PLOTINUS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
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IN SEVEN VOLUMES

IV

ENNEADS
IV. 1-9

CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD

MCMXXXIV
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Printed in Great Britain
PREFACE

TO LOEB PLOTINUS IV–V

The text of these volumes, except in a few places, is that of the second volume of the revised editio minor of Henry and Schwzyer, Plotini Opera II. Oxford Classical Texts, 1977. The editors, translator, and publishers have agreed that somewhat fuller critical notes should be appended to the Greek text than in the first three volumes of the Loeb Plotinus. These critical notes show clearly all places where the printed text departs from the manuscripts and all places where the text of these volumes differs from that of the Oxford Plotinus (H-S²): as a result of the extensive critical revision of the text of their first edition which the editors undertook in the preparation of the Oxford text, and in which the translator to a modest degree participated (hence the use of the first person plural in the notes where the changes are agreed by all), these latter are very few (36 in the Fourth Ennead, 7 in the Fifth). A number of them are corrections adopted by the editors after the publication of the Oxford Plotinus II and recorded in Addenda et Corrigenda ad Textum et Apparatum Lectiorum in III (1982) pp. 304–326.

A word of explanation and apology is due to the reader for the long interval between the publication of the first three volumes and that of these two. The translator’s work was completed (except for
minor corrections and revisions] in 1976: but as the result of the agreement between the Oxford University Press and the LoebClassics the volumes could not have been published with the Greek text before 1979. The subsequent delay was due to the financial stringencies which beset all academic publishing at the present time.

A. H. ARMSTRONG.

SIGLA

\[ A = \text{Laurentianus 87, 3.} \]
\[ A' = \text{Codex A primus corrector.} \]
\[ E = \text{Parisianus Gr. 1076.} \]
\[ R = \text{Laurentianus 85, 15.} \]
\[ R = \text{Vaticanus Reginensis Gr. 97.} \]
\[ J = \text{Parisianus Gr. 2082.} \]
\[ U = \text{Vaticanus Urbinates Gr. 62.} \]
\[ \beta = \text{Doverensis Gr. 375.} \]
\[ N = \text{Monacensis Gr. 215.} \]
\[ M = \text{Marcianus Gr. 240.} \]
\[ C = \text{Monacensis Gr. 440.} \]
\[ V = \text{Vindobonensis philosophicus Gr. 220.} \]
\[ Q = \text{Marcianus Gr. 242.} \]
\[ L = \text{Ambrosianus Gr. 367.} \]
\[ D = \text{Marcianus Gr. 200.} \]
\[ \omega = \text{AE} \]
\[ x = \text{DIJ} \]
\[ y = \text{USM} \]
\[ z = \text{QL} \]

Emil. = w x T C
Enni. = A m s x U C

mg = in margine
ad = ante correctionem
po = post correctionem
+ = consensum editorum sequentium cum editore nominato
ital. = cod. vel ed. Euschii

H-S 1 = Henry-Schwyzer, editio maior
H-S 2 = Henry-Schwyzer, editio minor (= OCT)
B-T = Bentler-Thiele
Docius = CQ 28 (1935) 47–53
IV. 1 [2]. ON THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL

Introductory Note

This little work is placed first in the Fourth Ennead by most MSS. and this order is confirmed by Porphyry in his accounts of his edition (Life ch. 20, see vol. 1 p. 78 ff.) and by the Pinax (table of contents; see p. 3). Ficino and the editio princeps, with the later editors, however, place it second, after the little detached note (IV. 2 [1]) which here follows it. Henry and Schweizer print it first, but saw it time to number it IV. 2. It seemed to me slightly less illogical to print it first and number it IV. 1, while retaining the original numbering of the printed editions in brackets.
IV. 1 [2]. ΠΕΡΙ ΟΤΙΔΑΙΣ ΨΥΧΗΣ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ

1. Τὸν τῆς φυσικῆς οὐσίαν τὰς ποτὲ ἔστω ἔγγοντες όμια οὕτως αὐτὰ δεῖξαμες εἶναι, οὐδὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοιοῦτοι ἀρχοντες ἀρχοντες ἂν τὸ τῆς ἀνθρώπους ὡς ἄλληθες οὕτως, οὐδὲ ἔρημος ὅπως, ὅτε διδομένων ὅπως τοῖς 5 τὴ ἐστιν ἀφθάστες, καὶ μὴν τῆς νοητῆς φύσεως εἰσπέμενε καὶ τῆς θείας μιρώμες εἶναι πάλιν μὲν ἂν τὸ σαφὲς εἰρήκοτες ἐγείρειν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς. ἱπέμας γε μὴν προσωπώρων χεριῶν ἡλίκων τούτων τοῖς μὲν οὖν διηρομένων αἰσθητή καὶ νοστή φύσει διαστελλόμενες, ὧν τῷ νομῷ τῇ ψυχῇ τεθέμενοι.

10 νῦν δὲ κείσασθαι μὲν ἐν τῷ νομῷ ἀλλὰ ἄλλως ἔσται τὰ προσωπῶρα τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς μεταδώκομεν. λέγεις δὲ τὰ μὲν πρώτοις εἰσερχόμενοι μερίτω, καὶ τῇ αὐτῶν φύσει ἐναλλάττα, ταῦτα δὲ εἶναι, ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῖς πιστοῖς εἰσερχόμενοι μὲν ἂν ἔρημον μὲν ἄλλως ἕρθεν ὅπως τὰ πολλὰ, τὸ τέσσερα αὐτῶν ἔσται δὲ τῷ πιστοῖς καὶ διὸ τοῦτω.

15 καὶ ὑποστάσθαι. ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ αἰσθητά μεγάλη καὶ ἄγιος, διὸ ἐκκορίτοις ἔδωκεν τόσον ἔχεις, καὶ ὅτι οὖν τῷ ἀμα ταῦτα ἐν πλείουσι τόσοις εἶναι. ἢ δὲ ἐστιν

2 The references back are to IV. 7 [2]. Chs. 1-8th demonstrate that the soul is not a body; ch. 8th that it is not a har.
be in several places at once. But there is another kind of being, opposed to this one, which in no way admits division; it is without parts and cannot be divided into parts: it does not admit any extension, even in our thought about it; it has no need of place, and is not in any other being either part-wise or whole-wise: it resides, so to speak, on all beings at once; not so as to make them its basis, but because the other things cannot exist without it and do not want to; it is real being always in the same state, common to all that come after it like the centre in the circle, to which all the lines which extend to the circumference are attached but none the less it remain in itself, and have from it their origin and their being, and participate in the point, and their principle is what is without parts; in proceeding from it they attached themselves to that central point. There is, then, this primarily indivisible which dominates in the intelligible and among real beings, and there is also that other in the perceptible world which is altogether divisible; and, bordering on the perceptible, and rather near it, and in it, there is another nature which is not primarily divisible, like bodies, but all the same does become divisible in bodies; so that when bodies are divided, the form in them is divided too, but is a whole in each of the divided parts, becoming many and remaining the same, when each of the parts is completely separated from another part, since it is completely divisible: like colours and all qualities and every shape, which can be at the same time in many separate things, having no part which is affected in the same way in which another part is affected: and therefore this too must be affirmed to be in every way divisible. But
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 1.

ποις δ' ἀλ ἐκείνη τῇ ἀμερίστῳ πάντῃ φύσει ἀλλή ἔξης οὐδ' ἡκαίρης οὐδ' ἐκείνης οὐδ' ἔχουσα μὲν τὸ ἀμερίστων ἀλ' ἐκείνης, προδόχῳ δ' τῇ ἀλ' αὐτῆς ἐπὶ τὴν ἐτέραν σπεύδουσα φύσιν εἰς μέσον ἀμβόων κατέστη, τοῦ τε ἀμβλώτου καὶ ομάλου καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὰ σώματα μερισμοῦ τοῦ ἑπὶ τὸς σώμαν, ὦν' ἄλλωσ τὸ τότε χρόνο καὶ ποιήσεις πᾶσα πολλαχως μὲν ἑτέρων ἡ αὐτῆς ἐν πολλαχως σώματος ὦγκως, ἄλλ' ἐτέρω τὸ ἑπὶ ἐκάστω ἀφετέρῳ τοῦ ἑτέρου πάντῃ.

50 καθάσω καὶ δ' ὦγκως τοῦ ὦγκου ἀπόστη, καὶ τὸ μέγας ἔτερος ἐν ἑξή, ἀλλ' τὸ γε ἐπὶ ἐκάστη μέρη ταῦτα συνειδήσεων εὐδομένων ἡ ἐκείνης ἐχει, ὅτι τὸ ταῦτα τούτο ἐγαίνοι, τὸ δ' ἑτέρον ἑστιν: πάντως γὰρ τὸ ταῦτα, οἷον οὕσιν ἡ αὐτή. ὃν' ἐπὶ τῇ ἑτέρῃ φύσεις φοιμέν εἰναι τῇ ἀμερίστῃ προσ-

55 χωροῦσαν οὐδέν, οὐδά τέ οὗτοι καὶ ἐγγέννησαν σώμασιν, περὶ δ' καὶ μεριζόμενη αὐτή συμβαίνειν οἱ πρώτοι τοῦτο πανωρίζωσί, πρὶν σώματα ἑπατή διώθοιν, ἐν ὃιν οὖν γίγνεται σώματι, καὶ ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ γίγνεται καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα διειστάτην, δοθέν' ἑπατή τῷ ὅλον οὐκ ἀφίνεται τοι ἐνα μία.

60 οἷον οὗτος, ὃς τὸ σώμα ἐν τῷ γὰρ συνεχεῖ τὸ σώμα καὶ ἐκαίρων δὲ τῶν μερῶν ἄλλο, τὸ δ' ἄλλο καὶ ἀλλαγοῦ, οὐδ' ὁ σώματος μία. ὃς' ὃς σώματος μία, ἡ δ' ἐπί ομοί μερισμῆ τοι ἀμερίστω τούς φύσεις, ἵνα δ' ἅμα ἑνίου εἰναι φοιμέν, οἷον οὗτος ὃς τὸ συνεχές μία, μέρος ἢ ἀλλι, τό δ' ἄλλο ἔχουσα. ἄλλα μερισμα μὲν, ὃτι

ON THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL

again, next to that altogether indivisible nature there is another reality following upon it and deriving from it, having indivisibility from that other nature, which pressing eagerly on in its progress from the one to the other nature, established itself in the middle between the two, the indivisible and primary and the “divisible which is in the sphere of bodies”, which is upon bodies: [it does] not [behave] in the same way in which every colour and quality is the same in many places and many bodily masses, but the quality or colour in one mass is totally separate from that in the other, just as much as one mass is separate from the other; and even if the magnitude is one, yet what is the same in each part has no community [with any other] leading to a common experience, because this “same” is one thing here, another there: for what is the same is an affection, not the same substance. But the reality which we affirm to be immediately above this nature [of the forms in body], and bordering on the indivisible reality, is substance and becomes present in bodies, and it happens to become divided in the sphere of bodies, though it was not affected in this way before it gave itself to bodies. In any bodies, therefore, which it enters, even if it enters the largest of all and that which is universally extended, by giving itself to the whole it does not abandon its unity. It is not one in the sense in which body is one; for body is one by continuity, but its parts are different from each other and in different places. And it is not one in the way in which quality is, either. But the nature at once divisible and indivisible which we affirm to be soul is not one in the way in which the continuous is, having different parts: but it is divisible in that it
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 1.

is in all the parts of that in which it is, but indivisible in that it is present in all the parts of it as a whole and in any one part as a whole. And anyone who clearly sees the greatness of the soul, and clearly sees its power, will know what a divine and wonderful thing it is and that it is one of the natures which transcend the things of this world. It has no size, but is present with every size, and is here and again there, not with a different part of itself but the same: so that it is divided and not divided, or rather it is not itself divided and has not become divided; for it remains whole with itself, but is divided in the sphere of bodies by the peculiar divisibility of bodies, since they are not able to receive it indivisibly; so that the division is an affection of bodies, not of itself.

2. The following arguments make it clear that the soul had to be a nature of this kind, and that there cannot be a soul different from this one which is neither only indivisible nor only divisible, but must be both in the way we have described. For if it was like bodies, having parts different from each other, then when one part was affected the other would not arrive at any perception of the affected part, but it would be that particular soul, the one in the region of the finger, for instance, which would perceive the affection as a soul distinct from the other and on its own: so, speaking generally, there would be many souls directing each one of us, and furthermore it would not be one soul which would direct this universe, but innumerable souls separate from each other. For the talk about continuity, if this does not gather to a unity, is futile: we certainly cannot accept what [the Stoics] say, deceiving themselves,
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 1.

έπε τὸ ἡγεμόνον ἡμών αἱ αἰσθήσεις, παραδεικτέον.
πρῶτόν μὲν γὰρ ἡγεμόνοι τρίχης μέρος λέγειν
15 ἀνεξετάστως λέγεται: τῶς γὰρ καὶ μεροὺς καὶ
tὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ἡμόνοιο, τὸ δὲ ἴδρυμα;
τηλεῖας διαφορὰς διαμορφώνει ἐκάστου ἢ τὰν διαφορὰ
ποιότητος, εὕρος καὶ συνεχοῦς ὤνος ὄντος: καὶ
πάτερα μόνον τὸ ἡγεμόνον ἢ καὶ τὸ ἄλλα μέρη
20 αἰσθητάται; καὶ εἰ μὲν μόνον, εἰ μὲν αὐτῷ προσ-
πείναι τῷ ἡγεμόνοντι, ἐν τῷ τῶν ἄλλων ἢμένοιν τὸ
αἰσθήμα αἰσθητάται; εἰ δὲ ἄλλω μέρει πρὸς τὸν ἴδρυμα,
αἰσθάνεται οὐ τοίσι τότε τὸ μέρος οὐ διαδέατι
τῷ ἡγεμόνοντι τὸ αὐτὸν πάθημα, οὐδὲ ὄλος αἰσθήσεως
ἐσται. καὶ αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ ἡγεμόνοντι εἰ προσπέσων,
25 ἢ μέρει αὐτῶν προστεθεῖται καὶ αἰσθημένον τόδε
τὰ λοιπὰ φίλοιο. μένων γὰρ, εἰ πολλοὶ αἰσθήμασιν
καὶ ἅπερον ἔσται καὶ οὐχ ὄνομα πάσας: ἂλλ' ἡ
μέν, ὁτι πρῶτός ἐστιν ἐγώ, ἢ δ' ὅτι τὸ άλλης
πάθημα ἠθέμων ποῦ τε ἐγένετο τὸ πάθημα,
ἀγριότεροί πάσης πάθεως τῆς πρώτης. ἢ καὶ ἕκασ-
30 τοῦ μέρους ὡς ὄνομα ἀναφέρεται δοξάζων, ὅπου ἔστιν,
ἐκεῖ γεγονόντα. εἰ δὲ μὴ μόνον τὸ ἡγεμόνον,

ON THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL I

that the perceptions reach the ruling principle by "transmission". For, first of all, to say that the ruling principle is a part of the soul is speaking without critical reflection: for how will they divide the soul, and say that one part is different from another, and one is the ruling principle? By what amount of quantity or difference of quality will they distinguish each part, when the mass is one and continuous? And will only the ruling principle perceive, or the other parts also? And if only the ruling principle perceives, and the object of perception comes into contact with the ruling principle itself, in what place will it perceive the object of perception as situated? But if the object comes into contact with another part of the soul, since this part is not naturally adapted to perceive, it will not transmit its affection to the ruling principle, and there will be no perception at all. And if the object comes into contact with the ruling principle itself, it will either come into contact with a part of it, and this will perceive, but the other parts will not any more: there would be no point in their doing so; or there will be many, indefinitely many, perceptions, and they will not all be alike; but one will say "I was affected first" and another, "I perceived another's affection"; but they will every one of them except the first be ignorant of where the affection occurred. Or even perhaps each part of the soul will deceive itself by supposing that the affection has occurred there where it is. But if not only the ruling principle, but any other part of the soul as well, is going to have per-

1 For the Stoic doctrine see Stoicorum Vaticanum Fragmenta 11 441 and 804 and Alexander of Aphrodisias De Anima 41, 5 Brusa.
ON THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 1.

... καὶ ὅτε ὦν τὸ μὲν ἢρμος ἀνήθησαι, διὰ τὸ τὸ μὲν ἢρμος ἀνήθησαι, τὸ δὲ πάγ, ἢ τὸ δὲ ἐπ' ἑκένω τὴν αἰσθήσεων ἄνεναι; πῶς δὲ καὶ τὰ ἕκ τολλών ἀνήθησαι?

36 θάρσεως, ὅταν ὥστε καὶ ὑμμάτων, ἐν τῷ γνώσεται; εἴ δ' ἐν τῷ γνῶσεται ἡ ψυχή ἐπ', ὁ ὅμως ἀνήθησαι τὸν καὶ ἐνὶ ἑκένω τὸν καὶ πάντῃ πλήθους καὶ κατακαλλήνθηκεν ἐκφεύγει τοῖς φώνας, οὐδὲν ὅλως ἢ τὸν ψυχήν κατακαλλήθηκεν, ἐφαρμοσθεὶς ἐσται; ἀλλ' ἔστων περὶ κέντρον στήθος, ἐκατέρωτα ἀνήθησαι ἄνεναι ἐνοχνόν ἐν εἰσαγόμενον πάντα τὴν πάθος ἡ ψυχή ὁμοιότατος. ἔστω τὸν ὅπου ὅλως ἐν τῇ καὶ πολλά καὶ κατακαλλήθηκεν καὶ ἀνήθησαι τῷ ψυχήν εἶναι, καὶ μὴ ἀποκεφαλίσθην τῷ ἰόμενος καὶ τῷ πολλῷ εἶναι. εἰ γάρ τοῦτο μὴ παραξενίζεται, ἡ τὰ πᾶν συνέκειται καὶ διασκέδασται κάθεται ὅπως ἐσται, ἂν ὄνομα τὰ πάντα περιπαθεῖται ἐκεῖ καὶ μετὰ φρονήσεως ἁγίου, πλὴν μὲν ὅλως, ἐνεπήκιν πολλά τὰ ὅπως, μᾶ τῇ, ἢ δ' ἐν τῷ ὅπως πάντα, τῷ μὲν ὅπως ἢ τῷ ὅπως ὁρμηθεὶς τῷ μερεστῶς πάντας, τῷ δὲ ἀνερχόμενο τῇ φρονίμου ἄγονος. εἰ οἷς δὲ μὴ ἀνθρώπως, δὲ ἐν τῷ ἀναφέρεται μικτὸς σύνθετος ἢ μὲν ἀνθρώπως τῇ καὶ αὐτά ἀνθρώπως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ σώματα γνώμης μεριστοῦτο τῇ τρίτην ἡ ἀνθρώπως συνεκεφάλισσαν αὐτὸς ἀνήθησις εἰδος. εἰ τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπως εἶναι πολλά καὶ ἐν τῷ δὲ σώματα πολλά μόνον ὅπως ἀνθρώπως ἐν ἄνεναι.

1 The reference is Ἰωάννου 35:1-4 (a passage repeatedly quoted or referred to in Plotinus's works on the soul).
IV. 2 [1]. ON THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL II

In the intelligible world is true being; Intellect is the best part of it; but souls are There too; for it is because they have come Thence that they are here too. That world has souls without bodies, but this world has the souls which have come to be in bodies and are divided by bodies. There the whole of Intellect is all together and not separated or divided, and all souls are together in the world which is eternity, not in spatial separation. Intellect, then, is always inseparable and indivisible, but soul is inseparable and indivisible. There, but it is in its nature to be divided. For its division is departing from Intellect and coming to be in a body. It is therefore properly said to be “divisible in the sphere of bodies” because it departs and is divided in this way. Then how is it also “indivisible”? Because the whole of it did not depart, but there is something of it which did not come [down here] which is not naturally divisible. So then “from the indivisible and that which is divisible in the sphere of bodies” is equivalent to saying that soul is composed of the part which is above and that which is attached to that higher world but has flowed out as far as these parts, like a line from a centre. But when it has come here in this part, see how in this way it preserves in this very part the nature of the whole.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 2.

μέρης αὐτῆς τὴν φύσιν τοῦ θλον. οὔτε γὰρ ἐνταξθα μόνον μεριστῇ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἁμερίστως. τὸ γὰρ
20 μεριζόμενον αὐτῆς ἁμερίστως μερίζεται. εἰς ὅλον
gὰρ τὸ πῶς δοσά αὐτήν καὶ μὴ μεροθέασα τῷ ὅλῃ εἰς ὅλον τῷ ἐν παντὶ εἶναι μερισταί.

ON THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL. II

For even here it is not only divisible, but also indivisible; for that of it which is divided is indivisibly divided. For it gives itself to the whole body and is not divided in that it gives itself whole to the whole and is divided in that it is present in every part.
IV. 3–5. ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL.

Introductory Note.

This great work (Nos. 27–29 in the chronological order), rather oddly divided by Porphyry into two major parts (see notes on IV. 3. 32 and IV. 4. 23) with an appendix on seeing and hearing, belongs to Plotinus's middle period. It was written soon after the treatise on omnipresence (VI. 4–5 [22–23]) and in Porphyry's chronological order immediately follows the treatise on impassibility (III. 6 [26]). In all these treatises Plotinus seems to have been particularly inclined to minimise the distinction between intellect and soul and to represent souls at their highest as virtually indistinguishable from intellects. In the great work which immediately follows in the chronological order (divided by Porphyry into III. 8 [30], V. 8 [31], V. 5 [32], and I. I. 9 [33]) the distinction between the hypostases is more strongly emphasised. The work consists of a series of very thorough discussions of what seemed to Plotinus to be the main difficulties in the Platonic doctrine of soul as he understood it. It is helpful to us (whose normal philosophical starting-point is very different) in our efforts to understand both the philosophy of Plotinus and late Greek philosophy in general to see how these difficulties arise. In the first place it is important to remember that for Plotinus, as for his Platonic and Stoic predecessors and his Neoplatonic successors, "soul" does not mean only, or primarily, human soul. The physical universe as a whole is a single ensouled living being, and its great parts, the heavenly bodies and the earth, have divine souls.

ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL.

greatly superior in dignity and power to human ones. The problem therefore arises of the relationship of our souls to the World-Soul, and we should notice that the conclusion of the very careful discussion of this at the beginning of IV. 3 is that we are not parts or products of the World-Soul, but it and our souls and all other souls are parts of the hypostasis Soul, being, that is, an essentially the same level. The World-Soul is our sister, mother, and we can rise as high as it and become its fellow-contemplatives and collaborators. Problems also arise and have to be carefully considered about the psychology of the universe as a whole, the heavenly bodies and the earth, about whether they have or need sense-perception and memory.

We also need to remember that for Plotinus, as for all Platonists, the presence of souls in bodies is something which raises problems and has to be accounted for. The distinctive characteristic of Platonic thinking about the soul is that its activities of pure thought, which seem to be independent of the body, are not considered in any way problematic; it is the soul's presence, activity and experience in the body and the world of the senses which Platonists find in need of explanation. Hence a large part of IV. 3 is devoted to discussing how the soul gets into the body and in what sense it can ever be said to be "in" the body. It does not seem that there is any much difference as has sometimes been maintained between Plotinus's earlier and later views on the descent of souls into bodies, though, as always with him, there are variations of emphasis in different passages. The doctrine at which he eventually arrives in IV. 8 (6) (after a very pessimistic and dualistic beginning) does not appear to be substantially different from that in this treatise or in later writings, e.g. II. 9 (33), I. 4 (46), III. 2–3 (47–8), I. 1 (53). Consistently with this Platonic attitude, Plotinus takes care in his detailed discussions of sense-perception and emotion to maintain a strict body-soul dualism and does his best to show, here as elsewhere, that body cannot really affect soul.
ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL

On difficulties about the soul

partly remains above: it is the result of an irresistible impulse which draws them to the bodies prepared for them by Universal Soul, and so is at once free and necessary (chs. 12-13). Comparison with the story of Prometheus, Epimetheus, and Pandora arbitrarily interpreted (ch. 14). Souls descend first from the intelligible world to heaven and then some of them go to earthly bodies; the reasons for their differences here below are diverse (ch. 15). Punishments, suffering, injustices are part of the universal order (ch. 16). Heaven is closer to the intelligible than earth; the distracting magic of our lower world (ch. 17).

In what sense disembodied souls, or souls in heavenly bodies, are reasonable, and why they do not talk (ch. 18). The embodied soul: what Plato means by "divisible" in the sphere of bodies, and what an embodied soul remains "invisible" (ch. 19). Neither soul as a whole nor its so-called parts are in body as a place. In what sense then can soul be said to be "in body"? Discussion of this question, on more or less Peripatetic lines but rejecting the Peripatetic solution that soul is in body as form is in matter (chs. 20-21). The analogy of light: body is in soul, not soul in body, and the different organic parts of body (brain and nervous system, etc.) are illuminated and activated by soul according to their capacities and needs (chs. 22-23). What happens to souls when they have left their bodies, and how such souls inevitably and naturally wander into the appropriate place of punishment (ch. 24). Discussion of memory (continuing to IV. 4. 12): what has memory? Certainly not eternal beings; but does it belong to soul or to the composite living being (ensouled body) (ch. 25)? Sense-perception and memory; memory belongs to the soul, not the composite (ch. 26). But to which soul? The analogy of the shade of Heracles (ch. 27). It is soul's image-making power which is the seat of memory, of desires, perceptions, and the verbal expression of our thoughts (chs. 28-30). Two image-making powers are required, one for the higher and one for the lower soul (ch. 31). What memories pass from one soul to the other,
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and how quickly good souls lose their memories in the higher world; they do not even remember who they are, but are assimilated to Intellect, grasping the whole of intelligible reality in a single act of intuition (IV. 3. 32–IV. 4. 2).

How souls again reactualize their potential memories when they descend from the intelligible world to heaven and then to the world below (chs. 3–5). Memory and the souls in heaven (in the living, divine, heavenly bodies); they do not exercise memory and do not need it (chs. 6–8).

The memory of "Zeus": this divine name can be used either for the World-Soul or for Divine Intellect as Maker of the physical universe; neither needs memory for its divine activity in the world (chs. 9–11). Calculation and memory are only necessary to beings which are not yet intelligent (ch. 12). The difference between Nature and Intellect (chs. 13–14). Time and souls, universal and individual (chs. 15–17). Discussion of the experiences and activities of embodied soul (continuing to ch. 29): body is not soulless but ensouled, like warmed air (ch. 18). The nature of pain and pleasure (ch. 19). The part played by body and soul in desire (chs. 20–21). The psychology of the earth: does it have perceptions (ch. 22)? Organs are necessary for sense-perception (ch. 23). The perceptions of the universe and its great parts (heavenly bodies and earth), which do not need sense-organs like ours (chs. 24–7). The part played by body and soul in passions (chs. 28–8). Prayer, magic and the operations of the stars: difficulties can be resolved by understanding the interaction of the parts in the organic unity of the whole (chs. 30–39). The magic of the universal living organism (chs. 40–5).

IV. 5

How do we see? Discussion and detailed refutation of theories that a medium is necessary for sight (chs. 1–4). A medium is not necessary for hearing either; both are to be explained by the organic unity of the universe (ch. 5). Light as incorporeal energy or activity of the luminous
IV. 3. (27) ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ ΑΠΟΡΙΩΝ
ΠΡΩΤΟΝ

1. Περὶ ψυχῆς, ὡσα ἀπορήσαντες δεῖ ἐς ἐυπορίαν καταστῆσαι, ἢ καὶ ἐν ἀβαίνῃς ταῖς ἀπορίαις σταθμὸς τοῦτο χαὶ πέρασις ἐξεῖν, εἰδέναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀπορον, ὁμοίως ὡς ἐχεῖ τὴν πραγματείαν 5 ποιήσασθαι. περὶ τίνος γὰρ ἂν τὸς μᾶλλον τὸ πολὺ λέγων καὶ ἑποτοῦμοις εὐλόγων ἢ διασειώματι, ἢ περὶ ταύτης; διὰ τὸ πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα, καὶ ὡς τι ἡμῶν τὴν γνώσιν διδόωμεν, ὡς τὸ ὑφεῖ ἐστὶ καὶ ἄφι 10 ἄν ἐστι. πειδοίμεθα δ’ ὡς καὶ τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ παρακελεύσματα ὑποτείχον γνώσεις εἰρήνην παρακελεύσμαται περὶ τοῖς τὴν ἐξήπταν ποιήσαμεν, ἔστεν τὰ ᾽ ἄλλα καὶ εἴρεων ὑποτείχοις δικαίως ἢ τὸ ἐγνώθαι τῆς περὶ ἑντὸς τοῦτος εἰρήνης, τὸ γας ἐρατῶν πολδούτες λαβέων θέμαν τοῦ νοῦ. 1 ἢ γὰρ καὶ ἢν τῷ παντὶ νῦ τοῦ ἐστὶν· ὡσεὶ εὐλόγων ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος τὸν ὑπάρχον ἀναλόγων, τὸ δὲ ὑπάρχων. τὰς δὲ

1 Θέμα τοῦ νεότατος Πολιτικῆς τοῦ νεότατος Πολιτικῆς, Ν. Σ. Θ. Θείων Th. Theiler.

1 It is interesting to compare the beginning of this great treatise on the soul with the beginning of the commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle's work on the same subject (Alexander De Anima 1-2 Bruns). Plotinus had probably read Alexander's work and quotes the same Delphic 32
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one of another. And we must consider how the gods are received into the soul. But we shall consider this when we investigate how the soul comes to be in a body: but now let us go back to those who say that our own souls, also, come from the soul of the All. For they will, perhaps, assert that it is not a sufficient argument for our souls not being parts of the Soul of the All that they too reach us far as it does, and are intellectual in the same way (even if they accept that "in the same way"), for parts (they will assert) have the same form as their wholes. And they will bring forward Plato as holding this opinion, when, to confirm that the All is ensouled, he says that, just as our own bodies are part of the All, so our souls are part of the Soul of the All. And (they will assert) that it is said and clearly shown that we follow along with the Circuit of the All, and, deriving our characters and fortunes from it, and being inside the All, receive our souls from that which encompasses us. And what in us each part of us receives from our soul, in the same way we too, being on the same pattern parts in relation to the whole, receive as parts from the whole soul. And (they will say that) "all soul cares for all that is soulless" means just this, and that when Plato said it he intended not to leave anything else outside soul, beyond the Soul of the All: for this is the soul put in charge of all that is soulless.

2. The first answer which we have to make to this is the following: that, by agreeing that [the Soul of the All and individual souls] occupy themselves with the same [bodies] they admit that they have the same form, and so by this same admission give them...
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a common genus and exclude individual souls from being parts; on the contrary, it would be more proper for them to say that they are the same, and one, and each soul is all. But if they make it one they attach it to something else, which is no longer the soul of this or that but is not itself the soul of anything, either of the universe or of anything else, but makes that which is soul both of the universe and of anything ensouled. And it really is correct that not all of soul belongs to anything, since of course it is an essence, but there is a soul which absolutely does not belong to anything, and all those which do belong to anything become souls of things occasionally and incidentally. But perhaps we must get a clearer idea of what "part" means in things of this kind. We can leave out of account "part" as understood of bodies, whether the body is all of the same form or not, noting only this, that when one speaks of "part" in the case of bodies whose parts are alike, the "part" refers to the mass, not to the form, as for instance with whiteness; for the whiteness in the portion of milk is not a part of the whiteness of the whole milk but is the whiteness of a portion, but not a portion of whiteness; for whiteness is totally without quantity, and not a quantity. But when we speak of "part" in things which are not bodies, we should be using it either as we do in the case of numbers, two part of ten, for instance: what we are saying is to be applied only to numbers by themselves; or as we speak of a part of a circle and a line, or as we say a theorem is part of a science. Now in the case of numerical units and geometrical figures it is necessary that, just as with bodies, the
PLOTINUS. ENNEAD IV. 3.

30 ἐπὶ φυσῆς τὸ μέρος λέγεται, οὐτὶ γὰρ ποσὰν ὀστὼς, ὡς δεκακά τὴν πάσαν, τὴν δὲ μονάδα ἔναι: ἀλλα τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ ὅσα συμβόλωσαν, καὶ οἷς ἐν τὰ τὰ δέκα, καὶ ἐκάστατα αὐτῶν τῶν μεγάλων ἡ φυσὴ ἔσται, ἡ ἐξ ἀξίων ἀπώτατον ἡ ψυχή, καὶ δι' αὐτὴν καὶ τὸ μέρος τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς ἀναγκάζεται ὡσοὶ ἔσται.

35 εἶναι. τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ συνεχοῦς διὸ ἀνάγκη τὸ μέρος, οὐν τὸ ὅλον ἐστὶν, εἶναι, ὃν κόσμον ἡ τετραγωνία, ἢ οὐ πάντα γε τὰ μέρα ρμαί ἐφ᾽ ἐν ἐντοι βαθεῖτέ τὸ μέρος, οὐν ἐπὶ τῶν τετράγωνων τρίγωνων, ἀλλὰ παραλληλοσταστα: τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ὁμοιὸν τίθενται εἶναι. καὶ

40 ἐπὶ γραμμῆς δὲ τὰ μεγάλα μέρας ὑπὲρ τὴν γραμμὴν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μεγέθη διαφέρει καὶ ἐντάθεται. ἐπὶ δὲ φυσῆς ἡ διαφορὰ τὸ μεγέθη εἰ λέγωστο τῆς μερικῆς πρὸς τὴν ὅλην, ποσὰν τι ἐστὶν καὶ πῶς τὴν διαφορὰν λαμβάνομεν καθὼς ψυχὴ παρὰ τὸν ποσοῦ ἀλλὰ ὑπόκειται τάσας δυναμὶ καὶ ὅλώς. φαίνεται δὲ

45 οἷοθε μερισμένη ὀστὼς ὡς τὸ μεγέθη. οὐδὲ ἐν συγχωρήσεις δὲ οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ καταστέμενοι τὴν ὅλην εἰς μέρη: ἀνακλαίοντας γὰρ τὴν ὅλην, καὶ ὅναμα
PLOTinus: Ennead IV. 3.

μόνον ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ ἀρχὴ τῆς ποτε ἦν πάσα, ὡς εἰ ὁ ὅμοιον μερισθέντος εἰς πολλὰ ἐκατον τὸ ἐν ἐκάστω
50 ἀμφορεῖ λέγω τοι ῳ μέρος ὁμοίο τοῦ ὅλου. ἄρ’ 
οὖν εὕρω μέρος ὡς θεορία τῷ τῆς ἐπιστήμης
λέγει τῷ ὅλῃ ἐπιστήμης, αὐτῆς μὲν μεσούσις
οὐδὲν ἦττιν, τοῦ δὲ μερισμόν ὁμοίο προφοράς καὶ
ἐνεργείας ἐκάστου ὅσῃ; ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιαύτῳ ἐκα-
τοτιν μελακοπήριε ἔχει τῷ ὅλῳ ἐπιστήμης, ὡ δὲ ἐστὶν
55 οὐδὲν ἦττιν ὅλῃ. εἰ δὴ οὕτως ἐπὶ ψευδῆ τῆς τε
ὅλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐκ ἂν ἦ ὅλη, ἦς τὰ πεινάτα
μέρη, ἔτοιν τωτῇ, ἀλλὰ σεῦ ἄφ’ ἐσορότι: οὐ
tοῖνος οὐκ τῷ κόσμῳ, ἀλλὰ τῶν καὶ αὐτή τῶν ἐν
μέρει. μέρη ἂρα πᾶσαι μὲν ὁμογενές ὅσοι; 
ἀλλὰ πῶς ἢ μὲν κόσμου, εἰ 2 δὲ μερῶν τοῦ κόσμου;
3. 'Αλλ’ ἄρα εὕρω μέρη, ὡσπερ ἄν καὶ ἐὰν ἐνὸς
ξύνει τίς ἐξ οὕτως τὴν ἐν τῷ δικτυλίῳ 3 ψευδῆ
μέρος τῆς ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἔως ὅλῃ; ἀλλ’ οὕτως γε ἐν ὅλῇ
ἡ συνειμὶς παίει ψευδῆ ἐξω σώματως γίγνεσθαι, ἢ
5 πάσαι οὐκ ἐν σώματι, ἀλλ’ ἐξω τοῦ σώματος τοῦ

1 Kirchhoff*: λέγει ν. RJTC: λέγει B.
2 Theler: δικτυλίῳ, ν. RJTC: δικτυλίῳ, ἧς B.
3 R, Creuzer*: δικτυλίῳ ν. RJTC, H–S.

1 Here and in IV. 3. 8. 43 practically all the MSS read δικτυλίῳ, which Henry and Schoyen wish to retain, supposing that in these two places alone in Greek the word means "diameter", a "fingerlet" or "toilet". But (i) everywhere
50 it will be only a name, unless it was once a kind of universal principle [but exists no longer], as if when wine has been divided into many portions, one might call each portion of wine in each jar a part of the whole wine. Well then, is it a part in the way
in which a theorem that belongs to science is said to be a part of the whole science, which continues to exist [as a whole] none the less, and its division is a kind of manifestation and activity of each individual part? In a state of affairs like this each theorem contains the whole science potentially, but the science is none the less a whole. If this is how it is with the whole soul and the others, the whole, of which the parts are parts of this kind, will not be the soul of anything, but an independent reality: so it will not even be the soul of the universe, but this too will be one of the partial souls. So all [both individual souls and the soul of the universe] will be parts of one, since they have the same form. But how then does one come to be the soul of the universe, and the others of parts of the universe?
3. But perhaps individual souls are parts in the way in which in one living thing the soul in the tool
might be called a part of the whole soul in all the living being? But this way of thinking about it
either allows no soul to exist outside body, or makes all soul disembodied, and puts even the soul called
else in Greek δακτύλοι means a ring or something ring-shaped; (ii) there is no reason for Plotinus to use a diminutive in either
passage. So it seems to me more reasonable to assume the meaning of the same archaic mistake twice (perhaps the
scribe of the archetype had some reason for thinking about
rings while he was copying the early chapters of IV. 3.) than a use of a fairly common Greek word in an unprecedented
sense for no good reason.

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that of the All outside the body of the universe. This we must consider [later]; but now we must enquire in what sense it would be possible to speak of “part” according to this analogy. For if the soul of the All gives itself to all the partial living things, and each individual soul is a part in this sense, then if it was divided it would not give itself to each, but it will be itself everywhere, the complete soul existing simultaneously in many things as one and identical. But this would no longer allow one soul to be the whole and the other a part, especially in the case of things which have the same amount of power: for all the powers are present in both souls. For where organs, too, have different functions, eyes and ears for instance, we must not say that one part of the soul is present in sight, another in the ears—this sort of division belongs to other philosophers—but the same part, even if a different power, is active in each separate organ; because the organs are different, different perceptions occur—though all are of forms, since the soul can take the shape of all forms (the fact that all perceived forms must go to one centre also makes this clear). And [we must say that] it belongs to the organs through which the forms go that not all of them are able to receive everything, and the affections differ according to the organs, but the judgement on them comes from one and the same principle, which is like a judge and is well informed about the words spoken and the things done. But we have already said that the soul is one thing everywhere, also in its different functions.
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And if our souls were like sense-perceptions, it is not possible for each one of us to think of himself, but the soul of the All [would have to do the thinking]; but if our thinking was our own, each soul would be independent. But since the soul is also rational, and rational in the sense in which the universal soul is called rational, that which is called a part will be the same as the whole, not a part of the whole.

4. What then is to be said, if the soul is one in this way, when someone enquires into the consequences, and raises the first difficulty, whether this sort of simultaneous unity in all things is really possible, and the next. If it is possible when some soul is in body, and some not in body? For perhaps it will follow that all soul is always in body, and especially the soul of the All: for it is not said to leave the body, as ours is; and yet some people do say that ours will leave this particular body, but will not altogether outside body. But if it is going to be altogether outside body, how will one soul leave the body and the other not, when it is the same soul [in both]?

Now in the case of Intellect, which separates itself by differentiation into parts which are not cut off from each other, but is all together for ever—for this reality is surely uncediled—no difficulty of this kind can arise; but in the case of the soul which is said to be divisible in relation to bodies, this assertion that all souls are one thing has many difficulties; unless of course one made the one stand by itself without falling into body, and then said that all the souls, the soul of the All and the others, came from that one, living together with each other, so to speak, down to a certain level and being one soul by belonging to no particular thing; and that, being

3 Theiler, Enn. 44
4 Thaul: ἐν σωματικά (vel ἐν σώματι) O Enn.
5 Theiler: ἑυγερέες ἐν σώματι.
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fastened [to the one] by their edges on their upper side, they strike down this way and that, like the light which, just when it reaches the earth, divides itself among houses and is not divided, but is one none the less. 1 And the Soul of the All would always remain transcendent because it would have nothing to do with coming down, even with its lower part, nor with a turning to the things here below, but our souls would come down because they would have their part marked off for them in this sphere, and by the turning to them of that which needs their care. The Soul of the All [that is], its lowest part] would be like the soul in a great growing plant, which directs the plant without effort or noise; our lower part would be as if there were maggots in a rotten part of the plant—for that is what the ensouled body is like in the All. The rest of our soul, which is of the same nature as the higher parts of universal soul, would be like a gardener concerned about the maggots in the plant and anxiously caring for it. Or it is as one might speak of a healthy man living with other healthy men as being at the service of his neighbours either in his action or his contemplation; and of a sick man, concerned with the care of his body, as being at the service of his body and belonging to it.

5. But how will there still be one particular soul which is yours, one which is the soul of this particular man, and one which is another's? Are they the souls of particular individuals in the lower order, but belong in the higher order to that higher unity? But this will mean that Socrates, and the soul of Socrates, will exist as long as he is in the body; but

1 For this image sp. Marcus Aurelius XII. 30.
he will cease to be precisely when he attains to the very best. Now no real being ever ceases to be; since the Intelligents. There too are not dissolved into a unity because they are not corporeally divided, but each remains distinct in otherness, having the same essential being. So too it is with souls, which depend in order on each several Intellect, and are expressions of intelligents, further unfolded than they are, having passed, we may say, from brevity to multiplicity. They are linked to the brevity of intellect by that in each of them which is least divided. They have already willed to be divided but cannot reach complete division; they keep identity and difference; each soul remains one, and all are one together. So we have given the sum of the discussion, that the souls springing from one, and the souls springing from one are many in the same way as intellect, divided and not divided; and the soul which abides is a single expression of intellect, and from it spring partial expressions which are also immaterial, just as in the world of intellect.

6. But why has the Soul of the All, which has the same form as ours, made the universe, but the soul of each individual has not, though it too has all things in itself? (We have explained that it can

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1 For the belief that there are Forms or Ideas of individuals (at least of individual men), which is probably, but not quite certainly, asserted here, cf. Y. 7. It also seems to be implied in IV. 3, 12, 1–5. For a careful examination of all the evidence about Forms of individuals in Plotinus see H. J. Blumenfeld, "Did Plotinus believe in Ideas of Individuals?" in Phronesis 11 (1966), 61–80; A. H. Armstrong, "Form, Individual and Person in Plotinus"; in Dionysius 1 (1977), 49–48 (= A. H. Armstrong Plotinian and Christian Studies (London 1978), No. XX.

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1 del. Kirkehoff.
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come to be and [continue to] exist in many things at once.) But now we must state—perhaps we shall also come to know how the same thing, when it is now in one body and now in another, does now this and now that, or is affected in this or that way, or both: this however requires a special discussion to itself: how then and why the Soul of the All has made the universe, but the particular souls direct [each] a part of it. There is of course nothing remarkable in some of those who have the same knowledge being in control of more, and some of less. But one could ask the reason why. But there is, one might answer, a difference between souls, and all the more in that the Soul of the All has not separated itself from soul as a whole but remained there and put on the body, but the individual souls, since body exists already, received their allotted parts when their sister soul, as we may say, was already ruling, as if it had already prepared their dwellings for them. There is a difference too, in that the soul of the All looks towards Intellect as a whole, but the individual souls rather to their own partial intellects. But perhaps those too would have been able to make [a world], but as the soul of the All had done so already they were unable to do so as well, since it had begun first. One could raise the same difficulty just as well if any other soul had taken the first place. But it is better to say [that the soul of the All has made the world] because it was more closely dependent on the beings above it: the beings which incline that way have greater power. For they keep themselves in a place of safety, and so make with the greatest ease; for it is a mark of greater power not to be affected in what it makes,
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and power comes from abiding above. The Soul of the All, then, abiding in itself makes, and the things which it makes comes to it, but the particular souls themselves go to the things. So they have departed to the depths; or rather, a great part of them has been dragged down and has dragged them with it by their thoughts to the lower existence. For we must understand that souls were called "second" and "third" according to whether they are nearer to or farther from [the higher world]; just as among us too not all souls have the same relationship to the realities There, but some men may unify themselves, others nearly reach this point in their striving, and others attain it in a lesser degree, in so far as they act by powers which are not the same, but some by the first, others by that by which comes after it, others by the third, though all of them have all.

7. So much for that. But what about the passage in the Philebus which suggests that the other souls are parts of the soul of the All? But this is not, as someone thinks, the intention of what is said, but what suited Plato's purpose at that stage in the argument, that the universe is ensouled. He establishes that by saying that it is absurd to say that the universe is soulless, when we, who possess a part of the body of the All, have souls. For how could the part have a soul when the All was soulless? He makes his own thought especially clear in the Timaeus, where [the Demiurge], when the soul of the All has come into existence, makes the other souls, mixing them from the same mixing-bowl from which he made the soul of the whole, making the other kind of soul of the same form as the soul of the All but giving it a difference by using second and third class

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1 See Timaeus 41D7.
2 Cf. Philebus 30A-B, whence, as Platonius suggests, Plato is really mainly concerned to argue that the universe must have a soul just as we have.
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ingredients. And what about the passage in the Phaedrus? All soul cares for all that is soulless? What could it be, then, which directs the nature of body, and either shapes it or sets it in order or makes it, except soul? And it is not the case that one soul is naturally able to do this, but the other is not. Plato says, then, that the "perfect" soul, the soul of the All, "walks on high," and does not come down, but, as we may say, rides upon the universe and works in it; and this is the manner of direction of every soul which is perfect. But when he speaks of the "soul which rules," he makes this another, distinct from the perfect one. But as for our following round the circuit of the All, and deriving our characters from it and being affected by it, this would be no sort of indication that our souls are parts of the soul of the All. For the soul is capable of taking many impressions from the nature of places and waters and air: and the situations of cities and the temperaments of bodies are different. And we stated that, since we are in the All, we have something from the soul of the whole, and we agreed that we were affected by the circuit of the universe; but we opposed another soul to this, and one which shows itself other especially by its opposition. As for the fact that we are begotten inside the universe, in the womb too we say that the soul which comes into the child is another one, not that of the mother.

our lower selves, the components of body and soul, by the physical universe of which they are parts, see II. 3, 9-12. Plotinus was always ready to admit that most of what ordinary people think of as distinctive traits of character and personality are due to physical conditions, heredity and environment.
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8. This then is how it is with the solution of this problem, and the fact of sympathy does not hinder our arguments: for since all souls derive from the same from which the soul of the Whole derives too, they have a community of feeling. For we have said already that they are both one and many. We have also explained how the part differs from the whole. We have made a general statement about the differences between souls, and now let us add briefly that besides their [different] bodies they can differ very notably in character, and in the activities of discursive reason and as a result of the lives they have lived before; for Plato says that the souls' choices take place according to their previous lives. And if one takes a general view of the nature of soul, the differences in souls have been mentioned in those passages too where there was talk of "seconds" and "thirds", and it was said that all souls are all things, but each [is differentiated] according to that which is active in it. That is, by one being united in actuality, one being in a state of knowledge, one in a state of desire, and in that different souls look at different things and are and become what they look at; and the fullness and completion for souls is not the same for all. But if the whole structure in which they exist is complex—for every single rational principle is manifold and complex, like a soul-organism containing many forms—if this is really so, there is structural organisation, and the realities are not completely cut off from each other, and there is nothing random among the realities (as there is not even among bodies), and it follows that there must be a [definite] number. For, again, realities must be static, and the intelligible realities must remain

3 Theiler.
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the same, and each must be numerically one: for this is how it is this definite reality. For in some things, because of their bodily nature, individuality is fluid because the form comes in from outside and they have continual existence only according to specific form, in imitation of the real beings, but in others, since they are not produced by composition, the existence of each is in that which it is, numerically one, which is there from the beginning, and does not become what it was not and will not cease to be what it is. Since even if there is to be something which makes them it will not make them out of matter; if it does this it must add something substantial from itself: so that there will be change affecting this making power itself, if it now makes more and now less. And why should it make more or less now, but not go on always in this same way? And that which has come into being will not be everlasting, if it is now more and now less; but it is settled that soul is a thing of this [everlasting] kind. How then will it be infinite, if it is going to remain static? Its infinity lies in its power; it is infinite because its power is infinite, and not as if it was going to be divided to infinity. For God too is not limited. And these souls, too, are not each what

"Infinity" here only mean infinity of power (as here) or unboundedness because there is nothing to bound or measure intelligible reality—infinitesimal number is the ultimate measure and so not itself measured, bounded or limited (as in VI. 6). The doctrine of "relative άπραξία" in Proclus (Elements of Theology prop. 89-90, pp. 83-7 Dods) is helpful to the understanding of Plotinus here. The One for him is infinite in the sense of being absolutely beyond any sort of determination or limitation, because it is beyond being and thought, but is hardly ever called άπραξίαs.

