] is different
as a whole, and the dimness is not something com-
mon, just as in the case of life there would be
nothing in common between nutritive, perceptive
and intelligent life. So here also being is different in
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

30.  ἐν γὰρ μόνον δεῖ, εἰ τὸ δεύτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ πρῶτου, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἀπὸ τῶν δύο ἑκείνου, τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ ἐφαξὶς χείρον καὶ ἐλαττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἁμφο, ἢ δὲ τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον μετασχοῦν πυρός, οἶνον κέραμοι, τὸ δὲ ἤττου, ὡστε μὴ κέραμος γενῆται.

35. τάχα δὲ εὖ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἔδος: διάφορα γὰρ καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις.

8. "Ἀλλά ἀρα τὸ μὲν διαίρεσιν ἐς στοιχεῖα ἕνα δεί, καὶ μέλλει μερισμα τῆς ἀισθητῆς οὐσίας διαφέροντα, ἢν δεὶ αἰσθήσεις μᾶλλον, ἢ λόγοι λογικοὶ καὶ τὸ εὐς ὄν συγκεκοινωναῖον—οὐ γὰρ εὐσεία ἐκείνα.

5. οὐ περὶ αἰσθητοῦ γαρ οὐσίας ἐν γένει, ἀλλὰ περὶ λαμβανόντα τὸ καλὸν ἀπὸ λίθου καὶ γῆς καὶ ἰδέας καὶ τῶν ἐν πολλῶν φυσιῶν, ἢ αἰσθητοῦ, καὶ ζωῆς οἰκοστοιοί; οὐ γάρ παραλείπεται ἡ ὑπὸ εὑρίσκει τὸ εὔος, ἢ γὰρ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία ἔχει τινὰ: ὅλα γὰρ καὶ εἴδων παρ' ἐκείνῳ καὶ γῆ καὶ τὰ μεταξύ ταῦτα, τἀ δὲ συνήθεις ἑξῆς πολλά οὗτα ἐν ἑνϊ καὶ τὸ κοιλιά πάντα τούτοις, ἢ τῶν ἄλλων.

10. κεκορισταὶ: ὑποκείμενα γὰρ ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ οὐκ ἐν ὑποκείμενοι οὔτε ἄλλοις καὶ ὡσα εἴρεται, ὑπάρχει τιμῆς, ἀλλ' εἰ οὐσία ἀυτή ἕνω καὶ μεγαθοῦς οὐδ' ἄνε καταράκτων, ποὺ ἐπὶ τὰ συμβεβηκά τα χωρίσεις, χωρίζομεν γὰρ τά ταῦτα, τὸ μέγα, τὰ χλόα, τὰ 15 χνίμα, ξενίστη, ὑγρόστη, τὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτὴν

1 Igal, H. S., διάφορα Ενν.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

(dyopeda; nctai yap ovoiai avrai. aXXa

20 ge η ιασηηή ούτα αμφορης τις ποιητην και

και μον μην κατα συμπαγετα επι ιηθη

μως ουτα, χωρις δε ουκασ ημιμπανευον το μην

που, το δε πουον έσται, η ποια πολλα; και δ μην

δεν κελισθαι μης αμπαμαμεν ει γεινοει την

υποστασιν, μερος της της ουτας, δ δεν γενομην

και η ουτα αισημηηή, της οικειον εχει τετον αν

κοστομενον εν τη μηματ τη ποιηνη την λεγομενη

ουτας; και αν τοιτο φημη, ας εκει μετα των αλλων αν

ετων ουτα, συμπληρων ενα ουγον τοσωδε και

tωνοδε, αλλαγον δε μη συμπληρων που, αλλα μεδε

30 εκε ουκασν ουτας, το δ ελον το εκ παντων ουτας.

και αν δεισηποντεσ, ει την ουταν η τη αισηηήν εξ αε

ουτων ποιηνεμεν ουδε γε την αλλο ουτα, αλλα

μιμοστενον την αλληθη, ητε ανευ των αλλων των περι

αυτην εχει το δε και των αλλων εξ αυτης γινομενον, ητι

35 αλληθης δεν ουλ το και το οποσαπληρον άγον και

ουχ ίκανον ενοι ον, ότι μεδε εξ αυτου τα αλλα, ακα δε

και επι οικα αυτη ουτη ζεωγραφη και το φαινεθαι.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

Substances are qualified substances. But is there something around which occur what make being simply substance into being qualified substance? And will fire be not as a whole substance, but something belonging to it, like a part? And what could this be? Just matter. But then, is sensible substance a conglomeration of qualities and matter, and are all these compounded together on one matter substance, but when each is taken separately will one be a quale and one a quantum, or will they be many qualia? And will that which, if it is lacking, does not allow a completed coming into existence to take place be a part of this substance, but that which, when a substance has come to be, comes to it as an addition, have its own position and not be hidden in the mixture which makes up what is called substance? I do not mean this in the sense that when it is there with the others it is substance, completing one mass of a particular size and quality, but elsewhere when it is not contributing to completion it is a quality, but that even in the former case each particular one is not a substance, but the whole made up from them all is substance. And there is no need to object if we make sensible substance out of non-substances; for even the whole is not true substance but imitates the true substance, which has its being without the others which attend on it, and the others come into being from it, because it truly is; but here what underlies is sterile and inadequate to be being, because the others do not come from it, but it is a shadow, and upon what is itself a shadow, a picture and a seeming.

1 Cp. ch. 15, 24–38 and II. 7.3.
9. So much for what is called sensible substance and the one genus. But what species of it should one posit, and how should one divide them? Now the whole must be classed as body, and of bodies some are matterish and some organic; the matterish are fire, earth, water, air; the organic the bodies of plants and animals, which have their differences according to their shapes. Then one should take the species of earth and of the other elements, and in the case of organic bodies one should divide the plants, and the bodies of animals, according to their shapes; or by the fact that some are on and in the earth, and, element by element, [one should class separately] the bodies in each; or [one could class them on the ground that] some are light, some are heavy, and some in between, and that some stand in the middle, some surround them above, and some are in between; and in each of these the bodies are already differentiated by their outlines, so as to be some of them bodies of celestial living beings and others appropriate to the other elements; or one should divide the four according to their species and afterwards proceed in another way to weave them together by blending their differences according to places and shapes and mixtures, classing them as fiery or earthly, called so according to the largest and predominant element in the mixture. But as for calling them "first" and "second"—"this fire" and "fire"—these have a difference in another way, because one is individual and one universal, but not a difference of substance; under quality, also, there is "something white" and "white" and "a particular..."
literary skill" and "literary skill". For what less does "literary skill" have in comparison with "a particular literary skill" and in general "body of knowledge" in comparison with "a particular body of knowledge"? For literary skill is not posterior to the particular literary skill but rather it is because literary skill exists that that in you exists; since that in you is particular by being in you, but in itself is the same as the universal. And Socrates did not in his own person give being human to the non-human but humanity gave being human to Socrates; the particular human is so by participation in humanity. Since what could Socrates be except "a man of a particular kind" and what could the "of a particular kind" do towards being more of a substance? But if it is because "humanity is only a form" but Socrates is "form in matter", he would be less human in this respect, for the rational form is worse in matter. But if humanity is not in itself form, but in matter, what less will it have than the particular human in matter, when it is itself the rational form of something in a kind of matter? Again, the more general is prior by nature, as the species is prior to the individual; but the prior by nature is also simply prior: how then could it be less? But the individual is prior in relation to us because it is more knowable; but this does not make a difference in actual fact. Then, if it were so, there would not be one definition of substance for the definition of what is primarily and what is secondarily is not the same, nor do they come under one genus.

10. It is also possible to divide like this, by hot and dry, and dry and cold, and moist and cold, or whatever kind of coupling he wants, and then a compo-

and mixture of these; and either to stop there, coming to a halt at the composite, or [to go on dividing] according to whether things are in or on the earth, or according to the shapes and according to the differences of animals, not dividing the animals but dividing according to their bodies, which are like their tools. The division according to their shapes is not out of place, since the division according to their qualities is not either, hotness, coldness and such like. But if someone were to say "but bodies act by these", we shall reply that they also act according to the mixtures and the colours and the outlines. For since our discussion is about sensible substance the division would not be out of place if it was taken to be made by the differences which present themselves to sense-perception, for this sensible substance is not simply being, but is perceived by sense, being this whole world of ours; since we maintained that its apparent existence was a congress of perceplibles, and the guarantee of their being comes from sense-perception. But if the composition has no limits, one should divide according to the species-forms of living things, the bodily species of man, for instance. For this, a species-form of this kind, is a quality of body, and it is not out of place to divide by qualities. But if we said that some bodies are simple and some are composite, opposing the composite to the simple in our division, we were speaking of matterish and organic bodies, not taking the composite seriously into account. It is not a division by opposition which sets the composite against the simple, but, when one had placed the simple bodies by the first division, one mixed them and differentiated the composites starting from an-

1 Sleeman. H-S: -βεθή- έπα.
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other subordinate principle, either by positions or shapes, some celestial and others earthly, for instance. And so much for substance or coming-to-be in the things perceived by sense.

11. But about the quantum and quantity, it has often been said how one should locate it in number and size, in so far as each individual thing which is in the number of things in matter and the extension of the substrate is of a certain size—for the discussion is not about separate quantity but about the quantity which makes the wood three cubits long and the five which applies to the horses—and that only those things should be called quanta, but that place and time should not be considered under quantity, but that time because it is the "measure of motion" should in its own nature also be given to the relative, and that place is what surrounds body, so that this too is put in relation and the relative; further, movement is continuous and so was not put in the class of quantity. But why are large and small not in quantity?

For the large is large by some kind of quantity and size is not something relative, but larger and smaller belong to the relative; for they are so in regard to another, like the double. Why then is "the mountain small, but the millet seed large"? Now, first of all, this is said instead of "smaller". For if it is agreed that it is called small in regard to and from [comparison with] things of the same kind, it is agreed that it is said instead of "smaller". And a large millet seed is not simply called "large" but "large millet seed" and this is the same as "of things of the same kind", and it con

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1 Aristotle Categories 6. 5b18-19.
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naturally be called larger than things of the same kind. Next, why is "beautiful" not said to be one of the relatives? But we call something beautiful in itself; it has the quality of beauty, but "more beautiful" is one of the relative terms; and then what is called beautiful might appear ugly in relation to something else, like the beauty of a man compared to a god; "the most beautiful of monkeys", he says, "is ugly in comparison with another kind"; but it is beautiful by itself, but in relation to something else it is more beautiful or the opposite. And in the case of size, then, a thing is large in itself by possession of size, but in relation to something else it is not so. Otherwise one would have to deny the "beautiful" because something else was more beautiful; so here one must not deny the "large" because there is something larger than it: since it could not be larger at all if it was not large, just as a thing could not be more beautiful if it was not beautiful.

12. We must allow then that there is opposition in the quantitative; for our notions admit the opposition, when we say "large" and when we say "small", and make our mental images opposite, just as when we say "many" and "few": for we ought to say much the same about "few" and "many". For "there are many people in the house" is instead of "more people": but this is in relation to something else; and we say "few people in the theatre" instead of "fewer". And one ought in general to call the many "many" as a multiplicity in number—and how can multiplicity be one of the relatives?—but this is the same as saying "an expansion of number" and

1 Heraclitus fr. B 82 DK, as quoted by Plato Hippias Major 289A3-4.

2 Aristotle Categories 8. 5b24-25.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

13. It has been well said that the continuous is distinguished from the discrete by the common and

1 Ficinus (ipsa): αὖτη Ἑν., H-S'.

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the opposite "contraction". And the same applies to
the continuous, in that our notion of it prolongs the
continuous into the distance. So there is a quantum
when the unit moves forward, and also when the
point does. But if either of them comes to a stop
quickly, one is few and the other small; but if the
advance does not halt quickly in its progress, one is
many and the other large. What then is the defining
limit? What is it of the beautiful? Or the hot? And it
is possible here also to be hotter. But "the hotter" is
said in relation to something, but "the hot" is simply
a quale. But in general there must be a rational form
of the large just as there is of the beautiful, which
when it is participated makes a thing large, as the
form of the beautiful makes a thing beautiful. In
these respects, then, there is an opposition in the
quantitative; for there is no longer one in place,
because place does not belong to the quantitative;
since, even if place did belong to the quantitative,
"up" would not be opposite to anything, since there
is no "down" in the All. But when "up" and "down"
are spoken of in the parts, they could not mean
anything else but "higher up" and "lower down"
and are like "right" and "left"; and these belong to
the relatives. But "syllable" and "word" have a
quantitative character and come under the quantita-
tive; for they are a sound of a certain length; but
sound itself is a movement; so it must be generally
referred to movement, as action is.

13. It has been well said that the continuous is
distinguished from the discrete by the common and

1 On sound as quantitative cp. VI. 1. 5.

2 By Aristotle: Categories 6. 4b.
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the particular limit; and further, in the case of number, that it is distinguished by odd and even. And again, if there are distinctions in each of these [divisions] they should be left to those whose business is number, or we should posit that these are distinctions of the monadic [ideal] numbers, but no longer of those in sense-objects. But if logic separates the numbers in sense-objects [from the objects], nothing prevents us from making in thought the same distinctions of these. But how do we make distinctions in the continuous, if one kind is line, one plane and one solid? Now the distinctions one-dimensional, two-dimensional and three-dimensional do not seem to be proper to one who is dividing into species, but rather to one who is simply making a count. For if in numbers also when they are taken like this according to the before and after, there is no genus common to them, there will be nothing common either to the first, second and third dimensions. But perhaps it is in so far as they are quantitative that they are one and the same, and some of them are not more quantitative and some less, even if some have wider extensions and some narrower. And numbers then would have what is in common to them in so far as they are all numbers; for perhaps the number one does not produce the number two or the number two the number three, but the same produces all. But if the number-series does not come into being, but is, but we think it as having come into being, let the lesser number be earlier and the greater later; but in so far as they are all numbers they are classed under one head. And now we must transfer what applied to numbers to magnitudes: we shall separate from each other line, sur-

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1 Westerink, H-S²: dei Enn.: ei fi Thaler, H-S².
ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

face and solid (which Aristotle calls body) by their all being magnitudes specifically different. But we must investigate whether we should divide each of them, line into straight, circular and spiral, plane into rectangular and circular form, solid into solid forms, sphere and those bounded by straight-line sides, and those again, as the geometers do, into those with triangular and those with quadrilateral sides, and these again into others.

14. What, then, are we to say that a straight line is? Is it not that it is a magnitude? Now one could say that the straight is a magnitude of a certain quality. What then prevents it from being a specific differentiation of the line as line?—for the straight does not belong to anything else but a line—since we get our specific differentiations of substance also from the qualitative. If a line, then, is straight, it is a quantitative with a specific difference, and the straight line is not for this reason a composite of straight and line; but if it is a composite, it is as with its specific difference. But the figure made of three lines—the triangle—why is it not in the quantitative? Now the triangle is not just three lines, but three lines in this particular disposition, and the quadrilateral four lines in this particular disposition; and indeed the straight line is both placed in a particular way and quantitative. If then we say that the straight line is not only quantitative, what prevents us from saying that the limited straight line is not only quantitative? But the limit of the line is a point, and not in anything else. And so the limited surface is quantitative, since lines limit it, which are much more in the quantitative. If then the limited surface is in the quantitative, and this is either a quadrilateral or a

1 Kirchhoff.
2 delevimus: καὶ Φίκιν ( = Ficinus), Müller.
polygon or a hexagon, then all figures are in the quantitative. But if, because we say that the triangle is a quale and the quadrilateral also, we are going to put them in the qualified, there is no objection to putting the same thing in several categories: in so far as it is a magnitude, and a magnitude of a certain size, it is in the quantitative, but in so far as it presents a shape of a certain quality, it is in the qualitative. Now the triangle is in itself a shape of a certain quality: what then prevents us from calling the sphere a quale? If then one comes to the real point at issue, geometry will not be concerned with magnitudes but with quality. But this does not appear to be so, but this activity is concerned with magnitudes. But the specific differences of magnitudes do not take away their being magnitudes, just as those of substances do not make them non-substances. Further, every surface is limited, for it is not possible for any surface to be unlimited. And further, just as when I grasp a quality of a substance, I call it a substantial quality, so, and much more, when I grasp figures, I grasp specific differences of quantity. Then, if we are not going to take these as specific differences of magnitudes, of what are we going to posit that they are differences? But if they are specific differences of magnitudes, the different magnitudes arising from the differences must be arranged in species of magnitudes.