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they are by some external limit, as if they were a definite size, but each is itself as much as it wants to be, and never goes outside itself as it proceeds, but that part of it which is naturally adapted to reach bodies reaches everywhere in them; it is certainly not torn away from itself when it is in the finger\(^1\) as in the foot. So it is also in the All, to whatever it reaches; it is in one part of a plant and also in another, even if it is cut off; so that it is in the original plant and the part cut off from it: for the body of the all is one, and soul is everywhere in it as in one thing. And when an animal reaps, if many others spring from it, the original soul of the whole animal is no longer in the body: for the body on its side does not have the capacity to receive it, or the animal would not have died. But the products of the decay which are adapted for the generation of animals, some for those of one kind and some for those of another, have soul since there is nothing from which it is absent, but one thing is able to receive it and another not to receive it. And things which become ensouled in this way do not make more souls: for they depend on the one soul which remains; just as in ourselves, when some parts are cut off and others grow instead of them, soul leaves the old ones and comes to the new as long as the one soul remains. But in the All the one soul is always there; but some of the things within it take soul and some put it off, but the soul-activities remain the same.

\(^1\) See ch. 3, n. 1.
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9. But we must also enquire how soul comes to be in body. What is its way of entering? This too is a subject no less worth wondering about and enquiring into. Now there are two ways of soul entering body: one is when a soul is already in a body and changes bodies, or passes from a body of air or fire to one of earth (people do not call this change of body because the body from which entry is made is not apparent); and the other, passage from bodilessness to any kind of body, which would of course be the first communication of soul with body. About this last, then, it will be proper to investigate what it is that happens when a soul which is altogether pure and free from body takes upon itself a bodily nature. It is perhaps suitable, or rather it is necessary, to begin with the Soul of the All. Of course when talking about the Soul of the All we must consider that the terms "entry" and "ensoulment" are used in the discussion for the sake of clear explanation. For there never was a time when this universe did not have a soul, or when body existed in the absence of soul, or when matter was not set in order; but in discussing these things one can consider them apart from each other. [When one is reasoning about] any kind of composition, it is always legitimate to analyse it in thought into its parts. For the truth is as follows. If body did not exist, soul would not go forth, since there is no place other than body where it is natural for it to be. But if it intends to go forth, it will produce a place for itself, and so a body. Soul's rest is, we may say, confined in absolute rest; a great light shines from it, and at the outermost edge of this firelight there is a darkness. Soul sees this darkness and informs

1 Th. 1:3:1

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PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 3.

Ἐπείσερ ὑπεσθή, ἐμφρούσειν αὐτῶ. οὐ γὰρ ἦν 
θεμιτὸν γειτονίαν τι αὐτῇ λόγον ἀμοιρὸν εἶναι, οἷον ἔδεχετο τὸ λεγόμενον "ὁμοίων ἐν ὁμοίῳ" τῷ 
γεγομένῳ. γεγομένου δὴ οἶνοι οἷς καλὸς καὶ 
ποικίλος οὐκ ἀπεκτάθη τοῖς πεποικότοις, οὔτ' ἂν 
ἀκούσας αὐτὸν αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ παλαιόστε τῶν ἄλλων ἐπικόλλησις ἀμοιβαὶς ἀγαθόν μὲν ἐμπιπτόμενον τὰ ἐξεῖ 
καὶ τῷ καλῷ, οὐδὲ δὴ τῷ εἶναι δυνατὸν ἢ ἀντὶ 
μεταλαμβάνειν, ἀλλὰ ἔλθε τῷ ἐφεστηκότι. ἄν

30 γὰρ μὲν ἔνων ἐπιστοταί: ἐξάφυγοι τῷ τιμωστῷ τρόπῳ, 
ἔχων σιγῆν οὐκ ἄντος, ἀλλ' ἄντος, κρατούμενος 
οὔ κρατοῦν, καὶ ἐγνώμενος ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχων. 
κεῖται 
γὰρ ἐν τῇ σιγῇ πικραίνομεν αὐτὸν καὶ οὐδέν ἀμοιρόν 
ἐπιπτός, ὡς ἂν ἐν τοιούτῳ δίκτυσιν τεκνόμενον 
ζῆν, οὐ διαμένον δὲ αὐτοῦ ποιεῖται ἐν ὧν ἐστιν.

40 ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν δίκτυον ἐκπαιδευμένης ὢς τῆς διακο-


images
10. With this understanding we must go back again to that which is always unchanged and grasp all as existing simultaneously; just as the air, the light, the sun, or the moon, the light and again the sun all exist simultaneously, but hold first, second and third positions, so here there is soul always static, or the first, then the next in order, like the last gleams of the light of a fire; afterwards the first coming from this last gleam is thought of as a shadow of fire, and then this at the same time is thought of as illuminated, so that it is as if a form hovered over what is cast upon soul, which at first was altogether obscure. It was given ordered beauty according to a formative rational principle, since soul has potentially in it, and throughout the whole of it, the power to set in order according to rational principles; just as the formative rational principles in seeds mould and shape living beings like little ordered universes. For whatever comes into contact with soul is made as the essential nature of soul is in a state to make it; and it makes, not according to a purpose brought in from outside, nor waiting upon planning and considerations; for in this way it would not make according to nature, but to an art brought in from outside. For art is later than soul, and imitates it, making dim and weak imitations, toys not worth much, bringing in many devices to help it in producing an image of nature.¹ But soul is by its essential power in control

¹ For his fullest critique of the idea of "artisan" creation. But Plotinus can be much more positive about art, and can even say that sometimes art can improve on nature because the artist's mind has direct access to the Forms in the Intelligible world of which natural things are images too, and sometimes, for various reasons, very imperfect ones; op. V. 8. 194-98.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 3.

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of bodies, so that they come to be and are in the state to which soul leads them, since their first principles are unable to resist its will. In the things that come after one often hinders another and they are deprived of the attainment of their proper form, that which the formative principle operating on a small scale wishes them to have: but there in the universe as a whole, where the whole form is produced by soul and the things which are produced have all together an order, what has come into being is beautiful without labour or hindrance. But soul has constructed in the world shrines of gods and dwellings for men, and others for other creatures. For what else ought to come from soul except the things which it has the power to make? It belongs to fire to make things hot, and to something else to cool them; but one power belongs to soul which remains within it, and another which goes out to form something else. In soulless things the one power, so to speak, lies asleep in them; and the power from them which goes out to something else consists in making like themselves that which is capable of being affected: and this is of course common to all that exists, to bring things to likeness with themselves. But the work of soul is something awake, both that within it and in the same way that which goes out to something else. Soul therefore makes alive all the other things which do not live of themselves, and makes them live the sort of life by which it lives itself. So since it lives in a rational principle, it gives a rational principle to the body, an image of that which it has—for what it gives to the body is also [only] an image of life—and the shapes of body, of which it has the rational formative prin-

1 transpos. Kleist (Studien 40); del. Dodds, B-T.
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1. It has these of gods and of everything. This, then, is why the universe too has everything.

11. And I think that the wise men of old, who made temples and statues in the wish that the gods should be present to them, looking to the nature of the All, had in mind that the nature of soul is everywhere easy to attract, but that if someone were to construct something sympathetic to it and able to receive a part of it, it would of all things receive soul most easily. That which is sympathetic to it is what imitates it in some way, like a mirror able to catch [the reflection of] a form. Yes, the nature of the All, too, made all things skilfully in imitation of the 'intelligible' realities of which it had the rational principles, and when each thing in this way had become a rational principle, and when each thing in this way had become a rational principle, and when each thing in this way had becoming a principle in matter, shaped according to that which was before matter, it linked it with that god in conformity with whom it came into being and to whom the soul looked and whom it had in its making. For it was certainly not possible for the thing made to be without a share in the god, nor again for the god to come down to the thing made. So that sun in the divine realm is Intellect—let this serve as an example for our discourse—and next after it is soul, dependent upon it and abiding while Intellect abides. This soul gives the edge of itself.

Necastrian theurgic practice, though not without objection from the more rational members of the school: cf. Sudaipius 475 (Maximus, Eusebius of Myndus, and the Emperor Julian).

1 The allusion here is to the ancient Egyptian practice of ritually animating statues: cf. the Hermetic Aetapagis 57. 11 p. 247 Nock-Pringshee. It became a regular part of later
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 3.

... καὶ ποτε διὰ μέσου αὐτής κάκει συνήφθαι ὅπως 26 ἐρμηνευτικὴ γενομένη τῶν τοῦ ἠλέῳ τοῦ ὕλης, καὶ εἰς τοῦτον τὸν ἴδιον τῷ ἴδιῳ, καὶ ποτε διὰ μέσου αὐτῆς κάκει συνήφθαι ὅπως 26 ἐρμηνευτικὴ γενομένη τῶν τοῦ ἠλέῳ τοῦ ἴδιον τῷ ἴδιῳ, καὶ ποτε διὰ μέσου αὐτῆς κάκει συνήφθαι ὅπως 26 ἐρμηνευτικὴ γενομένη τῶν τοῦ ἠλέῳ τοῦ ἴδιον τῷ ἴδιῳ, καὶ ποτε διὰ μέσου αὐτῆς κάκει συνήφθαι ὅπως 26 ἐρμηνευτικὴ γενομένη τῶν τοῦ ἠλέῳ τοῦ ἴδιον τῷ ἴδιῳ, καὶ ποτε διὰ μέσου αὐτῆς κάκει συνήφθαι ὅπως 26 ἐρμηνευτικὴ γενομένη τῶν τοῦ ἠλέῳ τοῦ ἴδιον τῷ ἴδιῳ, καὶ ποτε διὰ μέσου αὐτῆς κάκει συνήφθαι ὅπως 26 ἐρμηνευτικὴ γενομένη τῶν τοῦ ἠλέῳ τοῦ ἴδιον τῷ ἴδιῳ, καὶ ποτε διὰ μέσου αὐτῆς κάκει συνήφθαι ὅπως 26 ἐρμηνευτικὴ γενομένη τῶν τοῦ ἠλέῳ τοῦ ἴδιον τῷ ἴδιῳ, καὶ ποτε διὰ μέσου αὐτῆς κάκει συνήφθαι ὅπως 26 ἐρμηνευτικὴ γενομένη τῶν τοῦ ἠλέῳ τοῦ ἴδιον τῷ ἴδιῳ, καὶ ποτε διὰ μέσου αὐτῆς κάκει συνήφθαι ὅπως 26 ἐρμηνευτικὴ γενομένη τῶν τοῦ ἠλέῳ τοῦ ἴδιον τῷ ἴδιῳ, καὶ ποτε διὰ μέσου αὐτῆς κάκει συνήφθαι ὅπως 26 ἐρμηνευτικὴ γενομένη τῶν τοῦ ἠλέῳ τοῦ ἴδιον τῷ ἴδιῳ, καὶ ποτε διὰ μέσου αὐτῆς κάκει συνήφθαι ὅπως 26 ἐρμηνευτικὴ γενομένη τῶν τοῦ ἠλέῳ τοῦ ἴδιον τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιόν τῷ ἴδιό

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which borders on this [visible] sun to this sun, and makes a connection of it to the divine realm through the medium of itself, and acts as an interpreter of what comes from this sun to the intelligible sun and from the intelligible sun to this sun, in so far as this sun does reach the intelligible sun through soul. 2 For nothing is a long way off or far from anything else—distance in another sense is a matter of difference and not being mixed but [the divine] is by itself, and is with the world while remaining separate. These [heavenly bodies] are gods by for ever not departing from those intelligible gods and by being linked to the original soul by the soul which, so to speak, went away [to the visible world], and by this, by which they are what they are also called, they look towards Intellect, since soul for them never looks elsewhere than There.

12. But the souls of men see their images as if in the mirror of Dionysus 2 and come to be on that level with a leap from above; but even these are not cut off from their own principle and from intellect.

to tear him to pieces and eat him; after they had done so, Zeus destroyed them with his thunderbolts and men were made out of their ashes; so we contain a "Titanic", earthy, evil element and also a divine Dionysian one which must be released by purification. Plotinus here simply takes the mirror, in which Dionysus endowed seeing his own reflection, as a symbol of the attractiveness of the visible world for the souls which must descend into it (all material things for him are reflections of soul). The later Neoplatonists worked out an elaborate allegorical interpretation of the whole story, in which the naming of Dionysus by the Titans symbolizes the "division" of the prime mover in the material world. The relevant passages are collected in O. Kern Orphikorum Fragmenta (Berlin 1905) 209. See further J. Pélissier in Revue Internationale de Philologie 24 (1926) 394-399.

1 For the connection of the visible sun to the intelligible sun, see Julian Orison IV (To King Helios) passim; though for Plotinus this relationship of the two suns is just an example of the way in which everything in the sensible world is linked to the intelligible, of the intimate presence of the divine in the whole material world, but in Julian it is a theological doctrine of central importance.

2 For the Orphic story to which Plotinus here casually alludes see W. K. C. Guthrie Orpheus and Greek Religion 2nd ed. (London 1952) 122-3. The mirror was one of the images which the Titans fired away the child Dionysus Zagreus.
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For they did not come down with Intellect, but went on ahead of it down to earth, but their heads are firmly set above in heaven. But they experienced a deeper descent because their middle part was compelled to care for that to which they had gone on, which needed their care. But Father Zeus, pitying them in their troubles, makes the bonds over which they have trouble dissoluble by death and gives them periods of rest, making them at times free of bodies, so that they too may have the opportunity of being there where the soul of the All always is, since it in no way turns to the things of this world. For what it has is the All already complete; this is and will be sufficient to itself: it completes its course periodically according to everlasting fixed rational principles, and everlasting returns to the same state, period by period, in a proportionate succession of defined lives, these here being brought into harmony with those there and completed according to them, everything being ordered under one rational principle in the descents of souls and their ascents and with regard to everything else. The harmonious adjustment of the souls to the order of this All of ours witnesses to this; they are not cut off from it, but fit themselves in in their descents and make one harmony with its circuit, so that their fortunes and their lives and their choices are indicated by the figures made by the heavenly bodies and they sing, as it were, with one
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 9.

30 τὸ μνησικός καὶ ἐναρμονίως μᾶλλον τοῦτο εἶναι ἡμαρτήματος. τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἐν ἡ μὴ τοῦ κατ' ἑκάστων τούτου καὶ ἐκατός καὶ πάσχοντος ἐκάστα ἐπιμέρισμα περιόδων καὶ τάξεων καὶ βίων κατὰ γένης διεξάγουν, αὕτις οὐ Κυνηγήτους διεξετάζονται ὁπι μὲν ἔκει.

35 ὃ τε ἐν ἀρνημίᾳ, ὃτε δὲ ἐν σαλίδω τού τῶν ὑποτελείας ἐπιστρεφόμενοι, νοὶς δὲ πᾶσι οὐκ ἐν μὴ πετο ἐξό τῶν αὐτῶν γένεων, ἀλλὰ ἵκρυμαν πᾶς ἄνω πέμπει εἰς τὰ τῆς διὰ βουλής. ψυχῆς δὲ ἐκ ταύτων πληθυνα μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸ ἐκάθεν διάκεςται εἰδος καὶ διδασκαλίας χρὴ καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐκ ὑπ' αὐτήν, η μὲν ὑποτέλειας.

30 ἢ τε ἅλλος καὶ ἐνάρμονος, ἄγχονος ἐν τάξει τῆς πλαίνου κάτωτερος δὲ οὐκ ἔν τούτῳ ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου, ὃ τε ἐν σαλίδω, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀλλ' γένεως ἃν κατέχειν δὲ εἶναι ἐκάθεν καὶ ἰώμασις, τῆς διαιρεύσεως, ἐκεῖ γὰρ, ὃ ἐν ὑμνιτικής ἢ φέρεται, η μὲν ἀνθρώπου, η δὲ ἐν ἀκούσειν ἐνθαλκῆ.

13. Τό γὰρ ἀναστάθη τούτων καὶ η δίκαιος ὡστε ἐν φόνει κρατισμὸν ἑκάστων ἐκατέρα ἐν τάξει πρὸς ὅ τοις ἐκατόμον γνωσίους εἰδωλον προσωρεύσεως καὶ διαιρέοντος ἐργασίας, καὶ ἐπεὶ ἔκειν πάς ὃ πετο ἐκεῖνος ἐκατόμον πληθυνα, πρὸς τὴν διαιρέοντος τήν ἐν αὐτήν ἔχει, καὶ τά τάτῳ πέμποντος καὶ εἰσάγοντος οὐ δέι, αὐτὴ ἐν θαλής ἐν σῶμα τότε

2 The "fortunes and lives and choices" come from the concluding myth of Plato's Republic (see 617B). For a fuller discussion by Plotinus of this passage in Plato, see III. 4, 6. Plotinus here, characteristically, interprets "the minds of the spheres" allegorically to suit his own philosophical purposes. For the old literal interpretation of this Pythagorean doctrine see Cicero Somnium Scipionis 5, 16; and cf. P.-M. Schuh, Études sur la Philosophe Platonicienne (Paris 1947) 111 ff.
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or into this or that particular body, but when its moment comes to it, it descends and enters where it
must as if of its own accord. Each has its own time and when it comes, like a herald summoning it, the
soul comes down and goes into the appropriate body, so that what happens is like a stirring and carrying
away by magic powers and mighty attractions: it is like the way in which the ordered development of a
living thing comes to its fulfillment as [its soul] stirs and produces everything in its time—for instance
sprouting of beads and horns, and at the moment special impulses, and breaking out into spots in
excessive numbers which were not there before, and like the ordered development of trees coming about
at its appointed time. The souls go neither willingly nor because they are sent, nor is the voluntary element
in their going like deliberate choice, but like a natural spontaneous jumping or a passionate natural
desire of sexual union or as some men are moved unreasoningly to notic deeds. Each special kind
has its special destiny and moment, one now and one at another time. Intellecht which is before the uni-
verse has its destiny too, to remain. There however much it also sends out; and the individual, which is
subordinated to the universal, is sent according to law. For the universal bears heavily upon the partic-
ular, and the law does not derive from outside the strength for its accomplishment, but is given to be in
those themselves who are subject to it, and they
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bear it about with them. And if the time comes too, then what it wills to happen is also brought about by beings themselves in whom it is present, so that they accomplish it themselves because they bear it about, strong by its firm establishment in them; it makes itself a sort of weight in them and implants a longing, a birth pangs of desire to come there where the law within them as it were calls them to come.

14. Because all this has happened this universal order of ours, which has many lights and is illuminated by souls, is being further set in order and adorned, receiving new ordered beauties over and above its former ones, one from one source and one from another, from the gods of that other world and the other intellects which give souls; it seems likely that this is the hidden meaning of the story that when Prometheus had made the woman the other gods too helped to adorn her; that "he mixed earth with water", and gave her a human voice, and made her like the goddesses in appearance, and that Aphrodite gave her something and the Graces, and different gods gave her different gifts, and that she took her name from the gifts and all the gifts, for all gave something to this formation which came into existence as a result of a forethought (or "providence"). But what could Epimetheus rejecting its purpose is to reconcile the divergent accounts, pessimistic and optimistic, given by Plato in different dialogues. But there does not seem to be any fundamental difference between the thought of IV. 8 and the thought of this chapter. See further my introductory Note to IV. 3-5, p. 96 ff.

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1 The teaching of this chapter about the descent of the human soul should be carefully compared with that in the early treatise On the Descent of the Soul IV. 3-6. In this treatise one can see particularly clearly the variations of emphasis and the fluctuations between optimism and pessimism about the material world and our life in it which are characteristic of Plotinus' discussions of this subject, because...
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The gift of what had been formed signify except that the choice of a life lived more in the intelligible world is the better one? And the maker is bound because he is somehow in contact with that which he has made, and a bond of this kind is external; and his freeing by Heraclitus means that he has power even to free himself. This interpretation is as anyone likes to think it, except that the story displays the gifts made to the universal order and is in harmony with what we say. 1

15. The souls when they have peeped out of the intelligible world go first to heaven, and when they have put on a body there go on by its means to earthier bodies, so that they extend themselves in length. And some souls [only] come from heaven to lower bodies; others pass from one body into another, those whose power is not sufficient to lift them from this region because they are weighed down and forgetful, dragging with them much that weighs upon them. They become different

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1 The story of Prometheus, Epimetheus and Pandora here follows Hesiod, with slight variations, for the making of Pandora see Hesiod Op. 90-93; for the binding and leaving of Prometheus see Hesiod Theog. 251-6. Plotinus' remark about his own causal allegorical interpretation (line 17) shows how little seriously he took this sort of thing. The ancient myths do of course for him, as for other men of his age, express profound truths in symbolic form. But as long as you recognise what the truths are, it does not matter whether you discover them in any particular myth, or how you interpret the details of the poet's stories.

2 Here there appears the "cosmic religiosity" which Plotinus shared with other philosophers of late antiquity: the belief, that is, that the celestial regions and the heavenly bodies are divine and far closer to any higher, spiritual or intelligible, divinities there may behave, than the world below the

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either because of the variety of the bodies into which they entered or because of their fortunes or their upbringing, or they themselves bring with them a difference coming from themselves, or all these causes, or some of them, operate together to produce the differences. And some of them have altogether become subject to the destiny of this world, but others are sometimes subject to it and sometimes belong to themselves; others again accept all that it is necessary to endure, but are able to be self-possessed in all that is their own work, living according to another code of laws, that which governs the whole of reality, and submitting themselves to [this] other ordinance. This code of laws is woven from all the rational principles and causes here below, and the movement of souls and the laws which come from the intelligible world; it is in harmony with these last, and takes its principles from that world and weaves together what comes after with the intelligible principles, keeping undisturbed all things which can maintain themselves in accordance with the disposition of the intelligibles, and making the others circulate according to their natures, so that the responsibility lies with the souls which have come down for coming down in such a way that some are put in this place and others find themselves in that.

16. It is fitting to attribute the punishments which fall with justice on the wicked in the [universal] order in that it directs the world according to that which is right, but as for all that happens without justice to the good, like [unjust] punishments or poverty or sickness, are these to be said to have come upon them because of previous sins? For these are woven in and signified beforehand, so that they too happen
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according to rational principle. No, these things do not occur according to the rational principles of nature and are not given in their premises, but are consequences of them; for instance, if a building falls the man who is underneath it is killed, whatever sort of man he is; or if two horses are moving in an orderly way—or even one—anything which gets in the way is injured or trampled. Or [we should think that] this injustice is not an evil to the sufferer [and contributes] to the interweaving of the whole. Or it is not unjust because it has its justification from former faults. For one must not think that some things are contained in the order, while others are let loose for the operation of free will. For if things have to happen according to causes and rational sequences and according to one rational principle and a single order, one must think that the less important things too are contained in the order and woven in. And the injustice which one man does to another is certainly an injustice from the point of view of the doer, and the man who perpetrates it is not free from guilt, but as contained in the universal order it is not unjust in that order, or in relation to the sufferer, but it was ordained that he should so suffer. But if the sufferer is a good man, this will turn out for his good. For one must not think that the order is godless or unjust, but that it is accurate in the distribution of what is appropriate, but it keeps its reasons hidden and gives grounds for blame to those who do not know them.

17. One could deduce from considerations like the following that the souls leave the intelligible first enter the space of heaven. For if heaven is the better part of the region perceived by the
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 3.

5 έκαθεν τούς ψυχαίνει τιτία πρύτα και μεταλλαβάνει τις ἐπιτρέποντα μεταλλαβάνεις. τὸ δὲ γενέσθιν ὡστε τὸ καὶ ἐνεργάς ἡ τούτοις τοὺς ἕνας τοὺς ἐνεργάς μεταλλαβάνεις καὶ τῆς ἀσωμάτου φύσεως νόμων. πάσαι μὲν δὲ καταλαμβάνοντο τὸν οὐρανόν καὶ διδόμενον εἰς τὸ πολύ αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐκείνων.
10 τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοὺς ὑπότερος ἑνεχάζονται, αἰώνὶ ἐπιπλέουσα κατανεύσον ἐνανθάνον ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἑκάστων, αὐτῶς δὲ νῦν ἅμως ἀπὸ πολύ προϊόντων. εἴτε γὰρ τὸν κέντρον, ἢτοι δὲ τούτων κύκλων ἀπὸ τῶν ἑκάστων, ἢτοι δὲ τούτων ἐλασίων, ὅταν ἐκ φωτός ἔξωθεν δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἄλλος φωτὸς κύκλος.
15 ἄλλος, ἄλλοι δὲ εἰσὶν ὁδὸς ὡστε ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τούτων ἀλλήλοις. ἄλλος δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ ἐλλάμπει, καὶ διδέκα κατὰ λόγον εἰς αὐτὸν ἀφαίρητο, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα συνεπαλάματο, τὰ μὲν μένα, τὰ δὲ ἐπιπλέουσα κατά τὰς ἑκάστων ἐλλαμπρούσης ἄληθες. εἰτα διεύθυνεν τοὺς ἑλλαμπρούσης πλευράς φρουρίδες. ὅσπερ χειμαλίμιοι μέσων πλοίων κυριεύσει ἐνέστειλεν πρὸς τὸ πλέον τῆς ἑνῶν φρουρίδας καὶ ἁρμόζητος αὐτῶν.

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senses, it borders on the last and lowest parts of the intelligible. 1 So these heavenly regions are first en- soulled tience, and participate in soul first because they are better adapted to participate. But the body of earth is the last, and less naturally adapted to participate in soul and far from the bodiless nature. All souls then illuminate the heaven and give it the greatest and first of themselves, but illuminate the rest of the world with their secondary parts: those which come down further throw their light lower, but it is not to their advantage to have gone on so far. For there is a kind of centre, and around this a circle shining out from it, and beyond these another, light from light 2: but outside these there is no longer another circle of light but this next circle through lack of its own light needs illumination from another source. Let this be a wheel, or rather a sphere of a kind which from the third—for it borders upon it—obtains all the illumination which that third receives. So the great light abides and shines, and its radiance goes out through the world in rational order and proportion; the other lights join in illuminating, some staying in their places, but others are more attracted by the brightness of what is illuminated. Then as the things which are illuminated need more care, just as the steersmen of ships in a storm concentrate more and more on the care of their ships and are unaware that to find exactly this phrase (ἐκάπε τούτοις) which appears in Plotinus in strongly subordinationist contexts, occupying an important place in the first great erudite affirmation of non-subordinationist Trinitarian theology, where the Fathers of Nicæa are trying to state with the utmost possible emphasis that the Son is not inferior to the Father as one Plotinian hypostasis is to that above it.  

1 See note on ch. 15. There is here a certain "creeping spatiality". Plotinus does not really think that any part of the material universe, even the highest heaven, can be nearer to the intelligible than any other, because the intelligible is not in space at all. But here his language is influenced, perhaps not only by the "cosmological" of his time, but by his favourite myth in Plato's Phædros (pp. 244D-245B). 2 Cp. VI. 4. 9. 25-8 and the Nicene creed. It is interesting
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 3.

25 ἐλθον, ὡς κινωνεῖν συνεπυπασθήμει πολλάκις τῷ τοῦ νεῶν μαναγών, ἔφεραν τὸ 8 πλέον καὶ ἀστρὶ καὶ τῶν ἱερών. ἔτεινα δὲ κατεσειρήσαν πεσθήσαι γονητέας διασμάς, ἥξηθεναὶ φόνους κηρεμονίας. εἰ 8 ἐν τοῖς θανάτοι χορόν εἶχον εἶναι καὶ τῷ πάντῃ, τέλειον καὶ ικανὸν σώμα καὶ αἰέων
30 παθών, καὶ παρασχεὶς λεγομένη ἀπαχόρη ὄντι ἃν παρῆ ἀντί, καὶ παρεῖχεν αὐτῷ τίην μένουσα πάντως εἰν τῷ ὀντὶ.

18. Πόστερα δὲ λογισμῷ φυσῆς ἐχθεῖται πρὸς ἐλθεῖν καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸ εξελθοῦσα: ἢ ἔτεινα δὲ λογισμὸς ἐγγίζεται ἐν ὅπου ἐνίκη ὁ ὁμίλος καὶ ἀφανίζονται πληροὶ ὁμοίως καὶ μᾶλλον ἀθετοῦσθαι. ἐλάσσως δὲ γὰρ νοεῖ ἀυτήν εἰς τοῦ λογισμοῦ διαστάσεως ἄσπερ καὶ ἐν τῶν τέχνασιν ὁ λογισμὸς ἀπορροφεῖ τῶν τεχνών, ὦτας δὲ ἐνα χαλκὸν ἢ κρατεῖ καὶ ἐσφαγεῖ ή τέχνη. ἀλλὰ εἰ ἔκει ἰδία λογισμῶν, πἀγα ἃ ἐν τῇ λογισμῷ εἶναι; ἡ δὲ διαπνοὴ, εἰσὶ τῶν ἐν, ὅταν περισσοτερεῖ, ἐπιφανεῖ διακομίζεται.

10 δὲ δὲ τῶν λογισμῶν λαθεῖ τῶν των ὄσων ἐπεὶ εἰ τοὺς λογισμοὺς λαμβάνει τὴν ἐν νοθὴ νομιμότερον καὶ ὁδοὺν ἐν αὐτῶν δάκτυλον, καὶ ἐξίχνειν ἐτοιμάζει καὶ ἄκουεν ἐν τοῖς ὁποῖοι εἰ ἄκουεν, ἐναὶ δὲ λογισμῷ ἐφεύχοντες, οὐδὲ δὴ φανεῖ ομαλαί, χρῆσθαι νομιστικῶν ἐν μὲν τῇ γοήτει ὁποίας καὶ πάλιν, σωματικῶς
16 δ' ἐξουσίας ἐν οὐρανός, ἐσα μὲν διὰ χρεώς ἡ δ' ἡ

1 Thelar: τῆ Ρουα., H.-S1.

ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL I.

they are forgetting themselves, that they are in danger of being dragged down with the wreck of the ships; these souls incline downwards more with what is theirs. Then they are held fettered with bonds of magic, held fast by their care for [bodily] nature. But if every living creature was like the All, a perfect and sufficient body and in no danger of suffering, then the soul which is said to be present would not be present in it, and would give it life while remaining altogether in the upper world.

18. Does the soul use discursive reasoning before it comes and again after it goes out of the body? No, discursive reasoning comes into it here below, when it is already in perplexity and full of care, and in a state of greater weakness: for feeling the need of reasoning is a lessening of the intellect in respect of its self-sufficiency; just as in the crafts reasoning occurs when the craftsmen are in perplexity, but, when there is no difficulty, the craft dominates and does its work. But if they are without reasoning processes there, how could they still be reasonable? Because they are capable, one might say, when the circumstances arise, of considering rationally with the greatest of ease. But one must understand reasoning in this sort of sense; because if one understands reasoning to be the state of mind which exists in them always proceeding from Intellig, and which is a static activity and a kind of reflection of Intellig, they would employ reasoning in that other world, too. Nor do I think that we should suppose that they use speech in the intelligible world, and altogether, even if they have bodies in heaven, there would be none of that talk there which they engage in here because of need or over doubtful and dis-
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 3.

On Difficulties about the Soul I.

Ptolemy, 

puted points; but as they do everything they do in order and according to nature they would not give orders or advice and would know by intuition what passes from one to another. For here below, too, we can know many things by the look in people’s eyes when they are silent; but there all body is clear and pure and each is like an eye, and nothing is hidden or feigned, but before one speaks to another that other has seen and understood. But there is nothing absurd in spirits and souls in the air using voices; for they are [embodied] living creatures of a particular kind.

19. Are the “indivisible” and the “divisible” elements of the soul in the same place, as if they were mixed together, or is the “indivisible” in a different place and differently related, but the “divisible” so to speak following upon it and another part of soul, just as we say that the reasoning part is one thing and the unreasoning part another? This could be answered when it has been understood what we mean by each. The term “indivisible” is used without qualification, but “divisible” is not unqualified but Plato says that soul “becomes divisible in the sphere of bodies”, and not that it has already become so. One must then observe what kind of soul the nature of body requires to live, and what of soul must be present everywhere to body as a whole. Now the whole of the sense faculty, since it is going to operate throughout the whole body, comes to divide itself; for since it is everywhere it might be said to be divided; but since it appears everywhere as a whole, it could be said not to be absolutely and completely divided, but to become “divisible in the sphere of body”. But if anyone
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says that it is not divided at all in the other senses, but only in that of touch, we must reply that it must divide itself in the others too in this way, since it is body which participates in it, but less than in the sense of touch. And the plant principle in it, too, and the principle of growth are divided in the same way, and if desire is in the region of the liver and the spirited part in the region of the heart, the same argument will apply to them. But perhaps Plato does not admit that these sensations occur in the mixture of which we have been speaking: perhaps he considers that they arise in another way and as a result of some one of the things which have been already received. But what about reasoning and intelligence? These no longer give themselves to the body: for their work is not done through the instrument of the body: for this gets in the way if one uses it in rational investigations. So then the “indivisible” and the “divisible” are two different things, and not like one mingled thing but like a whole of parts, each of which is pure and separate in its power. If, however, that which is “divisible in the sphere of bodies” holds the “indivisible” from a higher power, this same thing can be both indivisible and divisible, as if it was mixed from itself and the power which comes into it from above.

90. It is proper that we should pay attention to the question whether these and the other so-called parts of the soul are in place, or whether these are of the chapter. At this point he seems somewhat uneasy about Plato’s firm attribution of different parts of the soul to different parts of the body in 70-71. In the next sentence he turns, perhaps with relief, to the clear-cut division of Plato’s 69.
ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL

not in any way in place but the others are, and where they are, or whether no part of the soul is in any way in place. For either, if we do not allot a place to each of the parts of the soul and put none of them anywhere,1 not making them any more inside the body than outside, we shall make the body soulless, and shall find it difficult to see how the works of the soul which are done through bodily instruments ought to come about; or, if we give a place to some of them, but not to others, then it will appear that we are not making those in which we do not give a place work within us, so that the whole of our soul is not in us. Now we must say in general that neither any of the parts of the soul nor the whole soul are in body as in a place. For place is something encompassing, and encompassing body, and where each divided part is, there it is [and nowhere else] so that the whole is not [as a whole] in any place; but soul is not a body, and is no more encompassed than encompassing. It is certainly not in the body as in a receptacle either.2 For the body would be soulless, whether it encompassed the soul as a receptacle or as a place, unless perhaps it was enucleated by a sort of transmission from the soul which remained collected together in itself, and then the amount of which the receptacle partakes will be lost to soul. But place in the strict and proper sense is bodiless and not a body: so what need would it have of soul? And body would come near to soul with its edge, not with itself. And many other objections could be made to [soul's being in body] as in place.

1 The sense seems much better if, with Theller, we omit the commas between ὅψες and τότον pointed by Henry-Schwyzer.
2 The dualism that soul is in body as a place or a receptacle is normal Aristotelian doctrine: cp. the long critical discussion of ways in which the soul may be said to be "in" the body by Alexander of Aphrodisias De Anima 12–13. Bruns, of which Plotinus makes use here and in the next chapter. Plotinus

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PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 3.

5 ἐκάστως τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς τόπων τινα ἀπαθανατοὶ ὀδὴν βίαν, οὐ μᾶλλον εἰπὼν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἡ ἔξω ποιούσης, ἀφύλον αὐτῷ ποιόσθημεν, τὰ τε δὲ ὀργάνων συμπαθικῶν ἔργα ὅτι γίνεσθαι προσεύχεσθε εἰπεῖν ἀπορήσαμεν, εἰτέ τοῖς μὲν, τοῖς δὲ οὐ, οὐς μὴ δίοδομεν, οὐσὶν ἐκ ἡμῶν αὐτὰ ποιῶν δοξομέν, ὡστε 10 μὴ πᾶσαι ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν ἡμῖν εἶναι. ἄλλως μὲν ὅσῳ ὀδὴν τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν ὀδὴν πᾶσαις φασάσθαι ὡς ἐν τόπω εἶναι τῷ σώματι; περιεκτικῶν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ τόπου καὶ περιεκτικῶν σώματος, καὶ οὐ έκάστων μεροῦσθεν ἠτῶν, εἰτεν ἔκει, ὡς μὴ δίοι εἰ ὅπως εἶναι, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ οὐ πόμα, καὶ οὐ περι-

15 εγκαίρων μᾶλλον ἡ περίκευς. οὐ μὴν οὖν ὡς ἐν ἀγγελίας: αἴσθησιν γὰρ ἢν γένεσθαι τὸ σῶμα, εἰτεν ὡς ἀγγελίας, εἰτεν ὡς τοῖς περικεφαλίαν εἰ μὴ ἀκολούθει ταύτης οὐδείς πρὸς αὐτὴν συνηθισμένης, καὶ οταναι, δόσως μετελθεῖ τὸ ἀγγελίαν, τὸν δὲ πολυπαλλόντας αὐτήν. οὐ δὲ τόπος ἡ περικεφαλίας αὐτοῖς

20 καὶ οὐ σώμα τῷ διέχαιται ψυχῆς; καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῷ πέρατι αὐτοῦ πληγώδεις ἡ ψυχή, ὁδὴ αὐτῆς. τοπικά δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἐνακεφαλεῖ πρὸς τὰ ἕως.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 3.

ἐν τόπῳ εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ σωματέου ἐν ἀεὶ ὁ τόπος, καὶ εἰσὶ τι ἔσται τὸν τόπον αὐτῶν περιφέρουν.

25 ἀλλ' οὖδ' ἐν τῷ τόπῳ διάστημα ἐντολὲς καὶ μᾶλλον σώμα ἡ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ τοῦ σώματος. τὸ γὰρ διάστημα κενὸν ἔλεις δεῖ τὸ δὲ σώμα ὁ κενόν, ἀλλ' ἔσορα ἐν ὑμῖν τῷ σώματι ἔσται ἀλλ' ὑμῖν τῷ τῷ τῷ σώματι. ἀλλὰ μὴ, οὖδὲ ὡς ἐν σωματεύεσθαι τῷ υπόμνευε τὸ γὰρ ἐν σωματεύεσθαι πάντος τοῦ ἐν ὑμῖν, ὡς χρώμα.

30 καὶ σχῆμα, καὶ χαρματόν ἡ ψυχή. οὐ μήν οὖν ὡς μέρος ἐν ὅλῳ οὐ γὰρ μέρος ἡ ψυχή του σώματος.

 ei δὲ τις λέγει, ὡς ἐν ὅλῳ μέρος τοῦ τοῦ ἑαυτῆς, πρῶτον μὲν ἢ αὐτὴ ἢ μέρος ἂν μένοι ἄσπολα, πῶς ἐν ὅλῳ νόμῳ ἔν τῷ πλησίω τοῦ ἑαυτῆς, ἢ ἐν σώματι, οὐδ' ἢ καὶ αὐτὸ τι ἐν αὐτῶ ἔσται.

35 ἀλλ' οὖδ' ὡς ἕλθος ἐν τοῖς κατέχεις: γελοιον γὰρ τίνι μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔλεγεν, τὸ δὲ σώμα μέρη. ἀλλ' οὖν ὡς εἶναι ἐν ὅλῳ ἐξώθησαν γὰρ τὸ ἐν ὅλῳ ἑαυτῆς, καὶ ἐν σώματι οὕτως ἀνέκοψεν τὸ ἑαυτῆς. ἢ δὲ ψυχὴ τὸ ἑαυτῆς πασχεῖ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ἄλλον τοῦ ἑαυτῶς ὀφθήν.

40 ei δὲ εἰ τῷ γελοιον ἐκεῖνοι, ἀλλὰ τὸ χωρίζομενον ψήφισαν, πως τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῷ σώματι, σώμα τούτῳ σώματος ἢ ἐκεῖνοι [καὶ χωριζόμενον ἡ ψυχὴ]. ἠ πῶς ἕν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἡ ψυχή λέγεται πρὸς πάντων ἢ ἐπειδὴ εὐκρατεῖ ἢ ἕν ἐν σώματι, ἀλλὰ τῷ σώματι σώμα των ὀρώντων, ἐμφανεῖ δὲ πιστεύει, ὅτι κατασταὶ

45 καὶ αἰσθήματα, ἐκεῖνοι γελοιον ψυχὴν αὐτὸ. εἰ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀρα τῷ σώματι τὴν ψυχήν εἶναι ἀκολουθεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἰσθήματα. εἰ δὲ γ' ὀρῶν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ αἰσθήματον ἶν

ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL I

For place would always be carried along with it, and body itself would be something carrying space itself about. But even if place is taken to mean interval, soul would still less be in body as in place. For an interval must be void; but body is not void; though that in which body is may be, so that body is in the void. But soul will certainly not be in body as in a substrate, either: for that which is in a substrate is an affection of that in which it is, colour and shape for instance, and soul is something separable. It is certainly not, either, like a part in the whole: for soul is not a part of body. If someone were to suggest that it was like a part in a whole living creature, first of all the sune difficulty would remain about how it is in the whole: for it is not, presumably, as the wine is in the jar of wine, or the gall in the gallon jar, or in the way in which some one thing is in itself. But it is not, either, in body as a whole is in its parts: for it would be absurd to say that the soul is a whole and the body its parts. But it is not, either, present like the form in matter: for the form in matter is inseparable, and it comes afterwards to the matter which is already there. But soul makes the form in matter and is other than the form [which it makes]. But if they assert that it is not: the form which comes to be in the matter, but the separate form, it is not yet clear how this is the form in the body. How then is it that the soul is said by everyone to be in the body? It is because the soul is not visible, but the body is, so we see the body and are aware that it is ensouled because it moves and perceives, and so say that: it has soul. It would then be a natural consequence for us to say that the soul is actually in the body. But if the soul was visible

1 del. Volkman at iter tatem o lin. 20-20.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 3.

and perceptible, in every way surrounded by life and extending equally to all the extremities [of the
body], we should not have said that the soul was in
the body, but that the unimportant was in the more
important, and what is held together in what holds
it together, and that which flows away in that which
does not.

21. Well then, how is it present? If someone asks
the question and does not give any answer himself,
what are we going to say? And is it all present in
the same sort of way, or one part in one way and
another in another? For indeed, none of the ways
of a thing's being in anything which are currently
spoken of fits the relationship of the soul to the body,
but it is also said that the soul is in the body as the
steersman is in the ship; this is a good comparison
as far as the soul's ability to be separate from the
body goes, but would not supply sufficiently
the manner of its presence, which is what we
ourselves are investigating. For the steersman as a
voyager would be present incidentally in the ship,
but how would he be present as steersman? Nor is
he in the whole of the ship, as the soul is in the body.
Are we then to say that it is present as the skill is
in the tools, in the rudder for instance, so that if
the rudder was ensouled the steersman's skill which
moves it according to the rules of his art would be
within it? But the difference is this, that the skill
comes from outside. If then, according to the model
of the steersman who has got into the rudder, we
stated that the soul was in the body as in a natural
tool—for this is how the soul moves the body in
whatever it wants to do—should we gain any ad-

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PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 3.

 hospitality, and the soul. 20 ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ὄργανῳ, καὶ πάντως δὲ ἄλλος ἀνθρώπος τῶν πρὸς τὸν ἐξελθὲν: ἀλλ' ἄλλος ἔτι πνευμάτων ἐξερχόμεν καὶ ἐγκυπτόροι προσέλθειν.

 22. Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως παρέτρεψα, παρέχειν αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς πόρπρεστι τῷ ἀέρι; καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ καὶ τὸν παρὰ τὸν πάροικὸν καὶ δὲ ἀλλ' ἀλλοι παρεπείπερ ἔγοντο καὶ ἔστρεψε μὲν αὐτό, καὶ οὐ δὲ παραπερεύει: καὶ ἐὰν οὐδὲν γίνηται τού ὕπο τῷ φῶς, ἀπήλθεν εἰς τὸν ἐμφάνειαν, ἄνω δὲ ἐντὸν ἐπὶ τὸν φῶς, πεπάτητοι. ἦστ' ἄρρητες ἔχοντα καὶ ἐπάνω αἱ λέγειν, ὡς δ' ἐστιν ἀπὸ τοῦ φῶς, ἤστερ τῷ φῶς ἐν τῷ ἀέρι. διὸ καὶ Πλάτων καλάς τὴν ψυχήν αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐπὶ τῶν πυτῶν, ἀλλ' τὸ σῶμα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐν τῇ ὑπό τῷ φῶς, καὶ ἔφησθ' τῷ σώματι, ἔστιν οὐδὲν ὅποιον ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ σώματι, τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἢν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ οὐκ ἔστεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ψυχῶν Ἀλφεύδους λέγει, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔχοντες τῷ σώματι λειτουργεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ σώματι.

 15 ὡς δ' ἐστιν, παρέτρεψα, καὶ ἐπάνω αἱ εἰσέβαλλοντας παρὰ μέρας ἐμφανίζοντες καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, καί πρὸς μὲν αἰσθήσεως παρέχειν τῷ πλαστικῷ τῇ ἀισθητικῇ, πρὸς ἐνέργειας ἔστιν ἄλλο ἔλεγχον.

 23. Λέγοντες δ' ὅτι τοῦ σώματος περιτυπώμενον

ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL

We shall again be in a difficulty about how it is in the soul, though this is a way of being in the body different from those mentioned before: all the same we are still anxious to discover it completely and approach nearer to the goal of our investigation.

22. Are we to say then that when soul is present to body it is present as fire is present to air? For this too like soul is present without being present, and is present throughout the whole and mixed with none of it, and stays still itself while the air flows past; and when the air goes outside the space where the light is, it departs without retaining anything of it, but while it is under the light it is illuminated, so that one can rightly say here too that the air is in the light rather than the light in the air. That is why Plato rightly does not put the soul in the body when he is speaking of the universe, but the body in the soul, and says also that there is a part of the soul in which body is and part in which there is no body, clearly the powers of the soul of which the body has no need. And the same principle clearly applies to the other souls. We must not say that there is even a presence of the other powers of soul to the body, but that the powers which it needs are present, and present without being situated in its parts, or in the whole either, and the sense-faculty is present to the whole of the perceiving body for the purposes of sense-perception, but one part at one time to one and one to another according to the particular sense-activity (which is going on).

23. What I mean is this: when the enwrapped body is illuminated by soul, one part of it participates in

1 The reference is to Timaeus 36D8-37C3: cp. ch. 20, n. 2.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 3.

τοῦ ἐμφάνου ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ ἄλλους μεταλαμβάνειν αὐτοῦ μέρος: καὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὀργάνου πρὸς τὸ ἔργον ἐπιτηδεύτητα, δύναμις τῇ προσ-δέχονται εἰς τὸ ἔργον ἀποδεδουθαν, οὕτω τοῖς λέγοντες τὴν μὲν ἐν ὀρθαλμοῖς δύναμιν τῇ ὀρα-τικῆς ἐστὶ, τὴν δὲ ἐν ὑπὸ τῇ ἀκοουστικῇ, καὶ γενομένῃ ἐν γλώσσῃ, διαφέρουν ἐν μῖα, τὴν δὲ ἀπευθεία ἐν παρτί παρείναι: ποὺς γὰρ ταῦτα τὴν ἁπλακάν παρὸ τῶν ὀργάνων τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστι.¹

10 τῶν δὲ ἀπικαίων ὀργάνων ἐπὶ πρώτοις τῶν νεύρων δύναται, καὶ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν κύκλου τῆς ζωῆς τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει, ἐναρθία τῆς προφανείας δύναμις ἀκοουστικής, ἀρχαιότητι δὲ ἀπὸ ἐγκαθεσθοῦν τῶν νεύρων, τὴν τῆς ἀλθήσεως καὶ ἔρμης ἀρχηγὴν καὶ ἄλλος παντὸς τοῦ ζωῆς ἐναρθία ἑθος φέροντες, οὐ ἐρμηνεύει ἢ

16 ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὀργάνων, ἐκεῖ παρέστι τὸ χρησιμον ἑτέρας ἐκεῖς—θέασιν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς δύναμας ἐκεῖ—οὐχὶ γὰρ ἐμελέτη κυκλικῶν τῶν ὀργάνων, ἐκεῖ ἐκεῖ ὡς οὖν ἐναρθεῖσθαι τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ τεχνίτου ἐκείνῃ τῆς τοῦ ὀργάνου πρόσοφος, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐ τὴν δύναμιν—παντοκοῦνα

20 γὰρ ἡ δύναμις—ἐκεῖ δὲ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἡ ἀρχή, οὐ ἢ

¹ Beattie: ἡμιφόρον Τεκ.:

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one way and one in another; and according to the adaptation of [each] sense-organ to its task, as soul gives [each] the appropriate power for its task, so the power in the eyes is called that of sight, the power in the ears that of hearing, and the power of taste is said to be present in the tongue, that of smell in the nostrils, and that of touch in the whole body; for the whole body is sense-organ to the soul for this perception. Since the organs of touch are in the first nerves, which also have the power to set the living being in motion because the appropriate soul-power communicates itself at this point, and since these nerves begin in the brain,² they established the principle of perception and of impulse and in general of the whole living being in the brain, seeming to obviously that which was going to use the organs would be there where their beginnings were—but it would be better to say that the beginning of the actualisation of the potency [of perception] is there. For it was necessary that at the point from which the organ [or tool] was going to be moved that the power of the workman, as we may call it, which was appropriate to the tool should be fixed: or rather not the power—the power is everywhere—but the beginning of its actualisation at the point where the

centre and seat of the intelligence. Their discoveries had been used and developed by the great Galen (2nd century A.D.) and were well known in the time of Plotinus. Plotinists welcomed these discoveries as confirmation of the view of Plato that intelligence was located in the head (Timaeus 44D—E: the reasons given are hardly scientific) as against that of Aristotle, the Stoics and the Epicureans, who located intelligence in the heart—a view still defended by Alexander De Anima 94, 7 ff. and 95, 24 ff. Brunet, cp. H. J. Blumenual Plotinist Psychology (The Hague 1971) 76.
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organ begins. Since, then, the power of sensation which is also that of impulsion, belonging to the soul which perceives and imagines, has reason above it, as it were a nature in close contact on its underside with that which this is above, the ancients thus put reason at the highest point of the whole living creature at the head, supposing it to be not in the brain, but in this perceptive faculty which in the way described above was situated in the brain. For one part of the soul had to give itself to body, and to the part of body most receptive of its activity, but the other part, which had no communication with body, was under the absolute necessity of communicating with the first part, which was a form of soul, and of soul capable of apprehending what came from reason. For the perceptive part of the soul is in some way capable of judgement, and the imaging part has a sort of intelligence, and impulse and desire are there following the lead of the imaging faculty, and reason. The reasoning part therefore is there in the perceptive not as in a place but because that which is there draws upon it. We have already explained the sense in which we say that: the perceptive part is "there". The part of the soul too which we have in common with plants, which is responsible for growth and nutrition, is not absent from any part of the body, and since it nourishes by means of the blood, and the nourishing blood is in the veins, and the starting point of veins and blood is in the liver, it is as if this [nutritive] power was fixed there, and so the appetitive part of the soul was assigned this place to dwell in. For that which generates and nourishes and produces growth must necessarily also have an appetite for generation, nourishment and

1 Cheller: ἀνάψη Ἐκκ.
2 transpos. Igal.
3 Harter, II-8, cf. loc. 17: δῆτο Ἐκκ.
PLOTINUS. ENNEAD IV. 3.

growth. But since the thin, light, quick, pure blood is the proper organ for the spirited part of the soul, the spring of this, the heart—for this is where blood of this kind is separated out—is made to be the appropriate dwelling place for the seething of the spirited part.¹

21. But where will the soul be when it has left the body? It will not be here below, where there is nothing capable in any way of receiving it, and it cannot stay with that which is not naturally adapted to receive it, unless, because it is unreasonable, it still has something of body which draws it to it. If it has another body, it is in that, and accompanies it to the place naturally appropriate to its existence and development. But since there are many places for each as well [as many bodies], the difference between them must come from the disposition of the soul, and must come also from the justice in the nature of things. For no one can ever evade what he ought to suffer for his unrighteous doings: for the divine law is reasonable and has in itself together with the judgment already pronounced its execution. He too who is to suffer punishment is carried up knowing to what he has to suffer; on his unsteady course he is tossed about everywhere in his wanderings, and in the end, as if utterly weary, by his very efforts at resistance he falls into the place which suits him, having that which he did not will for his punish-

¹ I print and translate here the text and punctuation adopted by Beufler-Tholuck: the minor alterations by Kirchhoff and Kleist which they accept, the insertion of ὑπός and the transposition of καθά with their punctuation, seem to me to give a much better sense than the MSS text retained by Henry-Schwyzer.
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ment as a result of the course which he willed. But it is stated in the law how much and how long he must suffer, and again there come together the release from punishment and the ability to escape up from these regions by the power of the harmony which holds the universe together. But if the souls have bodies, they have the capacity to be aware of bodily punishments; but those souls which are pure and do not in any way draw anything of body to them will necessarily also have no place anywhere in body. If then they are nowhere in body—for they have no body—a soul of this kind will be where substance and reality and the divine are—that is in god—there it will be with them and in him. But if you are still looking for the place where the soul is, you must look for the place where they are; but in looking you must not look for it with your eyes or in the way you look for bodies.

23. It is likewise worth investigating the question of memory, whether the souls themselves which have left these regions have the power of remembering or whether some of them have and others have not, and whether they remember everything or only some things, and if they always remember, or only for the time close after their departure. But if we are going to carry out our investigation of these questions correctly, we must understand its that remembers, I do not mean what memory is, but in what kind of realities it naturally exists. For what memory is, we have discussed elsewhere and there has been plenty of talk about it, but we must

1 It is not clear to what discussion of memory Plotinus is here referring. His short treatise On Sense-Perception and Memory (IV. 6) is, according to Porphyry, later than the present one (No. 41 in the chronological order). In the treatise III. 8 (26), written immediately before IV. 3-4, there is a brief treatment of memory which again seems to presuppose a previous discussion. In both these cases the references may be to oral discussions; at any rate, no trace of any writing of

Porphyr, on memory other than the long ch. 3 of IV. 6 and the careful discussion of the subject and content of memory which follows immediately here has survived.

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10 μνημονεύων πεφυκός ὁ τι ποτὲ ἐστιν ἀκριβοτέρων λαττένων, εἶ δὲ ἐστι τὸ τῆς μνήμης ἐκπατήματος τινὸς ἢ μαθήματος ἢ παθήματος, οὐτε τοῖς ἀπολύτων τῶν ἅπαντων οὐτε τοῖς ἐν ἄρχοντι.

15 εἰς αὐτῶν οὐδὲ γραφοῖς, ἀλλ’ ἀλλὰ περὶ τὸ ὅτι, καὶ οὐδ’ τὸ πρῶτον ὡς τὸ ἐπίβασμα, ἀλλ’ ἐστιν ἄλλ’ ὡς ἔχει ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀδιαφόροις παρεξελάθηκαν. τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀμαίνω τῶν ἃν ἐν μνήμῃ γένοιτο, οὐκ ἔχει αὐτὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἅμα 

20 άλλης, ἀλλ’ ἐν αὐτῇ μὲν ἡ ἄλλη δὲ μνημονεύειν ἐν εἰκόνι πρῶτον; ἀλλ’ ἴ συνελθεῖν τοῖς ἅλλοις μεταβολαῖς εἰκάθηναι οὐδὲ μεταβαλομενα αὐτῶν, οἷον κόσμου τὰς περιθώριας; ἢ ἂν ἄλλα μὲν πρῶτον, ἀλλ’ ἂν ἄλλα μεταβολήν νοησάμενα ἐπακολουθουσαν τοῖς ἀν διὰ μνημονεύον ημείς μεταβολαῖς, τὸ τι μνημονεύον παρὰ τὸ νοεῖν ἄλλο.

25 τὸ δὲ ἄν τροπον νοησάμενο ὑπὸ μνημονεύουσα ἀλλήλοις ὁ γὰρ ἔχει, ἐν εἰκόνα ἐν καὶ ἐν παρακεχαλίας. ἢ ὅσοι γὰρ ἔμενεν αὐτοὶ βλέπον τῆς ὑπὸ ὑπολογισθείς 

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understand more exactly what it is that has the natural capacity of remembering. If memory is something acquired, either learnt or experienced, then memory will not be present in those realities which are unaffected by experience or those which are in the timeless. We must certainly not attribute memory to God, or real being or Intelligent, for nothing [external] comes to them and there is no time, but eternity in which real being is, and there is neither before nor after, but it is always as it is, in the same state not admitting of any change. But how can that which stays in an identical and exactly similar state be in a condition of memory, when it neither has nor holds another way of being different from that which it had before, or one thought after another, so that it might stay in one and remember the other which it had before? But what prevents it from knowing the changes of other things without changing itself, the revolutions of the universe for instance? The reason is that it will think of one thing as before and another as after, following the changes of that which turns, and remembering is something different from thinking. One must not say that it remembers its own thoughts: for they did not come, so that it has to hold them fast to prevent them from going away; or in this way it would be afraid that its own essential nature might go away from it. In the same way, then, the soul must not be said to remember, either, in the sense in which we are speaking of remembering, the things

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1 The question whether divine beings (including higher souls and the World-Soul) have memory is fully treated and answered, as here, in the negative, in the latter part of the discussion which begins here (IV. 4. 16–17).
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which it possesses as part of its nature, but when it is here below it possesses them and does not act by them, particularly when it has just arrived here. But as for its activity, the ancients seem to apply the terms “memory” and “recollection” to the souls which bring into act what they possessed. So this is another kind of memory; and therefore time is not involved in memory understood in this sense. But perhaps we are being too easy-going about this, and not really examining it critically. For someone might perhaps raise the difficulty that perhaps what is called memory and recollection of this kind does not belong to that [higher] soul, but to another dimmer one, or to the composite, the living creature. Now if it belongs to another soul, when or how did it get it? And if it belongs to the living creature, when or how? So we must enquire what it is of the things within us which possesses memory, which is just what we were enquiring from the beginning. And if it is the soul which remembers, which power or what part of it; but if it is the living creature—just as the power of sense-perception has been thought by some to belong to this—how it works, and what one is to say that the living creature is, and further, whether one must ascribe the apprehension of sense-perceptions and thoughts to the same thing, or a different one for each.

26. If then the composite living thing is involved in actual sense-perceptions, perception must be something like boring holes and weaving—that is why it is called “common”—in order that the soul

lower soul), which is the other element in the “composite living thing”. See Blumenthal Plotinus’ Psychology 61. There is no reference to anything like Aristotle’s soul οὐσίαν.
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—οὐν τὸ τρυπεῖ καὶ τὸ υφάνειν, ἵνα κατὰ μὲν τὸν 5 τερόντη τὴν ὑπέρς ἤ ἐν τῷ αὐθάνατοι, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἔργαν ὑπὸ σῶμα, τὸν μὲν ὑμάτιον πάςχων καὶ ὑπρεπεῖς, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς παραδεχόμενης τῆν τύπωσιν τῆς τοῦ υμάτιον, ἢ τὴν διὰ τοῦ σώματος, ἢ τὴν κρύσιν, ἢ ἐποίησασθε ἢ τοῦ παθήματος τοῦ υμάτιον. οὐ δέ ἤ μεν αἰσθήσεις οἷς μονοῖ

10 ἐργον λέγετο δέ, ἢ δὲ μνήμη οἷς ἀνακαλοῦστοι τοῦ κοινοῦ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς παραδεχόμενης τοῦ τόπου καὶ ἡ φυλάξεις ἡ ἀποθέωσις αὐτῆς. εἰ μὴ τὴν τεκμαίρωσιν κοινοῦ καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ παῖς κρίσεις τῶν συμάτων καὶ μημονιαίων καὶ ἐπιλείψεως ἡμᾶς γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσον

15 καλοτεχνὸν ἢ ἦν καλοτεχνὸν λέγετο τὸ σῶμα γίγνεται, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ μνημονεύειν οἷς ἤτοι ἐν τῷ τοῖς, ὅταν δὲ μαθησάμεθα τός τοῦ κοινοῦ, ἀλλὰ οἷς ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ μημονεύειν ἐσται; εἰ δὲ τὸ ζῷον τὸ συμμοήτερον οὕτως, ὡς ἔτερον καὶ ἄλλος εἶναι,

20 πρῶτον μὲν ἀπόστει καὶ σῶμα μήτε ψυχῆς τὸ ἢτοι λέγεται ὡς γὰρ δὴ μεταβαλλόντων ἀμφότερον ἔτερον τι ἐσται τὸ ζῷον οὐκ οὐκ φιλάνθρωπος, ὡς δυνάμει τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ καίνω εἶναι. ἐπειδὴ 1 καὶ οὕτως ὁδὴ ἅτον τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μνημονεύειν ἐσται, ὡστε εἰ αὐτοῦ ὑπομενόμενος κρίεται καὶ τὸ γενέας,

25 παρὰ τοῦ μέλατος τοῦτο ἐσται. τό αὐτὸ, εἰ αὐτὴ μὲν μὴν μνημονεύει, τῷ δὲ (τῷ) 2 εἰ σώματι εἶναι [ὑπὸ] 3 μὴ καλλικρά εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ὡσπέρ τοιοῦτον, ἀναμίκτηθαι δύναται τοῦ πολλάκις τῆς ἀιτητῶν τύπωσις

1 Bentler: ἐπεὶ Ἐμπ.*
2 ἀναρρέω: Thiele.

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may be in the position of the workman in perceiving and the body in that of the tool; the body experiences and serves, and the soul receives the impression made on the body, or the impression which comes through the body, or the judgment which it made as a result of the experience of the body: sense-perception would certainly have in this case to be called a common work, but memory would not have to belong to what was common, as the soul would have already received the impression and either kept it or thrown it away; unless one was going to conclude that remembering is a common activity from the fact that the mixture of bodily elements makes us have good or bad memories. But even so the body might be said to be obstructive or not obstructive, but remembering would none the less belong to the soul. And how can it be what is common, and not the soul, which is the principle which remembers what we study? But if the composite living thing is something of such a sort as to be different from both its components, first of all it is absurd to say that the living thing is neither body nor soul: for the living thing will not be something different as the result of both of them having changed, nor again as the result of their having been mixed, so that the soul is in the living thing potentially. And then even so remembering would belong just as much to the soul, as in a mixture of wine and honey any sweetness there is will be due to the honey. But suppose it itself remembers, but because it is not pure as a result of being in the body, but has a kind of special quality, it is able to receive the impressions made by the
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καὶ τῶν οὐκ ἔδραν ἐν τῷ σώματι πρὸς τὸ παραδέχεσθαι καὶ μὴ ὅσπερ παραφρένεσθαι; ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν
30 ἄλλο ἔνοχον τὸν μεγέθη, οὗτος ὅσπερ ἐν ἄνθρωπον, ὁ ἐν ἄνθρωπον ἀνεφθησεν ὁπῶς ἀντερείεσθαι ἐν τοῖς ἁμαρτίας, ὡς ὁ ἡμῶν, ἡμῶν ὑπομνῆσθαι, ἡμῶν ἐν οὐσίᾳ, ἀλλὰ ὑποκείμενον ἀλλὰ ὑποκείμενον ἡ ἂντερείας λέγειται ἂν; ἡ τι δὲ σώματος ἡ ποιήσεως σωματικῆς μεθ᾽ ἑαυτῆς ἢ; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῶν
35 αὐτῶν νομιμάτων ὑπέγραψεν μὴν ἐν σύνεσιν Ἀνέγερσι, οἷον δὲν ἐπεθυμήσθη καὶ ἄλλο ἐπεθυμήσθην αὐτὸ ἢ ἔλθεν εἰς σῶμα τὸ ἐπιθυμημένο. τὸς γὰρ ἂν ἐπέτα ἡ σῶμα περὶ ὅλην ἢ ἔλθεν εἰς αὐτὸ; ἡ τίς μετὰ σώματος μετεχονεῖ, ἡ μὴ τέφρης γνώσεως ὅλος τὸ σῶμα; ἀλλὰ τὰ μαλλιόν εἰς σύνεσιν
40 λέγειν, ὡς διὰ σῶματος, τὸ δὲ ψυχῆς εἶναι μονής, εἰ δὲ τὴν ψυχήν εἶναι τι καὶ φύσιν τι καὶ ἔργον τινὰ ἄντερες. εἰ δὲ τούτω, καὶ έφεσαν καὶ μετάφης τῆς ἑσθήσεως ἀρα καὶ τῆς τεύχεως καὶ τῆς ὤν τεύχεως, ἐπέτα περὶ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἄντερες ὑπὸ τῶν
45 βέσων. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τούτῳ, ἀδέλφις οὐκολοίηται οὔτε παρακαλοῦσθαι σύν εἰς αὐτὸν σύνεσιν καὶ ὅλον σύνεσιν. ὦ γὰρ δὴ οὐδὲν ἔχουσα ποιήσας εἰ τῇ ἐξήκοντα ἀντίτροπον καὶ σύννομον, ἀλλὰ ἐφερχόμεν τὸν τοῖς ἐν σύνεσις, ἀλλὰ ἐφερχόμεν τὸν τοῖς ἐν σύνεσις, ἀλλὰ ἐφερχόμεν τὸν τοῖς ἐν σύνεσις. τῶν δὲ τὰς δικαιοδοτικὲς ἕκαστρον

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sense-objects and is also able to do this because it has a kind of standing-ground in the body for receiving them and does not, so to speak, flow away. But to begin with, the impressions are not magnitudes; nor are they like seal-impressions or counter-pressures or stamps, because there is no pushing and it is not like what happens in wax, but the way of it is like thinking even in the case of sense-objects. But in acts of thought: what counter-pressure could there be said to be? Or what need is there of a body or bodily quality as an accompaniment? But surely, too, the soul must have memory of its own movements, of what it desired, for instance, and of what it did not enjoy and the desired object did not enter the body. For how could the body speak of what did not come into it? Or how will it remember with the help of the body something which the body has been in no condition to know at all? But we must say that some things, all that come through the body, reach as far as the soul, and others belong to the soul alone, if the soul must be something, and a distinct nature, and have a work of its own. If this is so, it will have aspiration, and memory of its aspiration, and of attaining or not attaining it, since its nature is not one of those which are in a state of flux. For if this is not so, we shall not grant it self-awareness or consciousness of its own activities or any sort of power of combination and understanding. For it certainly is not the case that it has none of these in its own nature and acquired them in the body, but it has some activities of the works required for the completion of the bodily organs, and brings the potentialities of some of them with it when it comes, and the actualities of others. But as far as

1 An example of Plotinus's continually repeated attack in the corporeal Stic theory of sense-perception: cp. SVF II 544 and II 343 for the theory; Plotinus's fullest statement of the Platonism case against Stic psychology is IV. 7. 1-20 (ch. 6 deals with sense-impressions).
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 3.

50 ἡφονσα, τόν δὲ καὶ τάς ἐνεργείας. τό δὲ τῆς μνήμης καὶ τό σῶμα ἐμπλοῦσιν ἤχει: ετεί καὶ τόν προστιθεμένων τινῶν λήψη, εν δὲ ἀφαιρέσει καὶ καθάρεις ἀνακύστει παλακίς ή μνήμη, μνήμη δὲ εὐθύς ἀντίς ἀνάγη τήν τοῖς σώμασι πάνω κοινωνεῖν καὶ θέωνων λήψη αὐτίκα, ἀλλ' οὖ 55 μνήμης ἐγείραι διὸ καὶ ὅ τ' Ἀρχαίος θεοτικῶς διότι αὐτόν ἂν ὑπονοοῦσιν. ψυχῆς μὲν δὴ ἐστὶν τὸ πάθημα τοῦτο.

27. Ἀλλ' εἰςοι ὁνεμέσι, τῆς μὲν λεγομένης ὅπ' ἡμῶν Θεοτέρας, κατ' ἑν' ἡμῖν, τῆς δὲ Ἀλλής τῆς παρὰ τοῦ Ἑλλού; ἡ λεκτίλων εἰναι μνήμας ἑκτέρας, τάς μὲν ἡμίας, τάς δὲ κοινές· καὶ οίτε μὲν τό εἰπασυν, ὅμοιος πάσας, χωρὶς δὲ γενομένων, εἰ ἱππότε φέλων καὶ μένοιν, ἑκτέραν ἐπιτελεῖν τοῦ ἑαυτῆς, ἐν' ἢλθον δὲ χρόνον τῇ ἑπότερες. τοῦ γενὸς ἐνωλον εἰ 'Αδείν Ἡρακλεόν—τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τό ἐνωλον, ὅμοιο, χωρὶς ἡμοὶ ἡμῶν—μημονεῖρον τῶν πεπαγμένων πάντων κατά τοῦ βίου, αὐτοῦ 10 γὰρ μάλλον καὶ τὸ βίος ἦν. αἰ δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῦ συναμφότερον γεγομένας [οὗτος] 1 οὐδὲν πλέον ἠμῶν εἰχόν λέγει: ὅ δὲ τοῦ ἀκούσας, καὶ ᾠδαί τοῦ συναμφότερον γεγομένας] 2 πάντα ἅμαρτια τις ἤτοι δικαιοτίμης ἢ ἠμῶν. δὲ Ἡρακλῆς

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memory is concerned, it has the body as an actual hindrance: since even as things are, some additions produce forgetfulness, and when they are removed and purged away the memory revives. And since memory is a stable condition, the body's nature, moving and flowing, must be a cause of forgetfulness, not of memory; this is why the "river of Lethe" might be understood in this sense. So, then, let this experience of memory belong to the soul.

27. But to which soul, that which we shall call the more divine, by which we are ourselves, or the other which comes from the Whole? Perhaps we must say that there are memories of both kinds, some individual and some common; and when the two souls are together all their memories coincide; but if they become separated, if they were both to exist and persist in separation, each would have its own memories for a longer time and for a short time those of the other. At any rate the shade of Hercules in Hades—this shade too, I think, we must

coplasion of the great myth which ends the Republie (620C).

1 The reference is to Deipnosophists 11. 001ff., where the shade of Hermes in Hades is distinguished from Hercules himself, who is with the gods: ep. 1. 1. 12. 51ff. The passage had been recognised since Aristarchus as a later interpolation, but Plotinus was not aware of this (he was a scholar), or ignored it. His philosophical explanation had earlier forerunners, the ultimate source of which may be in the Old Academy or post-Platonic Pythagoreanism. See Plutarch, De facie in orbe terrae Book 9.4—9.5A with the note of H. Chemin ad loc. (Morello, Liberal edition vol. 12); F. Cumont, Lux Perpetua (Paris 1849) 189-91; H. J. Birnental, op. cit. 86; and the latest and most thorough examination by J. Tépin, "Héraclès et son relèvement dans le Néoplatonisme," in Le Néoplatonisme (Paris 1871) 167—86.

4 An example of casual philosophical interpretation of a Platonic myth: the "river of Lethe" is taken from the

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consider to be our self—remembers all that he did in his life, for the life particularly belonged to the shade. But the other souls which became composite entities [of higher and lower soul], all the same had nothing more to talk about than the things of this life, and they themselves knew them—except perhaps something concerned with righteousness. But Homer does not tell us what Hercules himself said, the Hercules without the shade. What then would the other soul say when it has been freed and is alone? The soul which drags after it anything at all [from the body] would speak of everything which the man had done or experienced. But as time goes on after death, memories of other things would appear from its former lives, so that it would even abandon with contempt some of these memories [of its immediately past life]. For since it has become free from bodily contamination it will go ever again in its memory also what it did not have in this life; but if when it goes out [of this body], it comes to exist in another, it will speak of the events of its outward life, of what it has just left and of many events of its former lives. But in time it will come to forgetfulness of many things which occurred to it from time to time. But when it comes to be alone what will it remember? First we must enquire what power of soul it is which remembering accompanies.

28. Is it that by which we perceive and by which we learn? Or does our remembrance of the things we desired accompany our power of desiring, and of the things which made us angry, our spirited power? For, someone will say, there will not be one thing which enjoys [the desired objects] and
5 γενν ἐπιθυμητικόν ὅν ἀπέλαυσε τοῦτος 1 κινεῖται πάλιν ὀφθέντος τοῦ ἐπιθυμητοῦ δηλαδή τῇ μνήμῃ. ἔτει δὲ τῷ οὐκ ἄλλου, ἢ οὐχ οὕτως; τῷ οὖν κοιλεῖ καὶ ἀκοῦσθεν τῶν τοιοῦτων διδύμων αὐτῷ καὶ τῷ ἀκούσματι τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ πάντα πάσιν ὥστε κατὰ τὸ ἔννοιον ἑνοῦτον λέγεσθαι; 10 ἡ ἀπάθεια ἄλλως ἕκαστῇ οὖν εἰπεῖ μὲν ἡ ἄρα, οὐ τῷ ἐπιθυμοῦν, ἐκεῖνῃ δὲ πάρα τῇ ἀκούσμασι τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦν οὐκ ἔκαστη, οὐχ ὡστε εἰπεῖν τῇ ἀπάθειαν οὐ, ἀλλ’ ὡστε ἀπαρακολουθήσας τοῦτον συνεχεῖ. καὶ ἐτί τοῦ θυμοῦ εἶδε τὸν ἀληθήσατα, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς ἀνέκτη, οἷον εἴ ποιμένος 15 ἑκάστου εἴ τις μίμη λύκων ἦ σκέπασε τῇ ὁδῷ ἡ τῷ κτύπῳ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦν ἄλλος ἄρην ἡμῶν ἄρνος. καὶ τοιοῦ ἀπέλαυσε μὲν τῷ ἐπιθυμοῦν, καὶ ἔχει χρόνος τοῦ γνωσμένον εὐθύνευν οὐκ ἔστω μνήμῃ, ἀλλ’ ἴσω διάθεσιν καὶ πάθος: ἀλλ’ δὲ τὸ ἔννοιον τῆς ἀπάθειας καὶ παρ’ αὐτὸν ἔχει τῇ μνήμῃ τοῦ 20 γεγονότος. τεκμηρίων δὲ τῇ μη ἠδέων εἶναι τὴν μνήμην πολλάκις ὡς μετέχει τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦν, καίτοι, εἰ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἦν οὖν.

29. Ἀρ’ ὃν τῷ ἀκοῦσμακρὸν δέχοντες ἀναβήσομεν

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1 The idea of "naming by predominance" goes back at least to Plato (see Philostratus, A 4, 187[18]). It was used by Antiochus of Ascalon in discussing the question whether an incompletely happy life could be called "happy" (Cicero, Tuscans V 22). It became important in post-Plotinian Neoplatonism: see P. Hadot, "Étre, Vie, Pensée..." 124

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another which remembers the objects enjoyed by the first. On this assumption the desiring power is moved by what it enjoyed when it saw the desired object again, obviously by means of the memory. For why [otherwise] should it not be moved when something else is seen, or seen in a different way? What then prevents us from giving the desiring power perception of desirable things and, again, the perceptive power desire, and giving everything to everything so that each is named by that which predominates in it? Now perception can be attributed to each power in a different way. Sight, for instance, sees, not the desiring power, but the desiring power is moved by a sort of transmission from the perception, not so that it can say what sort of perception it is, but so that it is unconsciously affected by it. And in the case of sight, one sees the wrongdoer and the anger arises; it is like when the shepherd sees the wolf by the flock and the shepherd is excited by the sight or the noise, though he has not himself seen the wolf with his eyes. And the desiring power, certainly, enjoyed and has a trace of what happened implanted in it, not like a memory, but like an [unconscious] disposition and affection; but it is another power which has seen the enjoyment and of its own motion retains the memory of what happened. It is evidence of this that the memory of the desiring power’s experiences is often not pleasant, though if it had been in it, it would have been.

29. Shall we then take the memory and put it in chais Plotin et avant Plotin" in Les Sources de Plotin (Entretiens Hardt 1960), with the discussion, 107-
the perceptive power, and will what remembers and what perceives be the same thing for us? But if
the shade, too, is going to remember, as was said,
the perceptive power will be double, and even if it is
not the perceptive power but something else
which remembers, this remembering power will be
double. Again, if it is the perceptive power which
remembers, this will also perceive studies and
thoughts [as well as sense-objects]. But there
must be a different power for each of these. Shall we
then assume that there is a common power of
apprehension, and give to it the memory of both?
But if that which apprehended the objects of both
the senses and the intelligence was one and the same,
perhaps there would be something in this statement;
but if it is divided in two, there will all the same be
two powers. But if we give both to each soul, then
there will be four. But in general, what
necessity is there for us to remember by that by
which we perceive, and for both perceiving and
remembering to come about by the same power,
and for us to remember our thoughts by that by which
we think? For some people are not the best at
thinking and at remembering, and those who are
equally perceptive have not equally good memories,
and some people have quick perceptions, but others
whose perceptions are not keenly remembered well.
But once more, if it is going to be necessary for each
of the two to be different, and something else is going
to remember what perception first perceived, will
that something else have to perceive what it is going
to remember? Now nothing will prevent a percep-
tion from being a mental image for that which
is going to remember it, and the memory and the reten-

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...tion of the object from belonging to the image-making power, which is something different: for it is in this that the perception arrives at its conclusion, and what was seen is present in this when the perception is no longer there. If then the image of what is absent is already present in this, it is already remembering, even if the presence is only for a short time. The man with whom the image remains for a short time will have a short memory, but people with whom the images remain for a long time have better memories; this power is stronger in them, so that it does not easily change and let the memory go, shaken out of it. Memory, then, will belong to the image-making power, and remembering will be of things of the mental image kind. And we shall say that the differences between men in respect of memory are due to the fact that their image-making powers are differently developed, or to the degree to which they attend or do not attend to them, or to the presence or absence of certain bodily temperaments, and whether they change or not and, so to speak, produce disturbances. But this we shall discuss elsewhere.

30. But what is it that remembers thoughts? Does the image-making power remember these too? But if an image accompanies every intellectual act, perhaps if this image remains, being a kind of picture of the thought, in this way there would be memory of what was known; but if not, we must look for some other explanation. Perhaps the reception into the image-making power would be of the verbal expression which accompanies the act of intelligence.

1 These words seem to express the intention to write something like ch. 3 of the later treatise IV. 6.
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The intellectual act is without parts and has not, so
to speak, come out into the open, but remains un-
observed within, but the verbal expression unfolds its
content and brings it out of the intellectual act into
the image-making power, and so shows the intellec-
tual act as if in a mirror, and this is how there is
apprehension and persistence and memory of it.
Therefore, even though the soul is always moved to
intelligent activity, it is when it comes to be in the
image-making power that we apprehend it. The
intellectual act is one thing and the apprehension of
it another, and we are always intellectually active
but do not always apprehend our activity; and this
is because that which receives it does not only receive
acts of the intelligence, but also, on its other side,
perceptions.

31. But if memory belongs to the image-making
power, and each of the two souls remembers, as has
been said, there will be two image-making powers.
Well, then, when the souls are separate we can grant
that each of them will have an imaging power, but
when they are together, in our earthly life, how are
there two powers, and in which of them does memory
reside? If it is in both of them, the images will
always be double; for one certainly cannot suppose
that the power of one soul has images [only] of
intelligible things and the power of the other images
[only] of perceptible things; for in this way there
will be two living things with nothing as all in com-
mon with each other. If then [both kinds of images]
relatively unimportant. As it appears in an early, a middle-
period, and a late treatise, Plotinus seems to have held this
doctrine consistently throughout his writing period.

3 For this doctrine that the awareness of our own thinking
which makes memory possible can only take place when pure
thought is translated into images, sp. IV. 8. 8 and L. 4. 8-10;
these passages add that the translation into images depends
on the good health and freedom from disturbance of the body;
consciousness in the ordinary sense, with memory, is thus
secondary, dependent on our own physical condition, and
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are in both souls, what is the difference? And why do we not recognise it? Now when one soul is in tune with the other, and their image-making powers are not separate, and that of the better soul is dominant, the image becomes one, as if a shadow followed the other and as if a little light slipped in under the greater one; but when there is war and disharmony between them, the other image becomes manifest by itself, but we do not notice what is in the other power, and we do not notice in general the quality of the souls. For both have come together into one and the better soul is on top of the other. This other soul, then, sees everything, and takes some things with it which belong to the other when it goes out [of the body] but rejects others; as when we keep company with inferior people and then change to other companions, we remember little of the inferior ones but more of the better sort.

32. But what about the memories of our friends and children and wife? Of our country, and all the things it would not be absurd for a man of quality to remember? Now the image-makimg power remembers each of them with emotion, but the lower one of quality would have his memories of them without emotion: for the emotion, perhaps, was in the image-making power even from the beginning, and those of the emotions which have any good quality pass to the noble soul, in so far as it has any communication with the other one. It is proper for the whole soul to aspire to the activities of the memory of the higher soul, especially when it is of good quality itself: for a lower soul can be comparably good from the beginning and can become so as a result of education by the higher soul. But the higher soul ought to
ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL I

be happy to forget what it has received from the worse soul. For it could be that even when the higher soul is noble, the other soul is naturally a rather bad one and is restrained forcibly by the higher soul. The more it presses on towards the heights the more it will forget, unless perhaps all its life, even here below, has been such that its memories are only of higher things; since here below too it is best to be detached from human concerns, and so necessarily from human memories; so that if anyone said that the good soul was forgetful, it would be correct to say so in this sort of sense. For the higher soul also flies from multiplicity, and gathers multiplicity into one and abandons the indefinite; because in this way it will not be [dragged] with multiplicity but light and alone by itself; for even here below, when it wants to be in that higher world, while it is still here below it abandons everything that is different [from that world]; and there are few things here that are also there; and when it is in heaven it will abandon still more. And Homer's Heracles might talk about his heroic deeds; but the man who thinks these of little account and has migrated to a holier place, and has been stronger than Heracles in the contexts in which the wise compact.

1 Porphyry, oddly, divides the great treatise here in the middle of a sentence. This may seem rather less odd if we consider that the sentence is anacoluthic: that the point of division marks the transition from the man of middle virtue (symbozed by Heracles) to the contemplative sage; and that division here enables Porphyry to lay great emphasis on the important question which begins IV. 4 (ex. the way in which Porphyry divides the treatise On Providence (III. 2-3) and the existing question with which Plotinus himself begins I.1).
IV. 4. ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL II

1. — What will he say? And what will the soul remember when it has come to be in the intelligible world, and with that higher reality? It is consistent to say that it will contemplate those things among which it is, and its mental activity will be concerned with them, or else it will not be there at all. Will it not then, remember any of its experiences here below, for instance that it engaged in philosophy, and even that while it was here it contemplated the things in that other world? But if it is not possible, when one has one’s thought directed on something, to do anything else but think and contemplate that object—and the statement "I had thought [it before]" is not included in the thinking, but one would say it afterwards, if one said it at all, that is when an alteration in one’s thinking has already taken place; it would not then be possible, when one is purely in the intelligible world, to remember the things which happened to one at any time when one was here. But if, as we believe, every act of intelligence is timeless, since the realities there are in eternity and not in time, it is impossible that there should be a memory there, not only of the things here below, but of anything at all. But each and every thing is present there; so there is no discursive thought or transition from one to the other. Well,
Plotinus: Ennead IV. 4

then, will there be no division starting from above into species, or an ascent from below to the universal and the higher? Granted that the Intellect does not have this, since it is all together in one in its actuality, why should the soul when it is there not have it? What then prevents the soul too from having a unified intuition of all its objects in one? Can it really see them as one thing, all together? Rather, it is as if all its acts of intelligence, with their many objects, were all together. For since its object of contemplation is richly varied, the act of intelligence too is richly varied and multiple, and there are many acts of intelligence, as there are many acts of perception of a face when the eyes and the nose and the other features are all seen at once. But [what happens] when the soul divides and unfolds some one object? It is already divided in Intellect and an act of this kind is more like a concentration of attention. And, as the prior and the subsequent in the species-forms are not temporal, so neither will the soul make its acts of intelligence of the prior and the subsequent in temporal sequence. For there is also the prior and the subsequent in order, as in a plant the order which begins from the roots and extends to the topmost point does not have for the observer the prior and the subsequent in any other way than in order, since he observes the whole plant at once. But when the soul looks first at one [intelligible object], and then possesses the whole multiplicity of them, how does it possess one first and another next? The one power is one in such a way that it becomes many in something else, and does not comprehend all things by one act of intelligence. For its acts are individual, but always to-

1 Keil, testator Thesaurus II. 11: τον θεόν, H-81.
5 οὐκ εἰς ψυχήν, H-81.
ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL II

gather in a power which remains unchanged, but is divided in other things.¹ For that intelligible object
is able in virtue of its not being one to receive in itself the nature of the many which did not previously
exist.

2. But enough about this. How does it remember itself? It will not even have the remembrance of
itself, or that it is the man himself, Socrates for instance, who is contemplating, or that it is intellect
or soul. Besides, one should certainly remember that even here below when one contemplates, espec-
ially when the contemplation is clear, one does not turn to oneself in the act of intelligence, but one
possesses oneself; one's activity, however, is directed towards the object of contemplation, and one be-
comes this, offering oneself to it as a kind of matter, being formed according to what one sees, and being
oneself then only potentially. Is a man then actually himself in any way when he is thinking nothing at all?
Yes, if he is [merely] himself he is empty of everything, when he is thinking nothing at all. But if he
is himself in such a way as to be everything; when he thinks himself, he thinks everything at once; so
that a man in this state, by his intuition of himself, and when he actually sees himself, has everything
included in this seeing, and by his intuition of everything he himself included. But if this is what he
does, he changes his acts of intelligence, and we ourselves did not think it right to assert this before.
Must we say then that unchangeability belongs to Intellect, but that in the case of Soul, which lies, so
unalterable. It adds nothing to what has been said in the previous sentence, but Plotinus is frequently repetitive. Igal's
suggestion is attractive, but not completely convincing.
ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL II

to speak, on the frontier of the intelligible, this change can happen, since it can also advance further into Intellect? For if something comes to be in the region of that which abides, it must be different from that which abides, and not abide in the same way. No, we must not even say that there is a change, when the soul moves from its own content to itself, and from itself to the rest of its content: for the self is all things, and both are one. But does the soul when it is in the intelligible world experience this "one thing after another" in relation to itself and its contents? No, when it is purely and simply in the intelligible world it has itself too the characteristic of unchangeability. For it is really all the things it is: since when it is in that region, it must come to unity with Intellect, by the fact that it has turned to it, for when it is turned, it has nothing between, but comes to Intellect and conveys itself to, and by that accord is united to it without being destroyed, but both of them are one and also two. When therefore it is in this state it could not change but would be unalterably disposed to intelligence while at the same time having a concurrent awareness of itself, as having become one and the same thing with its intelligible object.

3. Ἐξελθοῦσα δὲ ἐκείνη καὶ οὕτω ἀναρχομένη τὸ ἐν, τὸ δὲ ἄστρον ἀναστασιμένα καὶ ἑτερὸν ἀναλυόμενον εἶναι καὶ οὕτω προκύψασα, μνήμην, ὡς ἔνσει, ἐφέξει λαμβάνει. μνήμη δὲ ἐν μὲν τῶν ἐκεί ἐν 5 κατέχει μὴ πεσόντων, ἢ δὲ τῶν ἐνταλμάτων ὁδὶ φέρει, ἢ δὲ τῶν ἐν ὑλῇ κατεστάθη, καὶ ἄλλαι, οὐ μυθολ. ἐκείναι, ἐκεῖνο ἐστι καὶ γίνεται. ἣν γὰρ τὸ μνημονευ-
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of what is in heaven keeps it there, and in general it is and becomes what it remembers. For remembering is either thinking or imaging; and the image comes to the soul not by possession, but as it sees, so it is disposed; and if it sees sense-objects, it sinks low in proportion to the amount of them it sees. For because it possesses all things in a secondary way, and not so perfectly [as Intellect], it becomes all things, and since it is a thing belonging to the frontier between the worlds, and occupies a corresponding position, it moves in both directions.

4. Now in the intelligible world the soul also sees the Good through Intellect; for it is not excluded, so as not to come through to the soul, since what is between them is not a body which would obstruct it —yet even with even between there are many ways of arrival at the third level from the first. But if the soul gives itself to what is below it, it has what it wants in proportion to its memory and imaging power. Therefore memory, even when it is of the best, is not the best thing. But one must understand memory not only in the sense of a kind of perception that one is remembering, but so existing when the soul is disposed according to what it has previously experienced or contemplated. For it could happen that, even when one is not conscious that one has something, one holds it to oneself more strongly than if one knew. For perhaps if one knew one would have it as something else, being different oneself, but if one does not know that one has it one is liable to be what one has: and this is certainly the experience which makes the soul sink lower. But if when the soul leaves the intelligible region it recovers its memories, it had them somehow there.
ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL.

1. Yes, it had them potentially, but the active actuality of the intelligible obscured the memory. For its memories were not like imprints left in it (a supposition which would possibly have absurd consequences), but the potentiality was there which was later let loose into actuality. So when the actuality in the intelligible world ceased to be active, the soul saw what it had been seeing before it came to be in that world.

2. Well, then, does this very potentiality by which we remember bring the intelligible realities also to actuality in us now? If we did not see them themselves, it is by memory [that they are actual], but if we did see them, it is by that with which we also saw them there. For this is awakened by that which awakens it, and this is the power which sees in the sphere of the realities we mentioned. For one must not, when one makes statements about the intelligible world, use analogy or syllogistic reasoning which takes its principles from elsewhere, even when we are here below we can speak about the intelligible realities by that same power which is able to contemplate the higher world. For one must see the things in that world by a kind of awakening of the same power, so that one can awake it in the higher world also; as if one went up to some high viewpoint and raising one's eyes saw what no one saw who had not come up with one. From our discussion, then, it seems that memory begins in heaven, when the soul has already left the higher regions. Now if the soul has arrived in heaven from down here and stays there, it is in no way surprising if it remembers many beings below of the sort we have mentioned, and recognises many souls from...

1 Crouzet (discus Perinus): Μέγαντα Εκκ.
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among those it knew previously, especially if they must necessarily be clothed in bodies of similar forms [to their earthly ones]. And even if they have changed the forms of their bodies and adopted spherical ones, might they recognise [each other] by their characters and the individuality of their behaviour? For this is not absurd. Granted that they have put away their passions, there is nothing to prevent their characters persisting. And if they were also able to talk, they could recognize [each other] in this way too. But when they come down from the intelligible world to heaven, how do they remember? They will arouse again their memories of the same things, but less than the souls which come from below; for they will have other things to remember, and the longer time which has elapsed will have produced complete forgetfulness of many things. But if they turn to the world of sense and fall to birth here, what will be the manner of their rememberings? It is not necessary to tell the whole story of the depths. For it is possible for souls in motion to halt when they have advanced a certain distance, and nothing prevents them from coming again before they come to the lowest point of the process of generation.

6. One could say, then, that souls which migrate and change their state will also remember; for memory is of things which have happened and are past; but as for the souls to which it belongs to remain in the same state, what could they remember? The discussion is trying to find out about the memory...

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ries of the soul of all the heavenly bodics in general, and in particular about the sun and moon, and in the end it will go as far as the soul of the All, and will dare to be busy with the memories of Zeus himself. And in looking for this it will observe what their discursive reasonings and calculations are, if there are any. If, then, they neither investigate nor are perplexed—for they need nothing and learn nothing which was not part of their knowledge before—what could their calculations or logical deductions or discursive reasonings be? They will not even have designs and devices concerned with human affairs, by which they will manage our business and that of the earth in general: the right order which comes from them to the All is of another kind.

7. Well, then, will they not remember that they saw God? They always see him; and while they see him it is surely not possible for them to say that they have seen him: this would be something which would happen to those who have ceased to see. Well, will they not remember that they went round the earth yesterday, and last year, and that they lived yesterday and for a long time past and from the beginning of their lives? They live for ever: and “for ever” means an identical unity. The “yesterday” of their transit and the “last year” would be the same kind of thing as if one was to divide the step taken by one foot into many parts, and make the one step into many, one after another. For up there there is one transit, but we measure many, and different days, because nights intervene. But there, since there is one [unbroken] day, how can there be many? So there is not a last year either. But the space traversed is not the same, but
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 4.

δια τὴν γάρ τοῦ ζωὸς τὰ μήτεν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ λόγον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀλλὰ, διά τί οὖν οὐκ ἐρεῖ "παραθέλειν ποθε, νῦν δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐμί;" εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐφορεῖ τὰ ἀνθρώπων, πῶς οὐ καὶ τὰς μετα-
βολὰς τὰς περὶ αὐτῶς, καὶ οὐκ οἷος ἐν ἄλλῳ; εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ὑπὸ πρῶτον έτερον καὶ ἐτερα: ὥστε καὶ μὴν.

8. "Η ὡς ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐδὲν τὶς θεωρεῖ ἐν μυθη-
τικείαν, οὐδὲ τὰς πάντας κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐπακουλουθίαν έν φαντασία γίγνεθαί, ἃν τε ἡ 
μνήμη καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη ἐπερμοιοῦρε, εἰ πολλά πληθυνών 
γίγνονται, οὐδὲν ἀνάγκη παρά τὴν γνώσιν αὐτῶν τῷ 
κατὰ μέρος ἀποκεφαλώτη τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ποιείοισα, εἰ μὴ 
tις ἐξ αὐτῷ ἐκοινομοῦ τῇ, τῶν ἐν μέρει τῇ γνώσει 
tοῦ οἷον ἐπερμοιοῦρεν. λόγῳ δὲ ἐκαστὸν ἀπε-
ρωτῶν μὲν τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαίον εἶναι, ἢ τις ἀρχὴν, 
παρατίθεσθαι παρ' αὐτῷ. διὰ γὰρ μὲν ἐν τῇ 

different, and the section of the Zodiac is different.
Why then, will not the star say, "I have passed 
through this section, and am now in another"? And 
and it keeps watch over human affairs, why does 
it not see the changes which take place among men, 
and that they are now different? And if this is so, 
we say that men and their affairs were formerly 
otherwise; so that it also has memory.

8. Now it is not necessary to deposit in one's 
memory everything that one observes, or that al-
together incidental consequences should come to be 
present in the imaging faculty; and further, in the 
case of things of which the thought and knowledge 
are more effective, it is not necessary, if these occur 
in the field of sense-perception, to let the knowledge 
of them go and pay attention to the particulars per-
ceived by sense (unless one is engaged in the practical 
management of something), since the particulars are 
included in the knowledge of the whole. What I 
mean by each of these statements is as follows.
First point: that it is not necessary to keep stored 
up in oneself what one sees. When what is perceived 
makes no difference, or the perception is not at all 
personally relevant, but is provoked involuntarily by 
the difference in the things seen, it is only the sense-
perception which has this experience and the soul 
does not receive it into its interior, since the difference 
is not of concern to it either because it meets a need 
or is of benefit in some other way. And when the 
souls to the unchanging life of eternity, because they are not 
awake and do not remember their embodied experience in 
such a way as it is temporal and changing, see my "Eternity, Life 
and Movement in Plotinus' Accounts of Nous" in Le Néo-
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soul's activity is directed to other things, and completely directed to them, it will not accept the memory of things like these when they have passed away, since it is not aware of the sense-impression produced by them when they are there. Then again, one might understand the point: that things which happen altogether incidentally do not necessarily come to be present in the imaging faculty, and even if they did would not necessarily be there in such a way that it would guard and observe them, but the impression of a thing like this does not produce a conscious perception, if one took what was said in the following sense. This is what I mean; if it is never a primary consideration to us in local motion to cut through this piece of air and then that, or, even more, to pass through the air at all, we shall not observe the air or have an idea of it in our minds as we walk. For if it was not a primary consideration to us to complete a particular stretch of the road, but we could go on our way through the air, it would be no concern of ours at what milestone in the land we were, or how much of the way we had covered; and if we did not have to travel for a particular space of time, but only to travel, and referred no other activity to time, we should not remember successive periods of time. It is also well known that when our reason grasps what is being done as a whole, and has confidence that it will be completely carried out in this particular way, it will not any more attend to the details as they occur. Again, when someone is always doing the same thing, there would be no point in his observing the details of this same operation. If, then, the heavenly bodies in their courses move along concerned with their own affairs and not
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 4.

in order to cover the distance which they cover, and their business is not the sight of what they pass or the passing, and their passage is incidental and their mind is on other, greater things, and these things which they travel through are always the same, and the time taken on a particular stage of their course is not calculated (even if it were divided into stages); then there is no necessity for them to have any memory of the regions they have passed through or the periods of time; and they have the same life, in that their local movement also is around the same centre, so that it is not a local but a vital movement, the movement of a single living being with a self-directed activity, at rest in relation to what is outside it, but in motion by virtue of the everlasting life in it—even if one were to compare their motion to a dance, if it was a dance which some time came to a stop, the whole would be perfect when it had been completed from beginning to end, but each figure which formed a part of it would be imperfect; but if it is the sort of dance which goes on for ever, it is for ever perfect. But if it is for ever perfect, it has no time or space within which it will be completed; so consequently it will have no aspiration [for completion]; and in consequence of this it will not measure either temporally or spatially; and consequently it will have no memory of this. If, of course, the heavenly bodies themselves live a blessed life, and contemplate this life besides with their souls, by this direction of their souls towards one object and by the illumination which extends from them to the whole heaven—like strings on a lyre plucked harmoniously they sing a song which is naturally in tune—if this is how the whole heaven

1. Δροσή (=Schlegel), Creuza* (titia Ficinus): ἡδων λεον
ExUCC.
2. Kirschhoff*: ἵστοτης II.81.
4. Volkmar*: τῇ δὲ ως: τῇ U.
5. del. Volkmar*, ut correctionem ad τῇ falsa loco insertam.
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and its parts move, the heaven itself being self-directed and the different parts having the same direction in different ways (since their positions are different), then our account will be still more correct, since the life of all the heavenly bodies is still more one and uniform.

6. But Zeus who sees all things in order and administers and directs them for ever, who has a "royal soul" and a "royal mind" and foresight of how things will happen and authority over them when they have happened, and arranges the heavens in order and sets their cycles turning and has already brought many cycles to completion, how could he not have memory when all this is going on? In his devoting and comparing and calculating how many cycles and of what kind there have been, and how thereafter they may come to be, he would have the best memory of all, just as he is the wisest craftsman. Now the matter of his memory of the cycles is in itself one of much difficulty; there is the question of how great the number is and whether he could know it. For if the number is limited it will give the All a temporal beginning; but if it is unlimited, he will not know how many his works are. Now he will know that his work is one and a single life for ever—this is how the number is unlimited—and will know the unity not externally, but in his work; the unlimited in this sense will always be with him, or rather follows upon him and is contemplated by a knowledge which has not come to him from something other than himself. For as he knows the description of the activity of Zeus is inspired by Plato Phaedrus 246E-4-6: his "royal soul" and "royal mind" are from Philebus 30D-1-2.
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ζωής οίδει, οίτω καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὴν εἰς τὸ πᾶν οὖσαν μίαν, οὐχ ὅτι εἰς τὸ πᾶν.

10. Ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸ κοσμὸν διίτου, τὸ μὲν ὃς τὸν δημιουργὸν λέγειν, τὸ δὲ ὡς τὴν τοῦ παντός ψυχήν, καὶ τὸν Δία λέγοντες ὅτι μὲν ὃς ἐπὶ τὸν δημιουργὸν φερόμεθα, ὡτε δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ παντός, εἰς μὲν τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀναδεικνύει τὸ πάντα τὸ πρὸς καὶ ὁπὼς μᾶν αὐτῷ ἀπερρέστοι καὶ ἀρχον ζωὴν διάδοται. ἢ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ζωὴ τὸ ἡγεμόνιον ἐν αὐτῇ ἔχουσα ἐπὶ ἐπιτυγχαίνει λόγον, εἰ ὅντα καὶ αὐτὴ μη ἐν τῷ λοιπῷ ἔχει τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ μέτα τοῦ κόσμου, ὥστε καὶ τῷ ἐπὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἐπὶ τῷ ἐπὶ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ, ὥστε εἰς τὴν τὰ κόσμων ἐπὶ τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ, ὥστε εἰς τὴν πρωτότοκον·

10 καὶ τέτακται ἡ δεῖ, ὡς τελείωτα, τὰ γὰρ ταχύτερα ἢ τὸν γινόμενον, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦ ἀπὸ ἡ τάξις; ὅταν δὲ φύσεως ἐνεργείας ἐξηγητέομεν μενοῦντες ὁμοτες, ὡς εἰκὼν ἢ ἐν αὐτῇ τάξις. ὡς τριστεροῖς ὃς

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unlimitless of his own life, so he knows his activity exercised upon the All as being one single activity, but not that it is exercised upon the All.