15. But how do the "equal and unequal properly belong to the quantitative"? For triangles are spoken of as like. Now, magnitudes are also spoken of as "like" and the likeness which is spoken of does not abolish the fact that the like and the unlike are in the qualitative; for perhaps here in magnitudes...
"like" is used differently, and not as in the qualitative. Then, if he said that "equal and unequal properly belong to the quantitative", he did not abolish the possibility of predicating likeness of some magnitudes; but if he said that "the like and unlike belong to the qualitative", then, as we asserted, likeness in the quantitative must be understood in a different way. But if "the like" is understood in the same way also in magnitudes, we must investigate other characteristics proper to each genus, the quantitative and the qualitative. Now we must say that the term "like" can be used also of the quantitative, in so far as the specific differences are present in it, and in general that one ought to class the differences which help to complete the essence under that of which they are the differences, and especially when the specific difference as specific difference belongs to that alone. But if in one it contributes to the completion of the essence, but in the other not, it must be classed where it contributes, but where it does not contribute, simply taken by itself: I mean that it contributes to the completion not simply of the essence, but of the essence of such a kind, since "of such a kind" allows a non-substantial addition. And we must note this as well, that we call both triangles and quadrilaterals "equal" and apply the term to all figures, plane and solid. So let it be established that "equal" and "unequal" properly belong to the quantitative. But we must investigate whether "like" and "unlike" belong to the qualitative.

1 Aristotle. The statements about equality and inequality and likeness and unlikeness discussed here are Categories 6. 6a26 and 8. 11a18-19.
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It was said about the qualitative that, mixed together with others, matter and the quantitative, it effects the completion of sensible substance, and that this so-called substance is this compound of many, and is not a "something" but a "something like"; and the rational form, of fire for instance, indicates rather the "something", but the shape it produces is rather a quale. And the rational form of man is the being a "something", but its product in the nature of body, being an image of the form, is rather a sort of "something like". It is as if, the visible Socrates being a man, his painted picture, being colours and painter's stuff, was called Socrates; in the same way, therefore, since there is a rational form according to which Socrates is, the perceptible Socrates should not rightly be said to be Socrates, but colours and shapes which are representations of those in the form; and this rational form in relation to the truest form of man is affected in the same way. And so much for that.

16. But when each of the categories which have to do with so-called substance is taken separately, quality [must be said] to be in sense-objects, not the terms signifying "something" or "how much" or "movement" but those indicating the distinctive characteristic and the "of such a kind" and "of what kind", for instance beautiful and ugly applied to the body; for there is only a verbal identity between the beautiful here and there in the intelligible, as there is also between the qualitative here and there; since black and white also are different here and there. But is the qualitative in the seed, that is in the rational principle of a particular kind, the same or only verbally identical with that which appears?

And is it to be assigned to the intelligibles there or the sense-objects here? And what about ugliness in the soul? For that beauty in the soul is something different [from bodily beauty] is already clear. But if [ugliness or vice in the soul] is in this qualitative here, the question arises if virtue is among the qualitatives here. Perhaps some virtues are among the qualitatives here, and some among those there. Since one might be in some difficulty whether the arts, which are rational forms, belong among those here: for even if they are rational forms in matter, their matter is the soul. But when they are also with [bodily] matter, how are they here? Take lyre-playing for instance; for it has to do with the strings, and the tune, sensible sound, is in some way part of the art, unless perhaps one were to suppose that these are activities, not parts. But even so they are sense-perceived activities, since the beauty also which is in body is bodiless; but since it is perceived by the senses we allotted it to what has to do with body and belongs to body. But we suppose that geometry and arithmetic are double, and should rank one kind of them here in this qualitative, but the works of the soul itself directed to the intelligible should be ranked there. And indeed Plato says the same about music and astronomy. So then the arts which are concerned with body and use perceptible tools and sense-perception, even if they are dispositions of the soul, since they are dispositions of the soul inclining downwards are to be ranked in this qualitative here. And indeed there is nothing to

On the status of the arts in the intelligible and sensible worlds see also V. 9.11-12.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

1. The terminology here is Stoic: cp. SVF III 280.

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PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

This way of explaining the differences of sense-perceived qualities seems to go back to the Atomists: cp. Democritus A 120 DK. It was adopted by Plato (Timaeus 67E5-6) and Aristotle (Metaphysics I 7. 1057b8-9, Topica H 3. 153a28-31), who is criticised here.

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intelligible one can divide the qualities here below by the senses, some [perceived] through the eyes, some through the ears, some through touch, taste, smell; and if there are any differentiations of these, [they are to be distinguished,] colours by sight, sounds by hearing and [others] by the other senses: sounds, in so far as they are qualified, are sweet, harsh, soft. But, since we distinguish the differentiations of substances by qualities, and activities and actions as fine or ugly and in general of some kind—

for the quantitative comes into the differentiations which make species seldom or nowhere—and the quantitative by the qualities peculiar to quanta, one might be in some difficulty about how one should divide the qualitative by species, what kind of differentiations one should use and from what kind of genus one should take them. For it is absurd to divide it by its identical self, as if one said that differentiations of substances were again substances. By what then does one differentiate white from black? By what colours in general? From tastes and tangible qualities? But if these differentiations are by different sense-organs, the distinction is not in its subjects. But how does one distinguish qualia perceived by the same sense? If it is because one concentrates and one diffuses the eyes, and one diffuses and one concentrates the tongue, first there is a dispute about the experiences themselves, whether these are diffusions and concentrations; and then Aristotle has not stated by what the experiences themselves are differentiated.1 But if one says "by their powers"—and "by their powers" is

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2 Aristotle Categories 8. 9a14-16.
not unreasonable one should perhaps reply that
invisible things are to be distinguished by their
powers, branches of knowledge for instance; but why
should these, which are perceptible, be distinguished
by what they do? And when in the case of
branches of knowledge we are distinguishing them
by their powers, and in general with the powers of
soul separating them as different by what they do,
we are able to grasp their differentiations rationally,
since we see not only what they are concerned with,
but their rational forms. We shall be able to divide
the arts by their rational forms and their theories,
but how shall we divide the qualities in bodies? Now
even in that case one might enquire how the differ¬
ing rational forms are different. And white certainly
does appear to differ from black: but by what, we are
still enquiring.

18. But all these points of difficulty show that one
should look for differentiations of other things, by
which we separate them from each other, but to look
for differentiations of differentiations is impossible
and irrational: for it is not possible to look for
substances of substances or quantities of quantity or
qualities of qualities or differentiations of differen¬
tiations. But it is necessary, where the circum¬
cstances admit, [to distinguish them] by their powers
to make or something of the sort; but where even
these are not present, as [when distinguishing] leek¬
green from greenish-yellow (since they say1 that
these belong to white and black), what is one going
to say? But the truth is that it is either sense¬

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1 The Peripatetics: cp Aristotle De Sensu 4. 442a24—25; Categories 10. 12a18.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

10 δύνασθαι λόγον, η μόνον αίσθησις, η αίσθησις δέ τε, καὶ οὐ
15 διαφοράς διασαφέως ποιήσαμεν, οὐ δὲ νοσὶν ταῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιβολαῖς ἀπλαίς καὶ οὐ λόγοις χρήται πανταχοῦ, ὡς λέγεω έκαστον τάδε τάδε, τάδε τάδε καὶ ἐστιν ἐπερίπτωσιν ταῖς κατάστασις αὐτοῦ διαμέσου.

20 γραμματικὴς ψυχῆς, τῆς δὲ μονακής, καὶ μάλιστα, εἰ ἐφεξῆς εἶναι, ὡστε καὶ εἰσαγωγικοὶ διαφοράς γίνεσθαι καὶ εἰ ἐπὶ τις ὑλῆς διαφορά, ἐκ τούτου τοῦ γένους ἢ καὶ ἐξ ἀλλοῦ καὶ εἰ ἐκ ταῦτος γένους, τῶν ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους, οὐν ποιητῶν ποιήσεως. ἀρετὴ γὰρ καὶ κακία ἤ μέν γὰρ ἐξαίτια, ἢ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἡ ψυχή
25 ποιητῶν οὐδέν τῶν έξεσθαι αἱ διαφοραὶ ποιήσεως: εἰ μὴ τε ψυχῆς τῆς μὲν ἔξων τῇ διαφοράς μὴ ποιήσεως ἐξαιτία, τῷ δὲ διαφορᾶς τῷ ποιήσεως ποιήσεως. ἄλλ' εἰ τοῖς γλυκεῖς ὑφέλμιοι, θλαβηθέν τὸ πικρόν, σχέσω, αὐτοὶ ποιηται, ἀναφερόντες τί οὗτος γλυκός, τό δὲ
30 αὐστηρῶν λεπτόν; οὗ τί οὗν γλυκοῦ λέγει ποιήσας, ἄλλον

1 Müller, Cilento, Theiler.

This sentence is one of the clearest statements in Plotinus of the close resemblance between their and ours: cp. VI. 7. 29-31; he seems here to be developing the

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perception or intellect which says that they are different, and they will not give a reason, senseperception because the reason does not belong to it, but only giving different indications, but the intellect everywhere uses its own simple acts of attention, not reasons, so that it says of each thing "this is this and that is that"; and there is an otherness in its movements which distinguishes one thing from another and does not itself need an otherness. Then will all qualities be differentiations or not? Whiteness, indeed, and colours in general and touch- and taste-qualities would be differentiations of other things even if they are species, but how could literature and music be? By the fact that one soul is literary and another musical, especially when they are so by nature, so that these become species-forming differentiations. And if quality, then, was a differentiation, it would be either from this genus or also from another, and if from the same genus, it would be a differentiation of what is from the same genus, qualities of qualities for instance. For virtue and vice are states, one of this kind and one of that; so that since states are qualities the differentiations are qualities; unless one were to say that the state without the differentiation was not a quality, but the differentiation made the quality. But if [one says] that the sweet is beneficial but the bitter harmful, one is distinguishing them by relation, not quality. But suppose [one says] that the sweet is dense and the sour rare? One does not perhaps mean that what the sweet is is dense, but that in which the sweetness thought of Aristotle: cp. Nicomachean Ethics VI 11. 1143a35-55.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

is; and the same applies to the sour. So one must investigate whether everywhere quality is a differentiation of what is not quality, as substance is not a differentiation of substance or quantity of quantity. Now five differs from three by two. No, it exceeds by two and "difference" is not the word used: for how could it differ by "two" which is in the "three"? But neither would movement differ by movement from movement, nor would one find this in the other genera. But with vice and virtue one must compare the whole with the whole, and so one will distinguish the wholes by themselves. But as for the differentiations being derived from the same genus, the qualitative, and not from another, if one distinguished by one [virtue or vice] being concerned with pleasures, and one with tempers, and one with the acquisition of produce, and accepted that this was a good distinction, it is clear that it is possible for non-qualities also to be differentiations.

19. We should rank with quality, as it appeared, the differentiated qualia, in so far as there is quality in them, not bringing them themselves into consideration, to avoid having two categories, but going up from them, to that after which they are called qualia. But the "not-whites", if it indicates another colour, is a quality; but if it was only a negation it would be nothing but a sound or a name or a definition of the thing to which it is applicable; and if it is a sound, it is a movement, but if it is a name or definition, it is relative in that these are significant. But if there is not only a counting-out of things according to their genus, but one must also count out the words and the significations, we shall say that

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1 dox. Theil. 
2 coniecimus: καὶ Ἐπικ. 
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Plotinus: Ennead VI.3.

positive terms posit things by simply indicating them, but negative terms take them away. Yet perhaps it is better not to count in the negations, at any rate if we do not count in the positive terms because they are composite. But what about privations? If what they are privations of are qualities, they themselves are qualities, "toothless" or "blind" for instance. But the "naked" and the "clothed" are neither of them qualified, but rather in a particular state: in a relation, therefore, to something else. An affection, as long as being affected continues, is not a quality but a kind of movement; but when affection means having been affected and having the affection still remaining, it is a quality, but if something does not still have the affection but is said to have been affected, this means to have been moved; and this is the same as "was in movement". But one must only think of the movement, taking away the time: for it is not even proper to bring in the "now". The "well done" and such-like are to be referred to the single notion of the genus. But we must enquire whether being of a red complexion is to be referred to the qualitative, but not as well the [temporarily] red-faced man. Now turning red in the face is correctly not so referred; for there is affection or in general movement; but if someone is not any more turning red, but is red in the face already, why is he not qualified? For being qualified does not depend on time—or by what interval of time would it be defined?—but by being of such a kind, and when we say "red-faced" we say "qualified"; or otherwise we shall only call [settled] states, and not any more...

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del. Crouser

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PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

μόνας ποιότητας ἐρωμένει, τάς δὲ διαθέσεις νόκεται, και
θερμός τοῖς ἁλύϊς ὁ θερμανόμενος, καὶ νοσῶν ὁ ἁλύς ἀ
ἀγόμενος εἰς ψάλων.

20. Ὅραν δὲ δει, εἰ μὴ πάσης συνήθετι εστὶ τις ἄλλης ἐ
ἐναντία: ἐπὶ καὶ τὸ μέσον τοὺς ἄρα ροϊς δοκεῖ ἐπὶ ἁρμέτης
καὶ κακίας ἐναντίον εἶναι. ἂν ἐπὶ τῶν χρωμάτων τὰ
μεταξύ νοὰ στάσεις. εἰ μὲν οὖν, ὅτι μέτξος τῶν ἄρα ροῖς
τὰ μεταξύ, ἔδει μὸ ἀντίδιαστάραλα, ἄλλα λευκαὶ καὶ μέλαν, τὰ
δ’ ἄλλα συνῆθεσις. ἦ τῶν μὲν ταῦτα ἄλλης ἐπὶ τῶν
μεταξύ, καὶ ἐν πιθανότητας ἦ, τιθεορίζομαι ἀντιπρήμεν. ἦ
ὅτι δὲ τὰ ἐναντία οὐ μόνον διαφέρει, ἄλλα καὶ πλείοντον.
ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πλείστῳ διαφέρειν λαμβάνομαι ἐν
τῷ ἴδεσθαι ἐὰς τοιαῦτα τὰ μεταξύ ἐπ’ ἐς τις τῇ ὑνὶ ἐ
διατάσει ἀφέλου, τῷ τῷ πλείστοις ἀρκεῖ, ἦ δὲ τὸ φαινό
εὐγνωμένα τῇ λευκῷ μᾶλλον ἦ τὸ μέλαν καὶ πικτοῖ
παρὰ τῶν ἐναντίοις μηδένεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν χρώματι ὑσσύνους
καὶ τῶν ἄρα περὶ περὶ γλυκῶν. ἔρημον ἐπὶ τὰ μεταξύ ἀλλὰ ἦ
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὅπως ὀπλαμβάνειν
τὸ ἐθισμένος, δήλων, τάξα δ’ ἃν τις ἡμῖν ὡς συνήχοι
ταῦτα: τὸ δὲ λευκόν καὶ τὸ ἄρμαν καὶ ὅπως ὅτι πρὸ
ὁσίον ὁμίοις πάσης ἐπικρίνει ἄλληλον εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ

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[temporary] dispositions, qualities. And then a warm
man would not be a man who is getting warm, and a
sick man not a man on the way to sickness.