10. But since the ordering principle is twofold, we speak of one form of it as the Craftsman and the other as the Soul of the All; and when we speak of Zeus we sometimes apply the name to the Craftsman and sometimes to the ruling principle of the All. In the case of the Craftsman we must completely eliminate "before" and "after" and give him a single unchanging and timeless life. But the life of the universe which contains in itself the ruling principle still requires discussion (to determine) whether this too has a life which is not spent in calculation or in enquiring what it ought to do. [It does], for the things it ought to do have already been discovered and ordered without being set in order; for the things set in order were the things that happened, and what made them was the order; and this is the activity of soul which depends on an abiding intellect of which the image is the order in soul. But if that intelligence does not change, it is universe, its lower phases, Nature, being the immanent principle of life and bodily form. Soul's creative activity is for him real and important (op. V. 1. 2; II. 9. 18) but instrumental and intermediary, entirely dependent on the creative energy of the living World of Forms which is Intellect: op. V. 8. 7. 15-16. So Intellect remains for him the 'true Craftsman and maker of the universe' (V. 9. 3. 25-6).

1 The spontaneous, unreasoning (though supremely intelligent) character of the creative activity of Intellect and higher soul is something on which Plotinus several times insists, against Jews, Christians and simple-minded Platoists who supposed that God thought out his plans for the world and then made it: op. especially the chapter cited in the last note, V. 8. 7.
Plotinus: Ennead IV. 4.

necessary that this soul does not change either; for it does not sometimes look to Intellect and sometimes not; for if it left off looking it would be perplexed; for there is one soul and one work. For the ruling principle is one, always dominant, and not sometimes dominant and sometimes dominated: for from what source could come a multiplicity [of ruling principles] so that there would be strife between them and perplexity? And the one directing principle always wills the same thing: for why should it will now one thing and now another, so as to be perplexed about the multiple alternatives? Yet, even if, being one thing, it were to change, it would not be perplexed; for because the All is already many, and has parts, and oppositions between the parts, it is not for this reason in perplexity about how it shall arrange them; for it does not start from the last and lowest things, or from the parts, but from the primary things, and beginning from the first it proceeds by an unobstructed way to all things and arranges them in ordered beauty and dominates them for this reason, because it persists in one and the same work and is the same thing. But if it wishes for one thing after another, where would the other thing it wished for come from? Then it would be perplexed about what it ought to do, and its work would weaken as it advanced in its calculations to uncertainty about what to do.

11. The administration of the universe is like that of a single living being, where there is one kind which works from outside and deals with it part by part, and another kind which works from inside, from the principle of its life. So a doctor begins from outside and deals with particular parts and is often perplexed.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 4.

5 λαχη καὶ βουλεύεται, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπροσδεχής βουλεύεται εἰς τὴν διεύκρινα καὶ τὸν διακόπτοντα ἐν τῷ ἴμισθώμα τὴν κατ’ ἱατρόν ἐξομίλει ἕξω εἰς ἀλλ’ ὡς ἡ φύσις πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἑκεῖ τὸ ἀπλοῦν, ὅσον κατὰ πάντων ἐμπεριεκτικῶς ἀπὸ μερῶν ζῆλον ἔχος. πάντας γὰρ τὰς

10 φύσεως κρατεῖ μᾶς, αἱ δὲ ἐπινοεῖ ἀνήρτημα καὶ ἐξερθιμένα καὶ οἶκον ἐκφύει, ὡς αἱ ἐν κλάδως τῇ τοῖς ὀλοὶ φυτοῖ. τίς οὖν ὁ λογισμὸς ἡ τὸ ἀρκετήμορή τις ἡ μνήμη ἀναφοράς ἢί φανεροῦσι καὶ ἐνεργοῦσι καὶ κρατοῦσι καὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ διακόπτει; ὡς γὰρ δὴ ὅτι ποικίλα καὶ διάφορα τὰ

15 γνώμενα, δεὶ ταὐτόνομον τὰς τοῖς γυαλίων μεταβολῆς καὶ τὰ ποιοί ἰμισθήθηκα. δὴν γὰρ ποικίλα τὰς γνώμενα, ποσοῦτο τὰ ποιοί ἱμισθῶς μὲν. πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἐφ’ ἑκέντρῳ ἰμισθῷ ζῆλον τὰ γνώμενα κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐχ ὂργαν πάντα, αἱ ἡλίκια, αἱ ἐκφύεις ἐν χρόνοις, οἷς κεράσιν,

20 γενέσιν, μαζὶν αὐτές ἔχεισιν, ἀκριβὲς, γενέσις ἄλλα, αἱ τῶν ποίησεν λόγων ἀπολυμένων, ἐπεργασμένων δὲ ἀλλον. δήλων δὲ ἐκ τοῦ καὶ ἐν τῷ γενομένῳ αὐτῷ ἱμισθῷ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ σύμμαχων λόγων ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτήν φράσιν ἄξιον περιθέναι καὶ καὶ τάσην καθώς εἶναι οὗν κόσμων φράσιν

25 ἐστάσαι, πολλὴς μὲν καὶ πολυκλήν καὶ αὖ ἐπίληθη ἱμισθῶς ζῆλος μεγίστον, οἱ τῇ πολλῇ ἀλλοιομένην.
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living being, not subject to change because of the multiplicity of things, but a single rational principle and all things as one; for if it was not everything, it would not be that [universal] intelligence, but the intelligence of partial things.

12. But perhaps someone might say that a work of this kind belongs to nature, but it is necessary that the intelligence which is in the All should have calculations and memories. This is a statement of men who assume that unintelligence is intelligence, and have come to the conclusion that to seek to be intelligent is the same thing as being intelligent. For what else could calculation be but the effort to find intelligence and reason which is true and attains to the truly existent? For the man who calculates is like one who is playing the lyre to acquire the art of lyre-playing or who is practising to acquire habitual proficiency, or in general who one is learning in order to know. For the man who is calculating seeks to learn that which if someone already possesses, he is intelligent: so that intelligence is in one who has come to rest. The man who has been calculating is himself a witness to this: for when he finds what is needed, he stops calculating; and he comes to rest because he has entered into intelligence. If then we are going to put the ruling principle of the universe into the class of learners, we should attribute to it calculations and perplexities and memories which are proper to one who compares the past with the present and the future. But if we are going to class it as the knower, we must consider that its knowing is in a repose which reached its term. Then if it knows future events it would be absurd to say that it did not—why will it not
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know how they will turn out? And if it knows how they will turn out, why does it still need calculation and comparison of past events with present? And its knowledge of future events, granted that it has it, will not be like that which diviners have, but like that which those have who make things happen with full confidence that they will do so; this is the same as saying, those who are fully master of the situation to whom nothing is doubtful or disputable. Now those who have a fixed opinion retain it permanently. The intelligence of future things is, then, in its stability, of the same kind as that of present things; but this is outside the sphere of calculation. But if it does not know the future things which it is going to make, it will not make them with knowledge or looking at any [model] but will make whatever comes to it; but this is the same as saying, it will make at random. [The model], then, according to which it will make, abides. But that according to which it will make abides, it will no; make otherwise than in conformity with the pattern which it has in itself. It will make, then, in one single unvarying way; for it will not make now in one way and now in another, or what is there to prevent its failing? But if that which is being made is in different states, these different states do not derive from itself, but it is subservient to the rational forming principles; and these come from the maker, so that it follows upon the forming principles in their series. So the maker is in no way compelled to be in doubt or perplexity or to have difficulties, as some people have thought who considered the administration of the universe to be a burden. For to have difficulties is a matter, so it seems, of undertaking tasks which
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does not belong to one, that is, of which one is not master. But in work of which someone is master, and sole master, what does he need except himself and his own will? But this is the same thing as his own intelligence; for in a being of this kind will is intelligence. So a being like this needs nothing for its making, since its intelligence does not belong to someone else but is itself; using nothing brought in from outside. So it does not use calculation or memory; for these come from outside.

13. But how will intelligence of this kind differ from what we call nature? It differs in that intelligence is primary, but nature is last and lowest. For nature is an image of intelligence, and since it is the last and lowest part of soul has the last ray of the rational forming principle which shines in it, just as in a thick piece of wax a seal-stamp penetrates right through to the surface on the other side, and is clear on the upper side, but a faint trace on the lower. For this reason it does not know, but only makes; for since it gives what it has spontaneously to what comes after it, it has its giving to the corporeal and material as a making, just as a heated body gives its own form to that which is next in contact to it and makes it hot in a lesser degree. For this reason nature does not have an imaging faculty either; but intellect is higher than the power of imaging; the imaging faculty is between the impression of nature and intellect. Nature has no grasp or consciousness of anything, but the imaging faculty has consciousness of what comes from outside; for it gives to the understanding creativity of Nature, the soul-principle inherent in the physical world, which is below reason and imagination (for its unconscious activity see III. 8. 3–4).

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1 Plotinus here recognizes, but does not satisfactorily solve, one of the great difficulties which his ideas of unreasoning intelligence brings with it in his hierarchical system. This is, as he says, how to explain in any intelligible way the difference between the unreasoning intelligence of Intellect and higher soul, which is above reason and imagination, and

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one who has the image the power to know what he has experienced; but intellect itself is origin and activity which comes from the active principle itself. Intellec[t], then, possesses, and the Soul of the All receives from it for ever and has always received, and this is its life, and what appears at each successive time is its consciousness as it thinks; and that which is reflected from it into matter is nature, in which, or indeed before it, the real beings come to a stop, and these are the last and lowest realities of the intelligible world: for what comes after at this point is imitation. But nature acts on matter and is affected by it, but that soul which is before nature and close to it acts without being affected, and that which is still higher does not act on bodies or matter.

14. As for the bodies which are said to be produced by nature, the elements are just precisely products of nature; but are the animals and plants so disposed as to have nature present in them? Their relationship to nature is like that of air to light: when light goes away air holds nothing of it, but the light is in a way separate and the air is separate and as if it did not mix with the light. Or is it like that of fire and the heated body, when if the fire goes away a heat remains which is distinct from the heat in the fire and is an affection of the heated body. In the same way the shape which nature gives to the formed body must be considered as another form, distinct from nature itself. But if the body has anything else besides this, which is somehow in between it and nature itself, we must investigate it. And so we have explained the difference between nature and the intelligence in the All about which we were speaking.
15. But there is the following difficulty in relation to all that has just been said: for if eternity belongs to Intellect and time to Soul—for we maintain that we grasp time in its essential nature as around the activity of soul and deriving from it, how, if time is divided up, and has a past, will not the activity of soul be divided up, and when it turns towards the past will produce memory in the Soul of the All as well as in our souls? For, again, one must place sameness in eternity and otherness in time, or time and eternity will be the same, even if we do not attribute change to the activities of soul. Shall we then say that our souls, which are subject to other kinds of change and especially to defectency, are somehow in time, but the soul of the universe generates time, but is not in time? But, granted that it is not in time, what makes it generate time, and not eternity? It is because the things which it generates are not eternal, but encompassed by time; since even the [individual] souls are not in time, but such affections as they have are, and the things they make. For the souls are eternal, and time is posterior to them, and that which is in time is less than time; for time must encompass what is in time, as is the case, Aristotle says, with what is in place and number.

15. But if in soul one thing comes after another and if it itself makes some of its works earlier and some later, that is, if it makes them in time, it also

1. trans. Theler.
2. Ital.
3. Enn., II-S. τον ὑπότατον Κιρχhoff.
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directs itself to the future; and if so, also to the past. Now the earlier and the past are in the things
it makes, but in it nothing is past, but all the rational
forming principles are present at once, as has been
said. But in the things that are made there is no
simultaneity, as there is no togetherness, though
there is togetherness in the rational forming prin-
ciples, as the hands and feet in the rational principle
are together, but in the objects of sense they are
separate. And yet there is separateness in another
way in the intelligible world: so that there is also
priority in another way. Now one could speak of
separateness consisting in otherness; but how could
one speak of priority unless the arranging principle
gave orders? But if it gives orders it will say “this
after that”: for why will not all things exist at
once? Now if the arranging principle is other than
the arrangement, it will be of such a kind as to speak,
in a way; but if that which gives orders is the
primary arrangement, it no longer says, but only
makes this after that. For if it says it, it does so
with its eye on the arrangement: so that it will be
other than the arrangement. How then is it the
same? Because the arranging principle is not form
and matter, but only form and power, and Soul is
the second active actuality after Intellect; but the
“this after that” is in the [material] things which
cannot all exist at once. For the soul of this kind
is a noble thing, like a circle fitting itself round its
centre, the first expansion after the centre, an
extended extension: for this is how each [of the
intelligible realities] is. But if one ranks the Good
as a centre one would rank Intellect as an unmoved
circle and Soul as a moving circle; but moving by

1 The reference back is to the end of ch. 11.
2 Cp. V. 8. 7. 28 E.
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aspiration. For Intellect immediately possesses and encompasses the Good, but Soul aspires to [the Good] beyond being. But the sphere of the All, since it possesses the soul which aspires in that way, moves by its natural aspiration. But its natural aspiration as a body is to that which it is outside: that is, it is an unfolding and surrounding it on every side with itself, and so therefore [movement in] a circle.

17. But why are not the thoughts and reasonings of the soul of this kind in us too, but here below we are in time and there is succession and in this way investigations? Is it because there are many things which rule and are moved, and it is not one which has the power? Yes, and it is because there is one thing after another related to our needs and the present moment, not definite in itself but always related to one external thing after another; as a result our decisions are different and relevant to the occasion when the need arises, and now this and now that external incident: occurs. For because there are many that rule it is necessary that there should be many mental images, and they must come in from outside and the images of one must be new to another, and they must get in the way of the movements and activities of each individual part. For when the desiring part of the soul is moved, the mental image of its object comes like a perception announcing and informing us of the experience, and demanding that we should follow along with it and obtain the desired object for it; but our other part necessarily falls into perplexity, whether it goes along and obtains the object or resists. And the spirited part when it summons us to repel something does the same when it is moved, and the needs of
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the body and the passions make us have continually different opinions. Then there is ignorance of the [true] good, and the soul’s not knowing what to say when it is dragged in every direction, and still other results from the mixture of all these. But is it actually our best part which has different opinions? No, popularity and variety of opinions belong to the gathering [of our various parts and passions]: from our best part the right account of the matter is given to the common gathering, and is weak because it is in the mixture, not by its own nature. But it is as if in the great clamour of an assembly the best of the advisers does not prevail when he speaks, but the worse of those who clamour and shout, but he are quietly unable to do anything, defeated by the clamour of the worse. And in the worst kind of man there is the common gathering and his human nature is composed of everything in the manner of a bad political constitution; in the middling man it is as it is in the city in which some good can prevail as the democratic constitution is not entirely out of control; but in the better kind of man the style of life is aristocratic; his human nature is already escaping from the common gathering and giving itself over to the better sort. But in the best man, the man who separates himself, the ruling principle is one, and the order comes from this to the rest. It is as if there was a double city, one above and one composed of the lower elements set in order by the been shared, not only by his friends of the Roman senatorial aristocracy but by everyone who wrote or spoke about politics in the later Roman Empire (Christians as well as pagans).

For the sources of the opinions here see Plato Republic VIII 557, ff. and (for the μέλος and his state) Aristotle Politics IV 1276a26 ff.
Plotinus: Ennead IV. 4.

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powers above. But now it has been explained that in the soul of the All there is unity, sameness and likeness, but in other souls things are different, and what the reasons for this are. So much, then, for that.

16. Now about whether the body has anything by itself, and possesses already something of its own in its life when soul is present, or whether what it has is nature, and this, nature, is what is in association with body. Now the body itself, in which are soul and nature, cannot be something of a soulless kind or like air which is illuminated, but it must be like air which is warmed; the body of an animal or a plant has a kind of shadow of soul, and pain and bodily pleasure affect a body which is so qualified; but the pain of this body and pleasure of this kind result for us in a dispassionate knowledge. When I say "for us" I am referring to the other soul, since the qualified body does not belong to someone else, but is ours, and so we are concerned with it because it belongs to us. We ourselves are not it, nor are we clear of it, but it depends upon and is attached to us. "We ourselves" refer to the-dominant and essential part of us; this body is in a different way ours, but ours all the same. So we are concerned with its pains and pleasures, more in proportion as we are aware and do not separate ourselves, but consider the body the most honourable part of ourselves and the real man, and, so to speak, sink ourselves in it. For we must say that experiences of this kind do not belong entirely to the soul, but to the qualified body and something common and composite. For when something is one, it is sufficient to itself; for example, what could happen to body by itself if it was lifeless?
Plotinus: Ennead IV. 4.

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For if it was divided the division would not affect it itself, but the unity in it. And soul by itself is not subject even to division, and when it is in this state escapes everything. But when two things aspire to unity, since the unity which they have is an extraneous one, the origin of pain, it is reasonable to expect, lies in their not being permitted to be one. I do not mean ‘two’ as if there were two bodies, for they would have one and the same nature; but when one nature wants to share with another one, and a different kind, and the worse takes something from the better, and cannot take it itself but only a trace of it, and so there come to be two things, and one which has come to be in between what it was and what it could not grasp, this makes difficulties for itself by acquiring a communion with the other which is hazardous and insecure, always borne from one extreme to the other. So it swings up and down, and as it comes down it proclaims its pain, and as it goes up its longing for communion.

19. This is what people call pleasure and pain; pain is consciousness of withdrawal of a body which is being deprived of the image of soul, and pleasure is the knowledge of a living being that the image of soul is again fitting itself back in the body. The affection, then, is there; in the body, but the knowledge belongs to the perceptual soul, which perceives in the neighbourhood of the affection and reports to that in which the sense-perceptions terminate. And it was the body which felt the pain—I mean by ‘felt

For a clear and full explanation of Plotinus’s doctrine of the parts played by body and soul in experiencing pleasure and pain see H. J. Blumenthal, Plotinus’ Psychology ch. 3, ‘The Affections’. The essential point of it is that only body

is genuinely affected; soul perceives the affection without being affected (on Plotinus’s difficulties in maintaining this position see Blumenthal [c.]).
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the pain "that the body was affected; as in a surgical operation when the body is cut the division is in its material mass, but the distress is felt in the mass because it is not only a mass, but a mass qualified in a particular way; it is there too that inflammation occurs. But the soul perceives it, taking it over because it is, so to speak, situated next to it. The whole soul perceives the affection in the body without being affected itself. For it perceives as a whole and says that the affection is there where the wound and the pain are. But if it was affected itself, being wholly present in every part of the body, it would not have said or indicated that the affection was there [in that particular place] but would have all been affected by the pain, and in pain as a whole, and would not have said or made clear that the pain was there [in that particular place] but would have said that it was everywhere. But as it is the finger has a pain, and the man has a pain, because the man's finger does. The man is said to have a pain in his finger in the same way as we speak of a bright-looking man, because of his bright eyes. So then that which is affected has pain, unless one takes "has the pain" as including the immediately consequent perception: if one includes this obviously one is indicating that pain goes with sense-perception's awareness of the pain. But, then, the sense-perception itself is not to be called pain, but knowledge of pain; but since it is knowledge it is unaffected, so that it can know and give a sound report. For a messenger who is affected, if he gives himself over to the affection, either does not deliver his message or is not a sound and reliable messenger.

1 suspicio. Creuzer, see Kirehhoff*; mai Enn., II–51.
20. Καὶ τὸν συμπατήτων δὲ ἐπιθυμήσιον τὴν ἀρχήν ἐκ τοῦ οὗτος κοινοῦ καὶ τῆς τουατήρισις συμπατήτωος φύσεως ἀκόλουθον τίθεσθαι λέγεται. οὔτε γὰρ τῷ ὑποκούοντι ἔχουσι σῶματι δοτέον τὴν ἀρχήν τῆς ὀρέξεως καὶ προθυμίας, οὔτε τῇ ψυχῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀλμυρῶν ὁ χαλκώτως ἐξήλο, ἀλλὰ δὲ σῶμα μὲν ἐστιν, ἐδείξει δὲ μὴ μόνον σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ κυρίως εἰκότω ἐξελίσσετο πλέον ἡ αὐτῇ, καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ διὰ τὴν ἐπίκτησιν ἴματοκοτα τοῦτον τίθεσθαι: διὰ οὔτως μὲν ἔχειν ἀλμυρῶν, οὔτως δὲ ἡγεῖμεν, καὶ ἐγερμέναισθαι καὶ ἕρμασθαι ἕνθιν αὐτῷ μελέτειν, εἰ μόνον τῷ διότε οὗτος ἐγίνετο ἡ γνώσις, καὶ ἀπάγεις ἐκ τοῦ ποιητῆς τὸ πάθος ἡ ψυχὴ βουλούμενη ἐποίη τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ τοῦ πρώτου παθήτου διδάκτος τούτῳ προοῦ ἡγεῖμαι ποιεῖ καὶ καταβάλλει καὶ ὑπὸ προσέχει ὅπως τῷ ἀρίστῳ τῆς ἑπιθυμίας, οὕτως τὲ μετὰ πάσης ἐπιθυμήσεως. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ δύο ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλ᾽ οὔτως δέοικα εἶναι τῇ ἐπιθυμίαι τοῦ σώμα τοῦ τοιαῦτα; ἐὰν οὖν ἐποίησαν ἐπίθεται ἡ ψυχή, ἄτερον δὲ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ τοιαύτη πάρῃ τῆς ψυχῶν γενόμενου—ὅπως γὰρ ἡ ψυχή ποιητὴ ποιεῖ τὸ τοιαύτη σῶμα γενετεῖαι, αὐτὴ γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸ τοιαύτη σῶμα πλαστοῦσα καὶ μορφοῦσα—ἀνάγκη
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μηττος ἀρχειν αὐτὴν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτο σῶμα τὸ πεποιθότα ταῦτα καὶ ἀληθινὸν τῶν ἐναντίων ή πάντα ἐνθεμένον, ἱθανείς ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος καὶ πλημμένεις ἐκ τῆς ἐνεργίας ἃν τῇ δὲ φύσιν ἢ χρήσῃ, ὡσπερ συγκεκριμέναν τῶν τοῦ πεποιθότου πνεύματος, διώκοντες τε πιστεύει αἰτήσασθαι καὶ ἐπανάγειν εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ἡγήσασθαι τοῦ ἀκεραίω τοῦ συμμετέχοντος συνάφεια τῇ ἑνεργείᾳ τῇ τοῦ πεποιθότου ἐπιθυμία καὶ τῶν περίτας ἀπὸ ἑκείπον πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡκείνε. ὡσπερ τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἡς αὐτῶν—κέποι ἀν τῇ προσπάθειᾳ ἴσως καὶ προσθέμειν, τῷ δὲ ἐξ ἀλλού καὶ δι’ ἄλλον ἐπιθυμεῖ, τῷ δὲ πορεύομεν ἡ μὲν ἄλλην εἶναι.

21. Ὑπὶ δὲ τούτῳ ἐστὶ, περὶ δὲ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ αἱ ἡμείς μαθητικότεροι αἱ διάφοροι. Ἀλλαῖ γὰρ παθῶν καὶ μεμέρων καὶ ἱδρών αἱ συμφωνικαὶ ἐγκαθιστήθησαν τῇ καὶ νοσοῦν τοῦ ἐπιθυμητοῦ τοῦ αὐτῶν ὡς: δὴ γιὰ ὧς τῷ συμμετέχου ἀλλὰ καὶ σῶμα τοιαῦτα ἐν τῷ προσπυκτῇ συμφωνεῖ καὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐξελεῖ, καὶ ὡσπερ πολλοὶ συνεγερεῖται καὶ συναχύεται τῷ λογικοῖς προθυμεῖ τῆς πάσαν ἐπιθυμεῖ, οἷς τόλμω τῇ συμπερασμάτως μενοῦτα, καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ τοῦ λογισμοῦ εἶναι μὴ βουλέσθαι. ἡ δὲ ἡ πιον ἡ πιὸν ἐπὶ τὶ προσπυκτῇ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας λέγει, ὅτι μὴ ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτο σώματι, τῇ δὲ φύσιν μὴ συνάφεις σαράντα ἀυτὴν μὴ διαθέσθαι, μὴ δὲ βουλεύεισθαι, ὡσπερ αὖ δὲ καὶ φύσιν ἐξελεῖ, ὡσπερ εἰς τοῦ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι πάντως ἐπικυριαρχεῖν.

16 εἰ δὲ τῆς πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἐξελεῖν ἀρκεῖν τοῦ σῶμα

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ing and forming it), then it is necessary that nature should not begin desire; but it must be the qualified body which is affected in particular ways and feels pain in desiring the opposite of what it experiences, pleasure instead of suffering and sufficiency instead of want; but nature is like a mother, trying to make out the wishes of the sufferer, and attempting to eat it right and bring it back to herself; and, searching for the remedy, she attunes herself by her search to the desire of the sufferer, and the consummation of the desire passes from the body to nature. So one might say, perhaps, that the desire comes from the body itself—one might call it preliminary desiring and eagerness—but that nature desires from and through something else, and it is another soul which provides what is desired.

21. The differences of age-groups show that it is in this region that desire starts, for the bodily desires of children and adolescents and men, and of healthy men and sick men, are different though the desire faculty is the same: because it is bodily and a qualified body it is subject to every sort of change and has every variety of desire. And the whole desire is not in all cases aroused by what we call impulses and does not wish to eat or drink before consideration though the bodily desire persists to the end; this means that the desire reaches a certain point, as far as it was in the qualified body, but nature does not attach itself to the desire or associate itself with it or wish, as the desire is not according to nature, to bring it into nature, since it has to decide itself what is against nature and according to nature. But if someone answers this first argument by saying that the body in its different states is sufficient to
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make the desires in the desiring faculty different, he does not produce a sufficient reason to show why when one thing is affected in different ways the desiring faculty itself has various desires on behalf of this other, when what is provided to satisfy the desires is not for it. For certainly food, warmth, moisture, relief of what is emptied or satisfaction of what is filled, do not benefit the desiring faculty, but they all belong to the body.

22. But in the case of plants, is the kind of echo of soul in their bodies one thing and that which supplies it another, which is the desiring power in us, but the growth-power in them, or is this in the earth, as the earth has a soul in it, and is it what comes from this which is in plants? One might inquire first what soul there is in the earth. Is it a kind of illumination coming to the earth from the sphere of the All, which alone Plato seems to think primarily ensouled; or, on the other hand, when he says that the earth is "the first and oldest of the gods within heaven," does he give it too a soul like that of the stars? For how could it be a god if it did not have a soul like that? So the consequence is that it is difficult to discover the real state of affairs, and what Plato has said makes the situation more, or at least not less, perplexing. But first of all we should consider what appears to be most probably the real state of affairs. One might con-

1 This passage illustrates the attitude of Plotinus to reason and the traditional authority of Plato. He is primarily concerned to arrive at a true, rationally defensible solution of the problem with which he is dealing; and, though Plato seems to him to be the safest guide to follow, his reverence for him is not so exaggerated as to prevent him here and elsewhere complaining of the difficulties raised by the obscurity or carelessness of the master's language: cp. III. 6. 12. 9-11.

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jecture from the things which grow out of it that the earth has a growth-soul; but if many animals are visibly produced by the earth, why should one not say also that it is an animal? But since it is so large an animal, and no small part of the All, why should not one say that it has intelligence also, and so is a god? For if each of the stars is a living thing, why should not the earth also be a living thing, since it is part of the universal living thing? For one must certainly not say that it is held together from outside by a soul which does not belong to it, but has no soul within it, as if it was not able to have a soul of its own as well as the stars. For why should the fiery bodies be able to have a soul, but not the body of earth? For both are bodies, and the stars do not have muscular fibres or flesh or blood or humour any more than the earth does; even though the earth is more varied in composition and made of all bodies. But if [it is objected] that it is not very mobile, one might say that this only refers to its not moving from its place. But how does it have sense-perception? Well, how do the stars? For perception does not belong to flesh, nor, in general, does a body have to be given to the soul so that it may perceive, but a soul to the body so that the body may exist and be kept in being; but since the soul has the power of making judgments it can look to the body and make a judgment also about the body's affections. What then are the affections of the earth, and about what are the judgments made? Plants, too, insofar as they belong to earth, have no perceptions. Of what, then, are the earth's perceptions, and through what organs do they come? It is surely not too rash to say that perceptions take place with-

1 Thallic.
2 Müller: ἕνα ἔνθε, H—S (pra correctio ad lin. 32 falsa loco inserta).
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out organs. And what use would perception be to the earth? It would not need it for knowledge. For the power of thought \(^1\) perhaps suffices for beings which have no need arising from sense-perception. One could not, however, accept this argument. For over and above need there is in the objects of perception a knowing which brings a not unseemed pleasure, of the sun and the other heavenly bodies, and the sky and the earth, for instance: for the perception of these is pleasant in itself. This, then, we must consider later; now we must go back to the question whether the earth has perceptions, and of what it has perceptions, and how long it has them. First, we must take up again the difficulties which have been raised, and consider in general whether there can be perception without organs, and if perceptions are to meet a need, or if they have any other purpose independent of need.

23. We must suppose that the perception of sense-objects is for the soul; or the living being as an act of apprehension, in which the soul understands the quality attaching to bodies and the impression of their forms. Well, then, the soul will either apprehend alone by itself or in company with something else. But how can it do this when it is alone and by itself? For when it is by itself it apprehends what is in itself, and is pure thought; but if it also apprehends other things it must first have taken possession of them as well, either by becoming assimilated to them, or by keeping company with something which has been assimilated. But it cannot be

\(^1\) The most likely supposition seems to be that γνῶσις here is a gloss on the whole phrase which has ousted some other word now lost; as it is not possible to be quite certain what that word was, I print the MSS text with Henry-Schwizer and translate διαθέμα, a plausible suggestion of Clement.

Henry-Schwizer tentatively conjectured γνῶσις and Thillet. (Revue internationale de philosophie 24, 1970, 200) now suggests δόχια.
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assimilated while it remains by itself. For how could a point be assimilated to a line? For even the intelligible line would not assimilate to the sensible one, nor would the intelligible fire or man assimilate to the sense-perceived fire or man (since even the nature which makes the man does not identify itself with the man who comes into being). But when the soul is alone, even if it is possible for it to direct its attention to the world of sense, it will end with an understanding of the intelligible; what is perceived by sense will escape it, as it has nothing with which to grasp it. Since also when the soul sees the visible object from a distance, however much it is a form which comes to it, that which reaches it, though it starts by being in a way without parts, ends in the substrate of the form as colour and shape, when the soul sees all that is there outside. There cannot, then, be nothing but these two things, the external object and the soul: since then the soul would not be affected; but there must be a third thing which will be affected, and this is that which will receive the form. This must be jointly subject to like affections and of one matter with the sense-object, and it must be this which is affected and the other principle [the soul] which knows; and its affection must be of such a kind that it retains something of that which produced it, but is not the same as it, but as it is between the producer of the affection and the soul, it must have an affection which lies between the sensible and the intelligible, a proportional mean somehow linking the extremes to each other, with
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the capacity both of receiving and of transmitting information, suitable to be assimilated to each of the extremes. For since it is the organ of a kind of knowledge it must not be the same either as the knower or what is going to be known, but suitable to be assimilated to each, to the external object by being affected, and to the internal knower by the fact that its affection becomes form. If, certainly, what we are going to say now is sound, sense-perceptions must take place through bodily organs. This is consistent as well with the fact that the soul when it is altogether outside the body does not apprehend anything perceived by the senses. The organ must be either the body as a whole or some member of it set apart for a particular work: an example of the first is touch, of the second, sight. And one can see how the artificial kind of organs [or tools] are intermediaries between those who judge and what they are judging, and inform the judge of the characteristics of the object under consideration: for the ruler acts as link between the straightness in the soul and that in the wood: it has its place between them and enables the craftsman to judge that on which he is working. But it belongs to another discussion to determine whether what is to be judged must be immediately linked to the organ, or can affect it through a space between when it is at a distance from the sense-object, as when the fire is at a distance from the flesh, or if the medium is not affected, as if there was a void between the seeing and the colour, the possibility of seeing being due to the potential presence of the organ. But it is clear that sense-perception belongs to the soul in the body and working through the body.

1 s.v. Theler: robur Enn.
2 Kleist.

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24. But the question whether perception is only concerned with need must be considered in this way. If the soul when it is alone could have sense-perception, but its perceptions are with the body, then perception would be for the sake of the body, from which the perceptions also come, and would be given to the soul because of its communion with the body; and either it would be a necessary consequence—for every affection of the body, if it is one of the stronger ones, also reaches as far as the soul—or it has been devised so that we can take steps to guard ourselves against what is acting on the body before it becomes so strong as to destroy us, or before it comes too near. If this is so, perceptions would be intended for need. For even if they are also intended for knowledge, this would be for a being which is not in knowledge but is ignorant because of its misfortune, and so that it might remember again because of its forgetfulness, not for a being which is not in a state of need or forgetfulness. But if this is so, our investigation will not be confined to the earth, but must be about all the heavenly bodies and particularly the whole heaven and universe. For according to the present argument parts which are subject to being affected will have sensation directed to other parts, but what sensation directed to itself could the whole have, when it is in every way incapable of being affected; what sensation directed to itself could the universe have? Again, if the organ of perception must belong to that which perceives, and that which it perceives must be something different from the organ, but the All is one whole, it would not have an organ through which the perception comes distinct from the object.
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θην μὲν αὑτὸς, ὀπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἡμῶν συναίσθησιν ἐσμέναι, δοτέων, αὐτής δὲ ἢν ἐπὶ ἐκείνου ὀßen ὡς δοτέων. ὡς καὶ ἡμᾶς σαράν ταῦτά ὑμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸν ὑμῶν ἐκείνου ὀßen ὑμῶν σοματε ὄντα ἀναλφανάμαθαι,

20 ἔξωθεν προσελθόντος ἀναλφανάμαθαι. ἀλλ' ἐν 

περ ἢ ἡμῶν ὡς μένῳ τῶν ἔσοδεν ἡ ἀνάλφασις,

ἀλλ' καὶ μέρες. μέρους, τι κοιλείει καὶ τὸ πάν τῇ ἀπλανεῖ τὴν ψυχικὴν ὑπάρχῃ, καὶ ταύτῃ τῇ γῆν 

καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ βλέπειν: καὶ εἰ μὴ ὀπαθήνα ταῦτα ὑπάρχῃ, καὶ ἐπὶ σοματε ἐχειν καὶ

30 τὴν ὅρασιν μὴ μένῳ ὡς καθ' αὐτῷ τῆς ἀναφοράς 

ἔσεϊ, ἀλλ' ὡς ὑψιλομαθὸς ἀπαγόρευτος τῇ τοῦ 

παντὸς ψυχῆ ς ἐδει; καὶ γὰρ εἰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπαθῆ, 

dia τὶ ὢς ὡς ὃν δεῖκεν ὁμοφωνικά ἐμφανίζων δι; 

ἀλλ' ὁμαλώς, φησί, ὃν ἐπεείηει. ἀλλ' εἰ

35 ὃς μηδέν ἔξωθεν ὑπελείποντο ὁρατόν, ἀλλ' οὖν 

γε ἡ καὶ ἐκείνων ὁρῶν οὐδὲν ἐκκάλυψεν. εἰ δ' 

ὅτι μάλητε ἢ ἡ αὐτῶν ὁρῶν, ἐστο μὴ προηγου 

μένους μὲν αὐτῶν ὡς ἔκαναι τοῦ ὁρῶν γεγονότοι, ἀκο 

λοθέθεν δι' τὰς αὐτῶν οὖν ὄντ' ἀναφορας. διά τι ὃν 

εἰ μή τοιοῦτο ὁμὴν ἐναρέσκει τὸ ὁρῶν;

25. Ἡ οὖν ἀρχή εὕρει τὸ ἐν ὑι, ἐν ὁρᾷ καὶ

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which it perceives; but we must grant it self-awareness, just as we are aware of ourselves, but not perception of a continual succession of different objects; since we too, when we apprehend something in our body which differs from its permanent state, apprehend it as something coming from outside. But just as with us there is not only apprehension of things outside, but apprehension of part by part, what prevents the All from seeing the sphere of the planets with that of the fixed stars, and looking at the earth and the things in it with the planetary sphere? And, if these 'parts of the universe' are not free from the other affections, why should they not have other sense-perception, and particularly why should not sight not only belong to the sphere of the fixed stars as its own by itself, but as an eye announcing to the soul of the All what it sees? And even if it is not subject to the other affections, why should it not see as an eye when it is luminous and ensouled? But, Plato says, 'it had no need of eyes'1. But if this were because there was nothing visible left outside, there were things to see within it, and nothing prevented it looking at itself; but if it was because it would be pointless for it to look at itself, let us assume that it was not brought into being as it is with the main purpose of seeing, but that seeing is a necessary consequence of its being as it is. Why should not a transcendent body of this kind have the power of seeing?

20. 'The answer is that: the existence of the medium is not a sufficient cause for sight, and in

1 The reference is to Timaeus 33C1-2. As always, what Plato says is accepted as in some sense true, but very firmly interpreted to fit in with Plotinus's present line of argument.
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general for perception, but the soul must be so disposed as to incline towards sense-objects. But for the soul [of the universe], to which it is natural to be always directed towards the objects of intellect, even if it can perceive, this could not happen because it is always directed towards higher things; so with us too, when we are strongly concentrating on the objects of intellect, as long as we are in this state, sights and other perceptions pass unnoticed; and in general, when one is concentrating entirely on one thing, all the others are unnoticed. And then, too, it is mere inquisitiveness to want to apprehend a part by a part, as if a man were to look at himself, and if it is not for some purpose, it is futile. And to see the sight of something else so beautiful is the mark of someone who is suffering or in need. But smelling and tasting favours one would consider as mere externalities and distractions of the soul; but one would suppose that the sun and the other heavenly bodies see and hear incidentally. Certainly if one supposes that they pay attention [to the world below] by means of both these senses, the supposition would not be unreasonable. But if they pay attention, they will remember: it is absurd not to remember the benefits one confers. How then will they confer benefits, if they do not remember?

26 Their knowledge of prayers is the result of a sort of linking and a particular disposition of things fitted into the whole, and the same applies to their accomplishment of what we pray for; and in the arts of the magicians everything is directed to this linking: this means that magic works by powers which follow on sympathetically.

But if this is so, why should we not give perception

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to the earth? But what sort of perceptions? Why
not first touch, both touching of part by part: (with
sense-perception reporting this to the governing
principle) and touching of fire and the other elements
by the whole. For even if the earth's body is
difficult to move, it is certainly not immovable. But
the earth's perceptions will not be of small things,
but of great ones. But why? Because it is neces-
sary, since there is a soul in it, that it should not be
unaware of the greatest movements. And there is
nothing to prevent the earth having perceptions for
this reason, too, that it may make good arrangements
for men, as far as the affairs of men concern it—it
will make good arrangements by a kind of sympathy
—and hearing those who pray to it, and answering
their prayers, not in the way we do, and being subject
to affection by the other senses in relation to itself.
And what about other things, for instance concerning
scents and flavours? But [it will perceive] the scents
which come from the juices of plants in order to
provide for living things and for the construction and
repair of its own bodily parts. And we must not
require it to have the organs which we have: for
these are not the same in all living creatures; for
instance, not all have ears, and those which do not
have them are able to apprehend sounds. But how
about sight, if light is necessary? For we certainly
must not require eyes. If, then, accepting that the
earth has a power of growth, we could agree that
this was so either because the power of growth was
primarily in the breath of life, or because it was the
breath of life, why should we desire that this is
also translucent? But rather, if it is the breath of
life, it must also be translucent, and, when it is
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καί ἐλαμπύμενον παρὰ τοῦ κύκλου, ἐνεργεῖα διαφέρει: ὡστε οὐδὲν ἀτόπον οὐδὲ ἀδύνατον ὄρει τὴν ἐν τῇ γῇ ψυχῇ. καὶ δεῖ1 καὶ νοεῖ ψυχὴν οὐ 30 φαύλου σώματος εἶναι, ὡστε καὶ θεὸν εἰσακοποῦσιν γὰρ καὶ ἄγαθὴν δεῖ ὃ ἄρτι τῇ ψυχῇ εἶναι.

27. Εἰ οὖν τὸς φυτὸς διδωτὴς τῆς γεννητικής—

η αὐτὴ τῆς γεννητικῆς, ἢ ἐπὶ σωτὴρ καὶ γεννητικῆς, ταύτης δὲ ἔχεις ἢ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς—καὶ οὕτως ἐν ἐν αὐτῇ ἡ σάρξ ἔμφυσεν ἤδη καὶ ἐκομίσατο, εἰ 5 ἐχεῖ, καὶ τὴν γεννητικὴν ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ φυτά. ἀνέκοιτο δὲ διδωτὴ τῷ σώματος τοῖς φυτοῖς ὅπερ βέλτιον, οὐ διαδέχεται τοῦ κολέτου καὶ νομίζει φυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐμοί. ἀλλὰ αὐτῷ μὲ τὸ σώματος τῆς γῆς τῇ διδώσῳ ἡ ψυχή; οὐ ταῦτα δεὶ νομίζειν σῶμα εἰςοῦν γῆν ἀποτελεῖν τῇ τῆς γῆς

10 καὶ μένων υπεχέρει, οὐδὲ λίθοι δεκακόσιον αὐξόμενοι μέντοι, ἐκεῖ εἰσὶ συνηπηρισμένα, μένουσα καὶ σωμάτων ἐν τούτων ἐκείσον γεγονόντες. ἐκατον μὲν οὐδὲ μέρος ἔχεις οὕτως δια μοιζείν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τὸ πᾶν φυτικόν, δὲ νομίζειν τοῦδε ἐστίν ἡ τοιάδε, ἀλλὰ

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illuminated by the heavenly circuit, actively translucent; so that there is nothing absurd or impossible in the earth’s soul seeing. And we must certainly consider that it is the soul of no inferior body, so that it is even a god: for this soul must also be always good in every way.

27. If, then, the earth gives the generative soul to plants—either the generative soul itself, or the generative soul is in the earth itself and a trace of it is the generative principle in plants—in this latter case too, plants would be like flesh which is already ensouled and have acquired, if they possess it, the generative soul in themselves. And this generative soul, being present in the body of the plant, gives it what is better in it, that by which it differs from the piece which has been cut off and is no longer a plant, but only a stick. But what does the soul give to the body of the earth itself? One should not consider an earthly body the same when it is cut off from the earth and when it remains connected with it, as stones show, which grow as long as they are attached to the earth but remain the size they were cut when they are taken away from it.1 One must therefore consider that each part has a trace of the generative soul, and the whole power of growth is diffused over this, and belongs no more to this part or that, but

1 This remarkable doctrine that stones grow as long as they remain parts of the living body of the earth (op. VI. 7. 11. 24-5) is a striking illustration of the strength of the conviction that the great parts of the universe, the earth and the heavenly bodies, and the universe as a whole are living organisms. The idea that minerals and stones in the earth grow is to be found in Strabo V. 2. 6 and VII. 5. 8 and may well go back to the great Stoic geographer and philosopher Posidonius: see W. Theler: Fortsetzung d. Deexplicationum (Ducis 1899) 74.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 4.

tis dtup. eista tis tov aisthetikou fous an ukei
15 tw oima apompanepiwmant. epoxounan de-
ei tis alhn psoiyn kai nvoi, iin h 'Esaiou kai
Dhimtren eisoumataan anerzwsan thea phymh kai
fous apomantamh tis twv xroinoin.

28. Kai tauto mnu taut. epautewn h diw
kai per tov thmesieouz xephtv, el, oosper twn
epithumwv twv arxh v kai alghvna kai xdan-
tu padoyn, ou tais aisthtewv—ov tis ouv ou oinoi
kai tw oima epitwmu twv oivn koiokhtn, ouvou kai
tou thumou twv arxh v kai pantw tou thymwv
einou oima xynipwc o tov ouvou nuvou oima-
tos, ouvou karftas oinoi xonoih v xolhs ou
kourou oima twv poui kai el, xynipwv tou

doov, tis xynov to fusiok, ou xatwhn eiv te
ou h ypmh.

10 osekti para fousiwc 2 o aisthtewv. ekei
mnu ou
kai
ou tw oima to fusiok ou panti edidou
tw oima tv xynov, kai to allh
nu en panti kai to
xenwv, kai
o arxh
xenwv

8 Itse w per i omerra twv touc ouv tefestik. oswv
dev o peri to hpar topos tis epithumias arxh, oti
to
fusiok okei energei malon, ou tis xynov to

9 hous to fusi-

kinn to

xanwv to

ou oima

perchei. okei

h, ou tis

xenwv.

Alla peri tov thmikov 2

1 Sinner (C.Q. 20, 1926, 58): thewmos Evm.*
2 Theiler: thwmos Evm.*

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to the whole earth; then comes the nature of sense-
perception which is no longer "mixed up with the
body" 1 but in contact with it from above; then the
rest of the soul and its intelligence, which men,
making use of divine revelation and a nature which
divines such things, call Hesiod and Demeter.

28. So much, then, for this. But we must go back
again and enquire about the passionate power,
whether, just as we placed the origin of desires, and
pains and pleasures—he feelings, not the percep-
tions—in the body in a particular state, the body,
that is, somehow given life, so we shall attribute the
origin of the passionate spirit, or the passionate spirit
as a whole, to the body in a particular state, or some
part of the body, for instance to the heart in a parti-
cular state or the bile in a body which is not dead;
and also whether, if it is something else which gives it,
the passionate power is the trace of soul, or
whether here the passionate spirit is this one particu-
lar thing, no longer derived from a power of growth
or perception. Now in the case of desires the power
of growth, which is in the whole body, gave the
trace of soul to all the body, and pain and pleasure
were in it all, and the origin of desire was in all the
body, the desire, that is, of being satisfied; the desire
of sexual pleasures was not mentioned, but let us
assume that it concerns the parts which bring them to
 fruition. Let us grant, too, that the region around
the liver is the origin of desire, because the power
of growth is most active there which gives the trace
of soul to the liver and to the body: it is there because
its activity begins there. But about the passionate

1 Plato Phaedo 67B6.
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power [we must enquire] what it is itself and what kind of a soul it is, and whether a trace derived from it causes movement around the heart or something else which is classed as part of the composite being, or whether here it is not a trace, but the passionate power of soul itself which causes anger. First of all, then, we must consider what it is itself. It is obvious, I think, that we are angry not only over whatever our bodies suffer, but over the sufferings of anyone closely connected with us, and in general over anyone’s improper behaviour. So there is need of perception and some kind of understanding in being angry. For this reason anyone looking at these facts would not think that passion arose from the power of growth, but would try to find that it had its source in some other power of soul. But when a propensity to anger follows bodily dispositions, and when those whose blood and bile are boiling are prompt to fly into a rage, and those who are said to be “without bile” and “chilly” are easy-going and slow to anger, and animals are angry because of their temperaments,1 but not because it appears to them that

 But the sense given by this emendation—that animals are not made angry by the “boiling up” of anger in another animal, but only by their suppression that they are being ill-treated—seems to me inconsistent with the whole argument of the sentence, which is that the source of anger should be looked for in the constitution and state of the body, not in the soul. Böcher’s emendation gives exactly the necessary sense here and does not seem to me an intolerably violent change. I append Schwyzer’s latest note on the passage (on a postcard to me), in which he makes clear with force and elegance in both ancient languages that he maintains his original position: “In IV 4, 28, 32 (quamvis ab omnibus nec non ab infidel., i.e. desppectus repulsus derelictus) βολάως (κανέω τὸ θράσος εκεῖνο προς τὸ δοκεῖν ἐμναθέας).”

1 With the utmost regret I find myself compelled (with Thiele and B. S. Page in his latest [1969] revision of Mackarness’s translation) to reject Professor H. R. Schwyzer’s emendation βολάως—printed in the Henry-Schwyzer text—and fall back on the best of Böcher’s usually unacceptable critical suggestions. All that can be said in favour of βολάως is excellently said by Schwyzer in his “Sieben amphi φράσεις bei Plotin” in Nov. Helv. 20 (1948) 136-7. My reason for rejecting it is not the unprecedented sense given to the rare word βολάως (“boiling ”). Schwyzer makes a reasonable case for this, and is also of course right in saying that the substitution of καθόως for βολάως is philologically easy to explain.
they have been ill-treated, one would be inclined to attribute anger again to the more bodily part and to that which keeps the living organism together. And when the same people are more prone to anger when they are ill than when they are healthy, and when they have not tasted food than when they have eaten, they indicate that the bise of anger, or the origins of anger, belong to the qualified body, and that the bile or the blood, as a kind of animating principle, produce these movements of such a kind that, when the qualified body suffers, the blood or the bile are immediately set in motion, and a perception occurs, and the mental image puts the soul in touch with the state of the qualified body, and the soul launches itself against what has caused the pain; but on the other hand, the process can start from above: the reasoning soul, when a wrong appears, even if it is not a wrong which concerns the body, has that impassioned thing just described ready to hand and makes an ally of it, as it is naturally adapted to fight against the enemy which has been shown to it. And these are two kinds of anger passion, one which is emotionally awakened and does the venom over to its side by means of the mental image, and one which begins in the reason and comes to its conclusion in which is naturally adapted to be angry; and both of these derive from the power of growth and generation which constructs the body so as to be receptive of pleasures and pains, and it is this which makes the body bilius and bitter. And by being in a body of this kind the targe of soul is moved in this way by displeasure and anger, and, because wrong has been done to it itself first, it tries in a way to wrong the others too and, so to speak, make them
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like itself. The fact that those who are less desirous of bodily pleasures and in general despise the body are less moved to anger is evidence that this trace of soul is consubstantial with the other. But there is no need to be surprised that trees do not have a passionate spirit although they have the power of growth, since they have no share of blood or bile. For if these were present in them without sense-perception there would only be a seeking and a kind of irritation, but if sense-perception was present as well there would then be a drive against the cause of the wrong, resulting also in a movement of self-defence. But if the irrational part of the soul was divided into the desiring and the passionate, and the first was taken to be the power of growth, and the passionate a trace of it in the blood or the gall or the composite being, the dichotomy would not be a correct one, as one would be prior and one posterior. There is however nothing to prevent both being posterior, and the division being one between two things which are derived from a common source; for the division is one of impulses in so far as they are impulses, not of the substance from which they have come. But that substance in itself is not an impulse, but perhaps it brings the impulse to its goal by taking to itself the activity which comes from it. And it is not absurd to say that the trace of soul which is expressed in passion is in the region of the heart; for this is not to say that the soul is there, but the starting point of the blood which has this qualification.

1 The occurrence of the word ἁμαρτέων, so theologically important later, as an ordinary philosophical term here should be noted.
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29. Why, then, supposing that the body is like something warmed, but not like something illuminated, does it not have any trace of life when the other soul has gone out of it? It does have it for a short time, but it fades quickly, just as with things which are warmed when they go away from the fire. There is evidence for this in the growth of hair on corpses, and the growth of their nails, and the living creatures which move for a long time after they have been cut in two; for this is probably the trace of life still present in them. And if it goes away with the other soul, this is not a sign that it is not different from it. For when the sun goes away it is not only the light which is continuous with it and depends on it and is attached to it which goes, but the light which passes from this to that which is outside it and is seen in the things near by it, which is different from that first light, goes away too. Does it then really go away too, or does it perish? This is a question we must ask both about light of this kind and about the life in the body, which we say belongs to the body as its own. It is obvious that there is nothing of the light left in the things illuminated; but our discussion is enquiring whether it changes back into that which produced it or does not exist at all. How then can it not exist at all when it was certainly something before? But what, anyhow, was it? That in the case of corrupt bodies, when the bodies from which the light (which we call colour) comes have changed, the light does not exist is something into which nobody enquires, for instance where the colour of a burnt-out fire is, just as no one enquires where its shape is. But still, shape is a disposition, like elench-
tò mén eixhima sýmēs tois, òstere anatoil tῆς χειρός kai ἡ ἐκτάσεις, χρώμα de oíh óvtois, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν ῥυθμiῶν τῆς χειρισμοῦ τῆς χρώματος τῆς χρώματος μὴ ἀπολογίζεται καὶ τοῦ ἐφεδροῦ τῆς ἐκτάσεως, ἐν ἀλλη ἐπὶ τῶν ῥυθμiῶν ἡμᾶς, αὐτὴ ἀληθιστά ἐδὲ ἔδωκε διὰ τὸ μὴ τουχθῆναι τὰ τῶν ῥυθμiῶν τῆς μεταλλοφοτῆς, ἀλλὰ ἀντερέθαιν τὸν ἐν τῶν συνελέγασις ποιήσατο ἀλλ᾽ ἐδέχατο: ὅταν οὖν καὶ τὸ φῶς τῶν φθοράστων σωμάτων μένει, τῆς ἐν ἀντιπόλει τοῦ ἐκ πάντων ὀδοὺ καὶ πάντων ὀδοὺς, ἐν μὲ τὸ λέγον πώς τὸ χρώμα τῶν αἰγείρων τῆς ἀποτελεῖται μὴ ἐν τοῖς ἀπειρικοῖς ἐδέχατο. ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τούτῳ ἀνθρώπους ποιήσαμεν καὶ οὐ}

35 γινομένα ἐν ταῖς τῶν σωμάτων συναντάσσει τὰς ποιήτους, καὶ οὐδὲ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐν τοῖς στίχοις ποιεῖν τὰς χρώσεις, οἷον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν νοικισμένων ὀργίων, ἀλλὰ ὑπάρχουσαν οἱ τοιοῦτοι, προσκροβήθηκαν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ἐπροέρχητον ἐν τῶν ταχυτῶν, καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἔδωκαν ἐν τῷ ἀέρι οὐ}

40 στίχοις, οἷον, ἐν τοῖς συναντάσσεις φαινότακτα. ἀλλὰ ἀυτὴ μὲν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀποφθέγματα λειτουργίας. τοὺς συνανττών καὶ συνήθητα καὶ οὐκ ἀποτέλεσται, τὰ κωμία τὰ φῶς μετακινομένα τοὺς σωμάτων συμμετακινομένα τὸ τῶν προσεχεῖς καὶ ἐν τῷ τῶν συναντάσσεις συνήθητα καὶ μὴ φάσαι

45 ἀπαντῶν, ὅταν ἐνδει προσεχῆς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐν συνέτατο τὰ δεύτερα τῶν προσεχεῖς καὶ

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1 The reference is to the doctrine of Democritus the Atomist that "secondary qualities" exist only "by convention";
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elsewhere 4 whether the secondary parts follow along with the prior ones, and those in successive order go along always with those before them, or whether all the individual parts are on their own and separated from those before them and able to remain permanently on their own, or whether in general no part of soul is cut off, but all are one and many, and in what way this is so. But what is that which already belongs to the body and is a trace of soul? Now if it is soul, it will, if it is not cut off, go along with the rational principle of soul. But if it is a kind of life of the body, the same problem arises which arose about the vestige of light, and we must also enquire whether it is possible to have life without soul, except perhaps by the close presence of soul working on something else. 5

But now, since we established that memory in the heavenly bodies was unnecessary, but gave them perceptions, and hearing as well as sight, and said that they heard the prayers which we make to the sun, and other men to the stars, 6 and since it is

1 The reference book is to the earlier treatise IV. 7 (6) If All Souls are One.

2 At this point the MSS preserve a note which tells us that in the edition of Eustochius the second book on the soul ended here and the third book began with the next chapter. This is the only evidence for the existence of another edition of the works of Plotinus by his physician Eustochius (see Life chs. 2 and 7 and my Preface to Vol I, ix). Whether this was the edition from which Eusebius took his quotations in the Praeparatio Evangelica, Henry and Schwyzer, with some probability, still maintain, or whether, as a number of other good Plotinian scholars suppose, Eusebius was using Porphyry's edition, is much disputed but not very important question in either case the evidence of the Eusebius quotations confirms the soundness of the textual tradition (see Henry and Schwyzer Plotini Opera II (1959) Fragmente X-XI). If, of course, we could be certain that Eusebius was using the Eustochius edition, we should have some confirmation of the general belief of Plotinian scholars that Porphyry did not as editor tamper with the text of Plotinus.

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believed that the heavenly bodies accomplish many things for men, and so in such a casual way that they are not only helpers in right actions, but in many wrong actions too, we must inquire into these incidental questions—for there are very great difficulties about them in themselves and these are much talked about by those who dislike the idea that gods should be culpable accomplices in improper behaviour, especially in love affairs and wanting couplings—for these reasons, and particularly about what we were discussing at the beginning, their memory. For it is obvious that if when we pray they act, and do not do it once, but afterwards, and very often after a long delay, they have memory of the prayers which mortals offer to them. But the argument which we expounded earlier did not allow this. But there would also be some such need of memory for the conferring of benefits on mortals as with Demeter and Hestia—earth after all unless one were to attribute to the earth alone a beneficent influence on human life. We must therefore try to explain both how we are going to understand the phenomena of memory in these beings: this is something which concerns us, not the opinions of others, who are not prevented from giving [the heavenly bodies] memory—and also about these strange and unpleasant things which seem to happen, which it is the task of philosophy to investigate and see if there is any defence to be found to the charges brought against

1 Demeter was, naturally, always closely connected (though not originally identified) with the earth in Greek religious tradition. The identification of Hestia with earth is to be found in the 5th century B.C. (Empedocles' fr. 938 and 944 Nauk) and sp. Plato Phaedrus 247A1.
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the gods in the sky; and we must also try to explain about the whole universe itself—since this kind of charge is directed against it too—and see if those people are to be believed who say that the whole heavenly system is subject to spells put upon it by the presumption and skill of men. And our discussion will also inquire about spirits, in what way they are said to serve magical purposes, unless the problems of spirits are also solved by the previous discussion.

31. We must, then, take a general view of all actions and experiences which occur in the whole universe, both the ones which are called natural and those which come about by art: we must say that some of the natural ones are effects of the All on its parts and [some] of the parts on the All or of the parts on the parts; and that in those which come about by art the art either ends as it began, in the production of art, or brings in natural powers to help in producing acts and experiences which belong to the works of nature. By the acts of the whole universe I mean those which the whole heavenly circuit does to itself and its parts—for as it moves it disposes both itself and its parts in a certain way—both those within the circuit itself and all the effects which it produces on the things on earth. The effects and actions of parts on parts are obvious, presumably, to everyone, the positions of the sun in relation to the other heavenly bodies and the things on earth, and in other elements, and not only the actions of the sun but those of the other heavenly bodies and of the things on the earth and in the other elements—each of these requires separate investigation. As for the arts, those which produce a house and the

1 Théiler post Brébliot in versione.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 1.

20 ῥήτορεῖαν ἔνει καὶ μουσικήν καὶ πένθος φιλοσοφίας ἡ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἡ πρὸς τὸ κόσμον ἀγαθὸν ἀλλοιών, ἐν ἕλιον ἔτη, ὅπως ἐγὼ καὶ τὸ τῆς δύναμιν ἔχουσι· καὶ, εἴπερ εἶδο τε, ἐξ τούτων ἀπειρο τοῦ πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν κράτειν ἦμων καὶ τὸ

25 διατε ἐν ὑπολογεῖν πραγματευόμενον. ὅτι μὲν ἂν ἄλλοι ἡ φορὰ τουεῖ, αὐτὴν μὲν πρὸς τοῦτο διαφόρους διατελείσας καὶ τὰ ἐπίκειμον ἀνεμισάρητος μὲν τὰ ἐπίγεια ἢ ὑψόν τῶν ὁμοίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς διαλεύσει, καὶ τῶν μερῶν ἐκαστοῦ εἰς τὰ ἐπίγεια καὶ ἀλλοι τὸ κέντρο ποιεῖ, πολλάξη

30 δηλοῦν. εἰ δὲ καὶ τάπει τὸ πέρα ἐκείνη, ἀπετείχον τὸν ἔπει τῶν ἡμισέως, ἐπιρρέαν· τὰν δὲ τὰ πάντα ἡ τοῖς ἐκείνως αὐτοθύμων ἐπιπέτεις οὔτως ἔρχον, ὡς δὲ λόγον φανερά, πεπερατέων λέγει τὸν πάσαν ἢ ἄρχης τῆς τοιαύτης λαβώντας. ὅλη γὰρ μίαν καὶνεμάτως καὶ ὑψηλά καὶ τοιαῦτα ἔδη ποιάτες προτέτοι τῶν στοιχείων λέγονται, οὐδὲ

35 δεικτόν τὸν μίας τοιεῖν λειτουργεῖν ἄλλην πάντα τὸν ὄρον ἑρματίζειν, ὡς ἂν ἄλλοι τι—τὸ γὰρ ὁ φυσικός ἐν ἑνώθειν 1 καὶ τυπικόν ὄμοιον, ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλου ὑψωτοῦ τοῦτον ὄγον οὔτως τὰν διαφόρον αὐτῶς λαβώντας ἐδοκεῖν. πολλᾶ δὲ καὶ τῶν

40 γνωμικῶν εἰς ποιῶν τοῖς ὄνομα ἰδίων τε ἄρχειν. οὔτε γὰρ εἰ τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων διάφορος δοθῇ αὐτῶς  

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other products of art terminate in these: but the arts of medicine and agriculture and others of this kind are ancillary and help natural things to be in a natural state; but rhetoric and music and all the class of arts which influence the soul must be said to lead men to be better or worse by changing them; in these we must enquire how many they are and what is the power they have; and in all these which are relevant to our present purpose we must, as far as is possible, concern ourselves with the reason why. Now it is abundantly clear that the heavenly circuit acts, first of all disposing itself, and the bodies within it in different ways, and indisputably acting on the things of earth, not only in their bodies but in the dispositions of their souls, and that each of the parts of the circuit acts on the things of earth and in general on what is below it. But we shall discuss later whether the things of earth also act on the heavenly bodies; but for the present, we grant that what is agreed by all, or by most people, is so, in so far as rational discussion will show it to be so, and we must try to explain the way in which the heavenly bodies act, starting from the beginning. For we must not simply assert that it is hot and cold and things of this kind which act, the things which are called the primary qualities of the elements, nor that the sun does everything by its heat, and some other heavenly body by its cold—for what cold could there be in a fiery body in the heavens?—and another by its humid fire. In this way it is possible to understand the difference between them, and there are many things which happen which cannot be referred to one of these qualities as its cause. For even if one were to attribute differences

1 Harlart: ὁμοίως ἐν.
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of character to these qualities [and say that] they were as they were according to the bodily temperaments,1 because of the predominance of cold or heat — how could one refer envy or jealousy or wickedness to these causes? But even if one could, how could one anyhow make them responsible for fortunes, for men being good and bad, rich and poor, for the nobility of their families or themselves, and for the finding of treasures? One could mention a vast number of things, leading the discussion very far from the bodily quality which comes from the elements to the bodies and souls of living creatures.

We must certainly not, either, attribute to the deliberate choice of stars and the decision of the All, and to their rational calculations, what happens to the individuals subject to them. For it would be inappropriate for those divinities to plan human affairs so that some men became thieves, and other kidnappers, housebreakers, and temple-robers, others again effeminate, womanish in their doings and feelings and committing indecencies. So far from being appropriate behaviour for gods, it would not even be appropriate for respectable men, or perhaps any kind of men, to do and plan things like this, from which they would get not the slightest benefit.

32. If, then, we are not to attribute all that comes from the sky to us and the other living creatures, and in general upon the earth, to bodily causes or the deliberate choices of the heavenly bodies, what reasonable explanation is left? First of all we must

1 The "bodily temperaments" are those of men, not of the stars. Plotinus follows a long Greek tradition in attributing differences in emotional character and strength of the desires to the varying proportions of the elements mixed in the body.
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posit that this All is a "single living being which encompasses all the living beings that are within it"; it has one soul which extends to all its parts, in so far as each individual thing is a part of it; and each thing in the perceptible All is a part of it, and completely a part of it as regards its body; and in so far as it participates in the soul of the All, it is to this extent a part of it in this way too; and those things which participate in the soul of the All alone are altogether parts, but all those which also participate in another soul are in this way not altogether parts, but none the less are affected by the other parts in so far as they have something of the All, and in a way corresponding to what they have.¹ This one universe is all bound together in shared experience and is like one living creature, and that which is far is really near, just as, in one of the individual living things, a nail or horn or finger or one of the other limbs which is not contiguous, the intermediate part leaves a gap in the experience and is not affected, but that which is not near is affected. For the like parts are not situated next to each other, but are separated by others between, but share their experiences because of their likeness, and it is necessary that something which is done by a part not situated beside it should reach the distant part; and since it is a living thing and all belongs to a unity nothing is so distant in space that it is not close enough to the

¹ The quotation which introduces this sentence is Plato Timaeus 30D3–31A1. The doctrine indicated here, that men are truly parts of the All but not only parts—there is something in them which transcends the organic unity of the cosmos in which their lower natures share—is of great importance to Plotinus: see the Introduction to this treatise, p. 27.
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nature of the one living thing to share experience. So, then, that part which has a likeness to that which is acting upon it has an experience which is not alien to it, but if that which is acting is unlike, that which is affected has an experience which is alien and unpleasant. But one should not be surprised if the action of one part on another is harmful when it is one living creature: for in ourselves too in our activities one part can harm another, since bile and the passionate spirit, so it seems, oppresses and stings another part. And there is certainly something in the All which corresponds to bile and the passionate spirit, and other things which correspond to others [in our bodies]; and in plants one part gets in the way of another, so as even to make it wither. This All is visibly not only one living creature, but many, so that in so far as it is one, each individual part is preserved by the whole, but in so far as it is many, when the many encounter each other they often injure each other because they are different; and one injures another to supply its own need, and even makes a meal of another which is at the same time related to and different from it; and each one, naturally striving to do the best for itself, takes to itself that part of the other which is akin to it, and makes away with all that is alien to itself because of its self-love. Each as it: does its own work benefits that which can profit in any way from its workings, but makes away with or injures that which cannot endure the impact of its activity, like the things which are withered when fire comes near them, or the smaller animals which are swept aside or even trampled underfoot by the rush of larger ones. The coming into being and destruction and alteration for
PLOTinus: ENNEAD IV. 4.

...καὶ κατὰ φόνον ἔχουσαν ζωὴν ἀποστελεῖ, ἐπείτερ ὄχι οἷον τῇ ἀλήθειᾳ ἔχειν, ὡς μόνον ἴστα, οἰδὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ τὰ τέλεια εἶναι καὶ βλέπειν μέρη ὡντα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἔκεινον.

5ο συμπερικαὶ καὶ μέρη, διάφορα τῇ ὅπως μὴ πάσα τὰ αὐτῶν ἐν μὲν ζωῇ ὅπως οὐ μὴ ἔχειν: οὐ μὴ τῇ μένειν υἱόννει ὑμηλότατος, εἰπεν ἔμελθε τῷ πᾶν μένειν ἐν τῷ κυνεῖται τῷ μένειν ἔχον.

23. Τῆς δὲ φορᾶς τὸ εἰκῆ οὐκ ἐξουσίας, ἀλλὰ λόγου τῷ κατὰ τῷ ἐξον ἐφερέμενης, ἔδει καὶ συμφωνία τῷ ποιοῦτος πρὸς τὸ τάχυν εἶναι καὶ τινὰ τέξεων εἰς ἀληθεία καὶ πρὸς ἀληθεία τινάσκομεντοσ, ὅτε καὶ ἐκάστην σχέσεων τῆς φορᾶς καὶ τῆς τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς διάθεσις εἶναι, οἷον μιᾶν ὀρχησάμενον ἐν τοιούτῳ χρείᾳ ποιοῦτος ἐπεί δὲ καὶ εἰς ταῖς ἁμα ὄρχησαί τοι μὲν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν ὀρχήσασαν 1 καὶ ἐκάστης τῶν κυμάτων, οἷον ἐφέρεσαν μεταβαλλόντως τῶν συνηθείσης πρὸς τὴν ὀρχήσασαν, αὐλών τε καὶ μιᾶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συνηθησάσων, τι ἀν τῆς λέγοι φαινόντος ὡς ἀλλὰ τὰ μέρη τοῖς τῆς ὀρχήσασαν παρεξεχομένω καθ' ἐκάστου σχῆμα εἷς ἀνάγκης οὐκ ἂν ὡσάποτος ὅσαστο ἔχειν, τῶν μελῶν τοῦ σώματος ταῦτῃ χωρομένων καὶ παραποτομένων, παραποτομένων 2 µεν ἐφέρεσαν, ἀνείρετον δὲ ὀλλον, καὶ τοῦ µὲν σωσιάτου τοῦ δὲ ἀναποτομένω τινα τῷ πιέει τῷ διάφορῳ σχηματισμῷ διηρκομένον. καὶ ὡς µὲν προαιρεῖσθαι τὸν ὀρχήσασαν πρὸς ὅλλον βλέπει τὰ ὑπότιντα τῆς ὀρχήσασαν ἐπομένου καὶ ὑπογράφει τῇ

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worse or better of all these individual things brings to its fulness the unhindered living life according to nature of that one [universal] living creature; since it was not possible for all the individual things to be as if they were alone nor for the final purpose to be directed and look towards them when they are [only] parts, but it must be directed to that of which they are parts, and since they are different, they cannot all have their own for ever in a single life; it was not possible for anything to persist altogether the same, if the All was going to persist, which has its persistence in an movement.

33. The heavenly circuit has nothing casual in it, but goes according to the rational principle of its living organism; there must therefore be a harmony of action and experience and an order which arranged things together, adapting them and bringing them into due relation with each other, so that according to every figure of the heavenly circuit there is a different disposition of the things which it governs, as if they were performing a single ballet in a rich variety of dance-movements. In our ballets, too, there is no need to mention, since they are obvious, the external elements, the way in which piping and singing and everything else which joins in contributing to the total effect of the performance change variously at every movement. But the parts of the dancer's body, too, cannot possibly keep the same position in every figure: as his body follows the pattern of the dance and bends with it, one of his limbs is pressed hard down, another relaxed, one works hard and painfully, another is given a rest as the differing changes. The dancer's intention looks elsewhere; his limbs are affected in accordance with

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the dance and serve the dance, and help to make it perfect and complete; and the connoisseur of ballet can say that to fit a particular figure one limb is raised, another bent together, one hidden, another degraded; the dancer does not choose to make these movements for no reason, but each part of him as he performs the dance has its necessary position in the dancing of the whole body. 1 It is in this way, then, that we must say that the beings in the sky do what they do (but some things they only indicate); or, better, we should say that the whole universe actively lives its own complete life, moving its great parts within itself, and continually rearranging them, and, as when a single living thing moves, the relations of the parts to each other and to the whole and their different positions make everything else follow, being disposed in one way according to one set of relationships, positions, and arrangements and another way according to another, so that it is not the arranged parts which do what is done, but the arranger; but the arranger is not a doer distinct from what he does—for he is not acting on something different from himself—but he is himself all the things he does, the arrangements up in the sky and their consequences here below, which are experiences necessarily affecting the living being when it moves in this particular way, the living being, that is, which is composed in this particular way and naturally conjoined, and necessarily both acts upon itself and experiences its own action.

2 The dancer here, as in III. 2. 18, is one of the great solo ballet artists of the Empire, the pantomimist, who danced whole mythological stories by themselves to a choral and orchestral accompaniment. These excellent descriptions, and the choice

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1 "The dance..." refers to the dance of the gods as described in Greek mythology. The dance and the movements are seen as necessary and preordained, much like the natural world, to maintain harmony and balance.

2 Reference to a pantomimist who performed on stage. The pantomimist's role was to embody the stories and mythological narratives.
34. But we, by yielding that part of ourselves to experience which was our share of the body of the All, and not considering the whole of ourselves to belong to it, are subject to experience only within reasonable limits; just as sensible serfs with one part of themselves serve their master, but with another belong to themselves, and therefore receive more reasonably limited orders from their master since they are not slaves and do not totally belong to another. But it was necessary that the arrangements of the heavenly bodies should vary as they now do, since the heavenly bodies do not run their courses at equal speeds. But since the heavenly bodies move according to reason and their relationships within the [universal] living being vary, and then here below these events occur in our own sphere in sympathy with those above, it is reasonable to enquire here whether we should assert that these earthly occurrences follow on those above by correspondence, or whether the figures have the powers which bring about what is done, and whether it is simply the figures or the figures made by particular heavenly bodies. For the same arrangement of the same body in relation to another body and then again to others does not produce the same signification or action: since even by itself each appears to have a different nature. Or is it right to say that the configuration of these particular heavenly bodies is of a particular kind and this specific disposition, but the configuration of other heavenly bodies which is the same in arrangement is another? But if this is so, we shall give the power no more to the figures but to the actual bodies which are arranged. Should we give it to both? For we shall certainly give different
PLOTinus: Ennead IV 4

powers to the same heavenly bodies when they take up different relative positions, and even to the same single one when it occupies a different place. But what powers are we giving them? Powers of action or of signification? To the combination, the arrangement of these particular stars, both, and in many cases there is both action and signification, but elsewhere there are only significations. This argument, then, gives powers to the figures and powers to the bodies arranged: since with dancers each hand has a distinct power and so have the other limbs, but the figures also have great power, and then there is a third group of consequentially effective things, the parts of the limbs which are brought into the dance and their constituents, for instance the dexter fingers of the hand and the muscles and veins which are affected along with them.

35. How, then, should we understand these powers? We need to explain again more clearly what is the difference between triangle and triangle,1 in what way this heavenly body differs from that, and why and up to what point it acts in this particular way. For we did not attribute their activities either to their bodies or to their deliberate choices: not to their bodies, because the things which happened were not the works of body alone, and not to their choices, because it would be inappropriate for gods to choose to do inappropriate things. But if we remember that we postulated that the universe is a single living thing, and that since it is so it was absolutely necessary for it to have an internal self-communication of its experiences; and if we remember further that the calculation was based: op. II. 3, 4, where Plotinus shows himself much more hostile to the astrologers than here.

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1 “Triangles” are among the important “configurations” or “aspects” of the apparent motions of the signs of the zodiac at various seasons on which a great deal of astrological
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 4.

κατὰ λόγον ἡ διέξοδος τῆς ζωῆς σύμφωνας ὀμοιότητι ἀπάσα, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ εἰκῆ οἷοὶ ἔστων ἐν τῇ ζωῇ, ἄλλα μία ἀρμονία καὶ τάξις, καὶ οἱ σχηματισμοὶ κατὰ λόγον, καὶ κατ᾿ ἀρίθμους δὲ ἐκκατα καὶ τὰ χωρῶντα χεῖρα μέρη, ἁμωθα ἀνάγκῃ ἔμοιλεγοιν 15 τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ παντὸς εἴτε, τὰ τε ἐν αὐτῷ γενόμενα σχήματα καὶ τὰ σχηματιζόμενα μέρη αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐπόμενα καὶ οὕτω, καὶ τῶν τῶν τροπῶν ὡς τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἐκ τούτοις συμβόλλειν, ἀστερὰ 2 καὶ ἐχθριστὶς ἐφύνοντο ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν λόγῳ 3 πεπερατοῦτας καὶ τὰ μὲν

20 σχῆματα ὡς δοῦν λόγος εἶναι ἡ διαστάσεις ζωῆς καὶ ῥυθμών καὶ σχῆσεις χώρας κατὰ λόγον, τὰ δὲ διετεκτέντα καὶ διαχωρισμένα μέθοδος ἄλλα 3 καὶ εἰναι τὸν ζωοῦν δυνάμεις χωρίς [τῆς] 4 προαρθροες ἀλλὰς τὰς ὧν ζωοῦν μέρη, ἐπεὶ τῆς προαρχόσεως αὐτοῦς ἐξομαι καὶ οὐ οὐκέτως τρισὶ τῶν ζωοῦ τούτων.

23 τὴν φύσιν, μία γὰρ ή προαρχής ἐνός ζωοῦν, αἱ δὲ δυνάμεις αἱ ἄλλαι αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸ πολλαί. ἄσια δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ προαρθροες, πρὸς τὸ αὐτό, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ἡ μία. ἐπισφυρίσμα μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι πρὸς ἄλλο πάντω ἑαυτῷ· λαβεῖς γὰρ οἱ τὸν κέφαλόν τιν έκ τοῦ παρεκτεροῦ ἐκέντρως τὸ ἄλλο μέρος ἐνεχθείς ὑπὸ τοῦ κανόνος.

30 πρὸς τέτοιον, ὅταν τὰ παρακτικά, καὶ ἢ αὑτῆς παρ’ ἄλλοι καὶ ἡ ἔννοις ἐν ἄλλον μεριρῶν· τὸ δὲ ἄλλον καὶ εὐ κατὰ μὲν τὰς ποιητικὰς οὐκ ἀδύνατο δὲ τὸ ἀργάνθον ἤγεται, μελλών δὲ βλέπεις. τοῦτο τοῖς καὶ ἡ ὀρθὴ προαρθροες ὑπὸ ὑπὲρ τὰ πάθη

1 Thes, Enn. 3
2 Ἐμμ., H. 31 recta: ἀνώνομος, H. 33
3 Deld, Cl. Enn.: ἄλλα Ἐμμ.
4 Del. Teles.

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process of its life must be rational and all in tune with itself, and that there is nothing equal in its life but a single melody and order, and that the celestial arrangements are rational, and each individual part moves by numbers, as do the dancing parts of the living being, we must admit that both are the activity of the All, the figures in it and the parts of it which are arranged in figures (and the consequences of these and how they follow), and that this is the way in which the All lives, and the powers contribute to this, which they were brought into existence possessing him who made them in their rational principles. And the figures are like the proportions and intervals of the living being and its rational rhythms and relationships, and the bodies which are set at intervals and arranged in figures are its limbs; but there are other powers of the living being, which are, apart from deliberate choice, like parts of the living being, since what belongs to deliberate choice in these beings is outside [the universal organism] and does not contribute to the nature of this living being. For the deliberate choice of the one living being is one, but the other powers which it has directed towards itself are many. But all the chances which occur in it are directed to the same end to which that one choice of the All is directed. For the desire of one thing in it is directed towards another thing in it; for one part wants to take a part of the others since it is itself in need; and anger is felt against another part, when it is annoying in some way, and growth derives from another of the parts and coming into results in another. But the Whole does these things in these parts, but itself seeks the Good, or rather gazes upon it. This too is what the right
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choice which transcends the emotions seeks and in this way it contributes to the achievement of the same purpose: since when serfs work for another man, many of the things they do are directed to fulfilling the commands of their master, but their aspiration to the Good is directed to the same end to which their master also aspires. If then the sun and the other heavenly bodies act in any way on the things here below, one must think that the sun—it is best to speak of one body only—remains looking above, but just as its warming of the things on earth proceeds from it, so do any subsequent actions upon them, by a dissemination of soul, as far as is in its power, since there is plenty of the growth soul in it. And in the same way any other heavenly body, without choosing to do so, gives off a kind of irradiation from itself. And all the heavenly bodies when they have been unified in this or that particular configuration produce now one and now another disposition of things: so that the figures have power—for according to this or that figure different consequences follow—and something is due to the actual heavenly bodies arranged in the figures—for one consequence follows if these particular heavenly bodies are in the figure, and another if others are. As regards the figures themselves, one can see from what happens here below that they have powers. For why are some figures terrifying to those who see them though those who are terrified have had no experience of evil from them before, but others when they are seen do not terrify? And why do these particular figures terrify some people and different ones others? It is because these particular ones work on a man of a particular kind and
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others on this other man, since they cannot fail to act on that which corresponds to their nature. And something with one kind of figure stimulates one to look at it, but another kind does not stimulate the same man. And if someone were to say that it is the beauty which stimulates, why does one stimulate one man and another another? If it is not the difference in figure which has the power? For why should we assert that colours have power and act, but not assert that figures do? It would be absolutely absurd for something to exist in reality but not to have any power which it could exercise. For anything which exists is of such a kind that it can either act or be acted upon: in some cases we should attribute action, in other cases both. But besides the figures there are also powers in the bodies subject to configuration; and in the bodies in our world there are many powers which are not produced by hot or cold things but by things which have come into existence as the result of different qualities and forms. Rational principles and have a share in the power of nature, as the natures of stones and the active powers of herbs produce many astonishing results.

36. The All is full of the richest variety: all rational formative principles are present in it, and an unbounded store of varied powers. It is like what they say about man, that each of the bones has its own distinctive powers, the bones of the hand one power and the toe-bone another, and there is no part which has not a power, and one different from every other—but we know nothing about it, unless one of us has studied this sort of subject. The

1 This philosophical commonplace goes back to Plato Sophist 247D–25 and 248C.

1 del. Theiler, Harder.

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All is like this, but even more so: or rather the parts of our bodies with their powers are only traces of the parts and powers of the universe. In the All there is an indescribably wonderful variety of powers, especially in the bodies which move through the heavens. For it did not have to come to be an ordered universe like a soulless horse, even if a large and complex one, made of materials easy to reckon up according to kind, stones and timber, perhaps, and other things of the sort; but it exists, all awake and alive differently in different parts, and nothing can exist which does not belong to it. This then solves the difficulty of how there can be anything without soul in an ensouled living being; for in this way the account explains that different things in the Whole live in different ways, but we do not say that anything is alive which does not move itself perceptibly; but each thing of this sort has a hidden life: and the thing which is perceptibly alive is composed of parts which are not perceptibly alive but contribute wonderful powers to the life of a living thing of this kind. Man would not have been moved to such great achievements if the powers in himself from which he started had been without soul, nor would the All live as it does if each particular thing in it did not live its own life—even if the All does not exercise deliberate choice. For it acts without need of deliberate choice, since it is of older birth than choice; and therefore many things serve it with their powers.

37. Nothing, therefore, which belongs to the All can be discarded by it; since with fire and all the other things of the kind which we say are active, if any one of the people who have the reputation of experts tried to find out what their activity was, he
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 4.

would get into difficulties if he did not attribute this power to their actually being in the All, and did not say that anything sort of thing about everything else which is in daily use. But we do not think it proper to investigate ordinary things, nor do we disbelieve in them, but we disbelieve in the detailed working of the other powers which are out of the ordinary, and encounter the extraordinary with astonishment, though we should be astonished at these ordinary things too if we were unfamiliar with them and someone presented a detailed account of them to us and explained their powers. We must admit, then, that each particular thing has an unreasoned power, since it is moulded and shaped in the All and in some way has a share of soul from the Whole which is ensouled, and is surrounded by a universe of this kind and is part of an ensouled being—for there is nothing in it which is not a part—but some things are more powerfully effective than others, both among the things on earth and still more among those in the heavens, since these have a clearer nature: and many things happen according to these powers, not by deliberate choice of the beings from which the action appears to proceed—for the powers exist also in beings which have no choice—nor with any direction of attention to the giving of the power, even if there is some transmission of soul from them. For living beings could be generated from a living being without any act of deliberate choice, nor any determination of the original living being, nor any consciousness of what is happening: for the act of choice would be inactive, if he had it, or it would not be the choice.

1 A philosophical commonplace, probably of Stoic origin.

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1 Diehl.
2 Thélot: àutōs Ἐμμ., Η-8: αὐτὸς Kirchhoff.
PLOTinus: Ennead IV. 4.

 γάρ ἢν ὁ πρωτόπορος, εἶ ἔχων, ὡς ἢν ἡ ποιήσα. 28 εἶ δὲ μὴ ἔχω τι πρωτόπορον ζῶσιν, ἐπὶ μᾶλλον τὸ μὴ παρακολουθεῖν.

38. "Ας τε ἐκ νοῦν ἐκ νοῦν κυρίαν ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης ἄλλης τοιαύτη γίνεται [καὶ ὅλος ὁ οὐκ ἐξ αὐτῆς] 9 διὰ ταῦτα κυρίαν ἄλλου, ὡς συνήθες ἡ ἀπολύσει ἢ τέχνη ἀδελφόν, παρά ταύτα εἰς ἐκεῖνον

5 ἐκατέρω, ἀλλὰ εἰς τὴν τοῦ δραμάντος φῶς ἀνεκτένων. καὶ διὰ μὲν χρήσει ἡ ἀλληρχεῖν συμβαλλείται, τῇ δὲ ὀνείρῳ ἀνεκτένων, ἐξ ἄλλου μέρους μείζονος εἰς ἄλλο εὐθεῖόν ὁν. ὅ τι δὲ ἢν δυσχερέσει ἐξ αὐτῶν λεγόμενα εἰς τὰς γεγονότας τῶν χρωμάτων, ἡ τίς μὲν διώκειται το 10 εὐχαριστοῖ δεξιώθηκα καὶ το ποικίλλων—οὐ γάρ ἄπλοὺς γίνεται τῶν χρώματων, ἀλλὰ εἰς τοὺς καὶ ὅπιστι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ πάντων καὶ τὸ παύεται ὁ πολιτείας ἐνναὶ καὶ τούτῳ φωτίζει ἐναλλὰ, τώσον δὲ καὶ ἡ μὲν στηρεῖται, ἐκεῖνον το εὐχαριστοῖ εἰς τὸ ἐμὸν διάδοσις. γένοιτο δὲ ὅ τι καὶ μὴ συμβαλλόταν

10 παντὸς λυπητέον τὴν φώναν, καὶ ἡ ἀναμίλοντες τῶν όλων οὐ διδόντας ἐκάστην ἄλλης αὐτῶν μείζονος ἐκεῖνον ἑπάτων, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ πρωτότοκοι. αὐτὸς τῶν δὲ ὅ ὡς ἐν εὐπλήκτεσα καὶ θαυματικὴ τῆς συμβαλλόντος ἐγείρεται καὶ ἀπό τῶν ἄλλων ἄλλα, καὶ ἀπό ἐκατέρω τῆς πάντας γάρ ἐντος καὶ εἰ τί δὲ

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which would be operative. But if a living being had no choice, still more would there be an absence of consciousness.

38. The effects, then, which come from the heavenly body from its other kind of life without anything stimulating it, and all which are produced by the stimulation of another, for instance by prayers, either plain or sung to art, all these are to be attributed, not to each individual heavenly body, but to the nature of what is done. And all the effects which are beneficial for the preservation of life or some other useful purpose are to be attributed to the gift [of the heavenly body] and are something which comes from the greater part of the universe to another lesser one: but whatever had influence is said to come from the heavenly bodies upon the births of living creatures is to be attributed to the inability of the subordinate to receive influence—for what happens does not simply happen, but happens to this specific thing and in this specific way; and that which is affected, and that which is going to be affected, has a specific kind of underlying nature—but also the mixtures of influences produce many effects, though each individual heavenly body gives something beneficial to life. And a bad effect on something may occur also because the naturally favourable forces are not operating to help it, and the concatenation of universal forces does not always give each individual what it wants; and we too add a great deal to what we are given. But all the same, all things are woven into one, and are marvelously in tune, and things come from other things, even if they come from opposites: for all belong to one [universe]. And if anything among the things
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which come into being is at all lacking in excellence, since it is not completely formed because the matter has not been mastered, it is, so to speak, lacking in nobility of birth, and since it is deprived of this falls into ugliness. Some things, then, are done by the heavenly bodies, some the underlying nature introduces, and some are additions due to ourselves.

But since all things are for ever brought together into order and all are directed to a single end, all are signify. "But virtue has no master", yet its works, too, are woven into the common order, since the things here below depend on the world above, the things in this word on diviner beings, and this universe has a share, also, in those higher realities. What comes to be in the All, then, does not come to be according to seminal formative principles but according to formative principles which include powers which are prior to the principles in the seeds; for in the seminal principles there is nothing of what happens outside the sphere of the seminal principles themselves, or of the contributions which come from matter to the whole, or of the interactions on each other of the things which have come to be. But the rational formative principle of the All is more like the formative thought which establishes the order and law of a state, which knows already what the citizens are going to do and why they are going to do it, and legislates with regard to all this, and weaves together by the laws all their experiences and arts and the honour or dishonour that their acts merit, so that all that happens in the state moves as if spontaneously into a harmonious order. But the

1 This Platonic phrase, from Republic X 617E3, is more than once quoted by Plotinus: op. II. 3. 9. 17; VI. 8. 5. 31.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 4.

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signification is not designed for the sake of indicating what is going to happen before it does, but since things happen as they do some are indicated by others; for since all is one and belongs to one, one thing can be known from another, the cause from what is caused and the consequence from the antecedent, and the composite from one of its parts, because the rational principle of the universe composes one part and another together. If this argument is correct, the difficulties would be solved, that about the gift of evils coming from the gods by the consideration that it is not their deliberate choices which are effective but all that comes from above happens by natural necessity, as actions of parts on parts, and as consequences of the life of the one universe; and that we by ourselves create much to what happens, and that, though the gifts of the individual heavenly bodies are not evil, something else comes about in their mixture, and that the life of the universe does not serve the purposes of each individual but of the whole, and that the underlying nature receives one thing but experiences another, and is unable to master what it is given.

40. But how do magic spells work? By sympathy and by the fact that there is a natural concord of things that are alike and opposition of things that are different, and by the rich variety of the many powers which go to make up the life of the one living creature. For many things are drawn and eranished without anyone else's magical contrivance: and the true magic is the "Love" and also the "Strife" in the All.1 And this is the primary wizard and enchanter from the spells published in the 

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1 The reference is to Empedocles: op. e.g. fr. B 17, 19-20. This and the following chapters make clear that magic was for Plotinus a manipulation of natural forces, attractions and sympathies resulting from the living organic unity of the physical universe. His interest in it was philosophical rather than practical (see further n. 1 on cl. 43). An idea of the sort of magic of which Plotinus is thinking can be obtained from the spells published in the "Pygmy Occult Magic", ed. and tr. K. Preisendanz (2 vols., Berlin and Leipzig 1923, 1931).
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ter, from observing whom men came to use his philtres and spells on each other. For, because love
is natural to men and the things that cause love have
a force of attraction to each other, there has come
into existence the helpful power of a magical art of
love, used by those who apply by contact to different
people different magical substances designed to draw
them together and with a love-force implanted in
them; they join one soul to another, as if they
were training together plants set at intervals. They
use as well figures with power in them, and by
putting themselves into the right postures they
quietly bring powers upon themselves, since they
are within one universe and work upon one universe.
For if anyone put a magician outside the All, he
could not draw or bring down by attractive or binding
spells. But now, because he does not operate as if he
were somewhere else, he can work on his subjects
knowing by what way one thing is drawn to another
in the living being. And there is a natural drawing
power in spells wrought by the tune and the particu-
ar attraction and posture of the magician—for
these things attract, as pitiable figures and voices
attract: for it is the irrational soul—not the power
of choice or the reason—which is charmed by music,
and this kind of magic causes no surprise: people
even like being enchanted, even if this is not exactly
what they demand from the musicians. And we
must not think that other kinds of prayers either are
freely and deliberately answered: for people charmed
by spells do not act with free deliberation, nor, when
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a snake fascinates men, does the one who is fascinated understand or perceive what is happening, but he knows only afterwards that he has had the experience; his ruling intellect, however, remains unaffected. But, when a man prays to a heavenly body, some influence comes from it upon him or upon another person.

41. But the sun, or another heavenly body, does not hear his prayers. And that which he prays for comes about because one part is in sympathetic connection with another; just as in one tense string; for if the string is plucked at the lower end, it has a vibration at the upper. But often, too, when one string is plucked it has a kind of sense of this by its concord and the fact that it is tuned to the same scale. But if the vibration can even pass from one lyre to another in so far as a sympathy exists, then there is also one single harmony in the All, even if it is composed of opposites; and it is in fact composed of parts which are alike and all akin, even when they are opposites. And all the things which harm men do not come with the intention of harming, but as when the passionate spirit is drawn down with the bile and enters the nature of the liver, just as if someone, taking a light from a fire, hurts someone else—either the person who has made arrangements to go or that one who took it does the damage by having given some fire to someone who, in a way, moves it about from one place to another; and the fire which has come hurts if the person to whom it was transferred was unable to take hold of it.\footnote{1}

\footnote{1 The text here is very uncertain. H-S's critical note, printed under the Greek text, gives the principal suggestions.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{2}C}
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42. So there will be no need for the heavenly bodies to have memory, either, for this purpose [of answering prayers]—this was the reason why this investigation was undertaken—or sense-perceptions arising from the lower world; nor, if we look at it in this way, do they deliberately choose to attend to prayers, but we must admit that some influence comes from them both with and without prayer in so far as they are parts, and parts of one whole; and that there are many powers which work even without deliberate choice, both, without contrivance and with [magic] art, as in a single living being; and one thing is benefited and harmed by another because it is naturally so disposed, and by the arts of physicians and magicians one thing is compelled to give something of its power to another. And in the same way the All gives to its parts, both spontaneously and if someone else magically attracts [its power] to a part of it: for it lies at the disposal of its parts by its own natural disposition, and so the one who makes the prayer is no alien. But if the man who prays is evil, there is no need to be surprised; for the wicked draw water from the streams and that which gives does not know itself to what it gives, but only gives; but all the same which is given is also co-ordinated with the nature of the All: so that if someone takes what he ought not from what lies at the disposal of all, justice pursues him by an inevitable law. We must not therefore assume that the All can be affected; or we must grant that its ruling principle is altogether impossible, and when the parts come to be affected, the affection pene-

1 n. Crouzon, Müller*: αὐτῷ wvC: αὐτῷ U.
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πάθος, παρά φύσιν δέ μηδενὶς αὐτῇ ὅστοις ἀπαθεῖς τῷ γεγονόσιν] 1 ὃς πρὸς αὐτὸ εἶναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰς τῶν ἁστρῶν, καθότου μὲν μέρος, τὰ πάθη, ἀπαθή

25 μέντοι αὐτὰ ἐναὶ τῷ τὶς προαριστείς καὶ αὐτοὶς ἀπαθεῖς εἶναι καὶ τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς φύσεις ἀπάθατοι ὑπάρχει καὶ τῷ, καὶ εἰ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως τῆς ἀνθρώπους, μὲν ἔλεγεν ἀνθρώπος τὴν ὄψιν, καὶ τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν τὰ αὐτὰ μένει καὶ, εἰ τῷ ὄστερῳ, ἀνωθέντως ἀπολύτως καὶ τῷ

30 προσώπον, εἰ πρόσεχει, λαβόντως.

43. 'Ο δὲ αὐθανάστας πόσῳ ὡς γοητείας καὶ φαινόμενων; ἢ τῷ μὲν ψυχῇ ἀπαθεῖς εἰς γοητείας, καὶ ὁ δὲ τὸ λογικὰ αὐτῶν πάθος, οὐδὲν ἄν μεταδοθῇ τῷ τῷ ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἄλογον, καὶ τοῦτο πάθος ἄλογον μᾶλλον τῶν παθῶν ἄλογον ὅσον ἄλλη ἀπρότυπος ἐκ φαινόμενων, εἰς αὐτὸ τῷ ἐναντίω τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην παθήσεα. ἀποτελέσθαι τὸ ἀνθρώπου πάθος, ὡσού καὶ αὐτῷ ἄντρεμον καὶ ἀντεχεῖν τάς ἕκει δυνάμεις ἀναλύει, τόνατον ἀλλὰ ἐκ τοιουτῶν ὁ νόσος ἢ καὶ ἀκμώτατα πάθος ἄλογον τῷ γὰρ μέρος τῆς παθήσεως ἐν μήρῳ ἄλλω ἂν παθήσεως πάθος ἄλογον, εἰσὶν καὶ ἀπάθησις; τὸ δὲ μὴ εὕθυς, ἀλλὰ ἄλογον, ὡσὶν ἀποτελεῖ φόνοις.

1 deleitumus: C et al γεγονόσιν Seidel. B—T.

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trates to them, but since there is nothing there which is contrary to the nature of the All, it is unaffected, directed as it is towards itself. For the heavenly bodies, too, in so far as they are parts, are subject to affections; they are however impossible in themselves, because their powers of choice, as well as that of the All, cannot be affected and their bodies and natures remain unharmed, and if they give something by means of their soul, their soul is not diminished and their bodies remain the same, and if anything flows from them, it goes imperceptibly, and if anything is added to them, it is unnoticed.

43. But how is the good man affected by magic and drugs? He is incapable of being affected in his soul by enchantment, and his rational part would not be affected, nor would he change his mind; but he would be affected in whatever part of the irrational in the All there is in him, or rather this part would be affected; but he will feel no passionate love provoked by drugs, if falling in love happens when one soul assents to the affection of the other. But, just as the irrational part of him is affected by incantations, so he himself by counter-chants and counter-incantations will dissolve the powers on the other side. But he might suffer death or illnesses or anything bodily from such incantations; for the part of the All in him would be affected by another part or by the All, but he himself would be unharmed. (That the effects of magic do not follow immediately, but later, is not out of line with nature.) But spirits of the attitude of Plotinus to magic, see my contribution to the Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy 207-8 and the literature there referred to.
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themselves, also, are not incapable of being affected in their irrational part; it is not out of place to ascribe memory and sense-perceptions to them and to grant that they are charmed by attractions appropriate to their nature and that those of them who are nearer to the things here below bear the prayers of those who call upon them according to the degree of their concern with things here below. For everything which is directed to something else is enchanted by something else; for that to which it is directed enchanters and draws it; but only that which is self-directed is free from enchantment. For this reason all practical action is under enchantment, and the whole life of the practical man: for he is moved to that which charms him. This is the reason for saying "The citizen body of great-hearted Erechtheus looks attractive."1 For why does a man direct himself to something else? If he is drawn not by the arts of wizards but of nature, which brings illusion and links one thing to another not spatially but by the magic draughts which it gives.

44. Contemplation alone remains incapable of enchantment because no one who is self-directed is subject to enchantment: for he is one, and that which he contemplates is himself, and his reason is not deluded, but he makes what he ought and makes his own life and work. But in practical life there is no self-possession, and the reason does not produce the impulse, but the irrational also has an origin in the premises derived from the affection. For the care of children and concern for marriage have a manifest drawing power, and so do all the things of the lower world, which are always illusory, whether political or sexual.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 4.

which entice men since they give pleasure to their carnal desires. And the practical actions which are caused by our passionate spirit are the result of an irrational impulse, as are in the same way those caused by our carnal desires: political activity and the pursuit of office have the desire of power in us provoking them. And the activities which are undertaken to avoid suffering have fear as their origin, and those for the sake of getting more, carnal desire. Those undertaken because of necessary requirements, since they seek to satisfy a need of nature, obviously have the force of nature behind them making survival our own essential concern. But if someone says that noble practical activities are free from enchantment, or, if they are not, contemplation also, which is of noble objects, is under enchantment, [the answer is] that if one carries out the so-called noble activities as necessary ones, and grasps that what is really noble is something else, one has not been enchanted for one knows the necessity, and does not look to this world, and one's life is not directed to other things—but one has been enchanted in this way by the force of human nature and by the essential concern for the survival of others, or indeed of one self—for it seems, perhaps, reasonable not to take oneself out of this world on account of this essential concern. But if one is content with the nobility in practical activities, and chooses activity because one is deluded by its vestiges of nobility, one has been enchanted in one's pursuit of the nobility in the lower world; for, in general, to be actively occupied with the semblance of truth and drawn towards it in any way is characteristic of someone who has been deluded by the forces which draw one to the lower

1 del. Th. 273
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world: this is what the magic of nature does; for to pursue what is not good as if it was good, drawn by the appearance of good by irrational impuses, belongs to one who is being ignorantly led where he does not want to go. And what would anyone call this other than magical enchantment? The man, then, is alone free from enchantment who when his other parts are trying to draw him says that none of the things are good which they declare to be so, but only that which he knows himself, not deluded or pursuing, but possessing it. So he would not be drawn in any direction.