20. But one must see if there is not to every
quality another contrary one; since in the case of
virtue and vice even the mean appears to be contrary
to the extremes. But in the case of colours [he1 says
that] the intermediates are not so. Perhaps therefore,
because the intermediate colours are mixtures
of the extremes, we ought not to make a division of
them by opposition, but [only] by white and black,
[regarding] the others as compositions [of white and
black]. Or else we divide them by opposition because
one particular colour among the intermediates is
different [from the others] even if they can be seen as
resulting from composition. Or because the con¬
traries do not only differ, but differ as much as
possible. But it is likely that "differing as much as
possible" is only apprehended in already positing
these intermediates since if one takes away this
arrangement of intermediates, by what will one
define "as much as possible"? Or because grey is
nearer to white than black is, and we are informed of
this by sight, and it is the same with tastes and
touch-sensations, bitter, sweet, hot, cold, and what
is neither in between; but that this is how we are
accustomed to apprehend things is clear, but per¬
haps someone would not concede us this, that white
and yellow and any colour in relation to any other
are altogether different from each other, and since

1 Aristotle. Plotinus is contrasting Nicomachaen Ethics
II 5. 1106b24-28 (on virtue and vice as mean and extremes)
with e.g. Categories 8. 10b12-18 (on colours).
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they are different qualia are contrary. For their contrariety is not due to the fact that there are intermediates, but to this being different. At any rate, no intermediate intervenes between health and sickness, and they are contraries; perhaps because the results of each have the greatest possible difference. And how is it possible to say "the greatest possible" if there are not lesser differences in the intermediates? One cannot therefore say "the greatest possible" in the case of health and sickness. So contrariety is to be determined by something else, not by the "as much as possible". But if it is determined by the "much", if "much" is said instead of "more" compared with "less", again the contraries without intermediates will get away; but if it means simply "much", when it is agreed that there is much distance between each and every thing, one cannot measure the distance by the "more". But we must investigate how there is contrariety. Is it, then, that things which have some likeness—T do not mean likeness according to genus, nor at all that which results from the mixture of something like other forms of them—either greater or lesser, are not contraries, but those are contraries which have nothing the same in their specific form? And one must add: in the genus of quality. For then also the contraries which have no intermediates [will be contrary], those which have nothing tending to likeness, as there are no others which so to speak face both ways and have a likeness to each other—but of some of them only some intermediates do not have a likeness. If this is so those among colours which have something in common will not be contraries. But there will be nothing to prevent, not
every colour being contrary to every colour, but one colour to another. And the same will apply to tastes. And let that be the end of this discussion. But as for the "more" it appeared that it is in the participants, but there was a difficulty about health and justice. Certainly if each of these has the breadth for it, the permanent states themselves must be granted to have it. But there in the intelligible each is the whole and does not have a "more".

21. About movement, whether one should posit it as a genus, one might look at it in this way: first, whether it would not be appropriate to refer it to another genus, and then whether nothing higher than it could be predicated of it in its essence, and then whether by receiving many differentiations it will make species. To what genus will one refer it? For it is neither substance or quality of the things which have it; one will certainly not refer it to active doing and making—for there are certainly many movements in passivity—nor to passivity because many movements are active doings and makings: but one should rather refer activities and passivities to this [genus of movement]. Nor again could it be correctly referred to relation, because movement is movement of something and not on its own. In this way the qualitative would be in the category of relation, for quality is quality of something and in something; and the same will apply to the quantitative. But if it is because these are something particular, even if in so far as they exist they are of something else, that one is called quality and the other quantity, in the same way, since, even if movement is movement of something, it is something before it is of something, we should grasp what it is.
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on its own. In general, one should posit as relative not what first is, and then is of something else, but what the relationship generates without there being anything else beside the relationship in virtue of which it gets its name, for instance the double, in so far as it is called double, has its origin and its existence in the comparison with the single cubit-length, and, without anything before this entering the mind, is called and is double in being compared with something else. What then [in the case of movement] is this, which, though it is of something, is something in order to be of something, like the qualitative and the quantitative and substance? Now first we must understand that nothing prior to it is predicated of it as its genus. But if someone were to say1 that change is prior to motion, first of all he is either speaking of the same thing, or, if he is calling change a genus, he will be making another genus besides those previously mentioned; then it is clear that he will set movement among the species [of change] and set some other kind [of change] against movement, perhaps coming-to-be, saying that it also is a change, but not a movement. Why then is not coming-to-be a movement? If it is because what is coming into being does not yet exist, but movement has nothing to do with the non-existent, coming-to-be obviously could not be change either. But if it is because coming-to-be is nothing but a change of quality and an increase of quantity, because coming-to-be takes place when certain things are changed and increased, he is thinking

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1 Aristotle, Physics E 1. 225a34-b3; the discussion of Aristotle continues through the rest of the chapter.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

about what is prior to coming-to-be. But one must consider coming-to-be in these things here to be a different species. For having come to be and becoming do not consist in being passively changed, like being heated or whitened—for it is possible when these changes occur that coming-to-be in the absolute sense has not yet occurred, but only coming to be something, that is, this very change we are talking about—but when an animal or a plant acquires a specific form. But someone might say that it is more appropriate to make change a species than movement, because change intends to signify one thing instead of another, but the range of meaning of movement includes transition which does not take a thing out of its proper nature, such as local movement. But if this is not what one intends, it must be learning and playing the lyre, or in general movement which comes from a state. So change would be rather a species of movement, being a movement which takes a thing out of itself.

22. But let us grant that the idea of change is the same [as that of movement] in that "different" is a consequence of movement. What, then, are we to say that movement is? Let us grant that movement, to describe it sketchily, is the passage from potentiality to that which it is said to be the potentiality of. For one thing is potential because it can arrive at a particular form, potentially a statue for instance, and another because it can arrive at an activity, the activity of walking for instance, and when one progresses to a statue, its progress is movement, and when the other is engaged in walking, the walking itself is movement; and, with someone who is a potential dancer, his dancing whenever he dances is

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movement. And in one kind of movement, that to the statue, another form is acquired which the movement has made, but the other kind, dancing, as being a simple form of the potentiality, has nothing after it when the movement has stopped. So that it would not be inappropriate if one were to say that movement is a form awake, opposed to the other forms which are static, in that they abide but it does not, and is a cause to other forms, when something comes to be after it. But if someone were to say that this movement which we are now discussing is the life of bodies, one must give it the same name as the movements of Intellect and Soul. But one could be confident that movement is a genus no less because it is difficult, or even impossible, to comprehend it in a definition. But how can it be a form, in cases when the movement is to the worse, or in general passive? It is like when heating, the heating from the sun, makes some things grow and takes others the opposite way, and it is the same for both, but the apparent difference is in the subjects. Is it the same as becoming healthy or sick? Yes, in so far as they are movements it is the same; but in what will the difference lie? Will it be in the subjects, or in something else? But we will discuss this later, when we consider change. But now we must investigate what is the same in all movement: for in this way it could be a genus. Or perhaps it might be used in many senses, and be a genus in the way that being is. And [we must investigate] as well the difficulty that perhaps all the movements which lead to what is according to nature or are active in what is according to nature must be like species-forms, as has been said, but those which lead to what is against nature
35 ἀγωγαν. ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπί τις ἀλλωσώσως καὶ ἀδύνατος καὶ γενόμενος καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπὶ τῆς κάτω τῶν μεταβολῆς, καθὼς κυρίως ἀπασί πάσαι; ἢ τῷ μὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐκαστίον, ἐν ὑποτέρνῃ ἐν, ἐν ἡμερήσιαν μὴ ἐν ἡμερήσιαν παντελεῖ, ἀλλὰ καθόσιν κύριαν πάρασιν, αἱ πρὸς ἀλλο τῆς ἁγωγῆς ἑκεῖν, καὶ τὸ ἐτέρου ὅπερ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένεις ἀπόλλυσιν γὰρ τὴν κύριαν, ὅταν μὴ ἀλλὰ διὰ καὶ ἐφαρμογής ὡς ἐν τῷ γεγονόναι καὶ μένειν ἐν τῷ ἐτέρῳ, ἀλλὰ ἔκει ἐτέρῳ ἐκεῖν καὶ ἡ χρόνος ἐτέρου ἐκεῖ, δυστύχησι κύριαν αὐτὸν ποιεῖ μεμεταμορφώθη γὰρ κύριας αἱ μόνωσαι: αὐθεν ἢν αὐτῇ ὡς ἐπὶ θερμήνης ἀγωγόνος. κοινὸν ἄν πάσα τὸ ἐκ δυνάμεως καὶ τῶν δυνατῶν εἰς ἐνεργείαν πρόσδοκών καὶ ἁγωγήν εἶναι πάν γὰρ τὸ κύνημεν καὶ ἐκτός ὑπολογίαν κύριαν, προστάρχον δύναμεν τῶν ποιεῖν ἤ πάσχειν ἐν τῷ κυστίθηται γίγνεται.

23. Καὶ ἂν ἤ κύριας ἢ περὶ τὰ αἰσθήματα παρ' ἄλλου ἐνεργείας σέμενα καὶ ἔλαΐνουσα καὶ ἐγέρόμενα καὶ ἐναϊνόσα τὰ μετελαμβάνεται αὐτῇ, ὡστε μὴ εἰκονίζεται μοῦ ἐν τούτῳ ἐκεῖν, ὡς ἐν τῇ μή ἡμερήσια καὶ οἷον ἡ πολυπραγμονής τῶν ἐκτὸς ἐκείνων ὀνομάζεται ἡμίθεος. δεῖ δὲ οὐ τὰ κυνήματα τὴν κύριαν εἰναι νομίζεται οὐ γὰρ οἱ πάθεις ἢ βαῖδαις, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ τῶν πάθων ἐνεργείας ἡ δυνάμεως ἀποκαλεῖς τοὺς.

1 Igal, H-S': in Enn.

36 In spite of the sharp contrast implied between the sense-world and the intelligible world, the function of κύριας here below is described here in terms remarkably like those in which the functions of ἐπιστήμης καὶ κύριας in the intelligible world are described in VII. 7. 13. 11-16. And for Plotinus the function of movement and time in this world here below is positive. Such substantial existence

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must be considered in the same way as what they lead to. But what is the common element in change of quality and quantity and coming-to-be and the opposites of these, and in change of place, in so far as these are all movements? It is that each thing is not in the same in which it formerly was, and is not at rest or in total quiet, but, in so far as movement is present, is always being led away to something else and its being other is not abiding in the same; for movement persists when there is no other; for this reason otherwise is not in the having come to be in and remaining in another [state], but perpetual otherwise. So time is always another, because motion makes time; for it is measured movement which does not stay still; for it runs along with movement, as if riding on it as it goes. But common to all is being a progress and a leading from potentiality and the possible to active actuality; for everything that is moved according to any kind of movement has the pre-existing potentiality to do this when it comes into motion.

23. And the movement which is in sense-objects comes in from another and shakes and drives and wakes and pushes the things which have a share in it, so that they do not sleep and are not in sameness, in order that they may be held together by this inquietude and this sort of fussiness which is an image of life. But one must not think that the things which are being moved are movement; for walking is not the feet but the activity in the feet which comes from their potentiality. But since the potentiality is and coherence as the things here below have depend here on their being in motion and in III. 7.4. 19-29 on their being in time.
invisible, it is necessary to look only at the active feet, not simply the feet, as if they were at rest, but the feet already with something else; this is invisible, but because it is with something else, it is seen incidentally by looking at the feet occupying one place and then another and not staying still, but one sees the alteration from that which is altered, because its quality is not the same. In what, then, is the movement, when it moves something else, and indeed when it passes to actuality from an immanent potentiality? Is it in the mover? Then how will that which is moved and affected participate in it? But is it in that which is moved? Why then does it not stay when it has come? Now, it must not be separated from its producer nor in it, but from it and to that which is moved, and not be in that as cut off, but it comes from that and goes to that other, as a breath of wind goes to another. When, therefore, the potentiality of moving is a walking potentiality, it pushes, so to speak, and produces a continual change of place, but when it is a heating potentiality, it heats; and when the potentiality takes matter and builds it into a nature, it is growth, but when another potentiality takes away, it is diminution when that which has the potentiality of experiencing taking away is diminished; and when the generative nature is active, there is coming-to-be, but when this is impotent and that which has the potentiality of making things pass away is dominant, there is passing-away; not that which occurs in what has already come to be, but in that which is on the way; and becoming healthy works the same way, when that which has the potentiality of producing health is active (but the opposite potentiality produces the opposite re-
24. But about local motion, if moving upwards is contrary to moving downwards, and moving in a circle differs from moving in a straight line, how are we to differentiate, for instance, throwing something over the head and under the feet? For the pushful potentiality is one; unless someone says that the push upwards is different, and the push downwards is different and works differently in comparison with the movement upwards, especially if the movement is natural, if one is levity and one is gravity. But moving to one’s own place is common and the same for both, so that it is likely that here the differentiation is according to externals. But as for movement in a circle and in a straight line, if running around in a circle is the same sort [of running] as in a straight line, how is it different? It is according to the shape of the course, unless someone says that movement in a circle is mixed, because it is not entirely movement and does not altogether go out of its place. But in general it seems that local movement is one movement taking its differentiations by externals.

25. But we must investigate how it is with composition and dissolution. Are these different movements from those already mentioned, coming-to-be and passing-away, growth and diminution, change of place, and qualitative alteration, or are they to be referred to these, or are some of these to be con-
5 and, moreover, it is also the case that composition is a matter of the approach of one thing to another and coming close, and on the other side of going away back, one could say that they are local movements, saying that two things are moving to one or going away from each other. But if they mean to signify a composition and a mixture, and a coming together into a unity from another unity, which occurs in the actual coming together, not as a result of having come together, to which of the movements already mentioned is one to refer these? Certainly local movement will make the beginning, but what follows upon it will be something else, as one would find that local movement makes the beginning of growth, but quantitative movement follows upon it; so here too local movement takes the lead, but being composed, or again dissolved, does not necessarily follow, but when the parts which meet become interwoven there is composition, and when they are split apart there is dissolution. But often local motion even follows on dissolution or is simultaneous with it, the way what is in process of dissolution is affected being thought of differently, and not as local motion; and in composition another affection, that is a coming together, is thought of, and something else follows, local motion. Should then these be thought of by themselves, and [qualitative change be referred to them? For when a thing becomes dense it is changed; but this is the same as "it is composed [or compacted]"; but again when it becomes rarefied it is changed; but this is the same as "it is dissolved [or its texture is loosened]". And when wine and water are mixed something else comes into existence different from...
what each of them was previously: and this is composition, which has produced change. Now here too we must assert that compositions and dissolutions take the lead in some changes, but these changes themselves are different from compositions and dissolutions; nor are the other changes of this kind, and rarification and condensation are not composition and dissolution and do not in any way result from them; for if they did one would even have to admit the existence of void.  But how about blackness or whiteness? But if one raises a doubt about these, first of all he abhors colours and perhaps qualities, or at any rate most of them—but rather all of them; for if he says that all change, which we say is "alteration in quality", is composition and dissolution, the result is in no way quality but parts close set or widely spaced. Then how are learning and being taught compositions?

26. We should certainly consider these matters, and now we have to enquire again about what are described as specific kinds of movement, for instance in the case of local movement, if it is not to be distinguished by up and down and straight and circular, as the problem was stated, or by the movement of living and non-living things—their movement is not alike—and again these [movements of living things] by walking and swimming and flying. Or one might distinguish movements in each species by whether they are natural or unnatural. But this would mean that the differentiations of movements do not come from outside; now the movements themselves produce these differentiations and

Footnotes:
1 This is a reductio ad absurdum. For all ancient philosophers except Atomists and Epicureans, the existence of void was the ultimate physical absurdity.
2 In ch. 24, 1-11.
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could not be without them, and nature appears to be the principle of them. Or [one might distinguish movements] as some natural, some artificial, and some deliberate. Natural would be growths and diminutions, artificial building houses and ships, deliberate inspecting, learning, engaging in politics, and in general speaking and acting. And with growth and change and coming-to-be [one can distinguish] by natural and unnatural or in general by the subjects.

27. But what should one say about rest, the genus which is opposed to motion, or stillness? Should it be posited as itself one genus, or referred to some genus of those already mentioned? But perhaps it would be better to allot rest to the intelligibles there, and to look for stillness here below. We must, therefore, first enquire what this stillness is. And if it should appear that it is the same as rest, it would not be correct to look for it here below, where nothing stands still, but that which seems to stand still is in more leisurely movement. But if we are going to say that stillness is something different from rest, because it applies to what is absolutely unmoved, but rest to what has come to a standstill, but is naturally in movement, when it is not moving, then if one is going to say that being still is becoming still, [one is saying] that it is motion which has not yet come to a stop, but is pausing; but if [one means] that it is a stillness which does not apply to what is in movement, one must enquire first if there is anything here below which is not in movement. But if it is not possible to move with all the movements, but there must be some ways in which there is no movement if it is to be possible to say that what is
moving is this particular thing, what else should one
say about that which is not in local movement but is
still as regards this movement, except that it is not
moving? So stillness will be a negation of movement;
and that means, not among the genera. But a thing is
still only in regard to this movement, local move-
ment for instance: stillness therefore means only the
taking away of this. But if someone were to say
"Why are we not going to maintain that movement
is a negation of rest?" we shall reply that movement
comes bringing something with it, and is something
else active and in a way pushing what is subjected to
it and doing innumerable things to it and destroying
it; but the stillness of each thing is nothing besides
the thing, but only indicates that it does not have
movement. Why then do we not say that rest is the
negation of movement also among the intelligibles?
This is because it is impossible to say that rest is the
abolition of movement because it does not exist
when movement has stopped, but when movement
exists rest also exists. And rest there in the intelli-
gible does not consist in the fact that something
which is naturally adapted to move is not moving,
but in so far as rest has a hold on it, it stands still,
but in so far as it is in motion it will always be
moving: therefore it stands still by rest and moves by
movement. But here below it moves by movement,
but when movement is not there it stays still because
it is deprived of the movement which it ought to
have. Further, we ought to see what this rest here
below is in the following way: when one goes from
sickness to health, one is becoming healthy; so what
form of standstill shall we oppose to this process of
becoming healthy? For if it is that from which it
starts, this is sickness, not rest; but if it is that to which it is directed, this is health; and this is not the same as rest. But if someone is going to say that health or sickness is a particular kind of rest, he will be asserting that health and sickness are species of rest, which is absurd. But if rest is incidental to health, will health before rest not be health? But everyone may think as he likes about these questions.

28. It has been said that active doing and making and passive experience are to be called movements, and one can say that some movements are absolute, some actions, and some experiences. And it has been said about the other so-called genera that they are to be referred to these. And about relation, that it is a disposition of one thing in relation to another, and that they enter into it both together and simultaneously; and there is relation when a disposition of a substance produces it; the substance will not be relative as substance, except in so far as it is a part of something—hand or head for instance—or a cause or a principle or an element. It is also possible to divide relation, as the ancients divided it,1 distinguishing some relations as productive, some as measures, some consisting in excess and deficiency, some in general separating things by likenesses and differences. And so much for these genera.

1 Plotinus seems to have Aristotle *Metaphysics* A 15, 1020b26-31 in mind.
VI. 4-5. ON THE PRESENCE OF BEING, ONE AND THE SAME, EVERYWHERE AS A WHOLE

Introductory Note

This work, the first written by Plotinus after Porphyry joined him (Life ch. 5), was divided by Porphyry into two Ennead treatises (22 and 23 in the chronological order) at a point where Plotinus himself makes a break and a new start. In VI. 4 the discussion of the omnipresence of real being starts from man's experience of his soul in body. In VI. 5 it starts again from man's common awareness of the presence of God. There is, perhaps, no work in the Enneads which is more necessary to understand if we are really to grasp Plotinus' thought, and all Neoplatonically influenced thought about the nature and presence of spiritual being, in all its depth and breadth. Its influence, direct and indirect, has been very great. Plotinus explains in it, more fully and forcibly than elsewhere, what it means to be incorporeal and how an incorporeal divine being which is fullness of life and thought and power must be present immediately and as a whole in and to everyone and everywhere here below, at every point in space-time diffusion and dispersion. Because of his concentration on this main theme Plotinus does not make much in this work of the distinctions between the divine hypostases, Soul, Intellect and the One or Good. The boundary between Soul and Intellect is often not very well-defined in the Enneads, but it is unusual for so little stress to be laid on the transcendence of the One or Good. The transcendent Good is, however, by no means absent from the work, as a careful reading together of 4, ch. 11 and 5, chs. 1 and 4 will show.

The presence of being everywhere

The unity of the divine, the immediate presence of the higher in the lower, the unbroken continuity of the divine life from its source to its last diffusion (cp. V 2[11] 2, 24-29) were always essential parts of the thought of Plotinus. This was the core of his thought which Porphyry developed. Iamblichus and his successors, though still maintaining the continuity of divine life and the presence of the higher in the lower, were more inclined to sharpen and harden distinctions and transcendence.

The stress on the unity and omnipresence of spiritual being leads to strong statements of a doctrine which Plotinus always maintains, that of the unity of all souls (especially 4, chs. 4 and 14). It also leads to a powerful critique of emanation-images (4, ch. 7, prepared for by the critique of the common idea of "presence by powers" in ch. 3) which makes it clear that for Plotinus emanation was an inadequate, though necessary, metaphor. The immediacy of the presence of the spiritual or intelligible to the world of sense, and the total dependence of the latter on this presence for such quasi-reality as it has, are well brought out by the important distinction made in 4, ch. 10 between natural images, shadows or reflections, and artificial images, statues or pictures.

The ultimate object of the work, as so often with Plotinus, is not just to solve problems or expound a doctrine but to move its readers to seek liberation or salvation; and in some chapters as powerful as anything in the Enneads (4, 14-15; 5, 12) he shows what liberation and salvation means for him: deliverance from the limitations of our petty, empirical ego, the "other man" who has added himself to us, and return to that unity in diversity of the divine All which, at the deepest level, we always are.
THE PRESENCE OF BEING EVERYWHERE

Synopsis

VI. 4

The omnipresence of soul: because it is not a body, it is present as a whole everywhere in body (ch. 1). The really existent, intelligible universe is not in anything else, but in itself: its image, the sensible universe, is in the intelligible (ch. 2). Is the intelligible universe only present by its powers? No, where its powers are, it is itself immediately present as a whole, though not in place (ch. 3). The many beings, intellects and souls of which Plato speaks are all one together in the unity of Intellect-Being or of Soul (ch. 4). The greatness of Being is not a matter of material bulk (ch. 5). How many bodies come to and share in the one soul (ch. 6). The unity of immaterial power; critique of emanation-imagery (ch. 7). The participation of the sensible in the intelligible involves no division of the intelligible: it is present to each and every participant as a whole (chs. 8–10). The sense-world is a natural, not an artificial, image of the intelligible (chs. 9–10). Participation according to the capacity of the participant (ch. 11). How many ears or eyes or seers, soul does not "come" to body, but body to soul (ch. 12). The extended participates in the unextended (ch. 13). The unity-in-diversity of Intellect and Soul: but who are we? The "other man" who came and attached himself to our true original self, which was and is in the intelligible unity-in-diversity (ch. 14). What approaches is living body, already with a share in soul; our higher and lower self like the Senate and the mob (ch. 15). The "descent" of soul as self limitation and particularisation; its liberation is return to the whole and separation from its image (ch. 16).
VI. 4. (22) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΤΟ ΟΝ ΕΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΑΥΤΟΝ ΟΝ ΑΜΑ ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΥ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΟΛΟΝ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ

1. Αρά γε ἡ ψυχὴ πανταχοῦ τῷ παντὶ πάρεστιν, ὅτι σῶμα ἐστὶ τοῦ παντὸς τοσόνιος, περὶ τὰ σῶματα φύσιν ἔχουσα μερίζεσθαι; ἢ καὶ παρ' αὐτῆς πανταχοῦ ἔστιν, οὐκ οὖσαν ἀν υπὸ σῶματος προαχθῆ, ἀλλὰ σῶματος εὑρίσκοντος αὐτὴν πρὸ αὐτοῦ πανταχοῦ οὖσαν, ὡστε, ὅπου ἐν τεθῇ, ἐκεί εὑρίσκειν ψυχὴν οὖσαν πρὶν αὐτὸ τεθῇ ἐν μέρει τοῦ παντὸς, καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα τεθῆναι ἐν ψυχῇ οὖσῃ; ἀλλ’ εἰ ἔστων εἰς τοσοῦτον πρὶν τὸ τοσόνιο σῶμα ἐλθεῖν πληρώσα τὸ διάστημα πάν, πῶς οὐ μέγεθος ἔξει; ἢ τὰς τρόπους ἧν ἐν τῶν εἴη τοῦ εἴη ἐν τῷ παντὶ πρὶν τὸ πάν γενέσθαι τοῦ παντὸς οἷν οὕντος; τὸ τὰς ἀμερὰς λεγομέναν τὰς ἀμερέθθης εἴην πανταχοῦ εἶναι μέγεθος οὐκ ἔχουσα πῶς ἐν τοῖς παραδεξιοῖς; καὶ εἰ τῶς σῶματα λέγοντο συνεκτείνεσθαι μὴ σομαί οὖσα, οὐδ’ ὡσ τὸν ἐξεφύγην ποιεῖ τὴν ἀπορίαν τῷ κατὰ συμβεβηκός τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῆς διδώναι. ὡμοίως γὰρ ἐν τῖς καὶ ἑνώθη ἔστιν εἰδώλους, ὅπως κατὰ συμβεβηκός μεγεθύνεται. οὐ γὰρ δὴ, ὡσπερ ἡ ποιήτης,
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in the same way as quality, sweetness or colour for instance. For these are affections of body, so that the whole of what is affected has the affection, and this is nothing of itself since it is something belonging to a body and known as such when the body is affected; for this reason it is necessarily of a certain size, and the white of one part is not co-affected with the white of another. And with white, the white in one part is the same in form as the white in another, but not the same in number, but with soul, the soul in the foot and the soul in the hand is the same thing in number, as perceptions show. And in general, in qualities the same thing is seen divided into parts, but in soul the same thing is seen not divided into parts, but said to be divided in the sense that it is everywhere. Let us therefore speak about this from the beginning, to see if anything occurs to us which is clear and acceptable about how soul, which is incorporeal and sizeless, is able to reach the greatest extension either before bodies or in bodies. But perhaps if it appeared that it could do this also before bodies, it would become easier to accept that the same sort of thing happens in bodies.

2. There exist certainly both the true All and the representation of the All, the nature of this visible universe. The really existent All is in nothing: for there is nothing before it. But that which comes after it must necessarily then exist in the All, if it is going to exist at all, being as much as possible dependent on it and unable either to stay still or move without it. For even if one does not suppose this kind of being in to be like being in place (considering place as the boundary or the surrounding body in so far as it surrounds, or as

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1 Sleeman, Harder, Theiler: ἀλλο Ἐνν.
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Plotinus is working here with Aristotle's account of place: cp. Physics A 4. 212a5–11.

Plotinus is possibly thinking here of Parmenides fr. B 8 23–24 DK.
The idea of presence by power was widespread at the beginning of our era; cp. Pseudo-Aristotle On The Cosmos 6. 397b-398a. For souls as rays of light cp. Plutarch On the Face which Appears in the Orb of the Moon 28, 943D; Hermetica XII 1.
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thing [only], because they do not preserve the whole nature which exists in that true All itself, there a power of it is present to that to which [the true All] is present, though it is not true even so that that is not altogether present, since then too it is not cut off from its power which it gave to that recipient; but the receiver was able to receive only so much, though all was present. But where all the powers are, itself is clearly present, though being all the same separate; for if it became the form of this particular thing it would have departed from being all and being everywhere in itself while belonging incidentally to another. But it belongs to no thing which wishes to belong to it, but, as far as it can, approaches whatever it itself wishes, not by its coming to belong to that, nor again to anything else, but by the desire of that for it. There is nothing, therefore, surprising in its being in all things in this way, because it is also in none of them in such a way as to belong to them. For this reason it is not perhaps inappropriate to say that the soul as well runs along incidentally with the body in this way, if it is said to be itself on its own, not belonging to matter or body, but all body over the whole of itself is in a way illuminated by it. But one should not be surprised if [the true All] itself, which is not in place, is present to everything which is in place; it would on the other hand be surprising, and impossible as well as surprising, if it had itself its own proper place and was present to another thing which was in place, or was present at all, and present in the way in which we say it is. But now the argument says that it is necessary for it, since it has not been allotted a place, to be present as a whole to that to which it is
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present, and to be present as a whole to an all as well as to each individual. Otherwise some of it will be here, and some elsewhere; so that it will be divisible into parts and will be body. For how indeed are you going to divide it? Will you divide its life? But if the whole was life, the part will not be life. But [will you divide] its intellect, so that one intellect is in one thing and one in another? But neither of them will be intellect. But [will you divide] its being? But the part will not be being, if the whole was being. What then, if someone were to say that the body when it is divided has parts which are bodies? Now the division was not of a body, but of a body of such a size, and each [division] was said to be a body by the form according to which it is body; but this did not have a particular quantity, but was not in any way quantitative.

4. How then [does Plato speak of] being and beings, and many intellects and many souls, if being is everywhere one and not only in the sense of specific unity, and intellect is one and soul is one? And [he does say] that the soul of the All is different from the other souls. This seems to be contrary evidence, and what we have said, even if it has a certain [logical] necessity, is not convincing, since the soul thinks it unconvincing that the one should be everywhere present in this way. Perhaps it would be better to divide the whole in such a way that that from which the division originates is in no way diminished, or, to put it better, to generate from it, and so to allow one thing, the soul of the All, to be derived from it, and the ones which have come to be like parts, souls, then to fill up the number of all things. But if that being remains on its own, because
it seems contradictory that a whole should be simultaneously present everywhere, the same argument will apply to the souls. For they will not be in the bodies in which they are said to be as wholes in wholes, but they will either be divided or, if they remain wholes, will be somewhere in the body and give it their power. And the same difficulty of the whole everywhere will arise with them and with their powers. And further, some one part of the body will have soul, and another only power. But how are there many souls and many intellects, and being and beings? And furthermore, since they come forth from what is before them as numbers, not as magnitudes, they will cause a difficulty in a similar way about how they fill the All. So, therefore, we have discovered nothing from a multiplicity proceeding in this way which helps to a solution; since we shall agree that being also is many things by difference, not by place. For being is all together one, even if it is many things in this way; for "being borders on being" and "all is together", and intellect is many by difference, not by place, and all together. Are souls then also? Yes, souls also; since "what is divided in the sphere of bodies" means that it is naturally partless, but, since the bodies have magnitude, and this nature of soul is present to them (or rather the bodies come to be there in it), in so far as they are divided into parts, that nature being imagined present in every part, in this way it was considered to be divided in the sphere of bodies. For because it is not divided up along with the parts, but is everywhere in the body, it makes clear the unity and the true indivisibility of the nature. The soul's being one, then, does not do away with the many
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5. And its greatness is to be understood in this way, not as consisting in bulk; for bulk is a little thing, going to nothing if one takes away from it. But there in the true All it is not possible to take away; and if you do take away, it will not fail. If then it will not fail, why should one be afraid that it may depart from anything? For how will it depart when it does not fail, but is a nature which springs up for ever and does not flow? For if it flowed, it would reach as far as it was able to flow, but as it does not flow - for it could not, and has nowhere it could flow to; for it has taken hold of the All, or rather is itself the All - and is something greater than accords with the nature of the body, it would reasonably be considered to give little of itself to the [perceptible] All, only as much of itself as this is able to bear. But
we must not say that this is less, nor, because we assume that it is less in bulk, lose confidence at this stage because it is impossible for the less to extend to what is greater than itself. For "less" should not be predicated of it, nor should one set bulk and the bulkless side by side by measuring them - this would be like saying that the physician's art was less than the body of the physician - nor on the other side should one think that [the true All] is greater in the sense of quantitative measurement, since this does not apply to the soul either: this is how the great and small of body is. But there is evidence of the greatness of soul in the fact that when the bulk becomes greater the same soul reaches to the whole of it which was in the lesser bulk. For it would be ridiculous in many ways if one added bulk to soul as well.