45. From everything which has been said this is perfectly clear, that each thing in the All, according to how it is in nature and disposition, contributes to the All and is acted upon and acts, just as in each individual living thing each of the parts, according to how it is in nature and disposition, contributes to the whole and serves its purposes and has its own proper rank and utility; it gives what comes from it and receives as much of what comes from the others as its nature is capable of receiving; and all has a kind of common awareness of all; and if each of the parts was a living being, it would have functions as a living being different from its functions as a part. And this too has become obvious, how it is with us, that we too do something in the All, not only all that body does to body, and the kind of ways in which body is affected in return, but we also introduce the other nature which we have, in that we are connected by what we have that is akin to us in things outside us: we have certainly become connected, or rather we are connected, by our souls and dispositions both to what is next to us in the region of
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the spirits and to what lies beyond them and it is impossible that it should be unknown what sort of people we are.1 But of course we do not all give the same things, or receive the same things, for how could we give to another what we have not got—for instance, good? Nor, again, could we get any good if we have an incapacity to receive it. Anyone, therefore, who connects up his wickedness is recognised for what he is, and according to his own nature is thrust into that which holds him here in this world, and, when he escapes from here, into another region of the same kind by the pull of nature. But for the good man his acts of taking and giving and his transfers are different, since [all things] are transferred by pulls of nature as if they were drawn by lines.2 So wonderfully is this All possessed of power and order: all things go their quiet way according to a justice which nobody can escape; the bad man understands nothing of it, but is taken without knowing it to the place in the All to which he is destined to be carried; but the good man both knows and departs where he must, and knows before he departs where it is necessary for him to come and dwell, and has the good hope that he will be with gods.3 For in a small living being the changes of the parts and their mutual perceptions of each other are little ones, and it is not possible for the parts in it to be living beings except perhaps for a short time in some things; but

1 As in IV. 3. 15-17 (see notes there) some influence of the "cosmic religiosity" of the period can be detected here. The "region of the spirits" is the air, "what lies beyond them" is the Upper Cosmos of the heavenly bodies.
2 Plotinus is here summarising the doctrine of Plato Laws X 903E ff., with a reminiscence of the passage about men as puppets of the gods moved by strings in 1 644D-9 (μανθανούνες 644B2). The "quiet way" is from Euripides Troades 887-8.
3 Cf. Plato Phaedo 63B-C.
4 Plotinus may possibly be thinking here of Aristotle's reflections on the psychology of cut-up insects in De Anima A 5, 411b19-22 and B 2, 413b19-24.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 4.

EN T ON EN DE TΩ EN ΔIΑΣΤΑΣΙΣΕΣ ΠΕΤΟΡΑΙΤΑΙ KAI ΕΚΚΟΥΙΝ ΤΟΝ ΕΝ ΑΙΤΙΩ ΧΕΛΑΙΝΟ ΕΧΕΙ ΚΑΙ ΕΤΩ ΕΙΣΙ ΠΟΛΛAI, ΤΑΣ ΚΙΝΗΣΕΙΣ ΔΕΙ ΚΑΙ ΤΑΣ ΜΕΤΑΣΤΑΣΕΙΣ ΜΕΙΖΟΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ. ΩΡΙΜΟΙΝ ΕΝΙ ΚΑΙ ΗΛΙΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΕΙΡΗΤΗ ΚΑΙ ΤΑ ΆΛΛΑ ΆΧΟΡΑ ΕΝ ΔΙΣ ΜΕΤΑΣΤΙΔΙΜΟΝΑ ΚΑΙ ΜΕΤΑΚΙΝΟΝΤΑΙ. ΟΥ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΝ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΝ ΟΤΗ ΤΗΣ ΠΥΡΩΝ ΜΕΤΑΦΕΡΕΙΣΜΑΝ ΜΗ ΤΟ ΑΥΤΟ ΔΕ ΆΛΗ ΟΡΘΗΜΕΝΗΝ, ΤΗΛΙΚΗΜΕΝΗΝ ΔΕ ΌΜΟΛΟΓΟΝ ΔΝ ΕΠΑΘΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΙΟΤΗΝ, ΤΑΣ ΟΙΝ ΚΕΦΑΛΗΝ, ΤΑS ΔΕ ΌΛΟΝ ΠΟΛΕΟΝ ΛΑΒΟΝΤΑΣ, ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟ ΠΑΤ ΣΥΜΦΕΝΤΑI. ΕΧΕΙ ΓΕΡ ΚΑΙ ΑΥΤΟ ΔΙΑΦΟΡΕΩΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟ

40 ΔΗΜΙΟΥΡΓΗ ΤΕ ΚΑΙ ΑΡΗΜΗΝ. Υ ου μεν μεν το ΐMΣИΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΝΤΙΒΑΘΑ ΑΙΡΗΤΑΙ ΜΗΤΕ ΤΟΙ ΧΕΙΡΟΝΗ ΜΕΤΑΧΥΝΩΝ Θ, ΆΛΛΟΝ ΤΟΠΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΘΟΡΙΝ ΧΩΛΑΣΤΟ ΤΟΥΤΟΥ, ΟΥ ΕΙΔΟΝ, ΛΑΜΒΟΝΑ, ΑΙ ΔΕ ΚΙΝΑΚΣΕΙΣ ΕΪΣΤΕΡ ΕΙΣΝΟΙΗΚΕΝ Η ΜΕΡΗΝ, ΤΩΝ ΜΕΝ ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΕΙΝ ΦΩΒΑΙΚΕΝ, ΤΩΝ ΔΕ ΕΞΙΨΗΕΙΣ Η ΚΑΙ ΑΛΛΟΙΩΤΗΣΙ, ΗΝ ΥΓΕΙΩΝ ΤΟ ΠΑΤ

50 ΕΚΚΟΥΙΝ ΔΙΑΧΕΙΒΕΙΝΟΝ ΟΥ ΔΕΙΓ ΤΟ ΘΥΡΕΙΟΝ ΤΟΥ ΠΑΤΟΣ ΑΛΛΟΙΩΓΕΝΗΝ, ΤΟΝ ΔΕ ΕΞΙΨΗΕΙΝΟΝ ΕΙΣΠΕΘΕΝ, ΩΣ ΑΘΗΝΑΙ ΙΩΝΟΙΝ, ΟΥ ΕΝ ΜΗ ΙΟΝΗΣΗ, ΤΙΒΕΜΕΝΟΥ.

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in that in which the distances are so great and each of the things in it has freedom of movement, and there are many living beings, the movements and transitions must be greater. And we see that the sun and moon and the other heavenly bodies make their transits and move from place to place in order. It is not then unreasonable either for souls to change their places, since they do not always keep the same character, and are ranked in accordance with their experiences and actions, some receiving a rank like that of the head, others like that of the feet, in tune with the All: for the All itself has differences of better and worse. But the soul which neither chooses what is better here below, nor has any part in what is worse, changes to another place, a pure one, and has the position which it chose. But the punishments are like [the medical treatment] of diseased parts; some have caustics applied to them, others are extracted or modified, so that the All may be healthy when every part is disposed where it should be; but the healthy state of the All comes about when one part is modified, and another extracted from the place where it is diseased and placed where it will not be diseased.
IV. 5. (29) ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ ΑΠΟΡΙΩΝ ΤΡΙΤΩΝ Η ΠΕΡΙ ΩΞΕΩΣ

1. Ἡπεί δὲ ὑπερεξῆματα σκέψασθαι, εἰ μηθὲν ὅτι εἰς ὁμοιοῦ ἐστὶ ὅρνα ὁλον ὁλος ἡ ἄλλοι πιθὸς τοῦ λεγομένου διαφανοῦς σώματος, νῦν σκέπτετον. ὅτι μὲν δὲν διὰ σώματος τούτος δεῖ τὸ ὀρέα καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ τὰ λειασάνεσθαι γίνεσθαι, ἔργον. ἔνευ μὲν γάρ σώματος πάντη ἔν τῷ νοστῷ πάντη τὴν ψυχήν εἶναι. τοῦ δὲ λειασάνεσθαι ὅτες αὐτοκεφαλος οὐ νοητῶν, ἀλλὰ αἰτητῶν μόνων, δεῖ πως τὴν ψυχήν συναφῆ γενομένη τοὺς αἰτητοῖς διὰ τῶν προσομοίων κοινωνίαν τινὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ γράφοντος ἂν παθήματος ποιεῖσθαι. διὸ καὶ δὲ ἀργὴν πορειας ἡ γνώσις: ἡμάς γὰρ τοῖσι ὁλοὶ συμφέρουσιν ἡ συνεχών ὅτινα ποιῶν εἰς ἐν τῷ πρὸς αὐτὰ τὰ αἰτητὰ ἔναίτι, ἀμφαιθαίρεσιν τοῦ πότου πρὸς αὐτὰ γνωσίαν. εἰ δὲν δὲν συναφὴν συν νὰ πρὸς τὰ γνωσικόμενα γίνεσθαι, περὶ μὲν τῶν διὸν ἄβυσσων τινὶς ζητοῦσα, περὶ δὲ τῆς ὀράσεως—εἰ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄραμα, εἰ δὲ τι

IV. 5. ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL III, OR ON SIGHT

1. Since we undertook 1 to investigate whether it is possible to see without any medium, like air or some other body of the kind called transparent, we must now carry out the investigation. Now we have said that seeing, and in general sense-perception, must take place by means of some body; for without body the soul is wholly in the intelligible world. Since sense-perception is an apprehension, not of intelligible objects, but of sense-objects alone, the soul must somehow be connected with sense-objects through things which are very much like them and establish a sort of communion of knowledge or affection with them. This is why this knowledge comes through bodily organs: for through these, which are in a way naturally united to or continuous with sense-objects, the soul must somehow in some way come to a unity with the sense-objects themselves, and so a sort of common affection with them must arise. If then there must be a connection with the objects which are being known, why should one investigate all the things which are known by some kind of touch? But about seeing—we shall discuss later if we also ought to include hearing—but about sight, we must enquire whether there must be

1. In IV. 4, 23, 42 ff. The reference back in the next sentence is to the same chapter.
ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL III

some body between the eye and the colour. Or does the body in between impinge in incidentally on the sight, but contribute nothing to the seeing for those who see? But if when the bodies in between are dense, earthy for instance, they prevent us seeing, but we see better in proportion as the intervening bodies are subtler, one might maintain that the intermediates are a help to sight. Otherwise, if they cannot be a help, they cannot be a hindrance: but one would say that earthy bodies are a hindrance. But if the body in between receives the affection first, and is in a way stamped by it—an indication that this is so is the fact that if someone is standing in front of us, in so far as he is looking at the colour, he sees it too—then, if there was no affection in the intermediary, this would not reach us either. But on the other hand it is not necessary that the intermediary should be affected if that which is naturally disposed to be affected—the eye—is affected; or if it is affected, it is affected in a different way: for the rod which is between the torpedo-fish and the hand is not affected at all in the same way as the hand; and certainly there too, if the rod and the line were not in between, the hand would not be affected. Or even this might be disputed: for if the torpedo-fish gets into a net, the fisherman is said to receive a shock. But really the discussion seems to be moving in the direction of the sympathies we

1 The word ὑποστασέως was used in this context by the Stoics; esp. Alexander of Aphrodisias Montisc p. 130, 15 Bruna (= StP P II 804).
2 The example of the torpedo-fish is probably drawn from ordinary observation; but the comparison of Socrates to the fish in Plato Meno 80A may have suggested it to Plotinus.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 5.

θῶς τὴν τοιαύτητα ἐχειν πρὸς αὐτό, οὐκ ἢν τὸ μετατυπὸν ἀνώμων εἰς πάθος, ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ ὡς ἢν πάθος. εἴ τούτο, τοιαύτως μάλλον μηδενὸς ἄνωτος μετατυπὸν πάθος ἢ τὸ πεπροσό κάθειν, κἂν τὸ μετατυπὸν τοῦ μαθητὴν ᾖ, ὥστε αὐτὸ καὶ παθεῖν τι.

2. Εἰ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτῳ ἐστι τὸ ὑδά, οἷον τὸ τῆς ὁδής φῶς συνάπτει πρὸς τὸ μετατυπὸν φῶς, 1 μέχρι τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, δει μετατυπὸν τοῦ εἶναι τὸ φῶς, καὶ ἡ ἐποίησις αὐτῆ τὸ μετατυπὸν τοῦ ἔστει. εἰ δὲ τροπὴν ἐργάζεσθαι τὸ ὑποκάλεσαι σῶμα κεφαλομένων, τὴν κυλεῖ τὴν τροπὴν εἴθος πρὸς τὸ ὄμοιο ἴσον μηδενὸς ἄνωτος μετατυπὸν; εἰ καὶ τὸν εἶ ἀνάγκης, ὅτε ἐστὶν τρέπεσθαι πᾶς τὸ νῦν ὁμόμοιο πρὸς ἄλλον κεφαλομένον, καὶ οἱ εἰκόνες δὲ τὰς ὀρείς οἰκοῦν ἐν ὑποκάλεσαι τὸ πάθος μετατυπὸν τι εἶναι, εἰ

10 μὴ φόβοι, μὴ πέτος ἢ ἀκτίν. ἄλλα φωτὸς ἐστὶν, καὶ τὸ φῶς εἰδοποιεῖται. οἱ δὲ τὴν ἐνοτήταν αὐτῶν διέποιν ἢ πάθος τοῦ μετατυποῦν. οἱ δὲ τῶν εἰκόνων προσπαθεῖσαι διὰ τοῦ κεφαλοῦς λέγοντες διάνοιαν ἐγκεκριμένην, ἢ μὴ κωλυθῆναι ὑπερασπίσθαι τὰς εἰκόνας, μᾶλλον οὐ κωλύσει τὸ μὴ δέχοντο μετατυποῦν, οὐκ

15 ἀμφισβητηθῆναι τῇ ὑπόθεσι. ὡσα εἴ τι συμπαθεῖται τὸ

1 This very summary sketch of the doctrines of earlier philosophers, which introduces Plotinus's own view that seeing is by sympathy, seems to depend on earlier brief allusions and summary refutations of philosophical theories of vision: cp. especially Alexander of Aphrodisias, op. cit. pp. 127, 17 ff. Bruns; also Pseudo-Putarch De Placitis Philosophorum 284.

ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL III

talk about. But if one thing is naturally disposed to be sympathetically affected by another because it has some kind of likeness to it, then the intermediary between them, being unlike, would not be affected, or would not be affected in the same way. If this is so, then that which is naturally disposed to be affected would be so much more if there was nothing in between them, even if the intermediary was of such a kind as to be affected also in some way itself.

2. If then seeing is an activity of such a kind that the light of the eye connects with the intermediary which extends as far as the seen object, the light must be this intermediary, and this supposition requires this intermediary; but if the coloured body which is the object brings about an alteration [in the eye], what prevents the alteration getting to the eye immediately without any intermediary? This is all the more likely if, even as things are, that which is situated immediately in front of the eyes, when it is there, is necessarily altered in some way. Those who regard seeing as an efflux [light from the eye] would not in consequence have to maintain that there was any intermediary at all, unless they were afraid that the ray might fall down, but it is a ray of light, and light goes straight. Those who regard resistance as the cause of sight would have every reason for requiring an intermediary. The advocates of images, who say that these pass through the void, require space to prevent obstruction; so that, if the absence of an intermediary will result in even less obstruction, they have no quarrel with the supposition.1

IV. 13, 901 A-C; other references in the notes of the Harder-Beistler-Theiler edition II b, p. 548.
PLOTinus: Ennead IV. 5.

But all those who say that seeing takes place by sympathy will assert that one would see less well if there was any intermediary, in that it would obstruct and hinder and weaken the sympathy; but it would be more consistent to say that even that which is akin in all circumstances weakens the sympathy, in so far as it is itself affected. Certainly, if a body continuous to the bottom is set alight by the application of fire, all the same the bottom of it will be less affected by the fire applied to it than the part before it. But if the parts of one living being are in sympathy will they be less affected because there is something between them? Yes, perhaps they might be less affected, but the affection would be in the proportion which nature willed, and the intermediary would prevent excess; unless what is concealed amounts to this, that the intermediary is not affected at all. But if sympathy depends on being one living thing, and we are affected because we are in one and belong to one, how is continuity not needed when there is perception of something far off? The answer is that continuity and the intermediary are there because the living being must be continuous, but the affection is only incidentally of something continuous, or we shall have to say that everything is affected by everything. But if one thing is affected by one thing and another by another, not in the same way, one would have no need at all of an intermediary. If then someone says that an intermediary is needed in the case of sight, he must say why: since it does not affect whether it is even generally true that what goes through the air produces any effect on the air, apart from simply dividing it: for instance, if a stone falls from above, does anything
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 5.

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else happen except that the air does not stay as it is? For it is unreasonable to say [that the stone falls] as the result of the reciprocal thrust1 of bodies, when its fall is natural, since if this was fire would go upwards by reciprocal thrust: but this is absurd, for the fire by the speed of its movement gets ahead of the reciprocal thrust of air. But if anyone says that the reciprocal thrust is speeded up by the speed of the movement of fire, this would all the same happen incidentally, and would not cause the upward movement; for in trees also the impulse to grow upwards comes from themselves, without anything pushing them; and we when we are in motion cut through the air, and the reciprocal thrust does not push us on, but only follows us and fills up the place we have left empty. If then the air parts to make way for bodies like these without being affected, what prevents it from allowing passage, even without parting, for the forms which come to our sight? But if the forms do not even pass through the air as if in a stream, what need is there for the air to be affected and for the affection to reach us through it as the result of its previous affection? For if our perception resulted from the air being previously affected, when we looked at the object of sight we should not see it, but we should get our perception from the distant fire, but the warmed air lying close, that warms us; for warning is by contact, but in acts of seeing there is no contact; this is the reason why the sense-object does not produce sight when it is placed on the eye,2 but the intermediary space must be illu-

1 Cp. again Alexander of Aphrodisias cp. cit. 129, 1 Bruns.
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minated—or this may be because the air is [naturally] dark. If it was not dark, it would not perhaps need light. For the darkness which hinders seeing needs to be mastered by the light. But perhaps when the object is applied to the eye it is not seen because it brings with it the shadow of the air and its own shadow.

3. The most important evidence that we do not see the form of the sense-object by a kind of transmission through the medium of the air which has been affected is that fire and the heavenly bodies and their shapes are seen by night. For certainly nobody will assert that the forms come to be present in the darkness and so make connection with the eye: or there would not be a darkness, as the fire would radiate its own form. For even when it is very dark indeed and the stars are hidden and the light from them does not shine, the fire from beacons and lighthouses is seen. But if someone, contradicting the evidence of the senses, says that even in these cases the fire passes through the air, then the eye would have to apprehend the dimness in the air, not that original fire in all its brightness. But if when darkness intervenes what lies beyond is seen, it would be all the more visible with nothing intervening. But one might pause to consider this further point, whether it is not possible to see in the absence of an intermediary, not because there is no intermediary but because the living being with itself and of its parts with each other, which depends on being one thing, will be done away with. For it

\[ \text{ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL III} \]

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\[ \text{ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL III} \]
ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL II

looks as if any kind of perception depends on this, that the living being—this All—is in sympathy with itself. For if this were not so, how would one thing share in the power of another, and especially in power from a distance? But we should consider this problem: if there was another universe, that is another living being making no contribution to the life of this one, and there was an eye "on the back of the sky", would it see that other universe at a proportionate distance? This universe would have nothing to do with that one. But we will discuss this later. But now one might produce this additional evidence to show that seeing does not happen through the intermediary being affected. For if the intermediary air was affected, the affection would presumably have to be a bodily one; but this means there would have to be an impression, as in wax. Then a part of the seen object would have to be stamped on each part of the air; so that the part of the air in contact with the eye would receive a part of the seen object just as large as the part which the pupil of the eye would receive according to its own size. But as it is, the whole object is seen, and all those who are in the air see it, from the front and sideways, from far and near, and from the back, as long as their line of sight is not blocked; so that each part of the air contains the whole seen object, the face for instance; but this is not a bodily affection, but is brought about by higher necessities of the soul belonging to a single living being in sympathy with itself.

4. But what is the situation with the light of the

2 The phrase "on the back of the sky" is taken from Plato Phaedrus 247E7–C1. This interesting speculation is pursued further in ch. 8; see note there.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 5.

1. eye which is connected to the light around the eye and as far as the object? Now first of all the intermediate air is not needed—unless it is said that the light could not be there without air. In this way the air would be incidentally intermediate, but the light itself would be intermediate without being affected; and in general there is no need of an affection here, but there is, all the same, need for an intermediary; but if the light is not a body, there is no need for a body. And, further, the eye would not need this intermediate light, which is not its own, just for seeing, but only for seeing at a distance. The question then whether light could occur without air will be discussed later; but now we must consider our first question. If, then, this connecting light is ensouled, and the soul moves through it and is present in it, as it is also the case with the light within the eye, then of course in the apprehension of the object, which is what seeing is, there would be no need of the intermediate light, but seeing would be like touch; the power of sight will apprehend its object in the light and the intermediary will not be affected but the sight moves to its object. As this point one must enquire whether the sight must move there because there is a space between or because there is a body in the space. And if it is because it is a body in the intervening space which separates sight and object, if this was removed, the sight would see: but if it is simply because there is a space between, one must assume that the nature of the seen object is inert and does nothing at all. But this is not possible: for touch does not only tell us

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1 in ch. 8.
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that something is near and that it is touching it, but it is affected by and reports the distinctive characteristics of the object, and if there was nothing to separate it, it would perceive the object even if it was a long way off. For the intermediate air and we ourselves perceive a fire at the same time; we do not wait for the air to be warmed. Certainly the solid body \(^1\) is more warmed than the air, so that [the perception of warmth] comes through the air but is not caused by the air. If then the object has the capacity to act, and the recipient of the perception, or in any way the sight, has the capacity to be affected, why does it need another medium to act on what it is capable of acting on? This is to need a hindrance. For when the light of the sun approaches, it does not have to reach the air first and then us, but it reaches both at the same time, and we often perceive when it is elsewhere, before it comes near our eyes; so we see without the air being affected, with that which has not been affected in between and when the light with which our sight must connect has not yet arrived. Also it would be difficult on this hypothesis to explain correctly how we see the stars, or any kind of fire, at night. But if the soul stays in its own place, but needs light like a stick to reach the object with,\(^2\) then the apprehension would be a violent business, with the light stretched out and pushing against the object and the object of perception, the colour as colour, itself pressing back: for this is how sensations of touch occur through a medium. And [on this hypothesis] the object was

\(^1\) i.e. our body.

\(^2\) Again the Stoic theory according to Alexander of Aphrodisias, op. cit. 139, 17 Brune (—SVP II 897).
PLATO: ENNEAD IV. 5.

ναὶ ἁπασὶ. εἰσὶ καὶ πράτερ οὖν γέγονε μεθένοις μεταξύ ὅντος τοῦτο. οὕτω γερ ὅπερ εἶναι τό διά
45 μέσον ἀπεσθανεῖ πολεῖ τὴν γνώσιν, οἷον τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ ἐν μάλιστα τελειομαμένῳ: τόν δὲ οὐχ ὅπερ.
ἀλλ' εἰ παθῶν διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητόν φῶς, εἶτα διαμοιβᾶται μέχρι ὧδε, ἡ αὐτή γένεται ὑπόθεσις τῇ
ἀπό τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ τὸ μεταξύ πράτερ προσόνθε, προς ἣν ἕν καὶ ἐν ἄλλος ἤποτεστα.
5. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἄκωσεν ὁ ἐπιστάς ἐνεχθετεῖν, πάθος τοῖς ἀέροις τὴν κύριόν τινί πρῶτοι τοῦ
παρακείμενον ὡς τοῖς τῶν φῶς τοῦ πνεύματος, τῷ
τῶν μέχρι ἄκωσεν ἀέρα πάθει τῶν αὐτὸς, ὅπερ εἰς
5 αἰσθητῷ ἀμφικτιῶσι; ἢ καὶ συμβαθήσοις μὲν τὸ
μεταξύ τῷ παρείναι εἰς μέσῳ νοοφθόντος δὲ τοῦ
μεταξύ, ἂν αὐτός ἐγερμότιον τοῦ φῶς, οἷον
συμβαθήσων δύο συμβαθήσων, εὐθέως ἀπαντῇ
πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὴν αἰσθητῷ; ἢ καὶ διὰ μὲν ἄερος τὴν
πρῶτην τῷ κόσμῳ ὁμοθετίωσι, ἢ δὲ ἐνεχθεῖν ἕν
10 ἄλλως τὸ μεταξύ; ἐνεχθεῖται μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ κύρως
eἶναι ὃ ἄγρι τοῦ φῶς: μη γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ τῆς
ἀρχής γενέσθαι φῶς δύο συμβαθήσων οὐσιῶν, εἰ
mή ὃ ἄγρι πληκές ἐν τῇ τοιούτῳ συνάνθρωπος καὶ
ἐξωθεῖς πλῆθος ὕδωρ τῷ ᾠδήφῳ μέχρι
15 ὅμως καὶ ἄλλος. ἀλλ' εἰ ὁ ἄγρι κύριος τοῦ φῶς
καὶ τοιοῦτοι κυμαληθέντος ὑπήργη, παρά τί ἔνειρ ἡν.
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would account for the differences between voices and between other sounds? For bronze when it strikes bronze has a different ring from when it strikes something else, and other things striking others make different noises; but the air is one and so is the vibration in it; the differences of sounds are not just differences of loud and soft. But if a stroke produces sound because it strikes air, it must be admitted that it is not in so far as it is air: for air speaks when it has the static quality of a solid body, when it stays still for something solid before it is set flowing: so that the colliding bodies and their clash are enough [to produce sound] and their impact is the sound which comes to our perception; the sounds inside living beings are evidence of this, which are not in air, but are produced by one part knocking and striking another: bending of joints, for instance, and the grinding of one bone against another with no air between them. But enough of our problems about hearing. The line of enquiry has been much the same here too as in the case of sight, since the experience of hearing is a kind of common awareness of the sort which occurs in a living being.

6. But could light also occur if there was no air, as when the sun shines upon the surfaces of bodies, if the intermediary was void—and even as things are the intermediary is illuminated incidentally, because it is there? But if light resulted from an affection of air and the other [translucent bodies], and light had its substantial existence through the air—for it would be an affection of it—the affection could not exist without something to be affected. Now, first of all light does not belong primarily to air, nor to air in virtue of its intrinsic character; for it belongs

1 cfr. Theler.
2 cfr. Müller.
PLOTinus: Ennead IV. 5.

σώματος πυρικοῦ καὶ λαμπροῦ καὶ ὅτι καὶ λίθων τοιοῦτων φωτεινὴ χρῶν. ἀλλὰ τὸ εἷς ἄλλο ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀκούσαν χρῶν τοιοῦτον ὃν ἄρα ἐν εἰς μή ὁποῖο ἔκειν οὐκ οὖν; ἀλλὰ εἰ μὲν ποιῶς μένον καὶ τῶν ποιῶς, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ οὐσίᾳ πάσης ποιῶσιν, ἀνέγκαι καὶ τῷ φῶς ἐγεῖτο ἐν ὃ οὔτε αὐταὶ σώματε. εἰ δὲ ἐνεργεῖα ἀπ' ἄλλου, ἡ ὁκ τὸ ὄντος ἐφεξῆς.

15 σώματος, ἀλλά οὐκ εἴρικον μεταξὺ, εἰπερ οὔθεν τέ, οὐκ ἦστα τί πεποιθέται καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ ἐπάεινα; ἀπεκέφαλος γὰρ ἦν διὰ τὴν περιάκυς ἕκαν ἐπισκέψαν; εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ τοιοῦτον οὖν πεποιθέτει, καταλαβόμενον ἦστα, οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὁ ἄλλο μένος' ἀλλὰ τὸ φωτιζόμενον ἦστα τότε ἐξέφερεν ἀπὸ τοῦ φωτιζόμενος καὶ βιαζόμενος πρακτικόν; ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ χαμηλόθετο, ὡστε πάντως ἐπ' ἄλλο, ἡ πάσημα ἄλλο, ὅπερ δὲ εἶναι τὸ πεποιθόμενον. ἢ ὅπερ μείνης ἐλεφθώντος νῦν δὲ ἀπεστειλαί ὡστε καὶ ἠλθον ἀν' οὖν οὖν; ἡ τάσσων δὲ μόνον εἶναι οὐ διὰ γει ἀπολείη τὴν ἐνεργείαν.

25 τοῦτο [τοῦτο] 1 τῷ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τῷ τοῦ ἰδίου σώματι τοῦτο δὲ γὰρ τῷ φῶς. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὔτε τὸ φῶς τούτο ὄστεα. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ ἐνεργεία ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένως, οὐκ εἰς ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ μόνον ἦν. ἀλλὰ ἐπεὶ ἡ ἐνεργεία οὖσα φύσεως ἦσσων ἐνεργεῖα πάθους τοῖς, οὖν τοῦ σώματος εἰ παρεῖ, καὶ μὴ παρόντος δὲ ἄστι, τι ἀν κολβό καὶ ἐπὶ φωτός οὖσας, εἰπερ ἐνεργεία τῆς [τοῦ φωτεινοῦ] εἴη; οὐδὲ γὰρ νῦν τὸ φωτεινοῦ.

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also to each and every bright and fiery body: there are even stones of this kind with a shining surface. But could that which passes to something else from a thing which has a surface of this kind exist if air did not? But if it is only a quality, and a quality of something, since every quality is in a substrate, one must look for a body in which light will be. But if it is an activity from something else, why should it not exist and travel to what lies beyond without the existence of an adjoining body, but with a kind of void in between (if that is possible)? For since it is stretched out straight, why should it not get across without support? But if it is of such a kind as to fall, it will move downwards. For it will certainly not be the air (or in general what is illuminated) which pulls it out of the luminous and compels it to proceed: since it is not something which occurs incidentally, so that it is completely dependent on something else, nor is it an affection of something else, so that there must be something which is affected; or it would have to stay when it arrived; but now it goes away, so that it could also come. But where is it then? All it needs is a place. If this is so, the body of the sun will lose the activity which comes from it. But this was the light. If this is so the light will not belong to anything else. But activity comes from a substrate, but does not pass into a substrate; but the substrate, if it were there, would be affected in some way. But, just as life, being an activity, is activity of the soul, and if something, body for instance, is there, it is affected, but life also exists if this something is not there, what would prevent this being so also in the case of light, if it is a kind of activity? For as things

1 cf. Volkmann.
4 353
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV, 5.

τοῦ ἀέρος γενεῖς τὸ φῶς, ἀλλὰ γῆ συμμορφομένος ἐκ
σκοτεινοῦ ποιεῖ καὶ οὐ καθαρὸν ῥυθμὸν: ὡστε
ομοιον εἰναι λέγει τὸ γήλα καίνα, εἰ πικρὸ
μονήτη. εἰ δὲ εἰς τροπῆρ λέγει τοῦ ἁέρος τὸ φῶς,
λεκτόν ὡς ἐχοην αὐτοῦ πράσοςα τον ἁέρα τῇ
τροπῆ, καὶ τοῦ σκοτεινοῦ αὐτοῦ μὴ σκοτεινοῦ
γεγονέα γέλαιομένον. εἰν δὲ δ ἁγρο οὐδὲ ἑστὶ
μένει, ὡς ἐν οἴνοιν παράμε. τὸ δὲ πάθημα ἐκεῖνον
δεῖ γίνει, ὡς πάθημα τοῦ οἴνου ὁδε γράμμα αὐτοῦ,
ἀλλὰ εἰτὸ εἰ ἄλλου πάρεσθε δὲ δ ἁγρο, καὶ
τοῦτο μὲν οὕτως ἐπικατείχον.

7 Πάντως δὲ ἀπλάντισται ἡ ἀνατρέχει: τάχα γὰρ
ἀν τε καὶ ἐν τούτων λάβομεν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν, ἢ
εἰ μὲν ἦν ἐνδότως, ὡστε τὸ μεταλλομένος ἔχειν
πάσην ἡμί, τάχα ἂν τῷ τειν ἀπολλυόμεθα: εἰ δὲ
τῶν ἐνέργεια ὡς οὐκ ἐπείρασε γὰρ ἂν καὶ
ἐχεῖτο εἰσὶν πλῆκτος ἢ ὡς τὸ παρὰ τὸν ἐνεργοὺς ἐπεμβάλετο—οὐκ ἂν ἀπολλυόμεθα μένοις, ἐν
ἐποιεσθα διὸ τοῦ φωτίζοντος, μεταλλωμένοι δὲ ἐν
ἐλλο ἐστὶ τόπῳ ὡς ἐναρκοῦσι, ἢ μετατροπαῖς
γεγομένοις, ἀλλὰ ὡς τὴν ἐνεργείαν ἐκεῖνον οὕσης.
8 καὶ παραγωγοῦσι, εἴς ὃιν καλλίτε λίθον. εἰ δὲ
καὶ εἰ πολλαπλασία ἡ ἀπόστασις ἢ τὸ ὅν ἢ ὡς
πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοῖς ἠλιοῦ, ἢ ὡς καὶ μέχρι ἐκεῖ φῶς
μηδὲνος κυκλώσεις μηδὲ ἐμποδίζων ἐν τῷ μεταβὰ
ἰσταμένον. ἕστο δὲ ἢ μὲν εἰ μόνῳ ἐνεργείαν καὶ ὡσ

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are it now the luminosity of air which generates
the light, but air, being mixed with earth, makes it
dark and not genuinely pure: so that it is like saying
that something sweet exists if it is mixed with
something bitter. But if someone says that light is
a modification of air, one must reply that the actual
air would have to be modified by the modification,
and its darkness would be altered and cease to be
dark. But now the air stays as it is, as if it was not
affected at all. But an affection must belong to that
of which it is an affection: light therefore is not the
colour of air either, but exists independently. Air
is [simply] present. And so let us conclude this
enquiry.

7. But does light perish or return to its source?
For perhaps from this too we could gain something
which would contribute to the solution of our
previous problem. Now if it entered into what
participated in it, so that this possessed it as its own,
perhaps one would have said that it perished; but
if it is an activity which does not flow away—for
if it was, more of it would overflow all round and
pour into the interior of the recipient than reached
the recipient from the source of activity—it would not
perish as long as the luminary remained in existence.
But if the luminary moves, the light is in another
place, not as if it flowed back or changed the course
of its flow, but because the activity belongs to the
luminary and becomes present in so far as there is
no obstacle. For even if the distance between us
and the sun was many times greater than it is, light
would extend over that further distance if there was
no obstacle or obstruction standing in between.
But the activity within the luminous body, which is

2 Kleist (loc. cit., B-T: αναγράφομεν Ἐπι, a.)
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like its life, is greater and is a kind of source and origin of its [outer]ward activity; that which is outside the limits of the body, an image of that within, is a second activity which is not separated from the first. For each thing that exists has an activity, which is a likeness of itself, so that while it exists that likeness exists, and while it stays in its place the likeness goes far out, sometimes a longer, sometimes a lesser distance; and some activities are weak and dira, and some even indiscernible, but other things have greater activities which go far; and when an activity goes far, one must think that it is there where the active and powerful thing is, and again there at the point it reaches. As for eyes, one can see what happens when animals have luminous eyes, and their light is also outside the eyes; and with animals which have compressed fire within them, and when they expand, in the darkness, the fire shines outside them, and when they contract there is no light outside, neither has it perished, but it either is outside or is not outside.¹ What then? Has it gone in? Now, it is not outside because the fire is not reaching to the outside, but has gone into the inside. Has the light itself, then, gone in too? No, but only the fire; but when it has gone in the rest of the body is in front of it, so that its activity does not reach the outside. The light from bodies, therefore, is the external activity of a luminous body; but the light

¹ Plotinus speaks of the light within the eyes, which sometimes flashes from them, in V. 5. 7. 24 ff. (a comparison for the internal contemplation of Intellect). Aristotle speaks briefly of the phenomenon of phosphorescence (mentioning luminous fish and fungi and eyes which shine in the dark) in 330

De Anima B 7 415a2–6; Plotinus may be using this passage here or a Peripatetic commentary on it.
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in bodies of this kind, bodies, that is, which are primarily and originally of this kind, is altogether substance, corresponding to the form of the primarily luminous body. When a body of this kind together with its matter enters into a mixture, it gives colour; but the activity by itself does not give colour, but only, so to speak, tints the surface. Since it belongs to something else and is, one might say, dependent on it, and what separates itself from this something else separates itself from its activity. But one must consider light as altogether incorporeal, even if it belongs to a body. Therefore “it has gone away” or “it is present” are not used of it in their proper sense, but in a different way, and its real existence is as an activity. For the image in a mirror must also be called an activity: that which is reflected in it acts on what is capable of being affected without flowing into it; but if the object reflected is there, the reflection too appears in the mirror and it exists as an image of a coloured surface shaped in a particular way; and if the object goes away, the mirror-surface no longer has what it had before, when the object seen in it offered itself to it for its activity. But with soul also, in so far as it is an activity of another prior soul, as long as the prior soul remains, so does the dependent activity. But suppose someone says that it is not an activity, but the product of an activity, as we said that the life was which belongs to the body already, just like the light which has form. The doctrine of the incorporeality of light is not very much stressed by Plotinus, and seems to have been of only moderate importance to him; but it did provide a justification (if he felt he needed one) for his very free use of the symbolic language of light when speaking of spiritual activity.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 5.

τὸ ἀναμεμομεμένον ἤδη τοὺς σώματας; ἢ ἄνταθα
55 τῶς καὶ συμμεμφύθαι τὸ ποιοῦ τὸ χρώμα. ἐπὶ δὲ
tῆς ζωῆς τῆς τοῦ σώματος τί; ἢ παρακειμένης
ψυχής ἅλλης ἐχει. ὅταν οὖν τὸ σῶμα φθορῆ—οὐ γὰρ
dὴ ψυχῆς τῷ ἁμορφῷ δύσαναι εἶναι—φθειρομένου
οὖν τοῦ σώματος καὶ οὐκ ἐπιρρούσῃ αὐτῷ οὕτω
60 τὸς δούλης αὐτῷ εἰ τε παράκειται, πῶς ἀν ἐν ἑαυτῇ
μένῳ; τῆς οὖν, ἐξήλθῃ αὕτη; ἢ οὐδὲ αὐτῆς
εἰκόνοιν γὰρ ἐκλείμφεσιν καὶ τοῦτο ὧνκετε δὲ
ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ μόνον.

8. Εἰ δὲ εἰς σῶμα ἔξω τοῦ σώματος, καὶ οἷς τις
ἐντεθαιρ αὐθεντικος καλῶς εἰς τὸ ξύπνον, ἢ ἐν
θεάσατο τι τι μὴ συμπαθεῖ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, εἰ τὸ
sυμπαθεῖ οὐκ ἔχει διὰ τὴν ζωὴν ἑαυτῆς φύσιν; η ὃ
to συμπαθεῖ διὰ τοῦ ζωῆς τὰ αἴανα και τὰ
αισθήματα, καὶ αἰσθήματα όσα ἑαυτῷ, εἰ μὴ τῷ
σώματι τοῦτο τὸ ἔξω μέρος τοῦτο τοῦ ζωῆς: εἰ γὰρ
eἰπ, τἀκα χάριν, οὐ κατὰ χάριν, σῶμα ἢ
κεχρυσμένον καὶ τὰς ἄλλα πολλὰς ἄρτι, οὕτω
tο ἐνταῦθα, ὡμοιώθητι ὃν τῷ ἀργαλῷ; ἢ οὐδὲ
10 αὐτῷ, εἰ ἔρημη οὐ πολύζεις: εἰ μὴ τοῦ τούτῳ γε
αιτή τὴν ὑπάλληλα εἰσέλθῃ περίπου ἄτοπον εἶναι
λέγων, εἰ μὴ χρώμα ὑπέκειται ὡς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλα
καὶ ἄλλα αἰσθήματα τῶν αἰσθήματος σαφῶς
οὐκ ἐνεργήσουσιν πρὸς αὐτά. ἄλλα τὸ ἄτοπον
τοῦτο, πάθει δὲ φαίνεται, φήμασιν. ην ὃν ἐνταῦθα

ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL III

already been mixed with bodies? Now in this case
there is colour because that produces which has
been mixed with the bodies. But what about the
life of the body? It has it because there is another
soul close by it. When, therefore, the body perishes
—for nothing can exist without a share of soul—when
the body, then, is perishing and neither the soul
which gave it life nor any neighbouring soul is
sufficient [to avert its destruction] how could the life
still remain? Well, then, has this life perished?
No, certainly not; for this too is the image of an
irradiation: it is simply no longer there.

8. But if there was a body outside the heavenly
sphere and there was an eye looking from our universe
with nothing to obstruct its vision, would it see what
would not be sympathetically connected with our
universe, if as things are sympathetic connection is
due to the nature of a single living being? No if
sympathetic connection is due to the fact that per-
ceiving subjects and perceived objects belong to a
single living thing, there would be no perception,
unless this outside body was part of our [universal]
living being: for if it was, there would perhaps be
perceptions of it. But suppose it was not a part,
but a body which was coloured and had the other
qualities like those of a body in this world, and so
had the appropriate form for the organ of vision?
No, it would not be perceived even so, if our
hypothesis is correct: unless those were to try to
destroy the hypothesis by saying that it will be
absurd if the sight does not see a colour when it is
present, and if the other senses, when their objects
are presented to them, do not exercise their activities
in relation to them. But we shall state the origin
15 ἐν ἔν ὡς τε καὶ ἑνὸς ταῦτα ποιοῦμεν καὶ πάσχομεν. τότε οὖν σκέπτεσθαι, εἰ παρὰ τοῦτο, καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτάρκεια δεδεικτεῖ: εἰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ δὲ ἄλλων δεκτεῖν. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔσον ὅτι συμμετέχει αὐτῷ, δῆλον· καὶ εἰ ἐν ἔσον, ἀρκεῖ νῦν καὶ τὰ μέρη. ἢ ἐνὸς ἔσον. ἀλλ' εἰ δὲ ὁμοιότητα τις λέγοι;

20 ἀλλ' ἡ ἀντιληψις κατὰ τὸ ἔσον καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὅτι τὸν ὑμοῦσα μετέχει τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ γὰρ ὀργανόν ὑμοῦσα αὐτῶν· ὡστε ἡ αἴσθησις ψυχῆς ἀντιληψις ἔσται δὲ ὀργανῶν ὑμοῦσα τοῦ ἀντιληπτοῦ. τῶν οὖν ἔσον ὃν ἀληθεύτηται μὲν χ' τῶν ἔν αὐτῷ, τῶν δὲ

ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL. III

are "like" and "unlike"; so that since it has these oppositions in itself it is no hypothesis at all. For, besides, it asserts that the soul is in this other universe, so that it postulates something which is "all" and "not-all" and "other" and "not-other", and "nothing" and "not-nothing" and "perfect" and "not-perfect". So the hypothesis must be dismissed, as it is not possible to investigate the consequence of it by destroying its foundation in the very investigation.\footnote{Plotinus in this chapter draws an extreme logical conclusion from his doctrine that perception is due to the sympathy which unites the parts of the great living organism which is the physical universe. Taking up the (to him completely fantastic) suggestion made in ch. 3 that there might be another universe outside this one, he argues that, even if our universes had an eye on its outside, it could not see the other one because it would be outside the universal sympathy which causes perception; the two universes would be distinct organisms with different and unconnected souls. Plotinus does not seem to advert here to his discussion in IV. 3. 1-5, of which the conclusion is that the hypostasis Soul, of which all souls are parts, is not identical with the Soul of the universe, which is a partial soul like our souls (though of greater power and dignity). If he had done so, he would have had to consider the possibility that there might be two (or more) such partial souls of distinct universes, united by sympathy as being parts in some sense of the hypostasis Soul. But the unity and unicity of the physical universe was a dogma so firmly held and passionately defended in late antiquity that this line of thought probably never occurred to him.}
IV. 6. ON SENSE-PERCEPTION AND MEMORY

Introductory Note

This little treatise is a later supplement to the great treatise on the soul which it immediately follows in the Ennead arrangement. Plotinus is, as always, concerned to show that perceiving and remembering are activities of the soul, and that soul is not a quasi-corporeal thing which passively receives stamps or impressions from sense-objects and then stores them up in its memory.

Synopsis

The expression theory of sense-perception fails to correspond with the facts of sense-experience (ch. 1). The soul is active, not passive, exercising its power of knowing in its acts of sense-perception, as it does to a higher degree in its knowledge of intelligible reality (ch. 2). Memory again is the exercise of a power, which can be strengthened by training and varies in different people (ch. 3).
IV. 6. (41) ΠΕΡΙ ΑΙΣΘΗΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΜΝΗΜΗΣ

1. Τις αισθήσεις οὐ τυπώσεις οὐδ' έναφραγίας
λέγοντες εν ψυχῇ γιγνόμεθα, οὐδὲ τάς μνήμας
πάντως τε καὶ αισθανόμεθα ἑρμῆς κατοχῆς
μαθημάτων καὶ μνήμην ἵνα τοῦ τύπου
5 μείωσις εν τῇ ψυχῇ, δι' μηδὲ τῷ τρῶτον ἐγένετο,
δι' τοῦ αὐτῶν λόγου ἐν εἴδώλει, ἡ ἐγγένεσθαι
tε τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ μένειν, εἰ μημονεύσοντα, ἡ τό
ἔτερον ὁποτερον μη δίδοτα μη διδὼν μηδὲ
θάτερον. δοκεῖ δὲ λέγομεν μερίστερον, ἐνοχῶς
ἐγκακώς
τοῖς τρήτοις ἐκτέρου, ἔπειθ᾽ οὕτω τῷ
τούτῳ τοῦ αἰσθήτου ἐγγένεσθαι φαρέων τῇ ψυχῇ
καὶ τυπῶσαι αὐτῆς, οὕτω τῷ μνήματι λέγομεν εἶναι
τοῦ τύπου ἐμείναινυ. εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνορμη-
τάτης αισθήσεως Θεοῦ ὁμοίως τῷ σωματίου,
νάχ᾽ ἀκαταμάχους ἐκατέρως μημονεύσοντα
tο αὐτὸ ἐξερήσαμεν ἀν τῷ ἐγκακώς.

15 δόθησα ἐν πρώτῳ, οὐ τις αἰσθήτως οὕτω τὸ ὁμοίως
ἢ ἐφαγεῖν ἑκῆ ὁμοίως καὶ τῷ ὁμοίῳ προσβάλλεσθαι,
οὔ τι δρέπαν ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ἑκῆς θεούς, ἐκατέρως
διὸς ὑποτευνίζετε τῇ ἐνορμητάτῃ γνωμήνυς καὶ πρὸς τῷ
ἐξω τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπικούρευναι, ἐντὸς μηδένος, ὁμοῖος

1 Cp. Aristotle De Memoria I. 450a30-32 for the doctrine here rejected.
2 The phrase comes from Plato Phaedrus 260D2.
ON SENSE-PERCEPTION AND MEMORY

been or is being imprinted on it, nor has it yet received a seal-stamp, like the mark of a seal-ring on wax. For there would have been no need for it to look outwards, if it already had in it the form of the visible object since it saw by this entrance into it of the impression. And when the soul adds the distance to what it sees and says how far it is looking at it from, could it in this way be seeing as distant what was in it and not separated from it by any interval? And how would it be able to state the size as it is outside or say that it is large, to state for instance the size of the sky, when it would be impossible for as large an impression to be inside it? Most important of all: if we received impressions of what we see, there will be no possibility of looking at the actual things we see, but we shall look at images and shadows of the objects of sight, so that the objects themselves will be different from the things we see. But in general, just as it is said that it is not possible to look at a visible object if one puts it on the pupil of the eye, but one must move it away to see it, so much more, one should transfer this to the soul. For if we placed in it the impression of the visible object, that in which the impression was stamped could not see the sight: for that which sees and that which is seen must be two [distinct things]. That which sees, then, must be a distinct thing seeing the impression situated else-

1 In V. 5. 1. 17-18, where Plotinus is contrasting sense-perception with the immediate intuition of Intellect, he says that in sense-perception we do only see an image of the thing, not the thing itself.
ON SENSE PERCEPTION AND MEMORY

where, but not in that in which that which sees it is. The seeing, then, cannot be of an object situated where the seeing is, but of something not situated there.

2. If, then, it is not like this, how does it work? [The soul] speaks about things which it does not possess: this is a matter of power, not of being affected in some way but of being capable of and doing the work to which it has been assigned. This is the way, I think, in which a distinction is made by the soul between what is seen and what is heard, not if both are impressions, but if they are not by nature impressions or affections, but activities concerned with that which approaches [the soul]. But we must not believe that each particular power [of perception] can come to know its object unless it is struck by it, and make it be affected by the object near it instead of coming to know it, though it has been appointed to master it, not to be mastered by it. One should suppose that the same kind of process takes place in the case of hearing: the impression is in the air, and is a sort of articulated stroke, like letters written on the air by the maker of the sound; but the power and the substance of the soul does something like reading the impressions written on the air when they come near and reach the point at which they can be seen. And where taste and smell are concerned, there are some affections, but all [tastings and smellings] that are perceptions of them and judgments are acts of knowledge of the affections distinct from the affections themselves. But the

1 The pre-eminence of sight, the “clearest sense” (op. p. 321, n. 2), in Greek psychological thought is well illustrated by this casual use of sight-language to describe hearing.
knowledge of intelligible objects is much freer from affections and impressions: sense-objects are observed from outside, but the Intelligibles in reverse come out, one can say, from within; and they are activities in a higher degree and more authentically: for the object belongs to the knowledge, and the knowledge in its active exercise is each of its objects. But we discuss elsewhere\(^1\) whether the soul sees itself as two and as another, but Intellect is one, or whether both the dualities are one.