6. Why then does it not also come to another body? It is because that body must approach the soul, if it can, but the one which has approached it and received it has it. Well then, does the other body have the same soul when it itself has the soul which it has? For what is the difference? It lies in the additions. And then, how does it come to pass that it is the same soul in foot and hand, but that the soul in this part of the universe is not the same as the soul in that? But if the perceptions are different, the occurrent experiences must also be said to be different. But then it is what is judged which is different, not what judges; but he who judges is the same judge in a variety of different experiences; yet it is not he who has the experiences, but the nature of a body appropriately qualified; it is as if he judges the pleasure in our finger and the pain in our head. Why then does not one soul share in the perception of what another
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15 κρίσις εστίν, ἀλλ' οὐ πάθος. εἶτα οὖν ἀυτή ἡ κρίσις ἡ κρίσις τῆς ἱστορίας λέγει, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη μόνον ἐπεὶ ἐκείνη ἐποχ' ἡ ἡμέρα τῆς ἱστορίας λέγει, καθάπερ ἐκείνη ἢμερον, ἀλλ' ἡ λογισμὸς ἢταν ἄμφοτερον τοῦτο ὅτι ἐκείνη ἢμερον. πολλαχῇ δὲ καὶ ἡ λογισμὸς εἰδή τὸ ῥητὰ ἐπὶ κρίσιν καὶ σύνεσιν ἔσχεν ἕτερον πάθος. εἶδον δὲ περὶ τούτου καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις.

7. Ἀλλ' πάλιν λέγωμεν πῶς ἐπὶ πάντα ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτό τοῦτο δὲ ταῦτα ἔστιν τῶν ἔκαστων τῶν πολλῶν τῶν αἰδρείας, ὅπως ἀλμαν τὸ ἀυτὸ πολλάκις κείμενον. οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνον ἐρμακάς ἐχει ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων μερίζειν εἰς τὰ πολλά, ἀλλ' τὰ πολλὰ μερίζεσθαι εἰς τὸ ἐν μόνον αὐτόν, καθότι ὁ λόγος ἀλλοιών ἔλημιν πρὸς ταῦτα, ἀλλ' ταῦτα ἤταν διαδρομῆς παραγεγραμμένα δοξαὶ ἤμιν κατὰ ταῦτα καθένα νομίζω τὸ διελθέσθαι, οἷον εἰ τις τὸ κρατεῖ καὶ συνεχόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῇ κρατοῦμένῳ διαμορφώθηκεν.

10 κατὸς κρατεῖ δὲ καὶ χείρ σώμα ὅλον καὶ ἐνόλον πολυστίχον καὶ ἀλλ' τι, καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν μὲν τὸ κρατεῖν, ὡς διελθέσθαι τὸ ἐν μόνον εἰς τὰ κρατοῦμένα ἐν τῇ χειρὶ, καθότι ἐξάπτεται εἰς τὸ ὅπου ἐπιμερισμένης, ὡς δοκεῖ, τῆς διοικείσθαι, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως τῆς χειρὸς διαμαρτύρεται τῇ αὐτῇ ποιήσῃ, ποὺ ποὺ τὸ ποιομένου καὶ κρατοῦμένου σώματος, καὶ εἰ προσαθεὶς δὲ τῷ κρατοῦμένῳ σώματι μέγιστο ἄλλο καὶ δύναται καὶ χείρ φέρειν, ἡ δύναμις κάθεν κρατεῖ ὡς διαλυθείσης εἰς τοσοῦτον μέρη, ὥστε τὰ σώματα ἕχει. τί οὖν, εἰ τις τὸν ὅγκον τοῦ σωματικοῦ τῆς χειρὸς υποθέτει αὐθεντήθηκαί.

1 The reference is possibly to IV. 9.2-3 (on the unity of individual souls); IV. 7.6 7 deals with the unity of soul in the diversity of sense-experiences.

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judges? It is because it is a judgement, not an experience. And further, the soul itself which has made a judgement does not say "I have judged", but only judges; since not even in us does our sight say this to our hearing, though both have judged, but the reason over both. But the reason often sees the judgement in another and acquires an understanding of the other's experience. But we have also spoken of this elsewhere.1

7. But again let us ask how it is the same which is over all; but this is the same as asking how each and every one of the many perceptible things, though in many different places, is not without a share in the same. For, from what has been said, it is not correct to divide that same up into the many, but rather to bring back the divided many to the one, and that one has not come to these many, but those because they are scattered have given us the impression that also that has been taken apart, as if one were to divide what controls and holds together into parts equal to what is controlled. And yet a hand might control a whole body and a piece of wood many cubits long, or something else, and what controls extends to the whole, but is not all the same divided into parts equal to what is controlled in the hand; the bounds of the power, it appears, extend as far as the grip, but all the same the hand is limited in extent by its own quantity, not by that of the body it lifts and controls. And if you were to add another length to the body which is controlled and the hand was able to bear it, the power would control that too without being divided into as many parts as the body has. Well then, what if someone supposed the corporeal bulk of the hand to be taken away, but left the same
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power which also before held up what was formerly in the hand? Would not the same power, being without parts, be present in the same way in it all, in every part? And suppose you made a small luminous bulk a kind of centre, and put a larger transparent spherical body round it, so that the light of what was inside shone in the whole of what was round it, and no ray of light from anywhere else came to the outside bulk, shall we not affirm that what is inside has not itself been affected but has reached the whole of the outer bulk while remaining as it is, and that the light seen in the small bulk has taken possession of that outside? Now, since the light does not come from that small bodily bulk — for it is not in that it is body that it has the light, but in that it is luminous body, by another power which is not bodily — suppose that someone took away the bulk of the body but kept the power of the light, would you still say that the light was somewhere, or would it be equally present over the whole outer sphere? You will no longer rest in your thought on the place where it was before, and you will not any more say where it comes from or where it is going, but you will be puzzled and put in amazement when, fixing your gaze now here and now there in the spherical body, you yourself perceive the light. For with the sun also you can say whence the light shines over all the air by looking at the body of the sun, but none the less you see the same light everywhere, and this light is not divided into parts either. And the cuttings-off of light make this clear; they do not allow it to be on the other side of them from that whence it came, but

On the incorporeality of light cp. II. 1.7. 20-8; IV. 5.6-7.
they do not divide it either. And certainly, then, if
the sun was only a power which was without a body,
and gave light, the light would not have begun from
there [where the sun was] and you would not be able
to say whence it came, but it would be everywhere as
one and the same; it would have no beginning and no
starting-point anywhere.

8. Since light, then, belongs to a body you are able
to say whence it came because you can say where the
body is; but if there is something which is im¬
material, and has no need whatever of body because
it is naturally prior to body, itself set firm in itself, or
rather not in any way needing a setting of this kind,
how can you say that some of this is here and some of
it there when it has a nature of this kind and has no
point from which it started and does not come from
any place or belong to any body? For [if you could
say this] it would already have a place from which it
started and a belonging to some body. It remains,
then, to say that if anything participates in it, it
participates by the power of the whole, while it itself
is not at all affected, either in any other way or by
being divided into parts. For that which has a body
could be affected, even if only incidentally, and
could in this way be called subject to affection and
divisible into parts, since it is something like an
affection or a form of body; but that which belongs to
no body, but the body wishes to belong to it, must
necessarily itself in no way be affected by the other
bodily affections and cannot be divided into parts:
for this is an affection of body, and primarily so, and
of body in that it is body. If then the divisible is so in
that it is body, the indivisible is so in that it is not
body. For how will you divide that which has no

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they do not divide it either. And certainly, then, if
the sun was only a power which was without a body,
and gave light, the light would not have begun from
there [where the sun was] and you would not be able
to say whence it came, but it would be everywhere as
one and the same; it would have no beginning and no
starting-point anywhere.
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20 μερεῖσες οὐκ ἔχον μέγεθος; εἰ ὁν τοις ἐχος τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ ἔχον τὸ μέγεθος ἀμηχανίᾳ, μεταλαμβάνει, οὐ μερισμένον αὐτῷ ἄμα ἀριθμόν. τὸ ἐξείτι πάλιν, ὅταν ὁν ἐν πολλοῖς λέγης, οὐκ αὐτῷ πολλά γενόμενον λέγεις, ἀλλὰ τῶν πολλῶν τὸ πάθος. 25

25 περιαίστασις τῷ ἐν ἐκεῖνῳ ἐν πολλοῖς αὐτῷ ἄμα ὁμόν. τὸ δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς “οὕτως ληστένῃ ὡς οὐκ αὐτῶν γεγόμενον ἐκάστῳ οὐδ’ αὐτῷ παντὶ, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνοι μὲν αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ αὐτῷ εἶναι, αὐτὸ δὲ ἄν οὐκ ἀπολείπεσθαι ἐκατόπτῳ. οὐδ’ αὐτῷ τοσοῦτον, ὅπου τὸ πάν ἀυτήτων, οὐδ’ εἰ τι μέρος τοῦ παντός. ὅλοι γὰρ οὐδὲ τοσόν πώς ἄν οὖν τοσοῦτον; σώμαι, μὲν γὰρ τοσοῦτον”, τῷ δὲ μὴ σώμαι, ἀλλ’ ἔτερας ὅποιοι φόσαι, ὑθαρμὸν δεῖ προαπαίτης “τοσοῦτον”, ὅπου μετὰ τοσοῦτον οὐ τοιών οὐδὲ τὸ πός οὐκ τοιών οὐδὲ τὸ ἐνανθία καὶ ἐνανθία δὴν ἄν πολλακῆς ποιῶν “ποιῶν” εἰπέ. εἰ τοίῶν ὁ μερισμὸς τοῖς τόποις, ὅταν τὸ μὲν τι αὐτῷ ἄδη, τὸ δὲ ἄδη, ὅτι τὸ οὗ τι καθαράς, πώς ἄν τὸ μεριζοῦσθαι έχων; ἀμέρῳ ταῦτα ἄδη δεῖ αὐτῷ σῶμα αὐτών εἶναι, καὶ τὸ πολλὰ αὐτοῦ ἐφόμενα τυγχάνῃ, εἰ ὁν τὰ πολλὰ ἐφέτοις αὐτῷ ὅταν εἰ καὶ 30 δύναται μεταλαμβανεῖν, ὅλοι ἃν αὐτῳ καθόσον δύναται μεταλαμβάνει. δι’ οὖν τὰ μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῷ αὐτοῦ ὅποιος ἔχει αὐτό, ὡς οὐ μεταλαμβάνει, μὴ ἴδιον αὐτῶν ὅποιος εἶπεν τὸν μὲν αὐτῷ ἀποκλείειν ὅλον καὶ ἐν ὁς ὁπεῖ εἴλος ἄλλων. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἄλλων, οὐκ αὐτῷ, οὐδ’ αὖ οὖ

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298 magnitude? If then what has the magnitude in any way participates in what does not have magnitude it will participate in it without its being divided: or it will again have magnitude. Whenever then you say it is in many things, you are not saying that it has become many, but you are fitting what happens to the many to that one when you see it all at once in the many. But the “in them” must be taken in the sense that it does not come to belong to each one of them, or again to the totality, but it belongs to itself and is itself, and because it is itself does not depart from itself. Nor again is it of the same size as the perceptible All, or of any part of it; for it is altogether not quantitative: how then can it be of any size? For one attributes “of such a size” to body; but one should not in any way attach “of such a size” to what is not body but of another nature; one should not even attach “of such a kind” there; so then not “where” either; so then not “here and there” either; for that would already be “where” many times over. If then division is by places, when one part of it is here and another there, how can what has no “here” be divided? It must then be indivisible, itself with itself, even if the many aspire to and attain it. If then the many aspire to it, it is clear they aspire to it as whole; so that if they are also able to participate in it, they would participate in it as whole in so far as they can. The things therefore which participate in it must be so related to it as if they did not participate, since it is not their private property; for in this way it will remain whole itself by itself and whole in visible things. For if it is not whole, it is not itself, nor again will the partici
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40 ἐφίέναι ἡ μετάληψις ἐσται, ἀλλὰ ἄλλον, οὗ ἡ ἔφεσις ὅσο ἦν.

9. Καὶ γὰρ εἰ τὸ μέρος τὸ γενόμενον ἐστὶ ἐκάστι ὄλον ἢν καὶ αὐτὸ ἐκαστὸν οἷον τὸ πρῶτον—ἀποτελεθμένον ἢ ἐκάστα—πολλὰ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἐκαστὰ τρόπων. εἰ συνέστα τὰ πολλὰ πρῶτα τί ἐν εἴῃ τὸ διείργην, ὡστε τὰ ὑπὸ ὁμοῦ πᾶντα ἐφίέναι; οὐ γὰρ δέ τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν ὤν γὰρ τὸν σωμάτων ὅσον ἦν εἴῃ αὐτὰ, εἴπερ ὅμοια καὶ παῦτα ἐκεῖνα τὸ πρῶτον ἄφθεο. εἰ δὲ παῦται ἐκεῖνα τὰ πρῶτα μετά ἡμείς, πρῶτον μὲν οὐκέτι ὄλον ἐκαστὸν ἐστει πᾶς ἡλθὼν ἀποτελεθμένου καὶ καταλείπουσα, εἰ γὰρ ὅτι καὶ καταλείπον, δηλονότι κατέλειπον που ἦνεσται, εἰτα πάντα ἐστει εἰσὶν ἐν αὐτῷ διὰ τάδε ἐν ὁδῷ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ γεγονότι ἢ ἢν ἐν γὰρ μη μὴ εἰσίν, ἀπότομον ἐλαττωθήναι ἐκείνο καὶ ἀδυναμοί γεγονοῖ ἀπεριημένα διὰ πρότερον ἐξὶν δινόμενοι, χαρὰ τὸ τὸ ὅσον ὅσοι καὶ τὸ ὁποῖον ἐκαστὸν πῶς ἀν ὅσον τὸ ἢ ἀποτελεθμένας; εἰ δὲ ἐν ἐκεῖνῳ τὲ εἰσίν καὶ ἄλλος, ἢ ὅσον ἢ μέρη αὐτῶν ἐκαταθεῖν εἰστινα. ἀλλὰ εἰ μέρη, καὶ τὰ τὸ λοιπὰ μέρη. εἰ δὲ ὅσοι, ήττα αὕτη ἐκεῖ καὶ ἐκαταθήναι οὐκ μεμερισμένοι, καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸ ἐκαστὸ οὐ παντοκοινοί.

10 διονύσεις εἶναι τῶν ὅσον ἡμῖν σωμάτων πῶς ἄν ὅσον τὸ ἢ ἀποτελεθμένας; εἰ δὲ ἐκεῖνῳ τὸ εἰσίν καὶ ἄλλος, ή ὅσον ή μέρη αὐτῶν ἐκαταθεῖν εἰστινα. ἀλλὰ εἰ μέρη, καὶ τὰ τὸ λοιπὰ μέρη. εἰ δὲ ὅσοι, ήττα αὕτη ἐκεῖ καὶ ἐκαταθήναι οὐκ μεμερισμένοι, καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸ ἐκαστὸ οὐ παντοκοινοί.

20 οὐ μετερισμένον ἡ πολλὰ γενόμενον ὄλον ἐκαστὸν αἱ διονύσεις καὶ ὅσοι οἰκοδομεῖς, ὡστε καὶ μετά τῆς ὅσον ἐκάστη ἢ δυνάμεις; ἢ μὲν μόνον ἐσται τὰ συνώνω 300.

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vation be in what men aspire to but in something else to which the aspiration was not directed.

9. For indeed if the part which came to be in each was a whole, and each individual thing was like the first—each individual thing in a state of continual severance—then the firsts would be many and each individual would be a first. Then what would it be which kept these many firsts apart, so as not to be one thing all together? It would certainly not be their bodies; for it would not be possible for them to be forms of the bodies, assuming that these firsts are like that first from which they came. But if what are called the parts in the many things are the powers of that whole, first of all each is no longer a whole; then how did they come here when they had been cut off from and left that first? For if they really did leave it, they were obviously going somewhere when they left it. Then, are the powers which have come to be here in the perceptible world still in that first or not? For if they are not, it is absurd that it should be diminished and become powerless by being deprived of the powers which it had before; and how would it be possible for the powers to exist separate or cut off from their substances? But if they are both in that first and elsewhere, then either they will be here as wholes or parts of them will be here. But if it is parts, then the other parts will be there [in the true All]. But if they are here as wholes, then either they are here what they are there, not divided, and again there will be the same everywhere, not divided; or the powers will each be one whole thing which has become many, and will be like each other, so that each substance will have its power with it, or the power accompanying substance will only be one,
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 4.

If anything, one might say that the presence of being everywhere and the others will only be powers; and yet, just as it is not possible to have substance without power, so it is not possible to have power without substance. For power there [in the true All] is real existence and substance, or greater than substance. But if the powers from that first are other because they are less and dim, like a dim light from a brighter light, and the same is true of the substances which accompany these powers, that there may not be power without substance, first of all, even with powers of this kind it is necessary, since they are in every way of like form to each other, either to agree that there is one and the same power everywhere, or, if not everywhere, at any rate present at once as a whole in every direction, not divided, as in one and the same body (but if this is so why not in all the whole universe?). But if this is so, each power will be divided to infinity, and will no longer be a whole even for itself, but will by being divided be a powerlessness. Then if one power is in one part and one in another, there will be no room for consciousness. And then further, just as the image of something, like the weaker light, if cut off from that from which it is, would no longer exist, and in general one cannot cut off and make exist [separately] anything at all which derives its existence from something else and is its image, these powers also which came from that first could not exist cut off from it. But if this is so, that from which they derived will be there simultaneously where they are, so that again it will be present itself everywhere all at once undivided as a whole.

10. But if someone were to say that it is not necessary for the image to be dependent on anything...
Plotinus: Ennead VI. 4.

in the original – for it is possible for a likeness to exist when the original is not there from which the likeness is taken, and, when the fire has gone away, for the heat to exist in what has been heated – first of all, as regards the original and the likeness, if one is talking about the likeness made by the painter, we shall affirm that it is not the original which made the likeness but the painter, since even if some painter makes a self-portrait it is not a likeness of himself; for what made the painting was not the body of the painter or the bodily form which was represented; and it is not the painter, but this particular disposition of the colours, which should be said to make this particular likeness. This is not in the strict and proper sense the making of likeness and image as it occurs in pools and mirrors, or in shadows – here the image has its existence in the strict and proper sense from the prior original, and comes to be from it, and it is not possible for what has come to be to exist cut off from it. But they will accept that this is the way in which the weaker powers come from the prior ones. But as for what is said about fire, the heat should not be called a likeness of the fire, unless one is going to say that fire is included in heat; for if this is so [the inclusive form of heat] will produce heat without fire. And then, even if not at once, the heated body does cease to be hot and does grow cold when the fire has gone away. But if these people were going to quench these powers, first of all they will be affirming that only the One is indestructible, and will make the souls and Intellect destructible. And then they will make flow away the things which come from a substance which does not flow away.¹ Yet, if the sun were to stay fixed in any particular

¹ Vitringa: μὲν ο Ενν. 1

This must be the right sense, as Stellen saw (C.Q. 24. 1930, 78); cp. II. 6. 1. 50 and 59 (my translation there is incorrect).
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...place, it would give the same light to the same regions; but if anybody were to say, not the same light, he would confirm by this that the body of the sun was flowing away. But that the things that come from that first are indestructible, and that the souls and every intellect are immortal, has been stated at greater length elsewhere.

11. But why, if the intelligible is everywhere as a whole, do not all things participate in it as a whole? And why is there the first there, and the second as well, and after that others? Now one must suppose that what is present is present for the capacity of what is going to receive it, and that being is everywhere, where in being and does not fail short of itself, but that is present to it which is able to be present, and is present to it to the extent of its ability, not spatially; as the transparent is present to light, but the participation of the turbid is otherwise. And certainly things are first and second and third in rank and power and difference, not by their positions. For nothing prevents different things from being all together, like soul and intellect and all bodies of knowledge, major and subordinate. For the eye perceives the colour, the smell the fragrance, and other different senses different things, coming from the same body, which exist all together, but not separately. Is that first, then, variegated and many? Yes.

1 Vitringa, Müller.
itself being. For it is possible to be present while being separate. But the beings of the sense-world are present in one way to the intelligibles (those of them which are present, and to the intelligibles to which they are present), and the intelligibles to themselves in another; since also soul is present in one way to body, and a knowledge to soul, and a knowledge to another knowledge, differently, when both are in the same [mind]; and body is present to body in another way besides these.

12. Just as there is often a sound in the air, and a word in the sound, and an ear is there and receives and perceives it; and if you put another ear in the middle of the space between, the word and the sound would come also to it, or rather the ear would come to the word; and many eyes would look towards the same thing and all be filled with the sight of it (though the object of sight would be separate because one was an eye and the other an ear); in this same way that which is able to have soul will have it, and another again and yet another from the same source. But the sound was everywhere in the air and not as one sound divided into parts, but as one whole sound everywhere; and with sight, if the air has the shape by being affected, it has it not divided into parts; for wherever the sight is placed, it has the shape there. But not every way of thinking [about vision] accepts this, but let the mention of it stand, because the participation is of the same one thing. But with the sound it is clearer that the whole form is in all the air; for everyone would not have heard the same thing if the spoken word had not been in

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1 For an even more impressive version of this sound-image cp. III. 8. 6. 26-29.

2 Plotinus himself does not: see IV. 5. 6.
PLOTINUS. ENNEAD VI. 4.

"The presence of being everywhere I each and every place as a whole, and each hearing had not alike received the whole. But if even here the whole sound is not spread over the whole air, because this one part of it is joined to this one part of the air and that other divided up with that other, why should one disbelieve that one soul is not spread out and divided up with the body, but is present everywhere where it is present and is everywhere in the All without being divided? And when it comes to be in bodis, in whatever way it does come to be in them, it will be analogous to the sound already sounded in the air, but before the bodies it will be like what makes or is going to make the sound: yet even when it comes to be in a body it has not even so departed from being like the one who makes the sound and both has it and gives it. Well then, what happens with sound is not exactly the same as that for which it was taken as an example, but it has a certain likeness to it; but what happens with soul, since it belongs to the other nature, must be understood in the sense, not that one part of it is in body and another on its own, but that it is in itself as a whole and, again, is imagined as a whole in many. And again another come to get soul, and again this too has from the unseen what was also in the others. For soul was not made ready before in such a way that a part of it placed here came to this particular thing, but what was said to come was in everything in itself and is in itself, though we think it has come here. For how could it have come? If then it did not come, but was seen now present, and present not by waiting for something to come and participate in it, clearly it is both on its own and present to this thing. But if when it is on its own it is present to this, this
Plotinus: Ennead VI. 4.

πάρεστι, τούτο ἦλθε πρὸς αὐτήν. εἰ δὲ τούτῳ ἦλθον, διὰ τοῦ ἄστου ἢτοι ἦλθε πρὸς τὸ ἄστον. ὁ πρὸς τὸ ἄστον καὶ καὶ ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ τῆς ἐν ὧν καὶ ὁ τῆς ἐν ὧν ἐκ τοῦ ἄστου, καὶ πάντα. ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦν ἦ

came to it. But if this thing which was outside this kind of being came to that which exists in this way and came to be in the ordered beauty of life, and this ordered beauty of life was on its own, and was really on its own not divided over its own bulk — for there is no bulk — then what came to it also did not come to bulk; it did not therefore participate in a part of it; but if another thing as well comes to this kind of ordered beauty, it will participate in it as a whole. In the same way, then, if that is said to be present in these [two] things as a whole, it will be present as a whole in each and every thing. And so it will be everywhere, one in number and not divided into parts, but as a whole.

13. What, then, is the origin of its extension over all the heaven and all living things? Now, it is not extended. For it is sense-perception, to which we are paying attention when we disbelieve what is now being said, which says that it is here and there, but reason says that the "here and there" has not come about by its being extended but the whole of what is extended has participated in it, while it is not itself spaced out. If then anything is going to participate in anything, it is clear that it will not be participating in itself; otherwise it will not be a participant, but [just] itself. Body, then, if it participates in anything, cannot participate in body: for it has it already. A body certainly will not participate in a body. Nor, then, will magnitude participate in magnitude: for it has it already. For not even if it receives an addition will that magnitude which was there before participate in magnitude; for it is not: the length of two cubits which becomes three cubits long, but the substrate which had one quantity has

delimitus, ut glossam ad ejus miserist.
15. If the two things are to be one, then both the divided and extended will be divided and extended. For if it is not divided and extended, it cannot be one with another; for otherwise the two things themselves will be three. If then that which is divided and extended to a certain distance is going to participate in another kind, or in general in something else, that in which it participates must not be divided or extended or in any way quantitative. So that which is going to be present to it must be present to it everywhere as a whole, without parts; but not without parts as being small; for in this way it will none the less be divisible and will not fit the participant, and will not be with it as the same if it grows. But it is not without parts like a point either; for the whole bulk has it as a whole, it will have it in the whole of itself.

14. But if it is the same soul in each and every place, how is it the particular soul of each individual? And how is one soul evil and the other good? Now, it is sufficient for each and contains all souls and all intellects. For it is one and again unbounded and holds all things together and each distinct, and, again, not distinct in separation. For how could it be called unbounded except in this sense, that it has all things together, every life and every soul and every intellect? But each of them is not marked off by boundaries: for this reason, again, it is one. For it did not have to have [only] one life, but a life unbounded and again one, and the one life one in this way, that all the lives are together, not heaped together into one, but beginning from one and remaining where they began; or rather they did not even begin, but it was like this always; for nothing
THE PRESENCE OF BEING EVERYWHERE I

comes into being there; it is not then divided up into parts, but seems to be so divided to the recipient. But what is there is the primeval, that which was from the beginning; but that which comes to be draws near it and thinks to be joined to it and depends on it. But we - who are we? Are we that which draws near and comes to be in time? No, even before this coming to be came to be we were there, men who were different, and some of us even gods, pure souls and intellect united with the whole of reality; we were parts of the intelligible, not marked off or cut off but belonging to the whole; and we are not cut off even now. But now another man, wishing to exist, approached that man; and when he found us - for we were not outside the All - he wound himself round us and attached himself to that man who was then each one of us (as if there was one voice and one word and one here and another there turned their ears to it and heard and received it, and there came to be a hearing made actual, having that, which acted on it present): and we have come to be the pair of them, not the one which we were before - and sometimes just the other one which we added on afterwards, when that prior one is inactive and in another way not present.

15. But how did that which approached approach? Since there was an adaptability present in it, it and that to which it was adapted. But what comes to exist in such a way as not to receive all soul, though all is present, but not to it, like the other animals and the plants received as much as it can take: as when a voice says a word, and some partake of the word along with the noise of the voice, some only of the voice and its impact. So when a living thing
Plotinus may be thinking here of the Roman Senate: a number of his circle were senators (Porphyry Life ch. 7); but it is not clear that there is a reference to any particular episode in Roman history or passage of Latin literature (Henry and Schwyzer suggest Virgil Aeneid 1.146-59).
in himself a populace of pleasures and lusts and fears, which gain the mastery when a man of this kind surrenders himself to a populace of this kind; but whoever enslaves this mob, and runs back up to that man he once was, lives according to that man and is that man and gives what he gives to the body as to something other than himself; but someone else lives now this way and now the other; he has become a person mixed from the good self and the evil other.

16. But if that nature could not become evil, and this is the way of soul's coming and presence to the body, what are the descent at fixed periods, and again the ascent, and the judgements, and the entries into the bodies of other animals? For we have received these from those who in ancient times have philosophised best about the soul; and it is proper to try to show that our present discourse is in agreement, or at least not in disagreement, with them.

Since, then, participation in that nature was not its coming to this world and abandoning itself, but this our nature's coming to be in that and participating in it, it is clear that the "coming" those ancient philosophers speak of must mean that the nature of body comes to be there and participates in life and soul, and in general is not meant spatially, but indicates whatever the manner of this kind of communion is. So that "descent" means coming to be in body as we say soul comes to be in body, the giving to this body of something from itself, not coming to belong to it. and "departure" means that body in no

1 A very firm statement of the traditionalism of Plotinus; the ancient philosophers are of course Plato and, secondarily, the Pythagoreans.
way has any community with it; and there is an
order of this kind of communion for the parts of this
All, but soul, which is as it were on the edge of the
intelligible region, often gives them something of
itself since it is close to their, by its power and the
distances are shorter by the law of a nature of this
kind; but communion of this kind is an evil [for soul]
and release from it a good. Why? Because, even if it
does not belong to this particular body, yet when it
is said to belong to this body, it in some way or other
comes out of its All to be partial; for its activity is no
longer directed to the whole although it belongs to
the whole, just as if when a whole body of knowledge
is there [in his mind] the one who knows is active
about a particular subject of study; but the good for
the knower himself is not in some particular point of
his knowledge but in the whole body of knowledge
which he has. And so this soul, which belongs to the
whole intelligible universe and hides its part in the
whole, leapt out, we might say, from the whole to a
part, and actualises itself as a part in it, as if a fire
able to burn everything was compelled to burn some
little thing although it had all its power. For the soul
when it is altogether apart is particular without
being particular, but when it is separated - not
spatially, but it becomes each particular thing in its
activity - it is a part, not the whole, even so it is in
another way the whole; but when it is not in
charge of anything it is altogether the whole, and
then it is a part, one might say, in potency. But as for
going to Hades, if this means in the unseen, it is

1 The word-play here is clear in Greek, but cannot be
rendered in English.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 4.

soul's being apart that is spoken of; but if going to a worse place, what is surprising in that? For even now, soul too is said to be there in that place where our body is. But what if the body no longer exists? If the image has not been torn away from it, how can it not be there where the image is? But if philosophy has freed it completely, the image then too goes to the worse place alone, but the soul itself is purely in the intelligible without losing anything of itself. This is how it is with an image produced by this sort of process; but when the soul itself so to speak shines upon itself, by its inclination to the other [higher] side it is concentrated upon the whole, and it neither exists actually nor, again, does it perish. But this is enough about these matters: let us now take up the original discussion.