3. But now that we have said this [about sense-perception] we must next speak about memory; first we must say that it is not astonishing, or rather it is astonishing, but we should not disbelieve that the soul has a power of this kind, if it receives nothing itself and contrives an apprehension of what it does not have. For it is the rational principle of all things, and the nature of soul is the last and lowest rational principle of the Intelligibles and the beings in the intelligible world, but first of those in the whole world perceived by the senses.\(^2\) Therefore it is certainly in relation with both; by the power of the one it flourishes and gains new life, by the power of the others it is deceived by their likeness and comes down as if charmed. But, being in the middle, it perceives both, and is said to think the Intelligibles when it arrives at memory of them, if it comes to be near them; for it knows them by being them in a way: for it knows, not because they settle in it, but because it has them in some way and sees them and is them in a rather dim way, and becomes them more clearly out of the dimness by

\(^1\) The reference is probably to V. 6. 1–2.

\(^2\) The idea of Soul as the intermediary logos, the lowest principle in the intelligible world which is first in the world of sense because it expresses the intelligible there as far as it can, is frequent in Plotinus (and in general in the Platonists and Platonically-influenced thought of late antiquity): cp. in this Ennead, for Soul as in the lowest region of the intelligible IV. 4. 2. 17, and for Soul as the link between the two worlds IV. 8. 7.
Πλοτινος: Εννεάδα ΙV. 6.

εκ δυνάμεως είς ἐνέργειας ἴναι. τά δ’ αλαβάρτα τών αὐτῶν τρόπων οὐκοι συμβαίνει καὶ ταύτα παρ’ αὐτής οὖν ἐκλέγοντες ποιεῖ καὶ πρὸ ὁμάτων εἶναι ἐγγάζεται ἐνόησεν ὁδός καὶ πρὸ οὗν ὁδοιώσης πρὸς αὐτῇ τής δυνάμεως. ὅταν τοῖνοι ῥεσβή

20 πρὸς ὁποίων τών φανάτων, ὄσπερ πρὸς παρὰ διά-

κειται εὐποίησιν καὶ ὅσοι μᾶλλον, τόσοι ἄλλ.’

διό καὶ τὰ παθήματα μημονευοῦν λέγεται μᾶλλον, ὅτι

μὴ ἀφλάται, ἀλλὰ κέιται αὐτοῖς πρὸ ὁμάτων ὡς ἄν ὄρθοιν εὐών εἰς πλῆθος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλλα.

25 οὐκ ὕπερ τοῦ πολλὰ ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ δύναμις, ὄσπερ

παραδείκτονται καὶ αὕτη μένουσιν. εἰ δὲ γε ἐμενὸν τι

τόπον, οὐκ ἄν ἐποίησε τὸ πλῆθος ἔτοι μνήμης.

ἐτε, εἰ τόποι μένουσιν, οὐκ ὑπὲρ οὗτος, ἕναν

ἀναμνησθῆναι, ὥσπερ πρότερον ἐπιλάθημεν ὡστε

τόμον ἀναμνησθῆναι καὶ ἀπὸ αὐτῆς ἀνα-


80 λογονεὶ δὲ μελέτην δηλοῖται διάμεμπτην ψυχής τό

γινομένων ὑπάρχων, ὄσπερ χειρών ἢ ποδῶν τά

γυμνάσια εἰς τά ποιεῖν ῥαδίαν, εἰ μή ἔως χειρών

η στοι κέιται, εἰληθερεύον ἑτερίς οἰκεῖοι εἰς ἀνα-

άφωσθαι, ἄλλων δὲ πολλῶν, καὶ αὕτω λέγων υἱκ

35 ἐπειδή, πολλοὶ ὄστεπον χρόνον μήμενην ἄρα; ὃι

γὰρ ἢ τίῳ μέρῃ ἐσχηκέναι πρότερον τοῦ τόπου: ἔδει

γὰρ τοῖσιν μεμνησθῆναι. ἀλλ’ οὖν ἡδαίμων γράψειν.
have to remember these; but this happens with a kind of suddenness, as the result of some later hearing or exercise. This is evidence of a calling out of the power of soul by which we remember. In that this is strengthened, either in a general way or for the specific art of remembering. But when the power of memory is present to us not only for what we have trained ourselves to remember, but men who have acquired a great deal of knowledge through being accustomed to use reports come to a point where they easily apprehend (as people say) other information, what could one say was the cause of memory if not the strengthened power? For the persistence of impressions would tell of weakness rather than power; for that which is most impossibly is so by giving way, and, since the impression is an affection, that which is more affected must remember more. But what actually occurs appears to be the opposite of this; for nowhere does exercise for any purpose make what is exercised easily affected; since with the senses also it is not what is weak, an eye for instance, which sees, but that organ which has greater power for its activity. This is why those who have grown old are weaker in perception, and in just the same way in memory. So both perception and memory are a kind of strength. Further, when sense-perceptions are not impressions, how could memories be retentions of imprints which were never made [in the soul] at all? But if memory is a power and a preparation for readiness, why do we not come to recall the same things at once, but only later? Because one needs to set up to the power, so to speak,

PILOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 6.

ON SENSE-PERCEPTION AND MEMORY

and get it ready. For we see this with the other powers, which are made ready to do what they are able to do, and effect things at once and some if they collect themselves. But the same people do not as a general rule have both good memories and quick minds, because it is not the same power in each case, just as the same man is not a good boxer and a good runner: for different characteristics dominate in different people. And yet there would be nothing to prevent a man who had any kind of superiority of soul from reading of the deposited impressions, nor would a man who had a strong inclination this way have to possess an inability to be affected and to retain the affection. And the sizelessness of soul is also evidence that soul is a power. And in general it is not surprising that anything about the soul is different from what men have supposed because they have not examined it, or from the hasty notions derived from sense-objects which occur to them and deceive them by likenesses. For they think about perception and memory as they do about letters written on tablets or pages, and neither do those who assume that the soul is a body see all the impossibilities which their hypothesis involves, nor do those who assume it to be bodiless.

1 dei. Müller.

2 deii. Müller, ut initium e lin. 71.

3 Théler (mára ἄδη) Kirchhoff**: mára Emp.
IV. 7. ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

Introductory Note

This very early treatise is more "scholastic" than any other writing of Plotinus. The greater part of it is occupied by rejections of school-positions opposed to the Platonic doctrine of the immateriality and immortality of the soul by standard arguments taken from any convenient source; and the positive exposition of Platonic doctrine has little that is originally Plotinian. Bröbier's Notice introducing the treatise gives an excellent short account of the origins of the various arguments. Those against Stoic corporealism (to the rejection of which most of the controversial part of the treatise is devoted) are Peripatetic in origin, probably derived from the De Anima of Plato, the Stoic's favourite Aristotelian author, Alexander of Aphrodisias; those against a misinterpretation (so Plotinus thinks) of the Pythagorean soul-harmony doctrine derive from Aristotle's De Anima as well as Plato's Phaedo; those against Aristotle's own entelechy-doctrine are of course Plotonic (and perhaps original), but sometimes intelligently exploit difficulties raised by Aristotle himself in the De Anima. The Epicurean position is, as usual, very summarily dismissed (at the beginning of ch. 3) with an objection of Stoic origin.

Considerable portions of the treatise were missing from the archetype of our MSS of the Enneads, but were preserved in the excerpts made by Eusebius (Præparatio Evangeliorum XV, 22 and 10). Henry and Schwyzer give precise details in Plotini Opera II. Praefatio xvii-xxii.

The awkward double numbering of chs. 88-89 is due to

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the fact that these chapters, preserved by Eusebius, were not included in the Latin translation of Plotinus, from which our chapter-numbering derives; the first printed edition to insert them was that of F. Creuzer.

Chapter 15 is an odd little appendix to the treatise, indicating cursorily the support for belief in the immortality of the soul which those who feel need this sort of thing can find in traditional religious beliefs and practices. There is no reason to doubt that it is really by Plotinus: it is quite in accordance with his normal respectfully detached attitude to traditional Hellenic religion.

Synopsis

Man is not a simple thing, but a composite of soul and body; the body perishes, but the soul, which is the real self, survives (ch. 1). The soul is not a body: refutation of the Stoic corporealist position (and, incidentally and in passing, the Epicurean) in detail (chs. 2-8). Refutation of the soul-harmony theory supposed to be held by the Pythagoreans (ch. 8). Refutation of Aristotle's theory that the soul is the body's "entelechy" or inseparable form (ch. 8). Exposition and defence of the Platonic doctrine (chs. 9-14). Those who need this sort of evidence can find support for the doctrine of immortality in oracles and the cult of the dead (ch. 15).

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IV. 7. (2) ΠΕΡΙ ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΑΣ
ΨΥΧΗΣ

1. Εἰ δὲ ἔστω ἄθανατος ἐκαστὸς ἡμῶν, ἢ φθείρεται ταύς, ἢ τὰ μὲν αὐτοὶ ἀπεισίν εἰς σκέπασιν καὶ
φθοράν, νῦ δὲ μένει εἰς αὐτό, ἀπερ ἔστω αὐτός, ἀδ' ἀν τις μάθοι κατὰ φύσαν ἑπισκοποῦμεν. ἀπλοῦν
6 μὲν δὴ τι οὐκ ἄν εἰπή ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλ' ἐστών ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχῆς, ἔχει δὲ καὶ σάμα εἰς' οὐδὲ ὑμοῖς ἂν
ἡμῶν, εἰς' οὖν ἐτέρον τρόπον προσημηνύοι. ἀλλ' οὐν διηρήθη σε ταύτη καὶ ἐκατέρω τὴν φύσιν τε
καὶ εὐσίαν καταπελτέον. τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα καὶ αὐτὸ
10 συγκείμενον οὕτω παρὰ τοῦ λόγου δύνασαι μένειν, ἢ
τε αἰσθήσεις ἢ γὰρ λυμένον τε καὶ τηκόμενον καὶ παντοθέν ἐλθόνον δεχόμενον, ἴσως τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν φθειρόμενων, φθειρότοις τοὺς ἄλλους
ἐτέρον καὶ μεταβάλλοντος εἰς ἄλλο καὶ ἀπολαύσας,
nαι μάλιστα ὅπως ψυχής ἢ φῶλα ποιέσσα μὴ παρῇ
15 τοῖς δυνασί. κἂν μικρότερον ἐκπερατιμῇ γενόμενον ἐν,
οὐκ ἔστιν, λύων δεχόμενον εἰς τοὺς μορφήν καὶ ὅλην,
ἐξ ὧν ἀνάγει καὶ τὰ ἀπλὰ τῶν σωμάτων τὰς
συστάσεις ἔχειν. καὶ μὴν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχοντα, ἀπε
σώματα διότα, συμβολοῖς τε καὶ εἰς μικρὰ ὥραν

IV. 7. ON THE IMMORTALITY
OF THE SOUL

1. One might discover as follows, by an investigation
according to the nature of the subject, whether
each individual one of us human beings is immortal,
or whether the whole human being is destroyed, or
whether some of it goes away to dispersion and de-
struction but some of it, the part which is the self,
abides for ever. Man could not be a simple thing,
but there is in him a soul, and he has a body as well,
whether it is our tool or attached to us in some other
way. But let us divide man like this, and consider
the essential nature of each part of him. The body,
certainly, is also itself a composite thing and so
cannot reasonably be supposed to last, and, besides,
our senses perceive it dissolving and wasting away
and undergoing all sorts of destructions, when each
one of its component parts moves to its own place,
and one destroys another, and changes into another
and does away with it, especially when soul, which
reconciles the parts, is not present to their material
masses. And even if one part is isolated when it
has become one, it is not really gone; since it admits
dissolution into form and matter, from which it is
necessary that even the elementary bodies should
have their composition. And besides this, since they
have size, because they are bodies, they can be
divided and broken up into little pieces and so under-
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 7.

20 μενα και ταύτη φθόρνων ἄν ὁπομενον. διότι εἰ μὲν
μέρος ἡμῶν τοῦτο, οὐ τι πᾶν ἄδανατος, εἰ δὲ
ἀργανον, έδει γε αὐτό νε νέον τινες δοθεν ποιήτου
τὴν φύσιν είναι. τὸ δὲ κυριαρχεῖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ
ἀνθρώπως, εἴπερ τοῦτο, κατὰ τὸ ἑδον ὡς πρός ἄλλον
τὰ σώμα ἢ κατὰ τὸ χρόνον ὡς πρὸς ἄργανον.
25 ἐκατέρωσ δὲ ἡ φύσις αὐτὸς.

2. Τούτω οὖν τέλει φύσιν ἔχει, ἡ σῶμα μὲν ἢ
πάντως ἀναλυθείσα, αὐτῆς γὰρ πᾶν γε σώμα.
εἰ δὲ μὴ σῶμα εἴη, ἄλλῳ φύσεως ἀλλή, κάκειν η
τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δὲ κατ’ ἄλλον ὑπεκτέναι. πρῶτον
5 δὲ σκέπτεσθαι, εἰ δὲ τὸ τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα, δὲ λέγοντι
φυσική, ὀνομάζειν. εἰπὲ γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς ἀπευθείας
εξανάγησις, αὐθεντήσι τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα, τὴν φυσικήν, εἰ
μὲν δὲ δύο συμπᾶσα, πελάτεις εἴη, ἡ ἐκατέρωσ
αὐτῶν ἡ ἐκατέρωσ σωμάτων ἐχεῖν, ἡ τὸ μὲν
ἐχεῖν, τὸ δὲ μὴ, μὴ ἐκατέρωσ εἰς ἐχεῖν. εἰ μὲν
10 δὴ ἐν αὐτῶν προσελεῖ τὸ τῆς, αὐτὸ τοῦτο δι᾽ εἰς
φυσικήν, τὸ ἐν ὧν εἴη σῶμα ἔκατον τὸν ἐχεῖν,
τὴν γὰρ καὶ ἅρα καὶ ὁδόρ καὶ γῆ ὁμοία παρὰ
αὐτῶν· διὰ τὴν πάρεσα τοῦτο σωμάτων φυσικήν,
τοῦτο ἐπίκειται τῇ σωματίσα, ἀλλὰ δὲ παρὰ σωμάτα
σώματα ὡς ἐστὶ καί σωμάτα
15 χείρας τούτων ἐκείνα, σώματα, ὁ ἅγιοι, ἢ ἐξηράνθησαν
ἐίναι οὔθεν τῶν ἔχουσαν. εἰ δὲ μηδένος αὐτῶν ἔχον,
ἔχοντος ὠς σύνοιδος τοποθέτησα τοποθέτησα, ἄπειροι—εἰ δὲ
ἐκατέρωσ τότε ἔχον, καὶ ἐν ἀρκεί—μάλλον δὲ αὐξάνα-
ται συμφύλησιν σωμάτων ἐχόντων ἐργαζόμενα καὶ νοῦν

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go destruction also in this way. So, if this body of
ours is a part of us, the whole of us is not immortal,
but if it is a tool, it must, since it was given us for a
certain time, be of a nature to last for that time.
But the other part is the most important and the
man himself; if it is this, then it is related to the
body as form to matter or user to tool; in either way,
the soul is the self.

2. What nature, then, does this have? If it is a
body, it must be completely separable into its parts,
for every body is a composite. But if it was not a
body, but of another nature, then that nature also
would have to be investigated either by the same
[analytic] method or by another. But first we must
enquire into what [constituent parts] we are to
analyse this body which they call soul. For since
life is necessarily present in soul, then of necessity
if this body, the soul, was composed of two or more
bodies, either both or all of them will have a con-
natural life, or one of them will have it and another
not, or neither or none of them will have it. Now if
life was a property of one of them, this one would
actually be the soul. What body, then, could there
be which has life of itself? For fire and air and
water and earth are lifeless of themselves; and when
soul is present to any one of them this makes use of
a borrowed life—but there are no other bodies be-
sides these. And those who hold that there are
elements other than these have maintained that
they were bodies, not souls, and that they did not
have life. But if, when no single one of them had
life, their coming together produced life, it would
be absurd (but if each one of them has life, one is
enough) or rather impossible for a drawing together
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of bodies to produce life and for mindless things to generate mind. [The holders of this theory] will not themselves assert that their elements come alive when mixed at random. There is need, therefore, of an ordering principle and a cause of the mixture; so that this would rank as soul. This is not only because body is composite, but not even a simple body could be in existence without soul being in the universe, if it is the coming of a formative principle to matter which makes body, but a formative principle could not come from anywhere except from soul. 3. But if someone says that it is not so, but that atoms or things without parts make the soul when they come together by unity and community of feeling, he could be refuted by their [mere] juxtaposition, and that not a complete one, since nothing which is one and united with itself in community of feeling can come from bodies which are without feeling and unable to be united, but soul is united with itself in community of feeling. But no body or magnitude could be produced from partless constituents. Further, if the body is simple and they are not going to assert that what is material in it has life of its self, but that what holds the rank of form brings the life; then if they are going to say that this form is a substance, it will not be the composite body but one of these constituents which will

1 The true sense of this difficult passage was seen and clearly explained by Dr. H.R. Schwyzer in his review of Hardy, Ἐπιστ. 32 (1960) 34-5.
2 After a very summary dismissal of the Epicurean position in the first six lines of the chapter, Plotinus returns here to his main corporealistic opponents, the Stoics.
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be the soul, and this one would no longer be body; for this cannot also be made of matter, or we shall separate it again [into matter and form] in the same way; but if they are going to assert that it is an affection of matter, but not a substance, they must say where the affection and the life came from into matter. For certainly matter does not shape itself or implant soul in itself. There must, then, be something which supplies life, whether it is to matter that it supplies it or to any one of the bodies, and it must be outside and transcend all bodily nature. For there would not even be any body if the power of soul did not exist. For it flows away, and its nature is transitory, and it would perish very quickly if all things were bodies, even if somebody gave one of them the name of soul. For [the body called soul] would be affected in the same way as the other bodies if they had one and the same matter. Or rather it would not even come into existence, but all things would stick [undeveloped] in matter, if there was nothing to shape it. But perhaps there would not even be any matter at all. And this universe of ours would be dissolved if one entrusted it to the conjoining power of a body, giving the rank of soul as far as names go to this body, to air and breath which is extremely liable to dispersion and does not have its unity of itself. For how, since all bodies are in process of division, if one attributed the origin of this universe to any one of them, would one not make it a mindless thing, moving at random? For what order could there be in a breath, which needs order from soul, or what reason or intelligence? But, if soul exists, all these bodies serve it for the maintenance of the world and of each individual
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living thing, with different powers from different bodies contributing to the whole; but if soul was not present in the Whole these bodies would be nothing, and certainly not in order.

4. But they themselves are driven by the truth to bear witness that there must be a form of soul prior to bodies and stronger than they are, when they state that the breath has a mind in it and the fire is intelligent, as if without fire and breath the higher part of reality could not be in existence, and as if this higher part was looking for a place to establish itself in; when they ought to be looking for is a place where they will establish body, as bodies must be established in the powers of soul. But if they hold that life and soul are nothing but the breath, what is this "character" which they are always talking about, in which they take refuge when they are compelled to posit another working principle besides bodies? If, then, not every breath is soul, because there are innumerable soulless breaths, but they are going to assert that the breath "with a certain character" is soul, they will either say that this character and this condition belongs to the class of real beings or that it does not. But if it does not, then soul would be only breath and the character would be a mere word. And so it will happen to them that they will not be saying that soul and God are anything but matter, and these will all be mere names—only that [material breath] will exist. But if the condition belongs to the class of real beings and is something else over and above the substrate and the matter, in matter but immaterial itself—because it is not again composed of matter and form—then it would be a rational principle, and not a
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body, and so a different kind of nature. And besides, it is equally obvious for the following reasons that it is impossible for soul to be any kind of body. For if it is, it is hot or cold, hard or soft, fluid or solid, black or white, and [one could mention] all the other qualities of bodies which are different in different ones. And if it is only hot, it heats, but if it is only cold, it will cool, and the light when it is present makes things light and the heavy makes them heavy; and the black will blacken, and the white will make things white. For it does not belong to fire to cool things, nor to the cold to make them hot. But the soul does different things in different living beings, and even opposite things in the same one, solidifying some and liquefying others, and making some things dense and others rarefied, making things black and white, light and heavy. But if it was a body] it ought to produce one effect according to the body’s qualities, all of them including its colour; but as it is it produces many effects.

5. But why, I ask, are the movements different, and not one, when every body has one movement? If they make choices responsible for some and rational principles for others, that is correct; but choice does not belong to body and neither do rational principles which are various, while body is one and simple and has no share in rational principle of this kind, but only as much rational principle as is given to it by what made it hot or cold. But from where could the body get the power to cause growth in season and up to a certain measure? It is proper to body to grow, but to be without the power of causing growth except as much as may be received in the mass of matter for the service of that which
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brings about growth by means of it. For if soul, being a body, was to cause growth, it would have to grow itself, obviously by the addition of similar body, if it was going to keep pace with the body it was causing to grow. And what is added will be either soul or soulless body. And if it is soul, where will it come from, and how will it get in and how is it added? But if what is added is soulless, how will this become soul and how will it come to agreement with what was there before, and be one with it and share the same thoughts with the soul which was there before, but not be like a strange soul which will be ignorant of what the other soul knows? But if, just like the rest of our [bodily] mass, some of its substance will flow away, and some of it will come from outside, and nothing will be the same, how then do we have memories, and how do friends and relations recognise each other when they never have the same souls? Then again, if soul is a body, and when the nature of body is divided into several parts each part is not the same as the whole, if soul is a particular definite size of body, which is not soul if it is smaller, as every quantity changes from its former existence by subtraction—but if one of the things which have size remains the same in quality when its mass is diminished, it is different in so far as it is body, and in so far as it is a particular size, but can retain its identity by its quality which is different from its quantity—which then are the people who assert that soul is a body going to say about this? First of all about each individual part of the soul which is in the same body: is each of them a soul in the same way as the whole is? And again, is the part of the part? If this is so, the size contri-
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...butes nothing to its essential being; and yet it ought to, if the soul is a particular size, and it is as a whole in many places; this is something of which a body cannot possibly be capable, for the same body to be as a whole in more than one place and for the part to be what the whole is. But if they are going to say that each of the parts is not a soul, their soul will consist of soulless parts. And besides, if the size of each soul is limited in both directions, that at any rate which is less [than the minimum size] will not be soul; when, therefore, from one act of intercourse and one seed twin offspring are produced or, as in other living things a great many, the scd being distributed to many parts [of the womb], and each is a complete whole, why does this not teach those who are willing to learn that, where the part is the same as the whole, this thing transcends quantity in its own essential being, and must itself be non-quantitative? For thus it would remain the same when robbed of quantity since it would not care about quantity and mass, because its own nature would be something else. The soul and rational principles, then, are without quantity.

6. But it is clear from the following arguments that if soul is a body, neither perception nor thinking nor knowing nor virtue nor anything of value must exist. If anything is going to perceive anything, it must itself be one and every object by one and the same means, both if a number of impressions are received through many sense-organs, or many qualities are perceived in one thing, or if through one sense-organ a complex thing, for example a face, is perceived. For there is not one perception of the nose and another of the eyes, but one and the
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same perception of all together. And if one perception comes through the eyes and another through hearing, there must be some one thing to which both come. Or how could one say that these sense-perceptions are different, if they did not all come together to one and the same [recipient]? This then must be like a centre, and the sense-perceptions from every quarter, lines coming together from the circumference of the circle, must reach it, and that which apprehends them must be of this kind, really one. But if this were extended, and the sense-perceptions arrived at something like the terminal points at both ends of a line, either they will run together again at one and the same point, like the middle of the line, or the two different terminal points will each have a perception of something different: (as if I perceived one thing and you another). And if the object of perception was one, a face for instance, either it will be gathered together into a unity—which is what does obviously happen: for it is gathered together in the pupils of the eyes themselves: or how could the largest things be seen through the pupil of our eye? So still more when they reach the ruling principle they will become like partless thoughts—and this ruling principle will be partitioned: or if this is the case in which we regard all objects being divided, it is not as a whole that each part would perceive a different part of the object and none of us would apprehend the perceptible thing as a whole. But the whole is one: for how could it be divided?

1 This is a Peripatetic comparison: cp. Alexander of Aphrodisias De Anima II p. 63, 8-13 Bruns.

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So equal will certainly not fit equal, because the ruling principle is not equal to every perceptible object. Into how many parts, then, will its division be? Will it be divided into a number of parts corresponding to the varied complexity of the entering sense-object? And of course each of those parts of the soul will perceive with its own subdivisions. Or will the parts of the parts be without perception? But this is impossible. But if any and every part perceives the whole, since a size is naturally capable of division to infinity, there will come to be an infinity of perceptions for each observer regarding the sense-object, like an infinite number of images of the same thing in our ruling principle. Again, since the object being perceived is a body, perception could not occur in any other way than that in which sense-impressions are imprinted in wax from seal-rings, whether the sense-objects are imprinted on blood or on air. And if this happens as it does in fluid bodies, which is probable, the impression will be obliterated as if it was on water, and there will be no memory. But if the impressions persist, either it will not be possible for others to be imprinted because the first will prevent them, so that there will be no other sense-impressions, or if others are made, those former impressions will be destroyed: so that there will be no possibility of remembering. But if it is possible to remember and to perceive one set of things after another without the previous ones hindering, it is impossible for the soul to be a body.

7. One might see this very same thing also from pain and from the perception of pain. When a man is said to have a pain in his toe, the pain is presumably in the region of the toe, but they will obviously
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agree that the perception of pain is in the region of the ruling principle.¹ Well then, though the breath or life is different from the suffering part, the ruling principle perceives that it is affected, and the whole soul is affected in the same way. How then does this happen? They will assert that it is by transmission:² first of all the soul-breath in the region of the toe is affected, and passes the affection to the part situated next to it, and this to another, until it arrives at the ruling principle. It is necessary then, if the first part when it suffered perceived the suffering, that the second part's perception should be different, if the perception is by transmission, and the third part's different again, and there would be many perceptions, even an infinite number, of one pain, and the ruling principle would perceive after all these and have its own perception over and above all these. But the truth would be that each of those perceptions would not be of the pain in the toe, but the perception next to the toe would be that the sole of the foot was suffering, and the third perception that another part higher up was, and there would be many feelings of pain, and the ruling principle would not perceive the pain in the toe but the pain in the part next to itself, and would know this alone and let the other pains go, and not understand that the toe had a pain. If then, it is not possible for the perception of this kind of thing to come about by transmission, nor for one body to have knowledge when another is affected, since body is mass—for every size has one part different from another—one must suppose that the perceiving principle is of such

¹ Vitringa: τονέματος Εἰκ., Εἰκ., Η-Θ.
² This Stoic doctrine is attacked again at IV. 2. 2. 13.
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a kind that it is everywhere identical with itself. But this action is characteristic of some other kind of reality than body.

8. It can be shown by the following arguments that it would not even be possible to think if soul was any kind of body. For if sense-perception is the soul’s apprehension of the objects of sense by making use of the body, thinking cannot be comprehension through the body, or it will be the same as sense-perception. If then thinking is apprehension without the body, it is much more necessary that what is going to do the thinking should not be body. Again, if sense-perception is of sense-objects, and thinking is of objects of thought—even if they do not like it, yet all the same there will be thoughts at least of some objects of thought and apprehensions of things without size—how then will something which is a size think what is not a size and think what is partless with something which has parts? Perhaps [it will do so] with a partless part of itself. But if what is going to do the thinking is this, it will not be a body: for there is no need of the whole for touching: contact at one point is enough.1 If then they are going to agree that the primary thoughts, as is true, are of the objects most completely free from body, of absolute individual reality, then what thinks must know these objects by being or becoming free of body. But if they are going to say that thoughts are of the forms in matter, yet these thoughts come to be by the separation from them of the bodies,

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1 This is again an argument of Aristotle: cf. De Anima A 407a15–22. Plotinus does not appear to have noticed that it is directed against Plato (against a literal interpretation of the “soul-circles” of Timaeus 365b–370a).
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and it is mind which separates them. For the separation of "circle" and "triangle" and "line" and "point" is certainly not carried out with the help of flesh, or in general of matter. The soul, then, must separate itself from body in this kind of (abstractive) thinking.

But nobility and justice are also, I think, without size; so, then, is thinking about them. So that when they come to it, our thought will receive them in its partlessness and they will remain in it as partless. But how, if the soul is a body, could its virtues exist, self-control and justice and courage and the rest? For self-control or justice or courage would be a kind of breath or blood, unless courage was the breath’s lack of susceptibility to affectation, and self-control the well-balanced mixture of its elements, and beauty a kind of shapeliness in impressions, by which we say when we see them that people are fresh and young and beautiful in body. Now it might be appropriate to strength and beauty to consist in impressions on the breath: but what does breath need self-control for? Would it not rather find its comfort in embroiling and touching, where it will be warmed or have a moderated desire to be cool, or come close to soft, delicate, smooth things? But what would it care about disbursement according to worth? But does the soul attain the objects of its contemplation of the virtues and other intelligible things as eternal, or does virtue just happen to someone, benefit them and perish again? But who is it who makes it happen, and where does it come from? For if there is something which

\footnote{An allusion to Odyssey 10. 555.}
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makes it happen, that again would abide. The virtues, then, are required to be eternal and abiding, like the objects of geometry. But if they are eternal and abiding they are not bodies. That, therefore, in which they are must be of the same kind: therefore it cannot be a body. For the whole nature of body does not abide, but flows away.

8\(^{1}\) But if when they see the actions of bodies heating and cooling and pushing and weighing down they rank the soul with them and in a kind of way establish it in a field of action, first of all they are ignorant that bodies themselves do these things by the bodiless powers in them; and then that these are not the powers which we consider to belong to the soul, but thinking, perceiving, reasoning, desiring, supervising, intelligently and well,\(^{2}\) which all require another kind of being. By transferring, therefore, the powers of bodiless realities to bodies, they leave nothing for the bodiless. But that bodies are able to do what they can do by bodiless powers is obvious for the following reasons. They will agree that quality is different from quantity, and that every body is of a certain quantity, and that not every body is of a certain quality, as matter is not. But in admiring this they will also admit that quality in being different from quantity is different from body. For how without being of a

1 This list of powers of soul may be influenced by the list of soul-movements in Plato Laws X. 867A1-4, but the resemblance is not very close. Plato’s list is neutral and comprehensive: bad as well as good soul-movements are included. In Plotinus’s more conventional list there are only good powers, if the reading of the MSS of Eusebius makes in line 8 is accepted, as it is now by Henry and Schweizer, and has generally been by editors of Eusebius and Plotinus.
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certain quantity could it be a body, if every body is of a certain quantity? And further, as I think was said above, if every body and every mass ceases to be what it was before when divided, but when a body is broken up the same quality remains complete in every piece, as for instance the sweetness of the honey is no less sweetness in every fragment, sweet-ness could not be a body, and the same is true of the other qualities. Then again, if the powers were bodies, it would be necessary for the strong powers to be large masses, and the ones which could do little, small masses. But if the powers of large masses are small, but even the smallest masses have great powers, action must be attributed to something other than size: to something sizeless, therefore. And the fact that matter remains the same, being, as they say, a body, but does different things when it acquires qualities, makes clear that what it acquires are immaterial and bodiless rational principles. And they must not say that [soul is a body because] living things die when breath or blood leaves them. For it is not possible for living things to exist without them, or without a great many other things, none of which is soul. And further, neither does breath pervade the whole body nor does blood, but soul does.

38. Again, if soul was a body and possessed the whole body, it would be mixed with it in the way in which other bodies are intermixed. But if the mixture of bodies allows none of the bodies which are mixed to exist in actuality, the soul would not be actually present in bodies either, but only potentially, and would lose its existence as soul, just as, if sweet and bitter are mixed, the sweet does not
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exist; we shall not then have a soul. But if it is a body and is mixed with the body "whole through whole" so that wherever the one is, the other is also, with both bodies also occupying an equal amount of space, and if no increase takes place when the other one is inserted, this will leave nothing indivisible. For mixture is not by large parts placed side by side—for in this way [the Stoics] say it will be juxtaposition [not mixture]—but what is inserted penetrates through every part, even if it is smaller—this is impossible, for the less to be equal to the greater—but, anyhow, in penetrating it all it divides it everywhere; it is necessary therefore, if it divides it at every geometrical point, and there is no body in between which is not divided, that the division of the body must be into geometrical points, which is impossible. But if this is so, since the division is infinite—for whatever body you take is divisible—the infinity of parts will exist not only potentially but actually. It is impossible therefore for one body to penetrate another whole through whole; but soul penetrates through whole bodies, therefore it is immortal.

3 But as for saying that the same breath was growth-principle before, but when it got into the cold and was tempered because soul, since it becomes rarefied in the cold...
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they assert that growth-principle is prior to soul which comes into existence because of external happenings. So they find themselves making the worse first, and before this another of less good quality, which they call "character", and intellect last, obviously originating from the soul. Now if Intellect is before all things, then they ought to have made soul come next to it, then growth-principle, and have made what comes after always worse, as is the natural state of affairs. If then God (conceived as Intellect) is for them posterior and generated and has his intelligence as something brought in from outside, it would be possible for neither soul nor intellect nor God to exist. If the potential, without the prior existence of what is actual and of Intellect, were to come into existence it could not attain to actuality. For what will be the principle which will bring it there if there is not one different from and prior to itself? But if it is going to bring itself to actuality, which is absurd, all the same it will bring itself by looking to something, which will exist not potentially, but actually; though, if the potential is to have the property of always remaining the same, it will bring itself to actuality corresponding to itself, and this will be better than that which is potential, as it is the potential's desired objective. The better, which has a nature different from body, and always exists in potentiality, is therefore prior: so intellect and soul are prior to growth-principle. Soul, then, is not like breath or like body. But that soul should not be called a body has been proved by others with different arguments, but these too are sufficient.

But since it is of another nature, we must

PLATO: ENNEAD IV. 7.

κατὰ συντλήρας τὰς ἕξω γυναικεῖς. 1 συμβаίνει οὖν αὐτοὺς τὸ χαίρεν πρῶτον ποιεῖν καὶ πρὸ τοῦτον ἄλλη ἔλασσον, ἢ λέγουσαν ἔξω, ὅ δὲ νοῦς ὑποτέσσαρα ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς θηλαστὰ γενόμενος. ἢ εἰ σὺρε
tὸ πάντων νοσί, ἐφέξεκα ἔδωκεν ψυχὴν τοιούτην, ἐστατίσεως, καὶ αἰέτε τὸ ὑπερτέρον χειρόν, ἦπερ πέφυκεν. εἰ οὖν καὶ ὁ θεός αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὸν νοῦν ὑπερτέρος καὶ γεννητός καὶ ἐπακτόν τὸ νοῶν ἔχων, ἐνδόξοντο ἐν μηθε ἐνψυχήν μηθε νοῦν μηθε θεόν εἰσι. εἰ τὸ 
δυνάμεις, μὴ ὁπλικός πρότερον τοῦ ἐνέργειας καὶ νοῦ, 
γένοστο, οὐδὲ ἦξει εἰς ἐνέργειαν. τί γὰρ ἔσται τὸ 
ἄγων μὴ ὁπλικὸς ἐντός παρ' αὐτὸ πρότερον; εἰ δ' 
αὐτὸ ἦξεν εἰς ἐνέργειαν, ὑπὲρ ἀποτομῆς, ἀλλὰ 
βλέπων γε πρὸς τι ἢξεν, ὅ νοῦν δυνάμεις ἐνέργειας 
δὲ ἦρα. κατὰ τὸ ἀεὶ μένων τῶν αὐτὸ εἰστερ 
δυνάμεις ἦξεν, καθ' ἐναντίον εἰς ἐνέργειας ἢξεν, καὶ 
τὸ πάντοτε κραῖττον ἦσαν τοῦ δυναμείου ὕπον ὄρεκτον 
ἐν ἑκάστω. πρότερον ἄρα τὸ κραῖττον καὶ ἐπάλλα 
φώνοι ἔχων σώματος καὶ ἐνεργείαν ἃ ἐαὶ πρότερον 
ἄρα καὶ νοῦ καὶ ψυχήν φύσεως. οὖν ἄρα ὡς 
ψυχή ὧς σωμάτων ὁδὸν σώματος ἡ ἡσυχασσάν ἃ ἐν 
καὶ ὕψωτα καὶ ἄλλος ἐνέργας.

84. "ὅταν δὲ ἄλλης φύσεως, δέτι ἔρθεσθι, τίς αὐτη.

enquire what this nature is. Is it, then, something different from body, but belonging to body, like its tuning? For, though the Pythagoreans meant this term, tuning, in another sense, people thought it was something like the tuning of strings. For just as here, when the strings are stretched, they come to be affected in a kind of way, and this being affected is called being in tune, in the same way, since our body also consists of a mixture of dissimilar parts, the mixture of a particular kind produces life and soul, which is the way of being affected which comes upon the mixture. But many arguments have already been brought against this view to show that it is impossible: they are, that the soul is the prior and the tuning subsequent to it, and that this prior reality rules and directs the body and fights it in many ways, but the soul would not do this if it was being in tune; and that the prior reality is a substance, but being in tune is not a substance, and that the mixture of bodies of which we consist, when it was in proportion, would be health [not soul]; and that in each part, which is mixed in a different way, there would be a different soul, so that there would be many; and what is certainly the greatest difficulty of all, that it is necessary that there should be another soul before this soul producing this being in tune, as with musical instruments there is the player who brings the strings into tune and has a proportion in himself according to which he will tune them. For neither can the strings nor the bodies here bring themselves into tune, by themselves. And in general these people also make ensouled things out of soulless, and things casually arranged out of things in disorder, and do not make order arise from
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...the soul, but say that the soul has received its existence from a chance arrangement. But this cannot happen either in parts or wholes. The soul, then, is not being in time.

84. One might investigate the question of how the term “entelechy” could be applied to the soul in the following way: [the Peripatetics] assert that the soul in the composite being holds the rank of form in relation to the ensouled body as matter, but is not the form of every kind of body, and not of body simply as body, but of a “natural organic body which has life potentially.” If then it is assimilated to the body by being applied to it, as the form of the statue is to the bronze, then when the body was divided the soul would be separated into parts along with it, and when a part was cut off there would be a bit of soul with the cut-off piece of body, and the withdrawal in sleep would not take place, if the entelechy must be firmly fixed where it is—but in fact there could not even be sleep; further, if the soul was an entelechy there could be no opposition of reason to desire, but the whole would be affected throughout in one and the same way without disagreeing with itself. But perhaps it would only be possible for sense-perceptions to occur, but thoughts would be impossible. For this reason [the Peripatetics] themselves introduce another soul or intelligence, which they assume to be immortal. The reasoning soul, therefore, must be an entelechy in some sense other than this, if one really ought to use the name. And the perceiving soul, if this also possesses the impressions of absent sense-objects, keep the MSS text, rather illogically qualified the body, which is matter to the soul as form, as ἐνέλεξεν in line 3.

1 This is a slightly paraphrased version of Aristotle De Anima B1, 412b27–b1. The MSS of Enneads here read ὑφηγόντοι for Aristotle’s ὑφηγόντο and Solvay suggests that this could just possibly be a slip of Plotinus himself (who, if we
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20 τοὺς τύπους ἔχει, αὐτὸς οὐ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἃρα ἔχει· εἰ δὲ μὴ σώματος, ἔνασται ως μορφαί καὶ εἰκόνες· ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον ἄλλος δέχεσθαι, εἰ σώματι ἐνείην, οὐκ ἀρα ως ἀρχώριστος ἐνετέλεσε. καὶ μὴν οὐδέ τοῖς ἐνετόμοις, μὴ σοιών μηδὲ ποτῶν

20 ἀλλ' ἄλλων μερῶν τὰ τοῦ σώματος, οὕτως λόγος ἀρχώριστος ἐνετέλεσε. λοιπὸν δὲ τὸ φυτικὸν ἂν εἶν, ὃ ζωομομομεν καὶ δοξεῖται έχειν, μὴ τοὺς τῶν τρόπων ἐνετέλεσιν ἀρχώριστος γ.' ἀλλ' οὕτως τοῦτο φαίνεται σώματος έχειν. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ πατῶν φωτός περὶ τὴν ῥίζαν καὶ αὐλοκομίαν τοῦ ἄλλου

30 σώματος περὶ τὴν βίωσιν καὶ τὰ κατὰ ῥίζαν ὑπὸ τῶν φυτῶν ἡ ψυχή, δὴ λοιπὸν ὁτι οἱ ἀπολαύσας τὰ ἄλλα μὴρ ἐν τὶς κυκλάμινα· οὐκ ἄρα ἂν ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ ἔνας ἀρχώριστος ἐνετέλεσε. καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ πρὸν αὐξήθηκαν τὰ φυτῶν εἰς τὴν ἀλααγὰς ἰδεσμον. εἰ οὖν καὶ εἰς ἄλλον ἐξεταίρον ἐκ μέλλονος φυτῶν καὶ

35 ἐξ ἀλαγῆς ἐπὶ τὸν κωδὼν καὶ ἄλοιψ χρυσάνθεως; πῶς δὲ ἢ τὸ ἄλοιπον αὐτὸ μερῶν τοῦ σώματος ἐνετέλεσιν γένετο; ἢ τῇ ἀκτῇ ψυχῆς ἐξ ἀλλῶν ἔργων ἄλλων γένετο; πῶς οὖν ἡ τοῦ πρώτου τῶν ἐφεξῆ ἄν γένοετο, εἰ ἂν ἐνετέλεσιν εἶναι; οὕτως φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο ἰκ τῶν μεταβαλλόμεναι ἔργων εἰς ἄλλα

40 ζῶα. οὐκ ἂν τῷ εἴδος εἶναι τῶν τὸ ἐχεῖ ἁν, ἀλλ' ἄκριται, οὐκ ἂν τὸ ἄλλο εἴδος ἦρθε· τὸ ἄλλο εἰς αὐτόν ἐφέξ. ἂλλ' οὖν σοι καὶ σοῦν γενέσθαι ἢ σωματίζον εὔ σοι πάσης τῆς ψυχῆς

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will therefore hold them without the assistance of the body; but if this is not so, they will be present in it as shapes and images; but it would be impossible for it to receive other impressions if they were in it in this way. It is therefore not in the body as an inseparable entelechy. Furthermore, not even that which desires, not fuel and drink but other things besides those of body, can be an inseparable entelechy. There would remain the growth-principle, and there might seem to be some possibility of questioning whether this might not be an inseparable entelechy in this sense. But even this is clearly not so. For if the principle of every plant is in the region of the root, and when the rest of the body of the plant withers up, in many plants the soul [something] in the region of the root and the lower parts, it is obvious that it has left the other parts and gathered itself together into one: it was not, then, in the whole as an inseparable entelechy. And again, before the plant grows, the soul is in the small bulk [of the root]. If then the soul passes into a small root from a larger plant and from a small root to the whole plant, what prevents it from being completely separated? But also, how when it is without parts could it become the entelechy of a body with parts? And the same soul belongs to one living thing after another: how then could the soul of the first become the soul of that which comes next, which it was the entelechy of one? (This is obvious from the change of living things into other living things.) If so, the soul, therefore, does not have its existence by being the form of something, but it is a substance which does not derive its existence from its foundation in body, but exists before belonging to this particular body. What then is its

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gennásei. 1 tis ón ón koutí kai; ei dé káthe sàma, káthe páthos sàmatos, πράξει δέ καὶ
ποιέως, καὶ πολλά καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ζῇ αὐτῇ, οὐκαὶ παρὰ τὰ sàmatà ὑδά τοῖς τῆς ἐστὶν; ἡ
dèlèn πρὸ τί δὲ ἡμεῖς ὑπὸν ὑπὸν ὑπάνει. τὸ μὲν
génës, ἀλλὰ όν όν, τῶν τῶν σωματικῶν
einai ἀφέναι, γενόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον,
ἀντὶς δὲ ὁδὸν ἐπὶ ὑπὸ, μεταλῇς δὲ τοῦ ὑπάνει
50 συγγράμμα, καθότι ἐν αὐτῷ μεταλαμβάνει.

9. "Ἡ ἔστω φύσις, ἡ παρ' ἴδια ἡ ἐγκοπία να
evà, πῶς τὸ ἄντως ἀν, ἡ ἔστω γίνεται ὡστε
ἀπάλληλης; ἡ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα εἰχόμενα, κατὰ
ἀν ἐστορογ. γένος τουτό ὄποιο ὄποιο ὄποιο,
παρ' ἡ μετά τις σωματικά, τοὺς τὰ ἄλλας καὶ τὰδὲ τῷ
παντὶ διὰ τὴν ἐγκοπίαν ομοιομορφών καὶ κεκόσιμημένον,
ἀρχὴ γὰρ κινήσεως ὑπὸ χρησιμοσύνη τοὺς ἄλλους
κόσμους, κατὰ δὲ ἐν ἑαυτῶς κατοικήματος, καὶ ὅτι
τὸ ἐμφάνισε σώματι διδόμενο, αὐτὴ δὲ πάρ
ἑαυτής ἐγινέτα, ἦν ὑπότης ἀπολλύμενος, ὢστὲ
10 ἑαυτής ἐγινέτα, ὡς γὰρ τὸ ὑπότης ἑαυτῷ ἑαυτῆς
χορηγήματι; ἡ εἰς ἑαυτῶς ἐγινέτα ἀλλὰ τὰ τῶν φύσιν
πρῶτων ἔχοντα εἰναι, ἡ ἐνακόλουθον καὶ ἀπώλατον
εῖναι δὲ ἐν ἑαυτής, ἡ ἐνακόλουθον καὶ τοὺς
ἄλλους ἑιναι. ἦνδε δὲ καὶ σὺ ἓπειρόν ἔστω καὶ τὸ
μακάριον ἐκδόθη δὲ εἰς πάντα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἦν πάρ
15 αὐτοῖς, πρῶτως ἐν καὶ καὶ πρῶτως, μεταβολής
cat' ὑποτής ἔρισμα, ὡστε γενόμενον ὡστε ἀπολλύμενον.
πέθεν γὰρ ἀν καὶ γένος, ἡ εἰς τί ἀπόλυσε; καὶ εἰ
dei ἐπαληθεύετο τὴν τοῦ ὑπάνει

1 Del. Page, nt. glossum.

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substance? If it is not a body or an affection of
body, but action and making and many things are in
it and come from it, then since it is a substance
distinct from bodies, of what kind is it? It is obviously
what we call real substance. For everything bodily
should be called becoming, not substance; it " comes
to be and pass away, but never really is ", but is
preserved by participation in being, in so far as it
does participate in it.

9. But the other nature, which has being of itself,
is all that really exists, which does not come into
being or perish: or everything else will pass away,
and could not come into being afterwards if this real
existence had perished which preserves all other
things and especially this All, which is preserved and
given its universal order and beauty by soul. For
soul is the " origin of motion " and is responsible
for the motion of other things, and it is moved by
itself, and gives life to the ensouled body, but has it
of itself, and never loses it because it has it of itself.
For certainly all things cannot have a borrowed life;
or it will go on to infinity: but there must be some
nature which is primarily alive, which must be in
destructible and immortal of necessity since it is also
the origin of life to the others. Here, assuredly, all
that is divine and blessed must be situated, living of
itself and existing of itself, existing primarily and
living primarily, without any part in essential change,
neither coming to be nor perishing. For where
could it come into being from, or into what could it change
when it perished? And if we are to apply the name
" being " to it truly, then being itself ought not to

1 Plato Phaedrus 245C20.
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exist at one time, but not at another; as for instance white, the colour itself, is not white at one time and not-white another; but if white was being as well as being white, it would exist for ever: but [as it is] it only has the white [not being]. But that with which being is from itself, will always be existent. This, then, which is primarily and always existent cannot be dead, like a stone or wood, but must be alive, and have a pure life, as much of it as remains alone: but whatever is mixed with what is worse has an impeded relationship to the best yet it certainly cannot lose its own nature—but recovers its ancient state "when it runs up to its own.

10. Our demonstration that the soul is not a body makes it clear that it is akin to the divine and to the external nature. It certainly does not have a shape or a colour, and it is intangible. But we can also demonstrate its kinship in the following way. We agree of course that all the divine and really existing has a good, Intelligent life; now we must investigate what comes next, starting from our own soul and finding out what sort of nature it has. Let us take soul, not the soul in body which has acquired irrational desires and passions and admitted other affection, but the soul which has wiped these away and which, as far as possible, has no communion with the body. This soul does make it clear that its evils are external accretions to the soul and come from elsewhere, but that when it is purified the best things are present in it, wisdom and all the rest of virtue, and are its own. If, then, the soul is something of this kind when it goes up again to itself,
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It must surely belong to that nature which we assert is that of all the divine and eternal. For wisdom and true virtue are divine things, and could not occur in some trivial mortal being, but something of such a kind [as to possess them] must be divine, since it has a share in divine things through its kinship and consubstantiality. For this reason any one of us who is like this would deviate very little from the beings above as far as his soul itself was concerned and would only be inferior by that part which is in body. For this reason, if every man was like this, or there were a great number who had souls like this, no one would be so unbelieving as not to believe that what is soul in men is altogether immortal. But, as it is, they see the soul in the great majority of people damaged in many ways, and do not think of it as if it was divine or immortal. But when one considers the nature of any particular thing one must concentrate on its pure form, since what is added is always a hindrance to the knowledge of that to which it has been added. Consider it by stripping, or rather let the man who has stripped look at himself and believe himself to be immortal, when he looks at himself as he has come to be in the intelligible and the pure. For he will see an intellect which sees nothing perceived by the senses, none of these mortal things, but apprehends the eternal by its eternity, and all the things in the intelligible world, having become itself an intelligible universe full of light, illuminated by the truth from the Good, which radiates truth over all the intelligibles. So he will often think that this was very well said: "Greetings. I am for you an immortal god." 1

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ἀπενεκρός. εἰ δὲ ἡ κάθαρσις ποιεῖ ἐν γνώσει τῶν ἀριστών εἶναι, καὶ ἤ ἐπιστήμη ἠδονὴ οὕτως ἀκαθάρτως, εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄντων ἐπιστήμης εἶναι, αὐτῷ γὰρ δὴ ἐξ ὁ πρὸς τὸν ἀριστότητα ἀνάλημα ἐν αὐτῇ ἡ ἀριστοτελικὴ ἀρμόδια, οὐ μὴν χρώνιον ἤδη πεπληρωμένα καθαρὰ συνειδησίαν ὑπὸ χρόνου ἴσως δημιουργηθῇ ἀλλὰ ἀυτῷ παρ’ αὐτῇ.