3 For the relationship of soul and image or shade, illustrated by what is said about Heracles and his shade in Odyssey 11. 601–3. cp. I. 1.12 and IV. 3. 32–4. 1.
VI. 5. (23) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΤΟ ΟΝ ΕΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΑΤΤΟΝ ΟΝ ΔΑΜΑ ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΥ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΟΛΟΝ ΛΕΓΤΕΡΟΝ

1. Τὸ ἐν καὶ ταὐτόν ἀμβηχρὸν πανταχοῦ ἀμα ἐδον ἐδαι κατ' ἑνὶ τις ἐνυιῶν ψην εἴναι, ὅταν πᾶσι κωιμοῦσιν αὐτοφοίνως λέγωσι τὸν ἐν κατάστα ἥμιων θεῶν ὡς ἐν καὶ τὸν αὐτόν, καὶ εἶ τις αὐτῶν τὸν τρόπον μὴ ἄνωτοι μυθὲ
5 λόγῳ ἐξετάζειν τὴν δόξαν αὐτῶν ἑθελο, οὕτως ἐν καὶ θεωτῷ καὶ ἐνεργοῦσα τούτῳ τῇ διάνοιᾳ οὕτως ἀμπαίνοντο ἐν τοῖς συνεργῶνται καὶ ταὐτῶν, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἑθελον ταύτης τῇ ἐννήκος ἀποσχέθηκαν, καὶ ἦν πάντων βεβαιωθῆναι ἀρχῆς, ὡς οὗτος αἱ φυσικὲ ἡμῶν
10 φθέγγονται, μὴ ἐκ τῶν καθεκαστα συγκεφαλαιοθεσία, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὼν καθεκαστα πάντων προεθύνθη καὶ πρὸ ἐνεργής θᾶς τοῦ ἑγαθοῦ πάντα ὀρέγεσθαι τάκλημεν τις τῇ καὶ λεγόμενης. οὕτω γὰρ ἐν ἀυτῇ ἄλθει εἴπῃ, εἰ τὰ πάντα εἰς ἐν ὑπελείποι καὶ ἐν εἴπῃ, καὶ ταῦτον ἡ ὀρέξει εἴπῃ.
15 τὸ γὰρ τούτῳ προϊόντο μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα, ἐφ' ὅσον

VI. 5. ON THE PRESENCE OF BEING, ONE AND THE SAME, EVERYWHERE AS A WHOLE II

1. A general opinion affirms that what is one and the same in number is everywhere present as a whole, when all men are naturally and spontaneously moved to speak of the god who is in each one of us one and the same. And if someone did not ask them how this is and want to examine their opinion rationally, this is what they would assume, and with this active and actual in their thinking they would come to rest in this way somehow supporting themselves on what is one and the same, and they would not wish to be cut away from this unity. And this is the firmest principle of all, which our souls cry out, as it were, not summed up from individual instances, but preceding all the individuals and coming before that principle which lays down and says that all things desire the good. For this latter would be true if all things press on to the one and are one, and their desire is of this. For this one, proceeding to the others as far as, and in the way in which, it can

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"This is one of Plotinus' rare appeals to the common experience of mankind as a good starting-point for a philosophical investigation (III. 7. 1 may be compared, though "we" there probably means "philosophers" rather than "mankind in general"). The way in which he expresses this general consent may remind us of how much the centuries of Christianity and anti-Christianity have changed the common thinking of our own world. What he says here would probably still be true in India.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 5.

proceeded would appear as many and even, in a sense, be many; but the ancient nature and the desire of the good, that is of itself, leads to what is really one, and every nature presses on to this, to itself. For this is the good to this one nature, belonging to itself and being itself: but this is being one. It is in this sense that the good is rightly said to be our own; therefore one must not seek it outside. For where could it be if it had fallen outside being? Or how could one discover it in non-being? But it is obvious that it is in being, since it is no; non-being. But if that good is being and in being, it would clearly be for each individual in himself. We have not, then, departed from being, but are in it, nor has it departed from us: so all things are one.\footnote{On this passage and ch. 4, 17-24 see Introductory Note, pp. 270-271.}

2. But the reason which tried to make the investigation of what we are talking about, since it is not one thing but something divided and brings along to its enquiry the nature of bodies and takes its principles from them, being divided substance, thinking that it was of this [bodily] kind, and disbelieved in its unity, because it did not take the starting-point of its enquiry from the principles proper to substance. But we must take for our reasoning about the one and altogether existent principles which, being proper to it, will lead to conviction: that is, intelligible principles of intelligibles and those which belong to true substance. For since one [nature] is carried about and accepts every kind of change and is continually divided into every place, which it would be appropriate to call becoming, not substance, but the other
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 5.

[ἐπειλημμένων] ὁσαίτωσι κατὰ τούτο ἔχουν, οὕτω γενόμενον οὕτω ἀπολλάμενον οὐδὲ τινα χάραν οὐδὲ

15 τόπον οὐδὲ των ἔλθων ἔχων οὐδὲ ἔξων ποθὲν οὐδὲ ἀπ’ εἰσόν εἰς ὑπνοῦν, ἀλλ’ ἐν αὐτῷ μένον, περὶ μὲν ἑκείνων ἱέγουν ὧν τις ἑκείνης τῆς φύσις καὶ των ὑπ’ αὐτῆς ἀξιομενῶν ὑπάρχειν ἄκρατον ἢ ἐκότως ἢ ἐκότως εἰκότως καὶ τούτῳ παλαγματικῷ πιστεύεις; ὅταν δ’ αὕτη τοὺς περὶ τῶν νοητῶν λόγων τις ποιήσει, λοιμάζων

20 τὴν τῆς οἰκείας φύσιν περὶ ἢς πραγματεύεται τῶν ἀρχῆς τῶν λόγων δικαίως ἢ περὶ ὑπ’ ἐπερέατον ἀστερ ζηλωμενός ἢ ἀλλ’ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς ἑκείνης περὶ αὐτῆς τίνι κατανόησιν παλαγματικόν, ἐπειδὴ πανταχόν τό τι ἐστιν ἐκρήξι, καὶ τοῖς καλός ὑμαμαμένοις

25 καθὲ καὶ πάντα ἐν τῷ τῇ ἐστίν ὑπάρχει, πολλὴ μᾶλλον ἐν τούτοις ἔσται εἰς δεύτερον, καὶ εἰς τότε βλαστεύει καὶ πρὶς τούτο πάντα ἀνανεύειν.

3. Εἰ δ’ ἢτο τούτῳ τούτῳ καὶ ὁσαίτωσι ἔχει καὶ οὐκ ἐξελτιστὰται αὐτῷ ἀντικῦν καὶ γένος περὶ αὐτῷ σοφία καὶ τῶν ἐλεγέροντο εἰναι, ἐνάγεται αὐτῷ ἔχον αὐτὸς τόσα σοφίαν ἢ τόσον ἂν ἐκεῖ ἢ ἂν τὸ ἄνω τόσο, καὶ ἀκατάστατα αὑτ’ ἂν ἄλλοτε ἀκατάστατα

5 αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν ἄδικ’, τὸ δὲ ἄδικ’ ἀλλ’ μᾶλλον προϊέναι τι ἀπ’ αὐτῶν: ἢδε γὰρ ἢν ἔν ἄλλω καὶ ἄλλοι εἴη, καὶ ἄλλω εἴη̈.

1 del. Harder.

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[nature] is being, always in exactly the same state, neither coming to be nor perishing nor having any space or place or base, nor going out from anywhere nor entering into anything, but remaining in itself, when one was speaking about those things [of the lower world] one would reason logically from that nature and from what is held to be true about it and, reasoning probably by means of probable principles, would frame syllogisms which are also [only] probable. But when, on the other hand, one engages in reasonings about the intelligibles, the right way would be to take the nature of substance about which one is concerned and so establish the principles of one’s reasonings, without passing over, as if one had forgotten, to the other nature, but applying one’s mind to that intelligible nature by means of itself; since everywhere the "what it is" is the starting-point, and it is said that those who have defined well know most of the incidental accompaniments; but in things where everything is included in the "what it is", one must much more hold fast to this and look to this and refer everything to this.1

3. Now if this is real being and remains the same and does not depart from itself and there is no coming-to-be about it and, as was said, it is not in place, it is necessary for it, being in this state, to be always with itself, and not to stand away from itself; one part of it cannot be here and another there, nor can anything come out of it; [for if it did] it would already be in different places, and, in general, would

1 Plotinus is here developing an Aristotelian thought in a Platonic manner: cf. Aristotle on Socrates. Metaphysics M 4, 1073b24–25.
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be in something and not on its own or unaffected; for it would be affected if it was in something else; but if it is going to be in a state of freedom from affection, it will not be in something else. If, therefore, without departing from itself or being divided into parts or itself undergoing any change, it is in many things at once, existing at the same time as one whole with itself, then, being the same everywhere, it will have an existence in many things: but this is being on its own and, again, not being on its own. It remains, then, to say that it is itself in nothing, but the other things participate in it, all those which are able to be present to it and in so far as they are able to be present to it. We must then either do away with those hypotheses and principles and say that there is no nature of this kind; or, if this is impossible and there is of necessity a nature and substance of this kind, we must accept what we have been saying from the beginning, that the one and the same in number which is not divided but exists as a whole does not depart from any of the things which exist beside it, with no need of any diffusion either by some portions coming from it or, alternatively, by its remaining as a whole in itself but something else generated from it leaving it and coming to the others in many ways. For in this way it will be in one place and what comes from it in another, and it will have a place separated from what comes from it. And again with the things which come from it, if each is a part or a whole—if it is a part it will not preserve the nature of the whole, as has been said already; but if each is a whole, we shall either divide each one into parts equal to that in which it is, or we shall agree that the same can be everywhere present as a whole. This,
certainly, is an argument derived from the thing itself and its substance, dragging in nothing alien or derived from the other nature.

4. But, please, look at this argument also: we deny that God is in one place but not in another. For it is accepted among all who have a notion of gods that one says, not only about that [supreme God] but about all gods, that they are present everywhere, and the argument says that this must be assumed. If then God is everywhere, it is not possible that he should be divided; for then he would not still be everywhere, but each part of him would be one here and another there, and he would not still be one, as, if one cuts a magnitude into many parts, it will be destroyed and all the parts will no longer be that whole; and besides, he will be a body. But if all this is impossible, then again what is disbeliefed in has reappeared; in every human nature believing in God goes with believing that the same thing is everywhere as a whole. And again, if we say that that [divine] nature is unbounded – it certainly is not limited – what could this mean other than that he will not fall short? But if he is not going to fall short, does this mean that he is present to each and every thing? Yes, for if he should not be able to be present, he will fall short and there will be somewhere he is not. For even if we may be talking about something else after the One itself, this again will be together with the One itself and what is after it will be around that One and directed to that One and like something generated from it in close touch with it, so that what participates in what comes after it has also participated in that One. For, since there are many things in the intelligible, firsts and seconds and
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próton te kai deuterón kai trétov, kai olos ophiáras
mías eis ev kéntron átthménov, ou diastýmav
diálemynov, all' ántov ómous aútov ópántov, ópov
av parèi tis tréto, kai tis deutévra kai tis prótov
páresti.

5. Ka'i upérferei mèn ékei o lýgos polláis olos ev
kéntron enous pollouis grámmáis pouteras eis tinov
plóthos toj gynoménov eúthei árkei. deí de
perióntas ὦ μον ὀ πάτω τα λεγόμενα polla ginóntai légei,
óis kákei épi toj kýklou óois óuvias grámmáis áfwmis-
ménav ésti lamblánei épipédan ýar én. oí de oudè
kai épipédan ev diastýmav ti, all' adiéástato
dunámis kai óuviai, pánta ev tivnous kata kéntra lúmati
en én ómous kéntrr ònvménov, olos afánta tás grámmáv

to

5. And for the sake of clarity our discourse often,
by making, as it were, many lines proceed from one
centre, wants to lead to a notion of the multiplicity
which has come to be. But one must bear in mind
when one says this that the things which are said to
become many are all together at once, just as there
in the example of the circle one cannot take the lines
as being separated: for it is one surface. But where
there is not even any spacing out on one surface, but
only unspaced powers and substances, all may rea-
onably be spoken of in terms of their centres all
united in one centre, as if their ends located in the
centre dropped their lines, and then certainly all are
one. But again, if you put the lines on, they are
attached to their centres which each of them leaves,
and none the less each and every centre will not be
cut off from that one first centre, but they will be all
together with that end each, again, individual, and
they will be as many as the lines to which they gave
themselves to be their ends, so that they appear to be
as many as the lines with which they are in contact,
but all of them are one together. But if we likened all
the intelligibles to many centres all going back to
and united in one centre, but appearing as many
because of their lines – the lines do not generate
them but show them – the lines might serve our
purpose at present by providing an analogy to the

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On this passage see Introductory Note, pp. 270-271.
things by contact with which the intelligible nature appears to be present as many and in many places. 

6. For the intelligibles are many and they are one, and, being one, they are many by their unbounded nature, and many in one and one over many and all together, and they are active towards the whole with the whole, and active towards the part again with the whole. But the part receives into itself the first activity as that of a part, but the whole follows; as if [the Form of] Man came to a particular man and became a particular man though being on the other hand [the Form of] Man. For the man in the matter made from the one man according to the Idea many men, all the same, and the same thing is one in the many in a way like that in which there is one seal-imprint in many things. But the thing itself, Man, and each thing itself, and the [intelligible] All as a whole are not in many in this way, but the many are in the thing itself, or rather around it. For there is a difference between the way in which the white is everywhere and that in which the soul of each individual is in every part of the body the same; for this latter is the way in which being is everywhere.

7. For we and what is ours go back to real being and ascend to that and to the first which comes from it, and we think the intelligibles; we do not have images or imprints of them. But if we do not, we are the intelligibles. If then we have a part in true knowledge, we are those; we do not apprehend them as distinct within ourselves, but we are within them. For, since the others, and not only ourselves, are those, we are all those. So then, being together with

For the very important image of the circle and its radii in Plotinus see also, e.g., I.7.1; V.1.11; VI.9.8.
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1. This is the clearest explanation in the Enneads of Plotinus' statement, which so much annoyed later Neoplatonists, that we are "each of us an intelligible

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all things, we are those: so then, we are all and one. 1 So therefore when we look outside that on which we depend we do not know that we are one, like faces which are many on the outside but have one head inside. But if someone is able to turn around, either by himself or having the good fortune to have his hair pulled by Athene herself, 2 he will see God and himself and the All: at first he will not see as the All but then, when he has nowhere to set himself and limit himself and determine how far he himself goes, he will stop marking himself off from all being and will come to all the All without going out anywhere, but remaining there where the All is set firm.

But I for my part think that also, if one were to consider the participation of matter in the Forms, one would be more inclined to have confidence in what is being said and not to disbelieve it as impossible or continue to be puzzled about it. For, I think, it is probable, and indeed necessary, that the ideas are not placed separately on one side and matter a long way off on the other and then illumination comes to matter from somewhere up there: I am afraid this would be empty words. For what would "far off" and "separately" mean in this context? And again, the business of participation would not be said to be hard to express and extremely perplexing, but the explanation would be extremely accessible and well known from the examples. But even if we do sometimes speak of illumination we do not mean it in the sense in which we speak of illuminations of a sense-object in the realm of sense; but, since the universe, 3 (ll. 4.3. 22 cp. IV. 7.10. 34-36) and shows how literally it is to be taken.

1 Like Achilles, fl. 1.197-8.
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things in matter are images, and the Forms hold the rank of archetypes, and illumination is such that it keeps the illuminated object separate, we use the word in this sense. But now we must speak more precisely and not assume that the Form is spatially separate and then the Idea is reflected in matter as if in water, but that matter, from every side grasping (and again not grasping) the Idea, receives from the Form, over the whole of itself, by its drawing near to it all that it can receive, with nothing between; the Idea does not pass through and run over the whole of matter, but remains in itself. For if the Idea of Fire, for instance, is not in matter—let our discourse take the matter underlying the elements as an example—the fire itself which does not come to be in matter will give the character of fire to all the matter made fiery. (Let it be assumed that the first fire in matter comes to be a large bulk.) For the same argument will fit the other elements as they are called. If therefore that one fire in that it is the Idea is seen in all [the fires] giving an image of itself not in the way that it would if it was spatially separate, it will not give its image as the visible illumination does; for it would already be all wherever this fire in the sense-world is, if [that one fire] was itself-many as all, since, while the Idea itself of itself remained in the placeless, it would generate places out of itself if it was necessary for the same, having become many, to escape from itself that there might be many in this way and participate often in the same. And the Idea, not being scattered [like this], gave nothing of itself

1 I adopt Igal’s text and interpretation in this very difficult passage.
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Idia aspendastos oida, ou mou adynatos gynon en idia to mou en tis eu autn morfouai kai panti autn autn tivn pereinai, ou mou. Allw mou meres autn tode, allw de allo morfounai, alla panti ekastov kai 40 tov gelioyn gar to pollass idiai puros upotheferen, ou ekastov pur ouf ekastos allher, to de allher, morfouato apoteiri gar oystos epanetai ai idiai. Eita pou kai meries to gynomena sunechei eno puros dastos; kai ei prosostiei tiv outhe tausti allo puro meizon poetanta 45 autn, kai kataite aut to meros tis eu phaton tivn autn idiai tivn auta egrasvan ou gar h de allher.

9. Kai pwcws ei poita genonexa Kod to souxeia tivn lóghg tis eis en phairemnon axima agou, ou polloyn phatovn tivn sofianan psoi kata merhe allon allher antseumonon autn eis to psoi meres, allv en einai 5 tivn autov. Tis pshkous allo iatpti psoi eis mou merous autov alloi allo poioistos outhe gar en polloi eivn, ei mou eis en ameres anafheroan tivn pshkon, mallon d' ei en ameres to psoi tivn sofianan eis ouk autov xivntos eis tivn sofianan tou poioistos, allla tis.

1 Plotinus, like practically all ancient Platonists except his friend and colleague Amelius, maintained firmly that the number of the Ideas was finite; for Amelius' view that they were infinite in number see Syrianus In Met. 147. 2-6.

2 An allusion to the Stoic doctrine of “complete transfusion”, which Plotinus discusses fully in II. 7.
the whole sphere dependent on the maker. And so one and the same life holds the sphere, and the sphere itself is set in one life; and so all things in the sphere depend on one life; and so all the souls are one, but so one that it is also an unbounded soul. This is the reason why some people called it a "number" and some said that its nature was "a rational principle augmenting itself", perhaps imagining it in this way, that it does not fail anything, but, remaining what it is, reaches to everything, and if the universe was larger its power would not fail to reach again to everything, or rather this universe would be in the whole of it. One must then not take the "augmenting" literally, but [understand that] it means [that] it does not fail in being everywhere once: for its one is of such a kind as not to be the kind of thing the size of which can be measured: for this belongs to another nature which feigns the one and is imagined as one by its participation. But the one which possesses truth: is the kind which is not a one composed from many, so that if something was taken away from it the whole one would be destroyed, nor divided by boundaries, so that when other things fit themselves into it it would be diminished because they are too big for it, or torn apart because it wants to reach all, and would not be present as a whole to all, but with parts of itself to parts of those things; as the saying goes, it does not know where on earth it is since it is not able to come into one perfect whole because it is torn apart from itself. If therefore this one is going to be truly one,

1 The allusions are to Xenocrates (fr. 60 Heinze) and Heraclitus (fr. B 115 DK).
about which it is possible to predicate the one as of substance, it must appear as in some way having the opposite nature to itself, that of multiplicity, in its power, but by not having this multiplicity from outside, but by itself and from itself, and in this way being really one, and in its one having unboundedness and multiplicity; and since it is like this it must appear everywhere as a whole, a single rational principle encompassing itself, and the encompassing principle must be nowhere parted from itself, but everywhere in itself. It certainly does not belong to another in the sense of being spatially divided; for it was before all the things in space and had no need of them, but they needed it, that they might be established. But in their establishment they did not move that one out of its seat in itself; for if that seat was moved they would perish with the perishing of their foundation and that which sets them firm, and on the other hand that one was not so stupid as to separate itself from itself and be torn to pieces, or, being kept safe in itself, to deliver itself to the untrustworthiness of place which needs it to be kept safe.

10. It has the good sense, then, to remain in itself, and would not come to be in another; but those other things hang from it as if by their hanging they had found where it is. And this is "Love camping on the doorstep", 1 even coming from outside into the presence of beauty and longing for it, and satisfied if in this way he can have a part in it, since the lover here below also has beauty in this way, not by receiving it into himself but by lying with it. But that one

1 Cp. Plato Symposium 203C6-D3.
beauty] remains by itself, and the many lovers of the
one love the whole and have the whole like this,
when they have it: for it was the whole that they
loved. How, then, should that in its abiding not be
sufficient for all? For it is for this reason that it
suffices, because it abides, and it is beautiful because
it is whole for all. For thought also is whole for all,
that is why "thought is common", 1 not one thought
here and another there: for that would be ridiculous,
and thought would need space. And thought is not
like white; for thought does not belong to the body;
but if we truly have a part in thought, it must be one
and the same, all together with itself. And so we
have our part in it from thence, not receiving por-
tions of it, nor I one whole and you another, each
torn apart from each. Assemblies of the people
imitate this, and all meetings, being of people moving to
a unity of thought; and each member is weak in
thought but when everyone in the meeting, and the
true meeting of minds, comes together into one, he
generates and finds [true) thought; for what will
keep them apart, so that the minds of one and
another do not meet in the same? But though they
are together, they do not seem so to us; as if someone
touching the same thing with a number of fingers
thought that he was touching one thing after an-
other, or if, without seeing it, he plucked the same
string. And besides, we ought to have borne in mind
how with our souls we touch the Good. For I do not
touch one good and you another, but the same, and
not the same in such a way that one stream comes
from it to me and another to you, so that it is

1 Heraclitus fr. B 113 DK.
somewhere up there and what comes from it down here. And what gives gives to the recipients so that they may really receive, not to alien recipients, but to its own. For intelligible giving is not pros- 
essional. For even in bodies distant from each other in their places, the giving of one is related to an- 
other, and the giving and making go to the same; and the bodily part of the All acts and is affected in itself, and nothing comes into it from outside. If then with body, which by nature in a way flows from itself, nothing comes from outside, how can there be any- 
thing from outside in a thing unspaced? We are, 
then, in the same with the Good and see it and touch it being together with our own intelligibles. And the universe there is far more one; otherwise there will be two universes perceived by sense, divided in the same way, and the intelligible sphere, if it is one in this way, will be like this one; so that it will differ in 
that it will be more ridiculous, if this one here has 
bulk of necessity and reasonably, but the other is 
going to stretch itself out and go outside itself when it has no need. But what can stand in the way of its 
unification? For certainly one will not push away the other by giving it no room — as if we do not see that every subject of study and observation and in 
general all bodies of knowledge are in the soul without being crowded. But, someone will say, this is not possible with substances. No, it would not be possible if true substances were bulks.

11. But how can the unspaced stretch over all 
body, which has so great a size? And how, being one and the same, is it not torn apart? This difficulty has often been raised, when the argument was excessively anxious to end the discursive reason’s dif-
Plotinus: Ennead VI. 5.

5 ἀποδεικται μὲν οὖν ἡδὴ πολλαχῇ, ὅτι ἀόσως· δει δὲ τῶν καὶ παραμυθίων, κατακαίτεις ἡκα-Stavos, ἀλλὰ μέγιστον εἰς πεπλω ἡ έκεῖνη ἡ φύσις οὐ έστι θανατεία, ὅτι οὐκ έστιν ολοκλήρως, ο婼ν κύριος τῆς μέγας κείμενος ὁ κεῖται τοῦτον ἐπέχως, ὅπως ἄπω, καὶ τῆς ἐκβαίνεις συντάκτων ὑπὸ ἔριξιν πληροφορίας ἐπὶ τοιαύτην καὶ τῷ ἄγκμῳ καὶ τῇ σωματηγορηθείσῃ ἐν αυτῷ τῇ τούτο ὑπάρχουσι, αὐτῶν ἄσας πρώτη φύσις καὶ οὐ μετρηθεὶς οὐδὲ ἐμφανεῖται ὡς έναίναι—ταύτη γάρ ἄν τέρσα ἐνημερωθησται—πάντα ἐστὶν θάναμος

15 οὐκ δαμαστὶν τοσήμα, διδωσθής ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀλλὰ πάνως χρόνου ἔνα, τῷ μὲν χρόνῳ πεπλημμένον ἢ πρὸς διάσπασσαν, τοῦ δ’ αἰώνος εν τῷ αὐτῷ μένοντος καὶ κρατούντος καὶ πλείονος ύπότος δυνάμει ἐντὸς ἔνα πολλά δοκοῦντος έναν χρόνον, οὗ το έγραμμθ' εἰς ἀπειρον έναι δοκοῦσθε εἰς σημείον άνθρωπήν καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ

20 θεός ης πανταχή σα ἐν δράκη τοῦ σημείου αὐτῆς ἐμφανεισαμανίον αὐτὸν οὐ θέωστος, ἂλλα περὶ αὐτοῦ εικότης κεκλημένης, εἰ τούτον χρόνον πρὸς τὸ εν τῷ αὐτῷ μένον ἐν αὐτῇ ἔχει τὴν ἀναλογίαν, ἄστι δε εἰκόνει η φύσις οὐ μόνον τῷ γει αἴοντος, ἂλλα καὶ τῇ δυνάμει,

25 χρῆ καὶ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἄπωριαν τῆς δυνάμεως δημιουργούσας ἀποδόθωσα φύσιν ἀνθρωπομενήν καὶ ἐξηρμηνεύσεις εκείνης: ταύτης τα ἐν ποιε τῷ χρόνῳ θεώσας πρὸς μένουσα δύναμιν πλείους συνάσσα τοὺς τους, είκόνει ἀστὶν ὅσον πορετάθη τίτις τοῦ αὐτῆς έστιν ἡ μεταλαμβάνουσα ταύτης τῆς φύσεως κεβάνθωσι οἷαν τε

30 αὐτῇ μεταλαμβάνειν, πάσης μὲν παροίσχες, οὐ παντὶ δὲ

ficulty. Well, it has already been demonstrated in many ways that it is so; but a bit of encouragement is required, though not the least but the greatest reason for confidence is that nature expounded as it is, it is not like a stone, like a great squared block of stone lying where it is and extending to the size it is, unable to exceed its bounds because it has been measured to this particular size both by its bulk and by the power limited along with it. But since it is the first nature and is not measured or bounded to the size it ought to be — for in this way it would be again measured by another nature — it is all power, nowhere of this particular size. For this reason it is not in time either, but outside all time, for time is continually dispersed into distancing, but eternity abides in the same and has the mastery and is greater by its everlasting power than time which seems to go so far; it is like a line which seems to go on unlimitedly, but depends on a point, and as it runs round it the point is in the picture everywhere the line runs to, though the point does not run, but the line circles round it. If, then, time is related by analogy to that which abides in the same in substance, but that nature is not only unbounded because it is always but unbounded in power, one must also grant besides this unboundedness of power a nature running along over against it, swinging alongside that nature as it hangs from it; this nature runs, somehow in step with time, to the abiding power which is greater [than it] by making [it], and whatever it is is somewhat extended along it and participates in this nature as far as it is possible for it to participate; it is all present, but not all of it is seen in everything because of the incapacity of the
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underlying recipient. But it is present the same in number everywhere, not like the triangle in matter which is multiplied by being in many, but like the immaterial triangle itself from which those in matter derive. Why then is not the triangle in matter everywhere, if the immaterial triangle is everywhere? Because not every matter participates in it, but every matter has something different, and not every matter is suitable for every Form. For even prime matter is not all adapted to every Form, but to the primary kinds [of bodily Form] and then others upon them. Form is certainly in some way present to everything.

12. How then is it present? As one life: for life in a living being does not reach only so far, and then is unable to extend over the whole, but it is everywhere. But if someone again enquires how, let him call to mind its power, that there is not a certain quantity of it, but if he divides it endlessly in his discursive thought he always has the same power, endless in depth; for it does not have matter there in the intelligible, that it might fall short along with the size of its bulk and come to little. If then you grasp the endlessness for ever welling up in it, the unwearying and unwearing nature which in no way falls short in it, boiling over with life, we may say, if you concentrate your attention somewhere or fix your gaze on a particular point you will not find it there, but the opposite will happen to you. For you will most certainly not step out of it and go past it, and again you will not stop at a littleness as if it had no more to give in its falling short little by little; but you will be led along with it, or rather come to be in All and seek nothing any more, or you will
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 5.

15 ἄλλα καὶ πεσὼν ὅπως τῷ εἰς ἄλλου βλέπον. ἄλλοι εἰ "οὐδὲν ἐπὶ ἔγνησαν", πῶς ποτὲ τοῦτο πεισε; ἐστὶ πάντι προσέξθεσα καὶ οὐκ ἐμείνα ἐν μέρει αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ἐγίνα μέρος ἐν τῷ τοῦτούτῳ. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκείνῳ προσέξθεσα—ἄλλα τοῖς μὴ ἄντοι. γενόμενος δὲ τι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ἄντοι ἐστὶν ὁ πάς, ἄλλο ὅταν τὸ μὴ ὑπὸ ὁ πάς. αὐξέσθη τοῖς σεαυτὸν αὑχέρκι τῷ ἄλλῳ καὶ πάρεστιν σοι τῷ πάσῳ ἀφαίτητον εἰ δὲ πάρεστι μὲν ἀφαίτητον, μετὰ δὲ ἄλλου ὅπως οὐ παραήγηται, ὁ πάς ἡ ἄλλα, ἄλλα ὅτι ἀπέστησε, ὅτε ὁ πάρεστιν. εἰ δὲ ἀπέστησε, ὁ πάς ὅπως αὐτύ—αὐτῷ γὰρ πάρεστιν—οὕτω τότε ἀπέστησε, ὁ πάς παραίτηται τῷ ἐναντίῳ ἑσπράξει. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ εἰ ἄλλου θεοῦ παλλᾶν παράνομον ἐν ἑαυτὸν σολώκας, ὅτι ὁ ἐς ἔκεινος μόνος δύναται βλέπειν. ἄλλοι δὲ τέτοιοι ἦν οὐκ θεοῦ, ὥς παραθέτει ἐναντίον τοῖς πάλαις ἐς ἔκεινον ἐς αὐτὸν τὸν πᾶλος ἑπιστρέφειται καὶ πάντα γῆ καὶ πᾶσαι ὀνομά, πανταχοῦ ἐπὶ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐπὶ αὐτῷ μένυται καὶ ἐχύστα ἐξ αὐτοῦ τῷ ἐναντίῳ γῇ καὶ τῷ ἐκείνῳ ἐξ ἀπειροῦ ἐν αὑτῷ ἀμερέθει τῷ ἀπειρῷ.

20 Ἰ. Kirchhoff: ἐνν. Ἐκκ.

THE PRESENCE OF BEING EVERYWHERE II

give up and pass out of it to something else and fall by not seeing what is present because you are looking at another. But if "you will seek nothing any more", however will this happen to you? Now it is because you approached the All and did not remain in a part of it, and you did not even say of yourself "I am just so much", but by rejecting the "so much" you have become all - yet even before this you were all; but because something else came to you after the "all" you became less by the addition: for the addition did not come from being - you will add nothing to that - but from non-being. And when someone has come to be also from non-being he is not all except when he rejects the non-being. You will increase yourself then by rejecting all else, and the All will be present to you in your rejection; but if it is present in your rejection and does not appear when you are with the other things, it did not come in order to be present, but you went away when it was not present. But if you went away, it was not from it - for it is present - and you did not even go away then, but were present and turned the opposite way. For in this way the other gods also when many are present often appears to one, because that one alone is able to see them. But these are the gods who "in many forms travel round our cities"; but to that god the cities turn, and all the earth and all the sky, who everywhere shides by himself and in himself and has from himself being and the things which really are down to soul and life depending on him, and moving to an unbounded unity by his sizeless unboundedness.

1 Homer Odyssey 17. 436, quoted (with disapproval) by Plato Republic II 381D4.