45 ἐν τῇ καταμάθησι ἐστὶ καὶ τῷ ἄριστῳ ἄνθρωπῳ ἀλλὶ ἄλλῳ ἀλήματι ἐν αὐτῇ ἡ ἀριστοτελικὴ ἀρμόδια, οὐ μὴν χρώνιον ἤδη πεπληρωμένα καθαρὰ συνειδησίαν ὑπὸ χρόνου ἴσως δημιουργηθῇ ἀλλὰ ἀυτῷ παρ’ αὐτῇ.

50 χρηστάς δεισιδαιμονείς ἄριστος μετανοεῖ τε καὶ ἄντων ἀριστοτελεῖ παρ’ αὐτῇ ἀλήματι ἀθροίζων, καὶ ἄντων ὅσιον ἀριστήτητα ἀνακοινώναι ἀθροίζων, αὐτῷ κρατήστει τὴν ἀλήματι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀθροίζων.

11 Περὶ τοιούτου χρήστου τὸ ἀληθευόμενον ὑπὸ ἀληθευόμενον, ἀλλὰ ἀληθευόμενον; ἐπειδὴ μὲν ἂν ἄλλως ἦσαν, ἃν ἄλλως ἦσαν τῇ ἀκαθάρτῃ ἀλήματι ποὺ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἦσαν τῇ ἀλήματι αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔστω οὐκ αὐτῶν ἀλήματι ἀλήματι.

5 ὡς τῷ πυρὶ ἡ θερμότης πάντως ἡ θερμότης τῷ πυρὶ ἄλλα ἐκ τοῦ πυρὸς ὅπως ἰσχύει τῷ πυρὶ. ή δὲ φυσική ὁδὸς ἂν ἄλλως ἦσαν ἄλλα πολλά ἄλλα πολλά, ἀλλὰ μὲν ἄλλος μὲν ἄλλου ἄλλοις. 

10 ἡ γὰρ οὕτως εἶναι ἡ ζωή, καὶ ἄντων ὅσιον ἡ τοιοῦτο παρ᾽ αὐτῇ ἀλήματι, ὅπερ ἦσαν ὃς ἦσαν.

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to the divine and concentrating totally on likeness to it. But if purification causes us to be in a state of knowledge of the best, then the sciences which lie within become apparent, the ones which really are sciences. For it is certainly not by running around outside that the soul "sees self-control and justice", but itself by itself in its understanding of itself and what it formerly was, seeing them standing in itself like splendid statues all rusted with time which it has cleaned 1: as if gold had a soul, and knocked off all that was earthy in it; it was before in ignorance of itself, because it did not see the gold, but then, seeing itself isolated, it wondered at its worth, and thought that it needed no beauty brought in from outside, being supreme itself, if only one would leave it alone by itself.

11. Who with any sense could doubt that a thing of this kind is immortal? It has life of itself, which cannot perish: for how could it, since it is not brought in from outside, nor again does soul have it in the way in which heat is present to fire. I do not mean, of course, that heat in relation to fire is something brought in from outside, but that, even if it is not so for fire, it is for the matter which underlies fire: for it is by this that fire comes to an end. But soul does not have life in this way, as if it was underlying matter and life came upon it and made it soul. For life is rather a substance, and soul is a substance of this kind, living of itself—which is the thing we are looking for—and they will admit that this is

1 Again the Phaedrus myth (247D ff.), but remarkably transformed. The moral forms stand, not as in Plato in the "places above the heavens", but within the soul itself, and the soul sees them not as transcendent realities, but as included in its self-vision in the course of its self-

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immortal, or they will treat it also as a composite and separate its parts until they come to an immortal thing moved by itself; it is against the divine law for this to accept the fate of death. Or if they say that life is an external affection of matter, they will be compelled to admit that the very thing from which this affection came into matter is immortal, unable to receive the opposite of the life it brings. But there really is one single nature which is actually alive.

12. Besides, if they are going to assert that every soul is destructible, everything ought to have perished long ago; but if they say that one soul is destructible and another is not, for instance that the soul of the All is immortal, but ours is not, they must explain why. For each of them is a principle of movement, and each of them lives of itself, and each of them apprehends the same things by the same means, thinking the things in heaven and the things beyond heaven and searching out everything which has substantial existence, and ascending to the first principle. And the intellection of the authentic reality of each thing which the soul derives from itself, from the contemplations within itself, and from recollection, gives it an existence prior to body and makes it everlasting because it has everlasting knowledge. Again, everything which is diabolical has come into existence by being put together and is naturally liable to be disintegrated in the same way in which it was put together. But the soul is a single and simple nature which has actual existence in its living; it cannot, then, be destroyed in this way. “But then if it was divided into parts it would be chopped up and so perish.” But the soul, as has been demonstrated, is not a mass or a quantity.
PLOTINUS: ENEAED IV 7

"But it will come to destruction by qualitative change." But a qualitative change which destroys anything takes away its form, but leaves its matter; but this is something which happens to a compound. If then soul cannot be destroyed in any of these ways, it must be indestructible.

13. How then, since the intelligible is separate, does soul come into body? It is in this way: as much of it as is only intellect has a purely intellectual life in the intelligible and stays there for ever without being affected; but that which acquires desire, which follows immediately on that intellect, goes out further in a way by its acquisition of desire, and, desiring to impart order and beauty according to the pattern which it sees in Intellect, is as if pregnant by the intelligibles and labouring to give birth, and so is eager to make, and constructs the world. And, straining towards the sense-world by its eagerness, along with the whole of the soul of the universe it transcends what it directs and shares in the care of the All, but when it wants to direct a part it is isolated and comes to be in that part in which it is: it does not come to belong wholly and altogether to the body, but has some part as well outside the body. And not even the intellect of this [individual] soul is subject to affection; but this soul is sometimes in the body and sometimes out of the body; it starts from the first realities and goes out to the third, the things down here, by the activity of the Intellect which remains the same and fills all things through soul with beauties and sets them in order, immortal through immortal, since Intellect will be existent for ever through its inexhaustible activity.

1 Harder: ἐγκριταὶ τοῖς ἄρτοις: ἐγκριεὶ τὸν Α=ΕΥΟΔ: ἐγκρίτας τῷ ιπ.
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14. As for the souls of other living things, those of them which have been failures and come into animal bodies must also be immortal. But if there is another [non-human] kind of soul, it cannot come from anywhere else than from the nature which lives, and this too must really exist and be the cause of life in living things, and this came in certainly true of the soul in plants: for they all started from the same origin and have their own life and they too are bodiless and without parts and substances. But if it is said that the human soul, since it is tripartite, will be dissolved because of its composition, we too shall say that pure souls when they are set free abandon what was plastered on to them at their birth, but the others remain with it for a very long time; but when the worse part is abandoned, even it does not perish, as long as that from which it has its origin exists. For nothing of real being perishes.

15. Well, then, we have said what needed to be said to those who need proof. But what needs to be said to those who require confidence supported by the evidence of the senses is to be selected from the body of information about such things, which is extensive: from the oracles of the gods commanding appeasement of the wrath of souls which have been wronged, and the giving of honours to the dead (which supposes that they are conscious of them), just as all men do to those who have passed away. And many souls which were formerly in human beings did not cease to benefit mankind when they were out of the body: they have established oracular shrines and give help by their prophecies in other ways and demonstrate through themselves that the other souls have also not perished.
IV. 8. ON THE DESCENT OF THE SOUL INTO BODIES

Introductory Note

This early treatise, written in a style which suggests that it was intended for a comparatively wide circle of readers, is particularly interesting in a number of ways. It shows more clearly than any other work of Plotinus how conscious he was of the tension between the two sides of Plato's thought about the material world and the human body, the pessimistic dualism most strikingly apparent in the Phaedo and the optimistic view of the physical universe as the good product of unceasing divine goodness which all later Platonists found in the Timaeus; and it shows how hard (even if never entirely successfully) he tried to reconcile them. The movement of his thought in the treatise is worth noticing, from the pessimistic and dualistic beginning to a view (in chapters 6 and 7) of the material world and of soul's descent into body as positive and optimistic as anything in the Timaeus. Read as a whole, the treatise is strong evidence against the view that there is a development in the thought of Plotinus from a pessimism about the material world with Greek affinities to a more positive Hellenic view. The tension, and some never fully reconciled inconsistency, between the two sides of Plotinism appears in his latest works as it does in this early one. The extremely positive attitude to matter in chapter 6 should be noted. Whether it is to be regarded as an independent reality or as derived from higher principles is a question he here leaves open (in fact he adopted the second alternative; cp. III. 4, [15] 1; II. 3, [58] 17; I. 8, [51] 7). But in either case he sees it

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here as a capacity for good rather than, as he does in later treatises, as the principle of evil (see II. 4 [12], I. 8 [51]). The passage points forward to the abandonment of the doctrine of matter as the principle of evil and its positive valuation as an expression of the infinity immediately derived from the Good by the later Neoplatonists. The ten lines of spiritual autobiography at the beginning of chapter 1 say more about the personal experience of Plotinus than any other passage in the Enneads, and justify the belief generally held by his readers that very much of what he says in the Enneads about divine reality is in some way based on his own religious experience.

Synopsis

The experience of "waking up from the body"; how is the fact that we are in the body to be explained? What Hermes, Empedocles, Pythagoras and Plato have to say about Universal Soul in the physical universe (chs. 1-2); and about the human soul and its descent to and life in the body (chs. 3-4). Reconciliation of the apparent contradiction in Plato's thought between the idea of a "full" and the idea of a "mission" of the soul (ch. 5). The necessity of the material world as the term of the divine outgoing, and its closeness to the intelligible of which it is an image (ch. 9). Our souls need not be harmed, and may even be benefited by their necessary descent into this lower world (ch. 7). And we do not altogether descend. Our highest part remains in the Intelligible, though we are not always conscious of it (ch. 8).
IV. 8. (6) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΕΙΣ ΤΑ ΣΩΜΑΤΑ ΚΑΘΟΔΟΥ ΤΗΣ ΨΥΧΗΣ

1. Πολλάκις ἐγερόμενος εἰς ἑμαυτὸν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος καὶ γνώμενος τὸν μὲν ἄλλον ἐξοικείο, ἑμαυτοῦ δὲ εἶσιν, θωμασάντων ἡμῶν ὧν ὑπὸ κάλλος, καὶ τῆς κραίτους μοιρᾶς παιστεύσας τὸν μᾶλλον 8 εἶναι, ζωὴν τοὺς ἐριστήν ἐνεργήσας καὶ τῷ θείῳ εἰς ταύτῃ γεγονότας καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ὄρθιθείς εἰς ἐνεργείαν ἑλθοὶ ἐκεῖνον ὑπὲρ τῶν τό ἄλλον νοητόν ἑμαυτόν ὁρῶν, μετὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐν τῷ θείῳ στάσιν εἰς λογισμὸν ἐκ νοῦ καταβάς ἀποστὶν, πῶς ποτὲ καὶ νῦν καταβαίνω, καὶ ἐποίησεν ποτὲ μοι ἐξ ἔρχοντι ἡ ἡγεμονία.

10 γεγονότα τοῦ σώματος τούτῳ ὁ ἄντων, ἐπεὶ ἐφάνη καὶ ἐκεῖνον, καὶ περι ὁ ὁσιὸς ἐν σώματι. ὡς μὲν γὰρ Ἡράκλειτος, δε ἢ μὲν παρακελεύεται ἥγετων τοῦτο, ἀνοίξιμος τε ἐν ἄγα καὶ ἀνεκέμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀνοίξιμος τε ἐν ἀνω καὶ ἀνεκέμενος καὶ μεταβάλλων 15 ἀνασταθεὶ γεῖ καὶ κάρματος ἐστὶ τῶν αὐτοῖς μοχθείς καὶ ἀρχεθαι εἰκάζει καὶ ἀρχεθαι εἰκάζει σαθὴ ἡμῶν παρήκα τὸν λόγον, ὡς ἄδει τοῦ παρ' αὐτῷ ἠρχεθαι, καὶ αὐτὸς ἠρχεθαι εἰκάζει. Ἡμετεροκήθης τε εἰς τὰ πάντα ἐφαρμογικοὶ νῦν εἰσὶν τὰς ψυχὰς πεπωτὼ ἀνωταίς καὶ αὐτὸς ψυχάς 20 ἐξαίθειν γεγονοῦσιν δίκαιον πίστιν μανιμένῳ νεῖκει τοσοῦτον παρεγήγησιν, ὅπως καὶ Παθαγώρας, 396

IV. 8. ON THE DESCENT OF THE SOUL INTO BODIES

1. Often I have woken up out of the body to my self and have entered into myself, going out from all other things; I have seen a beauty wonderfully great and felt assurance that then most of all I belonged to the better part; I have actually lived the best life and come to identity with the divine; and set firm in it I have come to that supreme actuality, setting myself above all else in the realm of intellect. Then after that rest in the divine, when I have come down from Intellect to discursive reasoning, I am puzzled how I ever came down, and how my soul has come to be in the body when it is what it has shown itself to be by itself, even when it is in the body. Heraclitus, who urges us to investigate this, positing "necessary changes" from opposite to opposite, and saying "way up and down" and "changing it is at rest", and "weariness to toil at and be subjected to the same things", has left us guessing, since he has neglected to make clear to us what he is saying, perhaps because we ought to seek by ourselves, as he himself sought and found. And Empedocles, when he said that it is a law that sinful souls should fall into this world, and that he himself has come here as "an exile from the country of the gods" who "put his trust in raving strife", revealed just as much as the riddling statements of Pythagoras
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and his followers about this, and many other matters (and, besides, he is unclear because he writes poetry). We are left with the godlike Plato, who said many fine things about the soul and about its coming [into this world] in his writings, so that we hope we can get something clear from him. What, then, does this philosopher say? He is obviously not saying the same thing everywhere, so that one can easily know what his intention is; but he everywhere speaks with contempt of the whole world of sense and disapproves of the soul’s fellowship with body and says that soul is fettered and buried in it, and that “the esoteric saying is a great one,” which asserts that the soul is “in custody”; and his cave, like the den of Empedocles, means, I think, this universe, where he says that the soul’s journey to the intelligible world is a “release from fetters” and an “ascent from the cave.” And in the Phaedrus he makes “moulting” the cause of coming here, and he has cycles which bring here again the soul which has ascended, and judgments send others down here, and lots and chances and necessities. And, though in all these passages he disapproves of the soul’s coming to body, in the Timaeus when speaking about

Plotinus here starts from an account of his own personal experience unique in the Panneum, and then turns to tradition to help him to explain that experience. As always, he spends little time in considering the Pro-Socratics and does not seem to find them very helpful. “Necessary changes” is a phrase attributed to Heraclitus by both Iamblichus (cp. Stobaeus

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pantos legem ton te kosmon epaimi kai theon legi en eisai eidiakrona tis te physi para agathou tou theiouergou pros te enon tis te phainetai. Oi te ows phaini h tois pantos toin charin eis auti parata theou agathou, h te ekastou hmin, pros te telen auti evai. Epithei eidei, oas en nophi koum, to 45 auta tauta geveni zofon kai en tois aiththugon uparxei.

2. "Osites hmin oumbain einai peri thymetras physi par auton mafein zetisasan eis anagkhes ephapetiai kai peri physi olos zetis, pws toin kaiounain onomaitein pefwes, kai peri koumou fuses.

5 ows ows de auton eidei, en physi eudaiastai ekousia eis anagogesias eis th alla tropos kai peri psouto de, ene arbois eite hmin tetemai, physi elos, de eidei sówmai bionousa cheiroi de auton elos poli dina, epit helellon kraitis eis.

10 skexasen to ws en ekastos kai pros to oikous kopton fheri
en de tis panti pantas en oikeioi kata fousin kastai—pollhes de kai orismous pro

voiai deourgen, de polliw pwos allorion autous prospistikton eis te einiata synexemewn kai

1 As always, Plotinus thinks that Plato will be our best guide to the truth if we take the trouble to interpret him rightly and to reconcile his apparent contradictions. The passages in Plato's dialogues quoted or alluded to here are Phaedo 67D1; Cratylus 400C2; Phaedrus 52B-3; Republic 514A6; 615C4; 517B-4; Phaedrus 240C2; 247D-4; 269A6; Republic 619B7; Timaeus 54B6. The Phaedo, the image of the soul in the Republic, and the Phaedrus myth are for Plotinus the princi

principal Platonic authorities for the negative view of the soul's descent into the world, the Timaeus the principal authority for the positive view.
sort of help as being in great trouble. But since [the body of the universe] is perfect and adequate and self-sufficient and there is nothing in it contrary to its nature it needs only a kind of brief command; and its soul is always as it naturally wants to be; it has no desires and is not affected; for [the world's body] "loves nothing and gains nothing." 3 For this reason Plato says that our soul as well, if it comes to be with that perfect soul, is perfected itself and "walks on high and directs the whole universe"; when it departs to be no longer within bodies and not to belong to any of them, then it also like the Soul of the All will share with ease in the direction of the All, since it is not evil in every way for soul to give body the ability to flourish and to exist, because not every kind of provident care for the inferior deprives the being exercising it of its ability to remain in the highest. For there are two kinds of care of everything, the general, by the inactive command of one setting it in order with royal authority, and the particular, which involves actually doing something oneself and by contact with what is being done infects the doer with the nature of what is being done. Now, since the divine soul is always said to direct the whole heaven in the first way, transcendent in its higher part but sending its last and lowest power into the interior of the world, God could not still be blamed for making the soul of the All exist in something worse, and the soul would not be deprived of its natural due, which it has from eternity and will have for ever, which cannot be against its nature in that it belongs to it continually and without beginning.

\[1\] Timaeus 31c-34c
\[2\] Phaedrus 24c-25a
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And when Plato says that the souls of the stars are related to their bodies in the same way as the All—
for he inserts their bodies also into the circles of the soul 3—he keeps safe for them also their appropriate state of well-being. For, as there are two reasons why the soul’s fellowship with body is displeasing, that body becomes a hindrance to thought and that it fills the soul with pleasures, desires and griefs; neither of these things could happen to a soul which has not sunk into the interior of its body, and is not anyone’s property, and does not belong to the body, but the body belongs to it, and is of such a kind as to want nothing and be defective in nothing; so that the soul will not be filled with desires or fears; for it will never have any frightening expectations about a body of this kind, nor does any business make it turn to what is below and take it away from the better, blessed vision, but is always directed to those higher realities and sets this world in order with a power which requires no active effort.

3. As for what Plato says about the human soul, which is said to suffer all kinds of evils and to be in misery because it comes to exist among stupidities and desires and fears and all other evils, in that the body is its chain and tomb and the universe its cave and den, let us now state his thought about it, not inconsistent because the reasons [which he gives] for its descent are different. Now since universal Intellect exists in the realm of thought as a universal whole, which we call the intelligible universe, and since there also exist the intellectual powers con-

1 Timaeus 36C7-3.
2 Phaedo 65A10 and 66C2-3.
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tained in this and the individual intellects—for Intellect is not only one, but one and many—there had to be many souls and one soul, and the many different souls springing from the one, like the species of one genus, some better and others worse, some more intelligent, and some whose intelligence is less actualized. For there, in Intellect, we have on the one hand Intellect potentially including the others like a great living creature, and on the other the individual intellects, each of which actualizes a potentiality which the other [universal] intellect includes; as if, supposing that a city had a soul and included other beings with souls, the soul of the city would be more complete and more powerful, but there would certainly be nothing to prevent the others from being the same kind of thing. Or it is like universal fire, from which comes the great fire and the little ones; but the universal substance is that of the universal fire, or rather that from which the substance of the universal fire comes. The work, then, of the more rational kind of soul is intellection, but not only intellection; for if it was why would it be different from Intellect? For by adding to its being intelligent something else, according to which it did not remain intelligence, it itself also has a work to do, like any other intelligible reality which exists. But when it looks to what comes before it it exercises its intelligence, when it looks to itself it sets in order what comes after it and directs and rules it; because everything could not be stationary in the intelligible, when it was possible for something else as well to exist next in order to it, something less, but something which must exist if that before it exists.

4. The individual souls, certainly, have an intelli-
PLUTUS: ENNEAD IV. 8.

χρειάζεται ἐν τῇ ἐξ ὦ ἐγένοντο πρῶτο ἐπιστρο-
φὶ, δύναμιν δέ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπίταδε ἐγείωςα, οἷα περ ἔως ἐξερομήνων καὶ πάλιν ἀν ἤλθον, τῷ δὲ
5 μετ' αὐτῷ ὦ φθονοι καὶ χορηγίας, ἀπείκονα ὑπὸ
eἰ, μετὰ τῆς ἄλλης μενούσα ἐν τῷ νοήμα, ἐν
οἴσκης δὲ μετὰ τῆς ἄλλης συνιδοικητὸς ἐνίκης· πάντων
βασιλείων τῶν πάντων κρατοῦντες συνάντοι συνιοικοθ
10 ἕκατερον ὦ καταβαλλόντες ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀπὸ τὸν
tότε. μεταβάλλουσι δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ὑδατι ἐκ τὸ μέρος
tε ἔναν καὶ ἐν τῶν οὐδ' ἄλλος καίρων καί
θη συνιστάσας μεθ' ὑπὸ τοῦ τὸ 

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gent desire consisting in the impulse to return to
itself springing from the principle from which they
came into being; but they also possess a power di-
rected to the world here below, like a light which
depends from the sun in the upper world but does
not grudge of its abundance to what comes after it,
and they are free from sorrow if they remain with
universal soul in the intelligible, but in heaven with
the universal soul they can share in its government,
like those who live with a universal monarch and
share in the government of his empire; these also
do not come down from the abode of royalty: for
they are then all together in the same [place]. But
they change from the whole to being a part and
belonging to themselves, and, as if they were tried
of being together, they each go to their own. Now
when a soul does this for a long time, flying from the
All and standing apart in distinctness, and does not
look towards the intelligible, it has become a part
and is isolated and weak and fuses and looks towards
a part and in its separation from the whole it embarks
on one single thing and flies from everything else;
it comes to soul talk to that one thing hindered by
the totality of things in every way, and has left the
whole and directs the individual part with great
difficulty; it is by now applying itself to and caring
for things outside and is present and sinks deep into
the individual part.1 Here the "mouling", as it
is called, happens to it, and the being in the fetters
of the body, since it has missed the immunity which
it had when it was with the universal soul directing
the free universality of its higher state to bind itself to the
particular. This for him provides the key to the understand-
ing of the Platonic passages referred to in ch. 1.

1 This is a particularly clear expression of Plotinus’s con-
stant conviction that the soul is self-isolation, indi-
icialism, a turning away (never quite complete) from

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the better part of the universe; it was altogether better for it before when it was running upwards; it is fallen, therefore, and is caught, and is engaged with its fetter, and acts by sense because its new beginning prevents it from acting by intellect, and it is said to be buried and in a cave, but, when it turns to intelligence, to be freed from its fetters and to ascend, when it is started on the contemplation of reality by recollection: for, in spite of everything, it always possesses something transcendent in some way. Souls, then, become, one might say, ambitious, compelled to live by turns the life There, and the life here: those which are able to be more in the company of Intellect live the life There more, but those whose normal condition is, by nature or chance, the opposite, live more the life here below. Plato indicates this unobtrusively when he distinguishes again the products of the second mixing-bowl and makes parts of them; then he says also that they must enter into becoming, since they became parts of this kind.1 But if he says that God "sowed" them, this must be understood in the same way as when he makes God talk, and even deliver a kind of public speech; for the plan of his exposition generates and makes the things which exist in the nature of the Whole, bringing out in succession for purposes of demonstration what are always coming into being and always existing there.

5. There is then no contradiction between the

1 Cp. Plato Timaeus 41D3-8. There is in fact only one "mixing-bowl" in Plato, though there are two mixtures. But Atticus before Plotinus and Theodore of Amase after him read two mixing-bowls into the Timaeus text, as Proclus notes with disapproval (In Tim. III 246-7 Dohr).
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sowing to birth and the descent for the perfection of the All, and the judgment and the cave, and necessity and free-will (since necessity contains the free-will) and the being in the body as an evil; nor [is there anything inconsistent about] Empedocles' flight from God and wandering nor the sin upon which judgment comes, nor Heraclitus' rest on the flight, nor in general the willingness and also the unwillingness of the descent. For everything which goes to the worse does so unwillingly, but, since it goes by its own motion, when it experiences the worse it is said to be punished for what it did. But when it is eternally necessary by the law of nature that it should do and experience these things, and, descending from that which is above it, it meets the need of something else in its encounter with it, if anyone said that a god sent it down he would not be out of accord with the truth or with himself. For final results are referred to the principle from which they spring, even if there are many intervening stages. And since the sin of the soul can refer to two things, either to the course of the descent or to doing evil when the soul has arrived here below, the punishment of the first is the very experience of descent, and of the lesser degree of the second the entrance, and a very quick one, into other bodies according to the judgment passed on its deserts—the word "judgment" indicates what happens by divine decree—but the boundless kind of wickedness is judged to deserve greater punishment in charge of chastising spirits. So then the soul, though it is divine and comes from above, enters into the body and, though it is a god of the lowest rank, comes to this world by a spontaneous inclination, its own power and the

1 Theilir.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 8.

τοῦ μετ' αὐτὴν κοσμήσας ὡδὲ ἐσχάτας κἂν μὲν θάντας φύγῃ, οὐδὲν βέβλαται γραμμώς κακοὶ προσπλαβοῦσα καὶ φύσιν κακίας γραφότας τὰς τε δυνάμεις ἄγουσα αὐτὴς εἰς τὸ φανερὸν καὶ δείξασα ἔγρα τε καὶ ποιήσεις, ἡ ἐν τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ ἑρμομόντα μένην τε ἢ ἢν ἢ ἔνεντα εἰς ὅλη ἡντα, τινὶ τε ἰσχὺν αὐτὴν ἐλαθείν ἂν ἄει ἰσχῡν οὐκ ἐχθράντα τοιοῦτον λαβώντα· εἰπέρ πανταχοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῶν δύναμεων ἓκειθεν κρατήσεσθαι ἂν ἀπόπτησι καὶ ὦν ἀφαιρέσθαι καὶ οὐκ οὖν μὴν μερίστησαι ὅπως οὖν ὦν. ἰδίᾳ μὲν γὰρ θαύμα ἔχει τῶν ἐνδοι ἐκάστως διὰ τῆς σημαίας τῶν ἐξου, οὐκ ἑκατέρως ἐκ τῶν τὰ γλαφαρὰ τάτα δρέσαι.

6. Εἰπέρ οὖν δεί μὴ ἐν μῶνον εἶπα —δείκνυσι τοῦτον καὶ τὸ πάντα μορφὴν ἐν ἐκείνῳ οὐκ ἔχουσα, οὐδ' ἀνυπήκοα τι τῶν ὅτι οὖν ὀφθαλμοῖς εἰς αὐτόν ἑκεῖνα, οὐδ' ἢ τὸ σπάνιον ἢ τὸ τῶν ὅτι οὐκ οὕτως ἡ ποιήσεις καὶ τῶν τάτων τῶν ἐνδοι ἐκάστως λαβώντων, ἢ ποιήσεις ἐκάστῃ τοιοῦτοι ταύτα ἂν ἐν καθ' αὐτῷ γενόμενοι φαινόντες, εἰπέρ ἐκάστῃ φύσις ταύτῃ ἡ διαφορὰ τοῖς μετ' αὐτῆν ποιεῖται καὶ διεξελεύθερα οὖν στερμάτος ἐκ τῶν ἀμερῶν ἀρχῆς εἰς τῶν τοῦ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἰδίαν, μένουτος μὲν δεὶ τοῦ προτέρου

1 The same image of the seed is used in ΠΙ. 7. 11. 23–7, but with a significant difference of tone: here the emphasis is on the both necessary and generous self-expansion and self-
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dwelling-place, but, in a way, bringing to birth what comes after it from a power unspeakably great, all the power which was in those higher beings, which could not stand still as if it had drawn a line round itself in selfish jealousy, but had to go on for ever, until all things have reached the ultimate possible limit [impelled] by the power itself, which conduces them out and cannot leave anything without a share of itself. For there was certainly nothing which hindered anything whatever from having a share in the nature of good, as far as each thing was able to participate in it. The nature of matter, then, either existed for ever, and it was impossible for it, since it existed, not to participate in that which grants all things as much good as each one of them can take; or else its coming into being was a necessary consequence of the causes before it, and not even so was it required to be separate because that which gave it existence as a kind of gracious gift became stationary through lack of power before it came to it. The greatest beauty in the world of sense, therefore, is a manifestation of the noblest among the intelligibles, of their power and of their higher goodness, and all things are held together for ever, those which exist intelligibly and those which exist perceptibly, the intelligibles existing of themselves and the things perceived by the senses receiving their existence for ever by participation in them, imitating the intelligible nature as far as they can.

7. Since this nature is twofold, partly intelligible and partly perceptible, it is better for the soul to be in the intelligible, but all the same, since it has this kind of nature, it is necessarily bound to be able to participate in the perceptible, and it should not
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 8.

5 τέσσαρα ἀκτή, εἰ μὴ πάντα ἔστι το κρέατον, μέσην τάξιν ἐν τοῖς ὁδόν ἐπικοινώνοι, θείας μὲν μοιράς ὁδόν, ἐν ἑγκατέρω δὲ τὸν νοητὸν ὁδόν, ὡς ὠμοίων ὁδόν τῇ αἰσθήσει φύσιν διδάσκει μὲ τούτων παρ' ἀφθήγη, αὐτοκλαπάνες δὲ καὶ παρ' ἀφθήγη, εἰ μὴ μετὰ τὸν αὐτής δοκεῖν διανοημα, 10 προσθηκῇ δὲ πλείον εἰς τὸ εἴσοδο πάντα μὴ μείναις ἐλθεῖτε δῆλα, ἄλλως τέ καὶ δυνατὸν αὐτή πάλιν εξαναλύω, ἱστορίαν ὅποια ἐνεργεῖ εἰς τε καὶ ἐπιπλούσιον καὶ μεθούση, ὡς ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τῇ παραδείγματι τῶν ὁπολ ἑστι γενόμενον ὁ σκόπον σαφέστερον τὰ ἁμαίνει μαθείνη, γνώσις γὰρ ἑνεργείας ἐκ消极ου ὅ τοι κακὸν πάντα ὡς ἄντιος εὐθυγενεία, ή ἐκτὸς ἑνεργείας τὰ κακὰ πρὶν πάλιν γνωσίν, ὅπερ δὲ ἢ νοεῖ διάδεσιν κατάβασις ἔστων ἐν ἑσαχτοῦ τὸ χείρας—οὐ γὰρ ἐγέρει ἐν ἑς τὸ ἐπίκεισιν ἀναβαθμα, ἄλλα ἀνάγκη ἐνεργηθαισομαι 15 εἰς ὑπάρχη καὶ μὴ διαφημίζωσι μενείνει ἐνθαντής φύσις ὑπὶ ἅν ἀναγίμος καὶ νόμος μέχρι ὑπάρχης ἐπάθει τὸ μὲν νοεῖ διὰ τὸ πρὶν ἀρχή πρὸ τῆς τοιοῦτον, ταῖς μὲν πάρα μέρος 20 καὶ κράτους γυμνούτης τὸ τούτου καὶ ἐν τῷ χείρας γεματης ἔπιστμης πρὸς τὰ ἁμαίνει, τῇ δὲ λεγομένη τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ χείρας ἐργα γεγονόναι, ἐπιπλούσιον δὲ κακῶς ὁδήθη καὶ τέκνοι τὸ ἔτυκτην ἐξεργάζομαι τε τῶν πρὸ

1 Ἄπν., defensit Igel (Helmantica 28, 177, 252): δὴ Κρανττ.

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be annoyed with itself because, granted that all things are not the best, it occupies a middle rank among realities, belonging to that divine part but being on the lowest edge of the intelligible; and, having a common boundary with the perceptible nature, gives something to it of what it has in itself and receives something from it in return, if it does not use only its safe part in governing the universe, but with greater eagerness plunges into the interior and does not stay whole with whole; especially as it is possible for it to emerge again having acquired the whole story of what it saw and experienced here and learnt what it is like to be There, and, by the comparison of things which are, in a way, opposite, looming, in a way more clearly, the better things. For the experience of evil is a clearer knowledge of the Good for those whose power is too weak to know evil with clear intellectual certainty before experiencing it. And just as the intellectual way of outgoing is a descent to the lower limit of that which is worse [than Intellecit]—for it is not possible for it to go up to what which transcends it; but it must, acting outwards from itself and unable to remain on its own, by the necessity and law of nature arrive at soul; for this is its goal, and it must hand over what comes after to soul and run up again itself—so is the activity of soul; what comes after it is this world and what is before it is the contemplation of real being; this kind of experience comes slowly to partial souls, when they are in the worse and a turn takes place from itself and, but that which is called the Soul of the All has not become engaged in the worse kind of work and, having no experience of evils, considers what lies below it contemplatively.
and remains attached to the realities before it for ever; both are certainly possible; it can receive from There and at the same time distribute here, since it was impracticable for it as soul not to be in contact with this world.

3. And, if one ought to dare to express one’s own view more clearly, contradicting the opinion of others, even our soul does not altogether come down, but there is always something of it in the intelligible, but if the part which is in the world of sense-perception gets control, or rather if it itself brought under control, and thrown into confusion [by the body], it prevents us from perceiving the things which the upper part of the soul contemplates.¹ For what is grasped by the intellect reaches us when it arrives at perception in its descent, for we do not know everything which happens in any part of the soul before it is brought under control; for instance desire which remains in the desiring part is known by us, but [only] when we apprehend it by the power of immediate sense or discursive reason, or both. For every soul has something of what is below, in the direction of the body, and of what is above, in the direction of Intellect. And the soul which is a whole and is the soul of the whole, by its part which is directed to body, maintains the beauty and order of the whole in effortless transcendence because it does not do so by calculating and considering, as we do, but by intellect, as art does not deliberate. . . ² But the

¹ For this doctrine, that our consciousness of what goes on in the soul is limited and dependent on our bodily condition, cp. IV. 3. (27) 30 and I. 4. (46) 10.
² "Art does not deliberate." is a quotation from Aristotle Physica B 196128–9: "Art in fact does not deliberate either, and if the ship building art were incorporate in the timber, it would proceed by nature in the same way in which it now proceeds by art" (tr. Wicksteed-Cornford). This passage seems to be the starting-point for the development of the doctrine that the activity of Soul and Nature in forming and
πλοτίνου: ἐννεάδ α' 6.

αὐτῇς κοσμούσας ὁ τι οὖν ἵν. αἱ δ’ ἐν μέρει γνώμεναι καὶ μέρους ἔχουσι μὲν καὶ αὕτη τὸ ὑπερέχον, ἀπεχθεὶς δὲ τῇ μεσθείαι καὶ ἀνυλήφθαι πολλῶν ἀντιλαμβάνομαι τὸν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ 20 λυπώντων καὶ ταρακτώντων, ότι οὐ ἐπιμέλειται μέρους καὶ ἐλειτοίκαι καὶ πολλὰ ἐχόνως τὰ ἀληθρία κύκλων, πολλὰ δὲ ὃν ἐφίπτει καὶ ἡδέσται δὲ καὶ ἡδωνὴ ἠπόθησε. τὸ δὲ ἔστι καὶ ἰσχύον οὗ τὰς προσαιόρους ἡδονὰς, ἡ δὲ διαγωγὴ ἐμοῦ.

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souls which are partial and of a part have also the transcendent element, but they are occupied with sense-perception, and by their [lower] faculty of conscious apprehension they apprehend many things which are contrary to their nature and grieve and trouble them, since what they care for is a part, and defective, and has a great many alien and hostile things around it, and a great many which it desires; and it has pleasures, and pleasure deceives it; but there is a higher part which the transitory pleasures do not please, and its life is conformable [to its nature].
IV. 9. IF ALL SOULS ARE ONE

Introductory Note

This short early treatise takes up and carries forward the discussion of the same subject in the shorter and earlier IV. 2 (4) and anticipates the much more careful and elaborate discussions of the unity-in-multiplicity of Intellect and of Soul in VI. 4–5 (22–3) and of the relationship of our souls to the Soul of the Universe in IV. 3. (27) 1–8. The subject was one of much concern to Plotinus, to which he often returns in his writings; and he shows clearly by his defensive and argumentative tone in this treatise that he is aware that his characteristic doctrine of the unity-in-diversity of immaterial beings would seem paradoxical and objectionable to some Platonists.

Synopsis

Are all souls one? Objections from differences of perception, virtue, desire, experience and rationality between souls (ch. 1). Answers to these objections; bodily differences affect our perceptions etc. and the unity of soul does not completely exclude diversity (ch. 2). The argument for unity of souls from universal sympathy; and soul is no less a unity because it has many powers, of reason, perception, growth etc. (ch. 3). The one immanent soul in the many bodies derives from a prior, transcendent one which is not many (ch. 4). Soul both gives itself and does not give itself to the multiplicity of individuals; the analogy (often lack and unnoticed) of the whole of a body of knowledge in each of its parts (ch. 5).
IV. 9. (3) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΙ ΠΑΣΑΙ ΑΙ ΨΥΧΗΙ ΜΙΑ

1. 'Αρ' ὡσπερ ψυχὴν ἐκάστου μιν φαμέν εἶναι, δημοτικὴ τοῦ σώματος ὠσαῦ πάρεστι, καὶ ἓσται ωσπερ τὸν πρότον ταύτον μία, οὐκ ἄλλα μέν τι αὐτῆς ὁδῷ, ἄλλα δὲ ὀδῷ τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐμφαντικοῦ ὠσαῦ, ἡ ἐμφαντική, καὶ ὡς τοῦ κατοικου ἐν ἐκάστῳ μέρει, οὕτως καὶ ἡ ἐμφαντική σύ μι αὐτῇ καὶ τὰ πάντα μία; καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντός ἐν πᾶσι μία σὺ ὡς ὅγκον μεριμνημένη, ἀλλὰ παντοκράτορα ταῦταν; διὰ τί γὰρ ἐν ἐμοὶ μία, τὸ ἐν τῷ παντὶ ὡμέν μία; οὐ γὰρ ὅγκος ὡμέν ἐκεῖ ὡμέν σώμα. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ παντὸς καὶ ἡ ἐμφαντικὴ σύ μία, δὲ ἐχθανην, καὶ τὸ πάντα τοῦ ἐκατομμυρίου μίαν. εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῦ παντός καὶ ἡ ἐμφαντική σύ μία, σύλλογον ἑαυτὸν σύ μία. αὐτὴ τοῖς ὑπάρχουσι τοῖς μία; ἀλλαζόρως λέγεται τὸ μίαν τὰ πάντα, ὡς ἐν ἐκάστω τοῖς ὑπάρχουσι τοῖς μίαν τὸν μίαν ἀνάπτυξιν, ὡς ἐν ἐκάστῃ τοῖς ὑπάρχουσι τοῖς μίαν τὸν μίαν. οὕτως ὅμοιος εἶναι καὶ ἐστὶν ἐν πᾶσι μία. οὕτως ὁ μίαν τὸν μίαν ἀνάπτυξιν, ὡς ἐν πᾶσι μία. οὕτως ἐν πᾶσι μία. οὕτως ἐν πᾶσι μία. οὕτως ἐν πᾶσι μία. οὕτως ἐν πᾶσι μία.
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 9.

καὶ πρὸς τὸ πάν, ὡσπερ ἦμοι παθήματος συναισθάνομεν

20 θαι τὸ πάν. πῶς δὲ καὶ μᾶς οὐκ ἦς ἢ μὲν λογικὴ, ἢ

dὲ ἐλογική, καὶ ἢ μὲν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἢ δὲ ἐν φυσικῷ ἀλλῆ; τὰλα

dὲ ἐλ ἢ μὴ θησάμεθα ἐκείνου, τὸ τοῖς πάν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐσται, μὲν τοῖς ἄρχῃ ψυχῆς οὐδὲ εὑρεθήσεται.

2. Πρώτον μὲν οὖν οὕκ, εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ μέν ἢ ἐμὴ καὶ

ἡ ἄλλη, ἤδη καὶ τὸ συναμφότερον τῷ συναμφότερῳ

tαυτῶν. ἐν ἄλλῳ γὰρ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ταύτῃ ἐν οὗ τὰ

ἀυτὰ πάθη ἐξεῖ ἐν ἑκατέρῳ, ὡς ἰδίως εἰ ἐν ἑκατέρῳ

καὶ τὸν ἄλλον πάθη πᾶν τούτο πάθος ἐχει. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν ἐν ἕνος σώματος τῇ ἕνῃ ἑκατέρῳ χειρὸς.

10 πάθημα ἢ ἐτέρα ἡθεῖον, ἀλλ’ ἢ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ. εἰ δὲ

ὁ θεός τῷ ἑμῶν γεννησίματος καὶ σοι, ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ἄλλῳ, ὁ

συνεφαίνειν σώμα ἐχεῖ οὕτω, ὡστε γὰρ συναμφότερον

ἐκάκτηρα ἐσθοῦν ταύτην. ἐνθυμεῖται δὲ προσέ


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that if I had an experience the All would share in the
perception of it. And how, if there is only one
soul, is one soul rational and another irrational, and
one in animals but a different one in plants? But on
the other hand, if we are not going to make that
assumption, the All will not be one, and we shall not
discover one principle of souls.

2. First of all, then, it is not true that, if my soul
and someone else's are one soul, just for that reason
my composite [of body and soul] is the same as his
composite. For when something which is the same
is both in one thing and in another it will not have
the same experiences in each of them, as for instance
the [form of] the human being in me when I am in
motion: the form in me in motion and in you not
in motion will be in motion in me and stationary in
you; and there is nothing absurd, nothing really
disconcerting about the same thing being in me and
in you: it is certainly not necessary that when I
have a perception the other also should have exactly
the same experience. For even in one body one
hand does not perceive what happens to the other,
but the soul in the whole body. If you really had
to know what happened to me because there was
some one thing composed of both of us, it would have
to be a joint body; for if they were joined together
in this way each soul would have the same
perceptions. But one ought to consider also that there
are a great many things which the whole being does
not notice, even among those which happen in one
and the same body, and this is all the more so when
the body is of great size, as they say happens with
great sea-beasts, with whom, when a part is affected,
no perception of it reaches the whole because of the

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PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 0.

smallness of the disturbance; so that it is not necessary, when one part is affected, for a clearly impressed perception to reach the whole. But it is not absurd, and we do not have to abandon the idea, that the whole is jointly affected, but there is no need for there to be a perceptible impression. And it is not absurd that [the one soul] should possess virtue in me, but vice in another man, since it is not impossible for the same thing to be in motion in one and at rest in another. For we do not say, either, that it is one in such a way as to be altogether without a share in multiplicity—this must be attributed to a higher nature—but we say that it is one and a multiplicity, and participates in "that nature which is divisible in the sphere of bodies", and also in the "indivisible nature", so that again it is one. But just as in me the experience of a part need not dominate the whole, but what happens to what is more essential has an influence on the part, in the same way the influences which come from the All to the individual are more obvious, and we are often affected in the same way as the whole, but it is not clear whether what comes from us contributes anything to the whole.

3. Indeed, the argument deriving from facts opposed [to the assumption of complete separation of souls] asserts that we do share each other's experiences when we suffer with others from seeing their pain and feel happy and relaxed [in their company] and

1 The phrases from Plato's Timaeus 35A1-3 which provide the starting-point for the earlier discussion in IV. 2 (4), the much more careful and thorough discussion of the unity of souls in IV. 3. (27) 1-5, and for many later Neoplatonist discussions of the same subject.
are naturally drawn to love them: for without a sharing of experience there could not be love for this reason. And if spells and magical acts in general draw men together and make them share experiences at a distance, this must be altogether due to the one soul. And a word spoken quietly near, or what is far off, and makes something imparted by an enormous distance listen: from this one can learn the unity of all because their soul is one.

How then, if the soul is one, is one soul rational and another irrational, and one a mere principle of growth? It is because the indivisible part of it must be put on the rational level, and is not divided in bodies, but the part which is divided in the sphere of bodies is also itself one, but since it is divided in the sphere of bodies, when it supplies sense-perception in every part of the body this is to be counted as one of its powers, and its ability to shape and make bodies as another. Not because it has many powers is it not one; for in the seed there are many powers and it is one; and from this one come many units. Why then are not all souls everywhere? Well, in the case of the one soul which is said to be everywhere in the body, the sense-perception is not alike in all the parts, and the reason is not in the whole, and the growth-principle is also in the parts where there is no perception; and all the same it runs up into one when it leaves the body. But the nutritive power, if it comes from the whole, has also something from that [universal] soul. But why does not the nutritive power also come from our soul? Because what is nourished is a part of the whole, that which also is passively perceptive, but the perception which judges with intelligence belongs to the
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individual, and there was no need for this to shape that which had its shaping from the All. It would also have made this shaping, if it had not been necessary for it to be in this All.

4. We have said this, then, to prevent astonishment at the bringing back of all souls to one. But our discussion still wants to find out how they are one. Is it because they all come from one or because they all are one? And if they all come from one, is this one divided or does it remain whole, but none the less make many from itself? And how could it continue to exist as a substance and make many souls out of itself? Let us then call upon God to be our helper and say that there must be one which is prior, if there are many, and the many must come from this. If then it was a body, it would be necessary for the many to come into existence by the division of this, each one becoming an entirely different substance; and if the one soul was uniform in all its parts, all the souls would be formally the same, bearing one and the same complete form, but would differ in their [corpooreal] masses; and if their multiplicity was due to their underlying causes, they would be different from each other, but if it was due to the form, the souls would be formally the same. But this means that there is one and the same soul in many bodies, and, before this one in the many bodies, another again exists which is not in many bodies, from which derives the one in the many, which is like an image of the one in one projected in many places, as if many pieces of wax took and bore the impression of one seal-ring. Now in the former way the one soul would be used up in making the many, but in the second way the soul would be
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incorporeal. And, even if it was an affection, there would be nothing surprising in one quality being produced in many things from one thing; and if the soul existed as a composition [of affection and substance] there would be nothing surprising. But as it is we suppose it to be incorporeal and a substance.

5. How, then, is there one substance in many souls? Either the one is present as a whole in them all, or the many come from the whole and one while it abides [unchanged]. That soul, then, is one, but the many [go back] to it as one which gives itself to multiplicity and does not give itself; for it is adequate to supply itself to all and to remain one; for it has power extending to all things, and is not at all cut off from each individual thing: it is the same, therefore, in all. Certainly, no one should disbelieve this; for knowledge is a whole, and its parts are such that the whole remains and the parts derive from it. And the seed is a whole and the parts into which it naturally divides derive from it, and each part is a whole and the whole remains an undiminished whole—but matter divides it and all the parts are one. But someone might say that in knowledge the part is not a whole. Now there too that which has been brought into readiness because it is needed is an actualised part, and this part is put in front, but the other parts follow as unnoticed possibilities, and all are in the part [which is brought forward]. And perhaps this is the meaning of "whole" and "part" here: there [in the whole body of knowledge] all the parts are in a way actual at once; so each one which you wish to bring forward for use is ready; but in the part only that which is
PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 9.

μέρει τὸ ἔτοιμον, ἐνδυναμοῦται δὲ οἷον πλησιάσων
20 τῷ ἀλω. ἔφηβον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων θεωρημάτων οὐ
dει νομίζειν· εἰ δὲ μή, έτοιμα οἴκεται τεχνικῶν σωφτὲ
ἐπιστημονικῶν, ἀλλ' ὁπωτε ἄν καὶ εἰ παῖς δέχεται.
εἰ εὖν ἐπιστημονικῶν, ἐχει δυνάμει καὶ τὰ πάντα.
ἐπιστήμης γούν ἐπιστήμων ἐσάχθη δὲ τὰ ἄλλα οἷον
ἀκολουθεί· καὶ τὸ γενέτερον δὲ ἐν τῇ ἀναλύει
25 ὅσιον, ὅσι τὸ εἰ ἔχει τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ πάντα, δὲ ἄν ἢ
ἀνάλυεις, καὶ τὰ ἐφέξοψί δὲ, καὶ εἰς αὐτοῦ γενόται.
όλλα τούτα δὲ τὲν ἡμετέρων ἑπιστήμης ἐπιστεῖται,
καὶ διὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπισκοτεύει· ἔκει δὲ φανὰ πάντα
καὶ ἑκατον.

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ready for use is actual; but it is given power by a
kind of approach to the whole. But one must not
think of it as isolated from all other rational specu-
lations: if one does, it will no longer be according to
art or knowledge, but just as if a child was talking.
If then it is according to knowledge, it contains also
all the other parts potentially. So then the know-
in knowing [one part] brings in all the others by a
kind of sequence; and the geometer in his analysis
makes clear that the one proposition contains all the
prior propositions by means of which the analysis is
made and the subsequent propositions which are
generated from it. But we do not believe all this
because of our weakness, and it is obscured by the
body; but There [in the intelligible world] all and
each shine out.